Substitution Of Arbitrators, Unaddressed Statutory Imperative In Jagdeep Chowgule

The evolution of arbitration law in India reflects a persistent legislative endeavour to create an efficient alternative to traditional litigation. The Arbitration Act, 1940, despite its historical significance, was marked by excessive judicial oversight and procedural complexity that often defeated the very purpose of arbitration. The arbitral process under the 1940 regime became mired in delays, with courts exercising supervisory jurisdiction at nearly every stage from appointment of arbitrators to enforcement of awards. What was intended as a swift and effective mode of dispute resolution frequently descended into protracted litigation.

The enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 marked a paradigm shift. Drawing inspiration from the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, the 1996 Act sought to minimize judicial intervention, enhance party autonomy, and establish a streamlined framework for both domestic and international commercial arbitration. The new legislation consolidated the law relating to arbitration, conciliation, and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, while expressly repealing the 1940 Act. The legislative intent was clear: arbitration was to be truly alternative, not merely a prelude to litigation.

Yet, as judicial precedents accumulated, it became apparent that the 1996 Act was not entirely free from interpretive challenges. The Law Commission of India, through its 246th Report, identified several areas requiring reform. These recommendations culminated in the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, which introduced significant changes aimed at making Indian arbitration more efficient and internationally competitive. Among the most important innovations was Section 29A, which imposed, for the first time, a statutory time limit for making arbitral awards. This provision responded to the widespread perception that arbitration in India had become nearly as time-consuming as court litigation. The Section mandated that arbitral tribunals must render their awards within twelve months of entering upon reference, extendable by six months with the consent of parties. Any further extension required an application to the court, and failure to obtain such extension would result in termination of the arbitrators' mandate.

Critically, Section 29A(6) empowered the court, while granting extension of time, to substitute one or all of the arbitrators. This provision contemplated scenarios where delay might be attributable to the arbitral tribunal itself, and the court, in extending time, could reconstitute the tribunal to ensure expeditious completion of proceedings. The newly appointed arbitrators would be deemed to have received all evidence and material already on record, ensuring continuity despite the change in composition. Subsequent amendments in 2019 and 2021 refined various aspects of the arbitration framework but left the core structure of Section 29A largely intact, save for exempting international commercial arbitrations from its application.

While Section 29A introduced the mechanism for court ordered substitution in the context of time extension, another provision Section 15 had long governed the general principles of substitution when an arbitrator's mandate terminated. Section 15(2) contains a deceptively simple but fundamentally important prescription, where the mandate of an arbitrator terminates, a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced. This provision creates a statutory link between the original appointment mechanism and any subsequent substitution, mandating procedural continuity and institutional coherence.

The interpretive challenge arises when these two provisions are read together. Section 29A(6) vests the power of substitution in "the Court" when extending time under Section 29A(4). Section 15(2) requires that such substitution follow the rules applicable to the original appointment. The definition of "Court" under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act specifies that in domestic arbitrations, "Court" means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. This definition, however, begins with a critical qualifier "unless the context otherwise requires."

The controversy centres on the following scenario (i) if an arbitrator is appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act, a provision that vests the power of appointment exclusively in the Supreme Court or the High Court, can a civil court subsequently substitute that arbitrator under Section 29A(6) while complying with the mandate in Section 15(2) to follow the rules applicable to the original appointment? The question acquired urgency as different High Courts arrived at divergent answers.

A significant line of judicial authority interpreted the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" in Section 2(1)(e) to mean that where the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11, the same High Court must retain jurisdiction over substitution under Section 29A. The Delhi High Court in DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co. (2020 SCC OnLine Del 2501) articulated this position with clarity, holding that substitution of an arbitrator under Section 29A(6) cannot be performed by a court that lacks the power to appoint the arbitrator under Section 11. The Court reasoned that allowing a district court to substitute a High Court appointed arbitrator would be wholly impermissible and contrary to the scheme of the Act.

