

HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE G. ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY

**CRIMINAL PETITION Nos. 5073, 5560, 5673,5983,
5954, 6106, 6110, 6198, 6299 6932,6952,
6020, 6876, 6266, 6626, 6282, 6183,
6717, 7058, 7140 and 7164 of 2023**

COMMON ORDER:

All the above Criminal Petitions are filed to quash the proceedings against the petitioners-accused in respective Crimes/Calendar Cases/Preliminary Register Cases (P.R.Cs)/ Sessions Cases. The details of the relevant Crimes/C.Cs/ S.Cs/P.R.Cs, offences alleged etc., are mentioned in the following tabular form:

CRIME CASES

Sl. No	Criminal Petition No.	Crime No.	Accused Number	Offences allegedly committed
1	5073 of 2023	431/2023 of Banjara Hills Police Station, Hyderabad	A3	370, 370 (A)(2) I.P.C. and Sections 3, 4, 5 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (for short, 'the Act, 1956')
2	6183 of 2023	429/2023 on the file of Raidurgam Police Station, Cyberabad	A3	370, 370 (A) I.P.C. and Sections 3, 4, 5 of PITA Act
3	7164 of 2023	443 of 2021 on the file of Vanasthalipuram Police Station, Rachakonda	A5	370 (A)(2) I.P.C. and Sections 3, 4,5 and 7 of PITA Act

CALENDAR CASE

4	6952 of 2023	C.C.No.388 of 2023 on the file of I Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Kukatpally, Prashanthnagar	A4	370, 370(A) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Act, 1956
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PRELIMINARY REGISTER CASES

5	5560 of 2023	PRC No.256 of 2022 on the file of IV Additional Metropolitan Magistrate Hyderabad	A2	370A I.P.C and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Act, 1956
6	6106 of 2023	P.R.C.No. 4 of 2023 on the file of II Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-II Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Malkajgiri	A5	370(A)(2) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Act, 1956
7	6110 of 2023	P.R.C.No.18 of 2023 on the file of the II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate at Jagtial	A2	370(A) (i)(ii) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 7 of Act, 1956
8	6299 of 2023	P.R.C.No.146 of 2022 on the file of the XIV Additional Metropolitan Magistrate at Prashanth Nagar, Kukatpally	A3 and A4	370(A)(2) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Act, 1956
9	6932 of 2023	P.R.C.No.63 of 2023 on the file of the X Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Ranga	A5	370(A)(2) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Act, 1956

		Reddy District at Kukatpally		
10	6876 of 2023	P.R.C.No.52 of 2023 on the file of V Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-V Additional Metropolitan Magistrate at L.B. Nagar, Ranga Reddy	A3	370(A)(2) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Act, 1956
11	6626 of 2023	P.R.C.No.72 of 2023 on the file of the XIV Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Kukatpally, Prashanth Nagar	A2	370(A)(2) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Act, 1956
12	7058 of 2023	P.R.C.No.25 of 2023 on the file of X Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad, Kukatpally	A4	370(A)(2) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Act, 1956
13	7140 of 2023	P.R.C.No.127 of 2023 on the file of the III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad	A2	370, 370(A)(2) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Act, 1956

SESSIONS CASES

14	5673 of 2023	S.C.No.90 of 2023 on the file of the Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District	A3	370A I.P.C and Sections 3 (1)(2)(a), and 5 (1)(a) and 7 of Prevention of Immoral Traffic Amendment Act, 2006
15	5983 of 2023	S.C.No.804 of 2019 on the file of III Additional Senior Civil Judge-cum-	A2	370(A)(2) I.P.C and Sections 4 and 5 of Act, 1956

		Assistant Sessions Judge, L.B. Nagar		
16	5954 of 2023	S.C.No.24 of 2023 on the file of I Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-Additional Family Court, Medchal-Malkajgiri District	A2	370(A)(2) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Act, 1956
17	6198 of 2022	S.C.No.1762 of 2022 on the file of XXXI Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Kukatpally, Cyberabad	A4	370(A)(2) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Act, 1956
18	6020 of 2023	S.C.No.372 of 2023 on the file of the III Additional Senior Civil Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge, L.B. Nagar	A3	370(A) I.P.C and Sections 3(1)(2)(a), 4 of Act, 1956 and Sections 5(1)(a) & 7 of Prevention of Immoral Traffic (Amendment) Act
19	6266 of 2023	S.C.No.890 of 2021 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge, Medchal	A2	370(A)(2) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Act, 1956
20	6282 of 2023	S.C.No.1762 of 2022 on the file of XXXI Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Kukatpally, Cyberabad	A3	370(A)(2) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Act, 1956
21	6717 of 2023	S.C.No.285 of 2023 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge, Kukatpally	A4 and A5	370(A) I.P.C and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Act, 1956

