

**HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD**

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY

WRIT PETITION No.26095 of 2009

Date: 28.07.2026

Between:

Kusa Lachi Reddy and others ... Petitioners

AND

The District Collector,
Karimnagar District and another ... Respondents

ORDER:

The present Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the validity of the notification issued under Section 4(1) and the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, "the Act"), insofar as they relate to the lands of the petitioners. The principal grievance of the petitioners is that, notwithstanding the invocation of the urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act, they were deprived of the valuable statutory right to file objections and participate in the enquiry contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act. The petitioners, therefore, contend that the denial of such opportunity has vitiated the acquisition proceedings insofar as their lands are concerned.

2. Heard Sri V. V. Ramana Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Ms. Katta Radha Reddy, learned Assistant

Government Pleader for Land Acquisition appearing for the respondents. The material on record has been perused.

FACTS

3. The petitioners claim to be the owners and possessors of the subject lands. The Government proposed to acquire the lands, including those of the petitioners, for formation of a Resettlement Zone under the Mid Manair Reservoir Project, for rehabilitation of families displaced by the project. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in Proceedings No.G1/213/2008, dated 16.01.2008, and published in the District Gazette on 17.01.2008. The petitioners question the necessity of acquiring their lands and contend that alternative lands were available and that the acquisition would cause them serious hardship.

4. The respondents contend that the acquisition was for a genuine public purpose and that the lands were identified after survey and inspection. They further contend that notices under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 were issued on 30.01.2008 and that the petitioners either refused to receive them or failed to file objections though an opportunity was given. The petitioners deny service of the notices and contend

that no effective opportunity of being heard was afforded to them.

5. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was issued in Proceedings No.G1/213/2008, dated 21.03.2008, and published in the District Gazette dated 24.03.2008. The Gazette notification is of particular significance in this case, since it expressly records invocation of the powers under Section 17(1) and (2) of the Act of 1894 and states that possession could be taken on the expiry of fifteen days from publication of the notice under Section 9(1).

6. The respondents, however, state in their counter-affidavit that no urgency clause under Section 17 was invoked and that, consequently, Section 17(5) has no application. The petitioners dispute that assertion and rely upon the Gazette notification dated 24.03.2008 filed along with the Writ Petition. The respondents further state that notices under Sections 9(1) and 10 were issued on 03.08.2009 and that the award enquiry was fixed on 20.08.2009. The petitioners dispute the assertion that they participated in the award enquiry.

7. During the pendency of the Writ Petition, this Court granted an interim order of status quo on 09.12.2009, which

was extended from time to time. The significance of the interim order is that, so long as it subsisted, the respondents were bound to maintain status quo and could not proceed contrary to the order of this Court.

8. In the meanwhile, the Act of 1894 was repealed and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 2013”) came into force with effect from 01.01.2014. The effect of the repeal and the applicability of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, particularly in the context of the interim order dated 09.12.2009, therefore arise for consideration.

SUBMISSIONS

A. Submissions on behalf of the petitioners

9. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the acquisition proceedings are vitiated because the valuable statutory right under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 was denied to the petitioners. He contends that the respondents cannot now deny invocation of Section 17 when the Gazette notification itself expressly records the exercise of the urgency powers under Section 17(1) and (2).

10. Learned counsel submits that the stated public purpose, namely, formation of a Resettlement Zone for rehabilitation of project-displaced families, did not disclose an urgency of such an exceptional nature as would justify dispensing with the statutory enquiry under Section 5-A. It is further contended that the acquisition was not followed by immediate taking of possession, and that the later course of the proceedings itself shows the absence of the urgency pleaded by the respondents.

11. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioners approached this Court in the year 2009 and obtained an interim order of status quo on 09.12.2009, which continued from time to time. He submits that the respondents cannot take advantage of the period during which the acquisition proceedings remained subject to the order of this Court. After the enactment of the Act of 2013, the consequences of the pending acquisition have to be considered in accordance with Section 24 and the law declared by the Constitution Bench in *Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal*¹.

B. Submissions on behalf of the respondents

12. Learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that the acquisition was undertaken for a genuine public purpose and

¹(2020) 8 SCC 129

that the lands were identified after due survey and consideration. She contends that the enquiry under Section 5-A was not dispensed with, that notices were issued and that opportunity was afforded to the interested persons, and that the petitioners failed to file objections.