The Gujarat High Court in Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel v. Bhanubhai Patel (2018 SCC OnLine Guj 5017) adopted a similar approach, holding that when appointment is made by the High Court under Section 11, the High Court alone can extend the mandate under Section 29A, and by necessary implication, exercise the power of substitution under Section 29A(6). The Court emphasized that it would be anomalous for a district court to exercise jurisdiction over an arbitrator appointed by the High Court, and that the contextual exception in Section 2(1)(e) applied precisely in such situations to maintain institutional coherence.

The Bombay High Court in KIPL Vistacore Infra Projects JV v. Ichalkaranji Municipal Corporation (2024 SCC OnLine Bom 327) expressed similar concerns, observing that it would be inconceivable and anomalous for an arbitrator appointed by the High Court under Section 11 to be substituted by a district court under Section 29A(6). The High Court noted that the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" in Section 2(1)(e) must be given full effect, and that the context of Section 29A, when read with Section 11, clearly required that the appointing court retain jurisdiction.

The most comprehensive articulation of this position came from the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Goa in Sheela Chowgule v. Vijay Chowgule (2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3177). The Division Bench categorically held that where the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6), the application under Section 29A must lie before the High Court itself. The Court distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Chief Engineer, PWD v. Shree Balaji Enterprises on the ground that in that case, the arbitrators were not appointed by the High Court but were mutually appointed by the parties. Therefore, the ratio of Chief Engineer did not govern cases where appointment was by the High Court under Section 11. The Division Bench's judgment was subsequently challenged before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court's judgment in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 reversed the Division Bench and resolved the controversy in favour of civil court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court began by reframing the two questions that had been referred to the Division Bench into a single, simpler question: if an arbitral tribunal appointed by the High Court or by the parties concerned does not complete proceedings within the required or extended time limit, can an application to extend time under Section 29A be filed before the High Court or the Civil Court? The Court noted that there was no need to split the question based on whether the tribunal was constituted by the High Court under Section 11(6) or by the parties under Section 11(2), as this perceived duality in the appointment process had given rise to the divergent views of different High Courts.

The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme of the Act and observed that while Section 11 vests the power to appoint arbitrators exclusively in the Supreme Court or the High Court, this jurisdiction is special and limited. Relying on SBP and Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618, the Court reiterated that the power under Section 11 was conferred on the highest judicial authority to add credibility to the arbitral process, but this was essentially a power of appointment, not of continuing supervision. The Court noted that post the amendments to Section 11, including the introduction of Section 11(6A), the enquiry under Section 11 is confined to a prima facie determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and goes no further. Exercise of jurisdiction under Section 11 stands exhausted upon constitution of the arbitral tribunal, and there is no residual supervisory or controlling power left with the High Court over the arbitral proceedings after appointment is made.

Moving to Section 29A, the Supreme Court held that the provision introduced principles of integrity and efficiency by prescribing time limits for making awards. The Court observed that Section 29A(4) empowers "the Court" to extend the mandate of the arbitral tribunal beyond the prescribed time limit, and that this Court is the Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e). The definition in Section 2(1)(e), the Court noted, is exhaustive, using the expression "means and includes." The Court cited its earlier decision in Associated Contractors (2015) 1 SCC 32, where a three-judge bench had held that no court other than the one defined in Section 2(1)(e) gets qualified as "Court" under Part I of the Act.

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that considerations of hierarchy or institutional anomaly could justify departing from the plain definition in Section 2(1)(e). The Court observed that interpretation based on a perception of status or hierarchy of courts is opposed to the fundamental conception of rule of law, and that jurisdiction flows from statute, not from judicial status. The Court quoted extensively from State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 602, where a Constitution Bench had held that a superior court cannot assume jurisdiction on the foundation that it is a higher court, and that original jurisdiction must be vested in law. The Court emphasized that solely because a superior court appoints the arbitrator or issues directions, it cannot be regarded as a court of first instance, as that would go contrary to the definition of "Court" and curtail the right of a litigant to the forum provided by the legislature.

