Supreme Court Judicial Administration & Management- Issues & Concerns; The Supreme Court's recent trend on cases involving Civil Liberties & Political Rights

Seminar organized by Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms In partnership with The Wire and Livelaw 24th February 2024, Indian Society of International Law, New Delhi

Over the last few years, even as we have witnessed fundamental rights, democratic institutions and indeed democracy itself come under increasing attack, the judiciary's response has been found to be wanting in living up to its key role of protecting against executive excesses. In fact, in some cases, courts appeared to have ruled in favour of diluting civil liberties. While a few recent judgments have bucked the trend and restored some hope in the willingness of the judiciary to be a bulwark against repression and a custodian of constitutional guarantees, much remains to be done.

The Supreme Court's judicial administration has raised concerns especially with regard to the opacity and lack of accountability in the administration and management of the court. The selective and delayed or non listing of certain cases (despite judicial orders to the contrary), the open-court public system of mentioning urgent fresh cases giving way to a closed-door email-based system or application system with no response mechanism and therefore no accountability, leaving the absolute discretion with the Chief Justice and, the non compliance with the rules and procedures and departure from the long-standing conventions of allocation of benches, especially in certain critical matters, have sent alarm-signals among the legal community and citizens at large.

The issue and problems of allocation of cases to benches by the Chief Justice of India, who is regarded as the master of roster, was underlined at a press conference of the four senior most judges of the Supreme Court in January 2018. In that unprecedented press conference, the four judges had complained that the then Chief Justice was misusing his powers as master of roster in the allocation of critical cases, which had put democracy in danger. In their letter to the Chief Justice they stated *"The convention of recognizing the privilege of the Chief Justice to form the roster and assign cases to different member/benches of the Court is a convention devised for a disciplined and efficient transaction of business of the Court but not a recognition of any superior authority, legal or factual of the Chief Justice over his*

colleagues...the Chief Justice is only the first amongst the equals – nothing more or nothing less." They went on to state, "...members of any multi numbered judicial body including this Court would not arrogate to themselves the authority to deal with and pronounce upon matters which ought to be heard by appropriate benches, both composition wise and strength wise with due regard to the roster fixed...of late the twin rules mentioned above have not been strictly adhered to. There have been instances where cases having far-reaching consequences for the nation and the institution had been assigned by the Chief Justice of this court selectively to the benches "of their preference" without any rationale basis for such assignment. This must be guarded against at all costs."

Six years on and several Chief Justices later, the perceived concerns remain and there has been little movement on the part of the court as an institution to address these. The problem is not limited to perceived allocation of cases to benches selectively; it also extends to the listing of cases (a far more crucial function exercised by the Chief Justice). Thus the decision as to which cases are to be listed or not listed, sometimes becomes more critical than the benches before whom they are listed.

Apart from the perceived arbitrariness in the decision of which cases to list or not list, there are several recent instances of cases not being listed on dates for which there was a judicial order for listing. Some judges have called for explanations from the registry while others have let it go by giving a knowing look and saying that "the Chief Justice is surely aware of it".

The conduct on the part of the Registry in simply delisting the matters despite specific directions has recently come under the scanner and sharp criticism of several sitting and now retired Judges of the Supreme Court. This is routinely happening as if the Registry has power to override express judicial orders for listing. In December 2023, the bench presided by Hon'ble Justice A S Oka in Civil Appeal No. 4866/2015 took judicial notice of such deletion and directed the Registrar (judicial listing) to submit a report calling for explanation from the concerned staff members as to why the appeals were not listed on the date fixed by the bench. In the matter relating to the appointment of judges bearing cause title, *Centre for Public Interest Litigation v Union of India*, W.P.(C) 895/2018, was to be listed as item 13.1 in Court 2 on 05.12.2023, pursuant to a judicial order dated 20.11.2023. It was listed as item 13 on the cause list published on the Supreme Court website on 01.12.2023 at 19:09:58. In the cause

list subsequently available on the website of the Supreme Court, item 13 is omitted from the list (list published on 02.12.2023 at 13.11:00). There was no sms or email intimation by the registry either to the advocate on record or to the petitioner organization, regarding any deletion. When the matter was not called out in turn, it was mentioned before the bench led by Hon'ble Justice S.K. Kaul (sitting with Hon'ble Justice Dhulia), who stated that *he had not deleted the matter, that the Chief Justice would know about this* and further that "some things were better left unsaid". This seemed extremely unusual, especially since the deletion was without the knowledge of the presiding senior judge and in violation of a judicial order.

