Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Section 2(oo)(bb) - The 73-year-old petitioner, a former employee, filed a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution challenging a labour dispute denial of reinstatement. Appearing in person due to financial constraints, he struggled with English submissions. The Court appointed Advocate Sanchar Anand as Amicus Curiae, who rendered pro bono assistance over 14 hearings spanning two years, facilitating a negotiated settlement. The respondents (employer) agreed to a lump-sum payment in lieu of reinstatement under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, initially offering Rs.10 lakhs, revised to Rs.15 lakhs, and finally settled at Rs.20 lakhs. Issue(s): 1. Whether a lump-sum compensation of Rs.20 lakhs in lieu of reinstatement is just and equitable for an aged workman who waives claims on merits, per Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. The ethical duty of advocates, particularly young members of the Bar, to provide voluntary legal aid to indigent litigants to ensure access to justice, and to dispel the misconception that the Supreme Court is accessible only to the wealthy. Held, the Court directed the respondent-employer to pay Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs) via Demand Draft within three weeks as full and final settlement of all claims, extinguishing the petitioner's rights to reinstatement or further relief. This was deemed just, equitable, and proportionate given the petitioner's advanced age (73 years), long pendency, waiver of merits-based claims, mutual consent, and the employer's voluntary enhancement of the offer. No costs were awarded. As appreciation for the Amicus Curiae's selfless service, the Court directed an additional Rs.1,00,000/- to be paid to him by the respondents (Paras 9-11, 15) Shankar Lal Sharma v. Rajesh Koolwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2025 INSC 200

Section 2(s) — Master and Servant Relationship — Canteen Employees — Non-Statutory Canteen Run by a Co-operative Society — Test to Determine Employer-Employee Relationship – Held, the employees working in a non-statutory canteen, run by a Co-operative Society on the Bank's premises with the Bank providing significant financial subsidy (75% of wages) and infrastructure, cannot be deemed to be the employees of the Bank (principal employer) - The mere act of a Bank playing a pivotal role in setting up the canteen, or providing necessary infrastructure, finance, subsidies, and controlling the working hours/days, is an "obligation to provide facilities to run canteen," which is distinct from a statutory or implicit "obligation to provide a canteen." - This does not make the canteen a part of the establishment - Appellant-Bank lacked the right to supervise and control the work done by the canteen employees, or to take any disciplinary action against them, the relationship of master and servant did not exist - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Parimal Chandra Raha v. LIC of India, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 611; Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd. (2014) 9 SCC 407; Paras 36-40, 46-48] General Manager, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd v. Achchey Lal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1024 : 2025 INSC 1175

Section 17B - In cases of wrongful dismissal, lump sum compensation may be more appropriate than reinstatement with back wages in specific circumstances, provided courts balance the interests of the employee and employer with reasoned justification. Back wages are not automatic and depend on whether the dismissed employee was gainfully employed post-termination. The quantum of back wages is at the court's discretion if the employee admits to or is proven to have had gainful employment, with the employer bearing the burden of proof under Section 17B. In this case, the employer was found guilty of suggestio falsi (false representation) and suppresio veri (suppression of truth) before the Labour Court and Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, violating natural justice principles. The employee, a driver dismissed after a vehicular accident, was awarded 75% back wages from termination to superannuation, along with full terminal benefits, modifying the High Court's order for 100% back wages. (Para 25, 30, 34, 44, 45) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 212 : 2025 INSC 218 : [2025] 3 SCR 100 : AIR 2025 SC 1172 : (2025) 4 SCC 321

Section 25O - 'deemed closure' - If appropriate government does not communicate and order within 60 days of date of application - there shall be deemed closure - Upheld closure application and enhanced compensation offered to workers by an additional amount of Rs. 5 crores. Appeal allowed. [Relied on: Pimpri Chinchwad New Township Development Authority v. Vishnudev Coop. Housing Society (2018) 8 SCC 215, Paras 15, 16, 22] Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2025 INSC 801 : (2025) 10 SCC 286

Section 25O - Procedure for closing down an undertaking - “appropriate Government” - Who is an appropriate government - Powers under Section 25O rests with Minister, the State Government being the appropriate government has delegated its power specifically to the Ministry for Labour - Deputy Secretary is not duly authorized to conduct communication or to accept or reject applications for closure made by Industrial units - No notification for delegation of power - Internal noting in Official files of the Government cannot be considered as an application of mind by appropriate authorities - Administrative Authorities are also required to give reasons for a decision made under Section 25O. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2025 INSC 801 : (2025) 10 SCC 286

Supreme Court laid down tests to determine employer employee relationship to be kept in mind while deciding matters arising from legislations like industrial disputes act, 1947, the factories act, 1948 etc - Factors to be considered include - (1) Control Test- (a) who appoints workers; (b) who pays the salaries/remuneration; (2) who has the authority to dismiss; (3) Organisation Test- who can take disciplinary action; (4) whether there is continuity of service; and (5) extent of control and supervision, i.e., whether there exists complete control and supervision. [Relied on Shivanandan Sharma v. Punjab National Bank Ltd. (AIR 1955 SC 404; Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments (1974) 3 SCC 498; Workmen of Nilgiri Coop. Marketing Society Ltd. v. State of T.N. (2004) 5 SCC 514; Paras 37, 74-76] General Manager, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd v. Achchey Lal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1024 : 2025 INSC 1175

Injunction

Injunction Suit – Requirement for Declaration of Title - The appellants (original plaintiffs) filed a Title Suit seeking a permanent injunction against the defendants to restrain them from entering or interfering with the suit land. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, which was affirmed by the First Appellate Court. However, the High Court allowed the Second Appeal filed by the defendants on the ground that the suit for injunction simpliciter was not maintainable without a prayer for declaration of title. Whether a suit for permanent injunction simpliciter is maintainable without a prayer for declaration of title when the defendants do not dispute the plaintiffs' title. Held, A suit for permanent injunction simpliciter is maintainable without a declaration of title when the defendants do not dispute the title of the plaintiffs. The High Court failed to properly consider relevant issues, including the fact that the defendants did not dispute the plaintiffs' title. The matter was remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration of the Second Appeal in accordance with the law. Krushna Chandra Behera v. Narayan Nayak, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 69

Suit for Injunction Simpliciter - Effect of Non-Challenge to Validity of Documents - The appellants' argument that the respondent did not challenge the validity of the General Power of Attorney (GPA) and agreement to sell dated 04.04.1986 or the registered sale deed dated 01.04.1998 does not alter the legal position of the parties. In a suit for injunction simpliciter, the absence of a specific challenge to the validity of these documents or a separate prayer for declaration of title does not impact the legal standing of the parties when no direct challenge to the instruments' validity is raised. (Para 57) M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 257

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

An arbitral award for claims not included in an approved IBC resolution plan is unenforceable, as such claims are extinguished upon approval under Section 31 of IBC. The Court allowed Electrosteel Steels Ltd.'s appeal against the enforcement of an Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) arbitral award, ruling it non-executable due to the approved resolution plan settling operational creditors' claims at nil. The Court clarified that objections to an award's execution under Section 47 CPC are permissible if the award is a nullity, independent of a challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and that the MSEFC lacked jurisdiction to pass the award post-approval. (Para 50 - 52) Electrosteel Steel v. Ispat Carrier, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 491 : 2025 INSC 525 : (2025) 7 SCC 773

Article 226 - Delay and Laches - Natural Justice in CIRP - The Court emphasized that the respondent's delay of nearly three years in approaching the High Court, despite being aware of the proceedings, was fatal to their case. The initiation of parallel proceedings under the IBC further undermined the justification for invoking writ jurisdiction. The High Court had set aside the resolution plan on the ground of violation of natural justice due to inadequate notice (less than 24 hours) for a Committee of Creditors (CoC) meeting. The Supreme Court, however, found that the delay in approaching the High Court and the availability of alternative remedies under the IBC rendered the writ petition untenable. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19

Avoidance Transactions vs. Fraudulent / Wrongful Trading – Distinction Clarified - The Supreme Court elucidated the distinction between avoidance transactions under Chapter III and fraudulent or wrongful trading under Chapter VI of the IBC, 2016. Avoidance transactions, including preferential, undervalued, extortionate credit, and fraudulent transactions, are dealt with under Section 25(2)(j) and can be set aside by the Adjudicating Authority under Sections 44, 48, 49, and 51, focusing on ascertainable properties and persons involved. In contrast, fraudulent or wrongful trading under Section 66 requires a deeper inquiry into the intent behind the corporate debtor's business activities, with the Adjudicating Authority empowered to order contributions to the debtor's assets by individuals knowingly engaged in such activities. The Court emphasized that Section 66 applications are excluded from Section 25(2), operating in distinct situations, and the filing of avoidance applications under Section 26 does not affect insolvency proceedings. (Para 61) Piramal Capital and Housing Finance Ltd. v. 63 Moons Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 374 : 2025 INSC 421

CIRP initiated against BPSL (one of RBI's "dirty dozen") on 26.07.2017 by Punjab National Bank - JSW Steel's plan (total ₹19,700 crore: ₹19,350 crore to financial creditors; ₹350 crore to operational creditors vs. ₹733 crore claims) approved by CoC via e-voting (15-16.10.2018); filed with NCLT on 14.02.2019 - NCLT approved on 05.09.2019 with conditions; NCLAT modified/approved on 17.02.2020. Appeals by ex-promoters/creditors (e.g., Sanjay Singhal, Kalyani Transco) challenging procedural lapses/delays. Held, 1. Timelines under S.12 IBC (pre-2019 amendment): Mandatory 180+90=270 days from admission (max. 330 including litigation); RP filed Section 31 application after 1.5 years without extension under Section 12(2) or Regulation 39(4) (15-day pre-maximum filing); Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 1 and ESSAR Steel India Ltd. Committee of Creditors v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531 followed – Held, plan ex facie invalid; NCLT gravely erred in entertaining / approving post-expiry. 2. Avoidance Transactions (Ch. III IBC): RP statutorily obligated to file applications for preferential / undervalued / extortionate / fraudulent pre-CIRP transactions, especially for "dirty dozen" debtor – Held, RP's failure vitiates process. 3. RP's Other Non-Compliances: No certification of JSW's Section 29A eligibility; unverified Section 30(2) compliance (lawful, priority to operational creditors); Regulation 38(1) violated by prioritizing financial over operational creditors (pre-2019) – Held, RP abdicated duties. 4. CoC's Commercial Wisdom: Must ensure time-bound revival, asset maximization, statutory compliance (Sections 12, 29A, 30(2); Regulation 38 feasibility / viability); not mere rhetoric – Held, CoC approved non-feasible / non-compliant plan; contradictory affidavits (criticized JSW delays, then accepted ₹19,350 crore belatedly) indicate collusion / lack of bona fides, vitiating wisdom. 5. JSW's Delay Tactics: Challenged NCLT conditions via NCLAT appeal; post-NCLAT, delayed 2+ years citing appeal pendency (no stay granted); filed interim applications to prolong – State Bank of India and Others v. Consortium of Murari Lal Jalan and Florian Fritsch and Another, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 866 followed – Held, mala fide misuse of process; cannot ratify violations or grant leeway for non-implementation; dishonest intent in securing high score via misrepresentation, then stalling amid steel price rise. NCLAT/NCLT orders set aside; JSW plan illegal; process vitiated ab initio. CoC/RP faulted for non-discharge of duties; undue creditor prejudice from delays. (No explicit remand specified; implies re-initiation / fresh compliance.) Reinforces strict timelines, RP/CoC accountability, and zero tolerance for procedural abuse / delays in IBC; prioritizes creditor interests over tactical litigation. (Para 43, 53, 57, 64, 71, 72, 73, 77, 78, 82) Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

Condonation of Delay - National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) - Lengthy Orders - Verbose Submissions - The Supreme Court expressed concern regarding the NCLAT's practice of issuing excessively lengthy orders, particularly in applications for condonation of delay, citing a 17-page order in the present case. The Court acknowledged that while detailed orders may sometimes be necessary, it also pointed to the role of "verbose and unnecessary long submissions of the members of the Bar" in contributing to such lengthy adjudications. The Court observed a trend of lengthy submissions and pleadings from legal practitioners before the NCLAT, even in routine matters like condonation of delay. (Para 4) Power Infrastructure India v. Power Finance Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Resolution Plan – Approval – Timelines – Avoidance Transactions – Commercial Wisdom of CoC – Delay Tactics – Sections 12, 29A, 30(2); Regulations 38, 39(4) IBBI (IRPCP) 2016 – Held, Resolution Plan of JSW Steel for BPSL set aside as illegal and contrary to IBC; mandatory 270-day limit (pre-2019 amendment) violated; RP failed to file avoidance applications, certify eligibility/compliance; CoC exercised no commercial wisdom, took contradictory stands; JSW adopted mala fide delays misusing judicial process; NCLT erred in post-expiry approval; fresh compliance mandated. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Section 7 IBC – Financial Creditor – Financial Debt – Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares (CRPS) – Commercial Effect of Borrowing (Section 5(8)(f) IBC – Held, a holder of Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares (CRPS) is a shareholder and not a financial creditor and cannot initiate the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) against the Corporate Debtor.  EPC Constructions v. Matix Fertilizers and Chemicals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1036 : 2025 INSC 1259

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) initiated against BPSL in 2017 at the behest of Punjab National Bank. JSW's ₹19,700 crore plan—allocating ₹19,350 crore to financial creditors and ₹350 crore to operational creditors (against admitted claims of ₹733 crore)—was approved by CoC, National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) on September 5, 2019, and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) on February 17, 2022. However, JSW wilfully delayed implementation for two years post-approval, made misrepresentations to CoC, and contravened plan terms, frustrating IBC objectives. Appeals allowed from operational creditors. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

