The Court observed that detaining authorities are expected to act neutrally between the State and the liberty of a citizen and cannot function as “rubber stamps” of sponsoring agencies.

The Court was hearing a habeas corpus petition challenging two detention orders passed under Sections 8(1)(a) and 8(1)(a-1) of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, directing preventive detention of the petitioner on allegations relating to encroachment of forest land and allied activities.

A Bench comprising Justice Rajesh Sekhri observed: “It is a matter of common experience that grounds of detention furnished to a detenue in Habeas Corpus matters would often contain generic allegations forming part of the dossier submitted by the sponsoring authority, without any independent application of mind. Such a 'copy-paste' culture on the part of detaining authorities would fundamentally infringe upon fundamental rights of citizens guaranteed under the Constitution.”

The Bench further added: “Personal liberty of a person cannot be trifled in such a cavalier fashion. The detaining authorities are expected to act neutrally between the State and the individual liberty of a citizen and cannot afford to act as a rubber stamp of sponsoring authorities. Preventive detention is a drastic precautionary measure intended to intercept future crimes, but it cannot be invoked to punish a citizen for unsubstantiated claims. Therefore, detention orders which merely “copy-paste” the dossiers of sponsoring authorities, without independent evaluation of the detaining authorities, are illegal”.

The detention orders were passed based on a dossier submitted by the Divisional Forest Officer alleging that the petitioner was a habitual land grabber who had encroached upon forest land falling within the Bahu Forest Range and the Bahu Conservation Reserve. The sponsoring authority alleged that the petitioner had engaged in illegal construction, land breaking, illegal mining and smuggling of forest resources and had created a hindrance during demarcation proceedings.

The dossier further alleged that the petitioner had carved out plots on forest land and sold them in the form of residential plots, thereby duping members of the public and creating the potential for unrest among the general public.

The petitioner challenged the detention orders primarily on the ground that the allegations contained in the dossier did not fall within the ambit of Section 8(1)(a-1) of the Public Safety Act relating to smuggling of timber or liquor and that the detaining authority had mechanically reproduced allegations supplied by the sponsoring authority without independent application of mind.

It was further contended that two detention orders bearing the same number and date had been issued under different provisions of the Public Safety Act, demonstrating complete non-application of mind by the detaining authority.

The respondents opposed the petition, contending that the petitioner was a habitual encroacher and that ordinary law had failed to deter him from indulging in similar activities. It was also contended that reference to Section 8(1)(a-1) of the Public Safety Act in one of the detention orders was merely a clerical error.

The High Court examined the scope of Section 8(1)(a-1) of the Public Safety Act and observed that the provision could be invoked only in matters relating to the smuggling of timber or liquor, abetment of such smuggling, transportation or concealment of smuggled timber, or harbouring persons engaged in such activities.

The Court noted that none of the allegations against the petitioner related to smuggling of timber or liquor within the meaning of the provision invoked by the detaining authority.

The Bench observed: “It is evident from a plain reading of Clause (A-1) of sub-section (1) of Section 8 PSA that it can be invoked with a view to prevent a person from smuggling timber or liquor or abetting the same, or engaging in the transportation or concealing or keeping the smuggled timber or dealing in the smuggled timber, or otherwise engaging in the transportation or concealment or keeping or harboring persons engaged in the smuggling or abetting the smuggling of timber or liquor, which are not allegations against the petitioner.”

The Court held that the allegations merely referred to the petitioner as a land grabber enlisted in various encroachment lists maintained by the Forest Department, and therefore, no ground whatsoever was made out for passing the detention orders under the provision invoked.

The Court observed: “It is evident from a bare perusal of the aforesaid allegations that impugned orders have been passed by the detaining authority on misplaced and non-existent grounds. No ground whatsoever is made out for passing the detention orders, in terms of clause (A-1) of sub-section (1) of Section 8 PSA.”

The High Court further noted that two of the cases relied upon in the dossier related not to the petitioner but to alleged encroachments committed by his father.

