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MCRC-31871-2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PRAMOD KUMAR AGRAWAL

ON THE 5th OF OCTOBER, 2026MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 31871 of 2026

CNR No.: MPHC010467392026

*Versus**THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS*

.....
Appearance:

*Shri Ajay Kumar Jain - Advocate for the petitioners.**Smt. Ranjana Agnihotri - Dy.G.A. for the respondent No.1/State.**Shri Sanjay Pandey - Advocate for the respondent No.2.*
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ORDER

This petition has been filed by the petitioners under Section 528 of B.N.S.S. for quashing of F.I.R. and consequential criminal proceedings relating to Crime No.297/2026 registered at P.S. Bagsewaniya, District Bhopal (M.P.) for the offences under Section 85 of B.N.S.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and have been falsely implicated in the present case. The petitioner No.1 is the husband, petitioner No.2 is father-in-law and petitioner No.3 is mother-in-law of respondent No.2. The marriage between the petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 was solemnized on 26.01.2025. The respondent No.2 has been residing at her parental house since 18.03.2025; however, the FIR has been lodged on 12.05.2026, i.e., after a lapse of approximately 14



months. It is further submitted that the gold ornaments were not given by the parents of respondent No.2, but were purchased by the petitioners themselves. In this regard, learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the bills filed as Annexure A/2. It is further submitted that the hotel bill incurred at the time of marriage was also paid by the petitioners. Learned counsel submits that the petitioners had never demanded any four-wheeler or car from respondent No.2 or her parents, as they were already having two four-wheelers even prior to the marriage. In this regard, the registration documents of the said vehicles have been placed on record. It is further submitted that the present case has been registered only for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC/Section 85 of the B.N.S. and no offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act has been registered against petitioners. It is submitted that the allegations levelled against the petitioners are general and omnibus in nature. It is further submitted that when the grandmother of applicant No.1 died, petitioner No.1 was not present at his home and at the time of the last rituals, as he was on duty. Therefore, the allegation that a demand for 25 tolas of gold was made at the time of the last rituals is incorrect. It is further submitted that stridhan and other articles which were given at the time of marriage to respondent No.2 have already been taken away by relatives of respondent No.2. Therefore, it is prayed for quashing the FIR and consequential criminal proceedings arising from the said aforesaid crime number.

3. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.2 vehemently opposed the prayer made by the petitioners and submitted that the petitioners



were also harassing the respondent No.2 from very beginning. It is further submitted that the parents of respondent No.2 had spent approximately Rs.60 to 70 lakh at the time of marriage. They had given cash amounting to Rs.15 lakh along with other articles. It is further submitted that at the time of marriage, the petitioners had demanded Rs.15 lakh in cash and other articles; however, the relatives and other persons intervened in the matter. It is further submitted that the gold articles were purchased by the parents of respondent No.2 and, in this regard, the bill was produced before the police and has been seized during investigation. It is further submitted that during honeymoon trip, petitioner No.1 had demanded money from respondent No.2 and that amounts of Rs.50,000/- and Rs.10,000/- were paid by respondent No.2. In this regard, certain documents have also been submitted. It is further submitted that since this is a matter relating to matrimonial dispute in which there is possibility of compromise between the parties and the respondent No.2/complainant and her family members were trying to settle the matter, therefore F.I.R. was not lodged immediately. It is further submitted that sufficient material has been collected by the Investigating Agency during the course of investigation. The documents placed on record on behalf of the petitioners are matters of evidence and shall be considered by the Trial Court at the appropriate stage during the course of trial. Hence, it is prayed for dismissal of the petition.

4. Learned State counsel also opposed the prayer made by the petitioners and submitted that the respondent No.2 in her statements recorded under Section 180 and 183 of B.N.S.S. has deposed against the petitioners



for harassing and torturing regarding demand of dowry. Therefore, FIR has been lodged against. It is further submitted that the documents regarding transaction made by respondent No.2 to petitioner No.1 are available on record. It is further submitted that the parents and other witnesses have also stated against the petitioners. There is sufficient material available on record to prosecute the petitioners in the present case. It is also submitted that upon completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet has already been filed before the competent Court. Therefore, prayed for rejection of this instant petition.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 : (2023) 7 SCC 711* wherein it was observed at page 716:-

"17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482 CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27)"

27. ...27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.



27.2. *The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.*

27.3. *The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.*

27.4. *Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers.*

27.5. *Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.*

27.6. *The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.*

27.7. *The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.*

27.8. *Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise to and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.*

27.9. *Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and*



materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.

27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.

