

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

(1) CRM-M-39247-2025 (O&M)

Rajkumar Yadav @ Raj Kumar Yadav @ Rajkummar Rao

... Petitioner

Versus

State of Punjab and another

.. Respondents

(2) CRM-M-56441-2025 (O&M)

Nitin Upadhyaya

... Petitioner

Versus

State of Punjab and another

.. Respondents

(3) CRM-M-56640-2025 (O&M)

Anthony Raymond Philip Dsouza @ Tony

... Petitioner

Versus

State of Punjab and another

.. Respondents

Reserved on : 22.05.2026

Date of Pronouncement : 29.05.2026

Uploaded on : 29.05.2026

Pronounced in Full

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.S.GREWAL

Present:- Mr. Puneet Bali, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Tejeshwar Singh, Advocate,
Mr. Subhash Jadhav, Advocate and
Mr. Gagandeep Singh, Advocate for the petitioner
in CRM-M-39247-2025.

Mr. J.S. Ghuman, Advocate for the petitioner(s)
in CRM-M-56441-2025 & CRM-M-56640-2025.

Mr. Jastej Arora, Addl. A.G., Punjab and
Mr. Sandeep Kumar, DAG, Punjab.

None for respondent No.2 despite service.

H.S. Grewal, J.

1. This order shall dispose of CRM-M-39247-2025, CRM-M-56441-2025 and CRM-M-56640-2025 as these are arising out of same FIR. For the sake of brevity, the facts are being taken from CRM-M-39247-2025.

2. The aforesaid petitions have been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of FIR No.74 dated 19.04.2017 registered under Sections 295-A, 120-B IPC and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 at Police Station Division No.5, Police Commissionerate, Jalandhar, Punjab (Annexure P-1) along with final report/challan dated 31.01.2022 (Annexure P-4) and the order dated 04.07.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class-10, Jalandhar (Annexure P-9), whereby non-bailable warrants have been issued against the petitioner and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

Factual Matrix

3. The case of the prosecution is based upon a complaint given by Ishant Sharma-respondent No.2 and the relevant extract of the FIR is reproduced hereunder:-

“Complaint No. 1013-DCP dated 11.04.2017

To,

The Deputy Police Commissioner, Jalandhar.

Subject: Complaint against (1) Amul Vikas Mohan, (2) Ajay K. Pannlalla and (3) Raj Kumar Rao for outraging and hurting the religious feelings and sentiments of Hindus especially Lord Shiv Ji followers with deliberate and malicious intention and for promoting enmity on the ground of religion.

Sir,

with due respect its submitted as under:-

- 1. That we are law abiding citizens of India and not related to any political party.*
- 2. That we are Hindu by religion as well worshippers of lord SHIV Ji.*
- 3. That accused no 1 and accused no 2 are going to release a movie namely "Behn Hogi Teri", and in this upcoming movie accused no. 3 resembling lord SHIV Ji in cartoonist manner which is very objectionable and disrespect Lord Shiv Ji, Which Shows their weak & ill mental level. The objectionable picture of Lord Shiv Ji has also broadcasted by the accused no 1 on social media.*
- 4. That accused no 1 is the producer of the movie and accused no 2 is the director of the movie and accused no 3 is the actor of the movie.*
- 5. That the insult of lord SHIV Ji by the all accused has hurt the religious sentiments of the followers of Hindu Religion and especially devotees of lord SHIV Ji.*
- 6. That due to the above said malicious act by the all accused dishearten people of India on large amount and to just gain the cheap publicity for promoting the movie and the same cannot be accepted in any manner and we all numerous Hindu federations are condemn the same.*
- 7. That by this complaint we all Hindu Federations and devotee of Lord Shiv Ji, intimate and warn to those culprits who use to insult the sentiments of our Religious feelings that they should be dealt strictly and their acts cannot be tolerated in any way. It is,*

Therefore, requested that an FIR must be registered against the all accused under Section 295-A & 153A of the Indian Penal Code and under the relevant sections of IT, Act at Jalandhar and to arrest & put all the accused behind the bars.