2. Heard Sri Nageshwar Rao Pujari, Sri C. Rajeshwar Reddy, Sri T.S. Praveen Kumar, Sri M. Anil Kumar, Sri C. Vijay Shekar Reddy, Sri K. Venumadhav, Sr. R.R. Kalyan, Sri S. Ram Reddy, Sri Tera Rajinikanth Reddy, Sri Pranay Aditya Boyini, Sri Mohd. Fasiuddin, Sri Mettu Shankar, Sri Venkat Rao Patil and Sri Shaik Mahammad Hussen, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respective petitioners and Sri C. Pratap Reddy, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of respondent - State.

3. The question involved in all these criminal petitions is one and the same and, therefore, they are being disposed of by way of this common order.

4. In all the cases, the Police Agency is the complainant and the petitioners are the customers and they are arrayed as accused.

5. The brief facts are that on reliable information, raids were conducted by the police and crimes were registered against the organisers as well as the petitioners/customers for the aforesaid offences. In some crimes, charge sheets have also been filed.

6. In most of the cases, the statements of the victims were recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., a perusal of which, clearly discloses that due to poverty and other family backgrounds, the victims have voluntarily joined the organization of brothel house and have given their willingness to do sex with the customers.

7. The law relating to sex work in our country is guided as per I.P.C. and Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. The said Act was originally called as 'Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act, 1956' and it was amended in 1986.

8. Section 2(f) of the Act, 1956 defines "prostitution" as the sexual exploitation or abuse of persons for commercial purposes. The act of sexual intercourse for consideration is not illegal *per se*; however, the aim of the legislation, as made abundantly clear in the Act, 1956, is to inhibit or abolish commercialized vice namely, the trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of prostitution as an organized means of living. The Act, 1956 provides punishment to the persons maintaining a brothel house (Section 3) living on the earnings of the prostitution (Section 4), procuring,

inducing or taking person for the sake of prostitution (Section 5), detaining a person in premises where prostitution is carried on (Section 6), prostitution in or in the vicinity of public place (Section 7), seducing or soliciting for purpose of prostitution (Section 8) and seduction of a person in custody (Section 9).

9. This Court *vide* order dated 16.04.2021 in CrI.P.No.3002 of 2021, while dealing with the offences punishable under Sections 370(A)(2) and 188 I.P.C and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act, 1956, has relied on the judgment in *S.Naven Kumar v. The State of Telangana*¹, wherein a learned Single Judge in an alike-situation, where the customer alleged to have committed the offences punishable under Section 370A of IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act, 1956, dealt with the said provisions of Section 4 of the Act, 1956, and Section 370A of IPC, and quashed the proceedings in the PRC for the offence under Section 4 of the Act, 1956, but, however, directed the learned Committal Magistrate Court to take cognizance under Section 370A of IPC against the petitioner-accused No.3 therein. The observations in paragraph Nos.6, 7 and

¹ 2015 (2) ALD CrI.156 (A.P)

8 of the said judgment are relevant and the same are extracted hereunder:

“6. As rightly argued, Section 4 basically deals with the persons who lives on the earnings of the prostitution. Therefore, there is any amount of force in the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that a customer to flesh trade cannot be treated as offender under Section 4 of PIT Act. This aspect was no more res integra since at least two judgments of this High Court i.e. Goenka Sajan Kumar vs. The State of A.P. [2014 (2) ALD (Cri) 264] and Z. Lourdiah Naidu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [2013 (2) ALD (Cri) 393] establish the same. Therefore, criminal proceedings against the petitioner/A3 for the offence under Section 4 of PIT Act are no doubt liable to be quashed.

b) However, that is not end of the matter. A perusal of the charge sheet would show that the police while charge sheeting A1 and A2 for the offences under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of PIT Act and under Section 370A IPC, surprisingly charge sheeted petitioner/A3 only under Section 4 of PIT Act, but not under Section 370A IPC. Section 370A IPC reads thus: Section 370A - Exploitation of a trafficked person.

