

**HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR**  
AT SRINAGAR

LPA No.28/2020 in [WP(Crl.) No.251/2019]  
with connected CMs: CM(1414/2020), CM(1099/2020),  
CM(1098/2020), CM(724/2020) & EMG-CM-05/2020.

Mian Abdul Qayoom

...Appellant

Through: Mr. Z. A. Shah, Sr. Advocate, with  
M/s N. A. Ronga, and  
Mian Tufail Ahmad, Advocates.

v.

Union Territory of J&K & ors.

...Respondent(s)

Through:

Mr. D. C. Raina, AG, assisted by  
Mr. B. A. Dar, Sr. AAG, and  
M/s Shah Aamir & Aseem Sawhney, AAGs.  
Mr. Tahir Shamsi, ASG, for UOI.

**Medium: Virtual Court Hearing**

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**Coram:**

**Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ali Mohammad Magrey, Judge**

**Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vinod Chatterji Koul, Judge**

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Whether approved for reporting: **Yes**

**ORDER**

**28.05.2020**

**Per Magrey, J:**

1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed on behalf of the detenu against the judgment dated 07.02.2020 passed in WP(Crl) no.251/2019 whereby the learned Writ Court has dismissed the writ petition for habeas corpus seeking quashing of the detenu's detention order under Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. A few relevant facts may be narrated.

2. The appellant-petitioner filed WP(Crl) no.251/2019 challenging the detention of her husband, Mian Abdul Qayoom, a practicing Advocate of this Court, ordered by the District Magistrate, Srinagar, in exercise of the powers under Section 8 of the J&K Public Safety Act, 1978 (JK PSA), in terms of his Order no.DMS/PSA/105/2019 dated 07.08.2019. The said order is shown to have been passed by the detaining authority on being satisfied that, with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it was necessary to detain him. The detention order so passed by the detaining authority was challenged by the appellant-petitioner, broadly, on the grounds: (i) that the detenu was not supplied the material documents on the basis of which the detaining authority had attained the requisite satisfaction; thereby the detenu was prevented from making an effective representation against his detention, violating the most precious right guaranteed to him; (ii) that the FIRs relied upon by the detaining authority to form his opinion pertain to the years 2008 and 2010, and that the allegations contained in these FIRs are stale in nature; therefore, the same could not form the basis for detaining the detenu, and that the detention order on that ground is vitiated; (iii) that the detenu was previously detained in the year 2010 and the very same FIRs and the allegations made therein were then relied upon for detaining the detenu, but that detention order was subsequently withdrawn; therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, these FIRs could not have been taken into account for detaining the detenu afresh, and that the detention order on that count is vitiated; (iv) that the grounds of detention are replica of the police dossier, and that the detaining authority has signed the order of detention and the grounds of detention without application of mind; therefore, the detention of the detenu suffers from non-application of mind on the part of the detaining

authority; (v) that the grounds of detention are vague, indefinite, uncertain and ambiguous; (vi) that the detaining authority has not shown his awareness in the grounds of detention about the present status of the 2008 and 2010 FIRs and whether the detenu had filed any application for bail therein; and (vii) that the detenu was taken into preventive custody under Sections 107/151 Cr. P. C. during the intervening night of 4/5<sup>th</sup> August, 2019 and the detaining authority has not shown any compelling reason for ordering his detention under the provisions of the Public Safety Act in face of the fact that the detenu was already in preventive custody.

3. The learned Writ Court, vide its judgment impugned in this appeal, dismissed the writ petition with the following concluding para:

“21. To sum up, a law of preventive detention is not invalid because it prescribed no objective standard for ordering preventive detention, and leaves the matter to subjective satisfaction of the Executive. The reason for this view is that preventive detention is not punitive but preventive and is resorted to with a view to prevent a person from committing activities regarded as prejudicial to certain objects that the law of preventive detention seeks to prescribe. Preventive detention is thus, based on suspicion or anticipation and not on proof. The responsibility for security of State, or maintenance of public order, or essential services and supplies, rests on the Executive and it must, therefore, have necessary powers to order preventive detention. Having said that, subjective satisfaction of a detaining authority to detain a person or not, is not open to objective assessment by a Court. A Court is not a proper forum to scrutinise the merits of administrative decision to detain a person. The Court cannot substitute its own satisfaction for that of the authority concerned and decide whether its satisfaction was reasonable or proper, or whether in the circumstances of the matter, the person concerned should have been detained or not. It is often said and held that the Courts do not even go into the question whether the facts mentioned in grounds of detention are correct or false. The reason for the rule is that to decide this, evidence may have to be taken by the Courts and that is not

the policy of law of preventive detention. This matter lies within the competence of Advisory Board. While saying so, this Court does not sit in appeal over decision of detaining authority and cannot substitute its own opinion over that of detaining authority when grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant.”

*(Underlining supplied)*

4. At the hearing of this LPA, Mr. Z. A. Shah, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellant, invited the attention of the Court to the Detention Order no. DMS/PSA/105/2019 dated 07.08/2019 and the grounds of detention served on the detenu. He submitted that in terms of the detention order, the detaining authority had gone through and perused the Police Dossier and other connected documents placed before him by the Sr. Superintendent of Police vide communication no. LGL/Det.3108/2019/6167-70 dated 06.08.2019; whereas in the grounds of detention the detaining authority stated that he had perused four FIRs, [viz. FIR no.74/2008 U/S 13 ULA (P) Act, 132 RP Act P/S Kothibagh; FIR no.27/2010 U/S 13 ULA (P) Act, 188 RPC P/S Kothibagh; FIR no.15/2010 U/S 505(II) RPC, 153, 121 RPC P/S Maisuma; and FIR no.55/2020 U/S 24-A 188, 341 RPC P/S Maisuma]; the Police Dossier submitted before him by the Sr. Superintendent of Police, Srinagar; the Case Diaries of the FIRs; the reports and the newspaper reports, besides referring to the proceedings initiated against the detenu under Sections 107/151 Cr. P. C. in connection with which he was in preventive custody on the date of passing of the detention order. Mr. Shah, further, inviting the attention of the Court to the endorsement contained in the detention order, submitted that while forwarding the detention order to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Srinagar, for execution, the detaining authority ordered that it shall be ensured that the entire material relied upon was supplied to the detenu, but while endorsing a copy of communication no.DMS/PSA/Jud/3866-68 dated 07.08.2019 to the Superintendent, the detaining authority mentioned

only grounds of detention, copy of FIR and the said letter to be served on the detenu. The detenu, according to the learned senior counsel, was, in fact, supplied only ten leaves comprising detention order (1 leaf), grounds of detention (3 leaves), FIR copies (05 leaves) and communication no.DMS/PSA/Jud/3866-68 dated 07.08.2019 informing the detenu that he had been detained in terms of the above order, and that he could make a representation to him and the Government. The learned senior counsel submitted that the detenu, thus, was not provided the other materials viz. the Police Dossier, Case Diaries, reports, newspaper reports and the proceedings under section 107/151 Cr. P. C. perused by the detaining authority and on the basis of which he had attained his subjective satisfaction that, with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it was necessary to detain him under the provisions of the Public Safety Act. The learned counsel submitted that for lack of such material, the detenu was prevented from making an effective representation to the detaining authority and the Government against his detention, and was, thus, deprived of his most precious right of making the representation, guaranteed to him by law. The learned senior counsel submitted that because of such a failure, the detention of the detenu is rendered illegal; therefore, the detention order is liable to be quashed. The learned senior counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in holding that the contentions raised in this regard are meretricious. The learned counsel submitted that it has consistently been held by the Supreme Court that non-supply of all the materials, relied upon by the detaining authority to arrive at the requisite satisfaction, renders the detention order illegal and is a sufficient ground for quashing the order of detention. To buttress his submission, the learned counsel cited and relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Thahira Haris v Govt. of Karnataka*, (2009) 11 SCC 438.

5. It was next argued by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the grounds of detention supplied to the detenue do not attribute any specific instance of activity to the detenue. Instead, these grounds give out that the detaining authority assumed the requisite satisfaction on the basis of the contents of the FIRs and other materials placed before and perused by him. The learned senior counsel submitted that, apart from the fact that the grounds of detention are wholly vague, since the FIRs, admittedly, pertain to the years 2008 and 2010, the allegations, whatever, levelled therein are stale, being 9 to 11 years old. The learned counsel submitted that it is settled law that past conduct of a detenue is not relevant and has no live and proximate link with immediate need to detain him preventively. According to the learned counsel, the detenue has been detained on stale grounds. Concomitantly, it was argued that since the detenue was already in preventive custody of the respondents on the date of his detention, the detaining authority has not shown any compelling reason that despite that fact, it was necessary to detain him under the provisions of Public Safety Act. To bring home these points, the learned senior counsel cited and relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Sama Aruna v State of Telangana*, (2018) 12 SCC 150.

6. The learned counsel further submitted that the detenue was also taken into preventive detention under the provisions of JK PSA in 2010 and in the grounds of detention then served upon him the very same four FIRs registered in 2008 and 2010 were mentioned and taken into consideration to detain him. However, that detention order was subsequently withdrawn. It was submitted that this being the factual position, it was not open to the detaining authority to have relied on the very same FIRs and allegations contained therein to again detain the detenue 09 years later. According to the learned counsel when such is the

situation, the detention order is vitiated. In this regard, the learned counsel cited and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in *Chhagan Bhagwan Kahar v N. L. Kalna*, (1989) 2 SCC 318.

7. Citing *Rajesh Vashdev Adnani v State of Maharashtra*, (2005) 8 SCC 390, the learned senior counsel submitted that the grounds of detention are the reproduction of the Police Dossier verbatim, suggesting that the detaining authority did not apply his mind and, therefore, the detention order suffers from non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority, and, hence, it is vitiated.