The Supreme Court also addressed the applicability of Section 42, which provides that where any application under Part I of the Act has been made in a court, that court alone shall have jurisdiction over all subsequent applications arising out of the arbitration agreement. The Court held, following Associated Contractors, that Section 42 does not apply to applications under Section 11 because the Chief Justice or his delegate exercising power under Section 11 is not a "Court" as defined in Section 2(1)(e). Therefore, the fact that the High Court appointed the arbitrator under Section 11 did not mean that all subsequent applications, including those under Section 29A, must be made to the High Court.

On the power of substitution under Section 29A(6), the Supreme Court observed that this is a consequential power vesting in the court empowered to extend time under Section 29A(4). The Court noted that if the court finds delay attributable to the arbitral tribunal, it may, while extending time, substitute one or all of the arbitrators. The Court held that the extension of mandate or substitution of an arbitrator under Section 29A does not partake the character of "appointment" under Section 11, but is a measure designed to ensure timely conclusion of arbitration. The Court concluded that in the absence of any contextual indicia to the contrary, the expression "Court" in Section 29A must be accorded the meaning assigned to it under Section 2(1)(e).

The Supreme Court's reasoning is methodical and grounded in established principles of statutory interpretation. The Court correctly emphasized that jurisdiction is conferred by statute and that defined terms must ordinarily bear the meaning assigned to them unless the context otherwise requires. The Court's rejection of hierarchy based arguments is also doctrinally sound; the principle that law, not status, is the source of judicial power is fundamental to the rule of law. However, the judgment suffers from a critical omission: it does not address the interplay between Section 29A(6) and Section 15(2) of the Act.

Section 15, located in Chapter III of the Act dealing with the composition of arbitral tribunals, provides the general framework for termination of mandate and substitution of arbitrators. Section 15(1) specifies circumstances under which an arbitrator's mandate terminates, including withdrawal or termination by agreement of parties. Section 15(2) then provides that where the mandate of an arbitrator terminates, a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced. This is a mandatory provision, employing the word "shall," and it creates a direct link between the procedural rules governing the original appointment and the procedural rules that must govern the substitution.

The legislative intent behind Section 15(2) is to ensure procedural continuity and institutional coherence in the composition of the arbitral tribunal. If the original arbitrator was appointed through a particular mechanism whether by mutual agreement of parties, by an arbitral institution, or by a court, the substitute must also be appointed through the same mechanism. This preserves the parties' expectations regarding the composition of the tribunal and maintains the integrity of the appointment process.

When Section 29A(6) is read in isolation, it appears to vest a broad discretionary power in "the Court" to substitute arbitrators while extending time. However, statutes do not operate in isolation; they must be read harmoniously with related provisions. Critically, Section 29A(6) does not commence with a non-obstante clause, it does not say "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act" or any similar formulation that would give it overriding effect. The absence of such a non-obstante provision is legislatively significant. It means that Section 29A(6) must be read in harmony with, and subject to, other applicable provisions of the Act, particularly those that establish foundational procedural requirements.

Section 29A(6) is a specific provision dealing with substitution in the context of time extension, but it operates within the broader framework established by Section 15, which is the general provision governing all substitutions of arbitrators whose mandate has terminated. Under the principle of harmonious construction, a specific provision must be read subject to the general provision unless there is clear legislative intent to exclude the general provision's application. There is no such exclusionary language in Section 29A(6). Indeed, the absence of a non-obstante clause reinforces that Parliament did not intend Section 29A(6) to override or displace the procedural mandate in Section 15(2). Where the legislature intends a provision to have overriding effect, it employs clear language to that effect. The absence of such language in Section 29A(6) compels the conclusion that it must be read harmoniously with, and in subordination to, the general framework established in Section 15(2). Therefore, in the absence of any non-obstante condition, the general provisions of Section 15(2) must prevail over, or at minimum govern the operation of, Section 29A(6).

