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'Brazen Violation Of Article 21': MP Court Directs FIR Against 4 Cops For Allegedly Trespassing Complainant's Home, Assaulting Women & Minor

Jayanti Pahwa — Thu, 11 Jun 2026 09:28:17 GMT

A Magistrate Court in Datia, Madhya Pradesh has directed registration of an FIR against four police officers for allegedly trespassing into a residence and assaulting family members–including a woman and a minor child, observing that their actions bore no rational or reasonable nexus with the discharge of official duties and were rather a brazen violation of law.

The order was passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class Vijitashwa Pushkar in the complainant's application under Section 156(3) of CrPC, which empowers a magistrate to issue directions for registration of FIR, directing police to conduct an investigation into the cognizable offence, specifically if the local police refuses to do so.

The order stated:

"Forcing one's way into a private residence without a warrant, voluntarily causing hurt against women and a minor child are acts that bear no rational or reasonable nexus to any legitimate exercise of police power. They are not acts referable to official authority; they are, on the contrary, brazen violations of law and of the fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed to every citizen under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. No prior sanction is, therefore, required for directing investigation in the present matter".

Thus allowing Section 156(3) CrPC application, the magistrate court directed registration of an FIR against the four police officers, under Sections 452 and 323 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, on the basis of the allegations contained in the application and to conduct a fair, thorough and impartial investigation therein, submitting the final report to the concerned court without undue delay.

The court also made it "explicitly clear that non-compliance" with a lawful order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is liable to be visited with proceedings for contempt of court as permissible in law.

Background

Per the complaint, on March 27, 2026, the police personnel allegedly entered the complainant's rented house in Datia without a warrant or written authorisation and assaulted him along with several family members. The police personnel also used abusive language.

The complainant alleged that a "brutal and indiscriminate assault" was unleashed upon the "complainant, his mother, aunt, sisters and the minor" by the personnel who allegedly by means of "kicks, fists and lathis". It was also alleged that complainant's mother, was struck upon the head with a lathi by the personnel causing her to bleed profusely and collapse.

Thereafter they were taken to the police station, where the assault allegedly continued. The complainant has alleged that a false case was thereafter registered against the complainant and his family members. It is further alleged that the video recordings captured by the family members of the complainant on their mobile phones were deleted by the police before the said devices were returned to them.

The complainant alleged that despite written complaints to the police authorities, no action was taken, prompting the complainant to approach the Magistrate Court under Section 156(3) CrPC.

The complainant had sought registration of FIR under IPC Sections 452, 323, 294, 147, 148 and 149.

While examining the allegations, the court declined to direct registration of offences under Section 294, which deals with obscenity in public places, observing that the alleged use of abusive language was used inside a private residence and not in a public place, which is an essential ingredient of the offence.

"The indispensable element of the offence being absent, the ingredients of Section 294 IPC are not prima facie made out. The prayer for registration of FIR under Section 294 IPC is accordingly not acceded to at this stage," the court said.

The court however, found sufficient grounds to direct registration of FIR for trespassing (Section 452) and voluntarily causing hurt (Section 323) with common intention (Section 34) of IPC.

Regarding objections that Section 197 CrPC bars prosecution against police officers if actions are done in discharge of official duty, the magistrate observed:

"This Court, upon careful consideration, is of the firm and considered opinion that the alleged acts - namely, forcibly entering a private residential dwelling without any search warrant or written authority, assaulting women and a minor child within the premises of their own home and confiscating mobile phones cannot, by any stretch of constitutional or legal reasoning, be characterised as acts performed "in discharge of official duty." Such acts are not only beyond the pale of official authority but are, in fact, in direct contradiction of it".

Relying on the Supreme Court decision of XXX v. State of Kerala & Ors, the bench reiterated that where the alleged actions are not reasonably connected with official duties, proceedings may be initiated in the ordinary course and prior sanction is not necessary.