Supreme Court Rules and Handbook in allocation of benches

Chapter 12 of the Handbook of Practice and Procedure deals with "Listing of cases" and provides under the head "Cases, Coram and Listing" as follows:

"Fresh cases are allocated as per subject category through automatic computer allocation, unless coram is given by the Chief Justice or the Filing Counter:

Provided that such categories of fresh cases shall not be listed before a Judge, which have been so directed. Data entry of such cases be made in the computer, which excludes listing of such cases before that Judge."

This paragraph discloses that "*listing of cases as per automatic computer allocation*", <u>once</u> roster as provided in chapter VI is prepared along with general or special instructions regarding assignment/allocation of work to a bench, including allocation of work of a bench on account of non-availability to another bench, can be given a complete go by the Chief Justice or the filing counter. The discretion thus provided is wholly arbitrary. Further no guidelines nor requirement to assign any reason have been provided.

In Chapter XIII Para 49, Note 1 and 2 states as follows:

- 1. Save in case of a single coram, wherever a main case or application could not be listed before the first coram, it shall be listed before the second and then third coram, wherever applicable, and, if available, in seniority.
- 2. In case of non-availability of the single coram or members of the Bench on account of retirement or otherwise, a case shall be listed as per subject category through computer allocation, unless otherwise

ordered by the Chief Justice or fresh single coram is given, wherever such coram had been earlier given.

However, note 3 is curiously worded and appears to give the Chief Justice absolute discretion to allocate or assign any appeal or cause or matter to any judge or judges of the court notwithstanding anything contained expressly otherwise in this Chapter. It reads thus;

> 3. Notwithstanding anything contained expressly or otherwise in this Chapter, the Chief Justice may allocate or assign any appeal, cause or matter to any Judge or Judges of the Court

This power is extraordinary but is coupled with a duty which obliges the Chief Justice as the administrative head and as Master of Roster to act thereunder only in extraordinary circumstances.

Chapter XVI of the Handbook deals with constitution and functions of the judicial branch and provide that the judicial branches of the Registry shall be responsible for "listing". Detailed procedure is prescribed therein including to maintain diaries and record every moment of the matters. Under the head "Additional Registrar" it is provided that it shall be the duty of the Additional Registrar "to attend to the queries of the advocates and solve the problems to the maximum extent within the ambit of the rules". Curiously, despite this obligation, several letters addressed to the Registrar regarding the listing of cases in violation of the rules, remain unanswered. Clearly, Registrar (J-1) has a bounden duty to "ensure that the cases are listed in accordance with the Roster and instructions issued by the Chief Justice from time to time", meaning thereby, written instructions. <u>The Registrar therefore can neither ignore the roster nor the written instructions</u>. However, the complete opacity in the administrative orders of the master of roster and the listing of matters contrary to rules, has become an irregular practice.

Pertinently, the rules are absolutely silent on the power of the Master of the Roster, as the Chief Justice is called, nor do they provide for any well-defined, transparent and fair procedure or method for constitution of benches and listing of cases before such benches. Thus, the power exercised by the Chief Justice as the master of the roster is not statutory in nature because it is not prescribed either under the Constitution or under the Rules but is merely an executive power of the Chief Justice as the head of the institution as a matter of

convention. This being the position, there is a need for the Chief Justice to lay down proper instructions from time to time in writing for ensuring fair and transparent constitution of benches and listing of cases.

It is a matter of common knowledge that serious complaints have been made for quite a few years about improper listing of cases and forum shopping taking place. The complaints in this regard have remained unaddressed. Be that as it may, the executive power of the Chief Justice is coupled with the duty to ensure that fundamental principles of fair play in the administration of justice are scrupulously observed.