8. The learned senior counsel also submitted that the detention order is also vitiated on two other counts: first, that the detaining authority was obliged to convey to the detenu that he could make representation to him until the order was approved by the State Government within 12 days of its passing and, in this connection, the learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in *State of Maharashtra v Santosh Shankar Acharya*, AIR 2000 SC 2504; and second, relying on a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in *Jitendra v. District Magistrate*, 2004 CriLJ 2967, that it was imperative upon the detaining authority to communicate to the detenu the time limit in which he could make a representation to him.

9. Further, inviting the attention of this Court to Sections 17 and 18 of the JK PSA, the learned senior counsel argued that there is no power vested in the Government to extend the period of detention of a detenu beyond the period it is ordered and continued after confirmation under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act. The learned counsel submitted that the provision in the Act which governs revocation, modification or extension of an order of detention is sub-section (2) of Section 18. However, the extensions in respect of the detention of the detenu, admittedly, have not been ordered under the said provision, but have been ordered under clause

(a) of sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act, which does not relate to extensions. He further submitted that even the power of extension under sub-section (2) of Section 18 is relatable to foreigners, and that the detenu is not a foreigner. The sum and substance of the submission made is that the extensions granted in the detention of the detenu are not governed by the law and hence illegal.

10. The learned counsel also argued that the allegations contained in the FIRs against the detenu do not fall within the definition of the phrase ‘acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’ as given in Section 8(3)(b) of the Act. He submitted that the impugned order is, therefore, unfounded and vitiated.

11. We may summarise the principal arguments of Mr. Z. A. Shah, learned senior counsel, for the appellant. They are:

- i) first, that the detenu was not supplied all the materials on the basis of which the detaining authority had derived the requisite satisfaction;
- ii) second, that the FIRs and the allegations contained therein are stale – 9 to 11 years old – having no proximity to lend a suspicion to the detaining authority that the detenu may disturb public order;
- iii) third, that since the detenu was detained in 2010 on the very same FIRs and allegations contained therein, he could not have been detained anew on the very same allegations and material and on the basis of his past conduct;
- iv) fourth, that the grounds of detention are the reproduction of the Police Dossier verbatim, suggesting that the detaining authority did not apply his mind and, therefore, the detention

order suffers from non-application of mind and, hence, is vitiated;

- iv) fifth, that since the detaining authority did not convey to the detenu that he could make representation to him until the order was approved by the State Government within 12 days of its passing, specifying the time limit for the said purpose, the detention order is vitiated;
- vi) six, that the extensions accorded in the detention order of the detenu are not covered by the provisions of the Act; therefore, the same are illegal;
- vii) seven, that the activities attributed to the detenu in the allegations contained in the FIRs against the detenu do not fall within the definition of the phrase 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order'; hence the detention order is unfounded.

12. It may be mentioned here that on the earlier hearings of the case, the UT respondents were represented by Mr. B. A. Dar, Sr. AAG. However, today Mr. D. C. Raina, learned Advocate General, assisted by Mr. B. A. Dar, Sr. AAG, and M/s Shah Aamir & Aseem Sawhney, AAGs, appeared in the case. The learned Advocate General, apart from submitting that the points urged and argued by the learned counsel for the detenu have been already dealt with in detail by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, raised a specific point *vis-à-vis* the grounds of detention in the instant case and made submissions in relation thereto. Mr. B. A. Dar, assisting the learned Advocate General, cited some judgments in support of their submissions. Before we come to the specific point raised by the

learned Advocate General, we deem it appropriate to examine the judgments cited at the Bar on either side.

13. In *Thahira Haris v Govt. of Karnataka* (supra), cited by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, the main allegation against the detenu was that he was abetting smuggling of red sanders out of the country. The Supreme Court was considering the impact of non-supply of relied upon and relevant documents on the detention order. In doing so, the Supreme Court took note of and relied upon 15 of its earlier decisions, from *Ram Krishan Bhardwaj (Dr.) v State of Delhi*, 1953 SCR 708, to *District Collector, Ananthapur v V. Laxmanna*, (2005) 3 SCC 663, and laid down as under:

“29. There were several grounds on which the detention of the detenu was challenged in these appeals but it is not necessary to refer to all the grounds since on the ground of not supplying the relied upon document, continued detention of the detenu becomes illegal and the detention order has to be quashed on that ground alone.

30. Our Constitution provides adequate safeguards under clauses (5) and (6) of Article 22 to the detenu who has been detained in pursuance of the order made under any law providing for preventive detention. He has the right to be supplied with copies of all documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention without any delay. The predominant object of communicating the grounds of detention is to enable the detenu at the earliest opportunity to make effective and meaningful representation against his detention.

31. On proper construction of clause (5) of Article 22 read with Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is imperative for valid continuance of detention that the detenu must be supplied with all documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention.

32. In the instant case, admittedly, the relied upon documents, the detention order of Anil Kumar was not supplied to the detenu and the detenu was prevented from making effective

representation which has violated his constitutional right under clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution.”

14. In the decisions referred to and quoted in the above judgment of the Supreme Court, it has been, *inter alia*, laid down that in terms of the mandate of Article 22 of the Constitution the grounds on which the detention order is passed must be communicated to the detenu as expeditiously as possible and proper opportunity of making representation against the detention order must be provided. The phrase proper opportunity has been further elaborated by laying down that where there is an express statutory obligation to communicate not merely the decision but the grounds on which the decision is founded, it is a necessary corollary that the grounds communicated, that is, the grounds so made known, should be seen to pertain to pertinent and proximate matters and should comprise all the constituent facts and materials that went into making up the mind of the statutory functionary and not merely the inferential conclusions. What is meant is that the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenu. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them.

15. Above is the gist of what the Supreme Court has laid down on the point from time to time, as mentioned and quoted in the aforesaid decision viz. *Thahira Haris v Govt. of Karnataka* (supra).

16. In response to the above, Mr. B. A. Dar, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Gautam Jain v Union of India*, (2017) 3 SCC 133, submitted that if there are a number of grounds mentioned in the grounds of detention, the detention can be sustained on a single solitary ground if

the materials mentioned therein have been supplied to the detenu. He, in this connection, invited the attention of the Court to the grounds of detention and submitted that there is one such ground mentioning the supply of FIRs to the detenu. The above judgment seems to be somewhat crucial in context of the first of the points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, referred to hereinabove. In that case, viz. *Gautam Jain v Union of India*, the appellant before the Supreme Court was detained pursuant to a detention order passed under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. He was served with the grounds of detention as well as copies of certain relied upon documents with translation thereof. He filed writ petition in the High Court of Delhi, *inter alia*, for issuance of writ of habeas corpus with direction to the respondents to set him to liberty and for quashing the detention order. According to the appellant, complete set of documents, which were relied upon by the respondent therein, were not supplied. He had made representation to the detaining authority requesting for revocation of the detention order or, in the alternative, supply of complete documents/information, which was followed by another representation. According to the detenu therein, the representations were not considered.

17. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. As reflected in para 3 of the Supreme Court judgment, the High Court accepted the plea of the detenu that there was failure on the part of the respondents to furnish certain documents qua one particular allegation in the detention order, but it still upheld the detention order invoking the principle of segregation of grounds enumerated in Section 5-A of the Act. The High Court had come to the conclusion that there were various grounds which formed the basis of the detention order and even if the documents pertaining to one

particular ground were not furnished, that ground could be ignored applying the principle of segregation and on remaining grounds, the detention order was still sustainable.

18. Before the Supreme Court, the plea taken by the appellant was that the principle of severability of grounds, which was enshrined in Section 5-A of the Act, was not applicable to the case as the detention order was passed on one ground only in support of which few instances were given in the grounds of detention annexed with the detention order which could not be treated as different grounds. It was argued that those instances, forming part of detention order, were only further particulars or subsidiary facts rather than the basic facts which were integral part of, and constituted the grounds of detention. It was this aspect of the matter which, the Supreme Court expressed, needed examination.

19. In that case, the grounds of detention, in support of the order of detention, ran into 46 pages which enumerated various activities in which the detenu was indulging in making and receiving hawala payments upon the instruments received from abroad by him; and the detenu was making such hawala payments from his business premises as well as residential premises. Searches were conducted at his business place as well as at his residential premises. Indian currency to the tune of huge amounts was recovered from both places and seizure of incriminating documents was made at both places. Searches were also conducted against one Pooran Chand Sharma. Statements of various persons were recorded, particulars whereof were given along with utterances by those persons in a nutshell. Grounds of detention also referred to the summons which was issued to the detenu pursuant to which his statement was recorded and gist of the said statement was incorporated in the grounds. Various admissions

recording hawala transactions given by the appellant in his statement were also mentioned. Retraction of the statement was also taken note of.

20. Before the High Court, the plea taken to challenge the detention order was the failure on the part of the detaining authority to supply certain relied upon documents mentioned in the statement of one of the persons whose statements were recorded, namely, Pooran Chand Sharma. In the grounds of detention, statement of Pooran Chand Sharma was referred to from paras 37 to 41 wherein it was also mentioned that searches conducted against Pooran Chand Sharma had revealed that the appellant had continued to remain involved in prejudicial hawala dealings even in August 2009. According to the detinue, non-supply of these documents, which were very material, deprived him of his valuable right to make effective and purposeful representation.

21. The above factual position was not disputed by the respondents. However, they argued that the documents were not material and, therefore, non-supply thereof did not act to the prejudice of the detinue.

22. The High Court negatived the above plea of the respondents, holding that the said assertion was contrary to specific words and statement made in paras 37, 38 and 41 of the detention order and could not, therefore, be accepted. The High Court found that Pooran Chand Sharma had been confronted with a specific document seized during the search operation and he had implicated the detinue. The High Court held that this was a relied upon document and even otherwise it was a relevant document and formed the basis of the assertions made in paras 37, 38 and 41 of the grounds of detention. Nonetheless, the High Court had taken the view that paragraphs relating to seizure details in case of Pooran Chand Sharma, implicating the detinue, constituted a separate ground, which was severable on the application of the principle of segregation, as the

detention order was based on multiple grounds. The High Court also pointed out various grounds mentioned in the detention order, holding them to be different grounds.

