IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU

Reserved on: 31.10.2026
Pronounced on: 19.11.2026
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Whether the operative part or full judgment is pronounced: ***Full***

CRM(M) No.399/2025

ASHOK KUMAR GANDOTRA & ORS.

...PETITIONERS/APPELLANT(S)

Through: - Mr. Rahul Pant, Sr. Advocate, with
Mr. Aniruddh Sharma, Advocate.

Vs.

UT OF J&K ...RESPONDENT(S)

Through: - Mr. Raman Sharma, AAG, with
Ms. Saliqa Sheikh, Advocate.

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE

JUDGMENT

1) The petitioners, through the medium of present petition, have challenged charge sheet emanating out of FIR No.10 of 2020 for offences under Section 5(1)(d) read with 5(2) of J&K PC Act and Section 120-B of RPC registered with Police Station, Anti-Corruption Bureau, J&K, Jammu. Challenge has also been thrown to order dated 09.04.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge Anti-Corruption, Jammu, (for short "the trial court"), whereby charges for aforesaid offences have been framed against the petitioners.

2) As per the allegations made in the impugned charge sheet, petitioner No.2, who was posted as Vice Chairman,

Jammu Development Authority at the relevant time, without floating tenders, allotted the work for renovation/interior works of JDA Office Complex, Ground Floor, Vikas Bhawan, Jammu, to petitioner No. 3. After conducting verification into the aforesaid allegation, it was found that initially petitioner No.2, in his capacity as Vice Chairman, JDA, had granted approval for installation of 10 number of two-ton ACs and allied electric works at Ground Floor of Vikas Bhawan, Rail Head Complex, Jammu, by inviting tenders. Accordingly, the tenders were floated by the Executive Engineer, JDA, upon receipt of communication from Superintending Engineer. During the tendering process, M/s Lumen Engineers was found as L1, but instead of allotting work to the said agency, petitioner No.2 deliberately and intentionally under a well-knit conspiracy hatched with Shri T. R. Salgotra, the then Superintending Engineer, JDA (now expired), and petitioner No.1, the then Executive Engineer, JDA, allotted the work to petitioner No.3 with a view to confer undue benefit upon the said firm. The cost of the work was Rs.40.83 lacs, which involved renovation/interior works including air conditioning of the office complex of JDA. It was found that scope of work was changed from installation of ACs and allied electric works to renovation/interior works along with installation of ACs without any tendering process, which

HIGH COURT JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH

resulted in increase in the expenditure. It was also found that the work was allotted to petitioner No.3 on nomination basis without any justification and without inviting any tenders. It was further found that validity of license of petitioner No.3 had already expired, but still the said firm executed the entire work of electrical/renovation/interior works at exorbitant rates, for which payment of Rs.40.53 lacs was released in its favour. The Engineering Wing of ACB projected a total loss of Rs. 2,12,295/- on account of civil works so executed based on sanctioned schedule rates. Thus, loss to the State exchequer to the extent of aforesaid amount was estimated.

3) On the basis of aforesaid allegations, the FIR came to be registered and investigation was set into motion. After investigating the case, the aforesaid allegations were found established and it was found that initially, after inviting tenders for the work, instead of allotting the contract to L1 firm, petitioner No.1, on verbal directions of petitioner No.2, cancelled the tender on 08.04.2011, whereafter the participating tenderers were informed about this decision and their CDRs/bank drafts were returned. It was also found that on 30.04.2011, the Superintending Engineer, JDA, marked the letter, which was received from petitioner No.2 in the month of January, 2011, to Executive Engineer, JDA,

HIGH COURT JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH

who, vide his communication dated 24.05.2011, conveyed to the Superintending Engineer that as per J&K Bank's approved rates on which Shalimar Branch of J&K Bank has been renovated, the same rates may be considered whereafter, the Superintending Engineer put the note sheet for approval before petitioner No.2 on 27.05.2011, who approved the same. Pursuant thereto, an agreement was executed by Executive Engineer, JDA, with petitioner No.3 firm on 03.06.2011, and the said firm was asked to undertake/execute the works worth Rs.40.83 lacs.

4) During the course of investigation, spot inspection of the work executed was conducted by the experts of Engineering Wing of ACB, Jammu, on 05.10.2021, and it was found that loss to the tune of Rs.1,56,428/- was caused to the State exchequer. However, after scrutiny of the records and upon considering the reply submitted by the petitioners, it was found that unit price of ACs also included the charges for transportation/installation. Accordingly, loss to the tune of Rs 9600/- was deducted and the net loss to the State exchequer was quantified at Rs.1,46,828/-.