(1) Whoever, knowingly or having reason to believe that a minor has been trafficked, engages such minor for sexual exploitation in any manner, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

(2) Whoever, knowingly by or having reason to believe that a person has been trafficked, engages such person for sexual exploitation in any manner, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.

c) The phraseology engages such minor/such person for sexual exploitation in any manner employed in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 370A IPC in clear terms indicates that the flesh customer who hires the victim woman for sexual exploitation also falls within the fold of Section 370A as an offender.

d) It shall be noted that in the wake of gang rape of Nirbhaya in Delhi which arose an unprecedented public furore, Government considered it fit to drastically amend several provisions of IPC and in that direction appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of late Justice J.S. Verma, the former

Chief Justice of India. The Committee after interacting cross sections of stake holders submitted its detailed report suggesting amendments and introduction of various provisions in penal laws like IPC, Cr.P.C., Evidence Act etc. Consequent upon the said report sub-clause (2) of Section 370 IPC was amended and Section 370A IPC was introduced. Having regard to the avowed object with which report was submitted and amendments and new provisions were introduced in several acts, it cannot be presumed for the moment that Legislators considered customer as an innocent victim in the flesh trade. Therefore, Section 370A takes in its fold the customer also. So, despite the police charge sheeting petitioner/A3 only for the offence under Section 4 of PIT Act and the Committal Court accepting the same, it is evident from the charge sheet that the petitioner/A3 is prima facie liable for charge under Section 370A though not under Section 4 of PIT Act with which he was charge sheeted.

7. Now, the crucial question is whether the High Court in its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. while quashing the proceedings against the petitioner/A3 for the offence under Section 4 of PIT Act can direct the Committal Court to take cognizance of offence under section 370A IPC against him.

a) In my considered view, to secure the ends of justice, the High Court can exercise its inherent power to give such direction when the material placed by the prosecution i.e. charge sheet discloses the commission of offence under Section 370A IPC.

8. In the result, while quashing the proceedings in PRC No. 103 of 2014 on the file of II Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-XIX Metropolitan Magistrate, Kukatpally at Miyapur, Cyberabad under Section 4 of PIT Act against the petitioner/A3, learned Committal Magistrate is directed to take cognizance under Section 370A IPC against the petitioner/A3."

10. A perusal of *S. Naven Kumar's* case clearly discloses that in view of the gang rape of Nirbhaya in Delhi, the Government considered it fit to amend several provisions of I.P.C. Basing on the directions of the Law Commission and the penal provisions, Section 370A I.P.C was introduced. The learned Single Judge has

specifically given a finding that having regard to the avowed object with which the report was submitted and amendments were made and new provisions were introduced in several acts, it cannot be presumed for a moment that Legislators considered the customer as an innocent victim in the flesh trade.

11. Furthermore, as the petitioner in Crl.P.No.3002 of 2021 was only a customer and as per the remand report, the offences alleged against him were under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act, 1956, but not under Sections 370A(2) and 188 I.P.C., the learned Single Judge of this Court has relied upon the principle laid down in the said judgment, and quashed the proceedings against the petitioner therein for the offences under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act *vide* order dated 16.04.2021.

12. It is apt to refer to Section 370A of the Act, 1956, which reads as follows:

“370A: Exploitation of a trafficked person:

- (1) *Whoever, knowingly or having reason to believe that a minor has been trafficked, engages such minor for sexual exploitation in any manner, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment*

for a term which shall not be less than five years, but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

- (2) *Whoever, knowingly by or having reason to believe that a person has been trafficked, engages such person for sexual exploitation in any manner, shall be punished With rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine."*

13. A perusal of sub-clause (2) of Section 370A of the Act, 1956, discloses that whoever, knowingly by or having reason to believe that a person has been trafficked, engages such person for sexual exploitation in any manner, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine. However, the issue as to whether the customer has the knowledge that the person is trafficked or engaged for sexual exploitation has to be analyzed in order to punish him for the said offence.

14. Moreover, in the present cases, the 161 Cr.P.C. Statements of the victims clearly disclose that they have voluntarily participated in sexual intercourse with the customers. Furthermore, at the stage of filing of the FIRs, the Police Agency

could not prove that the customers have knowledge and/or the reason to believe that the women were trafficked for the purpose of prostitution.

15. Furthermore, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 introduced Section 370A, which criminalized those who engaged trafficked persons or minors for sexual exploitation. The term “sexual exploitation” is not defined in the IPC. Section 2(f) of Act, 1956 defines “prostitution” as sexual exploitation. But, there is no definition of the said term in international law either. In 2003, the UN Secretary General issued Special Measures for Protection of Women and Girls from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse and defined sexual exploitation as *“any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.”* That the persons, those who engage minors or adults for sexual exploitation, alone are punished, but not those, who engage others for labour exploitation.

