Cr. Case No. 5409/2018
STATE Vs. SUKASH CHANDER SHEKHAR @ SUKESH
FIR NO. 100/2017
PS: SUBZI MANDI (LATER INVESTIGATED BY CRIME BRANCH)

29.08.2026

Present: Sh. Amit Yadav, Ld. APP for the State.
Convict Sukesh Chandrasekhar produced from JC.
Sh. Praveen Dabas, Ld. Counsel for the convict Sukesh Chandrasekhar.

Ld. APP for the State had in the interregnum filed brief written submissions on the point of sentence along with the list of criminal cases pending against the convict, across different states. The same are on record.

Ld. APP for the State has again made a prayer for stringent approach in sentencing qua the convict, considering the gravity of the incident in question.

Ld. Counsel for the convict has assailed the list of cases filed by the Ld. APP for the State stating that the same may not be taken into consideration as the same are still sub judice and the convict has not been convicted in any other case so far. Ld. Counsel for the convict has at this stage, sought to make another submission. He submits that the convict be not sentenced to imprisonment consecutively and concurrent sentences be imposed.

This Court now proceeds to pronounce the order on sentence on the basis of the submissions made by the Ld. APP for the State as well as the Ld. Counsel for the convict today.

The additional documents filed by the Ld. APP for the State are also being taken into consideration now.

ORDER ON SENTENCE

PREFATORY REMARKS

1. By the judgment pronounced on 20.08.2026, this Court found the convict Sukesh Chandrasekhar @ Sukash guilty of the offences under Sections 170, 189 and 507 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. Thus, the question at this stage is not whether the convict deserves punishment. The finding of guilt has already answered that question. The question is one of degree: what punishment would be just, proportionate and legally appropriate in the circumstances of the present case? This Court now has the delicate task of determining and pronouncing the appropriate sentence to be awarded to the convict.
3. However, before proceeding with this exercise, this Court considers it appropriate to briefly set out the punishment prescribed for the offences under Sections 170, 189 and 507 IPC.
4. **Section 170 IPC states that:** "Whoever pretends to hold any particular office as a public servant, knowing that he does not hold such office or falsely personates any other person holding such office, and in such assumed character does or attempts to do any act under colour of such office, **shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."**

5. **Section 189 states that:** "Whoever holds out any threat of injury to any public servant, or to any person in whom he believes that public servant to be interested, for the purpose of inducing that public servant to do any act, or to forbear or delay to do any act, connected with the exercise of the public functions of such public servant, **shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."**

6. **Section 507 states that:** "Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication, or having taken precaution to conceal the name or abode of the person from whom the threat comes, **shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, in addition to the punishment provided for the offence by the last preceding section."** Section 507 IPC thus provides for imposition of up to two extra years of jail time, added to the punishment given for regular criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC.

WHY ARGUMENTS ON SENTENCE WERE HEARD ON THE DATE OF CONVICTION?

7. However, before proceeding to determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon the convict Sukesh Chandrasekhar, this Court considers it necessary to place on record the manner in which an opportunity was afforded to the convict and his Ld. counsel to address the Court on the question of sentence.

8. At the time when the judgment of conviction was pronounced, this Court specifically granted one week's time to Ld. counsel for the convict to address arguments on the question of sentence (this is recorded in the last paragraph of the judgment). The said opportunity was consciously afforded by this Court to the convict, so that the convict and his counsel could place before the Court all circumstances which they wished the Court to consider while determining the appropriate sentence. The grant of time was not a mere formality; it was intended to ensure that the convict received a full and meaningful opportunity of being heard on the quantum of sentence to be awarded.

9. However, Ld. counsel for the convict did not avail himself of the said opportunity. Instead, he himself requested that the arguments on sentence be heard on the very day on which the judgment of conviction was pronounced. This request was made despite the fact that the Court had already granted one week's time for the purpose.

