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2026:AHC-LKO:52087-DB

**HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW**

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 1491 of 2023

Smt. Sarita Devi

.....Appellant(s)

Versus

State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home U.P. Civil Secrett. Lko.

.....Respondent(s)

Counsel for Appellant(s)	: Anil Kumar Sharma, Aditya Kumar, Amol Kumar Srivastava, Jatin Gajwani, Parvez Ahmad Siddiqui, Ranjana Srivastava, Shivanshu Mishra
Counsel for Respondent(s)	: G.A., Gitanjali Nayak, Salil Tripathi, Yogendra Kumar Singh

With

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 1587 of 2023

Smt. Malti Sharma

.....Appellant(s)

Versus

State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home, Lucknow

.....Respondent(s)

Counsel for Appellant(s)	: Anil Kumar Sharma, Amol Kumar Srivastava, Jatin Gajwani, Parvez Ahmad Siddiqui, Ranjana Srivastava, Shivanshu Mishra
Counsel for Respondent(s)	: G.A., Gitanjali Nayak, Salil Tripathi, Yogendra Kumar Singh

Court No. - 9

**HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.
HON'BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.**

(Per Hon'ble Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Amol Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellants, Sri S.P. Singh, learned Additional Government Advocate (AGA) for the State, and Ms. Geetanjali Nayak, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the informant.

2. These connected criminal appeals, preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.'), challenge the common judgment and order dated 04.04.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 11, Lucknow in Session Trial No. 641 of 2016, arising out of Case Crime No. 426 of 2015, Police Station Sarojini Nagar, District Lucknow. By the impugned judgment, the appellants, namely Sarita Devi (in Criminal Appeal No. 1491 of 2023) and Malti Devi @ Malti Sharma (in Criminal Appeal No. 1587 of 2023), have been convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'I.P.C.') and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for six months.

3. The prosecution story, in brief, is that Manisha Sharma (the deceased), sister of the informant Manish Rai, was married to Kamlesh Sharma, son of Vimal Sharma, on July 3, 2003. It is alleged that the deceased was consistently harassed and faced ongoing disputes with her father-in-law, Vimal Sharma, at her matrimonial home. On October 27, 2015, at approximately 07:30 P.M., at her matrimonial residence situated in Village Chillawan near Sunny Toyota, Police Station Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow, the accused persons, namely Vimal Sharma (father-in-law), Malti Devi, Shambhu Sharma (son of Malti Devi), and Sarita Devi (wife of Shambhu Sharma), brutally assaulted the deceased. It is further alleged that with the common intention to eliminate her, the accused persons poured kerosene oil on her person and set her ablaze, inflicting severe burn injuries. Upon hearing her cries, neighbors and local residents rushed to the spot and shifted the deceased in a critical state to the Shyama Prasad Mukherjee (Civil) Hospital, Lucknow, where her

dying declaration was subsequently recorded by an Executive Magistrate on October 28, 2015, at about 08:44 A.M.

4. On the basis of the written tehrir submitted by the informant Manish Rai, a formal First Information Report (here-in-after referred as FIR) was registered against all the four named accused persons on 28.10.2015 at 18:10 hours as Case Crime No. 426 of 2015, initially under Sections 307 and 326 of the I.P.C. at Police Station Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow. Consequent upon the demise of the victim during the course of her treatment at Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi, on 04.11.2015, the case was subsequently converted/transmuted to Section 302 of the I.P.C.

5. During the period of hospitalization of the victim, her dying declaration was meticulously recorded by the Executive Magistrate/Tehsildar on 28.10.2015 at about 08:44 A.M. at the Civil Hospital, Lucknow. Consequent upon her medical condition showing no signs of improvement, she was referred to a higher medical center and was subsequently admitted to the Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi, on 02.11.2015. However, despite the best medical interventions, the victim succumbed to her severe burn injuries during the course of her treatment on 04.11.2015 at 11:45 P.M.

6. Following the demise of the victim, the inquest proceedings (panchayatnama) were conducted by the police on 05.11.2015, and the dead body, along with the requisite police papers, was dispatched for post-mortem examination. In order to furtherance of investigation, the Investigating Officer (hereinafter referred to as the 'I.O.') inspected the place of occurrence, collected material physical evidences from the spot, and prepared the site plan (naksha nazri). In view of the death of the victim, the case was converted into an offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C. On conclusion of the investigation, the I.O. finding sufficient and prime facie evidence against the accused persons, submitted the formal charge-sheets before the jurisdictional Magistrate.

7. After ensuring strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 207 of the Cr.P.C. regarding the supply of copies of the

prosecution documents to the accused, the learned Magistrate, finding that the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. was exclusively triable by the Court of Session, committed the case to the Court of Sessions Judge, Lucknow, in accordance with Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. From there, the case was subsequently made over to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 11, Lucknow, for trial according to law.

8. The learned Trial Court, after affording opportunity of hearing on charges, framed formal charges under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. against the accused persons. The charges were read over and explained to the accused persons in vernacular, who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried, thereby setting the trial into motion.

9. In order to substantiate its case and establish the guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution relied upon both oral and documentary evidence. The prosecution produced and examined as many as ten witnesses, namely: Sri Manish Rai (PW-1, the informant and brother of the deceased), Rajesh Kumar Srivastava (PW-2, the Tehsildar/Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration), Santosh Kumar Sahu (PW-3, an independent neighbor), Mansha Ram (PW-4, a witness to the circumstances immediately following the incident), Dr. Ashish Kumar (PW-5, who conducted the post-mortem examination), Head Constable Dhoom Singh (PW-6, who registered the chick FIR), Akhilesh Dwivedi (PW-7, the initial Investigating Officer), retired A.S.I. Rajendra Kumar (PW-8, who conducted the inquest proceedings in Delhi), Sudhir Singh (PW-9, the subsequent Investigating Officer who submitted the charge-sheet), and Dr. Rahul Chaudhary (PW-10, the Medical Officer who certified the fitness of the deceased before and after the recording of her dying declaration).

