Affirming the conviction and order of sentence recorded by the trial Court, a Single Bench of Dr. Justice Sanjeeb Kumar Panigrahi observed–

“This Court further finds that the conduct of the accused, namely dragging the victim, kissing her and inserting his hand inside her pant, clearly constitutes physical contact with sexual intent and squarely falls within the ambit of “sexual assault” as defined under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. Considering the age of the victim, this Court finds no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial court in holding the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Section 10 of the POCSO Act.”

As per the prosecution case, on 09.07.2023, the accused-appellant, who was a grinder mechanic, came to the house of elder brother-in-law of the informant (mother of the victim). At that time, the victim along with her sister were playing in that house. The appellant allegedly requested the sister-in-law of the informant to prepare tea for him.

During such time, he entered inside the house, called the victim near him and forcibly kissed her on her cheek and lips. It was further alleged that the appellant put his hand inside the pant of the victim and inserted his finger into her vagina. Thereafter, the victim allegedly escaped from the spot and hid herself, while the appellant fled away.

On the basis of such allegations, an FIR was lodged and investigation was taken up. On the completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted for commission of offences under Sections 452 (house trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint)/376(AB) (rape on woman under twelve years of age)/354 (outraging modesty of woman)/354-A (sexual harassment) IPC read with Sections 6 (aggravated penetrative sexual assault) and 12 (punishment for sexual harassment) of the POCSO Act. The ASJ-cum-Special Court under the POCSO Act, Cuttack convicted the appellant under Sections 452/354/354-A of the IPC and Sections 10 (punishment for aggravated sexual assault) and 12 of the POCSO Act. Challenging such conviction, the appellant preferred this criminal appeal.

Upon considering the rival contentions of the parties, the Court affirmed the finding of the trial Court regarding age of the victim. By relying upon the birth certificate issued by the Registrar of Birth and Death, CMC Niali, wherein the date of birth of the victim has been reflected as 01.11.2014, it was held that the victim was below 12 years of age at the time of the incident.

The appellant raised the issue of non-holding of Test Identification Parade (TIP) to ascertain his identity. However, the Court nixed such argument by holding that merely not conducting TIP is not fatal for the prosecution, especially when the witnesses were previously well acquainted with the appellant.

Though the appellant attempted to weaken the prosecution case by highlighting certain discrepancies, the Court did not find such contradictions fatal. Nevertheless, the allegation of inserting finger inside the vagina of the victim was held to be suspicious, especially considering the fact that the victim did not utter a word regarding the same in her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC, nor did the medical evidence support the claim of any external injury to the private part. Thus, the Court held–

“The learned trial court was, therefore, justified in extending benefit of doubt to the appellant in respect of the offences punishable under Section 376(AB) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. However, merely because the allegation relating to penetrative sexual assault was not established, the consistent testimony of the victim regarding dragging, kissing and inserting his hand inside her pant cannot be discarded, particularly when the same remained substantially consistent throughout.”

The Court was of the firm view that the conduct of the appellant in dragging the victim, kissing her and inserting his hand inside her pant apparently shows physical contact with sexual intent and hence, it falls within the definition of “sexual assault” as defined under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. Moreover, considering the age of the victim, which was found to be below 12 years, the offence gets qualified as “aggravated sexual assault” punishable under Section 10 the said Act.

Additionally, the Court also upheld the conviction and order of sentence passed against the appellant for commission of offences punishable under Section 452/354/354-A of the IPC read with Section 12 of the POCSO Act.

Case Title: Bablu Verma v. State of Odisha

Case No: CRLA No. 508 of 2025

Date of Judgment: May 22, 2026

Counsel for the Appellant: Ms. Rita Singh, Advocate

Counsel for the State: Ms. Sarita Moharana, Addl. Standing Counsel; Mr. Kuldeep Mohanty, Advocate

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ori) 52

For context, the Children Education Allowance Scheme is a scheme introduced by the Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India, in favour of the employees of the Department of Posts, whereby, several components of education, including Tuition fee, Admission fee, Laboratory fee, Special fee etc., are allowed to be claimed by an employee to facilitate their ward's education.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Devan Ramachandran and Justice Basant Balaji was considering a challenge to an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Ernakulam Bench, which had rejected the employee's claim for hostel subsidy.

The scheme contains a provision for 'Hostel subsidy', which is the amount spent by an employee for the purpose of accommodating his or her children in a hostel, to a limit of Rs. 3,000/- each.