10. The Court, conscious of the importance of hearing the convict on the question of sentence and desirous of ensuring that no grievance whatsoever could subsequently be raised by the convict/ his Ld. Counsel, regarding denial of an opportunity of hearing, specifically insisted that the matter be taken up after the stipulated period. The Court was of the considered view that since time had already been granted, the Ld. counsel for the convict ought to utilise the opportunity and address the Court comprehensively on the question of sentence.

11. Ld. Counsel for the convict, however, persisted in his request that the arguments on sentence be heard immediately. He first questioned the Court's intent in granting one week's time to hear arguments on point of sentence. He stated that when this Court was earlier in such haste to record the evidence and conclude the trial, it should show similar haste in pronouncing the order on sentence. When this Court brushed aside the said submission as an untenable insinuation towards the Court, the Ld. Counsel for the convict submitted that he desired to challenge the judgment of conviction at the earliest and, therefore, wished that the question of sentence also be dealt with forthwith.

12. Thus, it was not the Court which curtailed the time available to the defence. Rather, it was the defence which chose not to avail itself of the additional time granted.

13. Interestingly, when Ld. counsel for the convict was ultimately called upon to address the Court on the question of sentence, instead of placing before the Court any mitigating circumstance, personal circumstance, circumstance relating to age, family responsibilities, possibility of rehabilitation, or any other factor which could legitimately have a bearing upon the quantum of sentence, he simply stated that the Court may proceed in accordance with law and award sentence. He didn't seek any leniency in sentencing for the convict. Later, today, he sought for concurrent sentencing in place of consecutive sentencing.

14. This conduct of the Ld. Counsel for the convict is being recorded not by way of criticism or reproach, but to place the litigative and procedural history of the case beyond any ambiguity. The record makes it abundantly clear that the convict was afforded a reasonable and meaningful opportunity to address the Court on the point of sentence. The record therefore leaves no manner of doubt that it was the defence which chose not to avail itself of that opportunity and instead insisted that the matter be concluded immediately.

SUBMISSIONS OF LD. APP FOR THE STATE

15. The Ld. APP for the State has submitted that the convict is not an ordinary offender. He is a seasoned conman who has repeatedly employed deception, false identity and calculated manipulation to interfere with the administration of justice itself. It is submitted that the present case is not merely a case of impersonation or cheating; rather, the convict attempted to use a fabricated judicial identity to influence a sitting District Court Judge in another criminal proceeding and thereby secure an order of bail in his own favour. Such conduct, according to the prosecution, strikes at the very foundation of the justice delivery system and calls for a stern sentence. He also drew the attention of the Court to a list of 31 criminal cases registered against the convict. It was further submitted that the convict is a habitual offender without any possibility of reformation. He stated that 10 criminal cases are pending against the convict in Karnataka (Bengaluru), 09 cases are pending in Tamil Nadu (Chennai), 06 cases in Delhi, 02 cases in

Maharashtra (Mumbai), and 01 in Andhra Pradesh (Hyderabad) and all pertain to cheating by impersonation as Government Officials, son of a Chief Minister and Minister in Karnataka, cheating simpliciter etc., thereby causing huge losses to the victims. It was argued that many of the offences had been committed by the convict while remaining in judicial and police custody, which, according to the prosecution, demonstrated the intrinsic criminal proclivity of the convict. Ld. APP for the State also flagged the staggering extortion case involving the convict and Smt. Aditi Singh, the wife of former Ranbaxy owner Shivender Singh. He contended that the said case was one of the most brazen white-collar crimes in recent memory, where the convict operating entirely from behind bars, orchestrated a meticulously planned psychological and financial trap which allegedly caused losses of approximately Rs. 200 crores to the family. Ld. APP for the State argued that even in the said case, the convict has posed variously as the Law Secretary, Union Home Secretary, and senior representatives of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), used advanced spoofing software and voice modulation to make his calls appear as though they were originating directly from key government landlines. He also argued that in that case too, over months of calculated phone calls, convict systematically wore down the business family, forcing them to liquidate personal assets, deplete investments, and take heavy loans to pay this conman. He further submitted that this case was again a testament to the incorrigible mendacity and unchecked audacity of the convict, who knows how to exploit technology and human desperation. The Ld. Prosecutor argued that the most severe punishment be awarded to the convict and sentences be directed to run consecutively, so as to convey a strong and unyielding message to the convict and to men of his ilk, that judiciary shall deal with all architects of dupe and purveyors of deceit who dare look into the eyes of justice and seek to blind her with falsehoods, in the sternest manner possible.