13. It is specifically contended that the urgency clause under Section 17 was never invoked and that, therefore, Section 17(5) has no application. Learned Assistant Government Pleader further submits that notices were issued for the award enquiry and that the petitioners participated in the proceedings. As regards the Act of 2013, Learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that the effect of Section 24 has to be considered in accordance with the law declared by the Constitution Bench in *Indore Development Authority's* case (supra), particularly since the interim order granted by this Court prevented the respondents from taking further steps.

POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION

14. Having regard to the pleadings, the rival submissions and the material on record, the following points arise for consideration:

- (i) Whether the urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act of 1894 were invoked, and whether the

petitioners were lawfully deprived of the enquiry contemplated under Section 5-A?

(ii) What is the effect of the interim order of status quo dated 09.12.2009 and of the subsequent enactment of the Act of 2013, particularly Section 24 thereof?

(iii) Whether the declaration under Section 6 is liable to be set aside and, if so, to what extent?

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Point (i)

15. The first point concerns the relationship between Section 5-A and the urgency power under Section 17. Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 provides for publication of a preliminary notification where land is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose. Section 5-A confers upon a person interested in the land a statutory right to object to the proposed acquisition, and requires the Collector to give the objector an opportunity of being heard and, after considering the objections and making such further enquiry as may be necessary, to submit his report and recommendations to the appropriate Government. Section 6 provides for the declaration that the land is required for a public purpose. The ordinary statutory sequence, therefore, is the notification under Section 4(1), the opportunity contemplated under

Section 5-A and consideration thereof, and then the declaration under Section 6.

16. Section 17 is an exception to that ordinary procedure in cases of urgency. Sub-sections (1) and (2) enable possession to be taken in the circumstances specified therein, whereas sub-section (4) separately empowers the appropriate Government, in cases where the urgency provisions are applicable, to direct that Section 5-A shall not apply. Section 17(5), as applicable in the State of Andhra Pradesh, further provides that where the State Government has directed under Section 17(4) that Section 5-A shall not apply, the Collector shall take possession within the prescribed period, and that if possession is not taken within that period, Section 5-A shall apply as if there had been no such direction. Invocation of Section 17(1) and (2) and the exercise of the separate power under Section 17(4) to dispense with Section 5-A are, therefore, distinct matters.

17. In *Narayan Govind Gavate and others v. State of Maharashtra and others*², the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 17(4) and the burden upon the State to establish circumstances justifying elimination of

²(1977) 1 SCC 133

the enquiry under Section 5-A. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:

“38. Now, the purpose of Section 17(4) of the Act is, obviously, not merely to confine action under it to waste and arable land but also to situations in which an inquiry under Section 5-A will serve no useful purpose, or, for some overriding reason, it should be dispensed with. The mind of the officer or authority concerned has to be applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such a nature that even the summary proceedings under Section 5-A of the Act should be eliminated. It is not just the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry under Section 5-A which has to be considered.”

18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that schemes of development generally take sufficient time to enable at least the summary enquiry under Section 5-A to be completed without any impediment to the execution of the scheme, and that the very statement of such a public purpose therefore indicates the absence of an urgency requiring elimination of that enquiry. The principle is that the power to dispense with the enquiry is exceptional, and that the State must establish circumstances showing an urgency of such a degree that even the statutory enquiry cannot be undertaken.

19. The same principle was reiterated in *Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja and others*³, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

³(2004) 8 SCC 453

“16. Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5-A of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public purpose, however laudable it may be, by itself is not sufficient to take aid of Section 17 to use this extraordinary power as use of such power deprives a landowner of his right in relation to immovable property to file objections for the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The authority must have subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 keeping in mind the nature of the public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands and the time factor, i.e. whether taking possession of the property can wait for a minimum period within which the objections could be received from the landowners and the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act could be completed. In other words, if power under Section 17 is not exercised, the very purpose for which the land is being acquired urgently would be frustrated or defeated.”

20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that the failure of the authorities to take timely action for acquisition cannot furnish a ground to invoke the urgency clause to the serious detriment of the right of the landowner to file objections under Section 5-A.

