Service Law

Disciplinary Proceedings — Judicial Review — Scope of Interference — Proportionality of Punishment — Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001; Rule 18(b) - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's interference with the dismissal of a CISF Constable who contracted a second marriage while his first marriage was still subsisting - emphasized that judicial review under Article 226 is limited to the decision-making process and not the decision itself - Key Legal Principles: i. Limited Scope of Judicial Review: Under Article 226, the Court is not an appellate authority and cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own findings for those of the disciplinary authority if the enquiry was held by a competent officer following the rules of natural justice; ii. Proportionality of Punishment: Interference with a penalty is only permissible if the punishment is "shockingly disproportionate" or "shocks the conscience of the court". Personal hardships or financial difficulties resulting from dismissal do not necessarily render the punishment disproportionate when the act constitutes a clear violation of service conditions; iii. Strict Construction of Penal Rules: Rule 18(b) of the CISF Rules, 2001, which disqualifies or penalizes members for bigamy, is an institutional requirement meant to maintain discipline and must be strictly construed – Appeal allowed. [Relied on B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749; High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil (2000) 1 SCC 416; Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610; Paras 5-9] Union of India v Pranab Kumar Nath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1250 : 2025 INSC 1479

Service Law – Resignation vs. Voluntary Retirement – Forfeiture of Past Service – Pensionary Benefits – The deceased employee, a conductor with the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC), resigned in 2014 after nearly 30 years of service citing family circumstances- He later sought to withdraw the resignation and claimed pensionary benefits, arguing that his resignation should be treated as voluntary retirement- Held that as per Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, resignation from service entails forfeiture of past service unless withdrawn in the public interest- Since the resignation was accepted and the request for withdrawal was declined, the past service stands forfeited- Re-classifying a resignation as voluntary retirement would render Rule 26 nugatory and obfuscate the legal distinction between the two concepts- Consequently, the appellant is not entitled to pensionary benefits. [Relied on BSES Yamuna Power Limited v. Ghanshyam Chand Sharma and another (2020) 3 SCC 346; Paras 9-12] Ashok Kumar Dabas v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1186 : 2025 INSC 1404

Service Law – Payment of Gratuity – Applicability of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 4, Section 5 – Held, even in cases of resignation, an employee who has rendered continuous service for not less than five years is entitled to gratuity under Section 4(1)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - In the absence of a notification under Section 5 of the 1972 Act exempting the Corporation, the claim for gratuity cannot be denied - The legal heirs are entitled to receive gratuity for the service rendered along with 6% interest per annum from the date of resignation till payment - The respondent Corporation fairly conceded to the release of leave encashment benefits to the family members of the deceased employee - The legal heirs are entitled to receive the amount towards leave encashment. [Paras 10, 11] Ashok Kumar Dabas v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1186 : 2025 INSC 1404

Service Law – Recruitment for post of Principal – Determination of eligibility and experience cut-off date – Effect of deferred advertisement – Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Central Administrative Tribunal's (CAT) order, holding that candidates who acquired the requisite 10 years of teaching experience by the extended closing date of a re-notified advertisement are eligible - Observed that since the initial indicative advertisement was deactivated immediately due to COVID-19 and the selection process had never effectively commenced, the eligibility must be determined as per the subsequent detailed advertisement. [Paras 11] Kailash Prasad v. Union Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1168

Conflict in Advertisement Clauses – Interpretation of 'Eligibility in every respect' – Where a "Notice" in a re-notified advertisement claims eligibility conditions from an earlier deactivated advertisement remain unchanged, but Clause 9(b)of the same detailed advertisement explicitly states that eligibility "in every respect" shall be determined by the closing date of the Online Recruitment Application, a conjoint reading reveals a clear divergence - Held that the eligibility date must be the actual closing date of application submission as prescribed in the detailed advertisement- Noted that the UPSC's note-sheets failed to provide any justification for retaining an old cut-off date from a deactivated advertisement, especially when the selection portal was not even functional during the initial period - Appeals allowed. [Paras 7-13] Kailash Prasad v. Union Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1168

Alteration of Selection Criteria - Weightage of Qualifications - Jammu and Kashmir Services Selection Board (Board) - Recruitment of Foresters - Academic Qualification for Forester - Held that the minimum academic qualification for the post of Forester was or equivalent with Science - Stress was primarily on physical attributes and viva voce, not solely academic criteria - The Board initially provided 25 points for a B.Sc. Forestry degree out of a total of 100 points - After conducting interviews, the Board changed the evaluation criteria, differentiating between a 4-year B.Sc. Forestry course (awarded 25 points) and a 3-year B.Sc. Forestry course (awarded 20 points) - Altering the evaluation procedure after the interviews were held, when candidates had completed their participation in the selection process, was found to be arbitrary and lacking a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved - Held that the change in the evaluation criteria was made at the stage of preparation of the select list and was deemed arbitrary by the Supreme Court - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (2008) 3 SCC 512; Tej Prakash Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan (2025) 2 SCC 1; Paras 10, 11] J and K Service Selection Board v. Sudesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1156

Gramin Dak Sevak (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011 – Misappropriation of Public Funds – Judicial Review of Disciplinary Authority's Decision – Held, the High Court misdirected itself and travelled beyond the scope of jurisdiction exercisable in a matter of judicial review - Judicial review only permits scrutiny of the process of inquiry and not the case on merits, especially when no defect in the inquiry process was pointed out - The High Court erred by going into the merits of the controversy, examining the admission of guilt by the respondent, and setting aside the punishment - The Court noted that the documents clearly established the factum of embezzlement, evidenced by the passbooks being stamped with receipt of the amount but having no corresponding entries in the post office's books of accounts - Mere deposit of the embezzled amount subsequent to being caught will not absolve an employee of the misconduct - The respondent's explanation of having stamped the passbooks due to "ignorance of the Rules" after 12 years of service was rejected as "farfetched" and unacceptable - Supreme Court set aside the reinstatement of the Post Master who was removed from the service for embezzling the depositors amount for its personal use. The Court said mere deposit of the embezzled money will not absolve an employee of the misconduct - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 11] Union of India v. Indraj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1104 : 2025 INSC 1313

Guidelines on seniority - Supreme Court issued certain guidelines for the filling up of the DJ posts invoking powers under Article 142 of the Constitution - i. The seniority of officers within the HJS shall be determined through an annual 4-point roster, filled by all officers appointed in the particular year in the repeating sequence of 2 Regular Promotees, 1 LDCE, and 1 DR; ii. Only if the recruitment process is completed within the year after which it was initiated and no other appointments, from any of the three sources, have already taken place in respect of the recruitment initiated for that subsequent year, shall the officers belatedly so appointed be entitled to seniority as per the roster of the year in which recruitment was initiated; iii. If the recruitment process is not initiated for vacancies arising in a given year in the same year, the candidate filling such vacancy, in subsequent recruitment, shall be granted seniority within the annual roster of the year in which the recruitment process is finally concluded and appointment is made; iv. After the recruitment of DRs and LDCEs is complete for a particular year, the positions falling in their quota that remain unfilled due to lack of suitable candidates shall be filled through RPs, subject to such RPs being placed only on subsequent RP positions in the annual roster; and the vacancies in the subsequent year shall be computed so as to apply the proportion of 50:25:25 to the entire cadre; v. The statutory rules governing the HJS in the respective States, in consultation with the High Courts, shall prescribe the exact modalities of the Annual Roster and how the directions of this judgement shall be implemented - Clarified that these guidelines are not intended to resolve any inter-se dispute - The guidelines are general and mandatory to be incorporated into the regulations governing inter-se seniority of higher judicial services - The guidelines will not reopen any decided issues related to inter-se seniority disputes. [Paras 97-100] All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1119 : 2025 INSC 1328

Higher Judicial Services (HJS) – Inter Se Seniority – Direct Recruits (DR) - Regular Promotees (RP) - LDCE Promotees (LDCE) – Held, previous service in the lower rungs of the judiciary (Junior Division/Senior Division) cannot be reckoned for granting weightage, preferential treatment, or a separate quota for determining inter se seniority, fixation in higher grades (Selection Grade/Super Time Scale), or assignment of administrative duties within the common cadre of the HJS - Once appointed to the common cadre of the Higher Judicial Service, all members lose the 'birthmark' of the source from which they were recruited (RP, LDCE, or DR), and the service rendered in the feeder category pales into insignificance - The theory of classifying District Judges within the HJS based on their length of service in the lower rungs subverts the guarantee of equality available to members of the common cadre - Further advancement within the HJS, including promotion to higher grades, must be based on merit-cum-seniority, evaluated on the basis of performance and service rendered within the HJS cadre and not the lower feeder cadre - Supreme Court ruled out any special quota/weightage for promotee judges in the posts of District Judges, observing that there is no nationwide pattern of disproportionate representation of direct recruits in the Higher Judicial Service. [Relied on State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Sh. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 19; Paras 54-65, 94]  All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1119 : 2025 INSC 1328