23. It was argued before the Supreme Court that there was only one ground of detention on the basis of which the detention was passed, namely, 'preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation and augmentation of foreign exchange in future and the grounds of detention, which were given in support thereof, were, in fact, various instances to support the said ground. In other words, the submission was that the order was passed only on one ground viz. activities of the appellant were prejudicial to the conservation and augmentation of foreign exchange, and that the other grounds could only be those as mentioned in clauses (i) to (v) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, like smuggling of goods, abetting the smuggling of goods etc. but none of those grounds was invoked. The Supreme Court, after considering its earlier decisions on the point, as cited at the Bar, in para 22 of the judgment, held as under:

“22. From the above noted judgments, some guidance as to what constitutes 'grounds', forming the basis of detention order, can be easily discerned. In the first instance, it is to be mentioned that these grounds are the 'basic facts' on which conclusions are founded and these are different from subsidiary facts or further particulars of these basic facts. From the aforesaid, it is clear that each 'basic fact' would constitute a ground and particulars in support thereof or the details would be subsidiary facts or further particulars of the said basic facts which will be integral part of the 'grounds'. Section 3 of the Act does not use the term 'grounds'. No other provision in the Act defines 'grounds'. Section 3(3) deals with communication of the detention order and states that 'grounds' on which the order has been made shall be communicated to the detenu as soon as the order of detention is passed and fixes the time limit within which such detention order is to be

passed. It is here the expression 'grounds' is used and it is for this reason that detailed grounds on which the detention order is passed are supplied to the detenu. Various circumstances which are given under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, on the basis of which detention order can be passed, cannot be treated as 'grounds'. On the contrary, *Chamanlal Manjibhai Soni's* case clarifies that there is only one purpose of the Act, namely, preventing smuggling and all other grounds, whether there are one or more would be relatable to the various activities of smuggling. This shows that different instances would be treated as different 'grounds' as they constitute basic facts making them essentially factual constituents of the 'grounds' and the further particulars which are given in respect of those instances are the subsidiary details. This view of ours gets strengthened from the discussion in *Vakil Singh's* case where 'grounds' are referred to as 'materials on which the order of detention is primarily based'. The Court also pointed out that these 'grounds' must contain the pith and substance of primary facts but not subsidiary facts or evidential details.

*(Underlining supplied)*

Applying the aforesaid test to the facts of that case, the Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion of the High Court that the order of detention was based on multiple grounds inasmuch as various different acts, which formed separate grounds, were mentioned, on the basis of which the detaining authority had formed the opinion that it was desirable to put the detenu under detention. Therein the High Court had dissected the order of detention, which the Supreme Court found was the correct exercise done by the High Court.

24. In the instant case, admittedly, the detenu has been detained on the satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Srinagar, that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it was necessary to do so. This satisfaction of the District Magistrate is founded on the grounds of detention which read as under:

“Sub: Grounds of detention under J&K Public Safety Act for detention of Miyan Abdul Qayoom S/o Miyan Abdul Rehman

Miyan Abdul Qayoom S/O Miyan Abdul Rehman aged approximately 76 years, R/O Bulbulbagh, District Srinagar is President of J&K High Court Bar Association (Srinagar Wing) since long and has adverse record in view of his active involvement in various cases registered against subject in District Srinagar under various laws.

Miyan Abdul Qayoom (hereinafter referred as the Subject) over a period of time has emerged as one of the most staunch advocates of secessionist ideology. His believe that Jammu and Kashmir is disputed territory and it has to be seceded from Union of Indian (*sic*) and to annex with Pakistan has been repeatedly articulated in public for a through (*sic*) his speeches, appeals and active participation in such activities. The role of subject has remained highly objectionable and he was indicted many times in past for secessionist activities which can be gauged from the fact that at least 04 criminal cases have been registered against him and his other associates for violating various laws whose sanctity they are supposed to uphold in highest esteem. I have examined the record produced *viz-a-viz* secessionist activities which include the FIRs and reports in the matter.

It has been in the past that subject used every occasion to propagate secessionist ideology and even allows known secessionist elements to use platform of Kashmir High Court Bar Association, besides, subject has gone to extent of even sponsoring strikes as President Bar Association, thus instigating general public to indulge in activities which are prejudicial to maintenance of public order, be it land row agitation of 2008 and Law and order situation arisen in Kashmir valley after the neutralization of terrorist Burhan Wani in 2016 which lead to violence of serious nature leaving many people dead, or any other agitation which has taken place in valley in general and Srinagar in particular, role of subject has been found highly objectionable to the maintenance of Law and order. The subject has been found indulging in activities which are aimed at propagating secessionist ideology and to lend support to terrorist and secessionist activities. The subject for achieving this objective has been misusing platform of Bar Association which is regarded with esteem as per the status given to it in

the constitutional system. Investigation conducted in various cases registered against subject have indicated deep involvement of subject in instigating such activities in the state. A number of newspaper reports have also been presented before me substantiating the case made out by the District Police in the matter which clearly indicates the secessionist activities of the subject.

The details of the cases registered against the subject are mentioned as under:

FIR no.74/2008 U/S 13 ULA (P) Act, 132 RP Act P/S  
Kothibagh

FIR no.27/2010 U/S 13 ULA (P) Act, 188 RPC P/S  
Kothibagh

FIR no.15/2010 U/S 505(II) RPC, 153, 121 RPC P/S  
Maisuma

FIR no.55/2020 U/S 24-A 188, 341 RPC P/S Maisuma

The examination of cases registered against him reveals that despite holding a responsible position of Bar Association President he wilfully and actively indulged in unlawful activities and instigated the people for violence thereby disturbing the public order.

In view of various decisions taken by the Union Government on 05/08/2019, there is every likelihood / apprehension that subject will instigate general public to resort to violence which would disturb public peace and tranquillity and create circumstances which would disturb maintenance of public order.

Owing to the track record of the subject and agencies' inputs about his likely involvement to instigating the public he has been arrested in terms of 107/151 Cr. P. C. and is presently in custody. The matter of detention under the J&K Public Safety Act in case of person already in custody was considered in light of the judgments of Hon'ble High Court in this regard wherein it has been broadly underlined that the detaining authority has to show compelling reasons for directing preventive detention. There are sufficient compelling reasons for preventive detention of the accused in view of his active involvement in secessionist cases notwithstanding the legal position held by him as President of the JKHC Bar Association, and the detention under Sections

107/151 Cr. P. C. is temporary in nature resorted to as an exigency by the local Executive Magistrate based on such police report.

The dossier submitted by the Sr. Superintendent of Police, Srinagar, was examined thoroughly along with the case diaries of the FIRs mentioned therein and present status of these cases. Given the gravity of criminal offences the subject indulged in it is evidently clear that his instigation in many cases (*sic*) and personally spearheading agitations especially with secessionist ideology and actions thereupon he, on several occasions, endangers public life and property by disturbing the peace and order. Based on such record as has been produced before me and examination of the FIRs registered against him over a period of time, I am of the firm view and strong opinion that the subject could not be prevented from his activities under ordinary law.

In order to stop subject from indulging in activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order, peace and tranquillity, his detention under provisions of Public Safety Act- 1978 at this stage has become imperative.

In view of the contents of dossier submitted by the Sr. Superintendent of Police, Srinagar, case diaries / copies of FIR examined and material facts produced before me, I have concluded that there is every likelihood of the subject indulging in such activities of grave nature which may lead to disturbance of public order and tranquillity hence for maintenance of peace in the region his detention under the Section 8(1)(a) of the J&K Public Safety Act 1978 is required indispensably and all other options of preventing him from indulging in such activities stand exhausted as well as no other legal remedy or option is available at this stage to contain his activities to strongly prejudicial to maintenance of public order(*sic*).”

25. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid grounds of detention, it is clearly observable that most of them are somewhat clumsy, but the basic fact remains that the detaining authority is shown to have assumed his satisfaction on number of grounds and one such ground, separately and

distinctly stated is the one mentioning the details of the cases registered against the detenu which is the following para:

“The details of the cases registered against the subject are mentioned as under:

FIR no.74/2008 U/S 13 ULA (P) Act, 132 RP Act P/S  
Kothibagh

FIR no.27/2010 U/S 13 ULA (P) Act, 188 RPC P/S  
Kothibagh

FIR no.15/2010 U/S 505(II) RPC, 153, 121 RPC P/S  
Maisuma

FIR no.55/2020 U/S 24-A 188, 341 RPC P/S Maisuma

The examination of cases registered against him reveals that despite holding a responsible position of Bar Association President he wilfully and actively indulged in unlawful activities and instigated the people for violence thereby disturbing the public order.”

In this ground the detaining authority has exclusively considered these FIRs and no other document.

26. There is a provision in the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, (JK PSA) akin to the one contained in the enactment under which the detention of detenu in *Gautam Jain v Union of India* was passed. And that is Section 10-A which reads as under:

“10-A. Grounds of detention severable. –

Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under Section 8 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly –

(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one of some of the grounds is or are –

- (i) vague
- (ii) non-existent,

- (iii) not relevant,
- (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or
- (v) invalid for any other reasons whatsoever, and it is not therefore, possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in Section 8 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention;

(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said Section after being satisfied as provided in that Section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds.”

27. Going by the aforesaid provision of the JK PSA, the grounds of detention are severable and, therefore, a detention order would sustain even on a solitary single ground contained in the grounds of detention, independent of the other grounds, in the event the necessary procedural safeguards *vis-à-vis* that ground have duly been adhered to by the detaining authority.

28. As mentioned above, in the instant case, in one of the grounds of detention, quoted separately hereinabove, the detaining authority has exclusively considered the four FIRs registered against the detinue, and expressed his satisfaction therein on the basis of such FIRs, independent of the other materials referred to by him in other grounds of detention. In that view of the matter, in terms of Section 10-A(a) of the JK PSA, the detaining authority shall be deemed to have made the impugned order of detention after being satisfied with reference to the aforesaid ground of detention. So the detention order on that ground would sustain.