CRPS Holder is a Shareholder, Not a Creditor - A CRPS is part of the company's share capital, and the amount paid is neither a loan nor a debt - Difference between Debt and Preference share - Held that Preference shareholders are not in the position of creditors and cannot, as a matter of right, claim a return of their share money except in a winding-up - An unredeemed preference shareholder does not automatically assume the character of a 'creditor' - Held that preference shares are part of the company's share capital and the amounts paid up on them are not loans. Dividends are paid on the preference shares when company earns a profit-if the dividends were paid without profits or in excess of profits made, it would amount to an illegal return of the capital - Amount paid up on preference shares not being loans, they do not qualify as a debt. [Relied on Lalchand Surana vs. M/s Hyderabad Vanaspathy Ltd 1988 SCC OnLine AP 290.; Para 19, 20, 26, 27] EPC Constructions v. Matix Fertilizers and Chemicals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1036 : 2025 INSC 1259

Finality of CIRP Proceedings - The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of timely conclusion of CIRP proceedings, as delays undermine the objectives of the IBC. The Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the Adjudicating Authority to resume the proceedings from the stage they were interdicted and conclude them expeditiously. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the resolution plan approved by the CoC. The Adjudicating Authority was directed to expedite the completion of the CIRP proceedings. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19

Financial Debt - Test of Time Value of Money - Held that for a debt to be classified as a 'financial debt' under Section 5(8) of the IBC, the basic element is that it ought to be a disbursal against the consideration for the time value of money - The requirement of a 'debt' and 'disbursal against consideration for the time value of money' remains an essential part of all sub-clauses of Section 5(8) - The paid-up amounts towards shares, being part of the share capital, do not possess the character of a debt and, therefore, do not fall within the definition of 'financial debt' - Appeals dismissed. [Para 29-42, 47, 48] EPC Constructions v. Matix Fertilizers and Chemicals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1036 : 2025 INSC 1259

Interference with IBC Proceedings via Writ Jurisdiction – Whether the High Court, under Article 226, can halt insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor at the preliminary stage by determining waiver of liability, bypassing the statutory mechanism under the IBC. Held, the appointment of a Resolution Professional under Section 97 of the IBC to examine and report on the debt (under Section 99) is a mandatory preliminary step. The Adjudicating Authority is not required to ascertain the existence of debt before this stage. The High Court's exercise of writ jurisdiction was erroneous as it: (i) disrupted the statutory process under the IBC, and (ii) prematurely adjudicated the existence of debt, a mixed question of law and fact within the Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction under Section 100 of the IBC. While High Courts possess judicial review powers, they should not act as the decision-making authority in place of statutory tribunals tasked with adjudicating specific legal and factual issues. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, which had barred insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor by holding that the guarantor's liability was waived, as it interfered with the IBC's statutory framework. The appellant's application before the Adjudicating Authority was restored, with directions for expeditious disposal, considering the matter's pendency since 2021. [Relied on: Dilip B. Jiwrajka v. Union of India, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 1010 and Mohammed Enterprises (Tanzania) Ltd v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19; Para 9, 11, 12] Bank of Baroda v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2025 INSC 253 : AIR 2025 SC 1591

Issues - 1. Whether the RP discharged statutory duties under IBC and CIRP Regulations during BPSL's CIRP. 2. Whether CoC exercised commercial wisdom in approving JSW's non-compliant plan, and protected creditor interests. 3. Whether JSW's post-approval non-compliance and misrepresentations rendered the plan void. 4. Validity of NCLT/NCLAT approvals under Sections 30(2) and 31(2) IBC. Held: 1. RP's Failure: The RP utterly failed in statutory duties, warranting condemnation for enabling flawed CIRP. 2. CoC's Lapse: CoC abdicated commercial wisdom by approving a plan in "flagrant violation" of mandatory IBC provisions and CIRP Regulations; contradictory stances before Court and acceptance of JSW payments without demur undermined creditor protection. 3. JSW's Conduct: JSW's wilful non-compliance for two years, absent legal impediments, and misrepresentations to secure the bid constituted abuse of process; such delays frustrated IBC's revival objective, vitiating proceedings. 4. Plan's Invalidity: JSW's plan non-conformant with Section 30(2) IBC (e.g., inadequate creditor distributions); NCLT erred in not rejecting it under Section 31(2); NCLAT's judgment perverse and coram non judice. NCLT/NCLAT orders quashed; JSW's plan rejected; liquidation of BPSL directed forthwith. JSW's payments to creditors and equity infusions recoverable per CoC's undertaking (to refund within two months if appeals succeed, as recorded on March 6, 2020). State's appeal (Odisha) on dues dismissed without adjudication. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 in Insolvency Matters - Held, the High Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, especially when statutory remedies are available. The IBC is a complete code with its own checks, balances, and appellate mechanisms. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19

Liquidation Process - Private Sale - Regulation 33(2)(d) vs. 33(2)(c) - NCLT Rules, 2016 — Rule 15 — Power to Extend Time and Impose Forfeiture - Supreme Court clarified that a sale initiated after the failure of public auctions and the decision of stakeholders to sell assets at scrap value, which then proceeds via an application for NCLT approval, falls squarely under Regulation 33(2)(d) (sale with prior permission of Adjudicating Authority) rather than Regulation 33(2)(c) - Under Rule 15 - the NCLT has the power to extend time for payment upon such terms as the justice of the case requires - Where a purchaser fails to meet their own committed timelines and seeks extensions, the NCLT is justified in stipulating a forfeiture clause for any future deviations to ensure the expeditious resolution of the liquidation process. Shri Karshni Alloys v. Ramakrishnan Sadasivan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1195 : 2025 INSC 1411

Resolution Plan - Supreme Court disapproved the delay in implementation of the Resolution Plan, holding it was unjustified and contrary to the Code's mandate - Held that payments to financial creditors must precede operational creditors unless otherwise specified in the Resolution Plan, overruling contrary practice - It further found that the Resolution Plan approval freezes claims and bars fresh claims outside the authorized plan, ensuring certainty for the Successful Resolution Applicant - Recognized the dilatory tactics by erstwhile promoters attempting to derail CIRP, imposing costs on frivolous applications and emphasizing the primacy of timely resolution in public interest - Held that commercial decisions of CoCs are binding and beyond judicial review save for limited exceptions enumerated in the IBC - Appeals allowed. [Para 6, 7, 13, 14, 16–18, 46-49, 56-58, 64, 65, 67–68, 120, 134-136, 164-165, 187-190] Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 954 : 2025 INSC 1165

Resolution Plan Approval – Commercial Wisdom of Committee of Creditors (CoC) Upheld - The Supreme Court upheld Piramal Capital and Housing Finance Ltd.'s resolution plan for Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd. (DHFL), setting aside the NCLAT's January 2022 order that directed reconsideration of the plan's valuation of ₹45,000 crore in avoidance transactions at a nominal ₹1. The Court affirmed the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC), which approved the plan with 93.65% votes, emphasizing that NCLAT overstepped its jurisdiction by modifying the plan. Recoveries from avoidance transactions under Sections 43, 45, and 50 were allocated to the CoC, while proceeds from fraudulent trading under Section 66 were assigned to Piramal. Appeals by fixed deposit holders, non-convertible debenture holders (including 63 Moons Technologies), and former promoter Kapil Wadhawan, challenging the distribution mechanism and valuation, were dismissed, as the plan complied with RBI and NHB regulations. The NCLT was directed to decide pending avoidance applications afresh. (Para 102) Piramal Capital and Housing Finance Ltd. v. 63 Moons Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 374 : 2025 INSC 421

Section 7 - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 18 - Acknowledgement of debt - Article 137 of 1st schedule to Limitation Act - NCLAT dismissed application by appellant as time barred, holding that balance sheet did not name creditor and therefore did not qualify as acknowledgment of debt - Whether an entry in the balance sheet for F.Y. 2019-20 constituted a valid acknowledgment of debt under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in context of section 7 of IBC – Held, an acknowledgment must relate to a present subsisting liability and indicate jural relationship between parties with an intention to admit such relationship - Intention can be inferred by implication from the admission's nature and surrounding circumstances can be considered - Entries in balance sheets, financial statements of previous years constitute a valid acknowledgement of debt - Even if the name of creditor is not mentioned, still the balance sheets can qualify as acknowledgements under section 18 and it extends period of limitation - Section 238A of IBC makes Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to proceedings under the Code with Article 137 governing 3 year limitation period from the date the right to apply accrues - Appeal allowed. [Paras 22, 33-38, 41] IL & FS Financial Services v. Adhunik Meghalaya Steels, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 753 : 2025 INSC 911

Section 7 & 5 - Financial creditor - Homebuyer v. Speculative Investor – Held, a genuine homebuyer under the IBC is one who intends to take physical possession of the residential unit, whereas a 'speculative investor' is one who enters a transaction with the sole purpose of generating profits and no intention to obtain possession - the determination of whether an allottee is a speculative investor is a factual inquiry guided by the parties intent, considering factors like the nature of the contract, number of units purchased and presence of assured returns or buy-back clauses - Schemes with assured returns, compulsory buybacks, or excessive exit options are in reality 'finality derivatives masquerading as housing contracts. [Paras 18-20] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110

Section 7(5)(b) Proviso - Application for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by a financial creditor -Rejection for incompleteness - Mandatory requirement of notice to the applicant to rectify the defect within seven days of receipt of such notice prior to rejection - Held that Notice issued by the Joint Registrar of the NCLT under Rule 28 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 (general scrutiny/defect removal provision) is insufficient and cannot substitute the specific, mandatory notice required under the proviso to Section 7(5)(b) of the IBC - The notice under the IBC must be given to the applicant itself to rectify the defect in the application within seven days of the receipt of such notice - Service on an authorised representative, while permissible under Rule 38(5) of the NCLT Rules, was held insufficient to satisfy the mandate of the IBC in this context, as the IBC is the substantive legislation. [Relied on Dena Bank vs. C. Shivakumar Reddy and another, (2021) 10 SCC 330; Paras 11-16] Livein Aqua Solutions v. HDFC Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1135 : 2025 INSC 1349

Section 79 (15) - "excluded debts" - Damages awarded by NCDRC for deficiency in service fall under "excluded debts" under Section 79(15) of IBC, thus not covered by moratorium. The definition of "excluded debts" under Section 79(15) of the IBC, which includes fines and statutory penalties, reinforces that such liabilities remain enforceable despite an ongoing insolvency process. (Para 32 & 33) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2025 INSC 314 : (2025) 4 SCC 629

Section 8 and 9 - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Pre-existing Dispute - Moonshine Defence - Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT judgment which had dismissed an operational creditor's Section 9 application on the grounds of a "pre-existing dispute" - Held that a dispute must be "substantial and not mere moonshine" to warrant rejection of a CIRP application - In this case, the Corporate Debtor (CD) had explicitly confirmed its ledger account showing a debt of  shortly before the demand notice - The CD continued making payments even after raising minor grievances in correspondence, which negated the existence of a bona fide dispute - Clarified that the adjudicating authority must "separate the grain from the chaff" and reject spurious or illusory defenses. Saraswati Wire and Cable Industries v. Mohammad Moinuddin Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1200 : 2025 INSC 1410

Sections 8 and 9 - Operational creditor (Visa Coke Limited) supplied coke to corporate debtor (Mesco Kalinga Steel Limited) and issued demand notice dated 31.03.2021 under Section 8 IBC to debtor's KMP at registered office, claiming unpaid operational debt. Debtor neither repaid nor disputed debt within 10 days. Operational creditor filed Section 9 petition before NCLT, which dismissed it holding notice invalid as not addressed directly to corporate debtor. NCLAT upheld dismissal. During pendency, debtor sought settlement (unfruitful) but showed no prejudice from service on KMP. Operational creditor appealed to Supreme Court. Held, Section 8 mandates delivery of demand notice to "corporate debtor" but does not prescribe mode; service on KMP at registered office, addressed in official capacity and demanding payment from debtor, achieves statutory object without procedural irregularity causing prejudice. Notice deemed served on corporate debtor. Technical rejection of Section 9 petition unsustainable; appeal allowed. (Paras 14-18) Visa Coke v. Mesco Kalinga Steel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 505 : 2025 INSC 597 : (2025) 9 SCC 461

Sections 8 and 9 - Purpose of notice - to afford opportunity to corporate debtor to repay operational debt or raise genuine dispute - is fulfilled where notice explicitly demands payment from corporate debtor and no prejudice is demonstrated by debtor due to mode of service. Substantive rights of operational creditor ought not to be defeated on mere technicalities. NCLT/NCLAT orders rejecting Section 9 petition on ground of non-service directly on corporate debtor set aside; matter remanded to NCLT for adjudication on merits. (Para 14) Visa Coke v. Mesco Kalinga Steel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 505 : 2025 INSC 597 : (2025) 9 SCC 461

Sections 8 and 9 - Service of demand notice under Section 8 on Key Managerial Personnel (KMP) of corporate debtor at its registered office - Validity of – Held, Delivery of demand notice under Section 8 to KMP of corporate debtor, in their official capacity at registered office, constitutes substantial compliance with statutory requirement and amounts to deemed service, thereby validly triggering insolvency resolution process under Section 9. (Para 14) Visa Coke v. Mesco Kalinga Steel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 505 : 2025 INSC 597 : (2025) 9 SCC 461

Section 9 - Delay in filing application – Held that NCLAT erred in attributing delay to the operational creditor for waiting from August 2021 to February 2023 to file the Section 9 application - Supreme Court noted that a separate CIRP was already active against the CD during this period, and the creditor had correctly attempted to lodge its claim with the then-Interim Resolution Professional - The creditor filed its own application only after a withdrawal application was moved in the earlier CIRP - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mobilox Innovations Private Limited vs. Kirusa Software Private Limited (2018) 1 SCC 353; IBA Health (India) Private Limited vs. Info-Drive Systems Sdn. Bhd. (2010) 10 SCC 553; Tata Consultancy Services Limited vs. SK Wheels Private Limited (2022) 2 SCC 583; Paras 10-20] Saraswati Wire and Cable Industries v. Mohammad Moinuddin Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1200 : 2025 INSC 1410