The petitioner, a Postal Assistant residing in Thiruvananthapuram, had enrolled his child in Sainik School, Kazhakkoottam. He argued that since hostel residence was compulsory for all students of the institution, the expenditure incurred should qualify for reimbursement under the hostel subsidy component of the scheme.

The petitioner initially filed a claim before the Central Administrative Tribunal, which was allowed by the tribunal. But, the said order was set aside by the High Court, remitting it for reconsideration. Subsequently, the Tribunal reconsidered the matter and rejected the claim of the petitioner. This has resulted in the petitioner approaching the High Court.

The Court examined the provisions of the Children Education Allowance Scheme and noted that the scheme defines hostel subsidy as expenses incurred for keeping children in the hostel of a residential school or institution located beyond a distance of 50 kilometres from the employee's residence.

The petitioner contended that the objective of the scheme was to support employees in meeting educational expenses and that mandatory hostel residence should attract the subsidy irrespective of distance.

The Court rejected the contention and held that the subsidy provision must be interpreted in accordance with the policy framework formulated by the Government and cannot be expanded beyond its express terms.

The Court observed that while the scheme is a welfare measure, it remains a policy decision of the competent authority.

“It is perspicuous that the 'Scheme' is intended for the benefit of employees and is a welfare measure. However, it being a Scheme within the policy realm of the competent Authority, it would be impossible for this Court, while acting Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, to impose our wisdom and substitute its terms in any manner.…This Court does not obtain jurisdiction or competence to speak about the sweep of the 'Scheme' of this nature, or to suggest that a better version or terms, ought to be granted or substituted.” the Court said.

The Court further observed that the purpose of hostel subsidy is to alleviate the burden faced by employees who are compelled to place their children in hostels because suitable schooling is located far from their residence.

“It is to those parents who are employees of the Department of Posts, who are forced to put their children in school hostels, without there being any other option left, on account of the large amount of distance to be traversed, that the 'Scheme' applies. Different is a case as projected by the petitioner, where it is his choice to admit his child in a particular school where admission to the hostel was mandatory; and in this scenario, it is he who took the option, knowing fully well of its consequences.” Court added.

The Court further noted that the petitioner had several schooling options within a 50-kilometre radius and consciously opted for an institution requiring hostel accommodation. The Court held that the resulting expenditure stemmed from a personal choice rather than the kind of compulsion contemplated by the scheme.

“Solely for the need of completion, we must say that the purpose behind the 'Scheme' can surely be confined to the manner we have said above, and cannot be expanded to cover the personal choice of a parent, to admit his/her child to a particular school with peculiar or singular requisites, including mandatory hostel admission.” Court held.

The Court thus dismissed the petition and upheld the decision of the Tribunal.

Case Title: Anish Kumar S v Union of India and Ors.

Case No: OP(CAT) 60/ 2021

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 322

Counsel for Petitioner: Godwin Joseph

Counsel for Respondents: O M Shalina (DSGI), K.R Rajkumar (Sr. Panel Counsel) P. Vijayakumar (ASG of India)

Days after condemning the threats and attacks on the family members of former Bombay High Court judge Justice Gautam Patel over his judgment deciding the spiritual leader of the Dawoodi Bohra Community, the Bombay Bar Association (BBA) has filed a PIL seeking court's intervention and directions for safety of the judge and his family.

Reportedly, Justice Patel and his family have been facing threats for the last 10 months now over a judgment he delivered on April 23, 2024, wherein the judge held that Syedna Mufaddal Saifuddin was the rightful successor and 53rd Dai al-Multaq, the spiritual head of the Dawoodi Bohra community.

As per reports, the judge's wife received threat letters in Mumbai while his daughter received similar threat letters in London, where she lives, threatening the family of dire consequences if Justice Patel failed to "recant" his judgment via a YouTube video. The judge's daughter - Aditi Patel was also attacked by a masked man on the streets of London.

Taking cognisance of the issue, the BBA had on June 8, issued statement through its President and Senior Advocate Nitin Thakker.

"The Association records its strongest condemnation of any attempt to threaten, intimidate, harass, assault or otherwise target a Judge or members of a Judge's family on account of the discharge of judicial functions. Reports that a member of Justice Patel's family suffered physical injury in the course of one of these incidents render the matter particularly disturbing and warrant the most serious attention of the authorities," the BBA had said in its statement.