10. Apart from the ocular evidence, the prosecution also adduced and proved several vital contemporaneous documentary evidences, including the written tehrir (Exhibit K-1), the inquest report (Exhibit K-2), the dying declaration of the deceased (Exhibit K-3), and the post-mortem

report (Exhibit K-4), alongside relevant material objects collected from the scene of crime.

11. PW-1, Manish Rai, the complainant (brother of the deceased), deposed in his examination-in-chief that ever since the marriage of his sister on 03.07.2003, frequent matrimonial disputes and friction persisted between the deceased and her father-in-law, the accused Vimal Sharma. He explicitly stated that the accused Vimal Sharma had developed an illicit relationship with the co-accused Malti Devi, to which the deceased strongly and consistently objected. It was on account of this persistent objection that all the accused persons harbored deep-seated animosity and malice toward the deceased, which also led her to file a prior written complaint with the Police Station Sarojini Nagar on 12.07.2015 regarding her systemic harassment. PW-1 further deposed that upon receiving telephonic information regarding the incident from his brother-in-law, Kamlesh Sharma, he immediately rushed to the Civil Hospital, Lucknow. He testified that when he reached the hospital, his sister was in a conscious state and narrated the entire horrific incident to him in tears. According to her disclosure, her father-in-law had initially assaulted her, following which the accused Shambhu Sharma forcefully restrained her and muffled her mouth; the accused Sarita Devi then poured kerosene oil upon her person, and Malti Devi handed over the matchbox to the accused Vimal Sharma, who subsequently set her on fire. He also stated that after his sister succumbed to the burn injuries, her two minor sons came to reside under his care and custody.

12. PW-2, Rajesh Kumar Srivastava, the then Tehsildar, Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow, deposed in his examination-in-chief that upon receiving specific administrative instructions from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM), Sarojini Nagar, he proceeded to the Civil Hospital, Lucknow, for the purpose of recording the dying declaration of the severely injured victim, Manisha Sharma. He stated that at about 08:44 A.M. on 28.10.2015, after obtaining a formal certificate from the attending Medical Officer regarding the conscious and fit mental state of the injured to give a statement, he proceeded to record her declaration.

He testified that the victim explicitly stated that after having tea, she went inside her room where her father-in-law, Vimal Sharma, brutally assaulted her with a fist blow, causing her to strike violently against the wall. Thereafter, the daughter-in-law of his father-in-law's mistress brought kerosene oil, and both her suser (Vimal Sharma) and Malti Sharma poured the kerosene upon her person and set her ablaze, as a result of which her entire saree caught fire and she sustained extensive burn injuries. The victim further stated that her husband was not present at the time of the occurrence, she had been struggling/fighting for twelve years, and upon hearing her cries, the neighboring residents rushed to the spot to rescue her. PW-2 verified the recorded dying declaration in a sealed envelope before the court, identifying it as Exhibit K-3.

13. PW-3, Santosh Kumar Sahu, an independent resident of the locality, deposed that at about 07:30 P.M. on October 27, 2015, while he was conversing with his friend Ramu outside his residence, he suddenly heard frantic cries emanating from the house of Kamlesh Sharma. He testified that he saw Kamlesh's wife, Manisha Sharma, running out onto the verandah while engulfed in flames, whereupon he and his friend immediately rushed forward and extinguished the fire by covering her person with a bedsheet. He further stated that her screams drew neighboring women to the scene, and a local resident named Salman dialed '100' to inform the police. During his cross-examination, PW-3 categorically admitted that the victim's house was adjacent to his own, and at the time of the occurrence, the victim was entirely alone inside the house. He further disclosed that the accused persons, namely Shambhu, Malti, Sarita, and Vimal Sharma, owned another house situated four or five houses away, where they had shifted their residence prior to the incident. He also stated that although he knew the accused Vimal Sharma worked at the airport, he was not aware of his exact duty hours.

14. PW-4, Mansha Ram, deposed in his examination-in-chief that owing to a prior accident, he was infirm, used a walker for mobility, and regularly sat outside his house. He testified that between 07:00 P.M. and 08:00 P.M. on October 27, 2015, he observed the accused Vimal Sharma

passing by on a bicycle in a trembling state. He further stated that on the very same day, Vimal's daughter-in-law had sustained fatal burn injuries. In his cross-examination, the witness clarified that he had been sitting outside his house since around 06:00 P.M. and the time mentioned by him was approximate as he was not carrying a watch or a mobile phone. He admitted that he did not witness the actual incident of immolation firsthand and his knowledge regarding the source of fire was based on general public information. He further stated that while the signatures on his statement were his own, a police official (Diwan Ji) had obtained them about 10 to 15 days after the incident without reading or explaining the contents of the document to him.

15. PW-5, Dr. Ashish Kumar, who was then posted as a Senior Resident at Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi, proved the post-mortem report of the deceased (Exhibit K-4). He deposed that the dead body of the deceased was formally identified by her brother Manish Rai and her husband Kamlesh Sharma. External examination revealed that the body was wrapped in a multicoloured blanket and covered in medical bandages, except for the face and neck. Bluish discoloration was observed under the right toes, and the scalp hair was singed. The deceased had sustained extensive ante-mortem flame burns covering approximately 80% of her total body surface area, including the face, neck, chest, abdomen, back, lower back, and all four limbs. The presence of granulation tissue and yellowish foul-smelling pus at the margins of the burn injuries categorically indicated that she had survived for a considerable period after receiving the burns, and the margins showed signs of active infection. Internal examination revealed a congested and edematous brain, congested lungs with consolidation present in the lower lobes, an empty stomach, and congested abdominal organs. The Medical Officer opined that the cause of death was septicæmic shock resulting from infected ante-mortem flame burns involving about 80% of the total body surface area.