Section 14 & 17 - Where the cause of action for an offence under Section 138 NI Act arises after the imposition of a moratorium under Section 14 IBC, proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act cannot be initiated against the Director of the Corporate Debtor. Upon the imposition of a moratorium and the appointment of an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) under Section 17 of the IBC, the management of the Corporate Debtor vests in the IRP, and the powers of the Board of Directors are suspended. Consequently, the Director lacks the capacity to fulfil the demand raised by a notice under Section 138 NI Act. The judgment in P. Mohan Raj v. M/s Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258 is distinguishable, as in that case, the cause of action under Section 138 NI Act arose before the imposition of the moratorium. Proceedings under section 138 of the NI Act are quashed, when the cause of action arises after the imposition of moratorium, and the director of the company has been suspended from his duties, and the IRP has taken over the management of the company. (Para 11 - 13) Vishnoo Mittal v. Shakti Trading Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2025 INSC 346 : AIR 2025 SC 1741 : (2025) 9 SCC 417

Section 14 and 96 - Distinction between the moratorium applicable to a corporate debtor under Section 14 of the IBC and the interim moratorium applicable to individuals and personal guarantors under Section 96 of the IBC - The former is much broader in scope and stays all proceedings against the corporate debtor, including execution and enforcement actions. However, Section 96 of the IBC is more limited in its scope, staying only "legal actions or proceedings in respect of any debt." Unlike corporate insolvency proceedings, where the goal is a comprehensive resolution of the company's liabilities, individual insolvency proceedings are designed primarily for restructuring personal debts and providing relief to the debtor. The legislative intent behind limiting the scope of the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC must be respected, and a blanket stay on all regulatory penalties would result in defeating the objectives of consumer protection laws. (Para 30) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2025 INSC 314 : (2025) 4 SCC 629

Sections 14, 238 - Moratorium under Section 14 of IBC does not bar property attachments under the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (MPID Act). The MPID Act, enacted under the State List, enables recovery for victims of financial fraud through asset attachment, and such vesting with the State Competent Authority is unaffected by the IBC moratorium. No inconsistency exists between the IBC and MPID Act, negating claims of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution. Arising from the 2013 NSEL scam involving ₹5,600 crore in defaults, the case involved a challenge to property attachments under the MPID Act during an IBC moratorium. The Court, exercising its powers under Article 142, upheld the actions of a Supreme Court appointed Committee in executing decrees and distributing proceeds from attached properties to ensure equitable distribution to depositors, despite the IBC moratorium. Section 238 of the IBC was held inapplicable due to the absence of conflict between the two statutes. (Paras 48, 51, 52) National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2025 INSC 694 : (2025) 8 SCC 393

Sections 30(2) and 33(1) - the Supreme Court set aside the approval of JSW Steel Ltd.'s resolution plan for the corporate debtor, Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. (BPSL), holding it illegal, non-compliant with Section 30(2) IBC, and vitiated by the Resolution Professional's (RP) dereliction of statutory duties and the Committee of Creditors' (CoC) failure to exercise commercial wisdom. The Court ordered immediate liquidation of BPSL under Section 33(1) IBC, invoking Article 142 of the Constitution to prevent further abuse of process. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

Sections 31, 32A, 60, 61 – Companies Act, 2013 – Sections 408, 410 – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Provisional attachment of assets – Jurisdiction of NCLT/NCLAT – Judicial review under public law – Interference with statutory authorities – Held, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), being creatures of the Companies Act, 2013, and exercising circumscribed jurisdiction under the IBC, lack the power to review or interfere with actions of statutory authorities like the Enforcement Directorate (ED) under the PMLA, which operates in the realm of public law. Such interference, including staying provisional attachment orders post-approval of a resolution plan under Section 32A IBC or declaring investigations abated, exceeds their statutory mandate and renders findings coram non judice. The phrase "arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution" in Section 60(5)(c) IBC does not encompass judicial review of public law decisions by government or statutory bodies. [Referred: Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 13 SCC 308, Para 27, 30] Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

Section 31 - Contempt of Court - JSW Steel Ltd., successful resolution applicant (SRA) for a corporate debtor under IBC, faced demand notices from Chhattisgarh tax authorities for pre-resolution plan dues (GST and other taxes) despite NCLT approval of the plan under Section 31. Authorities had not filed claims during resolution process and were aware of binding precedent in Ghanshyam Mishra and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd., (2021) 9 SCC 657 (covering JSW's case). JSW filed contempt petition alleging willful disobedience. Whether issuance of demand notices for extinguished pre-plan statutory claims post-NCLT approval amounts to contempt, and whether authorities entitled to benefit of doubt despite non-participation in NCLT proceedings. Held; Reaffirming Ghanshyam Mishra, all stakeholder claims (including statutory dues to Central/State governments or local authorities) not part of approved resolution plan stand extinguished from approval date; no proceedings can continue or initiate thereon. Echoing Essar Steel, (2020) 8 SCC 531 SRA cannot face "undecided" post-approval claims, as all must be submitted to RP/CoC for finality. Demands were "totally contemptuous" as authorities proceeded despite notice of binding precedent; non-participation in NCLT does not exempt binding effect of approved plan. However, accepting unconditional apology and good faith contention (first post-Ghanshyam Mishra enforcement case), no punishment imposed; benefit of doubt extended. Demand notices and recovery proceedings quashed; petition disposed. (Para 17, 22, 27) JSW Steel v. Pratishtha Thakur Haritwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2025 INSC 401 : (2025) 9 SCC 673

Section 31(1) – Effect of Resolution Plan Approval - Post-Resolution Income Tax Demand - Held, once a Resolution Plan is approved by the Adjudicating Authority, all claims not included therein, including statutory dues owed to the Central Government, stand extinguished. (Para 8) Vaibhav Goel v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 330 : 2025 INSC 375 : (2025) 8 SCC 511

Section 31(4) proviso - Approval of the resolution plan - A resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, containing a proposed combination (a merger or amalgamation of entities), should only be placed before the Committee of Creditors (CoC), after it has been approved by the Competition Commission of India (CCI). Independent Sugar Corporation v. Girish Sriram Juneja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Section 31(4) proviso - Mandatory Nature of CCI Approval - Literal Interpretation - Whether the approval of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) for a proposed combination must be obtained prior to the approval of a resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) under Section 31(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016. Whether the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC, which mandates CCI approval before CoC approval, is mandatory or directory. Held, the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC is mandatory, requiring CCI approval for combinations before the CoC approves the resolution plan. The legislative intent was to ensure that combinations do not adversely affect competition, and thus, prior CCI approval is essential. The Court rejected the purposive interpretation argued by AGI Greenpac and upheld a literal interpretation of the proviso, stating that the language is clear and unambiguous. The Court noted that the proviso creates an exception for combinations, requiring stricter compliance. Independent Sugar Corporation v. Girish Sriram Juneja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Section 31(4) proviso - Procedural Lapses - Consequences of Non-Compliance - Whether procedural lapses in the CCI's approval process, including the failure to issue a show cause notice to the target company, vitiate the approval of the combination. The Court found that the CCI's failure to issue a show cause notice to the target company (HNGIL) was a procedural lapse. However, it did not vitiate the CCI's approval, as the Resolution Professional (RP) did not object to the process. The Court set aside the approval of AGI Greenpac's resolution plan, as it was approved by the CoC without the requisite CCI approval. The Court directed the CoC to reconsider INSCO's resolution plan and any other plans that had obtained CCI approval as of the date of the CoC's original approval. Independent Sugar Corporation v. Girish Sriram Juneja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Section 31(4) proviso - The appeal arose from the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of Hindustan National Glass and Industries Ltd. (HNGIL), a major player in the glass packaging industry. AGI Greenpac Ltd., the successful resolution applicant, proposed a combination with HNGIL, which would result in a significant market share in the glass packaging industry, raising concerns of an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC). The appellant, Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. (INSCO), challenged the approval of AGI Greenpac's resolution plan, arguing that the CCI's approval was not obtained prior to the CoC's approval, as required under the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) held that while CCI approval is mandatory, the requirement to obtain it prior to CoC approval is directory, not mandatory. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC is mandatory, and CCI approval must be obtained before the CoC approves a resolution plan containing a combination. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory timelines and procedural requirements to ensure the integrity of the insolvency resolution process and competition law. The Court underscored the importance of maintaining a balance between the objectives of the IBC and the Competition Act, ensuring that the resolution process does not distort market dynamics. The Court highlighted that conditional approvals, such as the divestment of assets, must be rigorously monitored to prevent anti-competitive practices. The Court reiterated that procedural safeguards are non-negotiable and must be strictly followed to ensure fairness and transparency in the regulatory process. Independent Sugar Corporation v. Girish Sriram Juneja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Section 61 - National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) Rules; 2016 - Rule 22 - The incident which triggers the running of the limitation period under the IBC is the date of pronouncement of the Order and in case of non-pronouncement of the Order when the hearing concludes, the date on which the Order is pronounced or uploaded on the website. Where the judgment was pronounced in open Court, the period of limitation starts running from that very day. However, the party is entitled to exclude the period, as per Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act 1963, during which the certified copy of the order was under preparation on an application filed by that party. When a party does not apply for certified copy, the period of limitation would start from the very next day of pronouncement of the order as the date of the pronouncement of order is excluded as per Section 61. Exemption from filing of certified copy cannot be claimed as a matter of right in terms of the statutory requirements of the Rules. The benefit of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is available only on an application for grant of certified copy of the Order having been filed till the date of preparation of the said certified copy. Since no such steps have been taken by the appellant for applying the certified copy, the appeal was beyond limitation. (Para 24 - 27) A. Rajendra v. Gonuganta Madhusudhan Rao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 392 : 2025 INSC 447

Section 61(2) - Condonation of Delay - Limitation - Hyper-technical Approach - Foreign Company – Held, while timelines under the IBC are crucial, a hyper-technical approach by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) can lead to undue delays, defeating the purpose of the Code. In a case where an appeal was e-filed within the permissible 15-day condonation period under Section 61(2) of the IBC, but the hard copy was filed after a weekend holiday, the delay adequately explained. The appellant's status as a foreign company, the NCLAT should have exercised discretion and condoned the delay. The Court set aside the NCLAT's order rejecting the condonation of delay and directed the NCLAT to proceed with hearing the appeal on merits. (Para 2, 5 & 6) Power Infrastructure India v. Power Finance Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Section 61(2) - The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) lacks jurisdiction to condone delays in filing appeals beyond the 45-day limit (30 days + 15 days condonable) prescribed under Section 61(2) of the IBC. The limitation period commences from the date of order pronouncement, rejecting the respondent's contention that it began later due to disclosure to the stock exchange. The appeal, filed on 24.05.2022, was time-barred as it exceeded the 45-day limit ending on 22.05.2022, with no relief under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the initial 30-day period ended on a working day (07.05.2022). NCLAT cannot condone delays beyond 15 days, even on equitable grounds, to uphold the IBC's time-bound appellate framework. The appeal was allowed, reinforcing the strict limitation regime under the IBC. [Relied on: Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd., (2021) 10 SCC 401 (Paras 10-13) Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 542 : (2025) 9 SCC 483

Section 62 – Appeal - Section 14 - Moratorium - IBC Moratorium doesn't bar voluntary surrender of corporate debtor's leased property to lessor if retaining the asset is deemed unviable and the Committees of Creditors (CoC) endorses decision - Held that commercial wisdom of the CoC should be given primacy during CIRP (Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process) - this case was distinguished from a simple recovery of property barred by Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC, as the CoC and Resolution Professional themselves desired to return the property due to adverse financial implications of retaining it - The respondent was stalling the process for “undisclosed and extraneous reasons” - Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC states that once the adjudicating authority, by order, declares a moratorium, it would prohibit, amongst other acts, the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or is in the possession of the corporate debtor - Set aside NCLAT's order and restored NCLT's order. [Paras 9, 10] Sincere Securities v. Chandrakant Khemka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 774 : 2025 INSC 931

Section 62 - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Proceedings (CIRP) - The Supreme Court quashed the NCLT and NCLAT judgments approving the Resolution Plan and directed initiation of liquidation proceedings - It was held that the Resolution Plan was not in conformity with statutory provisions, particularly Sections 30(2) and 31(2) of the IBC - The Court clarified the concept of "person aggrieved" under Section 61 of the IBC, including personal guarantors and erstwhile promoters, who have locus standi to challenge Resolution Plans - Held the strict timelines mandated by Section 12 of the IBC for completion of CIRP to avoid delays that frustrate the Code's objective of timely insolvency resolution - The Court reiterated the non-justiciability of the commercial wisdom of CoCs (Committee of Creditors) in approving Resolution Plans - Supreme Court held that the CoC loses authority upon approval of the Resolution Plan by the Adjudicating Authority, and the "erstwhile CoC" has no statutory recognition postapproval. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 954 : 2025 INSC 1165

Section 62 - Whether the claim of appellants which was verified and included in the list of creditors, should be treated as 'belated claimants' under Clause 18.4 of the Resolution Plan, entitling them to only a 50% refund and whether they are entitled to possession of their apartment – Held, once a claim is verified and admitted by the Resolution Professional (RP), it cannot be treated as 'belated' to deny substantive relief under a resolution plan - Noted that central issue did not hinge on whether the appellants initial physical claim was validly filed on Jan 11, 2019 - the undisputed fact was that the appellants' claim was resubmitted on February 7, 2020 and was subsequently verified by the Resolution Professional and included in the published list of financial creditors - Once a claim is verified and incorporated into the list of creditors, it gains full legal recognition within the CIRP - The appellants' case did not fall under Clause 18.4 of Resolution Plan, which is a 'residuary' clause for claims that were not filed, not verified, or not communicated to the resolution applicant - Since the appellant's claim was verified and admitted, it was to be treated under Clause 18.4(ii) read with Clause 18.4 (vi)(a), which applies to allottees with verified and admitted claims and provides for the delivery of possession or an equivalent alternative unit - The Resolution Plan itself distinguishes between verified claims and belated or unverified claims- Relegating the appellants, who had paid a substantial amount and had their claim admitted, to the status of a mere refund claimant would be a misapplication of the plan and would undermine the purpose of the IBC - It would be unjust to deny possession to bona fide homebuyers who have paid a significant amount and had their claim duly verified and admitted - Appeal allowed and directed Resolution applicant to execute the conveyance deed and hand over possession of the flat to the appellants. [Paras 32 - 38] Amit Nehra v. Pawan Kumar Garg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 882 : 2025 INSC 1086