The court said that it was satisfied that police investigation "is not merely desirable but absolutely indispensable" in the present matter after noting that the CCTV footage of the police station concerned pertaining to the relevant date and time requires immediate seizure, as it is likely to contain material evidence pertaining to the incident.

Further the video recordings allegedly deleted from the mobile phones of the complainant's family members may be recoverable through forensic examination by the Cyber Cell - a task entirely beyond the means and capacity of the complainant.

It also noted that the weapons and lathis allegedly employed in the commission of the assault require seizure from the persons of the accused. Further statements of the injured witnesses and the complainant require to be recorded and an independent site inspection is warranted.

The court said that the evidence requisite for establishment of the offences alleged is neither in the possession of the complainant nor can it be procured without the coercive assistance of the investigating authority.

With respect to offences of rioting and unlawful assembly under Sections 147, 148 and 149, the court said that the application revealed that the proposed accused are specifically identified only to the extent of four named individuals, while the remaining participants are described merely as "8- 10 unknown police personnel" without any particularisation of their individual roles or conduct; thus the offences were not prima facie established.

The matter is listed on June 16 for receipt of FIR copy.

Case Title: Yuvraj Singh Bundela v Arvind Bhadoriya [CR 293/2024]

Click here to read/download the Order

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Tacit Approval Of Minor Not Consent In Law But Has Bearing On Bail: J&K&L High Court Grants Bail In POCSO Matter

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Thu, 11 Jun 2026 09:06:23 GMT

The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh has held that although consent of a prosecutrix is legally irrelevant in offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, cases involving romantic relationships between young adults where there may have been “tacit approval in fact, though not consent in law” for a sexual relationship are required to be viewed with less severity while considering bail.

The Court observed that such relationships may be “misguided”, but they stand on a different footing from aggravated exploitative sexual offences, and that refusal of bail in such circumstances may amount to “perversity of justice”.

The Court was hearing a bail application filed under Section 483 BNSS by an accused facing trial for offences under Sections 64, 137(2) and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita along with Section 4 of the POCSO Act.

A Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Dhar observed: “While consent of the prosecutrix is legally irrelevant in cases involving offences under the POCSO Act, yet the Courts have recognised the relationships among young adults in cases where there may have been de facto approval of young adults for a sexual relationship. Such sexual relationships are definitely misguided, but have to be treated on a different footing. When the facts and circumstances of a particular case show that there was tacit approval in fact, though not consent in law for the sexual intercourse between two young adults, the offence that may have been committed has to be looked at with less severity.”

According to the prosecution's case, the father of the prosecutrix lodged a report alleging that his minor daughter had been kidnapped by the petitioner and taken to an undisclosed location. On the basis of the complaint, an FIR came to be registered, and an investigation was initiated.

During the investigation, the prosecutrix was recovered after a disclosure allegedly made by the petitioner. Her statement under Section 183 BNSS was thereafter recorded before the Judicial Magistrate.

In her statement before the Magistrate, the prosecutrix stated that she had come in contact with the petitioner, who used to work at a construction site near her house, and that the two had developed regular telephonic communication over a period of time. She further stated that she accompanied the petitioner to various locations and ultimately stayed with him at a house, where he allegedly established physical relations with her.

The investigation further revealed that the prosecutrix was a minor at the relevant time. After completion of the investigation, charges were framed under provisions of the BNS and the POCSO Act.

The petitioner sought bail, contending that during trial, the prosecutrix had admitted accompanying him out of her own will and volition and had further admitted that the two were in love with each other. It was also contended that the material prosecution witnesses, including the prosecutrix and her parents, had already been examined before the Trial Court.

The High Court examined the deposition of the prosecutrix recorded during the trial and noted that she had categorically stated that she had been in telephonic contact with the petitioner for around two months and that the two used to express love for each other during conversations.

The Court further noted that the prosecutrix admitted boarding several public transport vehicles with the petitioner out of her own will and volition and had also stated during cross-examination that physical relations between them were consensual in fact because they loved each other.

