Erosion Of Educational Federalism: The Battle For University Vice-Chancellors

Though many state governments have enacted new university laws removing the Governor as Chancellor, interestingly, such laws are at the doorsteps of the same Governors, waiting for assent. A supreme paradox is that this 'power to keep waiting,' though initially curtailed by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, has been circularly and intangibly overruled through an opinion solicited by the President of the Republic on acting on the aid and advice of the Union Cabinet.

A bit of legislative history behind the exercise of the power of appointment of VC by the Governor may add more to the context. Many state universities in India were established through state university acts, much prior to the UGC Act, which is a central act. Education, once the exclusive domain of the State, underwent a tectonic shift through the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution in 1976, which transferred 'Education' from the State List to the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule. This enabled both the Parliament and the State Legislatures to make laws on the subject, but placed the Union laws made under Entry 66 of the Union List, like the UGC Act, as superior in cases of conflict. The UGC derived its power to influence VC appointments through its Regulations, which were framed under Section 26 of the UGC Act, 1956, much later in 2010. These Regulations prescribed the minimum qualifications and procedures for the selection of the Vice-Chancellor, including the mandatory requirement for a Search-cum-Selection Committee to include a nominee of the UGC.

Backed by the above exposition of law, the Governors started acting contrary to the state government's collective wisdom, thrusting names of their choice. Though the underlying power is only that of a Chancellor, who is just a creation of a statute, wrapped in the constitutional clothing of the Governor, the voice made more noise, mimicking a constitutional scheme. The conflict over the names of VCs led to litigation between the State and the office of the Chancellor, though both are funded by the same state exchequer.

This conflict from many states finally reached the Supreme Court multiple times. These cases were mostly between a particular state Act versus the UGC Act ; over a period of time, case after case, UGC nominees in the search committees, irrespective of nominee's suitability to be a member of search committee attained permanency. More than the coordination, determination, and maintenance of standards in university education across India, the issue became purely political. The entire appointment process became a showdown between the Centre, through the Governor, and the State.

In some cases, though it was found that the UGC nominee was not competent or academically solid, the paramountcy of Entry 66 protected UGC nominees in the search committees. States also equally diluted the search committee composition, sprinkling it with not-so-academic personalities. Those judges ideologically aligned with a unitary form of governance found Entry 66 as exclusive, while those who were not, read it with more federalistic, inclusive elements. In most of the cases of Centre versus a particular State in the Supreme Court, the success of the Centre resulted in a step towards the unitary form, and the failure of 'a particular state' was a blow not to that state alone, but to federalism as a whole, affecting every constituent state which was not even a party.

Another casualty of resolving conflicts between central and state laws of education is often against the spirit of university autonomy, a non-negotiable academic necessity. The state universities are extensions of the respective state, culture, and language. In university education, there are many disciplines associated with the foundational ideals of the state. Theretofore, Ideally, the central regulatory bodies should always take a hands-off approach in the affairs of state universities other than maintaining the ingredients of Entry 66 of the List One.

Universities are not meant for the production of just graduates and post-graduates ; they should be a place of vibrant young India with a mission to develop the scientific temper, humanism, and the spirit of inquiry and reform, as cherished in Article 51A (h) of the Constitution of India. As of today, the UGC cannot claim high moral ground as a champion of academic excellence. The academic history of UGC- approved universities in India, managed by VCs appointed through UGC Regulations is not at all promising. For instance, in many Indian universities, 'astrology' is a course to study. Astrology can never align with Article 51A (h) of the Constitution of India. If the UGC does not find fault with such unacademic exercises, such a UGC has no moral or legal authority to insist on its nominees to elect VCs in state universities in the name of maintaining higher academic standards.

The ongoing disputes on VC appointments are symptomatic of a larger systemic failure and erosion of federalism, educational, and cultural advancement. The central institutions should start respecting the spirit of institutional autonomy to prevent the centralization of educational governance. Furthermore, the courts are also duty bound to verify the suitability and qualifications of the search committee members, irrespective of which entry of the Constitution they fall under.