Section 95 and 96 - Whether the execution of penalty orders imposed by the NCDRC can be stayed during an interim moratorium under IBC. The appellant, a real estate developer, faced multiple penalties (27 in total) imposed by the NCDRC for failing to deliver possession of residential units to homebuyers within the agreed timeline. The appellant sought a stay on the penalty proceedings, citing an interim moratorium triggered under Section 96 of the IBC due to insolvency proceedings initiated against them under Section 95 of the IBC. The NCDRC rejected the application, holding that consumer claims and penalties do not fall within the moratorium under the IBC. Held, regulatory penalties imposed under the Consumer Protection Act for non-compliance with consumer rights do not fall 2 within the scope of the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC. The decision reinforces the distinction between debt recovery proceedings and regulatory actions, ensuring that consumer protection mechanisms remain effective even during insolvency proceedings. (Para 37) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2025 INSC 314 : (2025) 4 SCC 629

Section 96 - Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 27 – Penalties imposed by the NCDRC are regulatory and punitive in nature, aimed at ensuring compliance with consumer protection laws, and do not fall within the definition of "debt" under the IBC. The interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC applies only to debts and does not extend to regulatory penalties or criminal proceedings. The Court distinguished between civil debt recovery proceedings and regulatory penalties, emphasizing that the latter serve a public interest function and cannot be stayed under the IBC moratorium. The Court rejected the appellant's reliance on precedents related to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, noting that penalties under the Consumer Protection Act are distinct and serve a different purpose. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was directed to comply with the NCDRC's penalty orders. (Para 29, 38, 40) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2025 INSC 314 : (2025) 4 SCC 629

Insurance Law

Contract of Insurance is a contract of uberrima fides (utmost good faith) – Held, the proposer is not under a duty to disclose facts which he did not know and which he could not reasonably be expected to know at the material time - An exclusion clause in the policy is to be construed in a manner that it does not defeat the main purpose of the contract and could even be read down to serve the main purpose of the policy that is to indemnify the policy holder - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Canara Bank vs. United India Insurance Company Limited and Ors. (2020) 3 SCC 455; Para 24, 25-30] Kopargaon Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd v. National Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1100 : 2025 INSC 1315

Exclusion Clause - Boiler & Pressure Plant Insurance Policy - Burden of Proof – Held, a subsequent discovery of damage or corrosion cannot be used to repudiate the claim as it would defeat the main purpose of the insurance contract - In the absence of a stand that the boiler and its parts had a prescribed life and had outlived it, or that there was a failure on the part of the insured in making full and complete disclosure, making the contract voidable, exclusion clause 5 could not have been pressed into service to repudiate the claim of the insured - The burden of proof to bring the case within the exclusionary clause lies on the insurance company - When an insurer accepts the risk, it can repudiate the claim on limited grounds such as: (a) by pleading and proving that there was a failure on the part of the insured in making disclosure of a material fact which renders the contract voidable at the instance of the insurer; and (b) by demonstrating that the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance exclude such claims. [Paras 20-25, 33-39] Kopargaon Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd v. National Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1100 : 2025 INSC 1315

Fire Insurance Policy - Accidental Fire – Held, once it is established that the loss is due to fire and there is no allegation/finding of fraud or that the Insured is the instigator of the fire, the cause of fire is immaterial, and it must be assumed and presumed that the fire is accidental and falls within the scope of the fire policy. The precise cause of a fire remains immaterial, provided the claimant is not the instigator of the fire - The final Surveyor's conclusion that the fire was not accidental was held to be incorrect, especially when the report did not conclude that the fire fell within the exception/exclusion clause or that the Insured caused the fire, fraud, or intentional damage -The final Surveyor's report was found to be perverse and to have misdirected itself in law for: i. Failing to deal with the 5,855 pages of documents provided by the Insured; ii. Ignoring the Cost Sheets for each item maintained in the regular course of business, which tallied with primary documents like purchase orders; iii. Arbitrarily assigning a uniform average unit price of ₹450/- for all identifiable damaged stock (e.g., leather jacket, leather belt, polyester lining), without considering the nature of the stock or the value of non-identifiable (charred) goods. [Relied on New India Assurance Company Limited and Others vs. Mudit Roadways, (2024) 3 SCC 193; Paras 32-43] National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Orion Conmerx Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1047 : 2025 INSC 1271

Insurance Policy - Interpretation of - Coverage of 'FFF' – Held, the phrase 'FFF' under the head "Description of Risk" in the policy clearly means Furniture, Fixtures, and Fittings, and the Insured was entitled to the claim amount under this head, contrary to the Surveyor and National Commission's view - Coverage provisions should be interpreted broadly, and in case of ambiguity, the same should be resolved in favour of the Insured - The exclusion clauses must be read narrowly - It is settled law that the contract of fire insurance is a contract to indemnify the Insured against loss by fire, the court said, while specifying the following rules to determine whether in a particular case, the loss is caused by fire: a) There must be an actual fire; hence mere heating or fermentation will not be sufficient to render the insurers liable for loss occasioned thereby; b) There must be something on fire which ought not to have been on fire; c) There must be something in the nature of an accident, but a fire occasioned by the wilful act of a third person without the consent of the Insured, is to be regarded as accidental for the purpose of this rule - If these requisites are satisfied, any loss attributable to the fire, whether by actual burning or otherwise, is within the contract - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Canara Bank vs. United India Insurance Company Limited and Others, (2020) 3 SCC 455; Paras 44-60] National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Orion Conmerx Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1047 : 2025 INSC 1271

Insurance claim cannot be denied for breach of impossible condition. An insurance company cannot reject a claim on the grounds of breach of a condition in the contract that was impossible to fulfill. (Para 18 & 20) Sohom Shipping v. New India Assurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2025 INSC 453

Life Insurance - Repudiation of Claim - Non-Disclosure of Material Facts - Duty of Insured - Uberrima Fides - Whether non-disclosure of existing life insurance policies by the insured justifies repudiation of a claim under a life insurance policy. Held, insurance contracts are founded on the principle of uberrima fides (utmost good faith), obligating the insured to disclose all material facts that could influence a prudent insurer's decision to accept the risk. Non-disclosure of material facts may justify claim repudiation, but materiality is assessed on a case-by-case basis. In this case, the insured disclosed a life insurance policy of Rs. 40 Lakhs but omitted other policies totaling Rs. 2.3 Lakhs. The non-disclosed policies were of negligible value and did not constitute material facts affecting the insurer's decision to issue the policy. The policy in question was a life insurance cover, and the insured's death resulted from an accident unrelated to the non-disclosed policies. Thus, the non-disclosure did not warrant repudiation. The insurer, aware of the insured's ability to pay premiums for a higher-sum policy (Rs. 40 Lakhs), issued the present policy (Rs. 25 Lakhs) with confidence in the insured's financial capacity. The repudiation was unjustified. The Court directed the insurer to release all policy benefits with 9% per annum interest to the appellant. The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the State and National Consumer Commissions were set aside. [Distinguished: Reliance Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod, (2019) 6 SCC 175; Para 12, 18, 19] Mahaveer Sharma v. Exide Life Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2025 INSC 268

Insurance Policy - Suppression of Material Facts - Exclusion Clause - Hospital Cash Benefit Policy - Repudiation of Claim - Chronic Alcoholism – Pre-existing Condition – Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums - The Supreme Court allowed an appeal by the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) against an order of the NCDRC which had upheld the decisions of the State and District Consumer Forums directing LIC to compensate the respondent-claimants under the “Jeevan Arogya” hospital cash benefit policy. The deceased insured, a chronic alcoholic, had suppressed this fact in the proposal form, answering “No” to questions regarding alcohol consumption. Following his hospitalization and death due to complications linked to chronic liver disease and cardiac arrest, LIC repudiated the claim under Clause 7(xi) of the policy, which excludes coverage for conditions arising from alcohol misuse. Held, the lower forums erred in interpreting the policy terms and the exclusion clause, as the deceased's chronic alcoholism was a material fact directly related to his hospitalization and death. Overruling the NCDRC's reliance on Sulbha Prakash Motegaoneker v. LIC, the Court clarified that suppression of a pre-existing condition justifies repudiation if it is linked to the cause of death. The appeal was allowed, the NCDRC order was set aside, and the repudiation upheld. However, considering the respondents' hardships and payments already made (approximately ₹3,00,000), the Court directed that no recovery of these amounts be sought, though no further payments were to be made. (Para 16 – 21) Life Insurance Corporation v. Sunita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 346

Vehicle Insurance - Insurance Policy Condition - Crane Accident - Insured Premises - Absurd Condition - Substantial Justice - Held, a condition in an insurance policy limiting liability to accidents occurring solely within the insured's premises is absurd, especially for a vehicle like a crane, typically used at construction sites. The appellant had insured a Tata Hitachi Heavy Duty Crane, which was damaged in an accident in 2007 at Tata Steel's powerhouse in Jamshedpur. The insurer rejected the claim, citing the policy condition that the accident occurred outside the insured's premises. Both the Commercial Court and the High Court upheld the rejection. The Supreme Court criticized the parties for overlooking this impractical condition at the time of insuring the crane and noted the insurer's delay in communicating the rejection. To ensure substantial justice, the Court directed the insurer to pay Rs. 40–45 lakh, including taxes, to settle the claim. The appeal was accordingly disposed of. (Para 21, 22, 24) Tarapore and Co v. United India Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 231

Interest

Interest on delayed payments to small scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (1993 Act) - If purchase/supply order pre-dates the enactment of the 1993 Act, then interest is governed by section 34 CPC and not the 1993 Act, which operates prospectively - The Act is considered retroactive in the sense that if goods are supplied after its enforcement, the supplier is entitled to the benefit of statutory protection for interest, even if the agreement was entered into prior to the Act's enforcement - The Act mandates payment of compound interest with monthly interests at the rate mentioned in Section 4 - Set aside order of High Court citing miscarriage of justice and excessive interest calculation - Appeals Allowed. [Paras 31-35] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928

Interpretation of Statues

Interpretation of Statutes - Statutory Interpretation - Harmonious Construction - Purposive Construction - Non-obstante Clause - A statute must be read as a whole and one provision construed with reference to others to achieve a consistent enactment, avoiding inconsistency or repugnancy - Courts should harmonize conflicting provisions - A construction that renders a provision futile or a 'useless lumber' is to be avoided - non-obstante clause operates only in case of a conflict to give enacting part an overriding effect, not otherwise - If the enacting part and non-obstante clause can be read harmoniously, they should be. [Paras 9.2-9.6] Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 783 : 2025 INSC 946

Interpretation - Legislation by incorporation and Legislation by Reference - Legislation by incorporation - the provisions of the original act, once specified become an integral and independent part of the subsequent act, meaning only the provisions as they existed on the date of incorporation are applicable and subsequent amendments are not automatically carried - Legislation by reference - applying the law as it exists on the date of application, including any subsequent modification - Court applied the principle of “legislation by incorporation” for section 28A of the SEBI Act, thereby considering the provisions of Income Tax Act as they stood at the time of incorporation. [Paras 9.6, 9.9] Jaykishor Chaturvedi v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 730 : 2025 INSC 846

Inversion Test - Ratio decidendi - propositions of law that were necessary to decide on the issues between the parties are binding - to determine whether a particular proposition of law is part of the ratio decidendi of the case, the proposition is to be inversed - it means that proposition is hypothetically removed from judgment or it is assumed that proposition is hypothetically removed or reversed - if after that reversal or removal, if the decision of the Court would remain the same, then the observations cannot be regarded as the ratio decidendi of the case. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. Utility Users' Welfare Association (2018) 6 SCC 21; Para 47,50-52, 58] Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Nirmala Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2025 INSC 843

Joint and inseverable decrees' - 'Contradictory or inconsistent decrees'- Whether a decree is joint and inseverable or joint must be decided for the purposes of abatement of entire appeal, only with reference to the fact as to whether the judgment/decree passed in proceedings vis the remaining parties would suffer the consequences of contradictory or inconsistent decrees - A decree can be said to be contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when two decrees are incapable of enforcement or would be mutually self-destructive and enforcement of one would negate or render impossible the enforcement of the other. [Relied on Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra by LRs and Ors. V. Pramod Gupta and Ors. (2003) 3 SCC 272; Para 17] Suresh Chandra v. Parasram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 728 : 2025 INSC 873

A statutory provision must be interpreted harmoniously to avoid rendering any part of the statute nugatory. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019

Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Permit for Resettlement in (or Permanent Return) to the State Act, 1982 - Constitutional Validity of – Held, the issue of its constitutionality no longer survives as the Act was never enforced and was repealed by the Act, 2019. The 1982 Act, enacted to permit pre-1954 state subjects who migrated to Pakistan after 1947 to return to Jammu and Kashmir, was stayed by the Supreme Court in 2002 and never came into force. The Act was repealed under Section 95(2) read with Section 96 and Table-3 of the Fifth Schedule of the Act, 2019. An affidavit filed by the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir confirmed that no Competent Authority was notified under the 1982 Act, and thus, no benefits were conferred under it. The challenge to the Act's constitutionality became infructuous due to its repeal. Writ petitions disposed of as the 1982 Act was repealed and never enforced. (Para 15) Jammu & Kashmir National Panthers Party v.. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 594

Judicial Review

It is not available at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker and a 'quia timet' action would not be permissible - Interference is generally not permissible at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings - An exception is made for cases where disqualification or suspension is imposed during the pendency of the proceedings and such action is likely to have grave, immediate, and irreversible repercussions and consequences. [Paras 34, 51, 80, 81].Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 755 : 2025 INSC 912 : AIR 2025 SC 3618