Judicial recognition of the Chief Justice as master of roster in adherence to Rules and procedures

A Constitution Bench in *Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms v. Union of India,* (2018) 1 SCC 196 while upholding the administrative powers of the Chief Justice as the Master of the Roster, inter alia, held as under;

> "6. There can be no doubt that the Chief Justice of India is the first amongst the equals, but definitely, he exercises certain administrative powers and that is why in Prakash Chand [State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 1 SCC 1], it has been clearly stated that the administrative control of the High Court vests in theChief Justice alone. The same principle must apply proprio vigore as regards the power of theChief Justice of India. On the judicial side, he is only the first amongst the equals. But, as far as the Roster is concerned, as has been stated by the three-Judge Bench in Prakash Chand [State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 1 SCC 1], theChief Justice is the Master of the Roster and he alone has the prerogative to constitute the Benches of the Court and allocate cases to the Benches so constituted.

Significantly the bench was constituted by the sitting Chief Justice in a case in which an SIT was being prayed for regarding allegations of bribery and corruption involving sitting Judges of the Court in a medical college scam. The medical college cases had been presided over be benches that included the Chief Justice himself.

Soon after the judges press conference in 2018 a writ petition was filed by Mr. Shanti Bhushan seeking that the roster should be decided by a collegiums of 5 senior judges rather than the Chief Justice alone. Unfortunately, the Court (by a bench chosen by the then Chief Justice) declined that plea, though they laid down that the Chief Justice should not violate the rules of practice and procedure in allocation of cases. The judgment in *Shanti Bhushan v. Supreme Court of India*, (2018) 8 SCC 396 has clearly and unequivocally circumscribed the power of the Master of the Roster. Justice Dr. Sikri speaking for the Bench held as under;

"26. Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is given the authority to frame rules for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the Court, including various subjects as enumerated in clause (1) of Article 145. The Supreme Court Rules, 2013 which have been framed in exercise of such a power empowered the Chief Justice to constitute the Benches and list particular matters before such Benches. Similar powers are conferred upon the Chief Justice of the High Courts in the Rules framed by the respective High Courts for regulating its procedure.

27. At the same time, the power of the "Chief Justice" does not extend to regulate the functioning of a particular Bench to decide cases assigned to him once the cases are allocated to that Bench. A Bench comprising of puisne Judges exercise its judicial function without interference from others, including the "Chief Justice", as it is supposed to act according to law. Therefore, when a particular matter is assigned to a particular Bench, that Bench acquires the complete dominion over the case."

It further held unequivocally as under;

43. Of course, it goes without saying that the matters need to be listed and assigned to the Benches in accordance with the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 and Handbook of Practice and Procedure.

Justice Ashok Bhushan in a separate but concurring judgement also held accordingly. The learned judge held;

"84. Insofar as submission made by Shri Dave that in allocation and listing of cases the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 have to be followed, no exception can be taken to the above submission. When the statutory rules are framed the entire business of the

Court which is covered by the Rules has to be dealt with accordingly.

89. Further, Handbook on Practice and Procedure and Office Procedure also laid down sufficient guidelines and elaboration of the procedure which is to be followed in this Court. Thus, for transaction of business of the Court, there are elaborate rules and procedure and it cannot be said that procedure and practice of the Court is unguided and without any criteria."

This court laid great emphasis on following the Supreme Court Rules and the Handbook because it felt that, "the ultimate purpose is to dispense justice which is the highest and the noblest virtue" and further observed again, in this role, "theChief Justice gets the authority and responsibility for the administration of justice, which gives him the ultimate authority for determining the distribution of judicial workload."

It has now been affirmatively held by this court that under the Constitution no one is *Imperium in Imperio*. Art 124 does not empower the Chief Justice with untrammeled powers. The Chief Justice is under the Law and not above the Law and he can only exercise powers as prescribed under the Rules, the Handbook and as per the Conventions, practices and the Law declared by the Supreme Court itself as referred above. Any exercise dehors the same, would-be *void ab initio*. The Registry is equally responsible to act only and only as per the Rules and the Handbook and is bound by the Law declared by this court. Any infraction by the Registry, is wholly unconstitutional, illegal and must be treated as *void ab initio*.