27.14. Where the charge sheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.

27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to an abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.



27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence."

7. Similar is the judgment in *Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603* wherein it was observed:-

26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.



(3) *Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.*

(4) *Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.*

(5) *Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.*

(6) *Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.*

(7) *Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.*

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”

8. It was laid down in *CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC, OnLine SC 379*, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial by leading evidence. It was observed:



"6. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial based on the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency.

7. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going into detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider "whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not.

8. One other reason pointed out by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried."

9. This position was reiterated in *Abhishek v. State of M.P. 2023 SCC*

OnLine SC 1083 wherein it was observed:

"15. The contours of the power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are well defined. In *V. Ravi Kumar v. State represented by Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Salem, Tamil Nadu [(2019) 14 SCC 568]*, this Court affirmed that where an accused seeks quashing of the FIR, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, it is wholly impermissible for the High Court to enter into the factual arena to adjudge the correctness of the allegations in the complaint. In *Neeharika Infrastructure (P). Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal*



*Appeal No. 330 of 2021, decided on 13.04.2021], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court elaborately considered the scope and extent of the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. It was observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, such standard not being confused with the norm formulated in the context of the death penalty. It was further observed that while examining the FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made therein, but if the Court thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, and more particularly, the parameters laid down by this Court in *R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab* (AIR 1960 SC 866) and *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335]*, the Court would have jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.*

10. It is apparent from these judgments that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings.

11. The Madras High Court also held in *Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213* that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:

“Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostate copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C.”

12. The Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in *Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP*, and held:



“9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

"The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings".

13. Similar view was taken in *Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka*, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was observed at page 142:

“16. ... the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, on the basis of the evidence collected during the course of the trial.”

14. This position was reiterated in *Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana*, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was held:

"13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents."

15. A similar view was taken in *Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik*



GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed:

"Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under section 482, Cr. P.C., in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing, is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by section 482, Cr. P.C.; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e., to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an F.I.R. or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under section 482, Cr. P.C. not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing of a process issued under section 204 read with section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand." (Emphasis supplied)

16. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material filed by the petitioner with the petition and the Court has to rely upon the FIR and the report submitted by the police.

17. It was submitted that the contents of the FIR are false and the same should be quashed. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of *Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503* that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed:



"21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra.

22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita, (2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89], this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC.

23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51], a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC.

18. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Manik B. Vs. Kadapala Sreyes Reddy and another*** 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 642, wherein it was observed:

"6. Whether the testimony of the witnesses is trustworthy or not has to be found out from the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of the witnesses when they stand in the box at the stage of such trial.

7. Such an exercise, in our considered view, is not permissible while



exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

8. The scope of interference, while quashing the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and that too for a serious offence like Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is very limited. The Court would exercise its power to quash the proceedings only if it finds that taking the case at its face value, no case is made out at all.

9. At the stage of deciding an application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. it is not permissible for the High Court to go into the correctness or otherwise of the material placed by the prosecution in the charge sheet. The High Court by the impugned order has done exactly the same.”

19. It is the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that there has been a delay in lodging the F.I.R.; however, in the opinion of this Court, the said contention is not acceptable. If a wife maintains patience and remains silent with the intention of saving her matrimonial life, it cannot be said that such conduct amounts to any weakness on her part. On the contrary, it reflects her sincerity and earnest endeavour to save her married life. After realizing that the conduct of her in-laws has not improved and reconciliation is no longer possible, the wife decides to lodge an F.I.R./complaint regarding the cruelty meted out to her, it cannot, merely on account of the delay, be said that the said F.I.R. is a counterblast. In the F.I.R., as well as in the statements recorded under Sections 180 and 183 of the B.N.S.S., specific allegations have been made against the petitioners regarding cruelty and demand of dowry. The contentions raised and the documents relied upon by the petitioners, as well as the material collected during investigation, involve disputed questions of fact and cannot be adjudicated upon in proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The same are matters to be considered by the learned Trial Court after recording the evidence during the course of trial.



20. It has been repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court should not undertake an appreciation of evidence or conduct a mini-trial. In *Aryan Singh (supra)*, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, at the stage of discharge or quashing of criminal proceedings, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial.

21. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that no ground is made out for quashing the FIR or the criminal proceedings in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

22. It is made clear that any observations made herein are only for the purpose of deciding the present petition and shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the case. The learned Trial Court shall proceed with the matter uninfluenced by any observations made by this Court and shall decide the case strictly in accordance with law.

23. Accordingly, present petition stands **dismissed**.

(PRAMOD KUMAR AGRAWAL)
JUDGE

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