16. With these prefatory remarks, this Court now proceeds to decide on the quantum of sentence to be imposed on the convict.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE SENTENCING EXERCISE

17. Sentencing is neither a mechanical nor an arithmetical exercise nor an occasion for judicial indignation. It is an exercise which requires the Court to assess the nature of the offence, the manner in which it was committed, the impact of the conduct upon the victim and society, the antecedents and circumstances of the offender, the possibility of rehabilitation or reformation, and the legitimate interests of society. Conviction determines criminal liability; sentencing determines the juridical response that the society, through the Court, must make to that liability. **The appropriate sentence must therefore occupy the point at which the competing considerations meet: punishment without vengeance, deterrence without excess, and compassion without abdication of judicial responsibility. It is therefore an exercise requiring considerable judicial discretion, restraint and calibration.** Fundamentally, **sentencing is an exercise in triangulation of three**

competing but interconnected interests—the interests of the offender, the interests of the victim, and the larger interests of society.

18. **The first point of the triangle is the offence and offender.** A sentence must not become an instrument of vengeance. Even a person who has been found guilty does not cease to be a human being. The Court must, therefore, take into account the circumstances of the offender, his age, antecedents, possibility of rehabilitation, conduct during trial and other mitigating considerations wherever relevant. The constitutional commitment to fairness does not disappear at the stage of sentencing. **Punishment must be proportionate to the culpability proved and cannot be dictated by anger, indignation or public clamour.**

19. **The second point is the victim.** Criminal justice cannot be understood exclusively as a contest between the State and the accused while rendering the victim invisible. **Behind every offence lies a human consequence—sometimes physical, sometimes psychological, sometimes financial and, in certain cases, institutional.** The pain suffered by the victim, the violation of his or her dignity, the loss occasioned by the offence and the need to restore faith in the administration of justice are legitimate considerations in the sentencing process. Compassion for the offender cannot translate into indifference towards the victim.

20. **The third and widest point of the triangle is society. Every criminal offence is not merely a private wrong between two individuals; it is also an affront to the social order protected by law. A sentence must therefore**

communicate that certain conduct is unacceptable and that the law possesses the institutional capacity to respond to it. The sentence must preserve public confidence in the justice system, deter conduct where deterrence is warranted, and reinforce the normative boundaries of lawful behaviour. Particularly where an offence attacks the administration of justice, public institutions or the rule of law itself, the societal interest assumes an added significance.

21. **These three interests do not always point in the same direction. The offender may seek leniency; the victim may seek vindication; society may demand deterrence.** The judicial task is not to mechanically choose one over the others, but to locate the point of equilibrium where all three can receive their legitimate weight. **That is why at the time of sentencing, the Court must constantly measure proportionality, culpability, consequence and societal interest, and arrive at a sentence that is neither unduly harsh nor unduly indulgent.**

22. The metaphor of a triangle is particularly apt because removing any one of its three sides distorts the entire structure. A sentencing process that considers only the offender risks becoming insensitive to the victim and society. One that considers only the victim risks degenerating into retribution. And one that considers only societal deterrence risks converting punishment into an instrument of institutional anger. **Justice lies not at any one corner, but in the reasoned space between all three.**

23. **The sentence must be sufficiently firm to vindicate the law, sufficiently sensitive to acknowledge human circumstances, and sufficiently measured to preserve the moral authority of the Court.** The Court must punish the offence without losing sight of the offender, recognise the victim without surrendering judicial dispassion, and protect society without allowing deterrence to eclipse proportionality.