29. It may, however, be mentioned here that Sub-section (a)(iv) of Section 10-A of the JK PSA further provides that such order shall not be

deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one of some of the grounds is or are not proximately connected with such person. The FIRs mentioned in the ground referred to by us hereinabove pertain to the years 2008 and 2010. So the question is if the detention order would be sustainable on the aforesaid ground exclusively relying on the FIRs, would it still be hit by reason of the fact that the FIRs are stale. This question would relate to the arguments advanced at the Bar by Mr. D. C. Raina, learned Advocate General and would be attended to later hereinbelow.

30. So, in view of the above discussion and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in *Gautam Jain v Union of India*, as regards the first of the main arguments raised by Mr. Shah, learned senior counsel, that the detinue was not supplied all the materials on the basis of which the detaining authority had derived the requisite satisfaction, thus fails, since the detention order would be sustainable on the single solitary ground mentioned hereinabove.

31. Coming to the second point raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, in *Sama Aruna v State of Telangana* (supra), relied upon and cited by him at the Bar, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the point involved was stale grounds. Therein, the husband of the appellant had been charged for various offences of criminal conspiracy, cheating, kidnapping and extortion, which he had allegedly committed during the years 2002-2007 and four FIRs pertaining to land grabbing had been registered. In three of the FIRs he was enlarged on bail. To prevent him from seeking bail in the fourth FIR, while in judicial custody, he was detained under the provisions of the law providing for preventive detention. In fact, there were two other crimes registered against the detinue in the years 2013 and 2014, but the detaining authority had taken into account only four older crimes which pertained to the period 2002 to

2007. The Supreme Court in para 12 of the judgment in this regard observed as under:

“12. The four cases which are old and therefore, stale, pertain to the period from 2002 to 2007. They pertain to land grabbing and hence, we are not inclined to consider the impact of those cases on public order, etc. We are satisfied that they ought to have been excluded from consideration on the ground that they are stale and could not have been used to detain the detinue in the year 2016 under the 1986 Act which empowers the detaining authority to do so with a view to prevent a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.”

32. The Apex Court in para 22 of the judgment further said as under:

“22. We are of the view, that the detention order in this case is vitiated by taking into account incidents so far back in the past as would have no bearing on the immediate need to detain him without a trial. The satisfaction of the authority is not in respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied. Incidents which are stale, cease to have relevance to the subject matter of the enquiry and must be treated as extraneous to the scope of and purpose of the statute.

33. Concluding, the Supreme Court, in para 26 of the judgment, laid down as under:

“26. The influence of the stale incidents in the detention order is too pernicious to be ignored, and the order must therefore go; both on account of being vitiated due to malice in law and for taking into account matters which ought not to have been taken into account.”

34. It may be mentioned here that in the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court referred to and relied upon 21 earlier decisions, starting from *Queen on the Prosecution of Richard Westbrook v. Vestry of St. Pancras*, (1890) LR 24 QBD 371 (CA), to *G. Reddeiah v. State of A. P.*, (2012) 2 SCC 389. In one such decisions, namely, *Khudiram Das v. State*

of *W. B.* (1975) 2 SCC 81, referred to and quoted in the judgment, it was held as under:

“9... The grounds on which the satisfaction is based must be such as a rational human being can consider connected with the fact in respect of which the satisfaction is to be reached. They must be relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry and must not be extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute. If the authority has taken into account, it may even be with the best of intention, as a relevant factor something which it could not properly take into account in deciding whether or not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it should be exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad *Partap Singh v State of Punjab* (AIR 1964 SC 72). If there are to be found in the statute expressly or by implication matters which the authority ought to have regard to, then, in exercising the power, the authority must have regard to those matters. The authority must call its attention to the matters which it is bound to consider.”

35. So far as the third point raised by the learned senior counsel, referred to above, and the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Chhagan Bhagwan Kahar v N. L. Kalna* (supra) relied upon by him in that connection, is concerned, therein the detinue was detained to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order. The principal allegation against him was that he was illegally keeping in possession country liquor and openly selling the same, and was conducting a den (*adda*). The Supreme Court in this case dealt with and disposed of the petition on the sole contention raised that the detaining authority had taken into consideration the previous grounds of detention which had been the subject matter of an earlier petition filed before the High Court of Gujarat and wherein the High Court had quashed the order of detention. In the grounds of the fresh detention, the detaining authority had, in fact, made a reference to the previous order and the allegations made therein. The detinue challenged the fresh detention order on the ground that since his

earlier detention order on the same grounds had been quashed by the High Court, fresh detention order on the very same grounds was vitiated. Referring to some of its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court in para 12 of the judgment laid down as under:

“12. It emerges from the above authoritative judicial pronouncements that even if the order of detention comes to an end either by revocation or by expiry of the period of detention, there must be fresh facts for passing a subsequent order...”.

36. In the above case, the detaining authority had made an explanatory statement in the counter saying that the earlier proceeding was considered only for limited purpose of taking note of the detenu's continued involvement in bootlegging activities, but the entire grounds of earlier detention as they were, were not considered. The Supreme Court, however, expressed its inability to accept this explanation because the detaining authority, in the counter, in clear terms had expressed that he had considered the earlier grounds of detention also and copy of the earlier grounds had also been supplied to the detenu alongwith the fresh grounds. The Apex court, in these circumstances, held that the order of detention was vitiated on the ground that the detaining authority had taken into consideration the grounds of the earlier detention order alongwith other materials for passing the fresh order.

37. Responding to the arguments of the learned senior counsel on the 2<sup>nd</sup> and the 3<sup>rd</sup> point raised by him, referred to hereinabove, the learned Advocate General, while strenuously defending not only the detention order, but also the impugned judgment, submitted that there is a distinction between the activities attributed to and alleged against the various detenues involved in the decisions cited at the Bar by the learned senior counsel, and the act(s) attributed to the detenu herein, in that, given the nature of

the criminal activities attributed to the detenues in the above cases, there is great probability that the adverse effects and impacts of such activities on the maintenance of public order may vanish and lapse with the passage of time, unless repeated in the immediate past; whereas the act(s) or activities attributed to and alleged against the detainee herein, reflected in the FIRs, are not such acts as, if once committed, would be treated as acts done in the past, and finished. The learned Advocate General submitted that the FIRs and the grounds of detention depict and relate to the secessionist ideology of the detainee, entertained, developed, nourished and nurtured by him over decades, which subserves disturbance in public order by the fringe elements in the Society, particularly the immature youth, who are susceptible to excitements. Such ideology nourished and nurtured by the detainee is not and cannot be confined or limited to time to qualify it to be called stale or fresh or proximate, unless, of course, the person concerned declares and establishes by conduct and expression that he has shunned the ideology. According to the learned Advocate General, it is this subsistent ideology, specified in the FIRs, nourished and nurtured by the detainee, which is detrimental to the maintenance of public order and which is always pertinent and proximate, for, there is a suspicion that the detainee has the potential to use it any time to disturb the public order. The learned Advocate General submitted that such suspicion is not imaginary but is founded on the conduct of the detainee as delineated in the FIRs which have duly been supplied to him and which is established by the intelligence reports.

38. The learned Advocate General submitted that in light of the above, the judgments cited at the Bar are wholly distinguishable on facts and not attracted in the instant case, and that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge in its judgment, that the grounds of detention served

on the detinue are precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant, does not suffer from any illegality. The learned Advocate General further submitted that viewed in that context, once the ideology and the mannerism of activities resorted to by the detinue to subserve this ideology in the past are brought home to him through the grounds of detention and the FIRs, it would constitute a proper opportunity afforded to him, especially so given his professional background in law, and that nothing more than the contents of the FIRs and of the grounds of detention furnished to him could spell out to him his ideology and the activities resorted to by him in the past which have satisfied the detaining authority that with a view to preventing him from acting in any such manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it was necessary to detain him. The learned Advocate General, in this regard, cited and relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Union of India v. Simple Happy Dhakad*, AIR 2019 SC 3428, particularly paragraph 43 thereof.

39. Mr. Z. A. Shah, learned senior counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, submitted that being a secessionist or having a secessionist ideology is a ground relatable to the maintenance of security of the State. Such is not the case *vis-à-vis* the detinue herein; for, admittedly, he has been detained allegedly for activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. He submitted that the submission made is thus belied by the detention order itself. However, he submitted that assuming for a moment, without admitting it, that a person does entertain such an ideology, that ideology must have an outer manifestation, i.e., it must have some practical conduct on the part of the detinue and that practical conduct must result in violation of some law. Citing an example, he submitted that if a person forges, for instance, a court order, but does not use the same, it would not amount to any offence. The learned counsel submitted that even if it be

assumed that the detinue was holding such an ideology in 2010, he has not violated any law. He submitted that Article 19 of the Constitution gives the citizen a right of speech and a citizen can speak on whatever his ideology may be; he does not commit an offence as long as he does not violate any law. He further submitted that the fact that there is no case of any criminal nature registered against the detinue since 2010 is an incontrovertible proof of the fact that, though the detinue may be holding an ideology, but he has not violated any law. Consequently, his activities could not be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

40. Before examining the judgment in *Union of India v. Simple Happy Dhakad* (supra), cited and relied upon by the learned Advocate General, we may observe that preventive detention is only preventive in nature, to prevent a person from acting in a particular manner which the competent authority may think is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order; it is not punitive for the commission of an offence. If a person forges a court order and keeps it in his pocket, there is always a suspicion that he may use it unless the forged order is discarded by him to the satisfaction of the competent authority. Until he discards it, there is always likelihood and apprehension that he may use it, and, with a view to preventing him from using it, the competent authority can take the measures under the preventive detention laws. So is the case with an ideology; one may not have violated any law in the immediate past, but if the detaining authority has suspicion that the person holding such an ideology has the potential to do so, he can take the measures permissible within the law to prevent him from doing so. The question only is whether past conduct or activities can lend succor to such a suspicion and whether such past conduct or activities

emanating from an ideology can be said to be stale? Let us see if the judgments cited at the Bar lend an answer to this question.