21. In *Anand Singh and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others*⁴, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered invocation of the urgency clause for acquisition for the development of a residential colony, and observed as under:

⁴(2010) 11 SCC 242

“43. The exceptional and extraordinary power of doing away with an enquiry under Section 5-A in a case where possession of the land is required urgently or in an unforeseen emergency is provided in Section 17 of the Act. Such power is not a routine power and save circumstances warranting immediate possession it should not be lightly invoked. The guideline is inbuilt in Section 17 itself for exercise of the exceptional power in dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A.”

22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that where the urgency power is invoked for a public purpose such as planned development of a city or development of a residential area, no initial presumption arises in favour of the Government, that a heavy burden lies upon it to establish that the use of the power was justified and that dispensation of the enquiry was necessary, and that such power cannot be invoked as a matter of rule or in a mechanical manner, since the development of an area ordinarily takes years, leaving sufficient time for the summary enquiry under Section 5-A to be held.

23. In *Dev Sharan and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others*⁵, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered an acquisition for construction of a district jail and found that the circumstances did not justify invocation of the emergency provision. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

⁵(2011) 4 SCC 769

“37. Thus the time which elapsed between publication of Section 4(1) and Section 17 notifications, and Section 6 declaration, in the local newspapers is of 11 months and 23 days, i.e. almost one year. This slow pace at which the government machinery had functioned in processing the acquisition, clearly evinces that there was no urgency for acquiring the land so as to warrant invoking Section 17(4) of the Act.”

24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that though the construction of a jail is in public interest, such acquisition can be made only by strictly following the mandate of the Act, and that if so advised the Government could initiate acquisition proceedings by following the procedure under Section 5-A.

25. The principles emerging from the above decisions are clear. The existence of a public purpose is distinct from the existence of such urgency as would justify elimination of the statutory safeguard under Section 5-A. The Court must examine whether the material placed by the State establishes that the purpose of acquisition could not brook even the short period necessary for completing the statutory enquiry.

26. That principle assumes particular significance here, because the respondents have taken a categorical stand in their counter-affidavit that no urgency clause under Section 17 was invoked and that, therefore, Section 17(5) has no

application. That assertion has to be tested against the contemporaneous statutory record placed before the Court by the petitioners.

27. The Gazette notification dated 24.03.2008, containing the declaration dated 21.03.2008 under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, expressly records invocation of the powers under Section 17(1) and (2) and states that possession could be taken on the expiry of fifteen days from publication of the notice under Section 9(1). That Gazette notification was filed along with the Writ Petition and forms part of the record. It is a contemporaneous document issued in the acquisition proceedings themselves. The statement in the counter-affidavit that Section 17 was never invoked is, therefore, contrary to the contemporaneous statutory record.

28. This Court accordingly finds that invocation of Section 17(1) and (2) is established. The respondents cannot, in the face of the Gazette notification, contend that the urgency provisions were not invoked at all. At the same time, this finding does not by itself establish that the power under Section 17(4) to dispense with Section 5-A was separately and validly exercised. The two provisions have to be kept distinct.

29. That distinction assumes significance in view of the Full Bench judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in *Ramdas Ramana v. Government of Andhra Pradesh*⁶. The Full Bench considered whether the provisions introduced by the Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act, 1983, namely Section 17(5)(a) and (b), continued to operate after the Central Amendment Act of 1984, and held as follows:

“17. Having regard to the objectives referred above, we are of the view that there is no interse conflict between the two provisions i.e. Section 17(3-A) and (3-B) introduced by the Parliament by Amending Act 68 of 1984, and Section 17(5)(a) and (b) which are introduced by the A.P. Amendment Act 9 of 1983. Both the provisions referred above, take care of different situations. Section 17(5)(a) and (b) is intended to revive inquiry under Section 5-A in cases where urgency clause is invoked but possession is not taken within the period of 90 days, whereas, Section 17(3-A) and (3-B) take care of payment of compensation before taking possession of the notified land. By applying the principles as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. Karumanidhi (4 supra) in Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh (3 supra), we are of the view that there is no repugnancy nor any inconsistency between the above provisions. Both the provisions will operate in their respective areas without giving any scope either for repugnancy or collision.”