5) On the basis of the aforesaid findings of the investigating agency, the aforesaid offences were found established and the charge sheet was laid before the trial court. It is pertinent to mention here that the petitioners had

challenged the FIR before this Court by way of a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. bearing CRM(M) No.351/2020, which is still pending before this Court. In the said petition, initially an interim direction was passed restraining the investigating agency from filing the charge sheet, but later on the said direction came to be modified and the respondent investigating agency was permitted to file the charge sheet.

6) The learned trial court, after scrutinizing the material on record and after hearing the parties, passed a detailed order dated 29.03.2025, holding that the offences under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of J&K PC Act and Section 120-B of RPC are made out against the petitioners. The charges were, accordingly, framed against them.

7) The petitioners have challenged the impugned charge sheet and the impugned order whereby charges have been framed against them by the learned trial court on the grounds that the respondent investigating agency, after scrutinizing all 44 contracting items, could manage to work out loss only in respect of three items. It has been contended that even in respect of these three items, the loss worked out is totally unsustainable. It has been contended that the investigating agency has, while calculating the loss, relied upon the Book of Analysis Rates of 2010 issued by the Government of India, CPWD for Delhi, which is of the year

2007. It has been submitted that CPWD Book of Analysis of 2010 is only a reprint of the book of 2007. According to the petitioners, the rates were to be calculated on the basis of CPWD Book of Analysis of 2012, which is based on prevailing market rate of the materials in Delhi between April, 2011 to September, 2011, during which period petitioner No.3 had executed the works which are subject matter of the charge sheet. It has been contended that if the investigating agency would have calculated the rates on the basis of CPWD Schedule of Rates 2012, it would have concluded that there was no loss to the State exchequer.

8) The petitioners have, in their petition, given details of rates of items in respect of which the Engineering wing of the respondent investigating agency has assessed loss to the State exchequer, and claimed that in case rates would have been calculated on the basis of CPWD Schedule of Rates for the year 2012, no loss to the State exchequer would have been found. It has further been submitted that while calculating the loss to the State exchequer, the respondent investigating agency has not factored in the labour component for fixing of floor tiles, thereby landing itself into an error while calculating the loss. According to the petitioners, these aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned trial court while passing

the impugned order. It has also been contended that merely because the tenders were not floated for awarding the work to petitioner No.3, it cannot be stated that the offence of criminal misconduct is made out against the petitioners, particularly when the material on record shows that there has been no loss to the State exchequer. According to the petitioners, at best, petitioner Nos.1 and 2 could have been proceeded departmentally, but in no case they could have been prosecuted for having committed the offence of criminal misconduct as defined in Section 5(1)(d) of the J&K PC Act.

9) It has further been contended that having regard to the nature of work that was required to be executed, which is a specialized job of experts/highly skilled manpower having the requisite infrastructure to deal with such kind of works, the decision of petitioner Nos.1 and 2 in not going for tenders cannot be questioned. It has been submitted that such kind of specialized job can be executed by the expert entities like petitioner No.3, who is empanelled for execution of such works by the Jammu and Kashmir Bank Limited, and in the instant case he has executed the works on the same rates on which he had executed work of renovating Shalimar Road Branch of the J&K Bank.

10) The respondent investigating agency has filed its reply to the petition in which it has reiterated the allegations made

in the charge sheet. It has been contended that the work in question cannot be termed as highly technical or sophisticated, nor can it be presumed that only petitioner No.3 was capable of executing it. It has been submitted that awarding of work to petitioner No.3 was a pre-meditated decision by petitioner Nos.1 and 2. It has further been submitted that public servants have no authority to perform their duties on the basis of presumptions without following rules and regulations. It has been further contended that loss to the State exchequer assessed by the Engineering Wing of the respondent investigating agency is based on correct appreciation of material.

11) The respondent investigating agency has given the details in its reply with regard to the manner in which the loss has been calculated/assessed. It has been submitted that analysis of the respondent investigating agency is detailed, costed item-wise by using standard indices and quotients used in Government valuation. It has been submitted that additions like 15% contractor's profit and 13.77% tax layered on top without establishing whether taxes were actually payable in the same structure, assuming all sundries, grouting water charges etc., apply at full CPWD estimated quantities regardless of actual site-specific efficiencies. It has been submitted that the petitioners'

assertion of savings is based on misleading and incorrect unit comparison. It has been further submitted that the analysis made by the respondent investigating agency is not only legally sound but also aligned with public financial discipline and audit standards and the same are in full conformity with CPWD norms. It has further been submitted that the rates applied by adopting mean of the rates mentioned in CPWD Schedule of 2010 and CPWD Schedule of 2012 is both logical and commonly accepted in engineering valuation practice, when exact DSR rates for a specific date are not available. It has also been submitted that CPWD guidelines serve only as a standard reference for public works and such guidelines are not binding upon the Courts in adjudicating criminal liability or factual disputes involving forensic analysis, especially in a case where there is deviation from standard procedure or alleged misuse of public funds.

12) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record of the case including the charge sheet laid before the court below.

13) As already stated, in the present case the petitioners are laying challenge to the charge sheet as also the order framing charge passed by the learned trial court. Before testing the merits of the contentions raised by the petitioners

for assailing the charge sheet and the order framing charges, it would be apt to understand the legal position with regard to scope of power of this Court under Section 528 BNSS to interfere with an order framing charge.

14) The law with regard to discharge and framing of charge as applicable to the instant case is provided in Section 251-A of J&K Cr.P.C. Sub-section (2) of the aforesaid provision provides that, if upon consideration of all documents referred to in Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall be discharged whereas sub-section (3) provides that if after undertaking the aforesaid exercise, the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, which such Magistrate is competent to try, the charge in writing has to be framed against the accused. It is a settled law that the court while framing charges is not required to conduct a mini trial and it has only to weigh the material on record to ascertain whether the ingredients constituting the alleged offence are prima facie made out against the accused persons.

15) The legal position as regards scope of power of a Court at the time of framing of charges has been settled by

Supreme Court in the case of **Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI**, (2010) 9 SCC 368. In the said case, the Supreme Court has laid down the following principles.

> *(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.*
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> *(ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.*
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> *(iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.*
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> *(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.*
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> *(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.*
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> *(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients*

constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.

16) 16. In **Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander**, (2012) 9 SCC 460, the Supreme Court has noted that test for quashing an order framing charge in exercise of revisional jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction is limited to whether the allegations, as made from the record of the case, taken at their face value, are patently absurd and whether the basic ingredients of the offence, for which the charge is framed, are not made out. The relevant extracts of the judgment are reproduced hereunder:

"17. *Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the case" and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the*

court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code."

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"27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:

27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic

ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.

27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a "civil wrong" with no "element of criminality" and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.

27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no

offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.

27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.

27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist....”

17) From the aforesaid analysis of the legal position, it is clear that at this stage, the scope of power of this Court to interfere in an order framing charge even under Section 528 of BNSS is very limited. This Court, at this stage, cannot reevaluate the evidence or hold a mini trial as the same would amount to assuming appellate jurisdiction, which is impermissible in law. The scope of power of this Court would be confined to ascertaining as to whether the trial court has properly appreciated the material on record and whether, on the basis of the material on record in the shape of charge sheet, it was open to the learned trial court to form an

opinion that the petitioners/accused have committed the offence for which they have been charged.

18) With the aforesaid legal position in mind, let us now analyze the facts of the present case. It is an admitted fact that petitioner No 3 has been awarded contract by petitioner Nos.1 and 2 without floating tenders. There is material on record to show that initially tenders were floated for execution of the work of air conditioning and allied electric works, but the contract was not awarded to L1 tenderer, and instead petitioner Nos.1 and 2 took a decision to cancel the tender, enlarge the scope of work to renovation of the office complex and award the same to petitioner No.3 without going for tenders.

19) The defence projected by the petitioners is that it was a specialized kind of work which could have been executed only by a specialized entity like petitioner No.3. Even if it is assumed that the work that was executed by petitioner No.3 was of a specialized nature, still then there is no material on record to show that it is only petitioner No.3 who is competent to execute such kind of work in the whole country. Even otherwise, renovation of an office complex or executing the work of air conditioning is not such a specialized kind of work that would require highly technical or skilled know-how. Any contractor who has experience and

license in conducting such types of work would be eligible to execute it. However, petitioner Nos.1 and 2 without inviting tenders proceeded to award the contract to petitioner No.3, which is a clear case of favouritism and nepotism. Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are public servants who were holding responsible positions in a public authority like Jammu Development Authority. A Government department or a public authority, while entering into contracts or granting other forms of largesse, cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will like a private individual. The actions of public servants while dealing in such matters have to be in conformity with standards and norms which are not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. Therefore, petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were under a legal obligation to invite open competition from all eligible contractors before awarding the contract to any of such eligible contractors. By not doing so, petitioner Nos.1 and 2 have, prima facie, abused their official position.

20) Section 5 of the J&K PC Act defines the offence of criminal misconduct by a public servant and as per clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 5, a public servant is said to have committed the offence of criminal misconduct if he, by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. Thus, essential

ingredient to constitute an offence under Section 5(1)(d) of J&K PC Act is that if the public servant, by corrupt means etc. abusing his position, obtains any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any other person. It is not necessary that the public servant by abusing his position should obtain pecuniary advantage only for himself, but a public servant can be said to have committed the offence under Section 5(1)(d) even if he/she by abusing his/her official position obtains a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for any other person who may not be a public servant. Thus, a public servant who causes wrongful loss to the Government by benefiting a third party would expose himself to be tried for offence falling within the definition of Section 5(1)(d) of the PC Act.

