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On 29 March 2026, the Facebook page belonging to digital news platform Molitics was blocked all over India and unavailable for viewing. Molitics approached the Delhi High Court claiming that it had neither received a reasoned order nor been informed why its page had been blocked. This question ultimately concerned a simple point of procedure; how can a person challenge the suppression of online speech when they are not informed as to the direction given to the social media intermediary by the government.

Similar procedural concerns arose in petitions filed by Saral Patel and Deepak Kumar after restrictions were imposed on their social-media content upon government notices issued under section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. According to the Internet Freedom Foundation, the relevant Sahyog directions were furnished only after the affected parties had approached the Delhi High Court.

These cases lay bare a fault line in India's digital takedown regime. The central question is not merely whether the State can require unlawful content to be removed. The question seems to be merely, Is the speaker, whose speech has been curtailed by state action, at least entitled to notice as to why it happened, and a proper opportunity to challenge it? It seems to be a question of natural justice as much as freedom of expression.

The Procedural Gap in Digital Takedowns

The existing framework, however, is not entirely devoid of protection. In October 2025, rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology Rules, 2021, was amended which now requires a reasoned written intimation from an authorized officer of senior-level providing with the legal justification of such removal or disabling, the nature of the unlawful act and the specific URL of electronic location to which unlawful information pertains to by the government in an event the government seeks removal or disabling of such information. Therefore, this amendment also improves accountability in communication between the State and the intermediary.

However, this does not fully resolve the difficult question raised by cases like Molitics. There can be reasoned directions and yet be negligible procedural protection for the speaker affected by the speech; this is not an insignificant distinction, as a reasoned direction communicated to an intermediary is not necessarily procedural fairness for a speaker who never receives that direction.

That is especially relevant considering that the Sahyog portal acts as a centralised medium through which authorised government entities communicate with intermediaries, under Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(1)(d). The Karnataka High Court, in X Corp v. Union of India (WP 7405 of 2025), upheld the mechanism, finding that it acted as a facilitation device and not a censorship tool in and of itself. In March 2026, the decision was subsequently challenged by X Corp, and the Karnataka High Court issued notice to the Centre. But one question remains: where does the affected speaker fit within this process?

Natural Justice and Digital Takedowns

The debate is not whether every online removal needs a full inquiry and a hearing prior to that. Natural justice has never been perceived rigidly in Indian administrative law; what is fair varies with the character of the power, the impact of the order, and the need for swift action. The core issue is a fair opportunity for the individual whose rights and interests stand to be prejudiced to know and contest state action.

In another case relevant in this background, Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (WP (Cri) No. 167 of 2012), while upholding Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Supreme Court placed considerable emphasis on the procedural safeguards accompanying the blocking power. The reason can be reviewed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further, if the originator can be established, the Blocking Rules would allow an opportunity of being heard. Thus, the Supreme Court linked restrictions on online speech to the processes by which they are exercised.

However, it cannot be accepted that a prior hearing is always an option. It was accepted in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981 SCC (1) 664) that the content of natural justice depends upon the statutory setting and circumstances, and urgency can affect the timing and form of the hearing. This distinction would seem particularly relevant to an online context. While it could be acceptable to take immediate action where waiting may cause greater harm, urgency cannot be an excuse for keeping the speaker affected by restriction away from participation entirely. Where prior hearing is not feasible, the right to immediate notice of restriction and a post-decisional avenue to dispute may become imperative.

A Comparative Perspective

Article 9 of the European Union's Digital Services Act (DSA) envisages orders from judicial or administrative authorities against illegal content. The order must cite the legal basis of the order, State why the content is to be considered illegal, state the body that issued the order and State information about legal remedies for the intermediary as well as for the user who placed the information content with the intermediary, and potentially the user who inserted it.

The European framework cannot simply be transplanted into India. In India, the takedown regime works in a specific statutory and institutional set-up and must also be consistent with our constitutional mandate under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. Even so, the European comparison shows that decisive action against unlawful online content does not inherently need to come at the expense of procedural fairness. A process can combine quick action by the authorities with the right for the user to understand why the action was taken and how they can contest it, which might be a more important takeaway for India.

Digital Due Process in India

Digital due process need not mean a full pre-decisional hearing before every takedown. The procedure can vary according to urgency and the nature of the harm involved.

When there is no immediate danger of harm to that person being done, the concerned party to the action usually has to be advised of what content restrictions are proposed, which legal authority the restrictions will be imposed under, and why the relevant content is prohibited and also must have a realistic chance to respond or review which would become all the more significant where a complete page or profile rather than a single post is concerned.

An immediate problem will involve a different solution. If the delay results in immediate and irreparable risk, immediate prohibition might take place before a hearing. The subject must be given the direction, its reason and an opportunity for post-decisional review within a time-bound avenue. However, the lack of a preliminary hearing does not necessarily equal the lack of natural justice. The subsequent notice of restriction must then specify the reasons that support its adoption. The party concerned has the right to challenge the restriction order. It must also set a time limit to challenge.

This distinction would mean that digital regulation is capable of maintaining its operation without the need for procedural fairness to rely on administrative convenience. However, there can be few practical occasions on which Judicial Review is useful and at which the individual at the heart of proceedings can identify the decision-maker, the power they exercised, the content of what they were seeking to prevent and/or the justification for doing so.

The real choice is whether it is an option between the fast takedown and natural justice. Both options could and should go hand in hand if reasonable safeguards for due process are tailor-made for a fast-paced decision and not just abandoned on the basis that the decision affects the internet.

However, the emerging debates on Sahyog show that the real lacuna of India's digital takedown regime lies not just in the presence of safeguards but in where the impacted speech maker lies within the frame. Having a reasoned order issued between the state and the intermediary is of limited use for an individual who does not understand the cause and remedy.

There is no need to embrace the European model or mandate pre-decisional hearings in all situations to reach a functional solution. A standard of digital due process can be derived within the confines of established natural justice in India. In ordinary cases, notice, reasons and an opportunity to challenge should precede or accompany the restriction. However, where genuine urgency necessitates immediate action, post-decisional hearing should ideally follow promptly. The ability of the State to address content which is likely to cause an immediate, unmitigated harm shall remain intact without making procedure a procedural charade. Digital urgency warrants a postponed hearing in the worst-case scenario, and not no hearing at all.

Views are personal.

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