Police Service — Dismissal — Appointment based on Forged Degree/Certificate - The respondent, appointed as a Constable in Delhi Police in 1988, was dismissed from service in 1997 after a complaint in 1996 alleged his appointment was based on a forged and fabricated degree/certificate - The Central Administrative Tribunal ("CAT") and the High Court of Delhi set aside the dismissal and remanded the matter for a full-fledged departmental inquiry - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the orders passed by the CAT and the High Court were unsustainable – Held, the act of getting an appointment in a uniformed service like the police, which is supposed to uphold the rule of law, on the basis of a forged degree/certificate is un-condonable - In the particular facts and circumstances of the case, where the forgery was established, the absence of a full departmental inquiry may not be a factor to vitiate the final order of dismissal from service - Appeal allowed. [Para 8] Commissioner of Police v. Ex. Ct. Vinod Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1117

Biometric Attendance System - Introduction without Prior Consultation – Issue - Challenge to the introduction of a Biometric Attendance System in the Office of Principal Accountant General (A&E), Odisha, via Circulars dated 01.07.2013, 22.10.2023, and 06.11.2013 - Supreme Court noted that the employees were not opposed to the introduction of the Biometric Attendance System, which was accepted by their counsel - Since the employees had no reservation, no controversy survived for adjudication, and the department could proceed with implementation - Held that the exercise undertaken by the High Court was "totally unnecessary" - The court ruled that when the introduction of the Biometric Attendance System is for the benefit of all stakeholders, the mere fact that the employees were not consulted before implementation does not render the introduction of the system to be illegal - Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 - 10] Union of India v. Dilip Kumar Rout, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1063

Compassionate Appointment - Civil Death - Date of Death - Decree of Civil Court - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 108 - Presumption of Death (Civil Death) – Held, in cases of civil death, a person is presumed to be dead only if their whereabouts are not heard of for seven years from the date the person went missing - The death will be presumed to be on the expiry of seven years from the date the person disappeared, unless a contrary or specific date of death is proved by adducing cogent evidence - A decree of a Civil Court declaring a person to be dead, pursuant to the seven-year statutory period having elapsed, does not, by itself, fix a precise date or time of death - The decree is silent on the specific date of death unless direct or circumstantial evidence is provided - The burden to prove the date or time of the death lies upon the person who makes such an assertion. [Relied on LIC v. Anuradha, (2004) 10 SCC 131; Paras 6, 7] Commissioner, Nagpur Municipal Corporation v. Lalita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1065 : 2025 INSC 1280

Compassionate Appointment - Civil Death - Retirement and Acceptance of Retiral Dues: Where the missing employee was treated to be in continuous service and duly retired during the period he was missing, and his family members accepted all the retiral dues and are receiving monthly pension, the family has accepted the father's retirement. In these circumstances, the son (Respondent No. 2) cannot claim compassionate appointment, as the father is deemed to have died a civil death after his retirement date - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and allowed the appeal - The Court left it open to the appellants to consider the case of the respondent for appointment for any suitable post independent of the claim for compassionate appointment, if otherwise permissible in law - Appeal allowed. [Paras 4,9, 10-12] Commissioner, Nagpur Municipal Corporation v. Lalita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1065 : 2025 INSC 1280

Appointment in excess of advertised vacancies – Termination – Justification of termination – Scope of Rule 12 of the relevant Rules – Maintenance of Wait List – Complete Justice- Held that Rule 12 was interpreted in Naseem Ahmad case to permit a waiting list of 'reasonable dimensions' to be maintained, which is adequate to meet vacancies that might be available within a reasonable period in the year of recruitment or the year succeeding thereto - The explicit rider in the advertisement that the vacancies could be increased or decreased indicated the Appointing Authority's intention to maintain a wait list to fill up excess vacancies, as permissible under the rules - Given that the next advertisement was only after 8 years (in 2008), it was evident that vacancies arose within that period, justifying the appellants' appointments subsequent to the twelve advertised vacancies - Held that the termination was found to be unjustified. [Relied on Naseem Ahmad and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2011) 2 SCC 734; Paras 6,7,10,11,12] Sanjay Kumar Mishra v. District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar (UP), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1031

Departmental Enquiry – Natural Justice – Non-examination of Complainant – Perverse Findings - Where the Enquiry Officer relied upon a written complaint of bribery without examining the complainant and the other witnesses did not support the charge, such findings are perverse and cannot sustain a dismissal order – Held, the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) was justified in setting aside the penalty - the High Court erred in interfering with such findings - Non-examination of a material witness whose statement formed the foundation of the charge and was never subjected to cross-examination vitiates the enquiry for denial of fair hearing - Noted that While the High Court held that judicial review could not be exercised over findings of fact, the Supreme Court clarified that when findings are based on “completely misleading material” or are perverse, interference is justified - Judicial review is permissible where the conclusion of guilt is unsupported by evidence or based on no evidence - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723; Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10; Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364; Paras 17-19] V.M. Saudagar v. Central Railway, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1029 : 2025 INSC 1257

Directions in Exercise of Complete Justice - Held, the appellants were out of employment for almost 17 years and had worked for eight years, the Court issued specific directions, making it clear that they were in the peculiar circumstances of the case and shall not be a precedent – Directed - i. To be accommodated in existing Class IV vacancies in the District Judgeship of Ambedkar Nagar - If no vacancies exist, they shall be appointed in a supernumerary post, to be adjusted against future vacancies or cease on retirement, whichever is earlier; ii. Appellants who have crossed the age of superannuation: To be entitled to minimum pension dehors (irrespective of) completing only 8 years in employment; iii. Appointed appellants: Shall be continued without any seniority but the prior service period shall be reckoned for determining pensionable service, and they shall be granted pension at the minimum; iv. Intervening period (17 years) shall not be treated as notional service or for computing pensionable service. [Paras 11] Sanjay Kumar Mishra v. District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar (UP), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1031

Parity in Service Conditions – Doctors (Allopathy vs. Indigenous Systems of Medicine) – Retirement Age and Pay Scales – Reference to Larger Bench - Parity in service conditions - The Supreme Court referred the issue of whether doctors practicing Allopathy and those practicing Indigenous Systems of Medicine (like Ayurveda, Homeopathy, Unani, etc.) can be treated equally for determining service conditions, specifically the retirement age and pay packages, to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement - The Court noted a divergence of opinion between its previous judgments regarding whether MBBS doctors and doctors practicing indigenous systems of medicine can be treated equally for service conditions - Held that the consideration for parity in service conditions should ideally be on the touchstone of identity of functions, similarity in work carried out, and comparable duties assigned. [Paras 4-6] State of Rajasthan v. Anisur Rahman, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1017

Principles of Natural Justice - Termination of Service - The termination orders were vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice - The termination orders were held to be violative of the principles of natural justice because the Department shifted the basis for termination to the exclusion of vocational marks after the appellants had successfully replied to the original charges in the show cause notice- This new reason, which was not alleged in the show cause notice, denied them a fair opportunity to defend themselves. [Relied on Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, V.P. & others, (2004) 4 SCC 281; Paras 30-36] Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1009 : 2025 INSC 1212

Recruitment – Wait List/Reserved Panel – Right to Appointment – Binding Nature of Concession on Law – Held, a candidate on a wait list/reserved panel has no vested right to be appointed - The right to be considered arises only if a selected candidate does not join, and the wait list operates for a limited period, not indefinitely, and certainly not after a fresh recruitment process has commenced - Since all selected candidates had joined, the respondent's right as a waitlisted candidate was extinguished - The statement/concession made by the appellants' counsel in 1999 that the respondent would be considered for a future vacancy in the SC quota cannot bind the appellants as it runs contrary to the statutory Recruitment Rules - Giving effect to such a concession would amount to extending the life of the wait list and filling a post in a subsequent recruitment on the basis of a previous, concluded recruitment exercise, which is impermissible and prejudices future candidates - It is open for a party to place the correct position of law before the Court and urge that it should not be compelled to give effect to an erroneous concession if compliance would result in the violation of any statutory rules or regulations - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Association Vs. State of Gujarat and others 1994 INSC 199; Paras 12-17] Union of India v. Subit Kumar Das, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1010 : 2025 INSC 1235

Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 (Jharkhand) - Rule 4 (Eligibility) vs. Rule 21 (Merit List) - Calculation of Marks in Intermediate Examination - Exclusion of Vocational Subject Marks - Supreme Court set aside suspension of school teachers in Jharkhand, finding that they were declared ineligible based on a different charge, which was never labelled against them in the show cause notice – Held, Rule 21 A (ii) (A) of the 2012 Rules, which excludes marks obtained in the "additional subject" for the purpose of calculating the "educational merit point" for preparation of the "Merit List," is not applicable for determining the "minimum qualification" or "eligibility" of a candidate - Rule 4, which deals with eligibility to appear in the Teacher Eligibility Test, does not provide for the exclusion of marks secured in the vocational subject - The method of calculation provided on the reverse side of the marksheet - which includes the bonus marks secured in the vocational subject (over and above the pass marks) to the aggregate to improve the result - must be followed for determining the minimum eligibility marks in the absence of a bar or an alternate method in the eligibility rule (Rule 4) - Department erred in applying Rule 21 for the purpose of deciding the eligibility criteria, an error also committed by the Division Bench of the High Court - Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's judgment, which upheld the termination of the appellants' services (Intermediate Trained Teachers for Classes I-V) - The termination was based on two grounds: (i) invalid graduation certificates and (ii) securing less than the minimum qualifying marks (40% for Scheduled Tribe candidates) in the intermediate examination. [Paras 10 - 29] Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1009 : 2025 INSC 1212

Migration of reserved category candidates to unreserved category - Relaxations availed – Held, Office memorandum, which disallows migration for candidates who avail of 'relaxed standards' like age and experience, does not apply to relaxations in physical standards such as height, weight and chest - Supreme Court drew a distinction between relaxations in age, experience, and written examination standards and variations in physical measurements - Different physical standards for genders, castes or geographical locations are not 'relaxations' in same sense as age or experience concessions - They are distinct parameters for different categories of candidates - Availing physical relaxation doesn't bar reserved candidate from general category selection if rules don't forbid. [Paras 9-12] Uma Shankar Gurjar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 886 : 2025 INSC 1083

Indirect Discrimination - Despite qualifying preliminary, mains, and interview stages of Jharkhand Combined Civil Services Competitive Examination, appellant was disqualified for non-appearance in the medical examination prescribed post-interview – Held, strict adherence to procedural instructions is generally required but found that no penalty for non-appearance at medical exam was prescribed - Reiterated principle that procedure is handmaid of justice and cannot be used oppressively to defeat substantive rights, and exceptions to it, where non-compliance should not automatically result in dismissal unless specific conditions apply - Ambiguity in the press advertisement about the medical examination date created a genuine doubt for appellant's non-appearance, which was not deliberate or mischievous - The appellant belonged to Scheduled Tribe, and indirect discrimination principles under equality jurisprudence were considered relevant - A one-time relaxation was directed by the Court to allow the appellant to appear for medical examination with creation of a supernumerary post and continuity of service benefits excluding back wages - The High Court order was set aside, allowing the appeal with directions for the medical examination to be conducted and appropriate appointment made. [Paras 6, 7, 10-21] Shreya Kumari Tirkey v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 937

Departmental Inquiry - Judicial Review - The power of judicial review of disciplinary inquiry matters is limited to correcting errors of law or procedural errors that result in manifest injustice or a violation of natural justice principles - It is not an appellate adjudication on the merits of the case - If a disciplinary authority accepts findings of the inquiry officer, it is not required to provide detailed reasons for imposing punishment - In a disciplinary inquiry, findings can be based on a preponderance of probabilities and strict proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required - Supreme Court restores SBI official's removal for taking bribes to sanction loans and reiterates limited interference in Writ jurisdiction - Writ Courts can interfere with disciplinary inquiries only in cases of procedural irregularities or violation of natural justice. [Paras 13-15] State Bank of India v. Ramadhar Sao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2025 INSC 1010

Service Law - Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (1995 Act) - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (1947 Act) - Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) - High Court upheld termination of a driver found to be color blind, without offering alternate employment – Held, Respondent failed to make demonstrable efforts to identify or assess the feasibility of alternative employment, violating statutory obligations and administrative fairness - Clause 14 of Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) dt. 17.12.1979, executed under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act, specifically provides for alternate employment to drivers declared color blind with pay protection and continuity of service - This clause remains valid & enforceable - The subsequent MOS dt. 22.12.1986, neither expressly overrides nor impliedly nullifies the 1979 settlement - Both settlements operate harmoniously, with the 1986 settlement being general and the 1979 settlement addressing a specific category of disability (color blindness) - A general provision does not override a specific provision - Failure to explore alternate employment before resorting to medical retirement is a substantive illegality that violates the appellant's right to livelihood and equal treatment - This obligation is rooted in constitutional discipline and statutory expectation flowing from Article 14 & 21 - The burden lies on Respondent-Corporation to establish that no suitable alternate post was available - Directed Respondent-Corporation to appoint appellant to a suitable post - The obligation to reasonably accommodate such employees is not just a matter of administrative grace, but a constitutional and statutory imperative, rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, dignity, and equal treatment. Appeal allowed. [Paras 13, 14, 17, 21, 25-27, 33, 35, 37, 40] Ch. Joseph v. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 763 : 2025 INSC 920

Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966 (Rules of 1966) - Rule 2(g) - State Forest Service - Forest Range Officer (FRO) - Supreme Court examined the definition of 'State Forest Service' under Rule 2(g) of Rules of 1966 and declared that 'any service in a State, being a service connected with forestry and the members thereof having gazetted status', constitutes the 'State Forest Service' subject to the approval of Central Government in consultation with State Government – Held, approval of Central Government is required for the entire service, not for individual posts within it - The post of FRO is part of the State forest Service and that its members are eligible for promotion to the Indian Forest Service (IFoS), provided the service is approved by Central Government - Appellant, a FRO, succeeded on the legal issue, the Court granted limited relief and held that appellant's delay in raising his grievance meant he could not be granted relief for past promotion cycles and that appellant could not be considered ahead of his senior - Respondents must treat the Andhra Pradesh Forest Service, including FROs as the State Forest Service and consider them eligible for promotion - Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 6-11] P. Maruthi Prasada Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2025 INSC 1019

Equal Pay for Equal Work - Contractual v. Regular/Ad Hoc Employees - Supreme Court examined the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' and is applicable to contractually appointed Assistant Professors - Contractual Assistant Professors were appointed through a rigorous public selection process and performed duties identical to those of their regular and ad hoc counterparts – Held, the State did not dispute that these professors performed the same functions - The principle that temporary employees are entitled to the minimum of the pay scale as long as they remain in service - Directed that the contractual professors be paid the minimum pay scale of an Assistant Professor and that arrears calculated at 8% should be paid from 3 years preceding the date of Writ petition were filed - Supreme Court expressed concern about low salaries of Rs. 30,000 p.m. paid to some contractual Assistant Professor for nearly two decades, noting that their regular counterparts earned significantly more - Suggested that the State should rationalize the pay structure based on the functions performed - Appeals allowed. [Paras 18-20, 22, 29, 31-33] Shah Samir Bharatbhai v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 827 : 2025 INSC 1026

Service Law - Retirement Age Extension – Held, excluding outside State experience to consider retirement age extension is arbitrary - Government's notification extending the retirement age from 60 to 65 years was made inapplicable to the appellant citing that appellant did not satisfy 10 year continuous teaching condition in University located in West Bengal - Classifying employees based on past teaching experience from universities within or outside West Bengal, particularly at the verge of retirement after decades of service, lacked a discernible object and nexus - Such classification was deemed artificial, discriminatory and arbitrary, violating the equality norm - There was no material to demonstrate how an employee who had served the university for 14 years would be better qualified for extended service only if their past teaching experience was solely in the State of West Bengal - It is a classic case of a suspect classification and artificial classification intended to sub serve only parochial interests and nothing more - Such classifications lacking a legitimate state objective should be struck down - Order of High Court was set aside - Appeals allowed and granted Rs. 50,000/- as costs to appellant. [Paras 19-24, 27] Subha Prasad Nandi Majumdar v. State of West Bengal Service, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 754 : 2025 INSC 910

Pension - Right to Property - Constitutional Protection - Court reiterated that pension is not a bounty but a valuable right to property, constitutionally protected under Article 300A - It can only be denied or reduced by clear prescription of law and with strict adherence to all procedural safeguards – Held - set aside order of High Court citing that High Court failed to read the regulation in its proper perspective and wrongly held that a compulsorily retired employee would not be entitled to any pension unless order is passed under Regulation 33(1) - Appellant was also not given opportunity of hearing prior to reducing his pension - Appeal allowed. [Para 17] Vijay Kumar v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2025 INSC 848