Complainant Sd/- Ishant Sharma 99157-40031 Dt:- 11.04.2017.”

4. After completion of investigation, the final report/challan under Section 173 Cr.P.C. (Annexure P-4) was filed on 31.01.2022 against the following accused persons:-

- i. Nitin Upadhyaya (Producer)
(Petitioner in CRM-M-56441-2025)
- ii. Amul Vikas Mohan (Producer)
- iii. Tony @ Anthony D'Souza (Producer)
(Petitioner in CRM-M-56640-2025)
- iv. Ajay K. Panna Lal (Director)
- v. Rajkumar Yadav (Actor)
(Petitioner in CRM-M-39247-2025).

Submissions

5. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner(s) submitted that the petitioners have been falsely implicated in this case and the entire prosecution is based on incorrect facts. It is submitted that the poster of the film which is alleged to be objectionable as well as the film in question itself, had already been reviewed and certified by the Central Board of Film Certification (hereinafter referred to as 'CBFC'), which is the statutory authority constituted under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, entrusted with the responsibility of examining and certifying films prior to their public exhibition. It is further submitted that the CBFC, after due scrutiny and consideration of the contents of the film, including the scene(s) depicting the petitioner dressed as Lord

Shiva and riding/seated on a motorcycle, granted a 'UA' certificate to the film titled "Behen Hogi Teri" for theatrical release. In other words, the 'UA' certificate dated 30.05.2017 was issued by the CBFC in accordance with the guidelines/notification issued by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting vide Notification No. S.O. 836(E) dated 06.12.1991 (Annexure P-5). Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that, in terms of the aforesaid notification, certification of films for public exhibition is guided by various principles, including Clause 2(xii), which mandates that visuals or words contemptuous of racial, religious or other groups shall not be presented in the film.

5.1 Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the petitioners namely Rajkumar Yadav @ Raj Kumar Yadav @ Rajkumar Rao, who is an actor, and Nitin Upadhyaya and Anthony Raymond Philip Dsouza @ Tony, who are the producers of the film in question, have been unnecessarily implicated in the present case. It is alleged in the FIR that the members associated with the film have insulted Lord Shiva and hurt the religious sentiments of followers of the Hindu religion. However, two of the petitioners are related to Hindu religion and the film after getting a 'UA' certificate by the CBFC, had not been released for public viewing. The entire FIR is stated to be based only upon a poster of the film which had allegedly been posted on social media by the producer. In this regard, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the provisions of Section 295-A IPC (now Section 299 of the BNS) are not attracted in the present case, as there was no *mens rea* on the part of the petitioners to insult or outrage the religious sentiments of any community and one of the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 295-A IPC i.e

‘deliberate and malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of citizens’, is completely absent. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the judgements of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the cases of **Ramji Lal Modi vs. State of UP, 1957 SCR 860; Mahendra Singh Dhoni vs. Yerraguntla Shyamsundar, (2017) 7 SCC 760; Priya Prakash Varrier vs. State of Telangana, (2019) 12 SCC 432.**

5.2 It is also submitted that the provisions of Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which penalizes publication or transmission of material i.e. “lascivious” or ‘appealing to the prurient interest’ are wholly inapplicable to this case. It is submitted that the image in question, being merely a film still depicting an actor dressed in the costume of Lord Shiva, does not contain any element of obscenity, sexual suggestion or moral depravity so as to attract the ingredients of Section 67 of the IT Act. It is further submitted that the said image/poster was not uploaded or posted by the petitioner-Rajkumar Rao and, therefore, no case is made out against the petitioner under Section 67 of the IT Act. In support of the submissions, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in **Aveek Sarkar vs. State of West Bengal, (2014) 4 SCC 257.**

