Dismissal Is Severest Punishment; Must Be Imposed Only For Grave Misconduct : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court recently observed that dismissal from service is one of the harshest forms of punishment; therefore, it must only be imposed by the disciplinary authority after duly considering relevant factors such as the nature and gravity of the misconduct, long service rendered, record, age, absence of financial loss to the company, etc. It also said that the period of suspension...
The Supreme Court recently observed that dismissal from service is one of the harshest forms of punishment; therefore, it must only be imposed by the disciplinary authority after duly considering relevant factors such as the nature and gravity of the misconduct, long service rendered, record, age, absence of financial loss to the company, etc. It also said that the period of suspension pending inquiry can't be imposed as a second punishment over and above dismissal.
In this case, the Appellant, Surekha Domaji Bele, was employed with the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCL) in 1985. She was placed under suspension pending inquiry in 2006 and was served with a showcause notice in 2008 after a domestic inquiry. It is her case that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated as a counterblast to the proceedings initiated by her under the Payment of Wages Act and other proceedings wherein she successfully challenged her transfer from Ballarsha to the Warora pole factory.
The domestic enquiry was found not to be fair. The Industrial Court remanded the matter to the Labour Court, wherein, based on evidence led, misconduct was proved. The MSEDCL dismissed her from service in 2017 based on the 2008 showcause notice. Although it was stated that she would be entitled to a subsistence allowance, her suspension was later treated as punishment, and she was denied any monetary benefit. Her challenge to the findings on misconduct and to the dismissal order failed before all forums before she approached the Supreme Court.
On the issue of dismissal from service, a bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice NK Singh held that it was wholly disproportionate because, although the charges of misconduct were proved, they related to indiscipline, insubordination, and tampering with documents. It didn't relate to serious offences such as corruption, illegal gratification, moral turpitude, or misappropriation of funds.
"Dismissal is ordinarily justified where the misconduct is of such gravity that continuance of the employee would be wholly incompatible with discipline, trust or institutional functioning. Cases involving corruption, illegal gratification, moral turpitude, misappropriation, acts causing substantial loss to the employer, or conduct showing complete unfitness for continued service stand on a different footing. However, where the misconduct does not involve corruption, moral turpitude, financial misappropriation or proved loss to the employer, and where there is long service without much blemish, the disciplinary authority must carefully examine whether any lesser punishment would meet the ends of justice."
It remarked that dismissal from service is the severest form of penalty, which not just leads to loss of income but also has a devastating impact on the employee and those depending on the employee. It leaves a permanent stigma in the service record, and therefore, the disciplinary authority must reserve dismissal for the most serious nature of offences.
"Dismissal from service is the severest form of penalty which can be inflicted on a delinquent employee in service jurisprudence. It brings the relationship of employer and employee to an end permanently and ordinarily deprives the employee of the incidents of past service, including retiral benefits. It does not lead merely to the loss of the existing source of income for the employee but also for the dependent family members. Thus, it will have a devastating effect not only on the dismissed employee but also on all those who are dependant on the employee. Because of the severity of its impact not only on the employee but also to his dependents, the disciplinary authority must be very careful in seeking to impose the severest form of punishment of dismissal."
Another issue related to dismissal was whether the dismissal order was sustainable in law, considering that it was issued based on the 2008 showcause notice in a domestic inquiry which was held to be unfair. Alternatively, could a fresh showcause notice have been issued?
The Court held that the 2017 dismissal order could not be sustained because the disciplinary authority proceeded substantially on the 2008 showcause founded on the defective domestic enquiry. It failed to undertake a fresh consideration of punishment based on the findings of misconduct by the Labour Court based on the de novo proceedings. It therefore remitted the matter back to the competent authority for fresh consideration on the quantum of punishment by issuing a fresh showcause notice.
It held: "We, accordingly, hold that non-service of a fresh notice after the Labour Court's de novo finding does not vitiate the finding of misconduct, since the Appellant was a party to the adjudicatory proceedings before the Labour Court and the Industrial Court. However, the disciplinary authority was required to apply its independent mind to the findings which ultimately survived after remand to the question of appropriate punishment and issue a fresh showcause notice on the proposed punishment, for the period of reply in terms of the earlier show-cause notice dated 25.04.2008 had long expired and the basis of it also does not exist."
On the issue of whether the disciplinary authority was justified in treating her period of suspension as punishment, the Court clarified that this was merely a suspension pending inquiry and not suspension as a substantive form of punishment. Therefore, the authority was unjustified in treating the period of suspension as punishment over and above the order of dismissal. It remarked that treating the entire suspension period, which was 11 years in this case, as punishment may deprive the employee of the ordinary service and monetary benefits attached to that period.
"The principle emerging from the aforesaid decision is that where the service rules prescribe distinct penalties, the disciplinary authority cannot impose an amalgam of separate substantive penalties for the same misconduct unless the rules authorise such a course. The order of punishment must therefore be tested with reference to the penalties prescribed under the governing Regulations."
It passed a direction that the order treating the suspension period shall not be operated as an additional penalty. Related to this was whether she was eligible for a subsistence allowance during period of suspension; the Court, referring to the applicable regulations, found that the suspension order was supposed to be reviewed within six months. However, it continued for 11 years. It divided the suspension period into the first six months and the remaining 10.4 years and said that for the first six months, the authority will have to consider whether the Appellant followed reporting conditions, or took a leave of absence etc and then consider whether she would be entitled to monetary benefit. However, for the rest period, she can't be deprived of her subsistence allowance.
The Court remarked that the Appellant was deprived of the allowance, which directly affected her ability to survive and to defend herself effectively.
"Once the first six-month period expired, the Respondent was required to show that the suspension was reviewed and continued in accordance with Regulation 88(a)(ii). The original reporting condition cannot operate perpetually as a ground to deny subsistence allowance for the post-six-month period, which unfortunately is not on record nor justified by the Respondent. We are, therefore, of the view that even if the Appellant's non-reporting at Warora is treated as relevant for the first six months, the position after 03.03.2007 stands on a different footing. In the absence of any order reviewing or validly continuing the suspension beyond six months being shown on record, the Appellant shall be treated as eligible for subsistence allowance for the period after 03.03.2007 till 12.07.2017."
As a final direction, the Court has directed the MSEDCL to issue a proper showcause notice to Surekha Domaji on the penalty to be imposed other than dismissal. It shall also determine her claim for subsistence allowance in two parts. From September 4, 2006, to March 3, 2006, the authority shall consider the original reporting condition, whether leave of absence was granted, etc but for the remaining period, the Appellant shall be eligible for subsistence allowance irrespective of the punishment to be imposed.
Consequently, the Bombay High Court's judgment, which upheld her dismissal from service, was set aside.
Case Details: SUREKHA DOMAJI BELE v EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, TESTING DIVISION, MSEDCL|DIARY NO. 11294 OF 2025
Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624