Judiciary

Civil Judge Appointments – Candidates denied appointment for submitting category certificates beyond the cut-off date - Advertisement silent on certificate issuance date – Held, the Advertisement appears to be silent on the aspect of last date of issuance of valid category certificate, however, clause (i) and (iii) of paragraph 6 explicitly provide that the candidates from concerned categories therein were to furnish certificate issued by the competent authority as per rules. Clauses 1 and 2 of paragraph 18 clarified that candidates should only apply under a said category if they meet all the eligibility conditions as per the Advertisement. The Subsequent Notice, which was issued by the High Court on 04.08.2022, cannot be said to be arbitrary or without any basis. It specified that the certificate belonging to the concerned reserved category should have been issued prior or upto 31.08.2021 i.e. the last date of receipt of the application in pursuance to the Advertisement. This was because the Advertisement required a candidate to possess eligibility upto the cut-off date. Thus, the Subsequent Notice issued was in consonance with law and as per the Advertisement, applicable Rules, instructions and circulars issued by the competent authority. The plea of the appellants is unsustainable and deserves to be rejected. No relaxation can be granted in the given facts and circumstances of the case nor can it be claimed as a matter of right in the absence of any such discretionary clause in the Advertisement/Rules/Instructions. Appeal dismissed. (Para 26 & 36) Sakshi Arha v. Rajasthan High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2025 INSC 463 : AIR 2025 SC 2232

Constitution of India - Referring to any court as a "Lower Court" or its records as "Lower Court Record" (LCR) is contrary to the ethos of the Constitution. The Supreme Court directed that Trial Court records be referred to as "Trial Court Record" (TCR), reiterating its order dated 8 February 2024 and the subsequent Registry circular dated 28 February 2024. (Para 25) Sakhawat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 626 : 2025 INSC 777

Constitution of India, Article 142 - Writ petition seeking guidelines for judicial recusal - Held, recusal is a matter of judicial discretion and Article 142 cannot be invoked to frame such guidelines. Chandraprabha v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 648

Court Managers - The concept of Court Managers was introduced by the 13th Finance Commission to assist judges in administrative functions and case management at district, sessions, and High Court levels, with similar recommendations from the Second National Judicial Pay Commission (SNJPC). Despite prior directions in the same proceedings (judgment dated August 2, 2018) to frame rules for their service conditions, duties, and regularization, many High Courts and State Governments failed to comply, resulting in Court Managers continuing on contractual or ad-hoc basis, with some services discontinued due to funding shortages. Whether existing Court Managers working on contractual or ad-hoc basis should be regularized, and whether High Courts should frame rules for their recruitment and service conditions to ensure administrative efficiency in the judiciary. Held, the Supreme Court, expressing concern over non-compliance with prior directions, directed the regularization of all existing Court Managers (subject to suitability tests) with effect from their initial appointment, without entitlement to salary arrears. High Courts were mandated to frame/amend recruitment rules modeled on the Assam Rules of 2018, with State Governments required to approve them within three months. Court Managers were to be classified as Class II gazetted officers, working under specified supervision, with duties ensuring no overlap with those of Registrars. Directions: 1. All High Courts to frame/amend rules on recruitment and service conditions of Court Managers, using Assam Rules of 2018 as model, and submit to State Governments within 3 months (with liberty for suitable changes). 2. State Governments to approve rules within 3 months. 3. Minimum classification as Class II gazetted officers for pay, allowances, and benefits. 4. High Court-appointed Court Managers to work under Registrar General's supervision. 5. District Court-appointed Court Managers to work under Registrar/Superintendent of concerned courts. 6. High Court Rules Committees to ensure duties do not overlap with Registrars'. 7. Existing contractual/ad-hoc Court Managers' services to continue and be regularized subject to suitability test under rules. 8. Regularization effective from initial appointment date, entitling continuation of service but no arrears or salary differences. 9. Personal regularization to be completed within 3 months of rule approval. 10. Registrar Generals of High Courts to adhere to timelines. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2025 INSC 713

Court of Records - The Supreme Court has reiterated that High Courts are Courts of Record and that whatever is recorded in their proceedings is presumed to be correct and cannot be contradicted later by parties or counsel- Petition disposed of petition with liberty to file an appropriate application before High Court to address the grievance regarding the unauthorized concession. [Relied on State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & Anr. 1982 2 SCC 463; Para 2-4] Savita v. Satyabhan Dixit, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1096

High Court Rules (Calcutta) - Rule 26 - Roster Allocation - Chief Justice's Power - Judicial Discipline - Division Bench of the High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide a writ petition when the case was not allocated to it by the Chief Justice, who is the master of the roster. The Court reiterated that consent of parties cannot confer jurisdiction, and any adjudication beyond the assigned roster is void. The impugned order of the Division Bench, which had allowed the writ petition, was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration by a bench assigned by the Chief Justice. (Para 7) Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers v. GRSE Workmens Union, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 322 : 2025 INSC 363

In a landmark ruling affirming judicial independence and equality under Article 14, the Supreme Court held that all retired High Court judges are entitled to full and equal pensionary benefits under the "One Rank One Pension" principle, irrespective of their date of appointment, source of entry (district judiciary or Bar), length of service, or status as permanent or additional judges. Discrimination in terminal benefits post-retirement violates constitutional equality, as judges in service receive uniform treatment. The Court issued comprehensive directions: 1. Retired Chief Justices of High Courts shall receive a full pension of ₹15 lakhs per annum. 2. Other retired High Court judges (including additional judges) shall receive ₹13.5 lakhs per annum. 3. Full pension applies regardless of service breaks between district judiciary retirement and High Court elevation. 4. Judges elevated from district judiciary post-introduction of the New Pension Scheme (NPS) are entitled to full pension; States must refund judges' NPS contributions (with accrued dividends) but retain State contributions. 5. Family pension and gratuity extend to widows/widowers or family members of judges dying in harness, without minimum service qualifiers, by aggregating career service periods. 6. All allowances, including leave encashment, pension commutation, and provident fund, shall comply with the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954. The judgment, pronounced by CJI Gavai, emphasizes that post-retirement benefits are essential for judicial dignity, rejecting distinctions based on entry mode or pension schemes. Certain writ petitions by former judges were also considered. In Re Refixation of Pension Considering Service Period in District Judiciary and High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2025 INSC 726

Increase in LDCE Quota - Reduction in Qualifying Service - Accelerated Promotion for Civil Judge (Junior Division) - Restoration of Advocate Practice Requirement - Vacancy Filling and Calculation - Suitability Criteria for Promotion - Directions - The Supreme Court directed all High Courts and State Governments to amend service rules to increase the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) quota for promotion from Civil Judge (Senior Division) to District Judge (Higher Judicial Service) from 10% to 25%. The minimum qualifying service for Civil Judge (Senior Division) to appear in LDCE for promotion to Higher Judicial Service reduced to 3 years, with a total minimum service of 7 years (including Civil Judge (Junior Division) service). 10% of posts in Civil Judge (Senior Division) reserved for accelerated promotion of Civil Judge (Junior Division) through LDCE, with a minimum qualifying service of 3 years. Civil Judge (Junior Division) aspirants must have a minimum of 3 years of practice as an advocate. Unfilled LDCE posts to be filled through regular promotion based on 'merit-cum-seniority' in the same year. Vacancies for LDCE to be calculated based on cadre strength where not already implemented. High Courts and State Governments to frame or amend rules to assess suitability for promotion to Higher Judicial Service based on: Updated knowledge of law, Quality of judgments ACRs of the preceding 5 years, Disposal rate in the preceding 5 years, Performance in viva voce, General perceptions, awareness, and communication skills. All High Courts and State Governments to amend relevant service rules to implement the above changes. Ensure rules are framed or amended to assess candidate suitability for promotion to Higher Judicial Service. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

In-House Inquiry Committee Report – The Writ Petition sought a writ of mandamus to initiate action against the third respondent based on allegations and the In-House Inquiry Committee's report. The report and the third respondent's response were forwarded by the Chief Justice of India to the President and Prime Minister of India. The Court declined to entertain the petition, observing that the petitioners had not sought redressal by filing a representation before the appropriate authorities. Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Supreme Court of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 649

Judges Protection Act, 1985 - Disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated against quasi-judicial officer merely on ground of passing wrong order. Mere "wrong orders" without allegations of corruption, extraneous influence, or dishonesty cannot justify disciplinary proceedings against the officer. (Para 9 & 16) Amresh Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2025 INSC 417

Judicial accountability - Freedom of Press - Sub judice debate - Contempt of Court - Liberal democracy - In a landmark pronouncement affirming the symbiotic relationship between the judiciary and the media in a liberal democracy, the Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court's order directing the removal of a Wikipedia page detailing a defamation suit by Asian News International (ANI) against Wikipedia editors. The High Court had deemed the page "prima facie contemptuous" for reporting the judge's warning that Wikipedia risked shutdown in India absent deletion of allegedly defamatory content against ANI. The Court held that courts, as public institutions, must remain receptive to public discourse, debates, and constructive criticism, including on matters sub judice. Vigorous debate by the public and press on important issues—even pending before courts—is essential for democratic vitality and judicial introspection. The judiciary and media, as foundational pillars of India's constitutional framework, must mutually supplement each other to sustain a thriving liberal democracy. However, critics must refrain from scandalizing the court or judges, warranting contempt action where established (per Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer's principles). Courts cannot proactively censor media by mandating content deletions; such overreach undermines free speech. The ruling echoes the Court's prior observations in the farmers' protests matter, rejecting blanket prohibitions on public protests during sub judice proceedings. Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2025 INSC 656

Judicial Officers' Pay - Directions - Increase of posts of District Judges - Constitution of Committees - Payment of Arrears - Regular Meetings - Clarification on Allowances - The Supreme Court directed the High Courts and State Governments to frame rules regarding the increase of posts of District Judges in the Selection Grade and Super Time Scale categories. All High Courts were directed to constitute Committees for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary within four weeks, with a Nodal Officer appointed to address day-to-day grievances of judicial officers. States were directed to pay arrears to judicial officers, including Special Judicial Magistrates, within three months. The Committees were directed to meet at regular intervals (not exceeding three months) to ensure timely resolution of grievances. The Court clarified that judicial officers are entitled to higher qualification allowances at every ACP stage, irrespective of promotions or ACP benefits. The Court emphasized the importance of timely implementation of its orders and the need for institutional mechanisms to address the service conditions of judicial officers. The directions were issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, binding all State Governments and High Courts to comply. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Officers' Pay - Implementation of Second National Judicial Pay Commission (SNJPC) Recommendations - The Court addressed the non-implementation of the SNJPC recommendations, particularly regarding the payment of super-time scale and selection grade scales for judicial officers, which were approved by the Court in its order dated 19.05.2023. The Court emphasized the need for timely payment of arrears and directed the constitution of Committees for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary (CSCDJ) in each High Court to oversee the implementation of these recommendations. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Officers' Pay - Individual Grievances - Miscellaneous Applications - The Court disposed of several intervention applications and clarified that individual grievances should be addressed by the respective High Courts through the newly constituted Committees. The Court directed the Committee for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary in the High Court of Telangana to address the grievance of a petitioner regarding inadequate pension, in line with the Court's earlier orders. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Officers' Pay - Remuneration for Special Judicial Magistrates - The Court clarified that Special Judicial Magistrates are entitled to a minimum remuneration of Rs. 45,000/- per month, along with a conveyance allowance of Rs. 5,000/- per month, effective from 01.04.2019. The Court directed the State of Andhra Pradesh to pay arrears to these magistrates within three months. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Officers' Pay - Risk Allowance and Higher Qualification Allowance - The Court addressed issues related to the admissibility of risk allowance for judicial officers and clarified that judicial officers are entitled to higher qualification allowances at every Assured Career Progression (ACP) stage, rejecting the argument that such allowances would lead to unjust enrichment. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Proceedings - Held, statements and questions posed in judicial proceedings, even if uncomfortable to the parties, cannot be construed as public humiliation or defamation. Such inquiries are inherent to the court's duty to ascertain the truth and cannot form the basis for collateral challenges absent malice or extraneous motives. Petitioner No. 1, whose habeas corpus petition was dismissed upon her voluntary return home, sought clarification from police regarding their in-court assertion that she had divorced her husband and remarried. The High Court initially entertained the application but later dismissed it as infructuous, rejecting subsequent review petitions. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner claimed open-court humiliation and defamation. The Court dismissed the petition, observing that during court proceedings, many statements are made and questions are posed which may make a person uncomfortable, but all such statements or questions cannot be misconstrued as humiliating a person. After all, it is the duty of the Court to reach the truth of the matter and such exercise may demand putting forward certain questions and suggestions which may be uncomfortable to some. The grievance was deemed "totally misconceived," emphasizing that judicial discourse in pursuit of truth does not equate to actionable harm. Dhanlaxmi @ Sunita Mathuria v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2025 INSC 196

Judicial Review - Contractual Matters – Scope of - Public-private partnerships - Conduct of Formula 4 racing - The High Court had permitted the event subject to several conditions, including financial obligations imposed on the private organizer (RPPL). The Supreme Court partly allowed RPPL's appeal, setting aside directions from the High Court. These directions constituted an impermissible interference with the contractual terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between RPPL and the Sports Development Authority of Tamil Nadu (SDAT). The Court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review in contractual matters involving the State and private entities, particularly in public-private partnerships. It also recognized the State's policy decision to promote motorsports and the benefits of public-private partnerships. The court upheld the High Court's directions regarding public safety and noise control measures. (Para 23) Racing Promotions v. Dr. Harish, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 270 : 2025 INSC 252

Judicial Service - Enhancement of Retirement Age - All India Judges Association Case - Petition filed for seeking enhancement of the retirement age of district judges in Madhya Pradesh to 62 years - M.P. High Court rejected the petition on the grounds that the decision of Apex Court in All India Judges Association Case (2002) does not allow it. Held, there is no impediment in permitting the state of Madhya Pradesh to increase the age of superannuation of judicial officers working in the state of MP to the age of 61 years. Relied on order passed in case of clarification sought by Telangana High Court wherein increase in the age of retirement was allowed citing it is beneficial to the Judicial Officers. If M.P. High Court rules framed by State permits and if High Court takes a decision to enhance the age of retirement to 61 years, the same would be permissible. Directed M.P. High Court on its administrative side to take a decision at its earliest within a period of 3 months. (Para 4 - 6) Madhya Pradesh Judges Association v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 664

