Aravalli Reclassification And Constitutional Environmentalism: A Legal Critique

Redefining the Aravalli Hills

In November 2025, the Supreme Court of India formally accepted a uniform definition of the Aravalli hills, as recommended by an expert committee appointed by the Central Government. According to this definition, only landforms exhibiting a minimum relative relief of 100 meters above the surrounding terrain qualify as “Aravalli hills.” This judicial endorsement marks a significant milestone in environmental governance, redefining both the legal and spatial recognition of one of India's most ancient and ecologically sensitive mountain ranges. The decision has triggered debate among environmentalists and scientists. Critics argue that the Aravalli system, particularly in its northern and eastern stretches, is largely composed of eroded, low-relief formations such as ridges, slopes, shallow hillocks, and pediments. Although many of these features do not meet the 100-meter criterion, they perform vital ecological functions: facilitating groundwater recharge, stabilizing soil, providing wildlife corridors, and moderating local climate in semi-arid regions. According to the Forest Survey of India, applying the new definition would result in only around 8.7% of the mapped Aravalli landforms being eligible for protection, leaving a substantial portion unregulated.

Scientific Reductionism and Legal Implications

Experts contend that reducing the Aravalli system to a single geomorphological parameter constitutes scientific reductionism, oversimplifying a complex ecological and geological entity. Such simplification may weaken the scientific basis for environmental protection and undermine regulatory safeguards. Beyond technical concerns, the legal acceptance of this definition raises fundamental constitutional questions. It touches on the State's duty to preserve natural resources, the scope of judicial review in environmental matters, and the broader principles of sustainable development. What might appear as a technical classification exercise has profound consequences for environmental governance, policy implementation, and the protection of ecologically sensitive landscapes.

Law & Constitution-

The controversy demands a deeper examination of whether environmental safeguards, carefully developed through constitutional interpretation and judicial precedent, can be diluted through administrative redefinition without violating settled principles of environmental law. Environmental protection under the Indian constitutional framework is not a matter of executive preference but a binding obligation. Article 48A mandates the State to protect and improve the environment, while Article 51A (g) imposes a corresponding duty upon citizens. These provisions have been judicially reinforced through an expansive interpretation of Article 21. In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar (1991), the Supreme Court unequivocally held that the right to life includes the right to enjoy pollution-free air and water. Any regulatory framework that facilitates ecological degradation therefore directly implicates Article 21.

Against this constitutional backdrop, redefining the Aravalli range in a manner that potentially removes ecologically sensitive land from legal protection cannot be characterised as a neutral administrative act. Legal definitions shape regulatory outcomes. When such definitions narrow environmental safeguards, courts are constitutionally obliged to examine their substantive impact rather than merely their formal validity. Indian environmental jurisprudence has consistently rejected formalistic approaches to ecological protection. Environmental systems are assessed based on ecological function and impact, not numerical thresholds alone. The Aravalli range, among the oldest geological formations in the world, plays a critical role in groundwater recharge, climate moderation, and prevention of desertification. Its environmental value lies in these functions rather than in elevation. A rigid height-based definition risks divorcing environmental law from ecological science, a concern repeatedly flagged by constitutional courts.

Judicial precedent reflects this functional and purposive approach. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Aravalli mining matters), the Supreme Court imposed restrictions on mining activities in the Aravalli region, recognising its ecological fragility and the irreversible consequences of unchecked exploitation. The Court emphasised that economic development cannot override environmental protection in ecologically sensitive zones. Any definitional shift that weakens this protective regime raises questions of doctrinal inconsistency.

The controversy also engages the precautionary principle, a cornerstone of Indian environmental law. In Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996), the Supreme Court declared the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle to be integral parts of domestic environmental jurisprudence. The Court held that where there are threats of serious environmental damage, the absence of scientific certainty should not be used to justify inaction. A redefinition that potentially exposes fragile ecosystems to exploitation without comprehensive ecological assessment runs contrary to this principle.

Equally relevant is the public trust doctrine, firmly embedded in Indian law through M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997). The doctrine recognises the State as a trustee of natural resources, holding them for public use and future generations. Mountains, forests and mineral-rich regions fall squarely within this trust. When regulatory mechanisms facilitate private exploitation by narrowing the scope of protection, the State risks breaching its fiduciary obligation. Judicial approval of such dilution must therefore be subjected to heightened scrutiny. From an administrative law perspective, environmental classifications must align with the object and purpose of enabling statutes such as the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. These statutes are conservation-oriented. In A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (1999), the Supreme Court cautioned that environmental decision-making must be informed by scientific expertise and ecological considerations. Mechanical or convenience-driven classifications undermine this requirement.

Further, under Article 14, State action must satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness. A classification that relies solely on elevation while ignoring ecological continuity and environmental impact risks failing the test of rational nexus. As the Supreme Court observed in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, arbitrariness is antithetical to equality. This principle applies with equal force to environmental governance. Judicial deference to executive expertise, while often warranted, cannot amount to abdication in environmental matters. In Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource Policy v. Union of India (2005), the Supreme Court underscored the judiciary's continuing responsibility to ensure that environmental decisions adhere to constitutional and precautionary principles. Environmental harm, once caused, is frequently irreversible, necessitating rigorous judicial oversight. The issue also implicates principles of cooperative federalism. Environmental regulation in India allows States to adopt stricter safeguards based on regional ecological needs. The Supreme Court has recognised that States may prescribe higher environmental standards unless expressly prohibited by central legislation. Uniform definitions that restrict State-level protection risk levelling down environmental safeguards rather than strengthening them. The Aravalli controversy ultimately exposes a deeper tension within India's environmental legal order—between constitutional duty and administrative convenience. Environmental protection cannot be reduced to technical classification divorced from ecological context and constitutional values. Indian environmental jurisprudence, developed through decades of judicial engagement, demands caution, foresight and restraint.

In an era of climate vulnerability, groundwater depletion and escalating ecological stress, the Constitution requires that environmental protection remain robust and precautionary. The law must err on the side of conservation rather than convenience. Any dilution of this commitment risks not only environmental degradation but erosion of constitutional environmentalism itself. Overall all things exist due to nature and mother earth.

Author is Advocate, Rajasthan High Court. Views Are Personal.