Withdrawal Of Riot-Related Prosecutions In Karnataka: Reconciling Prosecutorial Discretion With Constitutional Accountability

Can an elected government seek withdrawal of criminal prosecutions arising out of riots, political agitations, communal disturbances, and protest movements in the larger interests of public welfare and social harmony? More importantly, where such prosecutions involve allegations relating to unlawful assembly, violence, attacks upon public institutions, or destruction of property, what safeguards does Indian law prescribe before criminal proceedings may legally be terminated? These questions have acquired renewed legal significance following the Karnataka Government's decision to approve withdrawal of several criminal cases registered across different districts of the State. The issue, however, is not merely political in nature. It concerns the structure governing prosecutorial withdrawal under Indian criminal procedure and the institutional balance between executive policy, prosecutorial discretion, and judicial oversight.

The controversy first gained prominence on 15 October 2024, when the Karnataka Cabinet reportedly approved withdrawal of forty-three criminal cases, including prosecutions arising out of the 2022 Old Hubballi Town Police Station violence and other protest-related incidents. Subsequently, in May 2026, the Government reportedly approved withdrawal of another fifty-two criminal cases involving incidents connected with communal disturbances, Kannada language agitations, Cauvery protests, Kalasa-Banduri demonstrations, farmers' movements, and other public mobilisations across Karnataka. Among the incidents discussed in the public domain are the DJ Halli and KG Halli disturbances in Bengaluru, the Old Hubballi Town Police Station incident, and clashes associated with the Ladle Mashtaq Dargah at Aland in Kalaburagi district. Several of these prosecutions reportedly involve allegations relating to rioting, unlawful assembly, assault upon police personnel, obstruction of public servants, arson, destruction of public property, and offences affecting public tranquillity. The significance of these developments lies not merely in the number of cases proposed for withdrawal but in the nature of the offences involved and the statutory framework regulating prosecutorial withdrawal within Indian criminal law.

Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, offences relating to unlawful assembly and rioting continue to occupy a serious position within criminal jurisprudence. Section 189 BNS defines unlawful assembly, while Section 191 criminalises rioting where force or violence is used by members of an unlawful assembly acting in prosecution of a common object.

Section 191 BNS: Rioting occurs where force or violence is used by members of an unlawful assembly acting in prosecution of a common object.

Related offences may additionally attract provisions concerning assault upon public servants, criminal intimidation, damage to government property, promotion of enmity between groups, and offences affecting public peace and order. The legislative purpose behind these provisions extends beyond punishment alone. Riot-related offences are treated seriously because collective violence possesses the capacity to disturb public order, weaken institutional authority, and threaten constitutional governance itself. An attack upon a police station, for instance, is not merely an offence against public property; it represents interference with institutions responsible for maintenance of law and order. Similarly, incidents involving organised mob violence, destruction of public infrastructure, or assaults upon public authorities directly affect the State's obligation to maintain public tranquillity and constitutional order.

At the same time, Indian criminal jurisprudence also recognises that continuation of every criminal prosecution may not invariably advance public interest. In situations involving political agitations, social movements, labour protests, student demonstrations, or emotionally charged public mobilisations, governments have historically considered withdrawal of prosecutions where continuation of criminal proceedings was perceived as unnecessary, disproportionate, or inconsistent with broader considerations of reconciliation and social stability. The legal framework governing such withdrawal is presently contained in Section 360 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, corresponding to the earlier Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 360 BNSS authorises the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, with the consent of the Court, to withdraw from prosecution at any stage before pronouncement of judgment. The statutory structure is constitutionally significant because it does not permit unilateral executive termination of criminal proceedings.

The process ordinarily begins with an administrative decision of the Government recommending reconsideration of particular prosecutions. Such recommendation may arise after review by departmental authorities, representations submitted by social or political groups, examination by cabinet committees, or broader policy considerations relating to public welfare and social harmony. However, the Government itself cannot directly withdraw a criminal case. After the administrative recommendation, the matter is placed before the Director of Prosecutions or the concerned Public Prosecutor. At this stage, the Public Prosecutor is expected to independently examine the facts of each case, the evidentiary material available, the seriousness of allegations, the stage of trial, and whether withdrawal genuinely serves the interests of justice and public interest. This stage is legally important because Indian constitutional jurisprudence consistently recognises that the Public Prosecutor is not merely an executive representative but an independent officer of the Court. Only after such independent application of mind may an application under Section 360 BNSS be filed before the jurisdictional Court seeking permission for withdrawal of prosecution.

