A Magistrate Court in Datia, Madhya Pradesh has directed registration of an FIR against four police officers for allegedly trespassing into a residence and assaulting family members–including a woman and a minor child, observing that their actions bore no rational or reasonable nexus with the discharge of official duties and were rather a brazen violation of law.

The order was passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class Vijitashwa Pushkar in the complainant's application under Section 156(3) of CrPC, which empowers a magistrate to issue directions for registration of FIR, directing police to conduct an investigation into the cognizable offence, specifically if the local police refuses to do so. 

The order stated:

"Forcing one's way into a private residence without a warrant, voluntarily causing hurt against women and a minor child are acts that bear no rational or reasonable nexus to any legitimate exercise of police power. They are not acts referable to official authority; they are, on the contrary, brazen violations of law and of the fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed to every citizen under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. No prior sanction is, therefore, required for directing investigation in the present matter". 

Thus allowing Section 156(3) CrPC application, the magistrate court directed registration of an FIR against the four police officers, under Sections 452 and 323 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, on the basis of the allegations contained in the application and to conduct a fair, thorough and impartial investigation therein, submitting the final report to the concerned court without undue delay.

The court also made it "explicitly clear that non-compliance" with a lawful order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is liable to be visited with proceedings for contempt of court as permissible in law.

Background

Per the complaint, on March 27, 2026, the police personnel allegedly entered the complainant's rented house in Datia without a warrant or written authorisation and assaulted him along with several family members. The police personnel also used abusive language. 

The complainant alleged that a "brutal and indiscriminate assault" was unleashed upon the "complainant, his mother, aunt, sisters and the minor" by the personnel who allegedly by means of "kicks, fists and lathis". It was also alleged that  complainant's mother, was struck upon the head with a lathi by the personnel causing her to bleed profusely and collapse.

Thereafter they were taken to the police station, where the assault allegedly continued. The complainant has alleged that a false case was thereafter registered against the complainant and his family members.  It is further alleged that the video recordings captured by the family members of the complainant on their mobile phones were deleted by the police before the said devices were returned to them.

The complainant alleged that despite written complaints to the police authorities, no action was taken, prompting the complainant to approach the Magistrate Court under Section 156(3) CrPC. 

The complainant had sought registration of FIR under IPC Sections 452, 323, 294, 147, 148 and 149. 

While examining the allegations, the court declined to direct registration of offences under Section 294, which deals with obscenity in public places, observing that the alleged use of abusive language was used inside a private residence and not in a public place, which is an essential ingredient of the offence. 

"The indispensable element of the offence being absent, the ingredients of Section 294 IPC are not prima facie made out. The prayer for registration of FIR under Section 294 IPC is accordingly not acceded to at this stage," the court said. 

The court however, found sufficient grounds to direct registration of FIR for trespassing (Section 452) and voluntarily causing hurt (Section 323) with common intention (Section 34) of IPC. 

Regarding objections that Section 197 CrPC bars prosecution against police officers if actions are done in discharge of official duty, the magistrate observed:

"This Court, upon careful consideration, is of the firm and considered opinion that the alleged acts - namely, forcibly entering a private residential dwelling without any search warrant or written authority, assaulting women and a minor child within the premises of their own home and confiscating mobile phones cannot, by any stretch of constitutional or legal reasoning, be characterised as acts performed "in discharge of official duty." Such acts are not only beyond the pale of official authority but are, in fact, in direct contradiction of it". 

Relying on the Supreme Court decision of XXX v. State of Kerala & Ors, the bench reiterated that where the alleged actions are not reasonably connected with official duties, proceedings may be initiated in the ordinary course and prior sanction is not necessary. 

The court said that it was satisfied that police investigation "is not merely desirable but absolutely indispensable" in the present matter after noting that the  CCTV footage of the police station concerned pertaining to the relevant date and time requires immediate seizure, as it is likely to contain material evidence pertaining to the incident.

Further the video recordings allegedly deleted from the mobile phones of the complainant's family members may be recoverable through forensic examination by the Cyber Cell - a task entirely beyond the means and capacity of the complainant.

It also noted that the weapons and lathis allegedly employed in the commission of the assault require seizure from the persons of the accused. Further statements of the injured witnesses and the complainant require to be recorded and an independent site inspection is warranted.