The Bench observed that the mother of the prosecutrix had also stated during cross-examination that the prosecutrix and the petitioner were in love with each other and that the prosecutrix had left home of her own accord. The witness further stated that even after the arrest of the petitioner, the prosecutrix continued to stay with the petitioner's family and desired to marry him.

While recognising that consent of a minor has no legal sanctity under the POCSO Act, the High Court nevertheless observed that factual circumstances demonstrating a romantic relationship and tacit approval in fact cannot be ignored while considering bail.

The Court observed: “Such sexual relationships are definitely misguided but have to be treated on a different footing.”

Referring to the evidence that had emerged during the trial, the Court held: “Though the consent that may have been given by the victim to the sexual intercourse committed by the petitioner with her has no legal sanctity because she was a minor at the relevant time, yet it does have bearing upon the determination of the question relating to the grant of bail.”

The Court further observed: “In such circumstances, if bail is refused to the petitioner, it would be a perversity of justice.”

The High Court referred to the Supreme Court judgment in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Anurudh & Anr. (2026) wherein the Supreme Court had taken note of instances where provisions of the POCSO Act worked harshly in cases involving consensual adolescent relationships.

The Court also reproduced factors highlighted by the Allahabad High Court in Satish alias Chand vs. State of UP (2024) regarding the manner in which courts should evaluate such cases. These included assessing the context of the relationship, giving due consideration to the statement of the victim, avoiding “perversity of justice” and exercising judicial discretion in a manner that does not inadvertently harm the very individuals whom the statute seeks to protect.

The High Court further noted that the prosecutrix, her parents and other material witnesses had already been examined during the trial and that only police officials, doctors and formal witnesses remained to be examined. The Court observed that in such circumstances, there was hardly any likelihood of the petitioner tampering with prosecution evidence or influencing witnesses if released on bail.

The Court concluded: “Though the consent that may have been given by the victim to the sexual intercourse committed by the petitioner with her has no legal sanctity because she was a minor at the relevant time, yet it does have bearing upon the determination of the question relating to the grant of bail. In such circumstances, if bail is refused to the petitioner, it would be a perversity of justice. This Court has to take into consideration the fact that it has come in evidence on record that even after the arrest of the petitioner, the prosecutrix continues to live with his family, and she has not come back to her parental house, which shows that she is adamant on living with the petitioner. In these special circumstances of the case, a prima facie case for grant of bail is made out in favour of the petitioner”.

The High Court held that the peculiar facts emerging during trial, including the prosecutrix's own testimony regarding her relationship with the petitioner, disclosed special circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The Court observed that while the consent of a minor prosecutrix has no legal recognition under the POCSO Act, factual circumstances indicating de facto approval and a romantic relationship between young adults cannot be ignored while considering the question of bail.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the bail application and directed the release of the petitioner on bail subject to furnishing of personal bond and sureties, appearance before the Trial Court on each date of hearing, restriction on leaving the territorial limits of the Union Territory of J&K without permission of the Trial Court and non-interference with prosecution witnesses or evidence.

Case Title: Shahnawaz Amin Shah v. UT of J&K and Anr.

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL)

Appearances

For the Petitioner: Advocate Mir Umer.

For the Respondents: Deputy Advocate General Bikramdeep Singh.

Click Here to Read/Download Judgment

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Calcutta High Court Protects TMC MP Abhishek Banerjee From Coercive Steps In MLA Sign Forgery Case, Asks Him To Appear Before CID

Srinjoy Das — Thu, 11 Jun 2026 07:02:18 GMT

The Calcutta High Court on Thursday granted interim protection from coercive action to Trinamool Congress MP Abhishek Banerjee in a case alleging forgery of signatures of newly-elected TMC MLAs in a resolution relating to the appointment of the Leader of Opposition after the Assembly elections.

Justice Kausik Chanda directed Banerjee to appear before the investigating agency at 6 PM on Thursday (today) and cooperate with the investigation being carried out by the West Bengal CID, while restraining the State from taking coercive steps against him for a period of three weeks.