The Court observed that the petitioner sought to be detained under the Public Safety Act partly based on activities allegedly committed by another person, which clearly reflected total non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority.

The High Court made detailed observations on the growing practice of detaining authorities mechanically reproducing allegations supplied by sponsoring authorities without independently evaluating whether preventive detention was legally justified.

Emphasising the constitutional importance of independent application of mind in preventive detention matters, the Court concluded that detention orders which merely 'copy-paste' the dossiers of sponsoring authorities, without independent evaluation of the detaining authorities, are illegal.

The respondents had objected to the maintainability of the habeas corpus petition on the ground that the challenge had been made at the pre-execution stage before the petitioner was actually detained.

The High Court referred to the Supreme Court judgment in Additional Secretary to the Government of India v. Alka Subash Gadia (1992) and reiterated that writ courts possess limited jurisdiction to interfere with preventive detention orders even at the pre-execution stage in exceptional circumstances.

The Court held that the present case squarely fell within the exceptional categories recognised in Alka Subash Gadia because the detention orders had been passed for a wrong purpose, against a wrong person and on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds.

The Bench observed: “Therefore, present case is squarely covered under grounds (ii), (iii) & (iv) of Alka Subash Gadia, because impugned orders under Sections 8(1) (a) and 8 (1) (A-1) have been passed by the respondent detaining authority, for a wrong purpose, against a wrong person and on absolutely vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds.”

The High Court also noted that two detention orders bearing the same number and date had been issued under different provisions of the Public Safety Act.

The Court observed that the detaining authority appeared to be “oblivious” as to whether the petitioner was to be detained under provisions relating to security of the State and maintenance of public order or under provisions relating to smuggling of timber and liquor.

The Court held that the contradictory stand taken by the respondents that reference to Section 8(1)(a-1) was merely a clerical error, further exposing the lack of clarity and independent application of mind in the detention process.

The High Court held that the detention orders had been passed on vague, extraneous, irrelevant and legally non-existent grounds and that the allegations against the petitioner did not fall within the statutory framework of the provisions invoked under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act.

The Court further held that the detention orders reflected complete non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority and were based on a constitutionally impermissible “copy-paste” exercise reproducing allegations from the sponsoring authority's dossier without independent evaluation.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the habeas corpus petition, quashed the impugned detention orders and directed the immediate release of the petitioner from detention. However, the Court clarified that the respondents would remain at liberty to avail appropriate civil and criminal remedies against the petitioner regarding allegations of encroachment upon forest land.

Case Title: Talib Hussain v. UT of J&K

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL)

Appearances

For the Petitioner: Senior Advocate Rahul Pant with Advocate Tarun Sharma.

For the Respondents: Advocate P.D. Singh.

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The Court observed that such relationships may be “misguided”, but they stand on a different footing from aggravated exploitative sexual offences, and that refusal of bail in such circumstances may amount to “perversity of justice”.

The Court was hearing a bail application filed under Section 483 BNSS by an accused facing trial for offences under Sections 64, 137(2) and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita along with Section 4 of the POCSO Act.

A Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Dhar observed: “While consent of the prosecutrix is legally irrelevant in cases involving offences under the POCSO Act, yet the Courts have recognised the relationships among young adults in cases where there may have been de facto approval of young adults for a sexual relationship. Such sexual relationships are definitely misguided, but have to be treated on a different footing. When the facts and circumstances of a particular case show that there was tacit approval in fact, though not consent in law for the sexual intercourse between two young adults, the offence that may have been committed has to be looked at with less severity.”

According to the prosecution's case, the father of the prosecutrix lodged a report alleging that his minor daughter had been kidnapped by the petitioner and taken to an undisclosed location. On the basis of the complaint, an FIR came to be registered, and an investigation was initiated.

During the investigation, the prosecutrix was recovered after a disclosure allegedly made by the petitioner. Her statement under Section 183 BNSS was thereafter recorded before the Judicial Magistrate.