Disciplinary Action – Fake Transfer Order – Non-Supply of Preliminary Inquiry Report – Natural Justice – Prejudice Requirement – Clarity of Chargesheet – Whether disciplinary action can be challenged for non-supply of a preliminary inquiry report on grounds of violating natural justice without proving grave prejudice. The appellant, a Hindi-trained graduate teacher at Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, was dismissed for securing a transfer from Bangalore to Mumbai using a fake transfer order dated 01.10.1991. Her challenges before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay High Court, and Supreme Court were dismissed, upholding the disciplinary action. Held, Disciplinary proceedings cannot be set aside for non-supply of documents, such as a preliminary inquiry report, unless the delinquent employee demonstrates grave prejudice. Mere technical violations do not breach natural justice principles. The chargesheet clearly alleged the appellant's use of a fake transfer order, enabling effective defense. The Court reaffirmed three natural justice principles: (i) Audi Alteram Partem (right to a fair hearing), (ii) Nemo Judex in Causa Sua (no bias), and (iii) reasoned decisions (speaking orders). Non-supply of documents violates these principles only if it causes grave prejudice. The appellant, who participated in a regular departmental inquiry with evidence from both sides, failed to show prejudice from non-supply of the preliminary inquiry report or other documents. The 9-year inquiry duration, spanning multiple locations, was justified, with no evidence of prejudice or tampering, and the appellant received subsistence allowances. The transfer order was proven fake, with the appellant as the sole beneficiary. The disciplinary authority followed due process, sharing reasons for disagreeing with the inquiry officer and seeking the appellant's response. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the dismissal order, as no violation of natural justice was established. [Referred: Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727, Paras 18–26] S. Janaki Iyer v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2025 INSC 742 : (2025) 8 SCC 696

The Supreme Court directed the State of Uttarakhand to pay Rs. 89 lakhs, in addition to Rs. 11 lakhs already disbursed, to the family of a deceased doctor killed by assailants in a hospital while on duty. The Court noted that a proposal by the Chief Secretary to pay Rs. 50 lakhs as ex-gratia, approved by the Chief Minister, was not honored, with only Rs. 1 lakh initially paid citing rules. Despite subsequent payments and benefits like family pension, gratuity, and compassionate appointment to the deceased's son, the Court found the High Court's compensation calculation using the multiplier method unjustified. Emphasizing the gravity of the incident and nine years of litigation, the Court quantified the total compensation at Rs. 1 crore, including interest, to be paid within six weeks. (Para 5) State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 348

Annual Increment for Retirees – Held, government employees are entitled to an annual increment earned the day before retirement, as per Director (Admn and HR) KPTCL v. CP Mundinamani (11.04.2023). This entitlement applies prospectively to third parties from 01.05.2023, with enhanced pension including one increment payable from that date. No enhanced pension is payable for the period before 30.04.2023. For employees who succeeded in prior writ petitions, the judgment operates as res judicata, entitling them to enhanced pension with one increment as per the judgment, unless the judgment is under appeal and not final. Retired employees who filed applications for intervention, impleadment, writ petitions, or original applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), High Courts, or Supreme Court are entitled to enhanced pension with one increment for the three years prior to the month of filing, as per modified direction issued on 20.02.2025. Applications filed after Union of India & Anr. v. M. Siddaraj (19.05.2023) are governed by the prospective application rule and not the modified direction. Excess payments or arrears already made will not be recovered. Aggrieved parties may approach relevant authorities for non-compliance and, if necessary, the CAT or High Court as per law. Union of India v.. M. Siddaraj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 258

Out of 51 sanctioned lecturer posts at Motilal Nehru Government Polytechnic College, Puducherry, 45 were filled on an ad hoc basis, despite the introduction of recruitment rules in 2006 - Respondent Nos.1-3 were appointed ad hoc in 2005 and sought regularization with back benefits. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Madras Bench, and Madras High Court granted relief, citing parity with 15 similarly situated lecturers who had obtained prior CAT orders (upheld by the High Court and Supreme Court in 2007) for regularization - The Union of India (UoI) and Directorate of Technical Education, Puducherry, appealed, citing UPSC's refusal to regularize "illegal" appointees. No recruitment process was initiated post-2006 rules, despite the lecturers' unblemished service and qualifications - In 2007, the Supreme Court had directed a scheme for regularizing casual lecturers, but compliance lapsed, with UPSC obstructing the 15 prior cases despite past regularizations in other Puducherry institutions. Issues 1. Whether ad hoc lecturers, appointed pre-2006 rules and serving without blemish, are entitled to regularization despite UPSC's objection to "illegal" appointments. 2. Validity of prolonged ad hoc engagements without legitimate recruitment, in defiance of court orders and statutory rules. 3. Accountability for systemic non-compliance and illegal appointments in public employment. Held, Regularization Ordered: Invoking extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to secure "complete justice," the Court directed the Government of Puducherry to regularize the services of all 18 lecturers (15 prior + 3 respondents) forthwith, without UPSC involvement. This overrides exploitative delays, as the lecturers possessed requisite qualifications and had served since 2005. Critique of Authorities: Described the situation as a "very sorry state of affairs." Lamented UPSC's "audacious" stance against a subsisting 2007 Supreme Court order and non-compliance by Puducherry authorities. Noted failure to initiate recruitment post-2006 rules, enabling prolonged ad hoc exploitation. Precedential Clarification: Reaffirmed State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1] does not shield employers from regularization where no recruitment process was undertaken despite opportunities, per Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, (2023) 9 SCC 172]. Public employment mandates selecting the "best available talent" via open advertisement; ad hoc arrangements post-rules are impermissible. Future Safeguards: Prohibited ad hoc appointments for the 6 vacant posts or future vacancies; all must follow 2006 Puducherry Recruitment Rules. Investigation Directed: Ordered a Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) probe into illegal appointments, fixing responsibility on culpable officials (serving or retired). CVC report due by 14 May 2025. Union of India v. K. Velajagan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 170

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; Section 20 - Time-Barred Claims - A time-barred service dispute cannot be brought within the limitation period by filing a belated representation. When a government servant is aggrieved by a denial of a benefit, which is not based on a formal order, then a representation must be filed within a reasonable time. The cause of action to approach the Administrative Tribunal arises when an order is passed on such representation or no order is passed after the lapse of six months from the submission of the representation. There may be situations such as denial of promotion or increment, which are not based on formal orders. In such cases, filing of a representation may be necessary, even if the service rules do not provide specifically for such a remedy. (Paras 34 - 36) Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2025 INSC 565

Armed Forces Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2008; Rule 18 - Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982; Rules 5, 9 and 14 - Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 - Disability Pension - Invalided Soldier - Presumption of Disability Due to Military Service - Burden on Army to Prove Otherwise - Soldier invalided out of service due to disability presumed to have incurred disability from military service unless proven otherwise by the Army - No requirement for soldier to prove disease was contracted or aggravated by military service - Disability leading to invalidation presumed to be above 20%, entitling soldier to 50% disability pension - Beneficial provision to be interpreted liberally - Army directed to grant 50% disability pension with 6% interest on arrears from 01.01.1996 for life, payable within three months. (Paras 44 - 46) Bijender Singh v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 477 : 2025 INSC 549 : AIR 2025 SC 2130

Banking Service - UCO Bank Pension Regulations, 1995 - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 2(p) and 18(1) - Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957; Rule 58 - Bipartite Settlement, 1966 - An employee dismissed for misconduct after completing over ten years of service is entitled to pensionary benefits under the Bipartite Settlement. Regulation 22 which denies pension to removed employees, does not override Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement, which has statutory force under the Industrial Disputes Act. An employee meeting the minimum qualifying service requirement cannot be denied pension, regardless of misconduct, harmonizing the provisions to uphold the employee's superannuation benefits. Appeal dismissed. (Para 14, 17 & 22) Uco Bank v. Vijay Kumar Handa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 390 : 2025 INSC 442 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1484

Banking Service - Union Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976; Regulation 19 - Disciplinary Proceedings - Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) - Procedural Fairness - Mala Fides - Retirement Benefits - Whether the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and issuance of a charge sheet by Union Bank of India against a former employee, without obtaining the Central Vigilance Commission's (CVC) first-stage advice in a vigilance-related case, violated procedural fairness and the Bank's regulations. Held, the Bank's actions, initiated just before the appellant's retirement after 34 years of unblemished service, breached procedural fairness, particularly as the Bank had assured the High Court that the charge sheet would be issued only after receiving CVC advice. The Supreme Court quashed the disciplinary proceedings, finding the Bank's failure to obtain and consider CVC's first-stage advice before issuing the charge sheet arbitrary, mala fide, and in violation of Regulation 19 and CVC circulars. The appeal was allowed, the charge sheet and disciplinary proceedings were set aside, and the Bank was directed to release the appellant's full retirement benefits, excluding back wages. (Para 21) A.M. Kulshrestha v. Union Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2025 INSC 744 : AIR 2025 SC 2520

Caste Certificate - Plea to submit caste certificates beyond cut-off date - OBCNCL/MBC-NCL certificates valid for one year, extendable to three with affidavit – appellants lacked valid certificates at application deadline – No relaxation permissible – As per relevant law, rules and instructions, a certificate of a claim, as put forth by the appellants, was valid for 1 year from the date of issuance, and subsequently, extendable up to 3 years, provided an affidavit to the said effect was also produced along with the originally issued certificate. A claim made by a candidate, while filling their application as per the concerned advertisement, was to hold good as on the date of his or her application or as per the last date of submission of applications prescribed by the concerned advertisement. Thereupon, considering the date of issuance of the category certificates in the appellants' case, none of them had a valid certificate and/or accompanied by the affidavit as per the proforma at the relevant time as per requirement. (Para 33, 36 - 38) Sakshi Arha v. Rajasthan High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2025 INSC 463 : AIR 2025 SC 2232

Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) - Appeals by Group-A officers of CRPF, BSF, SSB, ITBP, and CISF seeking OGAS status and relief from promotional stagnation due to IPS deputation - Directions - Complete cadre review for all CAPFs within six months. Review and amend service and recruitment rules within six months with cadre officers' inputs. DoPT to decide on action taken reports within three months. Progressively reduce deputation posts up to SAG level within two years. (Para 45) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779

Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) - Whether CAPFs qualify as Organised Group-A Services (OGAS) for cadre-related matters, including cadre review and service benefits, and whether deputation of Indian Police Service (IPS) officers to CAPFs causes promotional stagnation for CAPF officers, necessitating reduction. Held, CAPFs are recognised as OGAS for all purposes, including cadre management and service benefits, as per DoPT OM dated 12 July 2019. All OGAS benefits must extend to CAPFs. Central Government directed to complete cadre reviews for all CAPFs and amend recruitment rules within six months to align with OGAS status. To address promotional stagnation, deputation posts up to Senior Administrative Grade (SAG) level to be progressively reduced within two years to enhance promotion prospects for CAPF officers. Ministry of Home Affairs to review service and recruitment rules with inputs from CAPF cadre officers within six months; DoPT to act on reports within three months. Deputation policies remain Central Government's prerogative, but CAPF officers' grievances regarding stagnation and recognition must be addressed to uphold morale. (Paras 43 & 44) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779

Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1977 (Karnataka); Rule 16(a)(iii) – Government Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1957 (Karnataka); Rule 6 – Cadre Change at Employee's Request – Effect on Seniority - the Tribunal as well as the High Court committed an error in directing the appellant to grant seniority to the respondent in the cadre of First Division Assistant with effect from the date in which the said respondent has entered service in the cadre of Staff Nurse from 05.01.1979, instead of 19.04.1989, when she was appointed in the new cadre of First Division Assistant. (Para 24) Secretary to Government Department v. K.C. Devaki, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2025 INSC 389

Compassionate Appointment - Applicable Scheme - Date of Death vs. Date of Consideration - Conflicting Precedents - Terminal Benefits - Retrospective Application - Canara Bank Scheme 1993/2005 - Merits of Claim - No severe financial hardship was demonstrated post-death to warrant compassionate appointment. The widow and respondent (son) were the only dependents; married daughters were settled. The High Court's direction under the 1993 Scheme was set aside, and the appeal allowed by dismissing the respondent's claim. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Conflicting Judicial Precedents on Applicable Scheme - The Court flagged ongoing uncertainty, noting divergent views across decisions - Date of Death View (Binding Precedent): Abhishek Kumar v. State of Haryana (2006) 12 SCC 44; Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar (2015) 7 SCC 412; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas (2020) 10 SCC 496; Indian Bank v. Promila (2020) 2 SCC 729; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashish Awasthi (2023) [Implied Reference]. These hold that claims must be decided under the scheme existing at the date of death, absent retrospective application of a subsequent scheme. No vested right accrues on death to demand consideration under a prior scheme if superseded. – Date of Consideration View: SBI v. Raj Kumar (2010) 11 SCC 661; MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh (2014) 13 SCC 583; N.C. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka (2020) 7 SCC 617. These apply norms prevailing at the time of application consideration, as no vested right exists post-death. The Court observed that three-judge Bench decisions in N.C. Santhosh (supra) and Amit Shrivas (supra) are at variance, and the reference to a larger Bench in State Bank of India v. Sheo Shankar Tewari (2019) 5 SCC 600 remains undecided. It debated retrospective application of executive schemes but deferred resolution, noting an existing reference. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Deceased bank employee left behind widow, unmarried son (respondent, now overage for entry-level post), and three married daughters (not dependents). Family received family pension of Rs. 4,637.92 (deemed sufficient for two dependents) and terminal benefits of Rs. 3.09 lakh. High Court directed appointment and Rs. 5 lakh compensation, upheld on appeal with costs. Impugned High Court orders set aside; compassionate appointment denied for absence of indigence. However, invoking inherent powers and prior coordinate bench observations, employer directed to pay respondent lump sum ex-gratia of Rs. 2.5 lakh within two months as final settlement, considering generated expectations from litigation success. (Para 32, 44, 49) Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Delay in Claim – A lapse of over two decades in pursuing the claim (father's death in 2001; claim assessed in 2025) does not automatically bar consideration where the dependent has diligently litigated against the employer and courts. Respondent's current age is irrelevant if merits are otherwise assessable. (Para 27, 28) Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Disagreement with Canara Bank (2015): Overruling aspects of Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar (supra), the Court held that Clause 3.2 (keeping offers open for minors till majority) is a benevolent provision for human dignity, not linked to terminal benefits. Grant of family pension/terminal benefits does not bar compassionate claims, as they serve distinct purposes. However, judicial propriety precluded referral to a larger Bench, given the pending Sheo Shankar Tewari reference and the claim's two-decade pendency. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Principles - 1. Exception to Equality: Compassionate appointment, offered on humanitarian grounds, is an exception to the constitutional principle of equality in public employment. 2. Rule-Based: It cannot be granted without specific rules or instructions. 3. Purpose: Aimed at addressing sudden financial crises due to the death or medical incapacitation of the family's breadwinner. 4. Immediacy: Appointments must be made promptly to alleviate distress, and delayed applications may be rejected. 5. Strict Interpretation: As a side-door entry, rules must be strictly interpreted. 6. Not a Right: Compassionate appointment is a concession, not a vested right, and depends on fulfilling eligibility criteria, including financial indigence. 7. No Inheritance: It cannot be claimed as an inherited right or based solely on descent. 8. Financial Need: The family's financial distress is a primary condition; terminal benefits and other income sources are considered to assess penury. 9. No Reservation: Vacancies cannot be reserved for minors until they attain majority unless specified by rules. 10. Judicial Restraint: Courts cannot grant compassionate appointments outside statutory regulations or based solely on sympathy. The Court underscored that compassionate appointments are not meant to provide endless support or bypass constitutional safeguards under Articles 14 and 16, ensuring fairness and objectivity in the process. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Scope and Criteria – Held, compassionate appointments under schemes for dependents of deceased employees dying in harness are to be granted only in "hand-to-mouth" cases where the family is below the poverty line and struggling with basic expenses like food, rent, and utilities due to lack of steady sustenance. Such relief is not warranted merely for a fall in standard of life following the breadwinner's death. There is no straitjacket formula; each case must be assessed on its peculiar financial condition, with indigence of dependents being the fundamental precondition. Failure to prove such indigence renders the claim untenable, as it would otherwise create an impermissible reservation conflicting with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (Para 29) Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – The respondent's father, an employee of Canara Bank, died in 2001 prior to retirement. The respondent sought compassionate appointment under the Canara Bank Compassionate Appointment Scheme, 1993. During pendency of High Court proceedings, the Bank introduced the 2005 Scheme, replacing appointments with lump-sum ex-gratia payments, and discontinued the 1993 Scheme via circular. The High Court directed appointment under the 1993 Scheme, leading to the Bank's appeal. Whether, for compassionate appointment claims, the applicable scheme is that prevalent on the date of the employee's death or on the date of consideration of the application. Effect of family pension and terminal benefits on eligibility for compassionate appointment under the 1993 Scheme. Interpretation of Clause 3.2 of the 1993 Scheme regarding minors and terminal benefits - Discussed. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Constitution of India; Article 245 - Principle of Functus Officio – Applicability to Executive Rule-Making Authority - the principle of functus officio does not apply to executive rule-making authority under Article 245 of the Constitution of India and is limited to judicial or quasi-judicial forums. Applying functus officio to the State's rule-making power would cripple executive functions and paralyze governance. The State is not required to provide a prior hearing to affected individuals during the exercise of its rule-making authority, as such a requirement would impose undue procedural constraints and undermine efficient policy implementation. The High Court's decision quashing a revised memorandum on the grounds of functus officio and lack of prior hearing was held to be untenable and ultra vires the Constitution. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 42, 45, 47) P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2025 INSC 212 : AIR 2025 SC 1335 : (2025) 4 SCC 127