Significantly, the Court observed that an accused person cannot be compelled to produce documents that may incriminate him, remarking that such a course would offend the constitutional protection against self-incrimination under Article 20.

The case concerns allegations that signatures of several TMC MLAs were forged on a resolution purportedly recording their unanimous decision regarding the election of the Leader of Opposition. The CID had earlier conducted searches at the party office situated at the residence of West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee.

Appearing for Banerjee, counsel submitted that the allegations were confined to offences of forgery and cheating and argued that his client was not an MLA at the relevant time but was functioning as the General Secretary of the party.

It was argued that after the election results, a unanimous decision had been taken by the MLAs and, in his capacity as party General Secretary, Banerjee merely communicated the decision to the Speaker.

When the Court asked why Banerjee had written to the Speaker, counsel responded that he had done so solely as General Secretary of the party.

The State, represented by Additional Advocate General Rajdeep Majumdar, opposed the plea and contended that the investigation had revealed serious discrepancies. According to the State, Banerjee initially informed the Speaker regarding the choice of Leader of Opposition without enclosing any minutes of the meeting. After the Speaker sought supporting documents, a resolution and attendance sheet bearing signatures of MLAs were subsequently furnished.

The State alleged that the signatures annexed to the resolution were claimed to relate to a meeting held on May 6, whereas several MLAs had stated that no such meeting took place on that date and that they had never signed the document. It was further argued that at least five MLAs had disputed the authenticity of the signatures and that comparisons with nomination papers revealed significant differences.

The State also submitted that Banerjee had failed to produce the original resolution despite repeated notices and argued that custodial interrogation was necessary to recover the document.

However, the Court repeatedly questioned how custody would assist in recovering the document and observed that the investigating agency possessed statutory powers of search and seizure to secure evidence.

At one stage, the Court remarked: "You cannot interrogate him to get a document. You cannot compel an accused to give a statement against himself like this."

The Court further observed that if the investigating agency wanted to recover the document, it must resort to lawful investigative measures such as search and seizure rather than compel the accused to produce it.

Rejecting the State's contention that protection should not be granted, the Justice Kausik Chanda stated: "Show me one provision that the investigative agency can compel an accused to produce a document. Nothing. You have to search and seize."

While acknowledging that the allegations concerning the sanctity of the Legislative Assembly were serious and warranted investigation, the Court held that Banerjee's willingness to appear before investigators and cooperate with the probe justified interim protection.

Dictating its order, the Court recorded that Banerjee had volunteered to participate in the investigation and held that the investigating agency was free to interrogate him and take all lawful steps available under law for recovery of documents and collection of evidence.

Accordingly, the Court directed Banerjee to appear before the investigating agency at 6 PM on Thursday and thereafter as and when required upon 24 hours' notice. The Court granted protection from coercive action for three weeks and directed that the matter be listed again after two weeks.

Before concluding the hearing, the Court reiterated that an accused cannot be compelled to assist the prosecution by producing potentially incriminating material, observing that the Constitution protects an individual's right against self-incrimination and that the investigating agency must secure evidence through procedures recognised by law.

Case No : CRR/2240/2026

Case : ABHISHEK BANERJEE VS THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

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Putting Hand Inside Minor Girl's Pant Amounts To 'Sexual Assault' U/S 7 Of POCSO Act: Orissa High Court

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Thu, 11 Jun 2026 06:13:02 GMT

The Orissa High Court has held that the act of an accused putting his hand inside the pant of a minor girl/victim, even without proof of inserting finger into her vagina, amounts to 'sexual assault' within the ambit of Section 7 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 ('the POCSO Act').

Affirming the conviction and order of sentence recorded by the trial Court, a Single Bench of Dr. Justice Sanjeeb Kumar Panigrahi observed–

“This Court further finds that the conduct of the accused, namely dragging the victim, kissing her and inserting his hand inside her pant, clearly constitutes physical contact with sexual intent and squarely falls within the ambit of “sexual assault” as defined under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. Considering the age of the victim, this Court finds no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial court in holding the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Section 10 of the POCSO Act.”

As per the prosecution case, on 09.07.2023, the accused-appellant, who was a grinder mechanic, came to the house of elder brother-in-law of the informant (mother of the victim). At that time, the victim along with her sister were playing in that house. The appellant allegedly requested the sister-in-law of the informant to prepare tea for him.

During such time, he entered inside the house, called the victim near him and forcibly kissed her on her cheek and lips. It was further alleged that the appellant put his hand inside the pant of the victim and inserted his finger into her vagina. Thereafter, the victim allegedly escaped from the spot and hid herself, while the appellant fled away.

On the basis of such allegations, an FIR was lodged and investigation was taken up. On the completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted for commission of offences under Sections 452 (house trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint)/376(AB) (rape on woman under twelve years of age)/354 (outraging modesty of woman)/354-A (sexual harassment) IPC read with Sections 6 (aggravated penetrative sexual assault) and 12 (punishment for sexual harassment) of the POCSO Act. The ASJ-cum-Special Court under the POCSO Act, Cuttack convicted the appellant under Sections 452/354/354-A of the IPC and Sections 10 (punishment for aggravated sexual assault) and 12 of the POCSO Act. Challenging such conviction, the appellant preferred this criminal appeal.

Upon considering the rival contentions of the parties, the Court affirmed the finding of the trial Court regarding age of the victim. By relying upon the birth certificate issued by the Registrar of Birth and Death, CMC Niali, wherein the date of birth of the victim has been reflected as 01.11.2014, it was held that the victim was below 12 years of age at the time of the incident.

The appellant raised the issue of non-holding of Test Identification Parade (TIP) to ascertain his identity. However, the Court nixed such argument by holding that merely not conducting TIP is not fatal for the prosecution, especially when the witnesses were previously well acquainted with the appellant.

Though the appellant attempted to weaken the prosecution case by highlighting certain discrepancies, the Court did not find such contradictions fatal. Nevertheless, the allegation of inserting finger inside the vagina of the victim was held to be suspicious, especially considering the fact that the victim did not utter a word regarding the same in her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC, nor did the medical evidence support the claim of any external injury to the private part. Thus, the Court held–

“The learned trial court was, therefore, justified in extending benefit of doubt to the appellant in respect of the offences punishable under Section 376(AB) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. However, merely because the allegation relating to penetrative sexual assault was not established, the consistent testimony of the victim regarding dragging, kissing and inserting his hand inside her pant cannot be discarded, particularly when the same remained substantially consistent throughout.”

The Court was of the firm view that the conduct of the appellant in dragging the victim, kissing her and inserting his hand inside her pant apparently shows physical contact with sexual intent and hence, it falls within the definition of “sexual assault” as defined under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. Moreover, considering the age of the victim, which was found to be below 12 years, the offence gets qualified as “aggravated sexual assault” punishable under Section 10 the said Act.

Additionally, the Court also upheld the conviction and order of sentence passed against the appellant for commission of offences punishable under Section 452/354/354-A of the IPC read with Section 12 of the POCSO Act.

Case Title: Bablu Verma v. State of Odisha

Case No: CRLA No. 508 of 2025

Date of Judgment: May 22, 2026

Counsel for the Appellant: Ms. Rita Singh, Advocate

Counsel for the State: Ms. Sarita Moharana, Addl. Standing Counsel; Mr. Kuldeep Mohanty, Advocate

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ori) 52

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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AP High Court Quashes Atrocity FIR, Says Private Monetary Dispute Can't Be Camouflaged As Caste‑Based Offences In Absence Of Ingredients

Ritika Verma — Thu, 11 Jun 2026 07:01:59 GMT

Centre Notifies Appointment, Four Advocates, Additional Judges, Andhra Pradesh High Court

The Andhra Pradesh High Court has quashed criminal proceedings against a man accused of caste-based abuse under the SC/ST Act and insulting a woman's modesty, holding that the allegations did not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged.