24. It is with these considerations in mind that this Court is proceeding to consider the quantum of sentence to be imposed.

25. It would be apposite to mention here that this court has in its judgment dated 20.08.2026, categorically held that **the present case is profoundly disturbing and qualitatively different from other cases of impersonation because it strikes at the very root of one of the foundational pillars of any democratic State i.e., the Judiciary.** The convict deliberately manufactured the identity of a Judge of the highest Constitutional Court of the Land for the purpose of influencing a judicial proceeding, which was kind of institutional sacrilege. **If such attempts are permitted to pass as mere acts of deception, it would embolden persons who seek to circumvent the Courtroom by manufacturing authority outside it. The judicial process cannot be allowed to become vulnerable to such purported commands, however sophisticated or audacious the impersonation may be.**

26. In cases such as this, when an architect of deceit attempted to corrupt the sacrosanct halls of justice—**the response of the law must not be a mere rap on the knuckles. Courts must come up with an authoritative and stern**

pronouncement, protecting the sanctity of the Judiciary. Such a stringent approach is required as the consequences of such an audaciously criminal act extend beyond the immediate case. **An attack upon the identity of a Judge can become an attack upon the integrity of the judicial process itself.**

27. The conduct of the convict in this case also brings into sharp focus a new and deeply concerning dimension of interference with the administration of justice. **With the rapid emergence and increasing sophistication of deepfakes, artificial intelligence-generated audio-visual material, manipulated communications and other forms of artificially generated media, the possibility of persons creating convincing digital representations of public figures and constitutional authorities can no longer be regarded as a matter confined to fiction or speculation.**

28. The contemporary technological environment makes such attempts, as was made by the convict in the present case, particularly insidious. **A fraudulent communication may no longer be confined to a crude telephone call, a forged letter or an obviously fabricated document. With artificial intelligence capable of generating remarkably realistic voices, faces, photographs, videos and written communications, a fraudster may potentially create an appearance of authenticity which, at first sight, may be difficult to distinguish from genuine communication.** The possibility of a fabricated video call, a cloned voice, a forged or spoofed electronic communication or an artificial image purporting to emanate from a Judge of

the Supreme Court presents a grave challenge to the traditional safeguards through which judicial communications have historically been authenticated.

29. **There is, therefore, a real likelihood that cases of this nature may become more frequent in the coming years. The ingenuity of cyber-enabled fraud is constantly evolving, and the criminal mind is increasingly capable of appropriating not merely the identity of an individual but also the institutional authority attached to that identity.** The impersonation of a Supreme Court Judge, in particular, may be attempted precisely because the very designation carries an aura of unquestionable authority. The objective may not necessarily be monetary gain alone. It may be to procure bail, influence an investigation, secure favourable orders, intimidate a litigant or judicial officer, alter the course of a proceeding, or otherwise obtain an outcome which could not legitimately be achieved through the judicial process. **It is consequently necessary for the judicial system to remain one step ahead of those who seek to exploit technological advancement for criminal purposes and to treat such cases with an iron hand. Such a stringent approach is required so that the sanctity of the judicial process remains unsullied.**

30. The Court is conscious that every sentence cannot be justified merely by invoking deterrence. **Yet where the mode of commission reveals a deliberate attempt to exploit institutional credibility, the sentence must carry a sufficiently clear message that such conduct cannot be treated as an acceptable means of securing an advantage in litigation.**

31. Hence, it is in this backdrop that this Court has considered the aggravating circumstances of the offence as emerging from the record; such mitigating circumstances as were urged or otherwise apparent from the record; the impact upon society and the need for deterrence.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES (THE OFFENCE IN PERSPECTIVE) AND THE INVISIBLE VICTIM (PUBLIC CONFIDENCE)

32. At first glance, the conduct of the convict may appear to be a mere instance of deception and impersonation. Such a characterisation, however, would substantially understate its gravity. **The material before this Court, as placed on record by the Ld. APP for the State, indicates that the convict is not a first-time offender acting out of immaturity or inadvertence. The convict in the present case is a 38 years old man, who has been involved in more than 30 criminal cases. He is currently facing trial in most criminal cases. Even while in prison, he was found to be using mobile phones, illegally smuggled into his cell.** As a result, he was transferred from Tihar Jail to Rohini Jail and then to Mandoli Jail. The convict has on multiple occasions displayed the characteristics of a seasoned scammer, employing deception as a means of achieving his objectives.