16. PW-6, Head Constable Dhoom Singh (No. 664), proved the check FIR and the corresponding GD entry as Exhibit K-5 and Exhibit K-6

respectively. PW-7, Akhilesh Dwivedi, Sub-Inspector, who was the initial Investigating Officer of the case, proved the site plan (naksha nazri as Exhibit K-7), the recovery memo of the material objects (Exhibit K-8), and other contemporaneous documentary exhibits prepared during the course of the investigation. He deposed that on 29.10.2015, he proceeded to the Civil Hospital, Lucknow, where he recorded the statement of the injured victim, Manisha Sharma, under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. He testified that during her statement, the injured victim explicitly disclosed that on 27.10.2015, between 07:00 P.M. and 07:30 P.M., her father-in-law, Vimal Sharma, initially assaulted her with fists, the accused Shambhu Sharma forcefully held and muffled her mouth, co-accused Sarita Devi poured kerosene oil upon her person, and Malti Devi handed over the matchbox to Vimal Sharma, who thereafter set her on fire. She explicitly reiterated that her husband was not present at the house at the relevant time and that the neighbours rescued her upon hearing her cries.

17. PW-8, retired A.S.I. Rajendra Kumar, who was then posted at Police Station Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi, deposed in his examination-in-chief that upon receiving official information from the Safdarjung Hospital regarding the demise of the deceased, Manisha Sharma, he recorded the identification statements of her brother (Manish Rai) and husband (Kamlesh Sharma). He testified that he formally conducted the inquest proceedings (panchayatnama) and prepared the relevant police papers, identifying the inquest report as Exhibit K-2 and Exhibit K-9. He further stated that the body was subsequently forwarded to the mortuary for post-mortem examination, and upon completion of the autopsy, the dead body was formally handed over to the husband of the deceased for final rites.

18. PW-9, Sudhir Kumar Singh, Inspector, deposed that while he was posted as the Station House Officer (S.O.) at Police Station Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow, the investigation of Case Crime No. 426 of 2015—which was initially registered under Sections 307 and 326 of the I.P.C.—was transmuted/converted to Section 302 of the I.P.C. on 10.11.2015

following the death of the victim, and the subsequent investigation was entrusted to him. He stated that after taking over the investigation, he perused the case diary (CD) prepared by the erstwhile Investigating Officer and recorded the statements of several prosecution witnesses, including Raj Kapoor, Munni Devi, and others under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. He also obtained and examined the medical treatment records of the deceased from the Civil Hospital, Lucknow. He further testified that during the course of the investigation, he conducted raids at the residential premises of the accused persons, namely Malti Devi and Sarita Devi, on several occasions, but they were found to be absconding. Consequently, after executing the necessary process, the co-accused Malti Devi and Sarita Devi were arrested and taken into custody on 01.05.2016, and their statements were recorded. He also verified the steps taken regarding the prior arrest and custodial statements of the accused Vimal Sharma and Shambhu Sharma.

19. PW-10, Dr. Rahul Chaudhary, who was posted as the Emergency Medical Officer (E.M.O.) at the Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee (Civil) Hospital, Lucknow, on 28.10.2015, deposed that the victim Manisha Sharma, aged about 32 years, was admitted to the Burn Ward at approximately 08:40 A.M. with extensive burn injuries. He categorically testified that prior to the recording of the dying declaration by the Tehsildar/Executive Magistrate, he thoroughly examined the patient and certified that she was fully conscious, oriented, and mentally fit to make a voluntary statement. He proved his initial fitness certification on the dying declaration (Exhibit K-3), which read: "Manisha Sharma W/o Kamlesh Sharma is in fit state of her mind for her statement". He further stated that he remained outside and was not present in the room while the Executive Magistrate was actively recording her statement. He testified that upon completion of the recording, he examined the patient again and appended his subsequent certification confirming that the victim remained in a fit state of mind before and during her statement.

20. In order to corroborate and substantiate the ocular testimony, the prosecution placed on record and successfully proved the written tehrir

as Exhibit Ka-1, the formal inquest report (panchayatnama) as Exhibit Ka-2, the dying declaration of the deceased recorded by the Executive Magistrate as Exhibit Ka-3, and the post-mortem examination report as Exhibit Ka-4. The procedural and investigative records were also established, including the Check FIR as Exhibit Ka-5, the corresponding General Diary entry as Exhibit Ka-6, the site plan (naksha nazri) as Exhibit Ka-7, the recovery memo (fard) of the objects seized from the spot as Exhibit Ka-8, and the supplementary inquest/body identification papers as Exhibit Ka-9. Furthermore, the primary charge-sheet submitted against Vimal Sharma and Shambhu Sharma was proved as Exhibit Ka-10, while the supplementary charge-sheet against Malti Devi and Sarita Devi was marked as Exhibit Ka-11. These documentary exhibits were corroborated by material objects produced before the Court, consisting of a sealed cloth bundle (potli) as Material Exhibit-1, a polythene container as Material Exhibit-2, and the samples of half-burnt clothes and ash as Material Exhibit-3, which upon FSL analysis confirmed traces of kerosene oil.

21. Upon the closure of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. All incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence were read over and explained to them, which they denied, reiterating their innocence and alleging false implication due to enmity. In her additional statement, the accused Sarita Devi specifically pleaded that she had been residing in a separate house prior to the incident; however, no oral evidence was adduced by the accused persons in support of their defence at that stage, save for filing a photocopy of the duty chart of the co-accused Vimal Sharma.

