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In a decision that quietly settles one of the most persistent friction points between constitutional remedies and the insolvency framework, a Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Vijay Bishnoi held in Davis Koottala Varkey & Ors. v. Samson T. George & Ors. (2026 SCC OnLine SC 1560) that where an order of the National Company Law Tribunal is appealable under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, judicial discipline requires the High Court to refrain from entertaining a writ petition against it. Delivered on 5 August 2026, the order sets aside an interim intervention by the Kerala High Court in an ongoing liquidation and, in doing so, offers the clearest articulation yet of why the breadth of Section 61 is itself the reason for writ restraint.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code has been read by the Supreme Court, almost from its inception, as a self-contained legislative scheme built around speed, certainty and a single adjudicatory channel. Yet the one avenue that no statute can formally close remains open: the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Aggrieved promoters, dissenting creditors and disappointed applicants have, with some regularity, sought to route their grievances through that avenue rather than the appellate hierarchy that the Code prescribes. Davis Koottala Varkey is the latest, and in some respects the most doctrinally economical, response to that practice.

A Liquidation, A Writ Petition, And An Interim Order

The dispute arose out of liquidation proceedings before the NCLT. An order passed by the Adjudicating Authority during the course of those proceedings was carried not to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal under Section 61, but to the Kerala High Court by way of a writ petition. On 21 April 2026, the High Court entertained the petition, issued notice and passed an interim order.

That intervention was challenged before the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petition. While entertaining the appeal, the Supreme Court stayed the impugned order and further proceedings before the High Court -an interim measure that in itself signalled the seriousness with which the Court viewed a parallel constitutional challenge running alongside a live liquidation.

The appellants urged that although the powers of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 cannot be whittled down by statutory provisions, judicial discipline requires that where a statute itself furnishes a mechanism for challenging orders passed in proceedings under it, parties must be relegated to that mechanism. They relied upon Committee of Creditors of KSK Mahanadi Power Company Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. and Mohammed Enterprises (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Farooq Ali Khan, both of which had deprecated High Court interference with proceedings under the Code.

The Breadth Of Section 61 As The Reason For Restraint

The reasoning that the Court adopted is notable for what it does not do. It does not proceed by asserting the supremacy of the Code over the Constitution, nor does it attempt to define exceptions to writ jurisdiction. It proceeds instead from the text of the appellate provision itself.

The Court observed that Section 61 confers a right of appeal upon any “person aggrieved” by an order of the Adjudicating Authority under Part II of the Code. Two textual features were emphasised. First, the right is expressed in broad terms and is not confined to parties to the proceedings; anyone aggrieved may invoke it. Secondly, the provision uses the word “order” without qualifying its nature it does not distinguish between final orders and interlocutory ones, or between orders on merits and orders of a procedural character.

From these two features the Court drew its conclusion: because the statutory appeal is capacious enough to accommodate virtually any grievance arising from virtually any order, there is no gap for the writ jurisdiction to fill. As the Court put it, judicial discipline would require the High Court to refrain from entertaining a challenge to an order of the Adjudicating Authority under the Code, particularly when the aggrieved person can raise those very grievances in appeal.

This is an argument from adequacy rather than from exclusion. The alternative remedy rule has always turned on whether the statutory remedy is efficacious; Davis Koottala Varkey supplies a textual demonstration that under the IBC it almost invariably is.

A Shifted Default, Not A Closed Door

It would be a misreading of the order to treat it as holding that writ petitions against NCLT orders are barred. The Court's chosen vocabulary “judicial discipline”, “refrain”, “ordinarily” is the vocabulary of self-imposed restraint, not of jurisdictional incapacity. The recognised exceptions to the alternative remedy rule, including breaches of natural justice, want of jurisdiction, and challenges to vires are not disturbed. Nor does the decision displace the principle that High Courts retain jurisdiction in cases of fraud or where an order is wholly without jurisdiction, even while the NCLT remains confined to matters arising from insolvency.

What the order does is shift the default. Prior to this decision, a litigant approaching a High Court could plausibly argue that the interlocutory character of the impugned order, or the petitioner's status as a non-party, placed the grievance outside the comfortable reach of Section 61 and therefore justified writ intervention. The Court has now foreclosed both arguments at the threshold. The burden has moved decisively onto the petitioner to demonstrate why the appellate remedy is inadequate in the particular case -and the textual breadth of Section 61 makes that a difficult burden to discharge.

The Limitation Problem And Section 14

The most practically significant portion of the order addresses a consequence that has troubled litigants relegated from writ to appeal. Having pursued a writ petition, the writ petitioners found that the period for appeal under the Code -thirty days, extendable by fifteen under Section 61(2) had long since expired. Relegation to the appellate remedy risked becoming relegation to no remedy at all. The Court's response balanced discipline against fairness. It granted liberty to approach the NCLAT and directed that if an appeal were preferred within fifteen days of 5 August 2026, accompanied by an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking exclusion of the time spent before the High Court and the Supreme Court, that application should receive due consideration in accordance with law.

The formulation is carefully calibrated. The Court did not itself condone the delay, nor did it direct the NCLAT to exclude the period; it preserved the discretion of the appellate tribunal while ensuring that the doctrine of alternative remedy does not operate as a trap. Given the well-established position that the outer limit under Section 61(2) is inelastic and cannot be extended by Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the route through Section 14 which excludes, rather than condones is the only doctrinally coherent path available. Practitioners should note that the invitation is to bona fide prosecution in a wrong forum, not to strategic forum-shopping.

Implications For Insolvency Practice

Three consequences follow. First, the interlocutory nature of an NCLT order is no longer a persuasive basis for bypassing the NCLAT; the Court has held that Section 61 draws no such distinction. Secondly, stakeholders who are not formal parties to the proceedings -allottees, employees, dissenting creditors cannot claim that the appellate remedy is unavailable to them, since the “person aggrieved” formulation is deliberately broad. Thirdly, resolution professionals and liquidators now have a stronger answer to collateral writ challenges that stall a process on interim orders.

Davis Koottala Varkey does not announce a new principle so much as it supplies a firmer textual foundation for an existing one. Its contribution lies in locating the case for writ restraint not in the sanctity of the Code's timelines -an argument of policy -but in the language of Section 61 itself. That is a more durable foundation, and one that High Courts will find harder to distinguish.

Author Siddharth Dev Prasad is a 4th year BSW LLB student at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar & Harshita is 4th year BA LLB student at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. Views are personal.

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