Therefore, when a court exercises its power under Section 29A(6) to substitute arbitrators, it must do so in accordance with Section 15(2), that is, by following the rules applicable to the original appointment. This interpretive requirement is not a matter of judicial creativity; it flows from the plain text of the statute and from established principles of statutory construction requiring that related provisions be read harmoniously to give effect to the legislative scheme as a whole.

The practical consequence of this reading becomes apparent when one considers a case where the original arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6). In such a case, the "rules applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced" are the rules under Section 11(6), which vest the power of appointment exclusively in the Supreme Court or the High Court as the case may be. These rules involve not merely administrative designation but judicial determination, including examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and consideration of factors such as the independence and impartiality of the proposed arbitrator. The power under Section 11 is conferred on the highest judicial authority precisely to add credibility to the arbitral process and to ensure that the constitution of the tribunal meets the highest standards of judicial scrutiny.

If a civil court is called upon to substitute an arbitrator under Section 29A(6) in such a case, it faces an insurmountable difficulty, it must comply with Section 15(2) by following the rules applicable to the original appointment, but those rules, the rules under Section 11(6), vest jurisdiction in the High Court or the Supreme Court, not in the civil court. The civil court has no jurisdiction to make appointments under Section 11(6). It cannot exercise a power that the statute has conferred exclusively on constitutional courts. Therefore, the civil court cannot lawfully substitute the arbitrator while simultaneously complying with the mandatory requirement in Section 15(2).

This is not a question of hierarchy or institutional status; it is a question of statutory compliance. The civil court's disability flows not from any inherent inferiority but from the clear allocation of jurisdiction made by the legislature. Section 11(6) vests appointment power in the High Court; Section 15(2) requires substitution to follow the rules of original appointment; therefore, substitution of a Section 11(6) appointee must also be by the High Court or the Supreme Court as the case may be. This is a matter of textual fidelity to the statutory scheme, not of judicial protocol.

The Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule did not address this argument because, apparently, Section 15(2) was not placed before the Court by the parties. The judgment does not cite, quote, or analyze Section 15(2). The word "substitution" appears in the judgment only in the context of describing Section 29A(6) as a "consequential power," but the Court did not examine whether this consequential power is constrained by any other statutory provision, specifically Section 15(2). This omission is significant because Section 15(2) is part of the same statutory framework, located in Chapter III, which comprehensively deals with the composition of the arbitral tribunal. The principle of harmonious construction requires that related provisions be read together to effectuate the legislative intent.

The Supreme Court's reliance on Chief Engineer, PWD v. Shree Balaji Enterprises (2024 SCC OnLine SC 4095) also merits scrutiny. In Chief Engineer, the Supreme Court held that the power under Section 29A(4) vests in the Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e), and that the power under Section 29A(6) is only a consequential power vesting in the court empowered to extend time. However, the factual matrix in Chief Engineer was materially different. In that case, the arbitrators were mutually appointed by the parties, not by any court under Section 11. Therefore, when the issue of substitution arose under Section 29A(6), there was no question of the civil court being unable to comply with Section 15(2), because the "rules applicable to the original appointment" were simply the parties' own agreed procedure for mutual appointment, which the civil court could readily follow. The Section 15(2) problem arises only when the original appointment was under Section 11(6), which vests jurisdiction in the constitutional courts.

The Division Bench in Sheela Chowgule had distinguished Chief Engineer on precisely this ground, noting that the arbitrators in Chief Engineer were mutually appointed by the parties, not by the court. The Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule, however, did not accept this distinction, holding that the perceived duality between appointments under Section 11(2) (by parties) and Section 11(6) (by court) was misconceived. The Court observed that there was no need to split the question into two based on the mode of appointment. However, this conclusion overlooks the fact that the distinction is not arbitrary or status-based; it is grounded in the textual requirement of Section 15(2). The mode of original appointment matters because Section 15(2) makes it matter by requiring substitution to follow the same rules.