22. The learned Trial Court, after hearing the learned counsel for both the parties, marshaling the facts, and critically analyzing the evidence on record, concluded that the prosecution had successfully established its case beyond all reasonable doubt against three of the accused persons, namely Vimal Sharma, Malti Devi @ Malti Sharma, and Sarita Devi, under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. Consequently, the

learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced Vimal Sharma, Malti Devi, and Sarita Devi accordingly. However, after analyzing the evidence regarding the remaining co-accused, Shambhu Sharma, the learned Trial Court found that the prosecution had failed to prove his complicity in the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and consequently, he was acquitted of the charges leveled against him. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence, the appellants have preferred these connected criminal appeals before this Hon'ble Court.

Finding of the learned Trial Court

23. The learned Trial Court, upon a holistic appreciation of the evidence, observed that there were no material contradictions or inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It held that the dying declaration of the deceased (Exhibit K-3) was entirely voluntary, truthful, and inspired confidence, being strongly corroborated by the medical certification of fitness provided by Dr. Rahul Chaudhary (PW-10) as well as the testimony of the Executive Magistrate, Rajesh Kumar Srivastava (PW-2), who recorded the declaration. The Trial Court further recorded a categorical finding that the evidence available on record conclusively demonstrated that the convicted accused persons poured kerosene oil on the body of the deceased and set her ablaze, an act which clearly manifested their deliberate intention to cause her death. This homicidal intent was further substantiated by the gravity and extent of the injuries sustained by the deceased, as evidenced by the medical and post-mortem reports confirming deep thermal burns covering approximately 80% of her total body surface area, which ultimately led to fatal septicaemic shock.

Submissions on behalf of the Appellants:

24. Learned Counsel for the appellants, while assailing of the impugned judgment of conviction, has rigorously submitted as under:

25. **Inconsistency in Multiple Dying Declarations:** It is submitted that the case of the prosecution hinges primarily upon multiple dying

declarations of the deceased, which are materially inconsistent, contradictory, and completely destructive of each other's credibility.

26. First Dying Declaration (Exhibit K-3): The first dying declaration, recorded by the Tehsildar (Executive Magistrate) on 28.10.2015, presents a distinct three-pronged narrative. Firstly, it alleges that the father-in-law (Vimal Sharma) initially punched the deceased, causing her to strike against the wall; secondly, it states that the daughter-in-law of his mistress brought the kerosene oil; and thirdly, it asserts that both Vimal Sharma and Malti Sharma sprinkled the kerosene and set her on fire. It is submitted that this first declaration is internally vague, ambiguous, and fails to precisely attribute the specific and exclusive overt act of immolation to any single accused. Furthermore, the deceased's statement that she had been "struggling for twelve years" indicates deep-seated mental distress, rendering her prone to imagination. Additionally, the constant presence of her brother (the informant) at the hospital creates a strong probability of tutoring and psychological influence. Crucially, no role was attributed to the co-accused Shambhu Sharma in this declaration, though he was subsequent indicted.

27. Second Dying Declaration (161 Cr.P.C. Statement): In complete variance to the first narrative, the second dying declaration recorded by the Investigating Officer on 29.10.2015 under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. introduces an entirely new version. In this subsequent statement, it is alleged that the father-in-law first called Shambhu Sharma, who then forcefully gagged the deceased; thereafter, Sarita Devi poured the kerosene oil, Malti Devi merely handed over the matchbox, and Vimal Sharma lit the fire.

28. Material Divergence and Embellishment: It is submitted that there is a total divergence and material shift in the rolls, persons, and the core conduct attributed to the accused persons between the two declarations. In the second declaration, the act of pouring kerosene is shifted entirely onto Sarita Devi, and the role of Malti Devi is

significantly scaled down to merely handing over a matchbox, which clear points toward a classic case of embellishment, deliberate over-implication, and improvements made by the prosecution. Since neither of the dying declarations inspires confidence or fulfills the test of being coherent, truthful, and reliable, they could not have been legally made the sole basis of conviction.

29. **Reliance on Judicial Precedents:** To fortify his arguments, the learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon the following judicial precedents:

30. **State of Punjab Vs. Parveen Kumar, (2004) 10 SCC 769:** Wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the name of an accused is common in two distinct dying declarations is not sufficient to sustain a conviction if the declarations contain material contradictions regarding the core incident.

31. **Smt. Vimalbai Vs. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 192 of 2010):** Wherein the Hon'ble Court, while discussing the validity of conflicting dying declarations, held that where the specific roles attributed to the appellants vary substantially between pouring kerosene oil and lighting the matchstick, the credibility of such declarations stands severely impeached, and no sole conviction can be safely predicated upon them.

Submissions on behalf of the State:

32. On the other hand, the learned Additional Government Advocate (AGA) appearing for the State, along with the learned counsel for the informant, has vehemently opposed the submissions of the appellants and contended as under:

33. **Sufficiency of Evidence and Validity of Judgment:** It is submitted that the prosecution has adduced overwhelming, credible, and sufficient evidence against the appellant-convicts to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt. The learned Trial Court, after a meticulous marshaling of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, correctly

found the appellants guilty. There is absolutely no legal infirmity, error, or perversity in the impugned judgment and order of conviction which may warrant interference by this Hon'ble Court.

34. **Sanctity of the Dying Declaration:** It is next submitted that the dying declaration of the deceased (Exhibit K-3) was recorded by the Executive Magistrate only after obtaining a strict prior certification from the Emergency Medical Officer (PW-10) pertaining to the conscious, oriented, and fit mental condition of the deceased. Furthermore, upon conclusion of the statement, the Medical Officer appended a subsequent certification confirming her mental stability and fitness throughout the recording process. The averments made in the dying declaration are completely natural, spontaneous, and there was absolutely no occasion, time, or opportunity for any manipulation or tutoring.

35. **Corroboration by Ocular and Medical Evidence:** It is further contended that the core of the dying declaration stands firmly corroborated by independent ocular and scientific evidence. PW-3, Santosh Kumar Sahu, upon hearing the victim's cries, immediately rushed to her rescue, extinguished the raging flames covering her person using a bedsheet, and she was subsequently shifted to the hospital. Additionally, the forensic evidence in the form of the FSL report (Exhibit K-11) conclusively establishes the presence of kerosene oil on the half-burnt clothes and ashes recovered from the scene of crime, which completely demolishes the defence theory. Therefore, the Trial Court rightly concluded that the appellants actively participated in setting the deceased on fire with a common intention to kill her.

