Can't Invoke Urgency Clause To Acquire Poor Farmers' Lands Over Speculation: Karnataka High Court Quashes Acquisition Near Hampi Monuments

Mustafa Plumber

2 Nov 2023 11:50 AM GMT

  • Cant Invoke Urgency Clause To Acquire Poor Farmers Lands Over Speculation: Karnataka High Court Quashes Acquisition Near Hampi Monuments

    The Karnataka High Court has quashed a 2006 notification acquiring certain land in Krishnapur Village which is proximate to the historical Hampi monuments and falls within the protected area of Hampi Monuments and remains.Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum sitting at Dharwad bench quashed the preliminary notification dated 25.05.2005 and final notification dated 5-04-2006 by which the...

    The Karnataka High Court has quashed a 2006 notification acquiring certain land in Krishnapur Village which is proximate to the historical Hampi monuments and falls within the protected area of Hampi Monuments and remains.

    Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum sitting at Dharwad bench quashed the preliminary notification dated 25.05.2005 and final notification dated 5-04-2006 by which the petitioners' lands were acquired.

    “The impugned preliminary notification as well as final notification are liable to be quashed as poor farmer’s lands are sought to be acquired on mere speculation and on the ground that they are required for beautification of National monuments and to provide related infrastructure and therefore the power exercised by the State in acquiring petition lands are found to be malafide and therefore, the impugned notifications need to be quashed.”

    The court held that the order of acquisition by invoking urgency power under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act and thereby dispensing enquiry under Section 5A of the Act is totally improper and therefore, the entire acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed.

    The case revolves around the acquisition of land in the Krishnapur and Kamalapura villages of Hospet Taluk. The petitioners are landowners who owned parcels of land in these villages. The government, particularly respondent No. 4/State and respondent No. 5, initiated proceedings to acquire these lands under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The stated reasons for the acquisition included the preservation of historical monuments and improving access to temples.

    The petitioners, who are agriculturists heavily dependent on their land, challenged the acquisition claiming that it was arbitrary. They argued that the government had been acquiring land around historical monuments without verifying the existence of historical artefacts. The petitioners further alleged that the acquisition violated the provisions of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958. They questioned the urgency clause invoked under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act and claimed that there was no real urgency.

    The government argued that the acquisition was necessary due to the proximity of the land to protected historical monuments. They contended that the petitioners' lands blocked access to the Badavilinga Temple and Ugra Narasimha Temple. They were essential for reviving the ancient connections between these temples and the holy tank. The government also invoked its duty to protect and preserve world heritage sites, claiming that these acquisitions were vital for the beautification of national monuments and related infrastructure.

    Findings:

    The bench noted that the State’s power of eminent domain finds expression in two statutory enactments namely, the Land Acquisition Act and the Right to Fair Compensation Act. Both legislations allow the State to invoke urgency clauses to bypass some important procedural safeguards and fastrack the acquisition process. 

    The court found that the government had inappropriately invoked the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. There was no substantial evidence of real urgency to justify bypassing the Section 5A inquiry. The delay between the preliminary and final notifications suggested that urgency was not a valid reason.

    “On examining the material on record, I am more than satisfied that urgency clause is invoked only to deny the right of hearing to the petitioners herein under Section 5-A of the Act.”

    It added that eminent domain power is a fundamental power that governments possess, allowing them to acquire private land for public use. However, this power is not absolute and is subject to various legal and ethical considerations.

    “Acquiring land based on speculation that valuable artefacts are concealed beneath it poses unique challenges to the principles of eminent domain. Speculation alone does not constitute a clear public purpose. If the State were to exercise eminent domain based on mere speculation of artefacts, it could infringe upon property rights and disrupt the lives of landowners without clear justification.”

    Here the State failed to follow proper legal and archaeological procedures in dealing with potential artifact discoveries on private land. There was no obstacle preventing respondent No. 5 from conducting an archaeological survey to confirm the presence and historical significance of artefacts.

    Even if the intention was to use the petitioners' land for beautification, the government could not simply seize private property using the eminent domain, especially by invoking the urgency clause. While eminent domain is vital for public development, it must adhere to specific criteria, primarily the need for a legitimate public purpose.

    “Poor farmers land which is a lifeline for his family is snatched under the garb of acquisition for public purpose at large. The acquisition in the present case on hand is not found to be consistent with constitutional ethics.”

    The proposed acquisition for public purposes was deemed unreal in this case. The court found tangible evidence of malintent and deceptive use of power, warranting its intervention.

    Despite the absence of an emergency, the respondents utilized Section 17(4), bypassing the inquiry process and denying the petitioner, a disadvantaged farmer, the opportunity to present their case regarding the existence of a public purpose or the selection of alternative land for acquisition.

    The court concluded that the petitioner's valuable rights were unjustly deprived due to the improper application of the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act.

    Accordingly, it allowed the petition.

    Appearance: Advocate Mallikarjunswamy B. Hiremath for Petitioners.

    AGA M.H.Patil for R1 TO R4.

    Advocate M B.Kanavi for R5.

    Citation: 2023 LiveLaw (Kar) 420

    Case Title: Nidasheshi Veeranna AND State of Karnataka & Others

    Case No: WRIT PETITION NO. 7954 OF 2007 C/W WRIT PETITION NO. 5574 OF 2007

    Click Here To Read/Download Order

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