Representative image | PTI
There is a distinct structural anomaly in how the Indian legal framework processes the service disputes of its paramilitary forces. The recent judicial trajectory of Baksish Ahmad, a Border Security Force (BSF) constable dismissed from service in 2022 while posted in Narayanpur, Malda, serves as a primary case study. When Ahmad approached the Delhi High Court in 2025 to challenge his dismissal, the Division Bench dismissed his writ petition. The dismissal was not predicated on the merits of the case, nor on an absolute lack of territorial jurisdiction. Instead, the Court invoked forum non conveniens—a discretionary doctrine suggesting that another forum would be more appropriate—effectively directing the petitioner to initiate proceedings in West Bengal or Jammu.
On June 9, 2026, the Supreme Court of India in Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India corrected this jurisdictional misapplication. However, while the judgment establishes a crucial procedural precedent, it simultaneously underscores a broader legislative deficit: the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) operate within a constitutional framework that demands high operational accountability but provides inadequate, geographically dispersed mechanisms for adjudicatory relief.
I. The Jurisprudential Architecture of the Judgment
The Supreme Court's judgment, authored by Justice Dipankar Datta alongside Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, provides a rigorous examination of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The core issue was whether the Delhi High Court was legally justified in refusing to exercise its writ jurisdiction despite the presence of the respondent authorities within its territorial limits.
Article 226 operates on a dual-axis framework. Clause (1) confers jurisdiction on a High Court based on the situs of the person or authority against whom the writ is sought. Clause (2) confers jurisdiction based on the geographical location where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. The Delhi High Court acknowledged its technical jurisdiction under Clause (1), given that the Ministry of Home Affairs and the BSF Director General are headquartered in New Delhi. Nevertheless, it opted to exercise judicial restraint, citing forum non conveniens.
The Supreme Court's intervention dismantled this approach. Expanding upon the precedent set in Abrar Ali v. CISF, the Court clarified that when a petitioner explicitly invokes Article 226(1) to approach the High Court located at the situs of the apex commanding authority, leveraging forum non conveniens against the litigant undermines the fundamental right of access to justice.
Furthermore, the judgment executed a precise reconciliation of conflicting coordinate Bench decisions. The Court addressed the tension between Abrar Ali and the earlier, more restrictive ruling in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee. It resolved this by anchoring the Delhi High Court's jurisdiction not merely in the physical location of the BSF Headquarters, but in the statutory requirements of Rule 22(4) of the BSF Rules, which mandates that all dismissal orders be transmitted to the Director General in Delhi. This statutory reporting mechanism creates a substantive legal nexus, solidifying the applicability of Article 226(1).
II. The Structural Anomaly of the CAPF
The significance of this judgment extends beyond procedural law due to the demographic and statutory reality of India's CAPF. Comprising the BSF, CRPF, CISF, SSB, ITBP, NSG, and Assam Rifles, the CAPF constitutes a deployment of over one million personnel. The CRPF alone maintains a sanctioned strength exceeding 3.25 lakh, making it the world's largest paramilitary entity.
Despite their scale and operational integration with the regular armed forces in various theatres, CAPF personnel are excluded from the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) Act of 2007. The AFT was established to create a specialized, tiered adjudicatory body for service disputes and courts-martial appeals for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. CAPF members, by contrast, must litigate service disputes—ranging from dismissals to pension anomalies—through the ordinary civil writ roster of various High Courts. This reliance on general writ courts generates significant delays, disparate jurisprudential outcomes across states, and complex jurisdictional hurdles.
III. Manifestations of Administrative and Adjudicatory Dysfunction
The absence of a specialized tribunal for the CAPF has produced quantifiable administrative bottlenecks. Five specific scenarios highlight the practical consequences of this statutory void:
1. The Absence of Pre-escalation Mechanisms: The 2016 case of Tej Bahadur Yadav, a BSF jawan dismissed after publicly airing grievances regarding rations, illustrated the systemic failure of internal communication channels. The rigid application of disciplinary rules, combined with the lack of an accessible, independent adjudicatory body for immediate grievance redressal, forces personnel into a binary of either accepting administrative mandates or facing prolonged civil litigation.
2. Occupational Stress and Redressal: Between 2014 and 2023, government data recorded over 700 suicides among CAPF personnel. Parliamentary Standing Committees have repeatedly noted that occupational stress, exacerbated by denied leaves and rigid hierarchies, requires an efficient institutional relief valve. The current adjudicatory framework is too sluggish to function as a deterrent against arbitrary administrative actions that contribute to this stress.
