Order XXI Rule 102 And The Limits Of Pendente Lite Transfers In Execution

The law of execution often reveals the real gap between paper rights and ground reality. A decree may declare who is entitled to property, but its actual value is tested only when possession is sought. Over the years, courts have struggled to prevent decree holders from being dragged into endless litigation by persons who enter the scene only after a suit is filed. In recent months, the Supreme Court revisited this problem through two important rulings on Order XXI Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter as 'Code' ).One decision of  Alka Shrirang Chavan and Anothers v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale and Others reaffirmed that a transferee pendente lite has no right to obstruct execution. The other case of Tahir V.Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar clarified that a purchaser who did not derive title from the judgment debtor is not hit by this bar. Together, these judgments show how the Court is trying to protect the finality of decrees while preserving fairness for genuine third parties.

Concept of Transferee Pendente Lite

The transferee pendente lite arises from the doctrine of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The rule is grounded in public policy. When a dispute over property is before a court, neither party should be allowed to alter the subject matter in a way that defeats the outcome of the case. If transfers were freely permitted during the pendency of litigation, every decree could be made meaningless by a simple sale or gift. The law therefore treats any transfer by a litigating party after the suit has begun as subordinate to the final decree. The transferee takes the property with the burden of the pending case, even if he was unaware of it (refer to Celir LLP ).The purpose is not to invalidate transactions but to ensure that the authority of the judicial process is not eroded.

Execution, Obstruction and the Role of Rule 102

Order XXI lays down the framework through which decrees are enforced. Section 47 of the Code requires all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree to be determined by the executing court itself. Within Order XXI, Rules 35 and 36 deal with delivery of possession. Further, Rules 97 and 99 allow resistance and claims by persons in possession, and Rule 101 directs the executing court to decide all questions of right, title and interest arising in such proceedings. These provisions reflect a legislative intent that execution should not be reduced to a mechanical process but should accommodate genuine disputes connected with enforcement.

Rule 102 operates as a narrow and important exception within this remedial scheme. It provides that a person who has obtained the property from the judgment debtor after the institution of the suit cannot take advantage of the protective mechanism available under the other rules. Such a person is treated as bound by the fate of the judgment debtor because his title itself is a product of a transaction made when the dispute was already before the court. The purpose of Rule 102 is therefore to prevent the elaborate inquiry contemplated under Rules 97 to 101 from being triggered by transfers that are designed to delay or defeat the decree. It works in harmony with Section 47 by ensuring that execution remains a continuation of the original adjudication rather than the beginning of a new one.

The core legal issue before the Supreme Court was the true reach of Order XXI Rule 102. The Court considered whether every purchaser who acquires property during the pendency of a suit is automatically barred from resisting execution or whether the bar applies only when the purchase is made from the judgment debtor. This issue was crucial because a broad reading of the rule would risk depriving genuine purchasers of the right to defend their possession, while a narrow reading could allow judgment debtors to frustrate decrees through indirect or collusive transfers.

Who Can Resist Execution under Rule 102

The Supreme Court answered this by tying the operation of Rule 102 strictly to the source of title. Where a person acquires the property from the judgment debtor after the suit has been instituted, the bar under Rule 102 applies in full force. In such a case, the executing court is not required to undertake a detailed inquiry into competing claims, since the transferee is bound by the decree in the same manner as the judgment debtor.

At the same time, the Court clarified that Rule 102 does not apply to purchasers who derive their title from someone other than the judgment debtor. Such persons do not step into the judgment debtor's position so they retain the right to have their claims addressed during execution. The limitation under Rule 102 is precise and narrowly drawn that is aimed at preventing abuse of the process rather than shutting out all third-party claims.

These rulings bring much needed clarity to the law of execution in cases involving transferred property. They reaffirm that litigation cannot be neutralised by selling the disputed property during the pendency of a suit, while also recognising that not every purchaser is a proxy for the judgment debtor. Order XXI Rule 102 now stands as a rule of discipline rather than exclusion by protecting the authority of decrees without sacrificing procedural fairness. In Alka Shrirang, the Supreme Court even exercised its constitutional power under Article 142 to do complete justice between the parties and to ensure that its decrees are not rendered meaningless by endless cycles of litigation and that the authority of its decisions is preserved. By drawing this careful boundary, the Supreme Court has strengthened both the effectiveness of execution proceedings and the legitimacy of property transactions carried out outside the shadow of the judgment debtor.

The Author Is An Advocate At Allahabad High Court

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