The Supreme Court's statement that "the extension of mandate or substitution of an arbitrator under Section 29A does not partake the character of 'appointment' under Section 11" is correct in a narrow sense, but substitution under Section 29A(6) is not governed by Section 11 as such. However, it is governed by Section 15(2), which in turn refers back to the rules of the original appointment. If the original appointment was under Section 11(6), then Section 15(2) requires the substitution to follow those rules, even though the substitution itself is occurring under Section 29A(6), not under Section 11. This is not a conflation of appointment with substitution; it is simply giving effect to the statutory mandate in Section 15(2).

The Supreme Court in Nimet Resources Inc. v. Essar Steels Ltd. (2009) 17 SCC 313 had occasion to consider Section 14 of the Act, which deals with failure or impossibility of an arbitrator to act. The Court held that applications under Section 14(2) for determination of whether an arbitrator has become unable to perform his functions must be made to the "Court" as defined in Section 2(1)(e), and not to the Supreme Court even if the Supreme Court had initially appointed the arbitrator. The Court observed that when an arbitrator is nominated under the 1996 Act, the court does not retain any jurisdiction; it becomes functus officio. This principle is sound and applies equally to Section 11 appointments. However, the question in the present context is not whether the appointing court retains jurisdiction, rather it is whether the civil court, in exercising jurisdiction under Section 29A(6), can comply with Section 15(2). These are distinct inquiries.

The Supreme Court's invocation of the functus officio doctrine in Jagdeep Chowgule establishes that the High Court does not retain supervisory jurisdiction after making an appointment under Section 11. This is unassailable. However, it does not follow that the civil court can substitute a Section 11(6) appointee in compliance with Section 15(2). The civil court's jurisdiction under Section 29A(4) to extend time is not disputed. What is disputed is whether, when the civil court exercises the ancillary power under Section 29A(6) to substitute, it can do so while following the mandate in Section 15(2) to apply the rules of original appointment. If those rules vest jurisdiction in the High Court, the civil court is disabled not by the functus officio doctrine but by its own lack of jurisdiction under Section 11(6).

The interpretive principle that a defined term must bear the meaning assigned to it "unless the context otherwise requires" has been consistently recognized by the Supreme Court. In K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Amman (1997) 2 SCC 53, the Court held that where a definition is preceded by the words "unless the context otherwise requires," the definition set out in the section must be applied, but this rule may be departed from if there is something in the context to show that the definition could not be applied. The question, therefore, is whether Section 15(2) provides such context.

Section 15(2) creates a procedural requirement that is impossible for the civil court to fulfill when the original appointment was under Section 11(6). This is not a matter of convenience or institutional preference; it is a matter of statutory impossibility. The civil court cannot follow rules that vest jurisdiction in the High Court. This impossibility is sufficient context to invoke the exception in Section 2(1)(e) and to hold that in cases where the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6), the "Court" under Section 29A for purposes of substitution under Section 29A(6) is the High Court, not the civil court.

The Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule concluded that the definition in Section 2(1)(e) is exhaustive and that there is no contextual justification to disapply it. However, this conclusion was reached without examining Section 15(2). Had the Court considered Section 15(2), it would have confronted a textual provision creating precisely the kind of context that the exception in Section 2(1)(e) contemplates. The failure to address Section 15(2) represents a significant gap in the Court's analysis.

The practical consequences of the Court's interpretation are also troubling. Under the Supreme Court's holding, when a civil court extends time under Section 29A(4) and decides to substitute the arbitrator under Section 29A(6), it must comply with Section 15(2). But how is this to be done when the original appointment was under Section 11(6)? The civil court has three options, none of which is satisfactory.

First, the civil court could decline to exercise the power of substitution under Section 29A(6), on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction to comply with Section 15(2). This would render Section 29A(6) effectively nugatory in all cases involving Section 11(6) appointments, which cannot have been the legislative intent.

Second, the civil court could purport to substitute the arbitrator without following the rules under Section 11(6), perhaps by applying its own procedure for appointments. This would violate Section 15(2) and would result in a substitution that does not comply with the statutory mandate. Such a substitution would be vulnerable to challenge.

Third, the civil court could extend time under Section 29A(4) but refer the question of substitution to the High Court, which would then apply Section 11(6) procedures. This would be administratively complex and lacks any basis in the statutory text and shall defeat the manifest purpose of Arbitration Act of expeditious disposal of the cases.

Each of these outcomes undermines the statutory scheme. The cleanest and most coherent interpretation is to recognize that when the original appointment was under Section 11(6), the High Court must exercise both the power of extension under Section 29A(4) and the power of substitution under Section 29A(6), because only the High Court can exercise the substitution power in compliance with Section 15(2).

The judgment in Jagdeep Chowgule also creates potential forum shopping and unpredictability. Parties may now file applications under Section 29A in civil courts even where the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court, knowing that the civil court has jurisdiction under the Supreme Court's interpretation. However, if the civil court then seeks to substitute the arbitrator, questions will inevitably arise about compliance with Section 15(2). Different civil courts may adopt different approaches, leading to inconsistent practice and uncertainty. This is precisely the kind of jurisdictional fragmentation that the Act seeks to avoid.

The Supreme Court's emphasis on the principle that jurisdiction flows from statute, not from hierarchy, is entirely correct. However, that principle cuts both ways. It requires courts to respect all statutory provisions, not merely the definition clause in Section 2(1)(e). Section 15(2) is a statutory provision of equal dignity and force. It creates a mandatory procedural requirement. Courts cannot ignore it in the name of giving effect to Section 2(1)(e), because both provisions are part of the same statute and must be harmonized.

The Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (supra) held that a superior court cannot curtail the right of a litigant to the forum provided by the legislature by assuming jurisdiction not vested in it. This principle applies with equal force to the civil court. The civil court cannot assume the power to substitute a Section 11(6) appointee when the statute, through the combined operation of Sections 29A(6) and 15(2) requires that such substitution follow rules vesting jurisdiction in the High Court. To do so would be for the civil court to arrogate to itself a power that the legislature has not conferred.

The resolution of this interpretive difficulty lies in recognizing that the Act contemplates two distinct situations, and that the jurisdictional regime under Section 29A differs depending on which situation obtains. In the first situation, where the arbitrator was appointed by the parties under Section 11(2) or by an agreed appointing authority, the "rules applicable to the original appointment" under Section 15(2) do not vest exclusive jurisdiction in any constitutional court. The civil court can therefore both extend time under Section 29A(4) and substitute the arbitrator under Section 29A(6) in full compliance with Section 15(2). In this scenario, Section 2(1)(e) applies without modification.

In the second situation, where the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6) or by the Supreme Court in cases of international commercial arbitration, the "rules applicable to the original appointment" under Section 15(2) vest jurisdiction in the constitutional court. The civil court can extend time under Section 29A(4), but it cannot substitute the arbitrator under Section 29A(6) in compliance with Section 15(2), because it lacks jurisdiction to follow the rules under Section 11(6). In this scenario, the "context" created by Section 15(2) invokes the exception in Section 2(1)(e), and the High Court or Supreme Court, as the case may be, must exercise the power of substitution.

This interpretation gives full effect to both Section 2(1)(e) and Section 15(2). It respects the definition of "Court" while recognizing that the definition itself contains an exception for cases where the context otherwise requires. It avoids rendering either provision nugatory. It maintains institutional coherence by ensuring that the court with jurisdiction to appoint under Section 11(6) also has jurisdiction to substitute when necessary. And it prevents the anomaly of a civil court purporting to exercise a power that it cannot lawfully exercise in compliance with the relevant statutory procedures.