33. The Court is also particularly mindful of the fact that **the offence in this case was committed with incredible sophistication and an acute awareness of the significance attached to judicial office.** The choice of the person impersonated was therefore not accidental. It was central to the

design of the fraud. The convict tried to deliberately appropriate the credibility that comes with the constitutional post and attempted to weaponize it to deceive his immediate target i.e. the complainant Smt. Poonam Choudhary. **The ultimate target of the deception was a judicial decision concerning the convict's own liberty in FIR No. 156/2017, PS Crime Branch. The convict by his acts committed a sacrilege of constitutional and institutional trust.**

34. Given the fact that multiple calls were made to the complainant by the convict on 28.04.2017, it can be said with reasonable certainty that **the conduct of the convict was not an impulsive act committed in a moment of poor judgment.** The series of calls made to the Judicial Officer, assumption of an identity of a Supreme Court Judge from South India (apparently with a view to making the impersonation more credible by imitating the Judge's regional accent), the invocation of judicial office and the communication undertaken for the purpose of influencing another proceeding, were not acts which arose from a momentary lapse of judgment or from a newly minted swindler. **They were the products of deliberation by a seasoned scammer, who has been honing his craft over the years.**

35. Though it may be subsequently argued by the convict that since the Judicial Officer in question was not ultimately deceived into granting bail to the convict, this would itself be a mitigating circumstance. This Court is however, unimpressed by this line of argument. **The fact that the attempted**

manipulation did not succeed, does not retrospectively make the act of impersonation innocuous.

36. **The criminal law necessarily recognises that certain conduct may warrant penal consequences because of the danger inherent in the conduct itself, even where the intended result is ultimately prevented.** Even where the intended consequence did not ultimately materialise, the accused deliberately attempted to produce it; the offence created a substantial risk of interference with administration of justice; the failure to deceive the Judicial Officer was merely fortuitous; and the intended consequence would have been particularly serious had the accused been successful in his nefarious designs. **This is one such criminal case, where failure to actually deceive the Judicial Officer into granting bail to the convict, doesn't extinguish the criminality of his actions.**

37. The conduct of the convict during the course of trial also assumes significance while assessing the question of sentence. **At no stage has the convict displayed any genuine remorse, contrition or appreciation of the seriousness of the conduct for which he has been found guilty. On the contrary, the tenor of the defence throughout the trial has been one of denial, deflection and an attempt to shift the focus from his own conduct to the conduct and credibility of the complainant Judicial Officer.**

38. Indeed, the convict and his Ld. counsel sought to assail the credibility of the complainant Judicial Officer by insinuating that she had acted in concert with the police and had caused a false FIR to be registered against

the convict. Such a suggestion is not merely a routine challenge to the prosecution case; it seeks to cast aspersions upon the integrity of a Judicial Officer and upon the bona fides of the law-enforcement machinery without any credible foundation.