21) The Supreme Court has, in the case of **Neera Yadav vs. CBI**, (2017) 8 SCC 757, while interpreting the provisions of Section 13(1)(d) of the Central Prevention of Corruption Act, which is in *pari-materia* with Section 5(1)(d) of J&K PC Act, observed as under:

> ***16.*** *Section 13 of the PC Act in general lays down that if a public servant, by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abusing his position as a public servant obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, he would be guilty of "criminal misconduct". Sub-section (2) of Section 13 speaks of the punishment for such misconduct. Section*

> *13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act lays down the essentials and punishment respectively for the offence of "criminal misconduct" by a public servant....*
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> ***17.*** *A perusal of the above provision makes it clear that if the elements of any of the three sub-clauses are met, the same would be sufficient to constitute an offence of "criminal misconduct" under Section 13(1)(d). Undoubtedly, all the three wings of clause (d) of Section 13(1) are independent, alternative and disjunctive. Thus, under Section 13(1)(d)(i), obtaining any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means by a public servant in itself would amount to criminal misconduct. On the same reasoning "obtaining a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage" by abusing his official position as a public servant, either for himself or for any other person would amount to criminal misconduct.*
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> ***xxx xxx xxx***
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> ***54.*** *A particular kind of corruption that has become more rampant of late is nepotism to promote the interests of those near and dear to them. Nepotism is in a sense a greater evil since it involves dispersal of favours by patrons amongst their arm coterie, depriving others of a career or office they deserve more. The practice of promoting the interest of few individuals to the detriment of many others is wholly reprehensible and deserves to be condemned.*

22) From the aforesaid enunciation of law on the subject, it is clear that if a pecuniary advantage is conferred on a third person on account of misuse of official position by a public servant, the provisions of Section 5(1)(d) of J&K PC Act would get attracted. In the present case, as already stated, petitioner Nos.1 and 2 have, admittedly, awarded

contract to petitioner No.3 without floating tenders, that too after cancelling the earlier tender regarding which process had already been completed. From this circumstance, it can be inferred that petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were having dishonest intention so as to confer undue benefit upon petitioner No.3.

23) Much emphasis has been laid by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners on the contention that in the present case no loss to the State exchequer has occurred, as the losses calculated by the respondent investigating agency are based on incorrect application of rates and erroneous appreciation of facts. To support this contention, the petitioners have put forward their own calculations and details to rebut the calculations and details computed by the respondent investigating agency which find mention in the charge sheet.

24) As already stated, the legal position regarding scope of this Court to interfere with an order framing charge is limited, inasmuch as this Court cannot undertake a mini trial nor can it test the veracity of the calculations and details projected by the petitioners by way of a defence to the calculations and details relied upon by the respondent investigating agency. The issue as to whether the rates mentioned in CPWD Schedule of 2012 or the mean of the rates taken from the years 2010 and 2012 is to be relied

upon for calculation of loss to the State exchequer is a matter which can be decided only after trial of the case when the engineering experts of the investigating agency depose before the trial court and they are subjected to cross-examination by the petitioners.

25) Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that it is only a case of application of proper rates to the works executed by petitioner No.3, and the said exercise does not involve undertaking a meticulous analysis of the material on record. I am afraid the contention of learned Senior Counsel cannot be accepted. The issue as to which rates are applicable to the works which are subject matter of the impugned charge sheet is a matter best left to be commented upon by the experts who will appear as witnesses before the trial court at appropriate stage. This Court is not an expert to decide as to what rates are required to be applied while calculating the loss to the State exchequer. The trial court can decide such matters only on the basis of the deposition of the expert witnesses, which stage is yet to arrive.

26) At this stage, the material placed on record by the investigating agency along with the charge sheet has to be taken at its face value, and once the said material shows that there has been loss to the State exchequer on account of

award of contract to petitioner No.3 by petitioner Nos.1 and 2, who have, admittedly, awarded the contract to petitioner No.3 without following the codal formalities, it cannot be stated that the charge against the petitioners is groundless.

27) For what has been discussed hereinbefore, I do not find any merit in this petition. The same is dismissed accordingly.

(Sanjay Dhar)
Judge

SRINAGAR
19.11.2026
"Bhat Altaf-Secretary"

Whether the **Judgement** is speaking: **YES**
Whether the **Judgement** is reportable: **YES**

HIGH COURT
JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH