Women's Property Rights In India: Law On Paper Vs. Reality

Update: 2026-06-11 04:30 GMT
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In India, after 79 years of independence, women have gained significant legal ground, and they are being treated equally to men. Several other rights have also been given with a view to protecting their independence, including modesty and dignity. They have entered the arena of competition with a framework of rights so extensive that some argue they now outweigh those of men. From equality...

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In India, after 79 years of independence, women have gained significant legal ground, and they are being treated equally to men. Several other rights have also been given with a view to protecting their independence, including modesty and dignity. They have entered the arena of competition with a framework of rights so extensive that some argue they now outweigh those of men. From equality under the law and inheritance entitlements to robust protections against abuse, the statutory landscape has shifted dramatically.

But do these rights truly exist in reality, or do they merely live on paper?

The harsh truth is that for many, these protections remain elusive in practice. India has witnessed transformative legislative reforms in Hindu personal law for over seven decades, ranging from the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (in short “HSA”) (Section 6, 8 & 15) to its landmark 2005 Amendment for giving rights in the coparcenary property. Similarly, a woman has a right of maintenance/residence under the following statutes:

(i) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005;

(ii) Under Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (previously Section 125 Cr.P.C.);

(iii) Under Section 18 & 19 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (in short “HAMA”);

(iv) Maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955;

(v) Right to reside in matrimonial home or right to live in a shared household, under Section 18(2)(d) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956;

(vi) Right to adoption under section 7 & 8 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956;

(vii) Right to divorce and permanent alimony as well as return of stridhan under section 13, 25 and 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,

Yet, a gulf persists between the statutory text and lived social reality. It is a gap that neither judicial interpretations nor parliamentary amendments have quite managed to bridge.

What would be thoughts of a woman, who is suffering injustice every day ? let me try to capture some of them .

“Whenever the question of property rights arises, my existence has always been denied.

I am considered a part of society as a daughter, sister, wife and mother. I am also revered as Griha Lakshmi (the goddess of the household), yet beyond the right to claim maintenance, I have no inherent legal right over movable or immovable property.

Many governments have come and gone. Laws have been amended repeatedly. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, was enacted, and under Section 8, after the death of a male family member, I (as a daughter, wife or mother) was placed in the category of Class I heirs. After a long period, Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, was also amended, placing me in the category of a coparcener. I was content.

Amendment of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, led to controversy following the Supreme Court's decision in Prakash & Ors. v. Phulavati & Ors., (2016) 2 SCC 36, which held that this right would apply prospectively, based on the date of my father's death. However, this was later overturned by the Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Ors., (2020) 9 SCC 1, which held that the amendment to Section 6 would have a retrospective effect.

Yet, despite these developments, it remains unclear to me what I have actually gained, especially if I was born after 1956, i.e., after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Under the currently established law, if I were born before 1956, I may be considered a coparcener. However, to claim my rights, I must effectively end my relationship with my father's home. The very act of asserting my right would almost certainly sever my relationship with my parents, brothers, bhabhis, bhatije and bhatijis, etc., if they are alive. If they are deceased, it would end my relationships with extended family members as well, provided the coparcenary property has not yet been transferred.

If I were born after 1956, the theory of “right by birth” does not apply to me. I must wait for my father's death, only if he has not transferred the property through sale, gift or will. If I challenge such a transfer, my relationship with my father and brothers is bound to end. Despite the progressive mandate of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, deeply entrenched customs and patriarchal expectations continue to discourage women from claiming their rightful share. A silent but powerful social code often prevails, whereby daughters who refrain from asserting their rights are considered virtuous, while those who seek their legal entitlement risk social ostracism. If my father dies intestate (without sale or will), I have a vested interest in the property under Section 8. However, my father's death often creates insecurity in the minds of my brothers, who fear their share will be reduced. As a result, time passes under vague, unspoken arrangements driven by uncertainty. Families grow, children mature.

In some cases, after the parents' death, sisters are made to sign affidavits or unregistered consent letters, resulting in property being transferred solely in the brothers' names. In other cases, false affidavits are submitted. Sometimes, the very existence of a sister is denied, or she is declared deceased, even though she is alive. All this happens because, despite having a legal right in property after marriage, I lack social recognition of that right.

This raises an important question: why is my right, even after marriage, confined only to my parental property? Why do I have no right in my husband's property? Why is my right tied only to someone's death?

As a daughter, I gain rights after my father's death; as a wife, after my husband's death; and as a mother, after my son's death.

As a daughter, I cannot even imagine wishing for my father's death. As a wife, I observe fasts like Karva Chauth for my husband's long life. As a mother, I observe rituals like Ahoi Ashtami for my children's longevity. How, then, can I think of their death as a condition for my rights?

Is it not possible for me to have an inherent, continuing right in property without having to demand it, though subject to restrictions on the transfer of the property without permission of the Court?

In reality, I do not even wish to demand my rights in the parental property. Yet I am compelled, sometimes by my husband or in-laws, to claim from my parental family, and sometimes by my parental family to claim from my marital home. In the process, all my relationships die.