Constitution of India - Article 226 - Acquittal in a criminal case based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not bar departmental disciplinary proceedings against a public servant, which are governed by the "preponderance of probabilities" standard. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's Division Bench decision setting aside the dismissal of an Assistant Engineer (Civil) at the Airports Authority of India (AAI), who was acquitted in a corruption case but dismissed following a departmental inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority is not obligated to address every ground raised by the delinquent officer or provide exhaustive reasons in disciplinary orders, provided the findings are supported by a reasoned conclusion and evidence establishing guilt on the preponderance of probabilities. In an intra-court writ appeal, the Appellate Court must exercise restraint, and interference with the Single Judge's judgment is permissible only if it is perverse or suffers from an apparent error of law. The Supreme Court upheld the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities' decisions, reinstating the respondent's dismissal, and found the Single Judge's dismissal of the respondent's writ petition to be well-reasoned. Appeal allowed; respondent's dismissal from service reinstated. (Paras 33, 34, 37 & 38) Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2025 INSC 149 : AIR 2025 SC 1052 : (2025) 4 SCC 111

Constitution of India - Article 311 doesn't mean only appointing authority can initiate disciplinary action against government servant. The appointing authority is not required to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a state employee. While the appointing authority's approval is necessary for dismissal, it is not required for initiating disciplinary action. The High Court's decision, which quashed the state employee's dismissal solely due to the lack of prior separate approval from the Chief Minister for the charge sheet, is erroneous. (Para 33, 34 & 39) State of Jharkhand v. Rukma Kesh Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2025 INSC 412 : AIR 2025 SC 1656

Consumer Forum - Qualification for appointment - A bunch of appeals and review petitions arose from Bombay High Court orders invalidating aspects of the Consumer Protection (Qualification for appointment, method of recruitment, procedure of appointment, term of office, resignation and removal of the President and members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules, 2020 (“2020 Rules”), concerning appointments to consumer fora under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, particularly in Maharashtra. In Impugned Order I, the Bombay High Court struck down Rule 6(1) of the 2020 Rules for executive dominance in the selection process (violating judicial independence per Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Limited, (2020) 6 SCC 1, Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2021) 7 SCC 369 (“MBA – III”), and Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2022) 12 SCC 455 (“MBA – IV”)) and partially invalidated Rule 10(2) on tenure extensions; absent clear reappointment rules, it applied Rule 8(18) of the Consumer Protection (Appointment, Salary, Allowances, and Conditions of Service of President and Members of State Commission and District Forum) Rules, 2019, temporarily. Impugned Order II clarified that directions in Secretary, Ministry of Consumer Affairs v. Dr. Mahindra Bhaskar Limaye, [2023 SCC OnLine SC 231] (“Limaye – I”) on written examinations apply only to non-judicial members of State Commissions and District Commission members. Impugned Order III (Telangana High Court) set aside District Commission appointments predating Limaye – I. The Supreme Court examined consumerism's constitutional foundations under Articles 38, 39, and 47, its evolution, and the adequacy of tenure-based grievance redressal mechanisms. Issues: (i) Feasibility of a permanent adjudicatory forum (e.g., Consumer Tribunal or Consumer Court) for consumer disputes, replacing or supplementing tenure-based appointments with permanent judicial/non-judicial members, staff, and Presiding Officers (potentially headed by sitting judges), alongside enhanced strength and infrastructure; (ii) Notification of revised recruitment rules ensuring judicial independence (majority judicial selection committees), efficiency (five-year tenures per precedents), and differentiated processes (no examinations for judicial posts; mandatory for non-judicial); (iii) Validity of 2020 Rules' provisions on selection committees, examinations, and reappointments; (iv) Scope of Limaye – I directions; (v) Status of existing/pending appointments, terminations, and recruitments amid transitions. Held: Upholding consumerism as a constitutionally embedded right integral to participatory democracy, economic activity, and environmental justice, the Court held that impermanent, tenure-based offices undermine security of tenure, motivation, judicial quality, efficiency, and consumer trust—necessitating a shift to permanency for qualitative, timely decisions. Exercising Article 142 powers, it advocated revamping consumer fora toward permanency at district, state, and national levels, aligning with precedents on judicial independence (Rojer Mathew, MBA – III, “MBA – IV”). Struck down unsustainable aspects of 2020 Rules; clarified Limaye – I requires no written examinations/viva voce for Presidents/Judicial Members of State Commissions or District Commission Presidents, but mandates them (in consultation with State Service Commissions) for Non-Judicial Members; restricted District Commission President qualifications to serving/retired District Judges; set aside Impugned Order I (qua 2019 Rules' applicability for reappointments), upheld Impugned Order II, set aside Impugned Order III; allowed review petitions exempting judicial posts from examinations; mandated four-year tenures for continuing appointments (five-year for future ones); applied judgment prospectively except as directed. Directions: (i) Union of India to file affidavit within 3 months assessing constitutional viability of permanent Consumer Tribunal/Court with permanent staff/members/Presiding Officers, enhanced strength, infrastructure, and independence; (ii) Union to notify new Rules within 4 months incorporating five-year tenures, majority judicial selection committees, differentiated examination requirements, and restricted qualifications per precedents (Rojer Mathew, MBA – III, MBA – IV); (iii) States to complete fresh recruitments within 4 months of notification. Granted interim protections (under Article 142) to seven categories of Presidents/Members, with continuing appointments limited to four-year tenures: (1) Maharashtra appointees (05-10-2023, post-examination) to complete tenures or continue until new process completion; (2) Maharashtra terminated members (06-10-2023) eligible for reappointment consideration under new Rules (judicial posts exempt from examination; non-judicial required); (3) Pre-Limaye – I (pre-2023) serving Presidents/Members to complete tenures or continue until new process; (4) Other States' serving/appointed Presidents/Judicial Members (with/without examinations) to complete tenures; stay-delayed selectees to be appointed for full terms; (5) Pre-Limaye – I non-judicial selectees (without examinations): serving to complete tenures; post-Limaye – I to continue until new process (no appointment if only selected); (6) Post-examination non-judicial selectees: serving to complete tenures; stay-delayed to be appointed for full terms; (7) Other States' terminated members eligible for reappointment under new Rules (judicial exempt from examination; non-judicial required). Ganeshkumar Rajeshwarrao Selukar v. Mahendra Bhaskar Limaye, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2025 INSC 752 : (2025) 8 SCC 634

Deputation and Pension – Right to Absorption – Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules - West Bengal Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules – No right to absorption in borrowed department – Service rendered by a state government employee on a deputation basis in a central government's department would not entitle him to pension as per Central Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1972 - Appeal Allowed. Union of India v. Phani Bhusan Kundu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Disability Pension – Burden of Proof – Schizophrenia – Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) – Medical Board Opinion - Whether the Army bears the burden to prove that a disability arising during service is not service-related, and whether denial of disability pension without reasoned medical opinion is permissible. Held, under the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961, disability pension provisions must be interpreted liberally in favor of the personnel. The burden of proof lies with the Army to demonstrate that a disability arising during service is neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service. The Medical Board's opinion, lacking reasons to classify schizophrenia as a constitutional (hereditary) disorder, was deemed arbitrary and insufficient. Since the appellant was medically fit at enrolment in 1988 and the onset of schizophrenia occurred during service, the authorities failed to discharge the burden of proving the illness was not service-related. Denial of disability pension based on an unreasoned Medical Board opinion is impermissible, as reasons are statutorily required to justify discharge and denial of pension benefits. Where the authority initiates discharge due to a medical condition (not at the personnel's request), the onus to substantiate the grounds for denying disability pension lies heavily on the authority. Appeal allowed; disability pension granted to the appellant. (Para 32 - 36) Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 546 : 2025 INSC 644 : AIR 2025 SC 2804

Disciplinary Action - Moral Turpitude - Dismissal from Service - Proportionality of Punishment - Doctrine of Proportionality - This doctrine forbids the competent authority to act arbitrarily, vengefully or so harshly that the punishment awarded to a delinquent employee pricks the conscience of the court. Held, Respondent-Constable was a member of a disciplined Para Military Force and was posted in sensitive border area. He was obligated to perform his duties and guard the cash boxes with utmost dedication, honesty, commitment and discipline. Contrary to the faith and trust reposed in him by his superiors, he broke open the cash box. On being found guilty of gross misconduct involving moral turpitude, relying on confessional statement and evidences, it is duty of Disciplinary authority to impose a punishment on Respondent. This duty increases especially in Para military forces. All the members of the force must note that there is zero tolerance for such brazen misconduct, where the guardian of the cash box became its looter. The genuineness of the respondent's confession has not been doubted by the High Court. High Court ought not to have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to compel the authorities to impose a punishment less than dismissal from service. Misconduct proved against respondent is so grave and alarming that any punishment less than dismissal from service would prove inadequate and insufficient. High Court ought not to have applied doctrine of proportionality herein. Appeal allowed. (Paras 10, 11) Union of India v. No. 900224364 Const/G.D. Jageshwar Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 668