36. **Reliance on Judicial Precedents:** To fortify his arguments, the learned AGA has placed placing reliance upon the following authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:

37. **Naeem Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 17 SCC 735:** Wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that a dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence and not an absolute rule of law. Once a dying

declaration, after careful judicial scrutiny, is found to be true, voluntary, and entirely free from any effort to induce or tutor the deceased, there exists no legal impediment in making it the absolute basis of conviction, even in the absence of independent corroboration.

38. Jemaben Vs. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2299:

Wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court categorically held that merely because there are minor discrepancies or trivial variances in the versions given by the prosecution witnesses or in the manner of occurrence narrated before independent witnesses (such as PW-3), the solemn dying declaration made before an independent Magistrate cannot be ignored or discarded if it forms a coherent and consistent chain of events.

39. In view of the aforesaid facts, circumstances, and settled legal position, it is submitted that the present appeals are entirely devoid of merits and are, therefore, liable to be dismissed.

Discussion, Reasons and Conclusion

40. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for both the appellant-convicts, the learned Additional Government Advocate (AGA) for the State, and perused the entire material available on record.

41. Upon a comprehensive consideration of the facts, circumstances, and submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties, the following point for determination is formulated to adjudicate the present appeals:

42. Whether the learned Trial Court committed a legal error or perversity in convicting and sentencing the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. on the basis of the evidence available on record?

43. Since the crux of the arguments advanced on behalf of both the parties fundamentally subverts and rests upon the evidentiary value and reliability of the multiple dying declarations of the deceased, it is expedient to analyze the statutory principles and the law propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard.

44. It is relevant to note that the statutory provision governing dying declarations, which was hitherto occupied by Section 32(1) of the old Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is now encapsulated under Section 26 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'BSA, 2023'). Section 26 of the BSA, 2023 provides that statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, are themselves relevant facts when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question.

45. The jurisprudential essence of a dying declaration under Section 26 of the BSA, 2023 rests upon the sanctified legal maxim "*Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri*", which translates to the principle that a person will not meet their Maker with a lie in their mouth. A dying declaration, if found to be voluntary, truthful, and free from any external tutoring or psychological promptings, can form the independent and sole basis of conviction without requiring any further corroboration. However, where multiple dying declarations exist on record, the Court is under a strict judicial obligation to subject each declaration to the closest scrutiny, ensuring that they are coherent, consistent, and do not suffer from any material variance or fatal improvements.

46. The legal philosophy and jurisprudential principles governing the admissibility and appreciation of a dying declaration have been clean-cut and well-settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, establishing that a dying declaration is a substantial piece of evidence under the statutory framework (formerly Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872). It is well-settled that there is no rigid statutory form prescribed for recording a dying declaration; it can be made verbally, in writing, or by any recognized method of communication, including signs, words, or gestures, provided the cognitive quality and fitness are established. The definite reason behind holding a dying declaration reliable is that a statement made by a person on the verge of death carries special sanctity, as at that solemn moment, a person is most

unlikely to make an untrue statement, and the shadow of impending death is by itself a guarantee of the truth of the statement regarding the circumstances leading to the demise. However, at the same time, a dying declaration, like any other piece of evidence, has to be rigorously tested on the touchstone of credibility to be acceptable, which is all the more essential because the accused does not get an opportunity of questioning veracity of the statement by cross-examination. Nevertheless, if the dying declaration is found entirely reliable, it can form the base of conviction, as a person who is facing imminent death, with even a shadow of continuing in this world practically non-existent, every motive of falsehood is obliterated. The mind gets altered by most powerful ethical reasons to speak only the truth, and great solemnity and sanctity are attached to the words of a dying person because a person on the verge of death is not likely to tell lies or to concoct a case so as to implicate an innocent person. As Matthew Arnold famously observed, "truth sits on the lips of a dying man". The general principle on which the species of evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced and mind induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth; situation so solemn that law considers the same as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a court of justice.

47. In this respect it is also relevant to consider the ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Mohan Lal Gangaram Gehani Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700**. The Apex Court in the said precedent held that where the prosecution relies upon more than one statement in the nature of a dying declaration, the statement which is first in point of time must ordinarily be preferred, unless the subsequent statements are proven to be equally spontaneous and reliable. However, for a plurality of dying declarations to be accepted as trustworthy, they must exhibit a high degree of coherence and consistency regarding the core substratum of the prosecution's case.

48. In the recent and authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Abhishek Sharma Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2024) 13 SCC 660**, the Apex Court comprehensive propounded and codified the legal parameters regarding the appreciation of multiple dying declarations. After evaluating the extensive jurisprudential matrix, the Hon'ble Supreme Court delineated the core guiding principles which a Court must strictly consider and apply while dealing with a case involving more than one dying declaration, ensuring that any material contradictions are carefully scrutinized to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, upon considering various judgments regarding multiple dying declarations, established the following principles for a court to consider when dealing with such cases:

“(1) The primary requirement for all dying declarations is that they should be voluntary and reliable and that such statements should be in a fit state of mind;

(2) All dying declarations should be consistent. In other words, inconsistencies between such statements should be “material” for its credibility to be shaken;

(3) When inconsistencies are found between various dying declarations, other evidence available on record may be considered for the purposes of corroboration of the contents of dying declarations;

(4) The statement treated as a dying declaration must be interpreted in light of surrounding facts and circumstances;

(5) Each declaration must be scrutinised on its own merits. The court has to examine upon which of the statements reliance can be placed in order for the case to proceed further;

(6) When there are inconsistencies, the statement that has been recorded by a Magistrate or like higher officer can be relied

on, subject to the indispensable qualities of truthfulness and being free of suspicion;

(7) In the presence of inconsistencies, the medical fitness of the person making such declaration, at the relevant time, assumes importance along with other factors such as the possibility of tutoring by relatives, etc.”