16. Since Section 370A I.P.C. relates to engaging a trafficked person for sexual exploitation, whether it attracts to the customer or not is the question in the present cases.

17. The Act, 1956 does not prohibit the sale of sexual services *per se* but it does criminalise the exploitation of sexual workers by third parties or any aspect of sex work that is likely to cause public nuisance. The Act, 1956 does not explicitly mention the customer's liability.

18. It is pertinent to mention here that in many cases, the customers are usually apprehended at the site of the flat, apartment, lodge or house, which have been mentioned as brothel houses. The customers are chargesheeted for a range of offences under Sections 3 to 7 of the Act, 1956 and sometimes under Section 370 IPC. The customers may file an application either for grant of anticipatory bail or for grant of bail along with a petition to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against them.

19. The persons, who were in and around the brothel houses, were also taken into custody by the police and were treated as customers waiting for the prostitution. Mere presence does not justify the offence for prostitution, which according to Section 2(f) of the Act, 1956 involves “sexual exploitation”, which in turn, requires some sexual intercourse.

20. In the present cases, none of the charge sheets, which are under challenge, disclosed that the customer was caught hold when he was committing the offence. Admittedly, even the 161 Cr.P.C. statements do not disclose that there was proof of any exchange of money. There is no specific provision under the Act, 1956, that is directed towards the customers.

21. In *Arjun Rao and others v. State of A.P.*², the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while dismissing the petitions filed to quash the proceedings under Sections 3 to 5 of the Act, 1956 held that the customer can be booked under Section 7(1) of the Act, 1956, as per the definition of “prostitution” under Section 2(f) of the Act, 1956, and decided that merely having sexual intercourse by

² MANU AP 0543/2013

paying money does not attract “prostitution” mentioned under Section 7 of the Act, 1956, since the prostitution involved “sexual exploitation” or abuse of persons for commercial purposes. Further, in *Z. Lourdian Naidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh*³, the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, while allowing the petitions filed for quashing of the proceedings for the offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, 1956, held that Section 4 of the Act would attract only if a person knowingly lives on the earnings of the prostitution of any other person. The activity carried out in a given premises will amount to prostitution within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act, 1956 only if sexual abuse by exploitation of the person is done for commercial purpose. Neither the brothel keeper, sex worker nor the customer can be held liable under this Section.

22. *Naveen Kumar's case (supra)* is notable for its ready conflation of trafficking with sex work. The exceptions to the judicial trend of exonerating customers under the Act, 1956 are limited. As per the said judgment, customers cannot be tried for

³ 2013 (2) ALD CrI.393

the offences under the Act, 1956. It is only where the customer performs his role of procuring for another, the Courts adopted different interpretation of customer's liability under Section 370 (A) I.P.C.

23. In *Mohd. Riyaz v. State of Telangana (Crl.P.No.5803 of 2018, dated 27.06.2018)*, this Court took into consideration the varying opinions of the High Courts on customer liability under the Act, 1956 and Sections 370 and 370(A) I.P.C and held that customer was not liable to be prosecuted under Sections 3 and 5 of the Act, 1956 or Section 370 I.P.C., but, he could be held liable under Section 370 (A) I.P.C.

24. It is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the ingredients of Section 370 (A) I.P.C. are not at all attracted to the customers, even if Section 161 Cr.P.C statements disclose that the victims have voluntarily stepped into prostitution due to poverty and other family backgrounds.

25. While interpreting so, in *Mohd.Riyaz's case*, the learned Single Judge of this Court has opined that it is clear that the

petitioner therein allegedly came to brothel house and found in a room along with the sex worker, and therefore, he is liable to be proceeded with the trial for the offence under Section 370A(2) I.P.C. In the said case, the learned Judge conflated participation in sexual intercourse with prostitution although the definition of prostitution under the Act, 1956, requires sexual exploitation or abuse. He then conflated sexual intercourse with sexual exploitation and presumed that the sex worker was trafficked although there is no allusion to this in the facts recounted in the decision.

26. But, in the present cases, none of the witnesses/sex workers stated that they have been exploited sexually or of sexual abuse. In the absence of any material that the women are trafficked for the purpose of engaging for sexual exploitation, the offence under Section 370 (A)(2) I.P.C. will not attract against the customers. Further, the wording "trade to flesh" is not found in the said Section. As per Section 370 (A)(2) I.P.C., it is for the prosecution to always prove that the customer is also having reason *inter alia* to believe that the victim is trafficked, engages

persons for sexual exploitation. Then only the said Section is attracted.

