Important MCQs Based On Latest Supreme Court Judgments For Law Examinations
1. In a criminal trial for kidnapping, the prosecution's case relies heavily on the testimony of the eyewitness (PW-1) who identifies the accused for the first time in the court ("dock identification"). No Test Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted by the investigating agency. The accused argues that this dock identification, occurring years after the incident, is inherently unreliable...
1. In a criminal trial for kidnapping, the prosecution's case relies heavily on the testimony of the eyewitness (PW-1) who identifies the accused for the first time in the court ("dock identification"). No Test Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted by the investigating agency. The accused argues that this dock identification, occurring years after the incident, is inherently unreliable and fatal to the prosecution's case. Which of the following factors, if established by the prosecution, would be most appropriate for a court to uphold the conviction despite the absence of a TIP?
(a) The eyewitness is a close relative of the victim and has a strong interest in ensuring the conviction of the accused.
(b) The accused was arrested a week after the incident from a different city based on a vague description, and his photograph was shown to the witness by the police prior to the trial.
(c) The incident occurred in the evening under dim streetlights, but the witness had a brief, fleeting glimpse of the accused's face.
(d) The accused was arrested on the spot immediately after the crime, and the witness had provided a detailed and accurate physical description of the accused to the police in the First Information Report (FIR) promptly after the incident.
Answer: D
Cause Title: HARJINDRA SINGH ETC. VERSUS THE STATE OF U.P. Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598
Explanation: The Supreme Court has observed that dock identification of the accused in the absence of the Test Identification Parade (TIP) would not be fatal to the prosecution's case if the accused was sufficiently described in the complaint or was arrested on the spot immediately after the occurrence of the crime.
2. In a paternity suit where the plaintiff claims inheritance rights, the defendant, who has been acquitted in a prior criminal prosecution for rape involving the plaintiff's mother, challenges the trial court's order directing him to undergo a DNA test. The defendant argues that the acquittal conclusively establishes that no biological relationship exists and that the subsequent civil suit is barred by the principles of res judicata. Additionally, he contends that compelling him to provide a DNA sample violates his fundamental right to privacy.
Which of the following represents the most accurate legal position?
(A) The defendant's acquittal in the criminal case operates as res judicata in the civil suit, conclusively establishing the absence of paternity. Consequently, the DNA test cannot be directed as it would serve no purpose and would be a futile exercise, also infringing upon his privacy rights.
(B) The civil suit for declaration of paternity is barred by the principle of res judicata as the issue of paternity could have been, and was, incidentally determined in the criminal proceedings. The right to privacy is absolute and outweighs the plaintiff's claim, thus the DNA test order must be set aside.
(C) The acquittal in the criminal case does not operate as res judicata in the subsequent civil suit, as the standard of proof is different (beyond reasonable doubt vs. preponderance of probabilities). A DNA test may be directed as scientific evidence is indispensable to resolve the question of biological parentage, provided that a balance is struck between the plaintiff's right to know his parentage and the defendant's right to privacy.
(D) A DNA test can only be ordered in a civil suit if the criminal trial resulted in a conviction, as the standard of proof is higher in criminal cases. Since the defendant was acquitted, there is no 'prima facie' case to compel him to undergo a DNA test, and doing so would be a violation of his testimonial compulsion rights under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
Answer: C
Cause Title: C VERSUS A& ANR., Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 612
Explanation: The Supreme Court recently held that a DNA test may be directed in a paternity dispute even where the alleged father was previously acquitted in a criminal rape case, observing that scientific evidence becomes indispensable when no other evidence can conclusively resolve the question of biological parentage.
3. A, claiming to be the absolute owner of a large tract of land, executes a Sale Deed in favor of B for valuable consideration. Subsequently, in a separate title suit filed by C, the true owner, a competent court declares that A had no legal title to the property at the time of the execution of the Sale Deed. Based on this judicial finding, a criminal complaint is filed against A for the offense of forgery under Section 463 of the Indian Penal Code, alleging that the Sale Deed executed by A is a "false document" under Section 464. Which of the following is the most accurate legal position regarding A's criminal liability for forgery?