Disciplinary Proceedings - Acquittal in Criminal Case - Disciplinary action cannot be sustained when an employee is acquitted in a criminal case involving substantially similar charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances, as upholding such findings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. The Court awarded Rs. 30 lakhs compensation and Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant, a constable wrongfully dismissed from Bihar Police Service, due to procedural illegalities, including withheld departmental records, vague charges, and denial of cross-examination rights, rendering the dismissal violative of fairness and natural justice. (Paras 37, 40, 44, 47, 50 & 52) Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2025 INSC 554

Disciplinary Proceedings - Extension of Time - Due Process and Natural Justice - Disciplinary proceedings extending beyond a court or tribunal's stipulated time limit without a genuine attempt to seek an extension are unlawful. If a time limit is conditioned with lapse of proceedings upon default, the disciplinary authority loses jurisdiction. Extensions may be sought in exceptional circumstances, but continuing proceedings without an extension, particularly despite objections, risks bias and violates due process. Non-compliance with judicial orders undermines the rule of law. In a case involving an Assistant Engineer accused of embezzling Rs. 2.5 crore, the Court identified multiple breaches of natural justice, including failure to provide enquiry documents and non-adherence to the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. The enquiry was declared wholly vitiated, and the Court dismissed the appeal, awarding the respondent full retiral benefits, adjusted for provisional pension arrears. (Paras 10, 38, 60, 62, 63, 70) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 463 : 2025 INSC 555

Disciplinary Proceedings - The appellant, a Senior Medical Officer with 34 years of unblemished service, was served a charge-sheet 11 days before his retirement on March 31, 2017, alleging misconduct, including non-compliance with Election Commission directives, unauthorized leave, and failure to participate in the pulse polio program. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated, and the appellant was denied an extension of service. An inquiry officer was appointed a year later, and the appellant was found guilty of most charges, leading to a 2% permanent pension cut. The High Court modified the penalty to a 2% pension cut for 5 years, but the appellant challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Whether the disciplinary proceedings and the penalty imposed were justified. Whether the High Court's modification of the penalty was adequate. Whether the appellant's procedural rights were violated during the inquiry. Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and the disciplinary authority's penalty, holding that the charges were not substantiated by legal evidence. The Court found that the inquiry officer's findings were based on perceived moral duties rather than the actual charges, and the disciplinary authority failed to provide a fair hearing. The appellant was exonerated of all charges, and the Court directed the restoration of his full pension, along with repayment of deducted amounts with 6% interest. The Court also awarded costs of ₹50,000 to the appellant, citing mala fide intent by the respondents in initiating disciplinary proceedings as retaliation for the appellant's prior litigation against high-ranking officials. The Court emphasized that disciplinary actions must be based on legal evidence and procedural fairness, and penalties must be proportionate to the misconduct. The Court deprecated the misuse of disciplinary proceedings to target employees, especially those nearing retirement, for personal vendettas. The Election Commission's policy exempting employees nearing retirement from election duty was highlighted, and the Court found the disciplinary action contrary to this policy. The appellant's full pension was restored, and deducted amounts were ordered to be repaid with interest. Costs of ₹50,000 were awarded to the appellant, with liberty for the State to recover the amount from responsible officials. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing all penalties and restoring the appellant's pension, while condemning the misuse of disciplinary proceedings for personal vendettas. Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2025 SC 620 : 2025 INSC 83

Disciplinary Proceedings - The respondent, a former branch manager of Syndicate Bank, was accused of financial irregularities, including fictitious debits, fraudulent withdrawals, and misappropriation of funds during his tenure at the Mudigubba branch (2007-2008). A disciplinary inquiry found the charges proven, leading to his dismissal in 2012. The respondent was acquitted in criminal proceedings but failed to overturn the dismissal in subsequent appeals. The High Court set aside the dismissal, citing lack of evidence and procedural unfairness, and ordered reinstatement with full benefits. Whether the disciplinary inquiry was conducted fairly and based on sufficient evidence. Whether the High Court erred in interfering with the disciplinary authority's decision. Whether the penalty of dismissal was proportionate to the misconduct. Held, the disciplinary inquiry was fair, principles of natural justice were followed, and the findings were based on substantial evidence, including the respondent's admissions and documentary proof. The Court reiterated that acquittal in criminal proceedings does not exonerate an employee in disciplinary proceedings, as the standards of proof differ. However, considering the respondent's long unblemished service (21 years), the pressure of work, and the reimbursement of the financial loss, the penalty of dismissal was deemed disproportionate. The Court modified the penalty to a reduction in the time scale of pay for one year, without cumulative effect or adverse impact on pension. The appeal was partly allowed. The findings of misconduct were upheld, but the penalty was reduced to a minor penalty under Regulation 4(e) of the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The respondent was entitled to retiral benefits, to be paid within four months. The judgment reaffirms the high standards of integrity expected from bank officers and the limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters. It underscores the principle of proportionality in imposing penalties, especially in cases involving long-standing employees with otherwise clean records. Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N. Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 92 : 2025 INSC 89 : (2025) 3 SCC 601

Education - Role of Teachers - The Court highlighted the pivotal role of teachers in shaping the future of the nation, especially in primary and upper primary education. Teachers are instrumental in moulding young minds, instilling values, and preparing students to be responsible citizens. The Court emphasized the need for teachers to adapt to modern challenges, including the use of technology and artificial intelligence, while guiding students to discern right from wrong. Parimal Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 142 : 2025 INSC 134

Education – Technical Education – AICTE Notifications – Qualifications for Teachers – PhD Requirement - Entitlement to Revised Pay Scales and Redesignation under 6th Pay Commission – Held, Assistant Professors in Engineering institutes (appointed after March 15, 2000), who did not have PhD qualification at the time of appointment or failed to acquire PhD within seven years of their appointment, cannot claim re-designation as Associate Professors in terms of the 2010 notification issued by the All-India Council for Technical Education (AICTE). At the same time, teachers who were appointed in various Engineering institutes prior to March 15, 2000, when PhD was not an essential requirement for the post of Assistant Professor, will receive the benefit and redesignation to the post of Associate Professor as per 6th Pay Commission. (Para 17 & 27) Secretary All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2025 INSC 422 : (2025) 6 SCC 605

Education - West Bengal Primary School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2016 - Eligibility cut-off for D.El.Ed candidates of the 2020-22 batch applying for Assistant Teacher posts in West Bengal is the date of the recruitment notification (21.10.2022), not the earlier announcement (29.09.2022), as no cut-off was specified in the Rules, 2016. Eligibility is determined by the date in the advertisement inviting applications when rules lack a cut-off. The Court upheld the 21.10.2022 notification, allowing candidates who received certificates on 29.11.2022 to participate, and directed the recruitment process to proceed expeditiously under Article 142. [Paras 24, 30 - 33] Soumen Paul v. Shrabani Nayek, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 444 : 2025 INSC 451

Equivalence of Qualifications - Judicial Interference - Where the appointing authority, after obtaining necessary clarification, accepts the equivalence of a candidate's qualification (Diploma in Electrical and Electronics Engineering) with the prescribed qualification (Diploma in Electrical Engineering) for recruitment to the post of Junior Engineer, and no glaring disparity exists between the two, Courts should refrain from interfering by setting aside the appointment on grounds of mere difference in nomenclature. The burden lies on the challenger to demonstrate arbitrariness or illegality in such acceptance, failing which judicial review is unwarranted, as equivalence is primarily a matter for the recruiting authority to determine. [Para 17 - 23] Sajid Khan v. L. Rahmathullah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 237 : 2025 INSC 251 : AIR 2025 SC 1300