49. In view of the aforesaid settled position of law propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court, we shall now proceed to critically evaluate and scrutinize the multiple dying declarations of the deceased available on record, in light of the extensive arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties.

50. The dying declaration of the deceased, Manisha Sharma, recorded by the Executive Magistrate (PW-2) on 28.10.2015 at the Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee (Civil) Hospital, Lucknow, which has been proved and exhibited as Exhibit Ka-3, is reproduced here-in-below:

मृत्यु कालिक बयान

*“Pt. Manisha Sharma W/o Kamlesh Sharma is in fit state **Paper torn** mind For her Statement.*

Sd/- Illegible

28-10-15

Stamp seal – EMO

Dr. S.P.M(Civil) Hospital

Lucknow (U.P.)

श्रीमती मनीषा शर्मा W/o कमलेश शर्मा उम्र 32 वर्ष,

ग्राम चिल्लौवा सनी टोयटा थाना

सरोजनी नगर

समय- 8:44 AM

दिनांक- 28 / 10 / 2015

स्थान सिविल अस्पताल

चाय पीने के बाद कमरे में गयी थी। मेरे ससुर मुक्के से मारे, दीवार पर चिपक गयी। उसकी रखैल की बहू मिट्टी तेल लेकर आ गयी, मेरे ससुर और मालती शर्मा मिट्टी का तेल थोड़ा सा छिड़का, आग ज्यादा लग गयी। पूरे साड़ी में आग लग गयी। मुझे इंशाफ दिलवाईये, मैं बारह साल से संघर्ष कर रही हूं, मेरे पति वहां नहीं थे। मेरे ससुर का नाम विमल शर्मा है, उन्होंने ही आग लगाया है। मालती शर्मा तेल डाली। मुझे जलाया गया है। पूरे मोहल्ले के लोग मुझे

बचाये। मेरे चिल्लाने पर आये। मेरे ससुर दारू पीते हैं। यह घटना कल की है।
शायं 05:30 की है।

*Manisha Sharma W/o Kamlesh Sharma remained in fit state of her mind
before and during her Statement.*

Sd/- Illegible

28/10/15

9-01 Am

मेरे द्वारा अपने समक्ष बयान लिखा गया।

ह० राजेश कुमार श्रीवास्तव

निशान अंगूठा दाया

तहसीलदार सरोजनीनगर

ह० अपठनीय

ह० अपठनीय

9.01 Pm पूर्वान्ह

28.10.2015

STAMP – EMO

Dr. S.P.M(Civil) Hospital

Lucknow (U.P.)”

51. On a thorough perusal of the material available on record, it reveals that the prosecution primarily rests its case upon the dying declaration of the deceased. However, before entering into the evaluation of the solemn dying declaration made by the deceased before the Executive Magistrate, it is expedient to analyze the ocular testimonies and other prosecution evidence available on record.

52. PW-1, Manish Rai, the brother of the deceased, admitted in his cross-examination that his brother-in-law, Kamlesh Sharma, had initially informed him regarding the alleged incident over a mobile phone. Upon receiving this information, he immediately rushed to the hospital, where his deceased sister narrated the entire incident to him. In his cross-examination, he further stated that on 27.10.2015, his mother was the first person to be intimated in respect of the burning incident of the deceased. Upon receiving this intimation, he directly reached the Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee (Civil) Hospital, Lucknow, following which his father also arrived at the hospital between 09:00 P.M. and 09:30 P.M. He candidly admitted that he was not an eyewitness to the actual occurrence, as he did not visit the matrimonial house of the deceased

immediately, and therefore, he could not interact with the neighbors at the spot. He testified that on 28.10.2015 at around 09:00 A.M., the Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. This witness categorically denied the suggestions put forth by the defence/convict side that the deceased had been cajoled or tutored into falsely implicating the accused persons in the matter.

53. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that the accused persons have taken a specific defence during the cross-examination of the witnesses, asserting that the deceased had set herself on fire. PW-1 vehemently denied the defence suggestion that the deceased was mounting pressure on the accused to deposit money into her personal bank account, which allegedly led to her self-immolation.

54. The learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that there are material contradictions and glaring inconsistencies between the oral statements of the prosecution witnesses, the statement recorded by the Investigating Officer, Akhilesh Dwivedi (PW-7), and the formal dying declaration made before the Executive Magistrate. To test the veracity of this argument, we have carefully perused the testimony of Sub-Inspector Akhilesh Dwivedi (PW-7). He deposed that on 29.10.2015, during the course of investigation, he proceeded to the Civil Hospital, Lucknow, where he recorded the statement of the injured victim, Manisha Sharma, under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. In the said statement, the victim disclosed that on 27.10.2015 between 07:00 P.M. and 07:30 P.M., her father-in-law, Vimal Sharma, initially called Shambhu Sharma. Upon his arrival, Shambhu forcefully pressed and gagged her mouth, co-accused Sarita Devi brought kerosene oil, Malti Devi handed over the matchbox to Vimal Sharma, and Vimal Sharma subsequently set her on fire. She further stated that all four accused persons thereafter fled the scene, following which the neighbors arrived, extinguished the flames on her body and with their assistance, her husband admitted her to the hospital.

55. PW-7 further exposed that on 30.10.2015, he recorded the statement of the victim's husband, Kamlesh Sharma, under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. Kamlesh Sharma narrated that he was not present at the house at the time of the alleged incident. Upon receiving information regarding the burning of his wife, he rushed back to the house and saw his wife lying in a severely burnt state. He stated that Vimal Sharma, Shambhu Sharma, Sarita Devi, and Malti Devi, after pouring kerosene oil, had set his wife on fire.