5.3 It is further submitted by learned Senior Counsel that the certification granted by the CBFC is a complete answer to the allegations levelled in the present FIR, inasmuch as the CBFC, being the statutory authority constituted under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, had already undertaken due examination and scrutiny of the contents of the film and arrived at a positive determination that the film did not offend public morality or

religious sentiments so as to disentitle it from public exhibition. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that once the competent statutory authority had granted certification to the film after examining the alleged objectionable scenes/posters, the petitioners cannot subsequently be subjected to criminal prosecution merely on account of differing perceptions of certain individuals. It is thus argued that the acts attributed to the petitioners are protected under Section 79 IPC and placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Raj Kapoor vs. State, (1980) 1 SCR 1081** and the judgment passed by this Court in **Sanjay Leela Bhansali vs. State of Punjab**, bearing CRM-M-37869-2013, decided on, 30.10.2014.

5.4 It is also submitted by learned Senior Counsel that the present FIR is based solely upon a single promotional poster released on social media and the complainant/respondent No.2 has admittedly not even viewed the film in question. It is submitted that the complainant merely got agitated/offended by the promotional poster and, on the sole basis thereof, got the FIR registered against the petitioners. Reference has also been made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335**, to contend that where the allegations made in the FIR, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence, continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law.

6. *Per contra*, learned State counsel, while referring to the status report filed by way of an affidavit of Ms. Dhanpreet Kaur, IPS, Commissioner of Police, Jalandhar, submitted that the ingredients of Sections 295-A and 120-

B IPC as well as Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 are *prima facie* attracted from the allegations levelled in the FIR. It is further submitted that though filmmakers and performers enjoy the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India but the said right is subject to reasonable restrictions and censorship so as to ensure that the religious sentiments of the public are not hurt. Learned State counsel strongly controverted the submissions raised on behalf of the petitioners; however, no judgment has been relied upon in support thereof. It is also submitted that the challan has already been presented before the competent Court. However, due to the proceedings having been stayed by this Court vide order dated 28.08.2025, no further headway could be made in the matter. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, prayer has been made for dismissal of the present petitions.

Analysis

7. I have considered the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties and have carefully gone through the material on record as well as the judgements cited by the petitioner in support of his submissions.

8. The fundamental issue that arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioners are liable to be prosecuted for offences punishable under Sections 295-A and 120-B IPC and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 merely on the basis of a promotional poster of a film, despite the fact that the film had already been granted certification by the CBFC under the Cinematograph Act, 1952.

9. In order to adjudicate upon the aforesaid issue, it would be apposite to examine the ingredients of offences alleged against the petitioners, which are as under:-

(a) First of all, Section 295-A IPC (now Section 299 of BNS, 2023) reads as under:-

“295A. Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.-

Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”

10. Now coming to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that there is nothing on record to *prima facie* indicate that the petitioners had any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage or insult the religious feelings of any class of citizens, which is the essential ingredient for attracting the provisions of Section 295-A IPC. Rather, it deserves mention that two of the petitioners themselves belong to the Hindu religion and are stated to be devotees of Lord Shiva. Various photographs depicting their participation and devotion at Hindu temples/religious places have also been annexed along with the petitions. In the absence of any material showing a deliberate intention on the part of the petitioners to insult the religion or religious beliefs of any community, the essential ingredients of Section 295-A IPC are not made out.

11. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Ramji Lal Modi vs. State of U.P.**(supra) wherein while upholding the constitutional validity of Section 295-A IPC, following observations have been made:-

“Section 295A does not penalise any and every act of insult to or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens but it penalises only those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens, which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. Insults to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class do not come within the section. It only punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class.”

12. Similarly, in the case of **Mahendra Singh Dhoni vs. Yerraguntla Shyamsundar**(supra), while applying the principles laid down in **Ramji Lal Modi's case** (supra), Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:-

“7. On a perusal of the aforesaid passages, it is clear as crystal that Section 295A does not stipulate everything to be penalised and any and every act would tantamount to insult or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of class of citizens. It penalises only those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion or religious belief of a class of citizens which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class of citizens. Insults to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that

class do not come within the Section. The Constitution Bench has further clarified that the said provision only punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. Emphasis has been laid on the calculated tendency of the said aggravated form of insult and also to disrupt the public order to invite the penalty.