30. The Full Bench further held that Section 17(3-A) and (3-B), introduced by the Central Amendment, and Section 17(5)(a) and (b), introduced by the State Amendment, operate in different fields and that there is no repugnancy between them. The protective purpose of Section 17(5)(a) and (b) was

⁶2014 (6) ALT 679 (FB)

also emphasised, namely, to restore the enquiry under Section 5-A where possession is not taken within the prescribed period after the urgency power has been exercised.

31. The decision in *Ramdas Ramana's* case (supra) therefore reinforces the distinction between invocation of the urgency power and the consequence of failure to take possession within the statutory period after a direction under Section 17(4). In the present case, however, the respondents have not placed any independent order or material showing a valid exercise of power under Section 17(4) dispensing with Section 5-A. Their counter-affidavit, in fact, proceeds on the premise that Section 17 was never invoked.

32. The further contention of the respondents that notices under Section 5-A were issued on 30.01.2008 and that opportunity was given to the petitioners does not answer the issue. The petitioners have specifically denied service of the notices and have disputed the assertion that they refused to receive them. If the case of the respondents is that the enquiry under Section 5-A was in fact held, they were required to establish compliance with the statutory requirements. If their case is that the enquiry was dispensed with, they were required to establish the lawful exercise of the

power under Section 17(4). Neither position has been established.

33. The later course of the proceedings is also significant. The declaration under Section 6 was issued on 21.03.2008, whereas the own case of the respondents refers to an award enquiry only in August 2009. The material does not disclose circumstances showing an urgency of such a nature that even the summary enquiry under Section 5-A could not have been held. The delay in proceeding thereafter is also inconsistent with the contention that the acquisition required immediate action so as to justify depriving the petitioners of the statutory safeguard.

34. Applying the principles laid down in the above decisions to the material on record, this Court is satisfied that the respondents have failed to establish a legally sustainable basis for depriving the petitioners of the statutory enquiry under Section 5-A. The declaration under Section 6, which followed that defective process, therefore cannot be sustained. Point (i) is answered accordingly.

Point (ii)

35. The next point concerns the effect of the interim order of status quo dated 09.12.2009 and of the subsequent

enactment of the Act of 2013. The Act of 1894 was repealed and the Act of 2013 came into force with effect from 01.01.2014. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 deals with acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894 and prescribes the consequences in cases falling within the circumstances specified therein.

36. Section 24(1)(a) provides that where no award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 has been made, the provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to determination of compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement apply. Section 24(1)(b) deals with cases where an award has been made and provides for continuation of such proceedings under the Act of 1894, subject to the provisions of Section 24. Section 24(2), subject to the conditions contained therein, deals with the deemed lapse where an award had been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 and the statutory requirements relating to possession and payment of compensation remained unfulfilled.

37. The relevant provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 read as follows:

“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,—

(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement shall apply; or

(b) where an award under the said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

38. The interpretation of Section 24(2) is now settled by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Indore Development Authority's* case (supra). While summarising its conclusions in paragraph 366, the Constitution Bench held as follows:

“366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an

interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed.”

39. The Constitution Bench further held in paragraph 366.8 as follows:

“366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.”

40. The Constitution Bench also held in paragraph 366.9 that Section 24(2) does not give rise to a new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition, and that Section 24 applies to proceedings pending on 01.01.2014.

41. The above declaration of law directly governs the present case so far as the effect of the interim order is concerned. This Court granted an interim order of status quo on 09.12.2009 and that order was extended from time to time. Therefore, if any question arises regarding computation of the five-year period contemplated under Section 24(2), the period during which the interim order remained operative has necessarily to be excluded. The respondents cannot be treated

as having failed to take possession during a period in which they were restrained by an order of this Court.

42. The principle is not merely one of procedural exclusion; it follows from the interpretation placed upon Section 24(2) by the Constitution Bench. The deemed lapse under Section 24(2) is attracted where there has been inaction on the part of the acquiring authority for the prescribed period. A period during which the authority was prevented by a subsisting judicial order from taking possession cannot be treated as inaction attributable to it.