39. **Even the circumstance that the complainant Judicial Officer returned the call received by her from the number in question was sought to be portrayed as suspicious and as conduct warranting adverse inference against her**. The defence thus attempted to convert an ordinary and natural human response to an unexpected telephone call into a circumstance casting doubt upon the complainant's integrity. **Such an approach, viewed in the overall factual matrix, reflects not remorse but an unwillingness to acknowledge the gravity of the convict's own conduct.**

40. **A person who, despite being confronted with the consequences of his actions, continues to attribute mala fides to the victim and seeks to undermine her credibility rather than demonstrate any realization of wrongdoing, cannot readily claim the mitigating consideration of genuine remorse.**

41. The Court is conscious that an accused is entitled to a fair trial and to contest the prosecution case with vigour. The exercise of that right, by itself, can never be held against an accused. **However, the Court is equally entitled, at the stage of sentencing, to take note of the overall conduct of the convict and, particularly, whether the circumstances disclose any genuine acceptance of responsibility, regret or possibility of reformation.**

42. In the present case, the record does not disclose such contrition. What emerges instead is a persistent attempt to explain away the circumstances, discredit the complainant Judicial Officer and attribute the prosecution itself to collusion. **The absence of remorse, therefore, forms a relevant part of the overall assessment of the convict's conduct and the appropriate sentence to be imposed.**

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CONVICT AND THEIR LIMITS

43. Having discussed the nature of offence committed by the convict, this Court now turns its gaze to the offender, as a sentencing Court must always resist the temptation to reduce a convict to the offence of which he has been found guilty. **This Court is acutely aware of the fact that a person is more than his worst crime and while deciding on the quantum of sentence to be imposed, this Court must take into account the possibility of reformation**.

44. At the same time, this Court also believes that rehabilitation and reformation cannot be peddled and accepted as a formulaic plea capable of neutralising every aggravating circumstance. This Court must assess whether the circumstances genuinely disclose the possibility of reform. The question is not simply: "Can this person reform?" but also "What does the evidence before the Court reveal about the realistic possibility of reform?"

45. **This Court has gone through the list of cases filed by the Ld. APP for the State. However, since those other cases are still sub-judice and the convict has not been convicted yet it those cases, this Court is refraining**

from taking those into account while deciding on the question of sentence. Though this Court has briefly mentioned about the pending criminal cases, as a submission had been made by the Ld. APP for the State, they have no bearing on the sentencing exercise at present.

46. The Court has otherwise also carefully considered whether there exists any mitigating circumstance which may operate in favour of the convict while determining the appropriate sentence. **Upon a comprehensive assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case, the conduct of the convict, the nature and gravity of the offences, and his conduct during the course of trial, this Court finds that there is no mitigating circumstance of any meaningful weight operating in his favour.**

47. The convict has not demonstrated genuine remorse, contrition or acceptance of responsibility. Rather, as noticed hereinabove, he has persisted in questioning the credibility of the complainant Judicial Officer and in attributing mala fides and collusion to the prosecution. His conduct throughout the proceedings, therefore, does not furnish any basis for extending the benefit of a mitigating consideration.

48. Accordingly, this Court finds that the mitigating side of the sentencing balance is conspicuously absent. The sentence must, therefore, be determined primarily with regard to the gravity of the offending conduct, the impact of the offence upon the administration of justice, the need for deterrence, and the larger public interest in preserving the sanctity and independence of the judicial process.

MESSAGE OF DETERRENCE

49. **The sentence in the present case must necessarily carry a deterrent message. It should send a message that calculated criminality, particularly when directed against the administration of justice, will invite consequences commensurate with its gravity.** The sentence awarded to the convict in this case, must therefore serve not only the purpose of reforming the convict, but also that of protecting public confidence in the justice system and warning those similarly inclined that criminal ingenuity cannot outrun the penal reach of law. **This Court must resolutely convey to the convict as well as men of his ilk that the cost of attacking the institution of justice is neither uncertain nor inconsequential. This Court must convey a message that no criminal ingenuity, however insidious or audacious; no fabricated identity, however impressive or grand; and no attempt at manufactured influence, can be permitted to bend the course of justice.**