Even then, the prosecution does not automatically stand withdrawn. The competent Court must independently examine whether granting consent would satisfy the requirements of justice, fairness, public interest, and administration of criminal law. Judicial consent therefore functions as the final constitutional safeguard within the withdrawal process. This framework reflects broader constitutional principles embodied within Articles 14, 21, and 50 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 guarantees equality before law and prohibits arbitrary state action. Consequently, withdrawal of criminal prosecutions must be guided by objective legal considerations and cannot operate arbitrarily. Article 21, particularly after the Supreme Court's interpretation in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, requires fairness, procedural reasonableness, and due process in all state action affecting legal rights and criminal justice administration. Further, Article 50 emphasises separation of judiciary from executive authority. The requirement of judicial consent under Section 360 BNSS reflects this constitutional balance by ensuring that criminal prosecutions are not terminated solely through executive preference.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified these principles while interpreting prosecutorial withdrawal provisions. In Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC 288], the Supreme Court observed that withdrawal from prosecution must advance public justice and cannot be exercised mechanically. The Court emphasised that the Public Prosecutor must independently determine whether withdrawal genuinely serves the interests of justice. Similarly, in Rajender Kumar Jain v. State [(1980) 3 SCC 435], the Supreme Court famously held that the Public Prosecutor is not a “post office” of the Government. The prosecutor is expected to apply independent legal judgment while considering whether continuation of prosecution remains necessary. In Rahul Agarwal v. Rakesh Jain [(2005) 2 SCC 377], the Supreme Court reiterated that judicial consent under the withdrawal provision is not a mere procedural formality and that courts must independently assess whether the proposed withdrawal is consistent with public interest and proper administration of justice. Likewise, in State of Kerala v. K. Ajith [(2021) 11 SCC 564], the Supreme Court emphasised that offences affecting society collectively require careful scrutiny before withdrawal of prosecution is permitted.

It is within this legal framework that the Karnataka High Court examined the earlier Government Order approving withdrawal of forty-three criminal cases. A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice N.V. Anjaria and Justice K.V. Aravind reportedly quashed the Government Order in May 2025 while hearing a Public Interest Litigation challenging the withdrawal proposal. The Court reportedly observed that prosecutorial withdrawal must remain consistent with the statutory scheme underlying Section 321 CrPC and reiterated the importance of independent prosecutorial assessment and judicial scrutiny before criminal proceedings involving serious allegations are terminated. The Court's observations are legally significant because they reaffirm an important constitutional principle: criminal justice administration in India functions through institutional checks and balances rather than unilateral authority.

Importantly, Indian law does not prohibit withdrawal of criminal prosecutions altogether. Historically, provisions such as Section 321 CrPC and now Section 360 BNSS have been invoked in cases involving labour agitations, student protests, political demonstrations, social movements, and situations where continuation of prosecution was considered inconsistent with broader public interest considerations. At the same time, courts have consistently maintained that offences affecting public order, communal harmony, attacks upon police authorities, and organised violence require careful judicial scrutiny before withdrawal is permitted. This is because riot-related offences possess a societal dimension extending beyond individual criminal liability. Criminal law in such situations serves preventive and institutional purposes in addition to punitive objectives. It reinforces public order, protects public institutions, safeguards law enforcement authorities, and maintains confidence in constitutional governance.

The Karnataka developments therefore provide an important contemporary example of how prosecutorial withdrawal operates within India's constitutional structure. The legal framework ultimately demonstrates that withdrawal of prosecution in India is neither exclusively executive nor purely judicial in character. It is a judiciously regulated process involving administrative recommendation, independent prosecutorial evaluation, and judicial supervision. Viewed through this legal lens, the ongoing discussion concerning withdrawal of riot-related prosecutions in Karnataka represents an important constitutional conversation regarding the functioning of criminal justice administration within a democratic society governed by rule of law. Ultimately, the legality of any withdrawal does not depend merely upon governmental recommendation or public debate. It depends upon compliance with statutory procedure, independent application of mind by the Public Prosecutor, judicial scrutiny by the competent Court, and adherence to constitutional principles governing fairness, equality, public order, and administration of justice.

Author is a Law student at CHRIST (Deemed to be University),Bengaluru. Views are personal.