The court said that the evidence requisite for establishment of the offences alleged is neither in the possession of the complainant nor can it be procured without the coercive assistance of the investigating authority.

With respect to offences of rioting and unlawful assembly under Sections 147, 148 and 149, the court said that the application revealed that the proposed accused are specifically identified only to the extent of four named individuals, while the remaining participants are described merely as "8- 10 unknown police personnel" without any particularisation of their individual roles or conduct; thus the offences were not prima facie established. 

The matter is listed on June 16 for receipt of FIR copy. 

Case Title: Yuvraj Singh Bundela v Arvind Bhadoriya [CR 293/2024]

Click here to read/download the Order

The Calcutta High Court on Thursday granted interim protection from coercive action to Trinamool Congress MP Abhishek Banerjee in a case alleging forgery of signatures of newly-elected TMC MLAs in a resolution relating to the appointment of the Leader of Opposition after the Assembly elections.

Justice Kausik Chanda directed Banerjee to appear before the investigating agency at 6 PM on Thursday (today) and cooperate with the investigation being carried out by the West Bengal CID, while restraining the State from taking coercive steps against him for a period of three weeks.

Significantly, the Court observed that an accused person cannot be compelled to produce documents that may incriminate him, remarking that such a course would offend the constitutional protection against self-incrimination under Article 20.

The case concerns allegations that signatures of several TMC MLAs were forged on a resolution purportedly recording their unanimous decision regarding the election of the Leader of Opposition. The CID had earlier conducted searches at the party office situated at the residence of West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee.

Appearing for Banerjee, counsel submitted that the allegations were confined to offences of forgery and cheating and argued that his client was not an MLA at the relevant time but was functioning as the General Secretary of the party.

It was argued that after the election results, a unanimous decision had been taken by the MLAs and, in his capacity as party General Secretary, Banerjee merely communicated the decision to the Speaker.

When the Court asked why Banerjee had written to the Speaker, counsel responded that he had done so solely as General Secretary of the party.

The State, represented by Additional Advocate General Rajdeep Majumdar, opposed the plea and contended that the investigation had revealed serious discrepancies. According to the State, Banerjee initially informed the Speaker regarding the choice of Leader of Opposition without enclosing any minutes of the meeting. After the Speaker sought supporting documents, a resolution and attendance sheet bearing signatures of MLAs were subsequently furnished.

The State alleged that the signatures annexed to the resolution were claimed to relate to a meeting held on May 6, whereas several MLAs had stated that no such meeting took place on that date and that they had never signed the document. It was further argued that at least five MLAs had disputed the authenticity of the signatures and that comparisons with nomination papers revealed significant differences.

The State also submitted that Banerjee had failed to produce the original resolution despite repeated notices and argued that custodial interrogation was necessary to recover the document.

However, the Court repeatedly questioned how custody would assist in recovering the document and observed that the investigating agency possessed statutory powers of search and seizure to secure evidence.

At one stage, the Court remarked: "You cannot interrogate him to get a document. You cannot compel an accused to give a statement against himself like this."

The Court further observed that if the investigating agency wanted to recover the document, it must resort to lawful investigative measures such as search and seizure rather than compel the accused to produce it.

Rejecting the State's contention that protection should not be granted, the Justice Kausik Chanda stated: "Show me one provision that the investigative agency can compel an accused to produce a document. Nothing. You have to search and seize."

While acknowledging that the allegations concerning the sanctity of the Legislative Assembly were serious and warranted investigation, the Court held that Banerjee's willingness to appear before investigators and cooperate with the probe justified interim protection.

Dictating its order, the Court recorded that Banerjee had volunteered to participate in the investigation and held that the investigating agency was free to interrogate him and take all lawful steps available under law for recovery of documents and collection of evidence.

Accordingly, the Court directed Banerjee to appear before the investigating agency at 6 PM on Thursday and thereafter as and when required upon 24 hours' notice. The Court granted protection from coercive action for three weeks and directed that the matter be listed again after two weeks.

Before concluding the hearing, the Court reiterated that an accused cannot be compelled to assist the prosecution by producing potentially incriminating material, observing that the Constitution protects an individual's right against self-incrimination and that the investigating agency must secure evidence through procedures recognised by law.