Another point of disquiet is the present procedure to mention for listing, fresh and pending matters. Fresh matters can only be mentioned before the Chief Justice who is often sitting in a Constitution bench, when no mentioning is allowed before that bench. Therefore very urgent fresh matters sometimes cannot get listed despite the urgency and are left to the discretion of the Chief Justice, who examines each application on the administrative side. Repeated applications for mentioning have sometimes been denied without attributing reasons. The non listing of matters for mentioning the life, liberty and livelihood of citizens and is a denial of their fundamental right to access speedy justice. It is therefore important that the procedure be streamlined to one that is transparent and accessible.

We are today faced with an extraordinary situation where the Supreme Court Rules and the Handbook of Practice and Procedure, which also incorporate the established conventions of the institution, and which have been held to be binding on all the administrative officers – including the Chief Justice, are not strictly adhered to. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Registry's functioning is opaque and non-transparent, often resulting in the non-compliance with the law and rules. While the judiciary at all levels seeks to hold the executive and even legislative authorities accountable to professed standards, it has failed to lead by example and be a model in its administrative functioning.

Condoning the serious and deep infringement of Civil liberties by state agencies against dissenters

Allied to this issue of listing and allocation of benches is the Supreme Court's attitude on cases involving civil liberty. The right to approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of a fundamental right is a fundamental right in itself guaranteed under Article 32. However, the Supreme Court's recent approach to matters relating to civil liberties has hollowed out this right and left it an empty shell. Far from upholding civil liberties, the Supreme Court has become an enablerto the continuing infringement of civil liberties by all manner of state agencies in arbitrary and unlawful ways. This has happened and continues to happen in two separate but linked ways – non listing or delayed listing of important matters relating to civil liberties, and judgements that have shrunk civil liberties while expanding the scope of powers enjoyed by investigating agencies.

The issue of civil liberties and political rights has become critical at a time when a large number of activists, journalists and politicians are being arrested by numerouscentral agencies such as the Enforcement Directorate, the Central Bureau of Investigation, and the National Investigation Authority on flimsy charges. Such agencies' powers are already increased thanks to draconian provisions in legislations such as the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1961 and the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1987. These legislations allow for the arresting authorities to detain individuals for longer, use confessions of accused in trial and dramatically restrict the right of accused to bail. Such provisions require a strong and vigilant judiciary to exercise its powers under the Constitution to ensure that the central agencies do not abuse their powers to target opposition parties or anyone who criticizes the government.

Problematic and delayed listing of cases relating to civil liberties

As the court of last resort, suitably empowered under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is expected to take prompt and effective action in the context of the erosion of civil liberties. Even as the Supreme Court repeatedly says that courts are supposed to list and dispose matters related to civil liberties promptly, its own record on this matter has been very unsatisfactory in the last few years. Matters relating to bail are kept pending indefinitely.

Umar Khalid, a JNU doctoral student, who has been accused under the UAPA, remains in jail without trial for a third year in running. The case against, as many cases in the last few years, is based on entirely on conjecture tenuously linking him to the riots that broke out in Northeast Delhi during the protests against the CAA and NRC. What is most concerning however has been the fact that his bail application in the Supreme Court has been kept pending for several months. The matter has been listed no fewer than 13 times and adjourned on most occasions without any effective hearing. The court's tardiness and lethargy in this matter (along with others) has meant that bail has become the exception and jail the norm – a complete perversion of all known canons of criminal justice. As was also seen in the context of the accused in the BhimaKoregaon case, the actual trial is nowhere close to starting and even on a prima facie reading, the evidence gathered so far does not seem to suggest any offence having been committed. Instead of holding the government and investigation agencies for tardiness in the conduct of the trial or the shoddiness of the investigation, the court has allowed the unlawful incarceration by simply not giving a hearing in the accused bail application.

Even where other courts have granted bail in politically motivated cases, the court has shown undue haste in setting aside the orders and denying the accused the benefit of the order. Nowhere was this more evident than in Prof. Saibaba's case. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had quashed the case against Prof Saibaba under the UAPA on ground of lack of sanction. However, the Supreme Court held a weekend sitting to stay the order and deny Prof. Saibaba release.