The Court noted that the complaint did not allege that the purported caste-based insults were made "within public view" as required under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, and observed that the dispute appeared to arise from private monetary transactions between the parties.

Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 apply when a caste-based insult or humiliation is intentionally made in a place within public view. A private dispute or mere reference to a person's caste is insufficient to attract these provisions.

Justice Y. Lakshmana Rao observed that continuation of the prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law, as the foundational requirements for invoking the penal provisions were absent.

"Upon a meticulous appraisal of the record, this Court is constrained to hold that the allegations, even if taken at their face value, are omnibus, bereft of particulars, and conspicuously silent on the indispensable statutory ingredient of occurrence “within public view,” which is the sine qua non for invocation of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of 'the SCs/STs (POA) Act'. The complainant has not demonstrated the presence of any independent witnesses or public visibility, and the statements of supporting witnesses are but verbatim reiterations of the complainant's version, lacking substantive corroboration. Furthermore, the Petitioner has placed on record that he was employed in Melbourne, Australia at the relevant time, a plea of alibi which, though ordinarily a matter for trial, in the present factual matrix renders the prosecution case inherently improbable.
In light of the authoritative pronouncements in Hitesh Verma supra, B. Venkateswaran supra, and Swaran Singh v. State, it is manifest that private monetary disputes camouflaged as caste‑based offences, absent the foundational ingredients of intentional humiliation in public view, amount to a colourable exercise of criminal law and constitute an abuse of process. Continuation of proceedings in such circumstances would occasion grave prejudice and miscarriage of justice, warranting interdiction in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of 'the Cr.P.C.,'/Section 528 of 'the BNSS.”

The Court said that the complaint was "conspicuously bereft of any averment" over public presence or independent witnesses, rendering the alleged caste-based slurs a purely private altercation, indistinguishable from quotidian acrimony, and thus wholly extraneous to the statutory ambit designed to safeguard vulnerable communities from public indignities.

It further said that there was absence of alleged sexual innuendo or modesty-outraging context in the alleged slurs and thus Section 354 IPC was inapplicable.

The case arose from a complaint lodged by a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste community, who alleged that the petitioner had borrowed substantial amounts of money, partially repaid them, and later abused her with caste-based remarks while refusing to repay the balance. She further alleged that another accused visited her residence, took away certain documents and hurled caste-based slurs. Based on these allegations, a case was registered under Section 509 IPC (now Section 79 of the BNS) and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act.

The petitioner sought quashing of the proceedings, contending that the allegations were false and motivated, that he was residing in Melbourne, Australia at the relevant time, and that the dispute was essentially civil in nature concerning alleged monetary transactions. He argued that the complaint lacked particulars regarding any incident occurring in public view and that the investigation failed to verify his plea of alibi or collect electronic evidence regarding his whereabouts.

The complainant and the State opposed the petition, arguing that the allegations disclosed caste-based insults and humiliation attracting the provisions of the SC/ST Act and that questions relating to the petitioner's alibi could only be examined during trial.

After examining the record, the Court found that the complaint did not indicate that the alleged caste-based abuse occurred in public view or in the presence of independent witnesses. The statements of supporting witnesses were found to be mere verbatim reiterations of the complainant's version without substantive corroboration. The Court further noted that the petitioner's claim of being employed abroad had not been properly investigated.

The High Court also found that the allegations under Section 509 IPC/ Section 79 BNS could not be sustained, observing that the offence requires a deliberate intention to insult the modesty of a woman, and that such intent was not borne out from the material placed on record.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed the proceedings against the petitioner.

Case Title: Pasupuleti Chinachennaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.