Judicial Service Rules, 2023 (Telangana) - Rule 5 (5.1)(a) - Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Telangana Judicial Rule, which mandates that a candidate aspiring for a District Judge appointment must have practised for at least 7 years in the Courts in Telangana - Rule 5(5.1)(a) mandates that candidates for direct recruitment as District Judges must have practiced as Advocates in High Court or Courts under control for not less than 7 years as on the date of notification - Held that 2023 Rules were validly enacted with retrospective effect, the High Court referred exclusively to the Telangana High Court and not others and Petitioners did not meet the 7 year advocate practice requirement - Directed the High Court to declare results and appoint candidates who qualified the examination but did not meet the eligibility criteria as a special case, without monetary benefits or seniority arrears, strictly limited to the facts of the case. [Paras 8-12] Usha Kiran Kshatri v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 957 : 2025 INSC 1169

Judicial Vacancies - Expediting long-pending cases in the Allahabad High Court - The Supreme Court expressed deep concern over the numerous writ petitions seeking expeditious disposal of cases pending for over three decades in the Allahabad High Court. In this particular case, a 95-year-old litigant sought urgent hearing of her Second Appeal pending since 2013. The Court acknowledged the heavy caseload on each judge of the Allahabad High Court (approximately 15,000 to 20,000 cases per judge). The Court noted the significant vacancy in the High Court, with only 84 judges working against a sanctioned strength of 160. The Court emphasized the urgent need to fill judicial vacancies based on merit and ability to alleviate the backlog. The writ petition was treated as a representation to the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, directing the Registry to forward a copy of the petition and the order. The Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court was requested to examine the matter and take appropriate administrative action. The writ petition was disposed of. (Para 1 – 10) Kamla Bai v High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 152

Persons with Disabilities - Reasonable Accommodation - Equal Opportunity - No person can be denied consideration for recruitment in the judicial service solely on account of their physical disabilities. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

Perverse bail order - Supreme Court directed that two judicial officers in the Delhi Judicial Service must undergo special judicial training for a period of at least 7 days for the illegal and erroneous manner in which they granted bail to two accused- Directed Chief Justice of Delhi High Court has been requested to make arrangements, with a focus on sensitising judicial officers on how to conduct proceedings and the deference to be accorded to superior court rulings- Supreme Court referred judicial officers' approach as 'untenable' and bordering on 'perversity'- Noted that accused had misled High Court while enjoying four years of interim protection and later concealed the rejection of their anticipatory bail applications while seeking regular bail- Supreme Court expressed disappointment on having formally surrendered before the Court, the accused were permitted to leave the Court without any formal order of release- Criticized the Delhi High Court for overlooking the factual position and declining interference- Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-33, 40-42] Netisty Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. State Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 962 : 2025 INSC 1181

Practical experience is critical for judicial officers handling issues of life, liberty, property, and reputation. Most High Courts, except Rajasthan and Sikkim, and States, except Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Nagaland, and Tripura, supported reintroducing the practice requirement. Concerns raised about superficial practice by aspirants signing vakalaths without effective experience. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

Promotion to the post of District Judge – Merit-cum-Seniority – Suitability Test – Seniority - Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal challenging the denial of promotion to the appellants, who were judicial officers in Jharkhand, despite qualifying the suitability test for promotion to the post of District Judge in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service. The appellants were denied promotion on the basis of a merit list, although they had secured more than the requisite minimum marks for suitability. The Court relied on the judgment in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta v. High Court of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 387, holding that under the 65% quota for promotion based on merit-cum-seniority, once a candidate qualifies the suitability test, promotions cannot be denied solely on the basis of a comparative merit list. The suitability of each candidate should be assessed individually, and a comparative assessment is not warranted unless explicitly provided by the applicable rules. Under the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services (Recruitment, Appointment, and Condition of Service) Rules, 2001, promotions under the 65% merit-cum-seniority quota should be based on suitability, not comparative merit. Once candidates qualify the suitability test, they are entitled to promotion without a comparative merit list ranking. The appellants were granted notional promotion from the date on which other officers from the same selection list were promoted (i.e., as per the notification dated 30.05.2019). They were also entitled to all consequential service benefits, including seniority, increments, and notional pay fixation, but without any back wages. Appeal Allowed. Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. Honble High Court of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 71

Public Interest Litigation – Publicity – Dignity of CJI's Office – Protocol Lapse – Dismissal – Nominal Costs Imposed – The Supreme Court dismissed a PIL filed by a lawyer seeking action against Maharashtra officials for protocol lapses during the Chief Justice of India's visit to Mumbai on May 18, 2025. The Court labeled the petition as “publicity interest litigation” filed for “cheap publicity” and criticized the exaggeration of trivial issues. Noting the officials' apology and the CJI's request to close the matter, the Court deemed the petition unnecessary. Considering the petitioner's status as a young lawyer with seven years of practice, the Court imposed a nominal cost of Rs. 7,000 instead of heavier costs. The Court underscored the need to uphold the dignity of the CJI's office and cautioned against filing frivolous petitions that invite controversy to the institution. (Paras 6–10) Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 623

Recruitment - Supreme Court Held that High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in exercise of review jurisdiction by reopening settled issues regarding cut-off marks and eligibility- Re-computation of cut-off marks and conducting a fresh main examination for candidates scoring below the original cut-off was impermissible exercise of review jurisdiction - Preliminary exam cut-off marks are sacrosanct once declared, and candidates failing to meet them cannot be considered in main examination - Conduct of second main exam for physically impaired candidates was a distinct case and could not justify a third main exam - Affidavit by High Court Registrar confirmed no ineligible candidate would be considered for appointment, allaying apprehension of respondents. [Para 9, 11-14] High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. Jyotsna Dohalia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 936 : 2025 INSC 1137

Recruitment - Under the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1994 (as amended), the eligibility criteria for the Civil Judge Entry Level post were revised by an amendment to Rule 7 on 23/06/2023 - The amendment stipulated that only advocates who have been practising continuously for at least three years, or those who have secured the specified minimum marks in their first attempt without any ATKT (Allowed To Keep Terms), are eligible to apply - The validity of these restrictions was challenged but ultimately upheld - A recruitment advertisement dated 17/11/2023 was issued for 199 posts - Following the preliminary examination, results were declared based on cut-off marks, and candidates who scored below the cut-off were not permitted to appear for the main examination - A review petition was allowed by the High Court, which directed a re-computation of the cut-off marks and a fresh main examination for eligible candidates who had previously scored below the earlier cut-off - This order was appealed by the High Court Registrar. High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. Jyotsna Dohalia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 936 : 2025 INSC 1137

Recruitment for Civil Judge (Junior Division) – Practice Requirement - The Supreme Court restored the 3-year practice requirement for candidates applying for Civil Judge (Junior Division) posts, clarifying that experience gained as law clerks with judges or judicial officers will count towards fulfilling this requirement. The Court emphasized that allowing fresh law graduates without practical experience into judicial service has proven problematic, as they lack firsthand exposure to court proceedings and the administration of justice, which is essential for judicial roles. The 3-year practice condition will not apply to recruitment processes notified before the judgment but will be mandatory for future recruitments. The Court underscored the necessity of practical experience to equip candidates with the skills to handle issues of life, liberty, property, and reputation of litigants effectively. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

Recruitment of Fresh Law Graduates as Judicial Officers – Minimum 3-Year Practice Requirement Restored – Held, Appointment of fresh law graduates without prior Bar experience problematic; bookish knowledge and pre-service training insufficient for judicial role; practical exposure to courtroom dynamics essential; 3-year practice mandate applies to future recruitments; law clerk experience counts towards practice period. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

Representation of Women in Judiciary - Importance of Diversity - Held, the Supreme Court emphasized that increased female representation in the judiciary enhances judicial responsiveness to diverse social contexts, challenges gender stereotypes, and promotes equality in decision-making. The dismissal of the appellant, a female judicial officer from the Scheduled Tribe category, for non-disclosure of prior employment was deemed unwarranted, and her reinstatement was ordered. The Court highlighted three key aspects: (i) entry of women into the judiciary, (ii) retention and professional growth of women, and (iii) advancement to senior judicial roles. Greater representation of women shifts gender stereotypes, enhances visibility, and encourages access to justice. The Court recognized the appellant's perseverance and potential to contribute to a competent, diverse, and inclusive judiciary. (Para 29, 31) Pinky Meena v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2025 INSC 756 : AIR 2025 SC 3013

Retired High Court Judges – Medical Reimbursement – Supreme Court clarifies that medical reimbursement for retired High Court Judges, their spouses, and dependants shall be borne by the State Government of either the Judge's first appointment or the State where the High Court from which the Judge retired is situated, addressing cases involving judicial transfers. Non-compliance with court orders on medical facilities, including cashless treatment, reimbursement for private hospital treatment without prior approval, and uniformity in benefits, may lead to contempt proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1981. States directed to file fresh affidavits, with matter listed for April 29, 2025. Justice V.S. Dave v. Kusumjit Sidhu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 470

Termination of Judicial Officer - Alleged Concealment of Prior Employment and Academic Impropriety - Violation of Natural Justice - Constitutional Rights under Articles 14 and 16 - Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal of a former Civil Judge and judicial magistrate, setting aside the High Court's Full Court decision to terminate her service in 2020. The termination, based on non-disclosure of prior government employment and simultaneous pursuit of academic degrees, was held to be a disproportionate penalty for a minor omission. The appellant's explanation—that she resigned from her teaching position before joining the judiciary and discontinued her B.Ed. upon learning of university regulations—was found reasonable. The dismissal process violated natural justice principles due to the lack of an opportunity to be heard. While probationers lack an absolute right to a post, arbitrary or discriminatory termination without adherence to natural justice violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court ordered reinstatement with notional pay fixation, treating the appellant as a confirmed employee who completed probation, but without backwages. (Para 23, 26, 32) Pinky Meena v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2025 INSC 756 : AIR 2025 SC 3013

Termination of Judicial Officers - Adverse Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) - Punitive Action - Natural Justice - Misconduct Allegations - Termination of judicial officers based on adverse ACRs without timely communication, opportunity to explain, or expungement of adverse remarks is arbitrary and illegal. "Poor performance" claims must be substantiated by clear and consistent evidence; contradictory or unsubstantiated claims in ACRs are insufficient grounds for termination. "Other material" used as a basis for termination, such as pending or concluded complaints, necessitates a fair opportunity to be heard, especially when such complaints form the foundation of termination, in adherence to Article 311 of the Constitution and relevant Conduct Rules. Termination based on misconduct allegations and "inefficiency," even if complaints were closed or resulted in advisories, is punitive and stigmatic, rendering it illegal if done without due process. Termination orders based on such flawed procedures are liable to be set aside, as they violate established principles of law and natural justice. (Para 16) Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2025 INSC 289 : (2025) 9 SCC 297

The Court examined the pension entitlements of retired High Court judges, addressing disparities arising from date of appointment, source of entry (judicial service vs. Bar), and status as permanent or additional judges. Relying on the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 (HCJ Act), and precedents including M.L. Jain v. Union of India (1985) 2 SCC 355, P. Ramakrishnam Raju v. Union of India (2014) 12 SCC 1, and Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Union of India 2024 INSC 862, the Court declared a uniform "one rank one pension" norm for this constitutional office. Issues: 1. Whether pension calculations must reckon full judicial service, using last pay as a High Court judge. 2. Validity of pension ceilings under the HCJ Act and Article 14 discrimination. 3. Parity in post-retiral benefits between permanent/additional judges and those elevated from judicial service/Bar. 4. Impact of service breaks or New Pension Scheme (NPS) on entitlements. Holdings and Principles Laid Down: The Court summarized the following binding principles: (i) Entire service as a judge is reckoned for pension, based on last pay drawn as a High Court judge (not hypothetical District Judge pay). [M.L. Jain (1985) 2 SCC 355]. (ii) Pension ceiling under clause (b), Paragraph 2, Part III, First Schedule to HCJ Act violates Article 14; effaced since 1 January 1996 per M.L. Jain (II) (1991) 1 SCC 644. Pension follows proviso ceiling therein. (iii) No discrimination in pension fixation for constitutional office holders; uniform pay, allowances, and perks extend to pensions regardless of elevation source. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (2014) 12 SCC 1]. (iv) Judicial officers' and Bar members' pre-elevation experience counts equally toward pension. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (supra); Jagdish Chandra Gupta 2024 INSC 862]. (v) Classification by elevation source (Bar vs. service) lacks rational nexus and is unreasonable. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (supra)]. (vi) "One rank one pension" is the norm for constitutional offices. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (supra)]. (vii) No discrimination in family pension payments. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (supra)]. (viii) Service breaks (e.g., between District Judge retirement and High Court elevation) do not deny pension based on High Court salary. [Union of India v. Justice (Retd.) Raj Rahul Garg (Raj Rani Jain)]. (ix) High Court judges elevated post-NPS are entitled to GPF benefits under HCJ Act. [Justice Shailendra Singh v. Union of India]. Significance: This judgment ensures parity and non-discrimination in judicial pensions, reinforcing constitutional uniformity for High Court judges' post-retiral benefits. In Re Refixation of Pension Considering Service Period in District Judiciary and High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2025 INSC 726

The Supreme Court reinstated a minimum three-year practice requirement for advocates applying for Civil Judge (Junior Division) posts, reversing the earlier relaxation from the 2002 All India Judges Association case. The decision revealed a lack of consensus among High Courts and States, with most supporting the three-year practice condition alongside a law degree, while Haryana, Chhattisgarh, Nagaland, and Tripura opposed any such requirement. The High Courts of Rajasthan and Sikkim also resisted the mandate, and conflicting stances emerged between certain High Courts and their respective State Governments, such as Chhattisgarh and Punjab & Haryana. The Allahabad and Calcutta High Courts endorsed prior practice but did not specify a minimum duration. The Court clarified that the practice period is calculated from provisional enrollment and does not apply to ongoing recruitment processes. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

The Supreme Court restored the 3-year minimum practice condition for entry into judicial service but clarified that this requirement will not apply to recruitment processes already notified by High Courts or States prior to the judgment. The condition will apply only to future recruitment processes. Recruitment processes previously held in abeyance due to this case may now proceed. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