41. In *Union of India v. Simple Happy Dhakad* (supra), the questions those arose for consideration before the Supreme Court were spelled out in para 11 of the judgment wherein it was observed as under:

“11. ... The following points arise for consideration in these appeals:

- (i) Whether the orders of detention were vitiated on the ground that relied upon documents were not served along with the orders of detention and grounds of detention? Whether there was sufficient compliance of the provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act?
- (ii) Whether the High Court was right in quashing the detention orders merely on the ground that the detaining authority has not expressly satisfied itself about the imminent possibility of the detenu being released on bail?”

Obviously, the above two questions are not directly linked with the questions arising in the instant case. However, what was said by the Supreme Court in para 43 thereof assumes importance when it comes to the role of the High Court in dealing with a Habeas Corpus petition. Para 43 of the judgment is quoted hereunder:

“43. The court must be conscious that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is “subjective” in nature and the court cannot substitute its opinion for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and interfere with the order of detention. It does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is immune from judicial reviewability. By various decisions, the Supreme Court has carved out areas within which the validity of subjective satisfaction can be tested. In the present case, huge volume of gold had been smuggled into the country unabatedly for the last three years and about 3396 kgs of the gold has been brought into India

during the period from July 2018 to March, 2019 camouflaging it with brass metal scrap. The detaining authority recorded finding that this has serious impact on the economy of the nation. Detaining authority also satisfied that the detenues have propensity to indulge in the same act of smuggling and passed the order of preventive detention, which is a preventive measure. Based on the documents and the materials placed before the detaining authority and considering the individual role of the detenues, the detaining authority satisfied itself as to the detenues' continued propensity and their inclination to indulge in acts of smuggling in a planned manner to the detriment of the economic security of the country that there is a need to prevent the detenues from smuggling goods. The High Court erred in interfering with the satisfaction of the detaining authority and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.”

As it becomes axiomatic from the above quoted paragraph of the judgment, the Supreme Court held that the Court must be conscious that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is ‘subjective’ in nature and that the Court cannot substitute its opinion for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and interfere with the order of detention. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the detaining authority was satisfied that the detenues had the propensity to indulge in the same act and passed the detention order, which was preventive in nature.

42. Mr. Shah, learned senior counsel for the appellant, submitted that in the aforesaid case, the detenie had been found to have continuously smuggled gold inasmuch as 3396 Kgs had been smuggled in camouflaging with brass scarp. In the instant case, the fact is that the detenie has not participated in any such activity since 2010, inasmuch as no criminal case has been registered against him which is a proof of that fact. Therefore, the judgment is not relevant.

43. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid paragraph of the judgment has used the words ‘continued propensity’. In the instant case, the detaining authority has mentioned that the detenu has been articulating in public through his speeches and appeals his ideology and has allowed using the platform of the Bar Association for propagating secessionist ideology which in turn has been working fundamentally prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. One or two of these FIRs also relate to the processions taken out by the members of the Srinagar Bar Association lead by the detenu alleging violation of the restrictions imposed by the District Authorities under Section 144 Cr. P. C. and forced march ahead despite an endeavour on the part of the Police on duty to stop them. The learned Advocate General has provided this Court with the English translation copies of the four FIRs. We have gone through the contents of these FIRs and we do not want to burden this judgment by quoting the contents of these FIRs. But we deem it apt to mention here that the FIRs do suggest the propensity of the detenu which has weighed with the detaining authority to arrive at the subjective satisfaction delineated in the impugned detention order. Mr. Shah on that score is not right as would be referred to hereinbelow.

44. As mentioned earlier, the appellant has repeatedly argued that the detenu was not provided the reports which the detaining authority in the grounds of detention has stated to have gone through. During the course of arguments, the learned Advocate General pleaded privilege about these reports in terms of Section 13(2) of the JK PSA, which provides that nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against public interest to disclose. However, with a view to satisfying itself, this Court called for the ‘reports’ in question for perusal. These reports were produced before us and we have gone through

the same. From a perusal thereof we find that there are a chain of reports depicting the activities of the detenu even after 24.06.2010, the date when the last of the aforesaid four FIRs was registered against the detenu, and we are satisfied about the continued propensity of the detenu which must have weighed with the detaining authority to arrive at the satisfaction recorded in the impugned detention order. There is thus a live link established between the alleged activities of the detenu and the detention order. We may observe here that this Court cannot quote the reports here. However, with a view to showing that there existed the spoken about live link, we deem it appropriate to mention the dates of the activities mentioned in the intelligence reports. The activities are reported to have been resorted by the detenu on 26.06.2010, 04.07.2010, 09.10.2015, 17.08.2016, 29.12.2016, 22.02.2017, 01.03.2017, 08.03.2017, 25.08.2017, 05.09.2017, 29.09.2017, 11.10.2017, 03.03.2018, 07.05.2018, 17.10.2018, 24.10.2018, 15.03.2019 and 15.05.2019. This also replies the argument of Mr. Shah, as referred to just hereinabove.

45. We have already made a detailed mention that there is a ground in the grounds of detention the materials relied wherein have duly been supplied to the detenu in relation thereto. At this stage, we may also refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Debu Mahato v State of W. B.*, (1974) 4 SCC 135, cited on behalf of the respondents wherein the detention order was passed on a solitary ground of detention. The argument raised before the Supreme Court was that the single solitary ground of wagon breaking attributed to the detenu would not sustain the inference that he was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The Supreme Court was of the view that the solitary, isolated act of wagon breaking committed by the detenu could not possibly persuade any reasonable person to reach the satisfaction

that unless he was detained, he would in all probability indulge in further acts of wagon breaking. But, at the same time, the Supreme Court laid down as under:

“2...We must of course make it clear that it is not our view that in no case can a single solitary act attributed to a person form the basis for reaching a satisfaction that he might repeat such acts in future and in order to prevent him from doing so, it is necessary to detain him. The nature of the act and the attendant circumstances may in a given case be such as to reasonably justify an inference that the person concerned, if not detained, would be likely to indulge in commission of such acts in future. The order of detention is essentially a precautionary measure and it is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Such past conduct may consist of one single act or of a series of acts. But whatever it be, it must be of such a nature that an inference can reasonably be drawn from it that the person concerned would be likely to repeat such acts so as to warrant his detention. It may be easier to draw such an inference where there is a series of acts evincing a course of conduct but even if there is a single act, such an inference may justifiably be drawn in a given case...”

*(Underlining supplied)*

In that case, however, the Supreme Court held that, that was not possible, and that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate recited in the order of detention was no satisfaction. In the instant case, however, as narrated and discussed by us above, there has been a live link between the alleged activities of the detenu and the satisfaction of the detaining authority.

46. In light of what has been discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that the FIRs and the allegations contained therein have a live link to the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority and they have the required proximity to have lend a suspicion to the detaining authority that, if not detained, the detenu may act in a manner as would be prejudicial to

the maintenance of public order, especially so because of the ‘surrounding circumstances’ prevailing then. The judgment in *Sama Aruna v State of Telangana* (supra) cited by the learned senior counsel for the detinue is, therefore, distinguishable on facts.

47. Coming to the third point raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, that since the detinue was detained in 2010 on the very same FIRs and allegations contained therein, he could not have been detained anew on the very same allegations and material, in this context we, firstly, reiterate that it is not that the detinue has been detained only on the very same FIRs and the allegations contained therein. We have said above that we have gone through intelligence reports which contain materials after 2010 depicting the activities of the detinue on the basis of which as well the detaining authority has shown to have arrived at his satisfaction reflected in the impugned detention order. These reports could be well said to constitute new facts. Apart from that, in view of the submissions made by the learned Advocate General and the rebuttal thereto on behalf of the learned senior counsel for the appellant, even if it be assumed that there were no such intelligence reports as had been placed before the detaining authority and have been gone through by us, some very crucial questions arise in the matter, such as the following:

- i) Whether an ideology that has the effect and potential of nurturing a tendency of disturbance in public order alleged against a person on the prognosis based on his previous conduct, such as is reflected in the FIRs registered against the detinue in the instant case, and of which the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied, can be said to be different from a criminal act or acts done sometime in the past and, therefore, would always continue to be proximate in their

impact and consequence and, therefore, would not attract the judgments cited at the Bar, or the same must be treated as extraneous to the scope of and purpose of the statute?

(ii) Whether an ideology alleged against a person, such as the one reflected in the FIRs registered against the detinue in the instant case in 2008 and 2010, irrespective of the age and fate of these FIRs, and reiterated in the fresh grounds of detention, can be said to have gone stale by efflux of time and, therefore, could not form the basis for attaining the requisite subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority for detaining the detinue and that such past conduct of the detinue would not be relevant and would have no live and proximate link with immediate need to detain him preventively?

iii) Whether such an ideology alleged against a person, if mentioned in the earlier grounds of detention, would lose its proximity and, therefore, cannot be taken into account and used for detaining such person subsequently if the detaining authority is satisfied that such an ideology of the person has the potential to goad or instigate disturbance in public order, in a susceptible given situation?