Case No.: Criminal Petition No. 12317 of 2025

Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri N. Ashwani Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents : Sri G. Sai Narayana Rao

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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Person Accused Of Offences Not Mentioned Under Section 82(4) CrPC Not Deemed As Proclaimed Offender: Gujarat High Court

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Thu, 11 Jun 2026 07:03:12 GMT

Gujarat High Court, Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act 1967, Section 10(3)(h) of the Passports Act 1967, Justice A. S. Supehia, No Material, Suggest, Involvement, Anti-National Activity, Quashes Passport, Impounding Order,

The Gujarat High Court has said that a person accused of only those offences enumerated under Section 82(4) can be declared a proclaimed offender noting that the nature of the offences was serious also carrying the safeguard of an inquiry as provided under the provision.

It further said that a person accused of offences other than the ones under section 82(4) and against whom a proclamation has been published under section 82(1) can be called a 'Proclaimed Person'.

Section 82(4) states that where a proclamation published under subsection (1) is in respect of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 302, 304, 364, 367, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 402, 436, 449, 459 or 460 of IPC and such person fails to appear at the specified place and time required by the proclamation, the Court may, after making such inquiry as it things fit, pronounce him a "proclaimed offender" and make a declaration to that effect. Some of the offences mentioned include murder, culpable homicide not amounting to murder, Robbery, Dacoity, Theft, extortion.

Justice PM Raval observed that Section 82(1) empowers a court to publish a written proclamation against a person, requiring him to appear at a specified place and at a specified time not less than thirty days from the date of publishing such proclamation.

It noted that Section 82(2) stipulates the manner and procedure of such proclamation. Section 83(3) stipulates that a statement in writing by the Court issuing the proclamation to the effect that the proclamation was duly published on a specified day, in the manner specified in clause (i) of sub- section (2), shall be conclusive evidence that the requirements of this section have been complied with, and that the proclamation was published on such day.

It further noted:

"Section 82(4) stipulates that a person, in respect of whom a proclamation has been published under section 82(1), if he fails to appear at the specified place and time required by the proclamation and if he is accused of offences mentioned in Section 82(4), the court may pronounce him as a proclaimed offender, after making such inquiry as it things fit. Section 82(5) stipulates that the provisions of Section 82(2) and (3) shall apply to a declaration made by the court under section 82(4) as they apply to a proclamation made under 82(1).

Other than section 82(4), Section 82 does not stipulate the consequences of non-compliance of the proclamation issued under it. 82(4) stipulates that where the proclaimed person fails to appear at the specified place and time, the court may pronounce him as a proclaimed offender. This pronouncement as a proclaimed offender can only be issued if he is accused of the offences stipulated in 82(4) and that also, only after the court has made such inquiry as it deems fit. There is no provision, other than section 82(4) in the Cr.P.C., under which the court can pronounce a person as a proclaimed offender"

The court rejected the State's argument that every person in respect of whom a proclamation has been published is deemed to be a proclaimed offender irrespective of the provisions of Section 82(4) CrPC.

The court said that if such contention is considered, then the consequence would be that a person against whom a proclamation has been published and is not accused of any of the offences mentioned in Section 82(4) CrPC would be deemed so, without the safeguard of an inquiry stipulated in section 82(4).

"This cannot be the intention of the legislature. The offence enumerated in section 82(4) are serious in nature. It could not be the intention of the legislature that qua a person who is accused of offences that are serious in nature, the safe guard of an inquiry is stipulated and no such safeguard is stipulated qua a person who is accused of offences that may not be so serious- (like the offence in case on hand)," the court said.

The court referred to Sections 40, 41, 43 and 73 CrPC with respect to a proclaimed offender and said that these clearly show that there are adverse consequences attached to being declared a proclaimed offender.

The court said that intention of the legislature cannot be that such adverse consequences "would automatically get attracted to a person qua" whom a proclamation has been published and is accused of offences of a less serious nature.

"I am thus of the considered view that a person who is accused of offences other than the ones enumerated in section 82(4) and qua whom a proclamation has been published under section 82(1) would be a Proclaimed person' and not a deemed 'Proclaimed Offender'," the court said.

