Felipe Massa's claim against Formula One Management (“FOM”), Bernie Ecclestone and the Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (“FIA”) reads like a story about sport, secrecy and missed remedies – but it is, above all, a test of private law doctrines. Who can sue, for what, and when. At stake is Massa's long-standing assertion that the deliberate crash during the inaugural Singapore Grand Prix in 2008 cost him the World Drivers' Championship. On 20 November 2025, Hon'ble Mr Justice Ray of the UK High Court delivered a judgment with relevance beyond Formula 1, clarifying how private law principles apply to international sporting regulators.
Background
The factual sequence leading up to the litigation was largely undisputed. The Singapore Grand Prix, now synonymous with the “Crashgate” scandal, took place on 28 September 2008. During the race, Nelson Piquet Jr crashed on lap 14 in circumstances that later were found to be deliberate. The safety car that followed “bunched” the field; several drivers pitted while the safety car was out. Massa, who was then leading the race, pitted on lap 17 and rejoined well down the order, suffering further mishap and a penalty that left him outside the points. The reshuffle of positions ultimately allowed Lewis Hamilton to surpass Massa's overall points tally of 97, securing his first of eight titles.
The allegation at the heart of Massa's claim is that, in late 2008, Nelson Piquet Sr told Charlie Whiting (the FIA race director) that his son's crash had been deliberate, that this information was passed up the chain of authority, and then, allegedly, suppressed by a conspiracy involving senior figures so that no timely investigation took place.
Renault's internal process and the FIA's own procedures led to a World Motor Sport Council (“WMSC") decision in September 2009, which applied a high standard of proof and found that Renault and key individuals had conspired to cause the crash. Renault did not contest the charges. The WMSC, however, did not annul or adjust the 2008 race result, and Ferrari did not take the matter to the International Court of Appeal. Around the same time, leaked material appeared in the press, and Piquet Jr gave a formal statement in July 2009. Massa publicly argued that the FIA should have cancelled the result and declared him champion, but neither he nor Ferrari pursued an ICA appeal.
A new twist came in 2023, when an interview attributed to Mr Ecclestone was published in which he appeared to suggest that he and Max Mosley had known about the deliberate crash “in good time” in 2008 but had “decided not to do anything for the time being.”
Claims and Contentions
Massa argued, firstly, that the FIA had breached the contract under the Super Licence and Sporting Code by failing to investigate the Singapore crash. Secondly, he said FOM and Mr Ecclestone had induced those breaches under English law. Thirdly, he pleaded an unlawful-means conspiracy by all three defendants, the alleged unlawful means being breaches of contract by the FIA or breaches of duties owed to its Members. Fourthly, he advanced a standalone French-law tort claim against the FIA based on alleged breaches of its Statutes. He also sought declarations that the FIA had acted in breach of that. However, for that breach, the Singapore result would have been annulled or adjusted in a way that would have made him the 2008 champion, alongside a £64 million damages claim.
The defendants sought a strike-out or a reverse summary judgment, which in English civil procedure are early-disposal mechanisms. A strike-out under CPR 3.4(2) allows the Court to remove a claim that is legally defective on its face, including where it “discloses no reasonable grounds” or amounts to an abuse of process. Reverse summary judgment under CPR 24.3 permits the Court to decide a claim without a trial where the claimant has “no real prospect of succeeding” and there is no compelling reason for the case to proceed. Together, these applications aim to prevent a claim from proceeding to the threshold stage before any factual evidence is heard.
The defendant argued that, firstly, the contract and duty claims were unsustainable because the duties relied on did not exist or were not enforceable by Massa. Secondly, they stated that any loss stemmed from Massa's failure to appeal the WMSC decision to the ICA (the Time Limit Ground). Thirdly, they stated that the claims were time-barred under English and French limitation laws (the Limitation Ground). Fourthly, they submitted that the Court would not grant the declaratory relief sought because it served no legitimate legal purpose and would improperly intrude into the FIA's exclusive jurisdiction over sports (the Declarations Ground).