27. As already stated supra, the complainant is always the Police Agency, who raids on the brothel houses, and that at that particular point of time, the customers whether knowingly by or having reason to believe that a person has been trafficked, engages such person for sexual exploitation in any manner have come to the brothel house or not, cannot be stated by the Police Agency at that particular point of time, in order to attract the said offence.

28. Furthermore, the persons, who are caught in the premises or in the surroundings of the brothel house, were also implicated for the offence under Section 370 (A) I.P.C. The reports or the proceedings issued by the police themselves disclose that the persons were not found along with the sex workers in the room and they were either waiting in or around the surroundings of the brothel house. Therefore, those persons cannot be termed as customers.

29. In any of the cases, neither the petitioners/customers nor the victims were subjected to medical evidence to prove that they had sexual intercourse and that the customers have sexually exploited the victims. None of the proceedings discloses about the said fact. Neither the contents of the proceedings of the police nor the 161 Cr.P.C. statements of the victims disclose that the customers knew or had a reason to believe that the women or minor were trafficked and that they were engaged for sexual exploitation.

30. Moreover, the petitioners were found only in the premises, but they were not found indulging in the act, in order to attract the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 370(A)(2) I.P.C.

31. Insofar as Section 370 I.P.C. is concerned, it envisages trafficking of person. As per the said Section, whoever for the purpose of exploitation (a) recruits, (b) transports, (c) harbours, (d) transfers or (e) receives a person or persons by using threats or using force, or any other form of coercion or by abduction or by practicing fraud, or deception or by abuse of power or by

inducement including the giving or receiving of payments or benefits, in order to achieve the consent of any person having control over the person, who is recruited, transported, harboured, transferred or received, commits the offence of trafficking.

32. The present cases are completely relating to the customers who have been involved in prostitution. Since Section 370 I.P.C. does not attract to the petitioners/customers herein, the question of trafficking of women in the present cases does not arise.

33. As already stated supra, insofar as the offence punishable under Section 370A I.P.C. is concerned, none of the statements of the victims disclose that they have been trafficked for the purpose of prostitution and were forced to do prostitution by the organizer. Further, the 161 Cr.P.C. statements of the victims clearly disclose that they are doing prostitution volitionally for the reasons best known to them. Therefore, Section 370A I.P.C. does not attract the facts of the cases on hand as far as the petitioners/customers are concerned, as the question of trafficking does not arise in the absence of the term "trafficking".

34. Insofar as the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Act, 1956 are concerned, in view of the law declared by different High Courts including this Court, the customers are not liable to be prosecuted for the said offences. Therefore, the petitioners cannot be held liable to be prosecuted for the offences under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Act, 1956.

35. As far as the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act, 1956, is concerned, the allegation of having sexual intercourse by paying money does not attract prostitution. Therefore, the customers cannot be held liable under Section 7 of the Act, 1956.

36. *Nextly*, none of the statements of the victims disclose that the victims have been trafficked for the purpose of prostitution and they were forced to do prostitution by the organizer.

37. For the foregoing discussion and having considered the authoritative principles of law and in the absence of any statement of the victims to the effect that the petitioners have approached them as customers, who were allegedly exploited, and since there is no sufficient material against the

petitioners/customers to prove that at the time of offence, the customers knowingly and had a reason to believe that the victims are trafficked women and engaged in sexual exploitation, this Court is of the considered view that the proceedings against the petitioners in the respective F.I.Rs/C.Cs/P.R.Cs/S.Cs are liable to be quashed.

38. Criminal Petition Nos.5073, 6183 and 7164 of 2023 are allowed quashing the proceedings against the petitioners therein in the respective Crimes mentioned therein;

39. Criminal Petition No. 6952 of 2023 is allowed quashing the proceedings against the petitioner therein in the Calendar Case mentioned therein;

40. Criminal Petition Nos. 5560, 6106, 6110, 6299, 6932, 6876, 6626, 7058 and 7140 of 2023 are allowed quashing the proceedings against the petitioners therein in the respective Preliminary Register Cases mentioned therein; and

41. Criminal Petition Nos. 5673, 5983, 5954, 6198, 6020, 6266, 6282 and 6717 of 2023 are also allowed quashing the proceedings

against the petitioners therein in the respective Sessions Cases mentioned therein.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.

G.ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY, J

Date: 16.08.2023

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