A) A is guilty of forgery because the Sale Deed was executed based on a false claim of ownership, which constitutes the making of a false document with the intent to defraud B.
B) A is not guilty of forgery because the Sale Deed was executed to assert a right to property, and the subsequent judicial finding of defective title does not, by itself, render the document 'false' under Section 464 of the IPC.
C) A is guilty of forgery under Section 467 (Forgery of valuable security) because the Sale Deed is a valuable security and its execution was predicated on a false claim of title.
D) A is not guilty of forgery only if he can prove that he had a bona fide belief in his ownership at the time of executing the document; mere negligent claim of title is insufficient to attract the offense.
Answer: B
Cause Title: BHIKHUBHAI GOVINDBHAI PATEL & ANR. VERSUS THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
Explanation: The Supreme Court has observed that a person does not commit forgery merely by executing a document asserting ownership over a property, even if that claim is subsequently found to be legally unsustainable.
4. A Hindu male, 'X', dies intestate in 2025, leaving behind his widow 'W', his son 'S' from his first wife, and his daughter 'D' from his second wife. All are Class I heirs under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. They inherit X's self-acquired property. 'W' claims she can sell a portion of the entire inherited property to pay for 'D's' higher education, arguing that as the senior-most member and a co-owner, she can act as the Karta of the property for the benefit of the family. 'S' challenges this, stating that 'W' has no such authority.
Which of the following statements correctly represents the legal position?
A) 'W' cannot sell the property on behalf of others as a Karta because the heirs inherit the property as tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares.
B) 'W' can act as the Karta and sell the property for 'D's' education, as it is a legal necessity for the benefit of the family, and her share as a coparcener is not separate.
C) 'W' can sell the entire property only if she obtains the consent of 'S' and 'D', as they are all joint tenants and no single co-owner can act as a Karta.
D) 'W' can sell the property, but only with the permission of a civil court under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, as she is the natural guardian of 'D'.
Answer: A
Cause Title: DARUBAI & ANR. VERSUS KAMALABAI & ORS., Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 581
Explanation: The Supreme Court held that heirs inheriting intestate property under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 hold it as tenants-in-common with definite shares, and not as a joint family property. Consequently, no co-heir can alienate the property on behalf of others, as the concept of a Karta does not apply in such cases.
5. A plaintiff files a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The agreement was executed in 1990, with a stipulated period of four months for completion. The defendant rescinded the contract in early 1991. The plaintiff institutes the suit in late 1993. At trial, the plaintiff produces bank statements and fixed deposit receipts dating from 1999 to 2001 to prove financial capacity. The defendant contests the suit, arguing lack of continuous readiness and willingness. Which of the following is the most accurate legal position regarding the plaintiff's burden of proof?
(A) The plaintiff need only prove readiness and willingness as on the date of filing of the suit, and any subsequent financial documents are admissible to show capacity at that time.
(B) The plaintiff must prove readiness and willingness only at the time of the agreement; delay in filing the suit is irrelevant if the suit is within the limitation period.
(C) The plaintiff must continuously demonstrate readiness and willingness from the date of the agreement through the decree, and financial documents created years after the suit was filed cannot retroactively establish such readiness for the relevant period.
(D) The plaintiff's burden is discharged if the total consideration is deposited in court at any time before the final decree, regardless of when the funds were arranged.
Answer: C
Cause Title: MOHAMMED KHALEEL (D) THROUGH LRs & ORS. VERSUS JAYAMMA, Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 638
Explanation: The Supreme Court reiterated that a party seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell must continuously demonstrate readiness and willingness to perform its contractual obligations from the date of the agreement, holding that financial documents created years after institution of the suit cannot be relied upon to establish such readiness.
6. An arbitral award is passed on 1st January 2024. The losing party files an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking correction of certain computational errors in the award. The Arbitral Tribunal entertains the application, hears the parties, and ultimately dismisses it on 1st April 2024, holding that no correction is warranted. The certified copy of the order dismissing the Section 33 application is received by the party on 10th April 2024. The party then files an application under Section 34 to set aside the arbitral award on 15th July 2024. The opposing party objects, contending that the limitation period under Section 34(3) started running from the date of the original award (1st January 2024) because the Section 33 application was dismissed and was not "maintainable" or "allowed." Which of the following is the correct legal position regarding the commencement of limitation under Section 34(3)?