Even when I do demand my rights, I receive nothing in practical terms. Due to prolonged legal proceedings, either I die during the pendency of the case, or my share of the property is sold by my husband or children, and the proceeds are deposited into their bank accounts. After that, I cannot visit my brother's home, nor does he visit mine. The possibility of any familial relationship surviving becomes negligible.

In any law, the only right I truly have is the right to maintenance/residence, and that too only when I am unable to maintain myself. Even if I am capable but still require maintenance, looking at the status of my husband, I must attempt to prove my incapacity. I am often asked by the opposing party or even the court: if I am educated, why am I not earning? Thus, my education becomes an obstacle to receiving maintenance, and I am more likely to receive it only if I am uneducated or less educated, despite being considered Griha Lakshmi.

If I am granted a legal right in my husband's property, I believe that:

  1. Incidents of cruelty and harassment in my matrimonial home would be reduced.
  2. The number of pending cases under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Sections 85 and 80 of the BNS, 2023 respectively) would significantly decrease.
  3. Litigation under laws such as : (a) the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; (b) the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; (c) the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005;and (d) under Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (previously Section 125 Cr.P.C.), and particularly cases involving divorce, judicial separation and maintenance would also reduce considerably.

I am a woman, physically weaker than a man. Without special training, I cannot directly confront a man physically, due to which someone dares to violate my dignity or succeeds in doing so.

After such incidents, I am either forced into silence or compelled to repeatedly recount the horrific experience before police officers and courts. In most cases, the offender is acquitted.

I submit that if any person establishes an unlawful relationship with me or violates my dignity, then in addition to imprisonment, upon the initiation of legal proceedings, I should be declared entitled to an equal share in the property of the offender or his family. Furthermore, the sale of such property should be restricted during the pendency of the case, so that no one even dares to commit such offences.

Under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023); the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, a wife and minor children can claim maintenance. However, due to lengthy legal procedures, obtaining maintenance takes considerable time.

It is often observed that maintenance is more likely to be granted where the person liable to pay is in government service or has a clearly established income. However, where income is uncertain, even after an order is passed, significant legal difficulties arise in actually receiving maintenance.

As stated above, the rights of a wife and minor children are largely limited to maintenance. Under the current legal framework, no right in property exists until the death of the parents. If the parents choose to sell or transfer their property, what right does a person entitled to maintenance have? If such a right is not exercised in time, the property may be transferred to a third party.

In such situations, along with claiming maintenance under the relevant law, a civil suit for declaration may be filed, seeking that although I may not have ownership rights in the property, I am entitled to maintenance. Therefore, the concerned person should be restrained from selling the property in a manner that defeats my right to maintenance. Further, if the property is transferred during the pendency of my maintenance claim, my right to maintenance should be treated as a charge upon that property.”

The Right to Equal Coparcenary in Ancestral Property

The most significant reform concerning the Hindu succession law is the conferral of coparcenary rights upon daughters by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005, which led to the substitution of Section 6 of the HSA, 1956. The amendment revolutionized the concept of Mitakshara Coparcenary, wherein it declared daughters coparceners by birth, with the same rights and liabilities as sons.

The legal journey to this point, however, was neither smooth nor uncontested. In Prakash & Others v. Phulavati & Others, (2016) 2 SCC 36, the Supreme Court held that the amendment was prospective, meaning it applied only to daughters whose fathers were alive as on 9 September, 2005 (the date of the amendment's commencement). This significantly restricted the class of women who could benefit. The Supreme Court in Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Another v. Amar & Others, (2018) 3 SCC 343, took a more expansive view, holding that the right to coparcenary was created by birth, not by the father's survival. The contradiction between these two coordinate benches was authoritatively resolved by a three-judge bench in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Others., (2020) 9 SCC 1, which settled that the 2005 amendment is retrospective in nature: a daughter is a coparcener by birth, irrespective of whether her father was alive on the date of commencement.

Although the law is now settled, it remains far from the reach of those who need it, because assertion of such rights confers a cost that is not merely financial but relational. As the concerned property in most joint families has already been informally allocated among male members; and this dominant social fact makes the statutory rights practically inoperative for the vast majority of Hindu women.

The Right to Property as Absolute Owner

Section 14(1) of the HSA converts any property possessed by a female Hindu acquired before or after the Act from limited to absolute ownership. The breadth of this provision was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Punithavalli Ammal v. Minor Ramalingam & Another, AIR 1970 SC 1730, which held that the section grants unconditional absolute ownership that cannot be curtailed by any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law.

The concept of "possession" was given its widest connotation in Mangal Singh & Ors. v. Smt. Rattno (Dead) by her Legal Representative and Another., AIR 1967 SC 1786, to include both physical and legal possession. The Supreme Court in V. Tulasamma & Others v. V. Sesha Reddi (Dead) by L.R.s, (1977) 3 SCC 99, confirmed the retrospective character of Section 14(1) of HSA, holding that property acquired by a woman before the HSA's commencement, including property received in lieu of maintenance, became her absolute property upon the Act's enactment. The condition precedent for application of Section 14(2), which preserves limited ownership, was clarified in Sharad Subramanyan v. Soumi Mazumdar & Others, (2006) 8 SCC 91: the instrument creating the interest must restrict the woman's right and create a new title, not merely recognise a pre-existing right.