The Supreme Court restored the requirement of a minimum of three years of practice as an advocate for eligibility to apply for entry-level judicial service posts (Civil Judge, Junior Division). The period of practice may be reckoned from provisional enrollment and includes experience as law clerks. The condition does not apply to recruitment processes initiated by High Courts before May 20, 2025, but applies to future recruitments. All High Courts and State Governments are directed to amend service rules accordingly. Candidates must provide a certificate from the Principal Judicial Officer or an advocate with a minimum 10-year standing, endorsed by the designated officer, to verify practice. The Court observed that allowing fresh law graduates without practical experience into judicial service has been counterproductive, as firsthand court experience is essential for effective judicial functioning. The decision overrules the 2002 judgment in All India Judges Association case, which had removed the minimum practice requirement. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

Violation of Statutory Eligibility - A single judge's finding of ineligibility based on objective assessment of documents and organizational hierarchy binds unless demonstrably erroneous. A division bench's reversal, premised on restricted interference in service matters without probing statutory violations, constitutes error. Where selection files reveal absence of supporting evidence for claimed experience and affirmative proof of shortfall (e.g., only ~4 years in qualifying roles), the appointment is quashed ab initio. Appointee directed to vacate office forthwith (within one week, sans policy/financial decisions); benefits accrued till date preserved, but future entitlements limited to verified tenure. Fresh selection process mandated expeditiously. Dr. Amaragouda L v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2025 INSC 201

Visually impaired candidates are eligible for judicial service, and Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, was struck down to the extent it excluded them. Rule 7 prescribing additional requirements for PwDs (such as three years of practice or securing 70% marks in the first attempt), was partially struck down as violative of equality and reasonable accommodation. Separate cut-offs must be maintained for visually impaired candidates, in line with the Indra Sawhney judgment. (Para 68) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

Women in Judiciary - Gender Equality - Judicial Decision-Making - Maternity Rights - Indirect Discrimination - Reinstatement of Terminated Judicial Officers - Increased representation of women in the judiciary is essential for enhancing judicial decision-making, particularly in cases affecting women, and for promoting broader gender equality by challenging stereotypes and encouraging women's participation in other decision-making roles. International covenants, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and CEDAW, mandate protection of maternity rights and equal employment opportunities for women, including freedom from discrimination during pregnancy and maternity. Miscarriage has profound physical and psychological consequences for women, requiring sensitive consideration in the workplace. Courts must address and rectify indirect discrimination, which often masks underlying patriarchal systems, to ensure equal opportunity and gender equality in public employment. A holistic approach to evaluating judicial officers, especially women, necessitates considering their medical and emotional circumstances, including the impact of pregnancy and miscarriage, and not solely relying on performance metrics like pendency and disposal. Termination orders of judicial officers were set aside, and they were reinstated with consequential benefits, emphasizing the need for a sensitive work environment and guidance for women in the judiciary. (Para 17 & 18) Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2025 INSC 289 : (2025) 9 SCC 297

Juvenile

Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000 - Rule 12 - Determination of age - Evidentiary value of school certificates vs. Public Documents and Medical Opinion - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 35 - Relevancy of Entry in public Record - Section 74 - Public Documents - High Court declared respondent 2 as 'Juvenile' – Held, a school transfer certificate issued by a private school where entry of date of birth was based solely on the oral representation of the father, without any supporting documents, is unreliable - Such school's records are not “public documents” and its Headmaster is not a 'public master' for the purposes of Evidences Act - In cases where school records about age on oral representations and are contradicted by statutory documents like a Family Register (maintained under U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947), Voters List and a Medical Board Report, the latter hold more weight - Medical evidence based on scientific investigation should be given due weight and precedence over school administration records that give rise to hypothesis and speculation - Benevolent legislation of the Juvenile Justice Act is meant for genuine child accused and cannot be used as a ploy to subvert justice by accused individuals of matured mind - In serious offences, documents and statutory public records should take precedence over school records that create reasonable doubt about juvenility - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 21-23, 25, 26] Suresh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 761 : 2025 INSC 918

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (JJ Act) – Section 7-A - Children's Act, 1960 – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Illegal Detention/Breach of Article 21 - Murder Convict – Claim of Juvenility - Supreme Court ordered release of the murder convict under the JJ Act, after finding he was a juvenile at the time of commission of offence in 1981 – Held, JJ Act is retrospective in operation, and applies to offences pre-dated the enforcement of the JJ Act - The plea of juvenility, which can be raised at any stage, is governed by Section 7-A of the JJ Act, 2000 - This section mandates that courts are under an obligation to consider the plea and grant appropriate relief if the convict was a juvenile on the date of the offence - The maximum period of detention for a juvenile under the JJ Act, 2000, is 3 years as per Section 15(1)(g) - Since the petitioner was a child at the time of the offence and had been behind bars for more than 3 years, his liberty was curtailed "not in accordance with procedure established by law." Breach of the right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution is "writ large," thereby extending the benefit of release from detention - The Court considered the respondent's contentions regarding the heinous nature of the offence (murder) and the petitioner's act of absconding and evading arrest from 2009 to 2022. However, the Court granted relief, noting that the petitioner had "suffered incarceration for more than the period permissible in law - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand 2005 3 SCC 551; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2010 5 SCC 344; Para 4, 5, 12-14] Hansraj v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 993 : 2025 INSC 1211

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015

Sections 15 and 94(2) - Juvenile Justice Board — Lack of Review Jurisdiction — Contradictory Findings on Juvenility Impermissible - The Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) constituted under the JJ Act, 2015 possesses no power of review, either expressly or by necessary implication, over its prior orders determining juvenility. Once the JJB accepts documentary evidence such as a school certificate establishing the date of birth of a child in conflict with law (in this case, 08.09.2003), it cannot in subsequent proceedings disregard the same, adopt a contradictory stance, or resort to medical opinion (e.g., ossification test estimating age as 21 years) to reopen the issue. Such action amounts to an impermissible review of its earlier order. Under Section 94(2) of the Act, medical evidence is admissible only in the absence of conclusive documentary proof; school records carry superior evidentiary value and cannot be overridden by subsidiary ossification tests. The Supreme Court thus upheld the High Court's grant of bail to the juvenile respondent, holding that a preliminary assessment under Section 15 recommending trial as an adult does not negate the statutory right to bail absent evidence of threat to the juvenile or society. Appeal dismissed. (Para 29) Rajni v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : 2025 INSC 737

Sections 3(xiv), 24 - Disclosure of Juvenile Conviction in Character Certificate - Whether disclosure of a juvenile's conviction in a character certificate violates Section 24 and affects future employment prospects. Held, Section 24 protects juveniles by prohibiting disqualification from past convictions and mandating non-disclosure of such records in public or official documents. The Court quashed the portion of the appellant's character certificate disclosing his juvenile conviction and directed authorities to refrain from disclosing such records in future verifications. The High Court's dismissal of the appellant's petition for availability of an alternative remedy was erroneous, as it overlooked the violation of the JJ Act's rehabilitative intent. Section 24 promotes rehabilitation by preventing stigma from past convictions and mandates destruction of records after a specified period. Disclosure in official certificates undermines reintegration and contravenes the JJ Act's protective framework. As the appellant's offense was not heinous, its inclusion in records was unwarranted, posing no threat to public safety. Appeal allowed; character certificate quashed to the extent of disclosing juvenile conviction; authorities directed to ensure non-disclosure and prevent disqualification based on juvenile record. (Para 9, 14, 16) Lokesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 245

Issue of juvenility and the failure of the judicial machinery to recognize and act upon the constitutional mandate regarding juvenile justice. The appellant was convicted of culpable homicide amounting to murder in 1994 and sentenced to death. Throughout the legal proceedings, he consistently claimed to be a juvenile at the time of the offense, but his plea was ignored by the trial court, High Court, and even the Supreme Court in earlier rounds of litigation. Held, a plea of juvenility, which was not properly considered by Courts as per due procedure, cannot be treated as final. Therefore, a fresh plea of juvenility can be raised when the plea of juvenility was improperly adjudicated upon in the previous rounds. The Court emphasized the paramount duty of the judiciary to unearth the truth and ensure justice, particularly in cases involving juveniles. Procedural and substantive laws should not obstruct the discovery of truth, especially in social welfare legislations like the Juvenile Justice Act. The Court reiterated that the plea of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after the final disposal of a case, and must be adjudicated upon in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court found that the appellant was indeed 14 years old at the time of the offense, as evidenced by school certificates and medical reports. The Court criticized the lower courts for ignoring crucial documents and failing to follow the procedural mandates of the Juvenile Justice Act. The appellant's incarceration for over 25 years was a grave injustice, and directed his immediate release, while maintaining his conviction. The Court also ordered the State Legal Services Authority to assist in his rehabilitation and reintegration into society. This judgment underscores the importance of the judiciary's role in ensuring justice for juveniles and the need for courts to actively seek the truth, particularly in cases involving vulnerable individuals. The Court's decision to allow the plea of juvenility even after final disposal of the case sets a significant precedent for future cases involving juvenile offenders. Om Prakash @ Israel @ Raju @ Raju Das v State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 35

Labour Law

For a person to claim employment in an organization, a direct masterservant relationship must be established on paper. (Para 7) Joint Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education v. Raj Kumar Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 343

Indefinite temporary employment for permanent roles is contrary to labour jurisprudence and principles of fairness. (Para 14 & 15) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144

Industrial Dispute - Reliance on Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 to deny regularization to daily-wage employees is misplaced where the employment is irregular, not illegal, and the employer has engaged in exploitative practices for years. (Para 14) Industrial Dispute - Regularization - A general ban on fresh recruitment cannot justify indefinite daily-wage status or unfair labour practices, especially where the work is perennial and essential. (Para 14) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144

Industrial Dispute - The employer's engagement of workmen in perennial municipal functions, while denying them statutory benefits and equal pay for equal work, constitutes an unfair labour practice. (Para 13) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144

Industrial Dispute - The principle of “equal pay for equal work” cannot be casually disregarded when workers have served for extended periods in roles resembling those of permanent employees. (Para 13) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U.P.) - Whether an individual is classified as regular or temporary is irrelevant as retrenchment obligations under the Act must be met in all cases attracting Section 6N. Any termination thus effected without statutory safeguards cannot be undertaken lightly. (Para 10) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144

Termination without adhering to Sections 6E and 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for employees engaged in essential duties, is illegal. Bureaucratic limitations cannot override the rights of workmen serving in de facto regular roles for extended periods. (Para 17) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144

Land Law

Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (Tamil Nadu) - Sections 7(2), 7(4) and 12 - Land Acquisition - Concluded Contract - Payment of Interest – Held, a concluded contract voluntarily entered into between the Government and the landowner/person interested for the determination of compensation under Section 7(2) or Section 7(4) of the 1997 Act is a complete package and excludes itself from the purview of the 1997 Act thereafter - The rights and liabilities of the parties would only be governed by the terms of the contract - Section 12 of the 1997 Act, which speaks of payment of interest from the time of taking possession until compensation is paid or deposited, has no application to a case where an agreement has been entered into between the parties under Section 7 - Once an agreement is finalized, the agreement becomes sacrosanct, and all disputes with respect to the determination of rent and interest would get subsumed within the contract itself - A party to a contract cannot be permitted to have recourse to two different modes (contract and statutory remedy) after having accepted the compensation under the contract without any demur or protest - The High Court committed a fundamental error in invoking Section 12 for the payment of interest from the date of the notice under Section 3(2) of the 1997 Act till the date of the impugned judgment, after giving a clear finding that the agreement was a complete package - The contract voluntarily entered into shall not be disturbed by taking recourse to the statutory provisions which are sought to be excluded by such contract. [Paras 14-25] Government of Tamil Nadu v. P.R. Jaganathan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1126 : 2025 INSC 1332

Although the land acquisition compensation is to be determined at the market rate prevailing on the date of issuance of the notification regarding the acquisition of land, the compensation can be determined based on a later date in exceptional circumstances when the delay in the disbursal of the compensation has been inordinate. Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : (2025) 7 SCC 580

Constitution of India - Articles 142 and 300-A – Compensation – Delay in Determination and Disbursal – Held, the appellants were deprived of their legitimate compensation for over 22 years due to the inaction and lethargy of the State and Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB). The delay violated the appellants' constitutional right under Article 300-A, which guarantees the right to property, mandating adequate and timely compensation for deprivation of property. The Court found that despite the statutory framework requiring prompt disbursal, the compensation was determined only in 2019 after contempt proceedings were initiated, using the market value from 2011 as the base. It was held that awarding compensation at the 2003 market value would result in gross injustice and render Article 300-A meaningless. In exercise of its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court directed the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) to determine compensation based on the market value as of April 22, 2019, along with statutory benefits under the 1894 Land Acquisition Act. Additionally, the judgment and orders of the High Court's Division Bench were set aside, and the appellants' writ petition was allowed. The Court clarified that the inter se dispute between the State, KIADB, and Respondents 6 and 7 regarding the delay in compensation payment must be resolved as per the agreements between them, without affecting the appellants' entitlement. Respondents 6 and 7 were granted liberty to pursue remedies in law if aggrieved. Appeals allowed; fresh award to be determined within two months based on the 2019 market value; statutory benefits to be provided. Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : (2025) 7 SCC 580

East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Validity of Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 upheld (paras 128-129). Lands reserved for common purposes including utilized and unutilized, vest in Gram Panchayat and are to be used for village needs - Bachat land, which has not been reserved for common use under the scheme, remains the proprietary land of the contributors and must be redistributed among them per their share - Compensation is not payable where acquisition is for common purposes and the beneficiary is not the State but the proprietors themselves via Gram Panchayat management - distinctions between acquisition by the State and modification of rights benefiting proprietors through Panchayat management of common land - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 24-43, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58-62-64] State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2025 INSC 1122