After a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court delivered a split verdict on whether or not the Karnataka government could ban the wearing of hijabs by Muslim girls in government schools in October, 2022, the Supreme Court has not set up a three-judge bench to hear the matter in over a year. The issue, concerning the rights of Muslims girls and women across the country, has not been given enough importance by the Supreme Court. The impact of the Supreme Court's failure to list this important matter concerning the rights of Muslim girls has become evident in the events in Rajasthan where the ruling government has promised to ban Muslim girls from wearing hijabs in all schools, forcing them to choose between religion and education. By allowing the Karnataka High Court's erroneous judgement to stand without serious scrutiny, the Supreme Court continues to jeopardise fundamental rights simply through delay.

Inconsistent approach to protecting free speech

The Supreme Court has been very inconsistent in the manner in which it has listed and heard cases concerning the freedom of speech of journalists who have been targeted by government. Even as it permitted Arnab Goswami to directly approach the Supreme Court to challenge his arrest and get the criminal case quashed, it took more than two years for the Supreme Court to even grant bail to Siddiq Kappan who had been arrested by the Uttar Pradesh government under the UAPA for entirely vague and unfounded allegations in an attempt to stop him from reporting on the Hathras gangrape and murder.

Even as the court allowed Goswami to approach it under Article 32, it has been turning away other litigants who have suffered serious infringements of their freedom of speech and expression to approach the entire hierarchy of courts. This sends out two kinds of wrong messages – one that the court favours certain litigants over others in terms who can approach it and two, by denying even a hearing, it doesn't believe that the case is a fit case for bail.

These cases are only illustrative of the unfortunate recent track record of the Supreme Court in permitting grave and serious infringement of civil liberties of anyone who dissents against the Union Government or is in the opposition. However, even in the sort of judgements it has delivered recently, the Supreme Court has vastly expanded the powers of investigation agencies and limited the scope of judicial oversight over such agencies. This has allowed agencies to act in a completely arbitrary and autocratic manner, giving the law a go-by with no consequences as it targets the political opponents of the ruling party.

Recent Judicial Trends – antithetical to civil liberties

Even as more and more draconian legislation is being passed by the Union and State governments in a bid to crack down on dissent and opposition, far from performing its role as the "sentinel on the qui vie", the Supreme Court in the last few years upheld and widened the scope of such draconian legislation. What makes laws such as the UAPA, PMLA, etcmore draconian are the provisions doing away with basic criminal procedural provisions which protected the rights of accused against investigating agencies. These laws make it harder to get bail from courts, allow for seizure of property, use of confessions made to the police as evidence, among other draconian provisions. Such provisions make the right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 illusory and therefore require the court to subject them to strict constitutional scrutiny. However, as the judgements mentioned below show, the court has allowed such provisions to stand with few, if any, safeguards to protect citizens from arbitrary state action.

1. Vijay Madanlal Choudhary judgement

In the guise of tackling money laundering, the ED has been given vast and unaccountable powers by the PMLA to hunt down political dissidents. Even as the ED's track record on actually getting convictions in money laundering cases is abysmal, the vast powers given under the PMLA mean that it can harass and hold anyone in jail for indefinite periods of time without having to bother with completing investigation.

One of the most problematic provisions of the PMLA is Section 43D(5) which makes it very difficult for accused to get bail from courts. While this provision was read down by the Supreme Court earlier, this was overturned by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Chowdhury v Union of India (2022 SCC Online SC 929). The resulting interpretation, like the Supreme Court's earlier judgement in *NIA v Zahoor Ahmed Watali* ((2019) 5 SCC 1)delivered in the context of the UAPA, has made it enormously harder for those accused by the ED even on flimsy, non-existent grounds to get bail.

Even apart from that, the Supreme Court has dramatically enlarged the scope of the offence of money laundering under the PMLA, effectively making retroactive criminal law. Whereas criminal laws should be read strictly to protect the rights of citizens against investigation agencies, the court here has adopted a wider definition of the offence of money laundering, even beyond perhaps the intent of Parliament. The dramatic expansion of the offence has not resulted in the ED cracking down on money laundering – rather it has become the agency that takes up investigations selectively and vengefully against opposition parties and dissenters by claiming that they're somehow in possession of some money that may have been involved in an offence in some way. Even as large-scale financial frauds and corporate malfeasance goes uninvestigated and unabated, the ED continues to focus its energies on harassing political opponents of the ruling government at the centre.