48. Having considered the matter, we may say that an ideology of the nature reflected in the FIRs and alleged against the detinue herein is like a live volcano. The ideology has always an inclination, a natural tendency to behave in a particular way; It is often associated with an intense, natural inclination and preference of the person to behave in the way his ideology drives him to achieve his latent and expressed objectives and when he happens to head or leading a group, as the allegations contained in the FIRs

suggest, his single point agenda remains that his ideology is imbued in all those whom he leads. Depending upon the nature of the ideology one has, he can have short term, continuous and long term objectives and strategies. So far as the ideology attributed in the FIRs is concerned, public disorder is its primary object and surviving factor. Taking out processions knowingly that such acts are likely to stoke public disorder, especially so when there are restrictions in position, raising provocative and antinational slogans of sorts, holding close door meetings within separatist leaders as being President of the Bar etc. etc. are such instances which point to only one thing that the ideology is not an act done by the detainee in the past, but it is his continuous inclination and preference. Generally, when a criminal act takes place, its impact may be felt within a small circle or its repercussions may be of bigger consequence, but with the passage of time the impact and the consequences generally subside or vanish. When it comes to propensity of an ideology of the nature reflected in the FIRs supported by the intelligence reports we have gone through, we are convinced that it subserves the latent motive to thrive on public disorder. In that context, we feel that most of the judgments of the Apex Court do not fit the facts and the given situation. Therefore, we are left with no option but to say that an ideology that has the effect and potential of nurturing a tendency of disturbance in public order, such as is reflected in the FIRs registered against the detainee in the instant case, and of which the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied, can be said to be different from a criminal act or acts done sometime in the past and, therefore, would always continue to be proximate in their impact and consequence and, therefore, would not attract the judgments cited at the Bar on the point. This is a unique tendency of its own kind, repercussion and detrimental outcome to the public order. Secondly, we are also of the view that the ideology alleged against a person, such as the one reflected in the FIRs

registered against the detenu in the instant case in 2008 and 2010, irrespective of the age and fate of those FIRs, and reiterated in the fresh grounds of detention, cannot be said to have gone stale by efflux of time; therefore, they can form the basis for attaining the requisite subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority for detaining the detenu and that such past conduct of the detenu would be relevant and germane to the object of relevant provision of the Act. Furthermore, we are also of the view that such an ideology alleged against a person, if mentioned in the earlier grounds of detention, because of its nature of subsistence and propensity, would not lose its proximity and, therefore, can be taken into account and used for detaining such person subsequently if the detaining authority is satisfied that such an ideology of the person has the potential to goad or instigate disturbance in public order, in a susceptible given situation, like the one it was at the relevant point of time. The judgments cited at the Bar on these points by the learned senior counsel are wholly distinguishable on facts; therefore, render no help to the appellant.

49. Let us proceed to deal with the next point raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, that the grounds of detention are the reproduction of the Police Dossier verbatim, suggesting that the detaining authority did not apply his mind and, therefore, the detention order suffers from non-application of mind and, hence, is vitiated. It is true that in *Rajesh Vashdev Adnani v State of Maharashtra* (supra), the Supreme Court found that the proposal made by the sponsoring authority and the order of detention passed by the detaining authority showed that except substituting the word 'he' by you, no other change was effected in the detention order and that the Supreme Court held the detention order unsustainable on the ground of the non-application of mind. What is most

relevant in this judgment is contained in paras 7 and 8 thereof which are quoted hereunder:

“7. Keeping in view the nature of the submissions made at the Bar, we have directed the State to produce the records before us. Pursuant to the said direction, the records have been produced.

8. From a perusal of the records produced before us, it appears that the second respondent directed obtaining of some documents when the proposal for detention of the detenu was submitted. She also sought for the statement made by the detenu before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. She further took note of a purported pre-detention representation made by the detenu on 18-4-2004. Detention order was passed upon discussions made in that behalf by her with three officers including Shri PO. S. Goyal, Deputy Director. It further appears that the order of detention as well as grounds therefore were formulated and placed before her for approval. It appears that only small changes were made by some officers.”

*(Underlining supplied)*

As seen from the above quoted paras of the judgment, the Supreme Court on perusal of the record found the above said things and it had come out that the detention order and the grounds had been formulated by the officers and placed for approval before the detaining authority who had signed the same. In the instant case, we have also perused the original record as well as the intelligence reports. Such is not the case in the present case. True there is a resemblance in contents of the grounds of detention and the police dossier submitted before the detaining authority, but the detaining authority in the impugned order has clearly stated that after perusal of the records submitted by the Senior Superintendent of Police and after applying his mind carefully and having regard to the requirements of law, he was satisfied that with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public

order, it was necessary to detain him under the J&K PSA. In the aforesaid case, the order of detention appears not to have recorded such a satisfaction. As per para 5 of the judgment, it is revealed that in the order of detention therein, it was alleged that the same was necessitated not only with a view to prevent the detinue from bringing in future smuggled goods but also as the detinue had been engaged in transporting or keeping smuggled goods. We are, therefore, of the view that the judgment cited is distinguishable.

50. As regards the fifth point, that since the detaining authority did not convey to the detinue that he could make representation to him until the order was approved by the State Government within 12 days of its passing, specifying the time limit for the said purpose, the detention order is vitiated, we have gone through the two judgments cited at the Bar in **State of Maharastra v Santosh Shankar Acharya**, AIR 2000 SC 2504, and **Jitendra v. District Magistrate**, 2004 CriLJ 2967. Before referring to the judgments cited at the Bar, we deem it imperative to quote hereunder the communication no.DMS/PSA/Jud/3866-68 dated 07.08.2019 addressed by the detaining authority to the detinue which he has duly received. It reads thus:

“Shri Miyan Abdul Qayoom  
S/O Miyan Abdul Rehman,  
R/O Bulbulbagh, District Srinagar.

Upon perusal of record provided by Senior Superintendent of Police, Srinagar and after carefully examining the said record the undersigned issued detention Order No.DMS/PSA/105/2019 dated 07.08.2019 under Section 8 of the J&K Public Safety Act 1978.

Now, thefore, in pursuance of sub Section (1) of Section 13 of the said Act, you are hereby informed that your detention was ordered on the grounds specified in the annexure to this letter. You may also inform the Home

Department if you would like to be heard in person by the Advisory Board.

You may make a representation against the order of detention mentioned above to the undersigned and to the Government, if you so desire.”

It is thus seen that the detenue had been duly intimated that he could make representations against the order of detention to the detaining authority as well as to the Government, if he wished. Obviously, the detenue has not wished so, inasmuch as he has also not opted to be heard in person by the Advisory Board. Now the question is whether by not mentioning the time within which the detenue could make the representations to the detaining authority and/or to the Government the detention order in the instant case *vis-à-vis* the detenue would vitiate, we have reason to say no, not at all. We shall spell out the reason a bit later. First we would examine the judgments cited at the Bar to canvass the point.

51. In **State of Maharashtra v Santosh Shankar Acharya** (supra), the question that had been referred to the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) for being answered was, whether in case of an order of detention by an officer under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drugs Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981, non-communication to the detenue that he had a right of making a representation to the detaining authority constituted an infraction of a valuable right of the detenue under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, and as such, vitiated the order of detention. There, while communicating the grounds of detention to the detenue, it had not been indicated therein that he had a right to make a representation to the detaining authority, though in the said communication it was mentioned that he could make a representation to the State Government. The Division Bench of Bombay

High Court on this aspect had taken inconsistent views and, therefore, the matter had been referred to the Full Bench. The Full Bench came to the conclusion that an order issued under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act could not remain valid for more than 12 days unless the same was approved by the State Government, and that, until the order was approved by the State Government in exercise of its power under sub-section (3) of Section 3, the detaining authority, who had issued the order of detention under sub-section (2), retained the power of entertaining a representation and annul, revoke or modify the same as provided under Section 14(1) of the Act read with Section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act. It had been further held that failure on the part of the detaining authority, in a case where order of detention is issued under sub-section (2) of Section 3, to communicate to the detenu that he had a right to make a representation constituted an infraction of the rights guaranteed under Article 22(5), and as such, the detention had become invalid on that score. Following the opinion on the question of law referred, the Division Bench of the High Court having set aside the order of detention the State Government was in appeal before the Supreme Court on the very same point. We need not mention here what the Supreme Court ultimately held, since in the instant case, as seen above, the detenu was duly communicated that he could make the representation to the detaining authority. However, we may hasten to add that such communication to the detenu was inconsequential and purposeless, since the Government had approved the detention order on the date of its issue itself viz. on 07.08.2019. Therefore, the judgment is not attracted herein.

52. So far as the judgment of Allahabad High Court in *Jitendra v. District Magistrate* (supra) is concerned, therein the substance of the averments was that since the detenu was not apprised of the time limit in

which he could make a representation to the detaining authority, he was deprived of his right to make a representation to him and the impugned detention order was, therefore, rendered violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The argument raised before the High Court was that since the Supreme Court in **State of Maharashtra v Santosh Shankar Acharya** (supra), had held that till a detention order is approved by the State Government, the detenu has a right to make a representation to the detaining authority and the failure to communicate to him the said right vitiated the detention order as being violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, it follows as a logical imperative that in the grounds of detention, the detenu should be communicated that his right to make a representation to the detaining authority was only available to him, till approval of the detention order by the State Government. The High Court held that since the detenu's right to make a representation to the detaining authority was only available to him till the approval of the detention order by the Government, it followed as a logical imperative that the detaining authority should have communicated to him in the grounds of detention the time limit in which he could make a representation to him, i.e., till the approval of the detention order by the State Government. There was a startling factor attendant to that case, in context of which the High Court made the said direction. Therein the order of detention was dated 02.09.2002. It and the grounds of detention were served on the detenu on 04.09.2002. The detention order was approved by the Government on 11.09.2002. The detenu made his representation to the detaining authority on 20.09.2002, i.e., 09 days after the detaining authority had become *functus officio*. Obviously, this fact by itself suggests that the detenu had been totally oblivious of the provisions of the relevant law and ignorant of the fact that he could make a representation to the detaining authority within 12 days only till the detention order was approved by the

Government. Naturally, therefore, the detenue was prejudiced and prevented from making his representation to the detaining authority within time. In the instant case, such could not even remotely be conceived of. Here the detenue is a practicing lawyer, as per the appellant-petitioner, having more than 40 years of impressive standing and practice at the Bar and President of the Bar Association since long. It could not be comprehended that he was oblivious of the period within which he could make a representation to the detaining authority, if such an occasion would have arisen. When the detenue happens to be of the stature and knowledge of the likeness of the detenue herein, and he does not make a representation, legally an inference is available that he had deliberately not done so, to claim violation of his right in this behalf in his habeas corpus petition. Such tactics cannot be allowed to be played. In any case, the judgment cited and relied upon is wholly distinguishable on facts. The detenue cannot claim violation of the right in this regard.

