Time, Arguments And Justice: Cooperation, Not Compulsion, At The Heart Of New SOP

The Chief Justice of India Surya Kant made several specific public and in-court remarks regarding the restriction of argument time in the weeks leading up to the release of the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on December 29, 2025. The CJI's comments cantered on the idea that judicial time is a "limited public resource" and that prolonged oral arguments by senior counsel were unfairly depriving "poor and ordinary litigants" of their day in court.

On December 11, 2025, during a hearing involving petitions challenging Special Intensive Revision (SIR) in Bihar, the CJI explicitly warned the Bar about upcoming changes. He stated:"From January 2026, I will not permit these endless hearings in cases. All the Counsels will have to give in writing a commitment to meet the scheduled time-frame." On December 12, 2025, the CJI further elaborated on the "human cost" of lengthy arguments, citing the example of a widow who waited 23 years for railway accident compensation. He remarked that it was "absolutely unfair and unjustified" for bail or motor accident cases to be pushed aside because of "unending arguments" in high-profile matters. In the Pre-SOP Briefing, the CJI reiterated that establishing "predictable timelines for case disposal" and a "unified national judicial policy" were his foremost priorities. He emphasized that no section of the Bar could claim "privileged access" to judicial time.

These observations have culminated in the circular issued on December 29, which has mandated:

* Advance Filing: Lawyers must submit their proposed timelines for oral arguments at least one day before the hearing.

* Written Briefs: Mandatory submission of a "brief note" not exceeding five pages, filed three days in advance.

* Strict Adherence: The circular explicitly states that all counsel must strictly adhere to the fixed timelines and conclude arguments within that duration

These have attracted instant comments/ debates in social media and WhatsApp forwards, - non lawyer public generally welcoming the initiative and the lawyers at once sounding cautious and apprehensive. The nay-sayer's adverse commentary, some of it premised on the assumption that the Court has imposed rigid caps on advocacy apper to be misplaced. The SOP is, in fact, far more modest and pragmatic. It does not prescribe a fixed ceiling on oral arguments at all. What it requires is advance disclosure of the time likely to be taken and strict discipline only in one respect: written submissions shall not exceed five pages. The rest is left deliberately flexible, placing the burden squarely on the Bar to act responsibly.

What the SOP actually mandates — and what it does not

A careful reading shows that the SOP stops short of dictating how long counsel may argue. Unlike foreign jurisdictions where time is allocated ex ante by the court, the Indian model adopted here begins with self-regulation. Counsel are expected to indicate, realistically and honestly, the time they seek. The Court reserves the right to manage the hearing accordingly. The only hard limit is on written submissions, capped at five pages, signalling that prolixity on paper will no longer be tolerated.

This design choice is telling. It reflects judicial awareness that Indian cases vary enormously in complexity and that a one-size-fits-all cap on oral time would be neither fair nor workable. At the same time, it sends an unmistakable message: the era of indeterminate argument, stretching across multiple days and listings, must end.

The unanswered question: what if counsel seek ten hours?

The SOP's flexibility immediately raises a practical question. What happens if counsel notify that they require, say, ten hours of oral argument? The answer lies less in black-letter rules and more in institutional dynamics. The SOP implicitly creates a fork in the road. If the Bar, collectively and case by case, suggests reasonable upper limits grounded in preparation and prioritisation, judicial intervention will remain minimal. If, however, notifications of excessive duration become routine, the Court will inevitably step in and impose limits. Those limits, once judicially dictated, are unlikely to be generous.

The choice, therefore, is strategic as much as procedural. The Bar can retain a measure of control over advocacy time by exercising restraint, or it can invite externally imposed caps that may prove far more stringent and, ultimately, unacceptable. The SOP thus operates as a nudge towards cooperation rather than a command backed by sanction.

A history of resistance and the cost of indulgence

This calibrated approach is informed by experience. Earlier attempts by courts to discipline oral advocacy were often met with resistance from the Bar, on grounds of fairness, complexity and the right to be heard. Over time, that resistance succeeded in preserving a culture of expansive argument. But the cost has been severe. Hearings are frequently inconclusive, adjournments multiply, and cases are “part-heard” for months or years. The SOP reflects judicial learning from that history: persuasion through structure is more effective than compulsion through rigid caps.

Trial courts and appeals: one size cannot fit all

An important nuance often missed in the debate is that argument time cannot be uniform across all stages of adjudication. Trial courts and appellate courts perform fundamentally different functions. At the trial stage, evidence—oral and documentary—is still being tested, credibility is assessed, and factual narratives are constructed. Arguments here inevitably require more time, particularly where cross-examination and factual disputes dominate.

Appeals stand on a different footing. By the time a matter reaches an appellate court, pleadings have crystallised, evidence has been recorded and digested, and a reasoned judgment already exists. The appellate function is to test the correctness of that reasoning, not to reconstruct the case from scratch. In such matters, arguments can, and should, be far more focused. The SOP's flexibility allows courts to recognise this distinction, tailoring argument time to the stage and nature of the case.

The shifting burden: judges and preparation beyond court hours

Time-managed advocacy necessarily shifts labour away from the courtroom. When arguments are concise, judges must be more thoroughly prepared in advance. This means reading pleadings, records and written submissions outside court hours. The SOP tacitly assumes this increased judicial workload. It also assumes institutional support that has not yet been uniformly provided. Without adequate research assistance, time limits risk overburdening judges rather than streamlining justice.

Law clerks, research support and untapped legal talent

Here lies an often-overlooked opportunity. The practice of engaging law clerks already exists in the Supreme Court and in several High Courts, distinct from short-term internships. These clerks assist judges with research, case preparation and, in some instances, drafting. Yet this system remains uneven and virtually absent in the district judiciary. At the same time, there is a vast pool of underemployed legal practitioners and young graduates whose skills remain underutilised.

If courts are to demand greater preparation from judges, they must reciprocate by institutionalising research support at all levels. Structured clerkship programmes in trial and appellate courts would ease judicial workload, improve the quality of adjudication and create a meaningful bridge between legal education and practice. Time discipline and human resource deployment must travel together.

Oral argument as culmination, not compensation

The SOP's deeper logic is procedural. Oral argument is meant to be the final act of adjudication, not a compensatory exercise for weak pleadings or incomplete records. When counsel seek long hours to explain basic facts or to introduce material that should have been in writing, the system fails twice: once in preparation and again in time management. By limiting written submissions and insisting on advance disclosure of oral time, the Court is reasserting the proper sequence of litigation.

The irony of timelines past

The closing irony is hard to miss. For years, higher courts routinely relaxed statutory timelines, particularly for filing written statements under the Civil Procedure Code and consumer law. Mandatory deadlines were diluted in the name of substantive justice. That indulgence, however, fostered procedural laxity and delay. The SOP marks a quiet recalibration. It does not abolish flexibility, but it relocates it—from indulgent defaults to informed judicial control, exercised after counsel have shown their hand.

A test of professional maturity

The Supreme Court's SOP is neither draconian nor decorative. It is an invitation to the Bar to participate in managing judicial time responsibly. If that invitation is accepted, flexibility will survive. If it is abused, compulsion will follow. In a system staggering under pendency, the real question is not how long counsel may speak, but how quickly courts can decide. Time discipline, differentiated by stage and supported by human capital, may be the only way to reconcile the right to be heard with the right to timely justice.

Views Are Personal.

Author is a Former Judge of High Court of Punjab And Haryana.