Now, the BBA along with Advocates Association of Western India (AAWI) and the Bombay Incorporated Law Society (BILS) has filed PIL in the HC, seeking urgent intervention of the Court to take note of the incident and to issue appropriate directions to the Respondents for the protection of a retired judge of this and his family members in light of the grave threats issued to them.

"These attacks and the threats are a direct attack on the independence of the judiciary and may also be aimed as a threat to the judges hearing the appeal against the ruling in question thereby interfering with the administration of justice," the PIL reads.

The PIL seeks constitution of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) comprising sleuths from the Maharashtra Police, the CBI and also the NIA.

"Judges regularly preside over cases involving dangerous criminals, terrorists and influential political figures. Adequate security prevents retaliation or coercion, ensuring that rulings are based solely on law and facts. In the present matter, an appeal has been filed against the April 2024 ruling rendered by Justice Patel as a single judge and the same is pending consideration before a division bench. Thus, the demands in the threatening letters issued to Justice Patel and his family members (to release a video recanting his ruling) appear to be a coercive tactic to browbeat or threaten even the judges hearing the appeal in the matter," the PIL states.

The PIL was mentioned before a division bench of Acting Chief Justice Ravindra Ghuge and Justice Gautam Ankhad, which has agreed to hear it and the same will be listed in due course.

The bench of Chief Justice SA Dharmadhikari, Justice CV Karthikeyan, Justice AD Jagadish Chandira, Justice M Nirmal Kumar and Justice Sunder Mohan will be deciding on the following questions of law:

• Whether leave under Tamil Nadu Suspension of Sentence Rules, 1982, can be granted to a prisoner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when his appeal against conviction is pending either before the Hon'ble Supreme Court or this Court?

• Whether the power to exempt under Rule 40 of the Tamil Nadu Suspension of Sentence Rules, 1982 can be exercised by the State to grant leave to a prisoner outside the scope of the said Rules when his appeal against conviction is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court or this Court in the light of the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.M.Nanavati v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1961 SC 112?

A division bench of the High Court had directed the registry to place the matter before the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger bench to consider the question of law after finding two different views taken by two full benches of the High Court in 2011 and 2025.

The division bench had also asked the registry not to entertain any application for grant of emergency leave or ordinary leave under TN Suspension of Sentence Rules when the appeal was pending before the High Court or Supreme Court, till the question of law was decided by the larger bench.

Following this, the matter came up for hearing before the full bench on Wednesday (June 10). After going through the question of law, the bench decided to take up the plea on June 19 and also considered appointing an amicus curiae to assist the court in the matter.

Background

The bench of Justice N Sathish Kumar and Justice M Jothiraman was dealing with a batch of cases challenging the orders of prison authorities, rejecting the request for emergency/ordinary leave to convict prisoners. The prisoners had also sought granting of emergency/ordinary leave.

When the matter came up for hearing, the prisoners brought to the court's attention a full bench decision of the High Court. It was argued that only trial prisoners were not entitled to leave, and since the appeal was pending in all these cases, it could not be treated as pending trial prisoners. It was thus argued that the prisoners were entitled to leave under Suspension of Sentence Rules.

On the other hand, the State argued that the full bench decision of the High Court relied by the prisoners was in direct conflict with the judgment of the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court in K.M.Nanavati v. State of Bombay as well as another decision of the full bench of the High Court in 2011.

The court noted that the earlier full bench of the High Court in State v Yesu had held that temporary release on parole by way of administrative action and temporary release on suspension of sentence as per the Tamil Nadu Suspension of Sentence Rules were two different concepts. The full bench had observed that suspension of sentence cannot be granted to a prisoner outside the scope of Suspension of Sentence Rules.

In 2025, however, another full bench in T Ramalakshmi's case observed that as per Rule 35 of the Tamil Nadu Suspension of Sentence Rules 1982, the prison authority was empowered to grant ordinary leave. The court, however, clarified that if the prisoner is facing trial in any other case, the prison authorities could reject his leave application in limine.

The division bench thus opined that the full bench decision in Ramalakshmi's case, which said that the Government could grant leave by exempting the Rules was directly against view taken by the earlier full bench in Yesu's case. Thus, the division bench thought it fit to refer the matter to a larger bench.

Case Title: Sheefa Rani v The Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu

Case No: WP Crl 722 of 2025

Justice Sobha Annamma Eapen was considering an appeal filed by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.