In her statement before the Magistrate, the prosecutrix stated that she had come in contact with the petitioner, who used to work at a construction site near her house, and that the two had developed regular telephonic communication over a period of time. She further stated that she accompanied the petitioner to various locations and ultimately stayed with him at a house, where he allegedly established physical relations with her.

The investigation further revealed that the prosecutrix was a minor at the relevant time. After completion of the investigation, charges were framed under provisions of the BNS and the POCSO Act.

The petitioner sought bail, contending that during trial, the prosecutrix had admitted accompanying him out of her own will and volition and had further admitted that the two were in love with each other. It was also contended that the material prosecution witnesses, including the prosecutrix and her parents, had already been examined before the Trial Court.

The High Court examined the deposition of the prosecutrix recorded during the trial and noted that she had categorically stated that she had been in telephonic contact with the petitioner for around two months and that the two used to express love for each other during conversations.

The Court further noted that the prosecutrix admitted boarding several public transport vehicles with the petitioner out of her own will and volition and had also stated during cross-examination that physical relations between them were consensual in fact because they loved each other.

The Bench observed that the mother of the prosecutrix had also stated during cross-examination that the prosecutrix and the petitioner were in love with each other and that the prosecutrix had left home of her own accord. The witness further stated that even after the arrest of the petitioner, the prosecutrix continued to stay with the petitioner's family and desired to marry him.

While recognising that consent of a minor has no legal sanctity under the POCSO Act, the High Court nevertheless observed that factual circumstances demonstrating a romantic relationship and tacit approval in fact cannot be ignored while considering bail.

The Court observed: “Such sexual relationships are definitely misguided but have to be treated on a different footing.”

Referring to the evidence that had emerged during the trial, the Court held: “Though the consent that may have been given by the victim to the sexual intercourse committed by the petitioner with her has no legal sanctity because she was a minor at the relevant time, yet it does have bearing upon the determination of the question relating to the grant of bail.”

The Court further observed: “In such circumstances, if bail is refused to the petitioner, it would be a perversity of justice.”

The High Court referred to the Supreme Court judgment in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Anurudh & Anr. (2026) wherein the Supreme Court had taken note of instances where provisions of the POCSO Act worked harshly in cases involving consensual adolescent relationships.

The Court also reproduced factors highlighted by the Allahabad High Court in Satish alias Chand vs. State of UP (2024) regarding the manner in which courts should evaluate such cases. These included assessing the context of the relationship, giving due consideration to the statement of the victim, avoiding “perversity of justice” and exercising judicial discretion in a manner that does not inadvertently harm the very individuals whom the statute seeks to protect.

The High Court further noted that the prosecutrix, her parents and other material witnesses had already been examined during the trial and that only police officials, doctors and formal witnesses remained to be examined. The Court observed that in such circumstances, there was hardly any likelihood of the petitioner tampering with prosecution evidence or influencing witnesses if released on bail.

The Court concluded: “Though the consent that may have been given by the victim to the sexual intercourse committed by the petitioner with her has no legal sanctity because she was a minor at the relevant time, yet it does have bearing upon the determination of the question relating to the grant of bail. In such circumstances, if bail is refused to the petitioner, it would be a perversity of justice. This Court has to take into consideration the fact that it has come in evidence on record that even after the arrest of the petitioner, the prosecutrix continues to live with his family, and she has not come back to her parental house, which shows that she is adamant on living with the petitioner. In these special circumstances of the case, a prima facie case for grant of bail is made out in favour of the petitioner”.

The High Court held that the peculiar facts emerging during trial, including the prosecutrix's own testimony regarding her relationship with the petitioner, disclosed special circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The Court observed that while the consent of a minor prosecutrix has no legal recognition under the POCSO Act, factual circumstances indicating de facto approval and a romantic relationship between young adults cannot be ignored while considering the question of bail.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the bail application and directed the release of the petitioner on bail subject to furnishing of personal bond and sureties, appearance before the Trial Court on each date of hearing, restriction on leaving the territorial limits of the Union Territory of J&K without permission of the Trial Court and non-interference with prosecution witnesses or evidence.