(A) The limitation period under Section 34(3) begins from the date of the original award (1st January 2024), because a dismissed Section 33 application does not extend the limitation period.
(B) The limitation period begins from the date of disposal of the Section 33 application (1st April 2024), regardless of whether the application was allowed, dismissed, or held to be not maintainable, provided it was formally invoked and entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal.
(C) The limitation period begins only from the date of disposal of the Section 33 application if the application was allowed and resulted in a modification of the award; if dismissed, the limitation reverts to the date of the original award.
(D) The limitation period begins from the date the certified copy of the order disposing of the Section 33 application is received (10th April 2024), but only if the opposing party does not challenge the maintainability of the Section 33 application.
Answer: B
Cause Title: NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA VERSUS T. YOUNIS & ANR., Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 589
Explanation: The Supreme Court reiterated that the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Act for filing an application seeking setting aside of an arbitral award would begin from the date on which a Section 33 application is disposed of. The Court rejected the contention that the limitation period for filing a challenge under Section 34 would commence from the date of disposal of a Section 33 application only if the application was allowed. It held that the relevant date is the disposal of the Section 33 application itself, regardless of its outcome. Accordingly, whether the application seeking correction or interpretation of the arbitral award is allowed, rejected, or otherwise disposed of, the limitation period under Section 34 must be computed from the date of such disposal.
7. In a criminal trial, the prosecution relies heavily on the testimony of an accomplice who has been granted a pardon and turned approver. The approver's testimony directly implicates the accused in the commission of the offence, but the approver also describes his own role in a manner that minimises his participation compared to the co-accused. The trial court finds the approver's testimony to be truthful and consistent with the surrounding circumstances, but there is no independent corroboration of the approver's account on certain material particulars, though there is some corroboration on other aspects. The defence argues that the conviction cannot be sustained because: (i) the approver's testimony is partly exculpatory as to himself; and (ii) there is no corroboration on all material particulars. Which of the following is the correct legal position?
(A) The testimony of an approver is inherently unreliable and cannot form the basis of a conviction unless it is corroborated by independent evidence on every material particular against the accused.
(B) The testimony of an approver must be entirely inculpatory as to his own role; if it is even partially exculpatory, it must be rejected in its entirety as lacking credibility.
(C) The testimony of an approver need not be corroborated on every material particular; it may form the basis of conviction if it is credible and trustworthy, and partial exculpation of the approver himself does not vitiate the testimony, provided the account is a full and truthful disclosure of the events and inspires confidence.
(D) The uncorroborated testimony of an approver is sufficient as a matter of law only if the approver implicates himself to the same extent as the other accused; otherwise, the rule of prudence requires mandatory corroboration from another approver.
Answer: C
Cause Title: GOPI CHAND @ PAPPU VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI), Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609
Explanation: The Supreme Court observed that even where an accomplice's testimony is not independently corroborated on material particulars, it may still form the basis of a conviction if the court finds it credible, trustworthy, and reflective of a full and truthful account of the events surrounding the commission of the offence.
8. A plaintiff enters into an agreement to sell immovable property in March 2010, paying 93% of the total consideration as earnest money. The balance is payable at registration, to be completed within four months. The plaintiff approaches the defendant in July 2010 and again in December 2010, but the defendant evades and demands extra money. The plaintiff issues a legal notice in February 2011 and files a suit for specific performance in March 2011 (within limitation). The High Court denies relief solely because the legal notice was issued after the four-month contractual period, holding this shows lack of readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Which of the following is the most accurate legal position regarding the effect of such delay in issuing a notice?
(A) Any delay beyond the contractually stipulated period for performance, including in issuing a notice, conclusively bars the remedy of specific performance, as readiness and willingness must be shown strictly within the agreed timeline.
(B) Delay in issuing a legal notice is irrelevant in all cases because readiness and willingness are determined only by the plaintiff's financial capacity to pay the consideration.