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To satisfy ourselves, we have bestowed our anxious consideration and scrutinized the allegations made in the complaint petition and we have no hesitation in holding that the allegations remotely do not satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence and, therefore, applying the principle stated in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & others, 1991(1) RCR (Criminal) 383 : 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335 we quash the complaint proceedings initiated against the petitioner.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. Likewise, in **Priya Prakash Varrier vs. State of Telangana(supra)**, the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings initiated against actors and producers of a film/song alleged to have hurt religious sentiments and held as under :-

“10. On a keen scrutiny of Section 295A and the view expressed by the Constitution Bench in Ramji Lal Modi (supra), we do not find that the said provision would be attracted in the present case. We are inclined to think so, for the picturization of the said song solely because of the ‘wink’ would not tantamount to an insult or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens. The said song has been on Youtube since February, 2018. We do not perceive that any calculated tendency is adopted by the

petitioners to insult or to disturb public order to invite the wrath of section 295A of the IPC.”

14. Furthermore, this Court in the case of **Tilak Raj vs. State of Punjab** (supra) emphasised the high threshold of Section 295-A IPC and held as under:

“15. In order to bring the case within the purview of section 295-A of the IPC it is not so much the matter of publication as the manner of it. The words published must be such as are bound to be regarded by any reasonable man as grossly offensive and provocative and maliciously and deliberately intended to outrage the feeling of any class of citizens of India.”

15. The aforesaid judgments squarely apply to the facts of the present case. Here also, the materials in question forms part of a cinematographic work and was used during the course of legitimate promotional and creative activity. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioners had any deliberate or intentional motive to insult any religion or religious beliefs. Mere objection or protest by an individual or a section of viewers cannot by itself be treated as proof of deliberate intention to outrage religious sentiments. Therefore, no offence is made out against the petitioners under Section 295-A IPC.

16. Insofar as Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is concerned, its relevant part reads as under:

“67. Punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form.-

Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted in the electronic form, any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to

all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it, shall be punished...”

17. The aforesaid provision penalises publication or transmission in electronic form of material which is lascivious, appeals to prurient interest, or tends to deprave and corrupt persons likely to read, see or hear the same. The provision targets three identifiable mischiefs, namely: (i) lasciviousness; (ii) appeal to prurient interest; and (iii) tendency to deprave and corrupt. However, none of these ingredients are attracted in the facts of the present case.

18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in **Aveek Sarkar vs. State of West Bengal** (supra) reformulated the test of obscenity from the rigid Hicklin test to the contemporary community standards test and held that the impugned material must be judged in the context in which it is presented. Viewed in that context, the impugned promotional material cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed obscene or lascivious. Rather, the grievance in the FIR is exclusively with regard to alleged hurt to religious sentiments and not obscenity. Consequently, the basic ingredients constituting the offence under Section 67 IT Act are primarily absent qua the petitioners.

19. Furthermore, the film “Behen Hogi Teri” had already been granted a ‘UA’ certificate by the CBFC on 30.05.2017 after scrutiny under the provisions of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, including the scenes complained of in the present FIR wherein the petitioner was depicted in the attire of Lord Shiva while riding a motorcycle. Section 5-B(1) of the Cinematograph Act specifically provides that a film shall not be certified for public exhibition if it is against public order, decency, morality or is likely to incite commission of

any offence. Thus, the grant of certification by the statutory expert body constituted under the Act carries significant legal sanctity.

20. At this stage, reference may also be made to Section 79 IPC, which reads as under:-

“79. Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself justified, by law.—Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law, in good faith believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it.”