Forfeiture of Alwara lands in Dadra and Nagar Haveli - Supreme Court dismisses allottees' plea against Collector's 1974 order for forfeiture of Alwara lands in Dadra and Nagar Haveli - The rights vested in the appellants fall under the OA specifically governed by emphyteutic principles, not general land revenue laws - The doctrine of lex specialis applies, giving precedence to the OA over the 1917 Portuguese Land Law under which the appellants sought relief, which was raised belatedly and not considered at earlier stages - The High Court rightly interfered with concurrent findings of fact upon showing perversity, misreading and ignoring evidence - Delay or long inaction by the administration does not amount to acquiescence unless there is deliberate waiver of rights; mere delay does not bar rescission - That appellants' pleaded waiver and acquiescence were rejected due to lack of evidence and failure to plead such grounds initially - Held that rescission was in exercise of statutory power by the Collector duly delegated by the Administrator, based on noncultivation contrary to Article 12 of the OA and was not mala fide - The 1971 Land Reforms Regulation repealed prior laws but saved pending proceedings; thus, the rescission proceedings initiated prior to its enforcement were valid - The principle of law on waiver against the Government requires intentional relinquishment of rights which was not made out here - No estoppel against government in exercise of sovereign, legislative or Executive power. [Paras 4, 8-11, 16-23, 33-38, 40-46, 60-62, 54-63, 70-74, 80-85] Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 942 : 2025 INSC 1145

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 - Section 15 - Principles of Natural Justice - Opportunity of Hearing - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court in a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) that directed the closure of civil suits and action against unauthorized construction and commercial use of residential property in Gurugram, on the ground that the directions were issued without joining the affected parties (appellants) and affording them an opportunity of hearing - Observed that while unauthorized construction or commercial use of residential property cannot be protected, the determination of such fact must be made by the authorities affording due opportunity to the owners and occupiers - Held that opportunity of hearing is a sine qua non for fair administration of justice and a Court's observations should not adjudicate the rights of any unheard party - Set aside order of High Court. [Paras 9 - 12] Gaurav Kohli v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1061

Issue of non-payment of compensation to land owners whose land was acquired for the construction of a water tank. The Court expressed strong disapproval of the conduct of the State authorities, who had failed to pay the compensation despite a final award in favor of the land owners. The Court directed to ensure the release of the compensation amount, along with interest and punitive costs. The Court also mandated an explanation from the Collector and warned of contempt proceedings if the payment was not made by the stipulated date. The Special Leave Petition was disposed of with these directions, and the Court clarified that its observations were not against any individual officer. Kondiram Manikrao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 54

Land Acquisition - Determination of Market Value - The determination of the prevalent market value of the acquired land is not an algebraic formula and that cannot be determined in a precise or an accurate manner. Some amount of guess work is always permissible. Therefore, a judge has to sit in an arm chair and without much taxing his mind has to determine the market value in a prudent manner. (Para 13) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2025 INSC 393

Land Acquisition - Enhancement of Compensation - Supreme Court enhanced compensation for acquired agricultural land from Rs. 30 per sq. mt. to Rs. 95 per sq. mt., based on GIDC's allotment of nearby commercial plot at Rs. 180 per sq. mt. in 1988 - Adjusted for 5% price rise over one year to Rs. 190 per sq. mt., followed by 50% deduction (40% for development costs, 10% for larger area). (Para 14) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2025 INSC 393

Land Acquisition - Income from Fruit-Bearing Trees – Compensation for trees requires documentary proof of income, not mere presence. (Para 15) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2025 INSC 393

Land Acquisition – Large areas do not attract the same price as is offered for the small plots of lands. Therefore, some amount of deduction is also normally permissible on account of largeness in area. Thus, deduction of at least 10% has to be applied to determine the rate of compensation. (Para 12) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2025 INSC 393

Land Acquisition - Natural Justice - Whether the High Court's reliance on the respondent's affidavit without granting the petitioner an opportunity to respond violates principles of natural justice. Held: The Supreme Court quashed the acquisition proceedings initiated by the development authority, holding that the High Court's Division Bench violated principles of natural justice by relying solely on the authority's affidavit and closing the matter on the same day without allowing the appellant to respond. The Court set aside the Division Bench's order, remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration, and permitted the High Court to conduct a spot inspection if necessary. (Para 14, 15) D.M. Jagadish v. Bangalore Development Authority, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 172 : 2025 INSC 157 : (2025) 4 SCC 347

Land Acquisition - Principles of Escalation and De-Escalation - The principle of escalation signifies adjusting the base value of land upwards to account for appreciation in market value over time. The principle is used when the reference sale deed or award is from an earlier period than the acquisition date. Whereas, the principle of de-escalation signifies adjusting the base value downward to account for time gaps when the reference point is from a later period, but the land was acquired earlier. (Para 25 - 28) Ram Kishan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2025 INSC 441

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Compensation vs. Job in Lieu of Acquired Land - Held, under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on land being acquired, the family is entitled only to the compensation which has already been paid - There is no provision under the Act for the grant of a job in lieu of the acquired land - A policy decision for giving a job in lieu of acquired land cannot prevail over the statutory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - The Supreme Court found no error or illegality in the authorities and the High Court dismissing the claim for a job, which was filed more than 18 years after the framing of the policy - Petition dismissed. [Para 3] Sanjeev Kumar v State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1079

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Highest bona fide sale exemplar must be considered when determining land acquisition compensation to ensure a fair market value for the acquired land. While determining the compensation, crucial factors such as the close proximity of the acquired land to the developed zone and non-agricultural utility should also be kept into consideration. (Relied: Mehrawal Khewaji Trust v. State of Punjab, (2012) 5 SCC 432, Para 19 & 31) Ram Kishan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2025 INSC 441

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 – Compensation - Determination of market value - Use of sale exemplars - Reference Court disregarded the highest value sale deed without providing reasons - High Court affirmed this decision with contradictory findings – Held, when there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, the highest of the exemplars, if it is a bone fide transaction, should be considered when determining compensation for compulsorily acquired land - Averaging of sale prices is only permissible when prices is only permissible when prices have a narrow bandwidth or have a “marginal bandwidth” or a “marginal variation” and not when the values are “markedly different” - The reference Court's approach of overlooking the highest exemplar and averaging the remaining was impermissible - Supreme Court enhanced the compensation by applying a 20% deduction to the highest sale exemplar's value, considering the larger area of acquired land compared to the exemplar plot and granted appellant's all benefit of solatium and interest on enhanced compensation - Set aside order of High Court citing as erroneous - Appeal allowed. [Paras 22, 31, 33, 46-48] Manohar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2025 INSC 900

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Principle of de-escalation - the Supreme Court allowed the landowner's plea seeking enhancement of compensation fixed by the High Court and enhanced the compensation from ₹55.71 lakh to ₹1.18 crore per acre for lands acquired in Dharuhera village (Haryana) in 2008 under the Act, 1894 by applying the principle of de-escalation. The Court set aside the High Court's decision to selectively rely on lower-value exemplars while ignoring comparable higher-value transactions. The High Court committed an error by ignoring evidence of proximity and potential for non-agricultural use since the acquired land was in a controlled urban area surrounded by various Multinational Companies and had a big residential colony opposite to it with multiple schools and townships within 1KM range. (Relied: BESCO Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2023), (Para 34 - 38) Ram Kishan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2025 INSC 441

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 5-A, Section 6, Section 11 - Singur Land Acquisition - Restoration of Acquired Land – Held, the remedial framework in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra) was anchored in the recognition that the acquisition disproportionately affected vulnerable communities ("poor agricultural workers") lacking financial resources and institutional access to challenge governmental action - Relief conceived to prevent impoverishment among the disadvantaged farmers cannot be extended to commercial enterprises with financial capacity and institutional sophistication, as this would defeat the remedy's foundational intent - The entity is precluded by its conduct and the principle of estoppel from claiming restoration after a delay of an entire decade - Held that land acquisition can/t be challenged after accepting compensation. [Relied on Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2016 SC 4156] State of West Bengal v. Santi Ceramics Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1000 : 2025 INSC 1222

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 23(1A) & (2)) and Section 28 - National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3J - In Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304 the Supreme Court declared Section 3J of the National Highways Act, 1956 unconstitutional to the extent it denied solatium (under Section 23(1A) & (2)) and interest (under Section 28 proviso) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to landowners whose properties were acquired by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) between 1997 and 2015. Post-judgment, NHAI sought clarification that the ruling apply prospectively, precluding recalculation of compensation in cases where acquisition proceedings had attained finality, citing financial burden (approx. Rs. 100 crores) and risk of reopening settled matters. Whether the Tarsem Singh ruling, striking down the exclusion of solatium and interest for NH Act acquisitions, operates prospectively or requires retrospective application to rectify pre-2015 disparities without disturbing final judgments. Held, the Court dismissed NHAI's plea, holding that the 2019 ruling applies to all eligible acquisitions between 1997 and 2015, mandating computation and payment of solatium and interest by competent authorities. Prospective application would nullify the intended relief and perpetuate unconstitutional discrimination under Article 14. Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2025 INSC 146

Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (Andhra Pradesh) – "Land Grabbing" - Definition of – Unauthorized Possession – Peaceful Occupation - mens rea - Whether peaceful, non-violent unauthorized possession of land constitutes "land grabbing" under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act. Held, violence or criminality is not a prerequisite for an act to qualify as "land grabbing" under the Act. Peaceful, unauthorized occupation of land without legal right falls within the ambit of "land grabbing" as per the Act. Mens rea required is the intention to illegally possess land through unlawful or arbitrary means, including for unauthorized use, construction, or creation of third-party rights. The appellant, who occupied land (Survey No. 9) without legal title despite believing he purchased an adjacent plot (Survey No. 10), was declared a "land grabber" under the Act. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision. [Para 7] V.S.R. Mohan Rao v. K.S.R. Murthy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 619 : 2025 INSC 708

Lease and Allotment - Difference Between - Explained - Lease is a temporary grant whereas allotment though is a temporary right of use and occupation of evacuee but does not include a grant by way of a lease. Dalip Ram v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 13

M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 – Sections 109 and 110 – Mutation based on Will – Held: There is no proscription in the 1959 Code against the acquisition of rights in land through a Will - Revenue authorities cannot reject a mutation application at the threshold simply because it is based on a Will - While a Tehsildar cannot adjudicate complex disputes regarding the authenticity or validity of a Will (which must be decided by a Civil Court), mutation should not be denied where no serious dispute is raised by the natural legal heirs of the deceased - Mutation entries are for fiscal purposes and do not confer title. Tarachandra v. Bhawarlal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1246 : 2025 INSC 1485

Orders in personam vs. in rem - Held that orders quashing acquisition on grounds personal to individual objectors (like vitiated consideration of specific Section 5-A objections) operate in personam and benefit only those who contested the matter - Benefits of quashing do not accrue to non-parties unless the entire acquisition is struck down on fundamental grounds applicable to all - Filing objections under Section 5-A, which are subsequently rejected, does not exhaust the remedies; failure to pursue judicial challenge renders the notification conclusive proof of waiver. [Paras 19, 20] State of West Bengal v. Santi Ceramics Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1000 : 2025 INSC 1222

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act) – Sections 26, 28 – Land Acquisition – Determination of Market Value – Rental Compensation/Mesne Profits for Illegal Occupation – Held, the Reference Court's enhancement of compensation under Section 26 of the 2013 Act was justified as it correctly adopted the "average sale price" method by considering one-half of the highest-priced sale instances, along with a 10% annual increase for the time gap, as mandated by Section 26(1)(b) read with Explanations 1 and 2 - The Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) erred in relying solely on the ready reckoner rates while ignoring genuine and undisputed sale instances of similar land in the vicinity - High Court was wrong to interfere with the Reference Court's finding on market value - Noted that the 'rental compensation' in land acquisition proceedings is granted only when the owner is completely deprived of its property's use - that rental compensation requires complete deprivation of property; denies Rs. 238 Crore claim against respondent - Appeal allowed. [Relied on R.L. Jain v. DDA 2004 4 SCC 79; Shankarrao Bhagwantrao Patil and Others v. State of Maharashtra (2022) 15 SCC 657; Paras 24-35] Pradyumna Mukund Kokil v. Nashik Municipal Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1007 : 2025 INSC 1236

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; Section 11 - Under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, the market value of acquired land must be determined based on the date of the Section 11 notification, as mandated by the proviso to Section 26(1). Overturning the High Court's decision to fix the valuation date as January 1, 2014 (the Act's enforcement date), the Court emphasized that the legislative intent is to ensure fair compensation reflecting the current market value at the time of acquisition. The use of "shall" in the proviso makes the Section 11 notification date mandatory for valuation, and courts lack discretion to select an alternative date. (Paras 9 - 11) Sumitraben Singabhai Gamit v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 448 : 2025 INSC 521

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; Section 26 - Determination of Market Value - Theory of Deduction - Circle Rates - Held, theory of deduction applied under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to adjust market value for development costs, is not mandatory under the Acquisition Act, 2013. Section 26(1) mandates compensation based on the highest of: (a) market value under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899; (b) average sale price of similar land; or (c) consented amount. Explanation 4 allows the Collector discretion to adjust this value if it does not reflect actual market value, potentially applying deduction, but requires recorded reasons. Absent such adjustment, circle rates fixed under the Stamp Act govern. Public authorities must adhere to State-fixed circle rates, which citizens pay as stamp duty. Appeals dismissed emphasizing scientific fixation of circle rates for equitable compensation and governance. (Para 37 - 43) Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation v. Vincent Daniel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 364 : 2025 INSC 408 : (2025) 7 SCC 798

Language

Display of an additional language was not a violation of the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022 and that there was no prohibition in the said Act on the use of Urdu. The purpose of the use of Urdu is merely "effective communication" and diversity in language must be respected. Varshatai v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2025 INSC 486 : (2025) 7 SCC 293

Lease

Agreement to Lease - An agreement to lease does not automatically confer leasehold rights until a formal lease deed is executed. Where the Delhi Development Authority ("DDA") executed an agreement to lease in 1957 but a formal lease deed was never executed, and the property was subsequently sold through liquidation proceedings, the auction purchaser acquired only those rights, if any, held under the agreement to lease. The auction sale, conducted on an "as is where is" basis, did not confer ownership or leasehold rights upon the auction purchaser. The DDA retained the right to pursue remedies for possession and unearned income, and that any regularization of the transaction would require the auction purchaser to apply to the DDA and for the DDA to consider such application in accordance with law. Funds held in liquidation proceedings could not be appropriated for unearned income payments without considering the claims of other creditors, particularly where the liquidation was still ongoing. (Para 10 - 16) Delhi Development Authority v. S.G.G. Towers (P) Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 306 : 2025 INSC 337