Case Title: Shahnawaz Amin Shah v. UT of J&K and Anr.

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL)

Appearances

For the Petitioner: Advocate Mir Umer.

For the Respondents: Deputy Advocate General Bikramdeep Singh.

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Affirming the conviction and order of sentence recorded by the trial Court, a Single Bench of Dr. Justice Sanjeeb Kumar Panigrahi observed–

“This Court further finds that the conduct of the accused, namely dragging the victim, kissing her and inserting his hand inside her pant, clearly constitutes physical contact with sexual intent and squarely falls within the ambit of “sexual assault” as defined under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. Considering the age of the victim, this Court finds no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial court in holding the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Section 10 of the POCSO Act.”

As per the prosecution case, on 09.07.2023, the accused-appellant, who was a grinder mechanic, came to the house of elder brother-in-law of the informant (mother of the victim). At that time, the victim along with her sister were playing in that house. The appellant allegedly requested the sister-in-law of the informant to prepare tea for him.

During such time, he entered inside the house, called the victim near him and forcibly kissed her on her cheek and lips. It was further alleged that the appellant put his hand inside the pant of the victim and inserted his finger into her vagina. Thereafter, the victim allegedly escaped from the spot and hid herself, while the appellant fled away.

On the basis of such allegations, an FIR was lodged and investigation was taken up. On the completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted for commission of offences under Sections 452 (house trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint)/376(AB) (rape on woman under twelve years of age)/354 (outraging modesty of woman)/354-A (sexual harassment) IPC read with Sections 6 (aggravated penetrative sexual assault) and 12 (punishment for sexual harassment) of the POCSO Act. The ASJ-cum-Special Court under the POCSO Act, Cuttack convicted the appellant under Sections 452/354/354-A of the IPC and Sections 10 (punishment for aggravated sexual assault) and 12 of the POCSO Act. Challenging such conviction, the appellant preferred this criminal appeal.

Upon considering the rival contentions of the parties, the Court affirmed the finding of the trial Court regarding age of the victim. By relying upon the birth certificate issued by the Registrar of Birth and Death, CMC Niali, wherein the date of birth of the victim has been reflected as 01.11.2014, it was held that the victim was below 12 years of age at the time of the incident.

The appellant raised the issue of non-holding of Test Identification Parade (TIP) to ascertain his identity. However, the Court nixed such argument by holding that merely not conducting TIP is not fatal for the prosecution, especially when the witnesses were previously well acquainted with the appellant.

Though the appellant attempted to weaken the prosecution case by highlighting certain discrepancies, the Court did not find such contradictions fatal. Nevertheless, the allegation of inserting finger inside the vagina of the victim was held to be suspicious, especially considering the fact that the victim did not utter a word regarding the same in her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC, nor did the medical evidence support the claim of any external injury to the private part. Thus, the Court held–

“The learned trial court was, therefore, justified in extending benefit of doubt to the appellant in respect of the offences punishable under Section 376(AB) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. However, merely because the allegation relating to penetrative sexual assault was not established, the consistent testimony of the victim regarding dragging, kissing and inserting his hand inside her pant cannot be discarded, particularly when the same remained substantially consistent throughout.”

The Court was of the firm view that the conduct of the appellant in dragging the victim, kissing her and inserting his hand inside her pant apparently shows physical contact with sexual intent and hence, it falls within the definition of “sexual assault” as defined under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. Moreover, considering the age of the victim, which was found to be below 12 years, the offence gets qualified as “aggravated sexual assault” punishable under Section 10 the said Act.

Additionally, the Court also upheld the conviction and order of sentence passed against the appellant for commission of offences punishable under Section 452/354/354-A of the IPC read with Section 12 of the POCSO Act.

Case Title: Bablu Verma v. State of Odisha

Case No: CRLA No. 508 of 2025

Date of Judgment: May 22, 2026

Counsel for the Appellant: Ms. Rita Singh, Advocate

Counsel for the State: Ms. Sarita Moharana, Addl. Standing Counsel; Mr. Kuldeep Mohanty, Advocate

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ori) 52

The Andhra Pradesh High Court has quashed criminal proceedings against a man accused of caste-based abuse under the SC/ST Act and insulting a woman's modesty, holding that the allegations did not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged. 

