Acquittal Cannot Be Reversed Unless Trial Court's View Is Perverse or Impossible: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has reiterated that an appellate court cannot reverse a judgment of acquittal merely because it prefers a different appreciation of the evidence. Before overturning an acquittal, the appellate court must find that the view taken by the trial court is perverse or impossible on the evidence on record, the Court held.
The Court restored a husband's (appellant) acquittal in a case under Sections 498A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, now Sections 85 and 108 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), holding that the High Court reversed the trial court's acquittal order without finding that the trial court's order was perverse or impossible on the evidence, and on the basis of observations that had no support in the record.
A bench of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S Chandurkar was hearing an appeal filed by the husband, whose acquittal by the trial court had been reversed into a conviction by the Himachal Pradesh High Court.
The appellant had married the victim (wife) in 2008. It is alleged that soon after the marriage, the appellant along with his sisters and mother started harassing her over dowry. In 2009, the victim gave birth to a daughter, even then the harassment continued, as she was not given proper food. On the day of the incident, the victim's family was informed that she had consumed poison and was taken to a hospital but died during treatment. Subsequently, a case was registered against the appellant, his mother, and two sisters, under Sections Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC.
During the trial, it was found that the evidence was largely hearsay, that no injuries were found on the victim's body, and that no complaint of torture had ever been made to any authority. The trial court, thus, acquitted all four of them in 2010.
An appeal was subsequently filed before the Himachal Pradesh High Court, which held that the case against the mother and two sisters was not proved. However, the High Court opined that the charges stood proved beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant. It was held that it was appellant's acts of torture and abuse that drove the victim to suicide. Hence, the High Court convicted him under Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC. The appellant was, thereafter, sentenced to four years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs 10,000 (under Section 306) and two years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs 5,000 (under Section 498A). Both the sentences were to run concurrently.
Aggrieved by the High Court's finding, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that the High Court had reversed the acquittal without considering the reasons assigned by the trial court, ignoring material omissions and improvements in the prosecution witnesses' testimony brought out in cross-examination, as well as the appellant's conduct in arranging immediate medical help for the victim. It was argued that there was no evidence of abetment. The appellant relied on Chandrappa & Ors v State of Karnataka, State of UP v Banne @ Baijnath & Ors, Mahendra Pratap Singh v State of UP, Bhagwan Das v Kartar Singh & Ors, and Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat & Anr. to argue on principles governing appeals against acquittal.
On the other hand, the respondent (the state) supported the High Court's judgment by submitting that the trial court had given undue weight to minor contradictions, that the presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now Section 117 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) was attracted, and that there was no rebuttal evidence from the appellant.
Perusing the submissions, the Supreme Court held that, “the High Court was in error in reversing the acquittal of the appellant without coming to a finding that the view taken by the Sessions Court in favour of the appellant was either perverse or was impossible in view of the evidence on record.”
The Court also noted that the prosecution witnesses had deposed only in general terms, without referring to any specific incident of torture, harassment, or dowry demand. PW1 (victim's mother) admitted that she had never informed any authority of the alleged torture, and that the couple appeared to be happy whenever they visited her. The victim's sisters also deposed similarly, with nothing specific stated about any incident of torture. A neighbour also testified that the accused (appellant) enjoyed good social standing, that she never heard of any dispute between the couple, and that the appellant had tried his best to save the victim's life.
The Court also took note of the pharmacist who deposed that the appellant had approached him for medicines and administering injection, and that on discovering that she had ingested poison, the appellant immediately arranged a vehicle and took her to hospital. The postmortem report also substantiated death due to poison and no marks of injuries were found on her body.
Referring to the High Court's judgment, the Court held that, “perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court indicates that it failed to come to close quarters with reasons assigned by the Sessions Court. In its short discussion spreading over only two paragraphs, the acquittal of the appellant was reversed by holding that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the victim had been harassed mentally and physically by the appellant. It observed that the appellant had abused and dragged the victim in the presence of her mother and sisters. We, however, do not find any such evidence on record. In fact, these witnesses admitted in their cross-examination that they had not made such statements before the police authorities. In our view, it was necessary for the High Court, as an appellate Court, while considering an appeal against acquittal, to record a finding that the Sessions Court had either misread the entire evidence to arrive at a perverse conclusion or that its conclusion could not be supported by the evidence on record. However, no such finding has been recorded in the impugned judgment.”
It reiterated the principles governing appeal against acquittal, by referring to Privy Council's ruling in Sheo Swarup & Ors v King Emperor (upheld by Supreme Court in Bhubneshwar Mandal & Ors. v State of Bihar), which requires the appellate court to give due weight to the trial court's view on the credibility of witnesses, the presumption of innocence which is strengthened by the acquittal, and the accused person's right to get the benefit of doubt. State of UP v Samman Dass was referred to reiterate that when two views are possible, the one favouring the accused should be adopted.
Referring to Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat, the Court reiterated that an offence under Section 306 IPC requires specific abetment as contemplated under Section 107 of the IPC (now Section 45 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), with an intention on the part of the accused to bring about the suicide. It observed that, “it is likely that there may have been some disputes or discord in the matrimonial life of the appellant and the victim. That,however, would not be sufficient in itself to attract the provisions of Section 306 read with Section 107 of the Penal Code.” Further, the bench found no evidence of any abetment.
In the light of above, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had correctly concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, and that the High Court had erred in reversing the acquittal. The bench, thus, set aside the High Court's judgment reversing appellant's acquittal and acquitted him of all charges.
Case: Sanjay Kumar v State of Himachal Pradesh
Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 901
Appearance:
For Appellant: Mr. DN Goburdhun, Sr. Adv; Mr PD Sharma, AOR; Mr Sumit Singh Somria, Adv.; Ms Anjali Sharma, Adv.; Ms Priyanshi Singh, Adv.; Ms Pahul Preet Kaur, Adv.
For Respondent: Mr Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva, AOR and Mr Arindram Gupta, Adv.