53. Notwithstanding the above, we reiterate that in view of the fact that the detention order dated 07.08.2019 was approved by the Government on the very same date viz. 07.08.2019 and the order was, in fact, executed after it had been approved by the Government, the detenue cannot claim violation of any of his right on account of non-communication of time within which he could make a representation to the detaining authority.

54. So far as the contention of the learned senior counsel that the extensions accorded in the detention order of the detenue from time to time are not covered by the provisions of the Act; therefore, the same are illegal, the learned counsel referred to Sections 17 and 18 of the Act. Before reproducing the argument raised by the learned counsel in this behalf, we deem it advantageous to reiterate that the detenue was detained in terms of order dated 07.08.2019. This order was executed on 08.08.2019. The order

was approved by the Government on 07.08.2019 i.e., the date of issue itself. On receipt of the opinion from the Advisory Board, the Government confirmed the detention order on 03.09.2019 and directed that the detainee be detained for a period of three months in the first instance. By a subsequent order dated 23.10.2019, the Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 8(1)(a)(i) read with clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the JK PSA directed that period of detention of the detainee be extended for a further period of three months. Similar orders were issued on 03.02.2020 and 01.05.2020.

55. Section 8(1)(a)(i), Section 17 and Section 18(1)(a) of the JK PSA are extracted / quoted hereunder:

“8. Detention of certain persons.

(1) The Government may

(a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to. –

(i) the security of the State or the maintenance of the public order; or

(ii) ...

...

it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.”

“17, Action upon report of Advisory Board. –

(1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit.

(2) ...”

18. Maximum period of Detention. –

(1) The maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under Section 17, shall be –

(a) twelve months from the date of detention in the case of persons acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or indulging in smuggling of timber; and

(b)...

(2) Nothing contained in this Section shall affect the powers of the Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time, or to extend the period of detention of a foreigner in case his expulsion from the State has not been made possible.”

The learned senior counsel submitted that on receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board, the Government has the power to detain a person for such period as it may think fit, upto a maximum of twelve months from the date of detention in the case of persons acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. He submitted that once such detention is ordered for a period less than twelve months, the power to extend the period of detention is exercisable only under sub-section (2) of Section 18, not under Section 18(1)(a) and, as becomes obvious from a plain reading of the language of sub-section (2) of Section 18, the power to extend is exercisable only *vis-à-vis* a foreigner, not a citizen of the UT. The learned counsel submitted that on this count, the extension orders accorded to detain the detinue have no backing of law. He further submitted that sub-section (2) of Section 18 comprises of two parts, the first part provides for revocation and modification of a detention order, and the second part provides for extension of detention period of a foreigner, but none of the two parts provide for extension of a citizen.

56. In this regard, the learned Advocate General submitted that the two parts of sub-section (2) of Section 18 the Act, read exclusively by the learned senior counsel, are actually inclusive in nature and relate to foreigners, not the citizens. He submitted that extensions in the period of detention in respect of the detinue have been ordered under Section

18(1)(a) which provides twelve months' maximum detention in the case of persons acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

57. We have considered the rival submissions. The initial detention order passed after the receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board specifically mentioned that the detinue be detained for a period of three months 'in the first instance'. The phrase 'in the first instance' means 'as the first thing in a series of actions'; meaning thereby, the Government had reserved to itself the power to pass a series of such orders under Section 18(1)(a) to make the total period of detention twelve months, if it so desired. The orders of extension make it clear that the same have been passed in exercise of the powers under Section 18(1)(a), not under Section 18(2). Reference to sub-section (2) of Section 18 by the learned senior counsel is misplaced. The learned senior counsel also seems to ignore the cardinal principle of law that one who has power to do a thing, has the power to modify, alter or revoke it.

58. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the detinue was not supplied the materials which were considered by the Government to arrive at the subjective satisfaction to extend the term of detention beyond the original fixed term. He, in this connection, referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Magrey J) was a member in *Tariq Ahmad Sofi v State of J&K*, 2017 (1) S.L.J. 21 (HC). In that case, the habeas corpus petition of the detinue had been dismissed by the learned Single Judge holding that since the order according extension in the detention period of the detinue had not been brought on record, no effective relief could be granted to the petitioner. The question before the Division Bench was whether it was incumbent on the detinue to challenge the various steps taken

by the Government under the provisions of the Act, including extension granted in his period of detention, after the detinue files the habeas corpus petition and challenges his detention. The Division Bench in context of the issue involved therein held that after the detention order is challenged, the respondents have to satisfy the Court about every step they take in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and that the detinue was not required to challenge the same. In the instant case, the extension orders have been placed before the Court. We have perused the same and we are satisfied that the Government has acted in accordance with law. It may be observed here that the Government is not required to consider any fresh material to accord extension in the order of detention upto the maximum period provided under Section 18 of the Act, nor is it required to indicate attainment of a fresh subjective satisfaction. The learned senior counsel seems to be labouring under some confusion or misconception.

59. The last argument advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that the activities attributed to the detinue in the allegations contained in the FIRs against the detinue do not fall within the definition of the phrase ‘acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’; hence the detention order is unfounded. To bolster this argument, the learned senior counsel referred to the definition of the expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” given in Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the JK PSA. With a view to pinpointing the argument raised by the learned senior counsel, the aforesaid provision of the Act needs to be extracted. It is extracted hereinbelow:

“(3) For the purpose of sub-section (1),

(a)...

(b) ‘acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’ means. –

(i) promoting, propagating, or attempting to create, feelings of enmity or hatred or disharmony on ground of religion, race, caste, community, or region;

(ii) making preparations for using, or attempting to use, or using, or instigating, inciting, provoking or otherwise abetting the use of force where such preparation, using, attempting, instigating, inciting, provoking or abetting, disturbs, or is likely to disturb public order;

...

...”

The learned counsel submitted that there is no activity like promoting, propagating, or attempting to create, feelings of enmity or hatred or disharmony on ground of religion, race, caste, community, or region attributed to or alleged against the detenu. Therefore, the sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) is not applicable to the detenu. So far as sub-clause (ii) of Clause (b) is concerned, the learned senior counsel submitted that the stress laid therein is on ‘use of force’, and that it is not alleged against the detenu that he had at any time used force to achieve the objectives mentioned in the said provision of law. In that view, the learned counsel submitted that the allegation that the activities of the detenu are or were in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order is not made out in terms of the definition of the expression; consequently, the satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority suffers from non-application of mind. It is vitiated and the detention of the detenu is rendered illegal.

60. The learned senior counsel seems to be forgetting that there is an unambiguous allegation contained in the FIRs that he had lead processions of angry mobs of lawyers, least minding about imposition of restrictions

under Section 144 Cr. P. C. It has been more than 59 years now that a five Hon'ble Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, headed by the then Chief Justice, in *Babulal Parate v State of Maharashtra*, AIR 1961 SC 884, held that an order passed under Section 144 Cr. P. C. is in the interest of maintenance of public order. If that be so and as it is, if a person intentionally, wilfully, deliberately and purposefully breaks and violates such a restriction, it would connote nothing less than using force and acting in a manner prejudicial to the interests of maintenance of public order. In that view of the matter, the argument of the learned senior counsel fails.

61. Mr. B. A. Dar, Sr. AAG, assisting the learned Advocate General, also cited the following judgments in the case:

- i) *Borjahan Gorey v. The State of West Bengal*, (1972) 2 SCC 550;
- ii) *Sasti v. State of W. B.*, (1972) 3 SCC 826;
- iii) *Haradhan Saha v. State of W. B.*, (1975) 3 SCC 198;
- iv) *State of U. P. v. Durga Prasad*, (1975) 3 SCC 210;
- v) *Wasiuddin Ahmed v. D. M., Aligarh*, (1981) 4 SCC 521;
- vi) *Ashok Kumar v Delhi Administration*, (1982) 2 SCC 403;
- vii) *State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande*, (2008) 3 SCC 613;

Let us chronologically take up and examine these judgments.

62. In *Borjahan Gorey v. The State of West Bengal*, (1972) 2 SCC 550, only two arguments were raised before the Supreme Court: first, that the facts disclosed by the grounds squarely fell within the purview of Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, the detenu should have been appropriately proceeded against under these sections rather than detaining him under Section 3 of the MISA, 1971; second, that the allegations levelled in the grounds of detention were untrue, the

detenue having pleaded alibi. The judgment is thus not even remotely relatable to the points involved in this case.

63. In *Sasti v. State of W. B.*, (1972) 3 SCC 826, the point raised was that as the act attributed to the detenue in the grounds of detention constituted an offence under IPC, he could only be tried in a court of law for the offence and no order for his detention on that score could be made. A further point raised was that there was a difference between the concept of public order and law and order. Again, this judgment has nothing to do with the points raised in the appeal.

64. In *Haradhan Saha v. State of W. B.*, (1975) 3 SCC 198, the constitutional validity of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 was under challenge. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the Act did not provide for an objective determination of the facts which were the foundation of a decision for detention; that opportunity to make a representation could not be reasonable if the order did not disclose the material on the basis of which the detaining authority arrived at a conclusion that grounds for detention existed; that the representation could not be reasonable if the detenue had no opportunity to test the truth of the materials relied on for detention; and that the Act did not define or lay down the standards for objective assessment of the grounds for detention. This judgment, so far as the challenge to the Act was concerned, is not attracted herein. As far the argument concerning the opportunity of making representation was concerned, the Supreme Court in para 23 observed that it was an established rule of the Court that a detenue has a right to be apprised of all the materials on which the order of detention is based or approved. This rule, however, is subject to the subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court. In any case, this judgment is not attracted to the points involved in this LPA.

65. The judgment in *State of U. P. v. Durga Prasad*, (1975) 3 SCC 210, does not relate to preventive detentions and, in any case, to the questions under consideration in this LPA. It seems to have been wrongly cited.