43. At the same time, the effect of the interim order must be confined to the computation contemplated under Section 24(2). Exclusion of the period covered by the interim order does not validate an acquisition proceeding which is independently found to be defective under the Act of 1894. The finding already recorded on Point (i), regarding the failure to establish lawful dispensation of the enquiry under Section 5-A, is therefore unaffected by the application of *Indore Development Authority's* case (supra).

44. It is consequently unnecessary, for the disposal of this Writ Petition, to declare that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under Section 24(2). The challenge to the declaration

under Section 6 can be decided on the independent ground arising under the Act of 1894. Any further question arising under Section 24 of the Act of 2013 shall be considered by the competent authority in accordance with the statutory provision and the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, including the exclusion of the period during which the interim order remained operative. Point (ii) is answered accordingly.

Point (iii)

45. The petitioners have challenged both the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6. This Court has found that the declaration under Section 6 cannot be sustained, because the respondents have failed to establish a legally sustainable basis for depriving the petitioners of the statutory safeguard under Section 5-A.

46. The challenge to the notification under Section 4(1) stands on a different footing. The public purpose stated in the notification has not been found to be non-existent. The infirmity established relates to the subsequent process culminating in the declaration under Section 6. The appropriate relief, therefore, is to set aside the declaration under Section 6 without disturbing the notification under Section 4(1).

47. This course is also appropriate having regard to the subsequent repeal of the Act of 1894 and the enactment of the Act of 2013. If the subject lands are still required for the stated public purpose, the competent authority shall be at liberty to take such further action as is permissible under the law presently applicable, subject to the findings recorded in this order and to the requirements of the Act of 2013. Point (iii) is answered accordingly.

CONCLUSION AND RESULT

48. The contemporaneous Gazette notification dated 24.03.2008 establishes that the powers under Section 17(1) and (2) of the Act of 1894 were invoked, notwithstanding the contrary assertion of the respondents in their counter-affidavit. That document, having been filed along with the Writ Petition and forming part of the acquisition record, cannot be ignored.

49. Invocation of Section 17(1) and (2) is, however, distinct from a valid exercise of the power under Section 17(4) dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A. The respondents have not produced material establishing such an independent exercise of power, or showing circumstances of such exceptional urgency as would justify elimination of the statutory safeguard. The principles laid down in *Narayan*

Govind Gavate, Krishan Lal Arneja, Anand Singh and Dev Sharan (supra), read with the Full Bench judgment in *Ramdas Ramana's* case (supra), support this conclusion.

50. The declaration under Section 6 dated 21.03.2008 therefore cannot be sustained. The notification under Section 4(1) is, however, not liable to be quashed merely on the ground on which the declaration under Section 6 is being set aside.

51. As regards the Act of 2013, the period during which the interim order of status quo dated 09.12.2009 remained operative, including the period covered by the orders extending it, shall be excluded while computing the five-year period contemplated under Section 24(2), in accordance with paragraph 366.8 of *Indore Development Authority's* case (supra). This finding is confined to the statutory computation under Section 24(2) and shall not be understood as validating the declaration under Section 6, which has independently been found to be unsustainable.

52. In the result, the Writ Petition is disposed of in the following terms:

- (i) The declaration issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in Proceedings No.G1/213/2008,

dated 21.03.2008, published in the District Gazette dated 24.03.2008, insofar as it relates to the lands of the petitioners, is set aside.

- (ii) The notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in Proceedings No.G1/213/2008, dated 16.01.2008, is not interfered with.
- (iii) If the subject lands are still required for the stated public purpose, it is open to the competent authority to take such further action as is permissible in law, in accordance with the statutory regime presently applicable, including the provisions of the Act of 2013.
- (iv) While considering any consequence under Section 24 of the Act of 2013, the period during which the interim order of status quo dated 09.12.2009 and the orders extending the same remained operative shall be excluded in computing the period contemplated under Section 24(2), in accordance with the law declared by the Constitution Bench in *Indore Development Authority's* case (supra).
- (v) It is made clear that this Court has not declared that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The competent authority shall

consider the further course, if any, strictly in accordance with law.

(vi) This Court has not expressed any opinion on the present requirement of the subject lands, the availability of alternative lands, or the disputed questions concerning the alleged participation of the petitioners in the award enquiry or the compensation, if any, payable to them.

(vii) There shall be no order as to costs.

53. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.

VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J

Date: 28.07.2026
AS