The petitioner had moved the high court challenging trial court order rejecting his application under Section 84 CrPC. The petitioner's father was facing trial in a Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act case and had gone missing. The petitioner had filed a missing person's report. In the mean time attachment proceedings had been initiated.

The high court was considering whether the trial Court had the jurisdiction to declare the father of the present applicant as a proclaimed offender. Finding that Section 138 NI Act is not one of the enumerated offences, the high court quashed the trial court order including the attachment order.

Case title: RAJESHBHAI LALJIBHAI PATEL v/s STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR

R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (QUASHING) NO. 7316 of 2026

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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'Left Free To Live As Spouses' : Supreme Court Quashes POCSO Conviction After Convict & Victim Marry

Gursimran Kaur Bakshi — Thu, 11 Jun 2026 07:06:41 GMT

The Supreme Court recently set aside a conviction under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, after the accused and the victim arrived at a settlement by marrying each other and after the accused offered her compensation.

A bench comprising Justice JK Maheshwari and Justice Atul S Chandurkar set aside the conviction invoking its special powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Court took note of the peculiar circumstances of the case that the accused and the victim solemnised their marriage after the victim attained the age of majority. The Court also ordered the accused to pay Rs. 10,00,000 to the victim as compensation.

Clarifying that the order shall not be treated as precedent, the Court observed: "Accordingly, the appeals are allowed and on the basis of subsequent events the conviction and sentence as directed by Sessions Court confirmed by the High Court stand set aside. The appellant and the victim are left free to live their life peacefully in society as spouse."

To briefly state, the appellant-accused was convicted and sentenced by the Trial Court under Sections 5(1) and 6 of the POCSO Act for a period of 10 years in 2019. An appeal was filed before the Madras High Court, which suspended his jail sentence.

Subsequently, the victim filed a quashing petition and prayed for further examination. In an affidavit sworn, she declared that she and the accused had been living together for the past four years, that she wanted to put a quietus to the matter, and that she sought to set aside his conviction. This was rejected by the High Court in 2021.

Being dissatisfied with the order, the accused filed an appeal before the Supreme Court, which directed that the victim may be allowed to record her Section 164 CrPC statement. Her statement was recorded, but since it was not clear whether the parties had married, the Court, vide an order dated November 28, 2024, directed that the victim's statement be recorded again by the Magistrate.

As per her statement, the appellant had intercourse with her on the promise to marry, but later refused. She then filed a police complaint but eventually got married to another man. However, when the other man got to know about her relationship with the appellant, he left her, and she stayed with her father. Eventually, the appellant's family approached her to marry the appellant, and they got married in 2024.

On April 6, when the matter was taken up, the Court was informed that the victim would not like to contest the litigation any further if she is paid Rs. 10,00,000 as the security of her life. The case was listed again, wherein the Court was informed that the amount had been paid by the appellant, and a statement in furtherance of this was recorded by the Registrar(Judicial).

Considering the State Government's position that it doesn't have any reservations if the conviction is set aside provided it's not treated as precedent, and the overall circumstances, the Court noted: "Now as per subsequent statement, appellant and the victim have solemnised the marriage on attaining the age of majority and also received the amount of compensation for his guilt with minor victim. Therefore, at this stage, without entering into the merits of the case, in the peculiar facts, as narrated above, we deem it appropriate to exercise our plenary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the judgment of conviction and sentence of the appellant for the charge under Section 5(1) of POCSO Act and in terms of the statements as recorded and the appellant is acquitted from the charge."

Case Details: MARUTHUPANDI v STATE REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE & ANR|CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 614

Click Here To Read Order

Appearances: For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rahul Shyam Bhandari, AOR Ms. G Priyadharshni, Adv. Mr. Satyam Pathak, Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sabarish Subramanian, AOR Ms. Arpitha Anna Mathen, Adv. Mr. Konark Tyagi, AO

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