The Court's Ruling: What Survived and What Fell Away
Firstly, the Court found that the FIA's rulebook and Super Licence could, in principle, give rise to investigative duties. The Court said Massa “has, in principle, a real prospect” of proving that point by construction of the documents and, alternatively, by implication of terms. At the same time, the Court was careful to limit that finding. It also concluded that those duties were not, on the evidence and as pleaded, “owed to him” personally; instead, they were owed to the FIA's membership and to the institutional structures the statutes protect. The practical consequence of that analytical split is that the pure contractual claim against the FIA does not have a real prospect of success in the form Massa had pleaded it. However, the parts necessary to support an unlawful-means conspiracy, namely breaches of duty or contract owed to others, which can be used as the “unlawful means,” do survive at this stage.
Secondly, regarding limitation, the Court held that Massa had a “real prospect” of demonstrating that the primary limitation period had not commenced in 2009 because the essential facts of the alleged conspiracy had been deliberately concealed. Under Section 32 of the English Limitation Act 1980, where there is fraud or “deliberate concealment” of any fact relevant to the cause of action, time does not begin until the claimant discovers the concealment or could reasonably have discovered it. The Court treated the 2023 Ecclestone interview as allowing Massa to “join up the dots by drawing an irresistible inference” that information had been intentionally withheld. The Court accepted that even though material existed in the public domain in 2009, it did not necessarily mean a reasonable person would have understood that senior figures had suppressed knowledge of the deliberate crash. Thus, Massa had a real prospect of showing that the true nature of the alleged conspiracy was not discoverable until 2023, meaning the six-year limitation period for his English-law conspiracy and inducement claims may only have begun when the interview surfaced.
Thirdly, the pure contract claims and the standalone French-law tort claim fared poorly. The Court described the pure contract claim as not worthwhile on its own and stated that the separate French tort claim added unnecessary complexity; it indicated that it would be inclined to strike the tort claim and raised “serious doubts” about certain aspects of the French-law case. It left open narrow French-law issues that might require further expert evidence before any trial.
Lastly, on declaratory relief, the Court delivered one of the clearest refusals in the entire judgment. Massa had sought declarations that the FIA had acted in breach of its own regulations in 2008 and that, had it acted properly, the Singapore Grand Prix would have been annulled or adjusted in a way that would have made him the world champion. The Court held that such relief would not be granted at trial. It stated that the declarations served “no legitimate legal purpose” and crossed the boundary between the Court's role and the FIA's exclusive jurisdiction in sports. The Court described Massa as being “caught on the horns of a self-imposed dilemma” since he had accepted that the declarations would have no legal or practical effect on the FIA, yet sought them primarily for their symbolic value, allowing him to present himself publicly as the 2008 champion. The Court held that it was not the function of declaratory relief to “rewrite the outcome” of a sporting championship or confer what would be perceived as a retrospective title.
Both sides were quick to declare victory. Massa called the ruling a “tremendous victory,” stressing that his core conspiracy claim will now go to trial. The FIA, meanwhile, stressed that the Court had dismissed the contract claim, the standalone tort claim, and the declaratory relief bid, and stated that the surviving case rests on “significantly narrowed grounds.”
In short, the Court drew a clear line. It accepted that sporting rules can give rise to enforceable duties but declined to turn regulatory failure into an automatic private right to a title. The Court allowed the unlawful-means conspiracy and inducement claims to proceed, but struck out the pure contract and many French-law claims, and refused the declaratory remedy. This means that Massa wins the right to a full hearing but not the championship. He must still prove causation, overcome evidential gaps and show concealment delayed the limitation clock. For sport and private law, the judgment is important as it opens a route to challenge regulators while warning that Courts will not substitute themselves for sporting bodies or use litigation as a means of rewriting results.
Author is law student at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad.
Views Are Personal.