56. The learned counsel for the appellants has pointed out that while the deposition of the I.O. (PW-7) emerges with a specific role for Shambhu Sharma (gagging the mouth), Sarita Devi (pouring kerosene), Malti Devi (handing over the matchbox), and Vimal Sharma (setting the fire); the statement of the deceased's husband (Kamlesh Sharma) generalizes the overt act by stating that all the accused persons collectively poured kerosene oil and set her on fire. On the other hand, a different posture is reflected in the formal dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate (Exhibit Ka-3), wherein the deceased stated that her father-in-law, Vimal Sharma, assaulted her with fists, the daughter-in-law of his mistress (Sarita Devi) brought the kerosene oil, and thereafter her father-in-law and Malti Sharma sprinkled the kerosene oil, and Vimal Sharma set her on fire. On the basis of these variations regarding the specific roles attributed to Malti Devi, Sarita Devi, and the complete omission of Shambhu Sharma in the Magistrate's recording, the appellants contend that the recitals in the multiple dying declarations are mutually destructive, unworthy of confidence, and completely lose their legal sanctity.

57. We are, however, not in agreement with this line of argument advanced by the defence. The reason is that neither the informant, Manish Rai (PW-1), nor the Investigating Officer, Akhilesh Dwivedi (PW-7), are medical experts to legally certify or disclose the exact cognitive and mental fitness of the deceased at the precise moment they interacted with her. Therefore, it cannot be conclusively presumed that at the time of giving the statement to the I.O. or the informal narrative to

the informant, the deceased was in a perfectly fit state of mind to render a precise and legally structured account.

58. On the contrary, to evaluate the statutory sanctity of the dying declaration (Exhibit Ka-3), the testimony of Rajesh Kumar Srivastava, the then Naib Tehsildar/Executive Magistrate (examined as PW-2), is of paramount importance. PW-2 deposed that upon receiving official intimation from the SDM, Sarojini Nagar, he reached the Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee (Civil) Hospital, Lucknow, on 28.10.2015 at around 09:00 A.M. He categorically testified that when he recorded the statement of the deceased, her voice was absolutely clear and intelligible. He clarified that any discrepancy regarding the date was merely typographical, and he firmly established that the statement was recorded on 28.10.2015. Crucially, PW-2 certified that the attending doctor had examined the patient and certified her to be in a mentally fit state of mind prior to the recording. He also clarified that during the actual recording of the statement, the medical officer was not present inside the room, ensuring an environment free from any influence.

59. The veracity of the Executive Magistrate (PW-2) stands fully fortified by the testimony of the medical expert, Dr. Rahul Chaudhary, who was examined as PW-10, who before the Magistrate commenced the recording and thoroughly examined the patient mentally and physically, finding her fully conscious, oriented, and fit to give her voluntary statement. He further deposed that after the completion of the recording by the Magistrate, he examined her again and appended a subsequent certification confirming that the deceased remained stable and in a fit mental state before and throughout the recording process. In his cross-examination, PW-10 firmly stated that he had actively ousted Kamlesh Sharma and all other relatives from the room before examining the victim, and after conducting the medical examination, he himself stepped out of the room. He emphatically controverted the defence suggestion that he had manipulated or manufactured the dying declaration in collusion with the victim's husband.

60. A joint and harmonious reading of the testimony of the author of the dying declaration, Rajesh Kumar Srivastava (PW-2), and the medical officer, Dr. Rahul Chaudhary (PW-10), conclusively demonstrates that the dying declaration of the deceased was recorded when she was in a perfectly fit state of mind, duly backed by contemporaneous medical certifications. The rigorous cross-examination of these witnesses has failed to elicit any material or substantive degradation which could assist the case of the appellants. The mere fact that this particular detailed version was not recorded in the same manner by the Investigating Officer does not diminish the overriding statutory value of the solemn dying declaration made before the Executive Magistrate. Any minor lacuna or defect in the investigation cannot override convincing, cohesive, and credible statutory evidence.

61. It has been next argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the dying declaration indicates a backdrop of long-standing matrimonial friction, as the deceased itself stated that she had been "struggling for twelve years", which according to the defence, indicates a motive for false implication. We find ourselves unable to accept this contention. The statement of the deceased regarding her twelve-year struggle clearly discloses the historical backdrop of continuous torture and harassment meted out against her. It highlights the circumstances of cruelty that culminated in her being set on fire and by no stretch of imagination can it be interpreted to imply that she voluntarily committed suicide by self-immolation.

62. This conclusion is further fortified by the medical testimony of Dr. Ashish Kumar (PW-5), who conducted the post-mortem examination. He categorically deposed that the cause of death was septicaemic shock resulting from infected ante-mortem flame burns involving approximately 80% of the total body surface area. Although the defence attempted to raise arguments to disprove the ante-mortem nature of the injuries, it is crucial to note that it is not even the case of the appellants that the death was not caused by burn injuries. Their sole defence rests

on the theory of self-immolation, which stands completely falsified by the nature and extent of the injuries and the evidence on record.

63. The appellants have further sought shelter under the testimony of Mansha Ram (PW-4) to argue that if the appellants were actively involved in the commission of the offence, they would have been noticed by this witness, whereas he only claimed to have seen the convict Vimal Sharma passing by on a bicycle in a trembling state. However, in his cross-examination, PW-4 candidly admitted that he did not witness the actual occurrence with his naked eyes and his knowledge was based on what he heard from others. A perusal of his testimony reveals that he is, at best, a chance witness who observed Vimal Sharma fleeing the vicinity immediately after the incident. The mere fact that he did not see the other co-appellants fleeing alongside Vimal Sharma on the bicycle does not establish their innocence or prove their non-involvement in the joint commission of the offence inside the house.