The Supreme Court's judgment in Jagdeep Chowgule represents a definitive resolution of the jurisdictional question under Section 29A, but it is a resolution that overlooks a critical statutory provision. The judgment's emphasis on textual fidelity, its rejection of hierarchy based reasoning, and its insistence that jurisdiction flows from statute are all salutary principles. However, those very principles demand attention to Section 15(2), which the judgment does not address. Section 15(2) is not a subordinate or peripheral provision; it is central to the statutory framework governing substitution of arbitrators. To interpret Section 29A(6) without reference to Section 15(2) is to read the statute in fragments rather than as a coherent whole.

The path forward requires either legislative clarification or judicial reconsideration. Parliament may choose to amend Section 29A(6) to expressly address the procedural requirements for substitution in cases where the original appointment was under Section 11, or it may amend Section 15(2) to clarify its applicability to substitutions under Section 29A(6). Alternatively, when the issue is properly placed before the Supreme Court with full reference to Section 15(2), the Court may reconsider its interpretation in Jagdeep Chowgule or distinguish it on the ground that the Section 15(2) constraint was not argued or considered.

Until such clarification or reconsideration occurs, the law on substitution under Section 29A(6) in cases involving Section 11(6) appointments remains doctrinally unsettled. The Supreme Court has held that the civil court has jurisdiction, but it has not explained how the civil court is to comply with Section 15(2). This gap in the jurisprudence is not merely academic; it has practical consequences for arbitral proceedings across the country. Courts and practitioners require clear guidance on the procedural requirements for substitution, particularly when the original appointment was made by a constitutional court under Section 11.

The case for doctrinal clarity on this point is compelling. Arbitration in India has made significant strides in recent years, and the legislative and judicial reforms of the past decade have enhanced India's standing as a seat for both domestic and international arbitration. However, jurisdictional uncertainty undermines these gains. Parties choosing arbitration expect clarity regarding the courts that will exercise supervisory functions, the procedures those courts will follow, and the legal framework within which arbitral proceedings will unfold. When fundamental questions about jurisdiction and procedure remain unresolved or are resolved without addressing critical statutory provisions, confidence in the arbitral framework is diminished.

The interpretive question presented by the interaction of Sections 29A(6) and 15(2) is ultimately a question about legislative intent and statutory coherence. Did Parliament intend, when it empowered courts to substitute arbitrators under Section 29A(6), that such substitution could occur without regard to the procedural requirements in Section 15(2)? Or did Parliament intend that substitution under Section 29A(6), like all other substitutions, must comply with Section 15(2)? The text of the statute provides a clear answer: Section 15(2) contains no exception for substitutions under Section 29A(6), and there is no indication that Parliament intended to create such an exception. The ordinary rules of statutory interpretation require that the specific provision (Section 29A(6)) be read harmoniously with the general provision (Section 15(2)), giving effect to both.

The Supreme Court's decision in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule has resolved one aspect of the jurisdictional controversy under Section 29A by holding that applications for extension of time lie before the court defined in Section 2(1)(e). However, the decision has not resolved, because it did not address, the question of how substitution under Section 29A(6) is to be accomplished in compliance with Section 15(2) when the original appointment was under Section 11(6). This question remains open, and its resolution is essential to the coherent functioning of India's arbitration regime.

The call for doctrinal clarity on this point is not a call for judicial activism or creative interpretation. It is a call for textual fidelity to the full statutory scheme as enacted by Parliament. Section 15(2) is law. It commands that substitution follow the rules of original appointment. If those rules vest jurisdiction in the High Court under Section 11(6), then substitution must also lie with the High Court. This conclusion flows not from assumptions about hierarchy or institutional propriety, but from the plain meaning of the statutory text read as a coherent whole. Until this understanding is reflected in authoritative precedent, the law on substitution of arbitrators in India will remain incomplete, and the promise of clarity and efficiency that animates the Arbitration and Conciliation Act will remain partially unfulfilled.

The author is a Senior Advocate at High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Views are personal