On 10 January 2026, the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh[1] urged the Union Government to consider introducing a Romeo-Juliet clause under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The suggestion reflects a growing judicial concern that a statute enacted to protect a “child” from sexual exploitation is increasingly being invoked against adolescents involved in consensual relationships. The challenge under POCSO is not the age of consent itself, but the law's inability to distinguish between exploitation and consensual intimacy between peers.
That difficulty stems from the statute's design. Section 2(d) defines every person below eighteen years of age as a child, aiming to uphold the object of the statute, namely, “to protect children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography.” The bright-line approach undoubtedly serves an important protective purpose by shielding minors from abuse and exploitation. Yet it leaves little room to account for the realities of contemporary adolescent relationships. As a consequence, relationships marked by mutual affection and age proximity are frequently treated in the same manner as genuinely exploitative conduct, exposing young people to the full force of the criminal law despite the absence of coercion or abuse.
The persistence of this problem is reflected not only in judicial observations but also in empirical data. While the Law Commission of India, in its 283rd Report, acknowledged concerns regarding the prosecution of consensual adolescent relationships, it rejected proposals to reduce the age of consent from eighteen to sixteen years. The Commission's position underscores an important point: the debate is not about lowering the age of consent, but about developing a framework capable of distinguishing consensual adolescent intimacy from sexual exploitation. The available data suggests that the absence of such a distinction has contributed to significant over-criminalisation under the Act.
Public debate often assumes that POCSO prosecutions primarily involve predatory conduct by adults against minors. However, the statistics paint a different picture. Findings from the fourth round of the National Family Health Survey (2015–16) indicate that approximately 11 per cent of girls reported initiating sexual activity before the age of 15, while nearly 39 per cent had done so prior to turning 18. Complementing this, an Enfold study examining 7,064 POCSO judgments delivered between 2016 and 2020 across Assam, Maharashtra, and West Bengal revealed that nearly one-fourth of the cases arose from romantic relationships; notably, in 82 per cent of such matters, the complainants declined to depose against the accused. Further, a subsequent Enfold–Project 39A analysis conducted in 2024, focusing on 264 prosecutions under Section 6 of the POCSO Act in the same jurisdictions, found that over a quarter of the cases involved relationships described as consensual.
The provision, while well-intentioned and firmly aligned with the objective of protecting victims of sexual abuse, completely overlooks the social reality of teenage romance. A significant number of POCSO prosecutions arise not from instances of exploitation, but from complaints filed by outraged parents of a young teenage girl, in a society where even consensual adult relationships continue to be viewed as taboo. Indian society, by and large, disapproves of pre-marital relationships; while this may not reflect a universal truth, it undeniably represents the dominant social attitude. This moral disapproval frequently finds expression through the criminal law, with POCSO becoming a convenient instrument to police adolescent intimacy rather than to address sexual harm. This trend is reflected in cases such as Ajay Kumar v. State,[2] where a rape complaint was initiated by the father of a seventeen-year-old girl, but the girl later appeared before the court seeking the release of the accused, stating that they were married. Similar cases are evidenced by low conviction rates and the frequent unwillingness of minors to support the prosecution, indicating that the criminal process is often set in motion by guardians who oppose the relationship, rather than by the purported victim herself.
Even in cases where both partners are minors, the law operates asymmetrically. It is often the boy who is projected as the potential “offender,” while the girl is automatically cast as the victim, irrespective of her agency or voluntariness.[3] The framework often assumes male culpability and female vulnerability, rather than engaging with the nuanced realities of adolescent relationships. Consent, by design, finds no place within the statutory scheme of POCSO; the Act proceeds on an absolute presumption of incapacity based solely on age. While this bright-line rule may simplify enforcement, it renders the law avoidant of lived realities, where adolescents increasingly engage in romantic and sexual relationships marked by mutuality rather than coercion.
According to the Ministry of Law and Justice, the rationale for pegging consent for sexual activity to age rests on the assumption that a minor is not mentally competent to understand sexual behaviour due to underdeveloped cognitive capacities. The age-based model rests on the assumption that minors lack the capacity to make informed decisions regarding sexual activity. While this assumption reflects a legitimate protective objective, it does not fully account for the realities of contemporary adolescent relationships. Contemporary adolescents engage with relationships, sexuality, and personal autonomy in ways that were not adequately contemplated when POCSO was enacted. A rigid age-based framework therefore risks treating all adolescent intimacy as evidence of exploitation, regardless of context.
