Whose Streets Are They? Supreme Court's Suo Motu And The Question Of Urban Safety

The Supreme Court's decision to take suo motu cognizance of the growing concerns surrounding stray dogs in public spaces must be understood not as a reactionary move, but as a constitutional response to an everyday reality that has long remained administratively unaddressed. The Court's intervention comes at a time when public safety, animal welfare and urban governance intersect in ways that demand nuance rather than slogans. In examining this issue, it becomes necessary to move beyond sentimental binaries and engage with the lived experiences of those most affected.

Indian constitutional jurisprudence has consistently held that the right to life under Article 21 is not confined to mere animal existence but extends to the right to live with dignity and reasonable safety. Public roads, parks and common spaces are meant to be accessible to all citizens without fear. When these spaces become zones of anxiety for children, the elderly and working class commuters due to the unchecked presence of territorial animals, the state's duty to protect life comes into question. The Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, cannot remain a silent spectator when systemic governance failures translate into daily risks for citizens.

The popular narrative that dogs are the natural companions of humans often overlooks historical and social contexts. Human civilisation has not evolved solely alongside domesticated animals in sentimental harmony. Horses, for instance, were companions in warfare, agriculture and transport, directly contributing to collective survival. The relationship between humans and animals has always been functional, contextual and shaped by necessity rather than romantic idealism. In modern urban India, this distinction becomes critical when the presence of stray dogs in public spaces begins to pose tangible risks to human life and dignity.The discourse surrounding stray dogs is often dominated by those who experience urban life from a position of relative security. However, the reality faced by economically weaker sections is markedly different. Individuals who rely on bicycles or two wheelers for daily commuting are particularly vulnerable to sudden dog attacks. For a street vendor or sanitation worker, an injury is not merely physical but economic, as it threatens their ability to earn a livelihood. It is therefore significant that large scale public mobilisation in favour of maintaining the status quo rarely emerges from these communities. Their silence should not be mistaken for indifference but understood as resignation born out of repeated institutional neglect.

Dogs, as sentient beings, possess heightened sensory awareness and often respond to fear with aggression. This behavioural reality places those who are already anxious or vulnerable at greater risk. Children, especially, lack the cognitive ability to assess danger or respond appropriately during such encounters. When a child bitten by a dog fails to report the incident out of fear or ignorance, the consequences can be fatal. Rabies remains one of the deadliest yet preventable diseases, and India continues to bear a disproportionate burden of rabies related deaths. In such circumstances, the question of responsibility extends beyond individual caregivers to the state itself, which is constitutionally obligated to prevent foreseeable harm.

The Supreme Court has previously emphasised that governance failures affecting public health and safety warrant judicial scrutiny. Suo motu cognizance is not an expression of judicial overreach but a recognition that certain issues demand urgent constitutional attention even in the absence of formal petitions. Where municipal authorities fail to implement effective sterilisation, vaccination and rehabilitation measures, the vacuum left behind often results in human suffering as well as animal distress. Judicial intervention, in such cases, acts as a catalyst for administrative accountability.

It is also worth reflecting on the broader human animal relationship without romanticising it. Historically, human survival has depended on making difficult choices to secure safety and continuity. While compassion forms an essential part of a civilised society, it cannot operate in isolation from responsibility. The Constitution itself recognises this balance. Article 48A calls upon the state to protect and improve the environment and safeguard wildlife, while Article 51A(g) places a fundamental duty on citizens to show compassion towards living creatures. Neither provision, however, can be interpreted to dilute the state's primary obligation to protect human life and dignity under Article 21.

Ironically, allowing stray dogs to remain in unsafe public environments often undermines animal welfare rather than advancing it. Countless puppies die each year after being run over by vehicles or succumbing to untreated injuries and disease. Life on the streets exposes animals to constant danger, hunger and abuse. Shelters and rehabilitation centres may presently be inadequate, but the absence of infrastructure cannot be used as a justification for perpetuating harm. Constitutional governance requires the state to build capacity, not to surrender to inertia.

The argument that removal from public spaces amounts to cruelty fails to acknowledge that structured sheltering, medical care and regulated adoption are inherently more humane than abandonment to hazardous urban conditions. The Supreme Court's cognizance must therefore be seen as an opportunity to reimagine animal welfare in a manner that is systematic rather than ad hoc. It urges authorities to move beyond temporary solutions and towards sustainable policy frameworks.

Judicial precedents have repeatedly underscored that fundamental rights do not exist in silos. The right of one group cannot negate the rights of another. In balancing competing interests, courts have often adopted a proportionality based approach. The present issue calls for a similar balance, one that neither demonises animals nor dismisses human suffering. Removing dogs from public places does not signify hostility but signals a commitment to organised compassion backed by institutional responsibility.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court's suo motu action reflects a deeper constitutional concern about governance failure in urban India. It is a reminder that empathy without structure can be as harmful as indifference. Public spaces must remain inclusive and safe, particularly for those who lack the privilege of choice. If this judicial intervention leads to better shelters, accountable municipal governance and safer streets, it would mark a meaningful step towards reconciling human dignity with animal welfare.

In a constitutional democracy, the measure of compassion lies not in emotional rhetoric but in policies that reduce suffering for all. The Supreme Court's intervention, viewed in this light, is less about removing dogs and more about restoring balance, responsibility and constitutional order in spaces meant to belong to everyone.

 Views are personal