(C) When the suit is filed within the period of limitation, mere delay in issuing a legal notice does not by itself establish lack of readiness and willingness; the court must assess the plaintiff's overall conduct and attending circumstances, including substantial part-performance and the defendant's evasive behaviour.
(D) Readiness and willingness can be presumed if the plaintiff has paid more than 50% of the consideration, and no further evidence of continuous readiness is required.
Answer: C
Cause Title: A. SHAHUL HAMEED Versus N. MALLIGARJUNA AND ORS., Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 604
Explanation: The Supreme Court has observed that mere delay in issuance of a legal notice to the defendant to receive the balance consideration and execute the sale deed could not be treated against the plaintiff as his lack of readiness and willingness to perform the contract. The Court held that when a suit seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell is filed within the limitation, any delay in issuing a legal notice is irrelevant to the denial of relief.
9. A prosecution complaint under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) is filed before a Special Court on June 24, 2024, when the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) was in force. The complaint is numbered and posted for preliminary scrutiny, but no judicial application of mind occurs before July 1, 2024. On July 2, 2024, after the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) has come into force, the Special Court takes cognizance of the complaint without affording any hearing to the accused. The accused challenges the cognizance order, arguing violation of the first proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS, which mandates a pre-cognizance hearing. The prosecution contends that (i) the PMLA is a standalone statute not governed by BNSS procedure, (ii) the old CrPC applies because the complaint was filed before BNSS commenced, and (iii) in any case, the accused has suffered no prejudice. Which of the following is the correct legal position?
(A) The PMLA being a special statute, its provisions override the BNSS; hence, the proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS does not apply to PMLA complaints, and the accused must show prejudice to challenge the cognizance.
(B) The old CrPC continues to govern the entire proceeding because the complaint was filed before July 1, 2024, under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS, and the accused cannot claim the benefit of any BNSS provision.
(C) The proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS is merely procedural and directory; non-compliance is a curable irregularity, and the accused must demonstrate actual prejudice to have the cognizance order set aside.
(D) The first proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS is a substantive safeguard flowing from Article 21, its non-compliance renders the cognizance order void ab initio, and the accused need not prove prejudice; since cognizance was taken after BNSS came into force, the hearing mandate applies prospectively.
Answer: D
Cause Title: PARVINDER SINGH VERSUS DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT, Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522
Explanation: The Supreme Court has held that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which mandates an opportunity of hearing to the accused before cognizance is taken in a complaint case, is a substantive safeguard flowing from the right to fair trial under Article 21, and non-compliance would render the cognizance order void ab initio. The Court further clarified that an accused need not demonstrate prejudice caused by such non-compliance, as the defect constitutes an illegality that vitiates the proceedings rather than a mere procedural irregularity.
BNSS S.223(1) Proviso Mandatory; Cognizance Without Hearing Accused Void Ab Initio: Supreme Court
10. A complaint is filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against a company and its office-bearers for dishonour of a cheque issued by the company. The complainant impleads an individual who holds the designation of "Executive Member" in the company. The averments in the complaint merely state that the accused persons are "responsible for the conduct of the business" without any further factual particulars. No document or evidence is placed to show that this Executive Member participated in the transaction, signed the cheque, or was in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company at the time of the offence. The Executive Member seeks quashing of the proceedings. Which of the following is the correct legal position?
(A) The designation of "Executive Member" is prima facie sufficient to raise a presumption of liability under Section 141, and the burden shifts to the accused to prove that he was not in charge.
(B) Section 141 creates vicarious liability based solely on holding a managerial or executive position, and the complaint need not aver specific acts of participation.
(C) The complaint must contain specific factual averments showing that the individual was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business at the relevant time; mere designation, without more, is insufficient to invoke Section 141.
(D) The individual can be prosecuted only if he is shown to have signed the cheque; absence of signature on the cheque is conclusive proof of no liability under Section 141.
Answer: C
Cause Title: M/S MANSI FINANCE (CHENNAI) LTD. VERSUS M. LALITHA AND OTHERS, Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 559
Explanation: The Supreme Court has observed that a mere designation of an individual holding a managerial position in a society would not be sufficient to invoke liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The complaint must disclose a factual basis showing that the person was in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business at the relevant time.