The Court noted that the complaint did not allege that the purported caste-based insults were made "within public view" as required under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, and observed that the dispute appeared to arise from private monetary transactions between the parties.

Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 apply when a caste-based insult or humiliation is intentionally made in a place within public view. A private dispute or mere reference to a person's caste is insufficient to attract these provisions.

Justice Y. Lakshmana Rao observed that continuation of the prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law, as the foundational requirements for invoking the penal provisions were absent.

"Upon a meticulous appraisal of the record, this Court is constrained to hold that the allegations, even if taken at their face value, are omnibus, bereft of particulars, and conspicuously silent on the indispensable statutory ingredient of occurrence “within public view,” which is the sine qua non for invocation of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of 'the SCs/STs (POA) Act'. The complainant has not demonstrated the presence of any independent witnesses or public visibility, and the statements of supporting witnesses are but verbatim reiterations of the complainant's version, lacking substantive corroboration. Furthermore, the Petitioner has placed on record that he was employed in Melbourne, Australia at the relevant time, a plea of alibi which, though ordinarily a matter for trial, in the present factual matrix renders the prosecution case inherently improbable.
In light of the authoritative pronouncements in Hitesh Verma supra, B. Venkateswaran supra, and Swaran Singh v. State, it is manifest that private monetary disputes camouflaged as caste‑based offences, absent the foundational ingredients of intentional humiliation in public view, amount to a colourable exercise of criminal law and constitute an abuse of process. Continuation of proceedings in such circumstances would occasion grave prejudice and miscarriage of justice, warranting interdiction in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of 'the Cr.P.C.,'/Section 528 of 'the BNSS.”

The Court said that the complaint  was "conspicuously bereft of any averment" over public presence or independent witnesses, rendering the alleged caste-based slurs a purely private altercation, indistinguishable from quotidian acrimony, and thus wholly extraneous to the statutory ambit designed to safeguard vulnerable communities from public indignities.

It further said that there was absence of alleged sexual innuendo or modesty-outraging context in the alleged slurs and thus Section 354 IPC was inapplicable. 

The case arose from a complaint lodged by a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste community, who alleged that the petitioner had borrowed substantial amounts of money, partially repaid them, and later abused her with caste-based remarks while refusing to repay the balance. She further alleged that another accused visited her residence, took away certain documents and hurled caste-based slurs. Based on these allegations, a case was registered under Section 509 IPC (now Section 79 of the BNS) and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act.

The petitioner sought quashing of the proceedings, contending that the allegations were false and motivated, that he was residing in Melbourne, Australia at the relevant time, and that the dispute was essentially civil in nature concerning alleged monetary transactions. He argued that the complaint lacked particulars regarding any incident occurring in public view and that the investigation failed to verify his plea of alibi or collect electronic evidence regarding his whereabouts.

The complainant and the State opposed the petition, arguing that the allegations disclosed caste-based insults and humiliation attracting the provisions of the SC/ST Act and that questions relating to the petitioner's alibi could only be examined during trial.

After examining the record, the Court found that the complaint did not indicate that the alleged caste-based abuse occurred in public view or in the presence of independent witnesses. The statements of supporting witnesses were found to be mere verbatim reiterations of the complainant's version without substantive corroboration. The Court further noted that the petitioner's claim of being employed abroad had not been properly investigated.

The High Court also found that the allegations under Section 509 IPC/ Section 79 BNS could not be sustained, observing that the offence requires a deliberate intention to insult the modesty of a woman, and that such intent was not borne out from the material placed on record.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed the proceedings against the petitioner.

Case Title: Pasupuleti Chinachennaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.

Case No.: Criminal Petition No. 12317 of 2025

Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri N. Ashwani Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents : Sri G. Sai Narayana Rao

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