Judicial responses to cases involving teenage romantic relationships under the POCSO framework have remained markedly inconsistent. In 2024, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan categorically held that “consensual sex” does not constitute an exception under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Court clarified that penetrative sexual intercourse with a minor is criminalised under both the IPC and the POCSO Act, rendering the existence of a “romantic relationship” legally immaterial. While setting aside the High Court's reasoning, the Bench emphasised that “The courts cannot commit violence against the law.”
In contrast, a more nuanced judicial stance has emerged in subsequent decisions. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr., the Supreme Court urged the Union Government to consider introducing a Romeo–Juliet clause to address consensual relationships between adolescents close in age. Echoing this shift, Justice B.V. Nagarathna emphasized the need to distinguish such relationships from cases involving sexual exploitation, observing that “There is the POCSO Act, which takes care of the penal cases, but there are romantic cases also where teenagers on the verge of majority run away, where there are genuine romantic cases, they want to get married, don't read such cases the same as criminal cases. We have to differentiate between criminal cases and this.”
The concern expressed in Anurudh did not emerge in isolation. In In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents,[4] the Supreme Court had already sought the Union Government's position on the criminalisation of consensual adolescent relationships under POCSO, signalling a growing judicial recognition that the statute's blanket framework may be producing unintended consequences. The uncertainty is already visible in practice. In 2025, in X v. State of Maharashtra,[5] the Bombay High Court deferred consideration of a consensual-relationship matter pending clarification of the legal position emerging before the Supreme Court.
More recently, the Delhi High Court in Harmeet Singh v. State[6] quashed proceedings after observing that continuing prosecution would inflict further hardship upon the very individual whom the law purported to protect. The decision reflects a growing judicial concern that, in certain cases involving consensual adolescent relationships, the criminal process itself may become a source of harm.
This leaves a clear area of ambiguity. A uniform reduction in the age of consent risks diluting the protective purpose of the law, while the existing blanket rule continues to unjustly criminalise young people who are navigating consensual intimacy. The objective, however, remains clear, to distinguish genuine adolescent relationships from exploitative ones, and to reduce the criminalisation of consensual relationships involving adolescents.
Notably, in many Western democracies, the age of consent is set at sixteen, accompanied by safeguards against coercion and abuse. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and several European Union nations recognise close-in-age exemptions, ensuring that teenagers in consensual relationships with slightly older peers are not subjected to criminal prosecution.[7] These frameworks focus on addressing exploitation arising from power imbalances, rather than penalising relationships marked by mutuality and age proximity.
In the Indian context, as indicated by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr. a close-in-age exemption appears to be a more balanced and pragmatic response than a uniform reduction in the age of consent. Such a reform would be most effective if incorporated directly into the statute through the insertion of a new Section 3A. The provision could create a limited defence where: (a) the complainant is at least sixteen years of age at the time of the alleged offence; (b) the age difference between the parties does not exceed three years; (c) the relationship and sexual activity were genuinely consensual; and (d) the accused did not occupy a position of trust, authority, dependence, or influence over the complainant. By confining the exemption to relationships between peers and excluding situations involving coercion, grooming, or power imbalance, such a provision would preserve the protective purpose of POCSO while preventing the prosecution of adolescents engaged in consensual relationships. Importantly, the defence should be available at the stage of framing of charge itself, thereby preventing young persons from being subjected to arrest, prolonged trial, and the punitive consequences of criminal process where the facts reveal no element of exploitation.
The question before Parliament is not whether children deserve protection because they unquestionably do. The question is whether the law should continue treating consensual adolescent relationships and sexual exploitation as the same phenomenon. A narrowly tailored close-in-age exemption would preserve POCSO's protective core while ensuring that criminal law remains directed at abuse rather than adolescence itself.
2026 INSC 47. ↑
BAIL APPLN. 1296/2022. ↑
Saundarya D. Nair & Priyasha Pattnaik, Evaluating the Efficacy of Romeo-Juliet Laws in India, 6 J. Rts. Child Nat'l L. U. Odisha 176 (Apr. 2025). ↑
2025 INSC 778. ↑
2025:BHC-AUG:16016-DB. ↑
2026:DHC:3142. ↑
Rajesh G. Inamdar & Arpita Arun, Romeo-Juliet Clause And POCSO, LiveLaw, 21 January, 2026. ↑
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