On 3rd May 2026, 22 lakh medical aspirants sat for the NEET examination, not knowing that a storm testing their patience and dedication lay ahead. For thousands of aspirants, stepping out of the examination hall marked the end of months of relentless preparation. It was a moment of relief, with many believing they could finally take a break before beginning college. What came next was something the aspirants could not have even thought of in their wildest dreams: news of a 'paper leak' over Telegram just a few hours before the NEET examination spread widely and surfaced quickly.
Finally, on 12th May, the National Testing Agency (NTA), the national agency responsible for conducting these examinations, “cancelled the 3rd May NEET”, announced a re-examination to be held on June 21, 2026, and referred the matter to the CBI to initiate an inquiry.
The CBI then took over the NEET UG 2026 paper leak probe, registering an FIR on May 12, 2026, forming special investigation teams deployed across multiple states, conducting raids at 14 locations, and arresting seven people, including an NTA insider and a retired professor with access to the question paper. The agency is questioning NTA officials, analysing digital evidence from phones and social media groups, and recording statements from over 100 candidates to trace the entire leak chain.
With the news spreading that the NEET paper had officially been leaked over the social media platform 'Telegram', the government, under pressure took the controversial step of banning the platform for all 150 million Indian users until June 22, 2026. MeitY also directed Telegram to disable its message-editing feature in India for previously posted messages until June 30, 'apparently' to help investigators track suspicious content without the possibility of post-publication alteration.
Telegram, in response challenged both decisions before the Delhi High Court. It argued that the temporary ban affected over 150 million Indian users, that the ban was not a proportionate measure, and that it did not achieve the desired outcome regarding the paper leak. Telegram's founder, Pavel Durov also stated in a post on X that “the ban hasn't stopped anything. The leaks just moved to other apps. Over the past few weeks, we removed hundreds of channels sharing leaked exam materials and related scams in India. We're also making the “edited” label more visible to prevent backdating scams. Telegram is a force for good. Banning it - even temporarily - is a mistake”.
It should be noted that Pavel Durov is facing ongoing criminal proceedings in Russia and France as Telegram has reportedly been used for financial fraud and organised crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, promotion of terrorism, distribution of child sexual abuse material, arms sales, hiring of hitmen and several other illegal acts, which makes Durov's statement about its 'good use' somewhat contradictory.
The Legal Framework
The government's authority to block access to online platforms flows from Section 69A of the IT Act which empowers the Central Government to direct any intermediary to block access to information where it is 'necessary or expedient' in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, public order or the prevention of incitement to any cognizable offence. The section is accompanied by the Information Technology Rules, 2009.
Section 69A is meant to be a balanced provision. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act as unconstitutional but explicitly upheld Section 69A noting that it contained several safeguards including the requirement that blocking orders be issued for specified grounds and that intermediaries be given an opportunity to be heard before their content is blocked. The court described Section 69A as a 'narrowly drawn provision'.
Additionally, the IT Rules, 2021 classify platforms like Telegram as 'significant social media intermediaries' given their user base. This classification comes with additional compliance obligations: appointing a grievance officer, following take-down timelines and acting upon law enforcement requests. Justice Karia noted during hearings that Telegram, as a significant social media intermediary, carries additional responsibilities under these rules.
The safe harbor provision in Section 79 of the IT Act shields intermediaries from liability for third-party content provided they act upon the knowledge of illegal content or upon instructions from the government or the judicial authorities and remove the content in a within the timelines. Telegram makes this complicated. It also offers a 'secret chat' feature that ensures end-to-end encryption. The group chats and channels it has on its server are end to end encrypted but Telegram can still see and respond to such text. But with hundreds of channels and thousands of messages, it is simply not possible to monitor content proactively without breaching privacy on a greater scale.
The Constitutional Dimension
The constitutional challenge to the Telegram restriction rests on Article 19(1)(a) which guarantees freedom of speech and expression. The right to receive information and to communicate through digital means have always been considered as part of this guarantee. At the same time, Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, public order, decency or incitement to an offence.
The critical question is one of proportionality. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that internet shutdowns must satisfy the test of proportionality, that orders must be made available in the public domain, and that indefinite suspension of internet services is impermissible. The court recognised freedom of speech and expression and the right to practise any profession over the internet as constitutionally protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g). The temporary nature of the Telegram restriction arguably distinguishes it from the kind of indeterminate shutdowns the court condemned in Anuradha Bhasin, but the proportionality test remains fully applicable.
In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the nine-judge bench recognised privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 and laid down a three-fold test: legality, necessity and proportionality. Any state intervention that affects privacy should be based on law, should have a legitimate objective, and the level of intervention should be proportionate to the objective pursued. The Delhi High Court accepted the government's claim that blocking Telegram for approximately six days before the Re-NEET examination was necessary and proportionate. The court deemed the reasons sufficient given the emergency circumstances, and concluded that the measures adopted were the least restrictive means available.
While this conclusion offers a quick and practical solution to the immediate threat, it does not amount to a complete resolution. The platform carries 150 million users in India, the majority of whom had no connection to the examination fraud. Blocking the entire platform rather than ordering restrictions and takedowns of specific channels or groups raises questions about whether a truly least-restrictive means was adopted. The Karnataka High Court also held that X Corp., as a foreign company, could not claim protection under Article 19(1)(a) since the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression only to citizens. However, this does not address the concerns of millions of users who relied on the application for legitimate purposes and whose access was disrupted by the restriction.