21. In **Sanjay Leela Bhansali v. State of Punjab(supra)**, while dealing with a similar controversy relating to a film certified by the CBFC, this Court, relying upon **Raj Kapoor’s case(supra)** and Section 79 IPC, held that certification by the CBFC amounts to adjudication by a specialised statutory body that the cinematographic work does not offend public morality or religious sentiments and that such certification would protect the filmmakers and persons associated with the film from criminal prosecution. The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

“The film maker and performers have got fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India as the said provision guarantees freedom of expression to them but the said freedom is subject to censorship contemplated under the Act. The said Act operates as reasonable restriction on the freedom of film makers who are required to obtain a certificate under Section 5A of the Act. A Central Board of Film Certification ... is required to assess the decency, morality, security of the State before issuing a certificate. The Board is a specialised body constituted under the

Act for determining whether a cinematographic film is fit for public viewing and consumption. ... The certification of the Board tantamounts to adjudication by a specialised statutory body that the movie does not offend any religious sentiments.

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... any distributor, exhibitor or any other person to whom the rights in the film have passed shall not be liable for punishment under any law relating to obscenity in respect of any matter contained in the film for which certificate has been granted under the Act. ... Section 79 of the IPC lays down that nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it. The provisions of Section 79 IPC make an offence a non-offence when the offending act is actually justified by law or is bonafide believed by mistake of fact to be so justified.”

“In view of the certificate of exhibition Annexure P-2 having been issued, the prosecution of the petitioners is unsustainable. ... the obscenity is to be adjudged upon by the Board constituted under the Cinematograph Act, the certificate issued Annexure P-2 by the said Board will absolve the petitioners from any liability under Section 79 of the IPC.”

(emphasis supplied)

22. It is also noticeable that one of the producer had merely tweeted/posted the promotional preview on social media on 04.04.2017 for promotional purposes, whereas the FIR came to be registered on 19.04.2017 and the CBFC thereafter granted the ‘UA’ certificate on 30.05.2017. Significantly, the complainant/respondent No.2 had admittedly not even viewed the film, as the same had not yet been released at the time of registration of the FIR. The grievance, therefore, is based solely upon a

promotional poster/preview detached from the full context of the cinematographic work.

23. Furthermore, the charge under Section 120-B IPC also cannot survive independently once the substantive offences under Section 295-A IPC and Section 67 IT Act are not made out. The FIR does not disclose any agreement between the accused persons to commit any illegal act or to commit a legal act by illegal means, which is the foundational requirement for constituting an offence of criminal conspiracy.

24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that artistic and creative expression occupies a protected sphere under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Criminal prosecution in relation to films, creative works and artistic depictions can be sustained only when the statutory ingredients of the alleged offences are clearly made out. The threshold for such prosecution is necessarily high, particularly where the work has already undergone statutory censorship and certification.

25. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of '**State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal**(supra), laid down categories of cases where inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may be exercised to prevent abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice, including cases where the allegations do not *prima facie* disclose commission of any offence. The relevant extract thereof is reproduced hereunder:-

“8.1. In the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under [Article 226](#) or the inherent powers under [Section 482](#) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following categories of cases are given by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised

either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guide- i7 myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:

(a) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;

(b) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R.

do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;

(c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;

(d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;

(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific

provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;

(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. ”

Conclusion

26. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the essential ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 295-A and 120-B IPC and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 are not made out against the petitioners and the continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law.

27. Consequently, the present petitions are allowed and FIR No.74 dated 19.04.2017 registered under Sections 295-A, 120-B IPC and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 at Police Station Division No.5, Police Commissionerate, Jalandhar, Punjab (Annexure P-1) along with final report/challan dated 31.01.2022 (Annexure P-4) and the order dated 04.07.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class-10, Jalandhar (Annexure P-9), along with all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed qua the petitioners.

28. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.

29.05.2026
A.Kaundal

(H.S.GREWAL)
JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No