Beyond Words - Why Chhattisgarh High Court's Approach To Victim Testimony Matters

The history of criminal law in India has had a long history of being plagued by an extremely tedious criminal process, right from filing a complaint or FIR to the passing of the final order. The intermediate stages are long and exhausting¹, and given the adversarial functioning of the Indian judicial machinery, a lot depends on the judge's interpretation and how evidence presented is perceived. The role of the court becomes particularly important in sensitive cases, like those involving sexual offences. Given that these offences often occur in private spaces, independent eye witness testimony is extremely rare, and the account of the victim, therefore becomes of utmost importance. Indian courts have had a long history of grappling with the question, whether the victim's account, by itself, can be the sole basis of conviction, this question was vehemently asked after the Mathura Rape Case² judgment, passed in 1978.

In Tukaram And Anr. vs, State of Maharashtra³ , also known as the Mathura Case represents a phase, where the testimony of the victim was approached with considerable skepticism. The Court focused on the absence of any visible injuries on the victim's body, which in its view, would have otherwise been present, had there been any active physical resistance by the victim. The Court further construed this to mean “passive submission”, thereby qualifying as “consent” and by extension as “consensual sexual intercourse”, which is antithetical to the requirement of “absence of consent” in order for a sexual act to constitute Rape under Section 375 of the IPC⁴.

The judgment was widely criticised for its implicit reliance on the idea of an “ideal victim”, one bearing physical injuries, genital tear or eyewitness testimony supporting claims of resistance. Since the victim's account did not fit this “model”, her testimony was treated with doubt. The result was, that her word, by itself, was considered insufficient to establish the offence of rape, ultimately leading to the acquittal of the accused.

A much appreciated departure occurred in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hijribhai vs. State of Gujarat5, where the Supreme Court held that corroboration is not a rule of law in rape cases, meaning, the testimony of the victim, if credible, can very well, by itself, form the basis of conviction. By placing such testimony at par with that of an injured witness, the court recognised the intrinsic evidentiary value of victim testimony. This case also grounded its reasoning in the socio - cultural context of indian society, acknowledging that the stigma associated with allegations of sexual assault make false cases unlikely. The case solidified what already was seen as intuitive amongst scholars and, to date, remains good law.

In cases where circumstantial evidence is bleak, this testimony becomes eminent. Primary reliance on the victim's testimony is a decision that courts come to once they are satisfied that the victim fulfills the pre-requisites of who shall be a witness as provided for in Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, 18726. The section lays down, inter alia, that a person, to be a witness, must be able to understand questions put to them and give rational answers to those questions. It is indisputable that correctly comprehending the questions asked during cross or chief examination is extremely important, as it forms the basis of how courts engage with evidence and any misunderstanding at this stage could directly affect how the courts construe the facts to arrive at a finding of guilt or innocence. Accurate comprehension of questions is therefore of high priority.

Within this context, a recent judgment by the Chhattisgarh High court in Neelam Kumar Deshmukh v. State of Chhattisgarh7 showcases how the judiciary has, over the decades, has acknowledged the centrality of victim testimony in rape cases and has been accommodative of special needs. In this present case, the victim was both deaf and mute. Covered under section 119 of the Indian Evidence Act8, in such cases, the witness can give evidence through writing or signs in open court, which is considered oral evidence. During cross-examination, although the victim was able to comprehend most of the questions, she admitted to not understanding some. The court, instead of treating this as “non-satisfaction” of the court under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act9, went ahead and in addition to an interpreter, employed a novel technique and brought in a plastic doll to facilitate better communication. On being asked through demonstration, she clearly indicated through gestures that the accused had forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. The court further noted that the fact that post demonstration she could answer accurately was a clear indication of her ability to depose.

Segwaying back to the centrality of victim testimony in rape trials, the High Court, in the judgement reffirmed the fact that a witness who is unable to speak can give evidence by signs or gestures and such evidence is admissible and can form the basis of conviction, provided the Court records satisfaction regarding the competency of the witness and her ability to understand and respond. The court applied these principles to the case at hand and despite absence of physical injuries or vaginal tear, the Trial Court, solely relying on the victim's testimony, and supplementary corroboratory evidence, convicted the accused for the offence or rape.

At the appellate level, the Chhattisgarh High Court upheld the conviction, while also appreciating the novel effort - of the use of a plastic doll - to enable the victim to communicate the nature of the offence clearly. While upholding the lower court's judgment,, the High Court affirmed “Her testimony inspires full confidence and constitutes reliable substantive evidence forming the foundation of the conviction recorded against the accused.10 In doing so, it relocated the eminence of victim's testimony in rape trials. This judgment is significant, because it acknowledges the responsibility of courts in creating conducive conditions which ensures ease of recording such evidence, which has the potency of becoming the foundational basis of conviction in sexual offences related cases.

While the outcry after Mathura11 and the judgment in Bhoginbhai12 performed the foundational task of affirming that victim testimony is not inherently suspect and can form the basis of conviction, the Chhattisgarh High Court, in Neelam Kumar Deshmukh13 moved a step forward. By endorsing methods that enable the victim to express herself, the Court shifted the focus from mere recognition of the importance of victim testimony, to its actual facilitation. The judgement, in this sense, marks a welcome development. It shows a judicial inclination towards substantive inclusion. The hope, moving ahead is that such approaches are not treated as mere exceptions, but as an integral part of how courts engage with evidence in cases of sexual violence.

End Notes & References:

¹ Rebecca Mammen John, 'The Supreme Court, Criminal Laws and Procedure' in S Muralidhar (ed), Incomplete Justice? The Supreme Court at 75 (Juggernaut 2025) 194.

² Tukaram v State of Maharashtra, 1978 INSC 178.

³ ibid.

⁴ Indian Penal Code 1860, s 375.

⁵ Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hijribhai vs. State of Gujarat, 1983 INSC 70.

⁶ Indian Evidence Code 1872, s 118.

⁷ Neelam Kumar Deshmukh v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026:CGHC:12396-DB.

⁸ Indian Evidence Code 1872, s 119.

⁹ Indian Evidence Code 1872, s 118.

¹⁰ Neelam Kumar Deshmukh v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026:CGHC:12396-DB.

¹¹ Tukaram v State of Maharashtra, 1978 INSC 178.

¹² Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hijribhai vs. State of Gujarat, 1983 INSC 70.

¹³ Neelam Kumar Deshmukh v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026:CGHC:12396-DB.