3. Geographical Hurdles for Dependents: Following the 2018 Sukma ambush, dependents of deceased CRPF personnel faced extensive bureaucratic delays in securing compassionate appointments and terminal benefits. Because jurisdiction under Article 226(2) scatters these cases across the respective High Courts of the dependents' home states, families are often forced to navigate disparate regional legal systems rather than a centralized, uniform tribunal.
4. Litigation Timelines: In a recent case originating in Rajasthan, a CISF constable spent nine years contesting a dismissal order through standard writ courts before achieving reinstatement. The standard civil docket backlog means that even favorable judgments arrive after irreversible financial and professional disruption, a timeline that the AFT model was specifically designed to truncate.
5. Record Management and Federal Litigation: In 2023, an Assam Rifles personnel challenged a compulsory retirement order in the Gauhati High Court. The proceedings were stalled because the administrative records were retained in New Delhi. This decentralization of litigation coupled with centralized record-keeping turns routine service matters into multi-state logistical challenges.
IV. Constitutional Intent versus Judicial Restraint
The application of forum non conveniens to domestic public law requires critical scrutiny. The doctrine originated in private international law—prominently utilized in common law jurisdictions to manage cross-border commercial disputes where competing sovereign forums are available.
Its application to restrict Article 226 jurisdiction runs contrary to constitutional history. During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar emphasized that the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts should be expansive. The 15th Constitutional Amendment of 1963, which introduced the "cause of action" provision (now Article 226(2)), was explicitly drafted to broaden litigant access, allowing them to approach High Courts where the injury occurred, without negating the pre-existing right to sue where the authority resides. Utilizing a discretionary common law doctrine to constrict this constitutionally mandated expansion effectively rewrites legislative intent.
While the BSF Act of 1968 provides an internal remedy via a statutory petition under Rule 28A, this mechanism terminates at the executive level. It is an administrative prerequisite, not a substitute for judicial review. The Supreme Court's ruling affirms that executive review cannot preclude access to a constitutional court.
V. The Legislative Lacuna
The disparity between the regular Armed Forces and the CAPF remains a deliberate legislative choice that lacks contemporary justification. Over the past decade, various parliamentary committees have debated the feasibility of a Central Police Forces Tribunal or an amendment to the AFT Act. None of these proposals have transitioned into enforceable law.
Consequently, the Supreme Court's judgment in Baksish Ahmad functions as a judicial stopgap. By reaffirming that the Delhi High Court must entertain CAPF service petitions based on the situs of the commanding authorities, the Court is centralizing CAPF litigation by default, mitigating the geographical fragmentation caused by parliamentary inaction.
VI. A Policy Roadmap for Statutory Reform
While the Baksish Ahmad judgment clarifies territorial jurisdiction, systemic efficiency requires institutional reform across three vectors:
1. Legislative Integration: Parliament must draft a Central Armed Police Forces Service Tribunal Act or expand the ambit of the existing AFT Act. A unified tribunal system, co-located with existing AFT benches across the country, would standardize jurisprudence, reduce civil docket burdens on High Courts, and provide specialized adjudicators familiar with paramilitary service conditions.
2. Administrative Digitization: The Ministry of Home Affairs must implement a mandatory, centralized digital repository for all CAPF disciplinary proceedings. Ensuring that regional High Courts—or future tribunals—have instant access to departmental records will eliminate the procedural delays caused by inter-state file transfers.
3. Judicial Standardization: Pending legislative reform, all High Courts should standardize their approach to CAPF service matters in alignment with the Baksish Ahmad precedent. The invocation of forum non conveniens should be strictly limited in service litigation where the State is the respondent, and specialized rosters for uniformed personnel should be considered to expedite pending writs.
VII. The Parameters of the Precedent
It is imperative to recognize the precise limits of the Supreme Court's intervention in Baksish Ahmad. The Court did not adjudicate the substantive merits of the constable's dismissal. It did not evaluate the legality of the alleged second marriage, nor did it scrutinize the procedural integrity of the Rule 22 show-cause notice. The adjudication of those substantive facts has been correctly remanded to the Delhi High Court.
What the Supreme Court established is a strict procedural safeguard: an enrolled member of the CAPF has an unassailable right to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court possessing territorial authority over the force's apex command. The State cannot utilize arguments of administrative inconvenience to deny this access.
The legal principle is now codified. However, the reliance on constitutional writ courts to manage the routine service disputes of a million-strong paramilitary force remains an inefficient deployment of judicial resources. The Baksish Ahmad judgment maximizes the utility of the existing legal framework, but the ultimate resolution to the CAPF jurisdictional conundrum rests entirely within the legislative domain.
Author is an Advocate practicing at Delhi High Court. Views are personal.