SENTENCE AWARDED

50. Having regard to the totality of circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present case calls for a substantial custodial sentence. The conduct of the convict is aggravated by the deliberate assumption of a false judicial identity, the calculated nature of the deception, the object of influencing a judicial officer, the attempt to secure bail in another criminal case through such deception, and the potential of the act to erode public confidence in the administration of justice. He has also not

shown any genuine remorse during the course of trial. Rather he as well as his counsel sought to put the Judicial Officer (complainant) in the dock by questioning her conduct in calling back on the number from which she had received the calls on 28.04.2017. The convict and his counsel have insinuated and even openly stated that the Judicial Officer had connived with the Delhi Police to falsely implicate the convict. This attempted slander of the Judicial Officer clearly shows that the convict has shown no remorse for his mendacious actions and continues to tread on the Road to Perdition. When the trial was nearing conclusion, the convict started a slanderous campaign against this Court also, hoping to derail the trial and delay the pronouncement of judgment.

51. The offences of which the convict stands convicted protect distinct legal interests. Section 170 IPC addresses the deliberate assumption of the character or position of a public servant; Section 189 IPC criminalises intimidation of a public servant with a view to inducing or deterring the exercise of public functions; and Section 507 IPC aggravates criminal intimidation where the threat is communicated anonymously or with concealment of the identity of its maker. **The statutory ingredients and the mischief addressed by these provisions are therefore materially distinct.**

52. **Accordingly, the convict Sukesh Chandrasekhar is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 02 years and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 170 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for 02 years and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 189 IPC; and**

rigorous imprisonment for 04 years for the offence punishable under Section 507 IPC. (Section 507 IPC provides for punishment up to 02 extra years of jail time, added to the punishment given for regular criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC. Further, Section 507 IPC subsumes within it Section 506 IPC, even though no separate charge may have been framed for the offence under Section 506 IPC.)

53. In case of default of payment of fine, additional imprisonment for one month to be undergone by the convict.

CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: WHY CONCURRENCY WOULD UNDERSTATE THE CRIMINALITY

54. **Further, the present case, in the considered view of this Court, is one where the sentences imposed for the offences under Sections 170, 189 and 507 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be permitted to merge into one another or to operate merely concurrently.**

55. The nature of the offences, the distinct mischief addressed by each provision, the manner in which the offences were committed and, most importantly, their cumulative impact upon the administration of justice makes this a fit and compelling case for consecutive sentences.

56. **The sentence must reflect that the criminal justice system distinguishes between an isolated unlawful act and a deliberate sequence of acts designed to manipulate, intimidate or interfere with the lawful functioning of public institutions.** Where distinct criminal wrongs are deliberately committed, each substantial wrong must be adequately reflected in the punishment. **The**

deliberate, calculated and deceptive manner in which the offences were committed by the convict in this case warrants a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the attack upon the rule of law and the administration of justice. Accordingly, all substantive sentences are directed to run consecutively.

<u>OTHER DIRECTIVES</u>

57. The convict shall be entitled to the benefit of the period already undergone in custody.

58. **A copy of this order be supplied to the convict/ his Ld. Counsel, free of cost, forthwith.**

59. At this stage, Ld. Counsel for the convict submits that the convict has already undergone the period of sentence as imposed in this case, as he was not released on bail. He submits that the convict had not at any point of time furnished bail bonds in the present case. In the ordersheet dt.04.05.2018, it is specifically mentioned that the convict (then an accused) was granted bail but had not furnished bail bonds. Till date, the bail bonds have not been furnished by the convict. However, a clarification is sought from the Jail Superintendent, if at any point of time, bail bonds /personal bonds were furnished by the convict before the Jail Superintendent. **Report be called from the Jail Superintendent accordingly, for 02.09.2026.**

60. **A copy of this order be also sent to the Jail Authorities forthwith for information and compliance.**

61. **Copy of this Order be sent to the Worthy Commissioner of Police.**

62. List for reporting on compliance by the Worthy Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police on **01.10.2026** (report as sought vide judgment dated 20.08.2026).

HARSHITA MISHRA

Digitally signed by HARSHITA MISHRA
Date: 2026.08.29 16:30:17 +0530

(HARSHITA MISHRA)
CJM/(Central)/THC/Delhi
29.08.2026