Criminal process has always drawn a sharp line between two very different state actions over crime property: taking custody of it to preserve evidence, and to ensure that whoever is ultimately found entitled to it actually gets it. The first is seizure, and the second is Attachment. For decades, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) gave police officers only the first tool by way of section 102 CrPC. Investigating agencies and courts stretched that single provision to also perform the second function, because no statutory alternative existed.
This improvisation is no longer required with the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”). In the BNSS, section 106 replicates section 102 CrPC exactly as it was earlier. Section 107 BNSS is new, where for the first time, to “secure the proceeds of crime” through attachment, power has been granted to an investigating agency. And this can only be exercised with the sanction of a Magistrate. This distinction has profound implications for practices like Debit freezing of bank accounts, a common tool adopted by investigating agencies in financial and cybercrime cases.
The old regime: Stretching s. 102 CrPC to do two jobs
Section 102 CrPC empowered a police officer to seize any property alleged or suspected to be stolen, or found under circumstances creating suspicion of an offence. Nothing in its text contemplated debit freezing to preserve the fruits of a crime for eventual restitution. The stated purpose of seizure was evidentiary. However, this lacunae led to State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy, 1999 INSC 417 (“Tapas D Neogy”), where the Supreme Court held that a bank account is “property” within section 102 CrPC and thus, an investigating officer could seize it by freezing the funds. The court explained why it read the provision broadly. It said that trials take years and if an account is not frozen, the accused would simply withdraw the proceeds before conviction, leaving the court powerless to restore it to the rightful owners (para 12). In other words, the Court used section 102 CrPC, an evidence preservation tool to perform an asset preserving function, because the CrPC contained no dedicated attachment mechanism for domestic proceeds of crime. This position was followed for two decades.
The CrPC was not wholly silent on attachment. Although the Criminal amendment ordinance, 1944 (“ordinance, 1944”), was in existence, it applied to very few IPC offences as mentioned in its schedule. It was introduced to protect government money and also properties believed to have been obtained by embezzling either government money or government property. The recovery was a civil recovery mechanism as held in State of west Bengal v. SK Ghosh, AIR 1963 SC 255. Apart from this, Cross border attachments under Chapter VII-A of CrPC (now Chapter VIII in BNSS) was present which allowed attachment of property outside India derived from crime, but only to give effect to reciprocal arrangements.
Domestic proceeds of crime like crime money sitting in an ordinary Indian bank, had no attachment mechanism at all. That lacunae is what forced the Supreme Court to give an expansive reading of section 102 CrPC in Tapas D. Neogy.
The change brought forth by BNSS
The BNSS did not simply carry section 102 forward as section 106 BNSS which retained the seizure power for evidentiary purposes. Law makers filled the vacuum with section 107 BNSS which empowers the police officers, during the course of investigation, to approach a magistrate where he has “reason to believe” that property is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, from criminal activity or commission of an offence. That magistrate after hearing the parties [save in exigent circumstances where he can pass ex parte interim order under section 107(5)], may order attachment of that property so that it can eventually be forfeited or distributed to victims.
The structural difference between section 106 and 107 BNSS is not cosmetic. Section 106 BNSS is triggered when the officers “finds some tangible property under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence”. The property is “found” and hence seized. It is retrospective and evidentiary. The property is seized because of what it can prove. On the other hand, section 107 BNSS is triggered based on an investigating officer's investigation, where he arrives at a strong reason to believe that a property is derived or obtained from the crime being investigated, and it needs to be attached. It is prospective and preventive. The concern is not what the property proves, but what will happen to it if it is left alone. The Kerala High Court captures this precisely in Headstar Global Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 339 (“Headstar”), observing that the CrPC's lacuna in providing for attachment of domestic proceeds of crime is what section 107 BNSS was inserted to cure, retaining section 102 CrPC as section 106 BNSS for seizure alone (para 10-14). The Kerala High Court decision when challenged in the Supreme Court, was declined to be interfered with in SLP (Cri.) No. 13433/2025.
Debit Freezing is inherently an act of attachment
When an investigating officer directs a bank to block all outgoing transactions of an account, it blocks withdrawals, transfer or debits while allowing credits. Nothing about this operation serves an evidentiary purpose, because the transaction history which proves or disproves an offence is fully captured in the bank's own statements and records, which do not vanish because the account remains operational. This statement and records need to be seized under section 106 BNSS. What is actually accomplished through a debit freeze is stopping the account holder from moving, spending, or dissipating the balance before the state can establish that the money is tainted and secure it for forfeiture or distribution to the victims. That is the textbook definition of attachment, which is to preserve value pending adjudication, and not to preserve evidence.
This reasoning has found wide acceptance. The Bombay High Court in Karthik Yogeshwar Chatur v. Union of India, Criminal Writ Petition 321 of 2025 relied upon Headstar, and held the act of debit freezing to be an attachment and quashed the debit freeze order for want of compliance with section 107, while expressly holding debit freeze to not fall under section 106 BNSS. Similarly, in Malabar Gold and diamonds v. UoI, W.P.(C) 4198/2025, the Delhi High Court held that freezing of bank account is done to secure Proceeds of crime (para 12-19). Apart from these three decisions, Karnataka, Madras, Calcutta, Punjab & Haryana, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh have followed suit, taking the combined tally to 18 decisions endorsing the position that a debit freeze is an attachment and section 107's safeguards like reasoned belief, prior superior officer approval and above all - a magistrate's order is mandatory, not optional.
Insisting of judicial oversight is not merely procedural fastidiousness. Right to property remains as a constitutional right under Article 300A, and a human right as per the Supreme Court in Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra, Civil Appeal No. 6156 of 2013 (para 96). A blanket freeze strikes at the ability to conduct business and touches Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 21. Judicial oversight, rather than mere investigating officer alone making decision of debit freeze, is the legislature's chosen safeguard against arbitrary exercise of a power with such serious consequences.
Addressing the sole contrary view
The outlier of the wide reasoning of various High Courts is the Allahabad High Court's decision in Ashish Rawat v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 210, which held that freezing could be sustained under section 106 BNSS, though only to the extent of the quantified tainted amount and not the entire account. The reasoning relies heavily upon Tapas D. Neogy's reasoning of holding freezing permissible under section 102 CrPC.
This view is however distinguishable. Tapas D Neogy was interpreting CrPC that had no attachment provision. Its wide and purposive reading was a judicial solution to a legislative gap. That gap now stands filled with section 107 BNSS. Once legislature has occupied the filed with a purpose-built provision, expression unius est exclusion alterius applies with full force: a specific procedure enacted for a specific purpose displaces the earlier improvised route through a general seizure provision.
Hence, Section 106 and 107 BNSS occupy distinct fields, although operating during the investigation stage. One does not make the other redundant. Section 106 BNSS exists to preserve evidence and section 107 BNSS exists to preserve the proceeds of crime. A debit freeze serves only the second purpose, because nothing about a frozen account is more probative than an operational one, since bank statements remain available for evidentiary purposes. A debit freeze denies the ability to deal with the money, which is precisely what attachment is designed to do. Read against the legislative history, with the ordinance of 1944, and Chapter VIIA CrPC, and the felt gap that section 107 BNSS was drafted to fill, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that with a dedicated attachment provision, debit freezing of bank accounts can only proceed under section 107 BNSS.
Views are personal.