64. The appellants have also placed reliance on the testimony of Santosh Kumar Sahu (PW-3), arguing that he was the person who rescued the deceased and shifted her to the hospital and at that time he did not find any of the appellants present at the spot. We have given our anxious consideration to this submission coupled with the testimony of PW-4. However, the absence of the appellants at the spot when the neighbors arrived to extinguish the fire is completely consistent with the prosecution narrative that after setting the deceased ablaze, all the accused persons immediately fled the scene of crime. Therefore, their absence does not point towards false implication, but rather corroborates their guilty conduct and subsequent abscondance.

65. It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the testimonies of Santosh Kumar Sahu (PW-3) and Mansaram (PW-4), when read in conjunction, completely establish that the appellants were not involved in the commission of the alleged offence by any means or manner and that they have been falsely implicated in the present case. We have given our anxious consideration

to this contention, but upon a thorough perusal of the record, we find ourselves unable to concur with this line of argument.

66. On a close examination of the testimony of Santosh Kumar Sahu (PW-3), particularly during his cross-examination, he stated that he did not see the accused persons exiting the house of the deceased. He further stated that upon hearing the victim's screams, she emerged out from the house by herself and at that specific moment of time, she was alone. He added that he was unable to recall the exact clothes worn by the deceased at that juncture. Seizing upon this statement, the defence has strenuously argued that none of the accused persons were present inside the house when the deceased allegedly set herself on fire.

67. The learned counsel for the appellants has further built his argument around a statement made by PW-3 in his cross-examination, wherein he mentioned that the accused persons—Shambhu, Malti, Sarita, and Vimal Sharma—owned two houses and had shifted their residence to their second house, while the deceased continued to reside in the house adjacent to that of the witness. However, in the very same deposition, PW-3 simultaneously clarified that this second house of the accused persons was situated just four or five houses away from their first house.

68. This proximity completely destroys the defence theory. The mere fact that the accused persons owned or occasionally occupied another house separate from the place of occurrence does not, by any stretch of imagination, imply that the other house was so geographically remote that they could not have reached the spot before or at the time of the commission of the crime. The presence of the appellants at the scene of the crime cannot be ruled out or denied on the faint plea of having another house, when that house was located in the immediate vicinity, roughly three to four houses away.

69. Here, it is also highly expedient to contrast this defence plea with the statutory statements given by the appellant-convicts under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. When incriminating circumstances were put to the

appellants, Malti Sharma and Sarita Sharma completely denied the testimony of PW-3 (Santosh Kumar Sahu), asserting that he had deposed falsely against them due to enmity. Similarly, with regard to the testimony of the prosecution witness Mansaram (PW-4), on whose statement the defence is paradoxically placing heavy reliance, both the appellants stated in their Section 313 Cr.P.C. examinations that the said witness had given a false statement. Furthermore, regarding the testimony of Rajesh Kumar Srivastava (PW-2), the scribe who recorded the solemn dying declaration, both appellants stated that they had nothing to say.

70. Thus, a glaring contradiction emerges in the defence strategy: while their counsel relies on the oral statements of PW-3 and PW-4 to argue innocence, the accused persons themselves have explicitly disowned and discarded those very witnesses in their statement under Section 313 by branding them as liars. Where sufficient opportunity was afforded to the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances, they chose a blanket denial of the ocular evidence but significantly failed to utter a single word to contradict the core recitals or deny the incriminating circumstances recorded in the dying declaration. Consequently, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted merely on the strength of an inconsistent oral plea.

71. On a minute and critical observation of the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate (PW-2), we do not find any structural inconsistency or infirmity regarding the presence and the explicit roles attributed to the present appellants. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that a dying declaration recorded by an independent Magistrate, where there is no opportunity for tutoring, fabrication, or psychological promptings, is highly reliable and cannot be ignored.

72. The genesis of the crime stands firmly established by the testimony of the informant, Manish Rai (PW-1), who deposed that the

deceased's father-in-law, convict Vimal Sharma, maintained an illicit relationship with Malti Devi. This relationship was continuously and vehemently opposed by the deceased, Manisha Sharma, on account of which Vimal Sharma, Malti Devi, Shambhu Sharma, and Sarita Devi collectively nurtured severe animosity toward her. The depth of this friction is evidenced by the fact that prior to the fatal incident, on 12.07.2015, the deceased had also submitted a formal written application detailing this harassment to the Police Station, Sarojini Nagar.

73. It is true that the deceased's husband (Kamlesh Sharma) was not examined by either side during the trial. However, the defence has urged before us to consider that the appellants were falsely implicated because the deceased was under severe mental distress and was allegedly mounting pressure on her father-in-law, Vimal Sharma, to disburse and deposit his retirement funds directly into her personal bank account. We find this alternative theory of self-immolation to be highly speculative, weak, and entirely unsubstantiated by the record. Where the statutory dying declaration is clinching, reliable, and convincing—completely free from any visible embellishment, manipulation, or inducement—and is fully supported by the broader circumstances disclosed in the prosecution evidence, the defence plea becomes fail.

74. Therefore, after taking into consideration all the facts, evidence, and circumstances in their entirety, as well as the role and active participation of the appellants in the alleged offence, we find that the prosecution has successfully established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the learned trial court has thoroughly discussed every aspect, analyzed the evidence in detail, and arrived at a proper conclusion. There is no illegality, infirmity, or perversity in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court dated 04.04.2023.

75. Consequently, both the criminal appeals (Criminal Appeal Nos.1491 of 2023 and 1587 of 2023) are devoid of merits and are hereby

dismissed. The conviction and sentence of the appellants, as recorded by the learned Trial Court, are upheld.

76. Since we have decided the appeals on merit so the pending bail applications stand dismissed.

77. Let a copy of this judgment along with the trial court record be transmitted to the learned Trial Court immediately for necessary compliance.

(Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.) (Rajesh Singh Chauhan,J.)

July 30, 2026

Haseenuddin