The Larger Problem
Now, the uncomfortable truth that the Telegram controversy has brought to light but hasn't resolved. Telegram has not leaked the NEET-UG 2026 question paper. It is a different story when you look at the arrests made by the CBI- paper setters, translators and middlemen. The leak itself started in the middle of the examination supply chain much earlier than any social media application came into picture.
Paper leaks of this kind typically involve a network of insiders. Printers, officials at examination authorities, transporters of sealed question paper packets and employees at examination centres have all featured in past investigations across Indian states. Once a paper is leaked, it can travel through any medium: WhatsApp groups, email chains, Discord servers, physical photocopies handed over in person. The use of Telegram as a means of dissemination is simply because it is a popular platform and it has the ability to have large numbers of subscribers. Most importantly because of its 'edit feature' which was used by the 'potential paper leakers'. The scam through the feature works like this, The channel admins post an identical looking yet irrelevant pdf before an exam (with a timestamp showing when it was sent) and after the exam ends and the real question paper is publicly available, they edit that same pdf to replace it with the actual paper. The original timestamp remains unchanged, making it appear the leak happened in advance. However, the 'edited' label only appears in the main channel and not in linked discussion groups, so students viewing the discussion group see no warning that the file was changed. This allows scammers to circulate screenshots as fake proof that the paper was leaked in advance which is then used to convince anxious students and parents to pay money for future leaks.
Regarding the editing feature, the Court said, "Telegram permits messages, including files, to be edited at a later point in time. Such functionality may be employed to disseminate misinformation by editing messages sent prior in time by replacing the attachment to give impression that the examination paper was leaked prior to the examination even though such editing takes place after conclusion of the examination. Accordingly, any subsequent editing of messages relating to NEET UG, 2026 may mislead general public and, consequently, give rise to a potential public order situation."
The Supreme Court observed in hearings related to NEET-UG 2024 that if question paper leaks were taking place through Telegram, WhatsApp and electronic means they spread “like wildfire”. The symptom is aptly captured in that observation. The disease is a broken examination ecosystem: poor physical security at printing presses, lack of audit trails over the movement of examination papers, poorly paid and inadequately screened examination center staff, and organised cheating syndicates with well-established operations spanning several years.
Coaching centers too occupy an ambiguous space in this ecosystem. Some have been found to have advance knowledge of questions. In prior NEET controversies candidates who paid enormous sums to coaching centers and middlemen were found memorising leaked questions the night before the exam. Blocking Telegram does not disrupt these offline networks in the slightest.
The Way Forward
The NEET 2026 crisis calls for structural reform and not merely reflexive restrictions. Cybersecurity across the examination supply chain is the immediate need. Question papers should be encrypted from the time they are set to the time they are distributed, with multiple authentication protocols at each stage. If a copy is leaked, digital watermarking of each copy can enable investigators to pinpoint the exact source of the leak.
The accountability system for insiders needs to be strengthened. All individuals involved in the creation of question papers ranging from those who set the papers to those who print them, those who deliver them to the centres and those who superintend them should be subject to real-time monitoring of access to sensitive information, more rigorous background checks, and signed liability agreements.
While the CBI's arrests are a meaningful step, conventional investigations can take a considerable amount of time to catch up with perpetrators. Dedicated cyber cells specialising in examination fraud would be more effective than platform-wide blocks in emergencies and would be better positioned to seek judicial assistance for platform data in an efficient and targeted manner.
In terms of intermediary cooperation, what's needed is a formal, transparent and efficient system for targeted and timely takedowns that has deadlines and accountability. The issue raises a valid regulatory concern: the absence of a local accountability system makes it more difficult to coordinate with Indian authorities on time especially when it comes to immediate action. All major social media intermediaries should be expected to have a response team in place to work closely with Indian law enforcement agencies during emergencies.
Finally, the judiciary needs to pay more attention to blocking orders. Such orders should be subject to prompt judicial review and the reasons for issuing them should be made public except where confidentiality is genuinely required.
While it is legal to temporarily block Telegram, it is not a justification or remedy for a systemic failure. It also does not seem to be a solution that will last the test of time for the issue of paper leaks. Telegram did not create the leak; it's just one of the platforms where the leaked paper was shared. In such a scenario, those responsible can easily switch to another platform tomorrow if the source of the leak hasn't been disturbed.
The real challenge is far greater. The repeated paper leak controversies in India highlight the inadequacies of the examination system. Improved security, greater accountability, tougher measures against insiders and quicker investigations are more critical than just using stopgap measures to address systemic failures.
The Telegram controversy isn't simply a matter of one platform. It is about how India maintains a balance between safeguarding the integrity of examinations and upholding constitutional rights. While temporary restrictions may provide an immediate response in extraordinary circumstances, long-term public confidence can only be gained by the system taking measures to counter the systemic failure and reacting before leaks occur.
Author is a 2nd Year B.B.A LL.B. (Hons.) student at National Law University Odisha. Views are personal.