66. In *Wasiuddin Ahmed v. D. M., Aligarh*, (1981) 4 SCC 521, there were several issues taken up and involved in the case. Two of the issues which are relevant in context of the arguments raised in the instant case are whether the detaining authority was bound to disclose and supply to the detenu the intelligence report or history sheet, relied upon by him in passing the detention order, and whether past prejudicial conduct or antecedent history of detenu could be considered by the detaining authority. It was held that under Article 22(6) of the Constitution, the District Magistrate was not bound to disclose the intelligence reports and it was also not necessary for him to supply the history sheet, if any. So far as reliance on past prejudicial conduct or antecedent history of detenu was concerned, it was held as under:

“25. The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can appropriately be taken into account in making a detention order. It is indeed usually from prior events showing tendencies or inclination of a man that an inference is drawn whether he is likely in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Of course, such prejudicial conduct or antecedent history should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and should have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary.”

This judgment lends support to our view taken hereinabove.

67. In *Ashok Kumar v Delhi Administration*, (1982) 2 SCC 403, as reflected in para 3 of the judgment four points were canvassed before the Supreme Court: first, that there was unexplained delay of two days in furnishing the grounds of detention; second, that period of detention had

not been mentioned while making the order of detention, therefore, the order suffered from non-application of mind; third, the grounds of detention were not connected with maintenance of public order; fourth, that the facts set out in the grounds of detention did not furnish sufficient nexus for forming the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and that the same were vague, irrelevant and lacking in particulars. None of these points is relevant to the questions involved herein.

68. The case, *State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande*, (2008) 3 SCC 613, fundamentally involved the question about permissibility of judicial review of a detention order at pre-execution / pre-arrest stage. There the detenu had evaded his arrest and challenged the detention order before the High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench) prior to its execution seeking quashing of the detention order and some other reliefs. The High Court held that the detenu was not entitled to know the grounds on which the order of detention had been passed, unless he surrendered. On perusal of the record made available to it, the High Court concluded that the writ petition could be entertained at the pre-execution stage. On merits it held that on consideration of the cases instituted against the detenu, it could not be said that the detaining authority could not have reached the subjective satisfaction and as such the order could not be challenged. However, the Court also held that the case was covered by one of the exceptions laid down in *Addl. Secy. to the Govt. of India vs. Alka Subhash Gadia*, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496, and, hence, the petition was maintainable and the detenu was entitled to relief. The High Court had, accordingly, set aside the order of detention. On appeal by the State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition and in quashing and setting aside the order of detention at pre-execution stage. The Supreme Court in

its judgment observed that it was true that such order must be preventive and not punitive in nature, but the Court must be conscious and mindful that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is subjective in nature and the Court cannot substitute its objective opinion for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority for coming to the conclusion whether the activities of the detenu were or were not prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of essential commodities to the society. Holding so, the Supreme Court thought it appropriate to consider the concept of and relevant principles governing preventive detention which it dealt with under different headings, namely, personal liberty: precious right; Habeas corpus: first security of civil liberty; preventive detention: meaning and concept; preventive detention: necessary evil; subjective satisfaction: scope of judicial review; ground of challenge; and challenge to the detention order prior to execution.

69. Principally saying, we have taken note of the judgments of the Supreme Court cited at the Bar and endeavoured to abide by what the Courts are ordained to do and we have already discussed and reached definite conclusions on the numerous points on the basis of the settled law etc., cited at the Bar and referred to hereinabove.

70. No other substantial point was raised before us on behalf of the appellant-petitioner.

71. For all what has been discussed above, we do not find any merit in this LPA. It is, accordingly, dismissed and the detention of the detenu is upheld, however, for our own reasons recorded hereinabove.

72. This shall govern all connected CMs, except EMG-CM 5/2020 originally filed in WP(C) PIL No.4/2020 with respect to which we are making a separate order hereinbelow:

**EMG-CM 5/2020:**

73. The direction issued by the Division Bench, headed by the Chief Justice, directing that this application shall be placed on the record of LPA no.28/2020 and separately registered as an application in this appeal seems not to have been adhered to. If it is so, as it appears to be, Registry to take note of this lapse.

74. This application had been filed by the wife of the detenu, the appellant herein, before the PIL Bench headed by Lord Chief Justice, hearing the popularly known Covid-19 PIL. The prayer made in the application is quoted hereunder:

“It is therefore most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be graciously pleased to accept the present application and direct the high powered committee [constituted under the directions dated 23.03.2020 of the Supreme Court comprising (i) Chairman of the State Legal Services Committee, (ii) the Principal Secretary (Home/Prison) by whatever designation known, (iii) Director General of Prison(s)] to direct release of detenu Mian Abdul Qayoom detained under PSA, presently lodged in Jail no.3, Tihar Jail Complex New Delhi; and or pass any other direction in alternative, ....”

75. The principal ground taken in the application is the health condition of the detenu because of underlying ailments suffered and numerous surgeries undergone by him.

76. The PIL Bench, headed by Lord Chief Justice appears to have made certain directions and obtained reports from various concerned agencies concerning the detenu on this application. Objections from the UT respondents have also been invited.

77. In their objections, the respondents have, *inter alia*, stated as under:

“12. That, it is submitted that High Powered Committee headed by the Hon’ble Judge of the High Court, has not specifically referred the representation of the detenu to the Govt. However, the observation of the High Powered Committee in its meeting held on 31.03.2020 in respect of PSA detenues is as under:

‘In context of the representation referred by the Hon’ble Chief Justice, High Court of J&K, who is patron-in-Chief, JK SLSA, for release of PSA detenu, the HPC noted that release of prisoners detained under PSA is not in terms of the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hence, the request cannot be considered by it. **However, considering the present situation the authorities may re-consider these cases on merits.**’”

*(Highlighting supplied)*

78. Ostensibly, faced with the above situation, the PIL Bench, headed by Lord Chief Justice ordered as under:

“102. It needs no elaboration that in the present proceedings this Court is concerned with public interest issues and not with any issue involving an individual case. It was only because of the apprehension expressed about the fragile medical condition of the husband of the applicant, the imminence of Ramzan, the risk on account of COVID-19, the delay, which would have resulted in diverting the matter at that stage to the other Wing and the difficulty of Mr. Dar for want of the official records and instructions in Srinagar, that the above three issues were taken up as an exception. Therefore, it is not open to this Court to examine the objections pressed by Mr. Z. A. Qureshi to the correctness of orders passed against the applicant. It is open to the applicants to raise these issues in appropriate legal proceedings.

103. At this stage, Mr. Z. A. Qureshi submits that inasmuch as the respondents have filed replies to this application, keeping in view interests of expediency, the restrictions on movement, internet and procedural difficulties on account of the lockdown, this application along with reply filed by the

respondents may be electronically transferred for consideration of the fourth and last issue to the record of LPA No.28/2020 which is listed on 4<sup>th</sup> May, 2020.

104. It is therefore directed that copies of this application, replies /status reports filed by Mr. B. A. Dar, Sr. AAG, Mr. T. M. Shamsi, ASGI and the Superintendent, Tihar Jail No.3, Delhi shall be electronically sent by the Registrar Judicial, Jammu to Registrar Judicial, Srinagar for registration of the application and placing on the record of LPA No.28/2020 and listing on 4<sup>th</sup> May 2020.

105. It is further directed that this application shall be placed in the record of LPA No.28/2020. It shall be separately registered as an application in that appeal and listed along with the main appeal on the 4<sup>th</sup> of May, 2020.

106. Apprehension is expressed by Mr. Z. A. Qureshi, Sr. Advocate that the hearing in the appeal would be delayed by the respondents by non production of the record.

107. We are assured by Mr. B. A. Dar, Sr. AAG that the record necessary for hearing shall be positively produced before the Division Bench.”

79. Mr. Z. A. Shah, learned senior counsel for the applicant-appellant reiterated his submissions based on the health condition of the detinue and submitted that the Government has got the power to revoke, amend or alter the detention order and even to release the detenues on parole. He prayed for such a direction. During the course of arguments, when this prayer was put to Mr. D. C. Raina, learned Advocate General, he submitted that the prayer of the applicant stands already considered and rejected.

80. Keeping in view the fact that this application has been referred to this Bench by the PIL Bench headed by lord Chief Justice and bearing in mind the judicial hierarchy, its judicial decorum and judicial discipline, we think that there is some magnitude of judicial sanctity attached to such reference; otherwise nothing would stop that Bench, headed by lord Chief

Justice, to dismiss the same. At the same time, this Court, having dismissed the LPA, and even otherwise, is conscious that in these proceedings it cannot make any direction of the nature sought for by the appellant- petitioner. However, the Court would not be debarred in making some legally permissible order in this application on the admitted facts of this case as we proceed to mention hereunder.

81. As mentioned in para 37 of this judgment, while addressing his arguments on the ideology nourished and nurtured by the detinue, the learned Advocate General submitted that such ideology cannot be confined or limited to time to qualify it to be called stale or fresh or proximate, unless, of course, the person concerned declares and establishes by conduct and expression that he has shunned the ideology (*emphasis supplied*).

82. In light of the above legally rightful and sound argument taken by the learned Advocate General, we leave it to the detinue to decide whether he would wish to take advantage of the stand of the learned Advocate General and make a representation to the concerned authorities to abide by it. Simultaneously, we also leave it to the discretion of the Government and of the concerned/competent authority(ies) to take a decision in terms of the relevant provision(s) of the JK PSA on any such representation, if made, by the detinue. It is made clear that an adverse order on any such application, if made, shall not entail any legal proceedings, whatsoever.

83. The Registry shall send a certified copy of this judgment to the Principal, Secretary, Home, by any available mode in this regard.

84. The application is, accordingly, disposed of.

85. Records submitted by Mr. B.A Dar, Sr. AAG, shall stand returned to him.

**(Vinod Chatterji Koul)**  
**Judge**

**(Ali Mohammad Magrey)**  
**Judge**

**Srinagar,**  
**28.05.2020**

Syed Ayaz, Secretary

- i) Whether the judgment is speaking : Yes/No
- ii) Whether the judgment is non-speaking: Yes/No.