Singhvi: it becomes a license to permit external... ... Sabarimala Reference : Live Updates From Supreme Court 9-Judge Bench [Day 4]

Singhvi: it becomes a license to permit external adjudicator or judges to decide the essential or non essential components of religion, mylords then will not where to stop

Lastly, a legitimate query may arise as to whether the Court’s review is so minimal and so self-denying that even an absurd practice proclaimed by a religion (e.g. eating only elephant meat or eating only human meat) should be non-reviewable because it is part of the bona fide belief of a person who claims to be an adherent of the religion.

This seemingly extreme proposition does not in any manner derogate from what has been stated herein for the following reasons:

a. Firstly, if the belief (an extreme one in the above example) does not form part of the collective institutional and denominational belief of a group or sect belonging to a religion, it will be rejected not because of an objective external standard but because it does not constitute religion at all since it does not exist in the collective of a group but is asserted only by a few maverick and eccentric individuals who claim to be adherents of a religion.

b. Alternatively, it would be hit by the three stipulated textual derogations, viz., in the above example, indeed all three i.e., public order, morality, and health.

c. However, notwithstanding the above, if there is in fact hypothetically a religion whose collectivity genuinely believes in and can trace back its lineage to the factual and genuine existence of such practices, then the Courts, having found that such a religion does in fact exist, cannot set aside such practices on personal or subjective judicial notions of abhorrent behaviour or impose external societal norms.

They would, however, be fully entitled to examine whether such practices would fall under the three above-stated derogable heads and accordingly uphold them or strike them down on that basis.

Conversely, if we now take an example of what might well be an abhorrent practice by normal average and external standards but is genuinely believed to be a core part of a known and established religion, then the application of Article 25 in its full platitude becomes clear.

This example comes from the significant Jain sect of Digambars, who, ex hypothesi, are called sky clad, who, as the latter words’ literal translation suggests are obliged to be sky clad. There is no doubt that nudity is abhorrent to normal canons of civilised behaviour in most societies. Yet, since Digambar Jain practices, including nude existence and nude movement in public, are undeniably accepted as a core part of a well-known religion, it would not be liable to be struck down under Article 25-this would have been abolished because nudity is proscribed but its nobody's case that mahaveer, this whole thing will be abolished

J Nagarathna: that is why its not a constitutional morality but public morality which has to find it abhorrent