The deceased was a salaried employee working as a sweeper in a school. She was walking on the public road when a motorcycle driven in a rash and negligent manner hit her. She succumbed to her injuries two days later. The husband and three children of the deceased approached the Tribunal claiming compensation of Rs. 25 lakhs. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 13,49,757 with 9% interest. Aggrieved, they approached the High Court.

" In the present case, the deceased was a salaried employee in a school. Though the appellants have claimed an additional sum of ₹15,000/- per month towards the services rendered by her as a homemaker, no oral evidence was adduced by them in support of the said claim. Though the appellants are four in number, none of them mounted the witness box to explain or substantiate the contribution made by the deceased to the family as a homemaker. The appellants do not have a case that the deceased was not continuing in service at the time of the accident. The Tribunal, while fixing her income, took ₹ 10,788/- per month, being the salary received by the deceased as reflected in Ext.A8 salary certificate. I do not find any error or illegality in the fixation of the income of the deceased by the tribunal and hence, I am not inclined to interfere with the same"

The appellants contended that the Tribunal did not consider the claim for the income of the deceased's contribution as a homemaker. They said that the Tribunal ought to have added Rs. 15,000 to the monthly salary income of Rs. 10,788 proved through salary certificate. Reliance was placed on the Apex Court decision in Sunita v. Vinod Singh [2025 (2) KHC 635].

The insurer opposed the argument and submitted that no separate amount could be added towards the deceased's contribution as a homemaker when she was a salaried employee.

The Court was of the view that the afore Supreme Court judgment would not be applicable in the present case since therein the deceased was a recipient of family pension and a homemaker but here, the deceased is a salaried employee.

The Court also noted that no evidence has been adduced to support the claim. Thus, the Court refused to interfere with the income fixed by the Tribunal based on the deceased's salary certificate.

The appellants also challenged the sum of Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 60,000 awarded towards loss of consortium and towards loss of love and affection respectively.

The Court relied on the decision of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and found that each of the claimants are entitled to Rs. 40,000 each and further enhancement of 10% in a span of 3 years under 'loss of consortium'. It awarded an additional amount of Rs. 1,78,600.

The Court, relying of New India Assurance Company v. Somwati and Ors., deleted the sum granted towards loss of love and affection since amount was already awarded towards loss of consortium.

It rejected the claim of enhancement of compensation under the other heads stating that award made by the Tribunal appeared to be just and reasonable.

Thus, the Court allowed the appeal in part and enhanced the compensation by Rs. 1,18,600 with 8% annual interest.

Case No: MACA No. 666 of 2020

Case Title: Thomas Poulose and Ors. v. Albin Mathew @ Anto and Anr.

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 321

Counsel for the appellants: Susanth Shaji, V.V. Shaji, Varghese C. Kuriakose

Counsel for the respondents: Lal K. Joseph, Sanjay Sellen, Sonia Shibu

Click to Read/Download Judgment

A single judge bench of Justice Suraj Govindaraj confirmed the Commissioner's order directing PSBB Learning Leadership Academy to pay Rs 10 lakhs within 3 months as future treatment expenses to a teacher, Ms. Barnali Raut, previously employed with the private institution. She had acquired 90% PP1 locomotor disability in 2013 while trying to save a Class VI student threatening to jump off from a school building, allegedly by ignoring the established SOPs.

“…The Teacher's disability is not the problem. The absence of a wheelchair-accessible classroom, the absence of a disabled-friendly washroom, the absence of accessible transport, and the school's unwillingness to adjust its timetable constitute the socially constructed barriers that prevent her from resuming her teaching duties. These barriers arise from the school's failure to make reasonable adjustments, not from her disability…”, the Court observed.

The Court further directed the CBSE school to reinstate the teacher with reasonable accommodation, including a ground-floor classroom, disabled-friendly washroom, transport allowance of Rs 150000/-, and flexible timings, online teaching options.

In 2015, the school had terminated her services as a teacher by offering an administrative role at a reduced salary scale post the duly payment of her teacher's salary for 21 months posts the accident. However, the administrative role was refused by the teacher.

“…the Teacher did not choose to become disabled. She acquired the disability in an act of selfless courage within the School's own premises. The School's response, to offer her a demotion and then to treat the employment as ended, is precisely the kind of institutional indifference that the 2016 Act is designed to counter…”, the bench sitting at Bengaluru noted in the order.