In practice, however, the litigation concerning Section 14(1) occurs after a woman's family has already transferred the property to third parties. The declaration of absolute ownership provides little protection against informal pressures to surrender one's share.

But unfortunately, in many cases, women are asked to execute affidavits or unregistered consent letters in favour of male heirs. In some cases, women are falsely declared deceased in revenue records to facilitate illegal transfers.

The Right to Maintenance

The right to maintenance under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 ("HAMA"), Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ("HMA"), and Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 144 of BNSS, 2023) is, paradoxically, the most formally accessible right and the most practically illusory for a significant class of women.

The law is clear: a wife, minor children, and dependent parents are entitled to maintenance. Under Section 125 CrPC, this extends to divorced wives who have not remarried, and to children of all religions. The Supreme Court's decision in Rajnesh v. Neha & Another, (2021) 2 SCC 324, providing a judicial blueprint for maintenance laws, which consolidated and systematised maintenance law across statutes, represents the most comprehensive judicial attempt to address overlapping and inconsistent orders. The Court laid down guidelines on the avoidance of parallel proceedings, the quantum of maintenance, and enforcement mechanisms.

But the core problem is enforcement. The enforceability of maintenance orders highly depends on the kind of employment the men are engaged into.

Such orders are enforceable only against men in salaried employment where attachment of salary is possible, leaving out the men engaged in informal trade, agriculture, or daily wage labour, undoubtedly constituting the overwhelming majority of Indian men.

In such a situation, maintenance orders exist only on paper and cannot be converted into recurring payments. Hence, the realisation of such entitlements without continuous litigation, which itself the applicant could not afford, is inevitable.

Rights to Inheritance, Stridhan, Testamentary Disposition, Residence, Adoption, Divorce, and Remarriage

Beyond the three rights discussed above, the HSA and other statutes recognise a further set of rights: the right to inherit property under Sections 8 and 15 of the HSA [as confirmed in Ganduri Koteshwaramma & Another v. Chakiri Yanadi & Another, (2011) 9 SCC 788]; the right to stridhan as absolute property (as confirmed in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar & Another, AIR 1985 SC 628; Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav & Another, AIR 1988 SC 644; Mulakala Malleshwara Rao & Another v. State of Telangana & Another, AIR 2024 SC 4067); the right to dispose of property by will under Section 30 HSA; the right to reside in the shared household under section 18(2)(d) of HAMA, 1956, confirmed by Aishwarya Atul Pusalkar v. Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Authority & Ors., AIR 2020 SC 4238; the right to adopt under Sections 7 and 8 of HAMA; the right to seek divorce on grounds including cruelty and desertion under Sections 13 of HMA (Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, AIR 2002 SC 591); the right to remarry without forfeiture of maintenance rights (Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad (Dead) By LRs vs Kothuri Venkateswarlu (Dead) By LRs and Another, AIR 2000 SC 434); and even the right to succeed to hereditary priestly office (Raj Kali Kuer vs Ram Rattan Pandey, AIR 1955 SC 493); the right to property of woman not to be defeated in the absence of any proven custom to the contrary, denial of a woman's or her heirs' inheritance amounts to arbitrary discrimination, impermissible under Article 14 of the Constitution, succession cannot be governed by silence or outdated custom to the detriment of women's rights as confirmed recently by Hon'ble Apex court in Ram Charan & Ors. v. Sukhram & Ors., AIR 2025 SC 3356.

Collectively, these rights have formed an impressive statutory architecture; however, their impact falls short in most of the social contexts in which these rights need to operate. The right to stridhan, for instance, is routinely violated when in-laws retain jewellery after marital breakdown and the woman cannot afford protracted litigation to recover it. The right to reside in the matrimonial home means little in practice when a woman's physical safety in that home is not guaranteed. The right to divorce means little when the waiting period and costs of contested proceedings span years, and the woman has no independent income.

Her fight becomes challenging as the occasional misuse of legal protections where rights are invoked not as shields but as instruments of undue advantage or control casts a shadow over genuine claims. Such instances, though not representative of the larger reality, foster a climate of suspicion, making courts increasingly cautious and exacting. As a result, women with legitimate grievances often find their battles intensified, as the threshold for establishing entitlement grows more rigorous and their sincerity is subjected to deeper scrutiny

The law has given women a voice, but society still teaches her to whisper. Her rights exist in books, yet her silence is written into relationships she fears losing. She is asked to choose between justice and belonging, and too often, love becomes the price of equality. Still, she endures; holding families together even when the law fails to hold her. Her struggle is not just for property, but for dignity, recognition, and a place she never has to beg for. And perhaps the true reform will begin the day her rights are honoured not in courts, but in hearts. 



Author is a Judge at High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench Jabalpur. Views are personal.

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