2. Arup Bhuyan overturned in review

Even as the Supreme Court had earlier held that mere membership of a banned organisation would not be sufficient to be convicted of an offence under the earlier TADA and now UAPA laws (Arup Bhuyan v State of Assam (2011) 3 SCC 377 and State of Kerala v Raneef (2011) 1 SCC 784), in a review petition filed by the Union Government, the Supreme Court has effectively overturned the judgement in both these cases holding that mere membership of a banned organisations was enough to be convicted and sentenced under anti-terror laws. Inexplicably, the judgment reviewed and reversed on the 2011 judgment on the ground that the statutory provisions were not under challenge before the court. Yet, it went on to reverse the position and uphold the statutory provisions – making observations on the desirability thereof on merits.

3. PMLA Arrests made easier

In Ram Kishor Arora v Directorate of Enforcement (2023 INSC 1082) the Supreme Court overturned the judgement of the Delhi High Court which had held that an arrest by the ED would not be valid if the grounds of arrest had not been given in writing to the arrested person at the time of arrest. Such a judgement was based on not only on the interpretation of Section 19 of the PMLA but also in furtherance of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution.

In its judgement delivered on 15th December, 2023 the Supreme Court however held that there is no requirement under the PMLA to furnish grounds of arrest in writing at time of arrest, and that it would be enough if such grounds were provided at some point within twenty-four hours of arrest. It narrowed the scope of its own judgement rendered earlier

in Pankaj Bansal v Union of India (2023 SCC Online SC 1244) holding that it was enough if a copy of the grounds of arrest is shown to the accused at the time of arrest. Needless to say that such narrowed reading entirely defeats the purpose of ensuring the accused is informed of the grounds of arrest and makes the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22 entirely illusory.

The judgments of the Supreme Court, in the recent past, far from protecting citizens against the unaccountable use of state power, has only made citizens even more vulnerable to such misuse of power. Such unrestricted power has been used by the government to target dissidents and the opposition, dramatically shrinking the space for democratic dissent and debate in the country.

To discuss these twin issues of seminal importance today, this seminar will bring together former judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble High Courts, senior advocates and members of civil society. The following are the confirmed speakers:

Session 1: Supreme Court Judicial Administration & Management - Issues & Concerns; (10a.m.-1p.m.)

Introduction: Cheryl Dsouza, Advocate and member, CJAR

Moderator: Alok Prasanna, Co-founder Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy

- 1. Justice Madan B. Lokur, former judge, Supreme Court
- 2. Justice Kurian Joseph, former judge, Supreme Court
- 3. Justice Ajit Prakash Shah, former Chief Justice, Delhi High Court
- 4. Justice Rekha Sharma, former Judge, Delhi High Court
- 5. Justice Govind Mathur, former Chief Justice, Allahabad High Court
- 6. Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Advocate, Supreme Court
- 7. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court
- 8. Mr. Gautam Bhatia, Advocate, Supreme Court
- 9. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Advocate and Convenor, CJAR

Session 2: The Supreme Court's recent trend on cases involving Civil Liberties & Political Rights

(2p.m.-5p.m.)

Moderator: Anjali Bhardwaj, Right to Information activist, Satark Nagrik Sanghatan & CJAR

Introduction – Mr. Prsanna S. Article 21 Trust and member, CJAR

- 1. Justice AK Patnaik, former Judge, Supreme Court
- 2. Justice Indira Banerjee, former Judge, Supreme Court
- 3. Prof Mohan Gopal, former Director, National Judicial Academy
- 4. Mr. Trideep Pais, Senior Advocate
- 5. Mr. Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate
- 6. Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Advocate
- 7. Mr. Mihir Desai, Senior Advocate, Bombay High Court
- 8. Ms. Warisha Farasat, Advocate, Delhi High Court & Supreme Court

Session 3: Resolutions and way forward

(5-5:30p.m.)

Moderated by: Indira Unninayar, Advocate Supreme Court & Amrita Johri, RTI Activist, SNS, members CJAR working committee