If the teacher were to accept reinstatement, she shall be reinstated with seniority from her original date of appointment but without back wages for the period of absence, the court further said.

“…an inclusive educational environment necessarily includes a teaching staff that models inclusion. A school that employs a teacher with disability and provides her with reasonable accommodation demonstrates to its students the lived reality of inclusion. The refusal to accommodate the Teacher undermines the very values of inclusive education that Section 16 [educational institutions funded or recognized by state to provide inclusive education free from discrimination] seeks to promote…”, the court reasoned.

The order also contains an expansive SOP covering physical and digital accessibility, equal opportunity policies, grievance redressal, timelines for compliance, and penalties for non‑compliance, holding that accessibility is a fundamental right flowing from Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

Obligation To Provide 'Reasonable Accommodation' & Private Institutions

A private unaided school cannot be expected to provide 'reasonable accommodation' in line with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the petitioner's senior counsel B K Sampath had argued before by relying on Dalco Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2007).

“Section 2(i) of the 2016 Act defines 'establishment' to include a Government establishment and private establishment. Section 2(v) defines 'private establishment' to mean a company, firm, cooperative, institution, organisation, union, factory or such other establishment. The petitioner‑school falls squarely within this definition …The decision in Dalco Engineering was rendered under the 1995 Act, which has since been repealed. The 2016 Act operates on an entirely different definitional framework. Dalco Engineering has no application to the interpretation of the 2016 Act”, the Court further clarified.

The Court further noted that Section 3(3) of the 2016 Act provides that “No person with disability shall be discriminated on the ground of disability, unless it is shown that the impugned act or omission is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”.  This prohibition, the Court held, is universal and binds all persons and entities, government or private.

The High Court said that the school's refusal to provide accessible infrastructure and its offer of a demoted role amounted to discrimination under Section 2(h) [benchmark disability-not less than 40 per cent] read with Section 3(3) of the Act.

“….Globally, teachers with disabilities teach with appropriate support. The school's assumption that the Teacher's disability necessarily renders her unable to teach at a high level is itself a form of stereotyping that the Disabilities Act of 2016 seeks to combat…”, the court said.

The Court also noted that the school had violated Section 21 of the Act, which says that every establishment is required frame and notify an Equal Opportunity Policy, and Rule 8 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017, which expressly applies to private establishments with 20 or more employees.

The court has, hence, directed the CBSE School to frame, notify and register an Equal Opportunity Policy under Section 21 read with Rule 8, and conduct an accessibility audit and comply with the Harmonised Guidelines, 2021.

Jurisdiction Of PwD Commissioner

The Court also referred to Section 82(2) of the 2016 Act, which declares proceedings before the Commissioner to be 'judicial proceedings' and deems the Commissioner to be a civil court for purposes of contempt, and clarified as below:

“…The decisions of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala v. Vinesh Kumar Bhasin (2010) and the line of cases following it were rendered under the 1995 Act, which had no equivalent of Section 82(2). Under the 2016 Act, the Commissioner has the power to issue binding corrective directions against private establishments….” the Court underscored, disagreeing with the school's argument that the Commissioner could only issue directions.

Additionally, the court also clarified that Section 89 of PwD Act is a criminal penal provision which mandates Rs10,000/- as fine for the first offence whereas the Commissioner's current direction was a civil compensatory relief without such ceiling. Hence, the court also disproved the school's reliance on Section 89.

“…Section 89 operates in the criminal domain; Sections 80‑81 operate in the domain of civil enforcement and compensatory relief. The direction to pay Rs. 10 lakhs is a conservative fraction of the Teacher's documented expenses exceeding Rs. 46 lakhs. It is not arbitrary…”, the court further observed.

“…In Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that sympathy has no role in construing a statute. This Court applies the same principle. No sympathy for the Teacher should lead this Court to stretch the statute beyond its terms; no sympathy for the school's operational convenience should lead this Court to restrict the statute below its express terms. The plain text of Section 3(3) – 'No person with disability shall be discriminated' – is universal….” the single judge bench finally held.

Additionally the court issued a comprehensive SOP on Universal Accessibility mandating that all government buildings as well as private buildings such as schools, malls, hospitals, and transport hubs as well as digital platforms become fully accessible to persons with disabilities

Case Title: PSBB Learning Leadership Academy v. Mrs. Barnali Rout & Ors.

Case No: Writ Petition No. 11351 of 2020 (GM‑RES)