Case No : CRR/2240/2026

Case : ABHISHEK BANERJEE VS THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

The Gujarat High Court has said that a person accused of only those offences enumerated under Section 82(4) can be declared a proclaimed offender noting that the nature of the offences was serious also carrying the safeguard of an inquiry as provided under the provision. 

It further said that a person accused of offences other than the ones under section 82(4) and against whom a proclamation has been published under section 82(1) can be called a 'Proclaimed Person'. 

Section 82(4) states that where a proclamation published under subsection (1) is in respect of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 302, 304, 364, 367, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 402, 436, 449, 459 or 460 of IPC and such person fails to appear at the specified place and time required by the proclamation, the Court may, after making such inquiry as it things fit, pronounce him a "proclaimed offender" and make a declaration to that effect. Some of the offences mentioned include murder, culpable homicide not amounting to murder, Robbery, Dacoity, Theft, extortion. 

Justice PM Raval observed that Section 82(1) empowers a court to publish a written proclamation against a person, requiring him to appear at a specified place and at a specified time not less than thirty days from the date of publishing such proclamation.

It noted that Section 82(2) stipulates the manner and procedure of such proclamation. Section 83(3) stipulates that a statement in writing by the Court issuing the proclamation to the effect that the proclamation was duly published on a specified day, in the manner specified in clause (i) of sub- section (2), shall be conclusive evidence that the requirements of this section have been complied with, and that the proclamation was published on such day.

It further noted:

"Section 82(4) stipulates that a person, in respect of whom a proclamation has been published under section 82(1), if he fails to appear at the specified place and time required by the proclamation and if he is accused of offences mentioned in Section 82(4), the court may pronounce him as a proclaimed offender, after making such inquiry as it things fit. Section 82(5) stipulates that the provisions of Section 82(2) and (3) shall apply to a declaration made by the court under section 82(4) as they apply to a proclamation made under 82(1).

Other than section 82(4), Section 82 does not stipulate the consequences of non-compliance of the proclamation issued under it. 82(4) stipulates that where the proclaimed person fails to appear at the specified place and time, the court may pronounce him as a proclaimed offender. This pronouncement as a proclaimed offender can only be issued if he is accused of the offences stipulated in 82(4) and that also, only after the court has made such inquiry as it deems fit. There is no provision, other than section 82(4) in the Cr.P.C., under which the court can pronounce a person as a proclaimed offender"

The court rejected the State's argument that every person in respect of whom a proclamation has been published is deemed to be a proclaimed offender irrespective of the provisions of Section 82(4) CrPC.

The court said that if such contention is considered, then the consequence would be that a person against whom a proclamation has been published and is not accused of any of the offences mentioned in Section 82(4) CrPC would be deemed so, without the safeguard of an inquiry stipulated in section 82(4).

"This cannot be the intention of the legislature. The offence enumerated in section 82(4) are serious in nature. It could not be the intention of the legislature that qua a person who is accused of offences that are serious in nature, the safe guard of an inquiry is stipulated and no such safeguard is stipulated qua a person who is accused of offences that may not be so serious- (like the offence in case on hand)," the court said. 

The court referred to Sections 40, 41, 43 and 73 CrPC with respect to a proclaimed offender and said that these clearly show that there are adverse consequences attached to being declared a proclaimed offender.

The court said that intention of the legislature cannot be that such adverse consequences "would automatically get attracted to a person qua" whom a proclamation has been published and is accused of offences of a less serious nature. 

"I am thus of the considered view that a person who is accused of offences other than the ones enumerated in section 82(4) and qua whom a proclamation has been published under section 82(1) would be a Proclaimed person' and not a deemed 'Proclaimed Offender'," the court said. 

The petitioner had moved the high court challenging trial court order rejecting his application under Section 84 CrPC. The petitioner's father was facing trial in a Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act case and had gone missing. The petitioner had filed a missing person's report. In the mean time attachment proceedings had been initiated. 

The high court was considering whether the trial Court had the jurisdiction to declare the father of the present applicant as a proclaimed offender. Finding that Section 138 NI Act is not one of the enumerated offences, the high court quashed the trial court order including the attachment order. 

Case title: RAJESHBHAI LALJIBHAI PATEL v/s  STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR

R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (QUASHING) NO. 7316 of 2026

Click Here To Read/Download Order