Forest Service - Performance Appraisal Reports (PARs) - Authority to Act as Reporting, Reviewing, or Accepting Authorities for Indian Forest Service (IFS) Officers up to Additional Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (APCCF): Held, reporting, reviewing, and accepting authorities for IFS officers up to APCCF must be their immediate superiors within the Forest Department, as mandated by Supreme Court rulings in State of Haryana v. P.C. Wadhwa (1987) and Santosh Bharti v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2007). For the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (PCCF), the reporting authority may be from another department, provided they are higher in rank and familiar with the PCCF's work. The Supreme Court quashed the Government Order (G.O.) dated June 29, 2024, permitting Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers, such as District Collectors and Divisional Commissioners, to comment on PARs of IFS officers up to APCCF, as it violated prior Court directions in Santosh Bharti (September 22, 2000) and TN Godavarman Thirumalpad (April 19, 2004). Noting Madhya Pradesh as the only state adopting this practice, the Court deemed it contemptuous but refrained from further action. The Ministry of Environment and Forests had directed that PARs of IFS officers up to APCCF be evaluated by superior Forest Department officers. IAS officers may provide comments on IFS officers' developmental work on a separate sheet, subject to review by a superior IFS officer. The State of Madhya Pradesh was directed to amend its rules to comply with prior Court orders. The ruling upholds the autonomy of the IFS in performance appraisals up to APCCF, restricting evaluations to Forest Department officers, except for the PCCF. (Para 37) In Re Performance Appraisal Reports of the Officers of the Indian Forest Service, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 605 : 2025 INSC 748

Frivolous Litigation - The petitioner, a former employee of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL), was dismissed in 2000 for habitual absenteeism and misconduct. Despite multiple judicial and administrative forums upholding his dismissal, the petitioner engaged in persistent and frivolous litigation, including filing multiple review petitions, appeals, and complaints alleging corruption against judges. The Court condemned the petitioner's abuse of the judicial process, emphasizing that such conduct wastes valuable judicial time and resources. The Court imposed a cost of ₹1,00,000 on the petitioner, to be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority, as a deterrent against unscrupulous litigants. The SLP and the application for condonation of delay were dismissed, and the Court underscored the need to curb frivolous litigation to ensure timely justice for genuine cases. Pandurang Vithal Kevne v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2024 INSC 1051

Government Service - Sikkim Government Services (Leave) Rules, 1982; Rule 36 r/w. 32 - A government servant re-employed after retirement is not entitled to additional leave encashment under Rule 36 of the Rules if they already availed the maximum 300 days of leave encashment upon initial retirement. Rule 36 applies only to employees retiring at the age of superannuation (58 years) and does not extend to re-employed individuals. Rule 32, which governs re-employed servants, operates independently and does not entitle them to fresh leave encashment. Leave encashment, rooted in principles of equity and deferred compensation, must balance employee welfare with the financial stability of the employer, particularly when public funds are involved. Allowing multiple encashments for the same leave accrual risks unjust enrichment and burdens the public exchequer. The Court set aside the High Court's decision, upheld the State's clarificatory Office Memorandum, and rejected claims of procedural unfairness, finding no violation of natural justice. (Paras 14, 16, 21- 33) State of Sikkim v. Dr. Mool Raj Kotwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 472 : 2025 INSC 559 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1770

IAS (Pay) Rules, 2016; Rule 2 - Contention that no benchmark score was fixed under Rule 2 is inconsequential. Clause 7.2 of the Guidelines clearly states that no benchmark is required. Moreover, the absence of a fixed benchmark does not constitute arbitrariness or discrimination, as the appellant was considered a 'special case' despite 90% of his ACRs being unavailable. (Para 23) Raju Narayana Swamy v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : 2025 INSC 563

IAS Officer - Individual excellence may foster a superiority complex, potentially undermining discipline, decorum, and collegiality. Given the critical need for collective leadership at the highest levels of civil service, the Committee was justified in prioritizing adherence to discipline and collegiality. (Para 22) Raju Narayana Swamy v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : 2025 INSC 563

IAS Officer - Promotion to Chief Secretary Grade - Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) - Eligibility Criteria - Screening Committee - Dismissal of Plea - Officer failed to meet the mandatory requirement of having 90% of Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) completed, a key criterion for promotion eligibility. (Para 25) Raju Narayana Swamy v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : 2025 INSC 563

Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 - Maternity leave is an integral component of maternity benefits, forming part of reproductive rights recognized under international human rights law, encompassing the rights to health, privacy, equality, non-discrimination, and dignity. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's order denying maternity leave to a government teacher for her third child, citing the State's two-child norm policy. The appellant, who had two children from a prior marriage (not in her custody) and sought leave for her first child born during employment, was entitled to maternity benefits under the Act. The Act prevails over conflicting State service rules by virtue of Article 254 of the Constitution. The Act's provisions on maternity leave duration (26 weeks for women with fewer than two surviving children, 12 weeks for those with two or more) do not limit benefits based on the total number of children, and “surviving children” refers to those in the custody of the woman employee. The State's two-child norm must be harmonized with the objectives of maternity benefits through purposive interpretation. The impugned order was set aside, restoring the Single Judge's direction to grant maternity leave from 11 October 2021 to 10 October 2022. (Paras 28, 32, 34, 35) K. Umadevi v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : 2025 INSC 781 : AIR 2025 SC 2719 : (2025) 8 SCC 263

Pay Scale - Employees appointed on a temporary basis against sanctioned posts are entitled to a regular pay scale after completing three years of service, as per the relevant government circular. The designation of employees as "part-time" does not negate their entitlement to a regular pay scale if they are appointed against sanctioned posts and fulfill the conditions of the applicable rules. The absence of a Screening Committee for scrutinizing eligibility does not justify denying benefits to employees who are otherwise similarly situated to those who have received such benefits. The appellants were granted the benefit of a regular pay scale, and the State was directed to pay arrears accordingly. Rakesh Kumar Charmakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2025 INSC 136 : (2025) 3 SCC 326

Pensionary Benefits – Regularization of Absence as Extraordinary Leave – Break in Service - Whether a retired government employee can be denied pensionary benefits on the ground of 'break in service' when their unauthorized absence was regularized as extraordinary leave. Held, pensionary benefits cannot be denied to a retired government employee whose unauthorized absence was regularized as extraordinary leave. Once the absence is treated as extraordinary leave, it cannot be considered a 'break in service' for denying pension. Denial of pensionary benefits must be supported by a departmental inquiry proving unauthorized absence, and the burden cannot shift to the employee to prove they were prevented from working. In the absence of such an inquiry, the regularization of service prevails, entitling the employee to pensionary benefits. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the decisions of the State Administrative Tribunal and High Court. The respondents were directed to finalize the appellant's pension within three months. (Para 11, 12) Jaya Bhattacharya v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2025 INSC 270 : AIR 2025 SC 1575

Pensions – Odisha Pension Rules, 1992 – A batch of job contract employees in Odisha, initially engaged under job contract establishments and later regularised in pensionable posts, claimed pensionary benefits counting their entire pre-regularisation service. The Orissa Administrative Tribunal and Single Judge of the Orissa High Court upheld the claim, treating job contract service akin to work-charged service. The State's writ appeals before the Division Bench were dismissed as time-barred due to inordinate delay. The State approached the Supreme Court via special leave petitions, many filed belatedly. Appeals allowed; costs imposed. (Para 3. 15, 20) State of Odisha v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : 2025 INSC 259

Pensions – Odisha Pension Rules, 1992 – Rule 18(3), (6) – Distinction between work-charged employees and job contract employees – Entitlement to pension for pre-regularisation service – Job contract employees not entitled to count entire pre-regularisation service towards pension; only qualifying period to make eligible for pensionary benefits – Unlike work-charged employees, whose full service of 5 years or more counts if uninterrupted and followed by regular appointment – 2001 amendment to Rule 18(6) limits job contract service to minimum qualifying period post-regularisation – State's delay in appeals condoned due to fiscal implications on exchequer and large number of affected employees, but costs of ₹1.5 lakhs per employee imposed on State for lethargic litigation approach – Orissa Administrative Tribunal and Orissa High Court orders set aside insofar as they allowed full pre-regularisation service for job contract employees. (Para 3. 15, 20) State of Odisha v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : 2025 INSC 259

Pensions – Odisha Pension Rules, 1992 – Rule 18(3), (6) – Whether job contract employees, upon regularisation, are entitled under the Odisha Pension Rules, 1992, to pension benefits counting their full pre-regularisation service period, or only a limited qualifying portion thereof, as distinct from work-charged employees. Held: The Supreme Court, departing from the norm against condoning excessive delays, examined the merits given the matter's impact on numerous employees and the State exchequer. It clarified the statutory distinction under Rule 18: sub-Rule (3) qualifies the full uninterrupted service of work-charged employees (5+ years) for pension upon regularisation, whereas sub-Rule (6) limits job contract employees to only that service portion necessary to achieve pension eligibility post-regularisation. The 2001 amendment reinforced this intent to curb undue fiscal burden. The Tribunal and High Court misinterpreted the rules by equating the two categories. Full pre-regularisation service for job contractors impermissibly expands eligibility beyond legislative scheme. Directions issued for State to deposit ₹1.5 lakhs per affected employee within 4 weeks, non-effective until compliance; dismissed delay-based petitions revived per merits. (Para 3. 15, 20) State of Odisha v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : 2025 INSC 259

Police Service - Constitution of India; Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Constitutional Validity of Retrospective Amendment – Whether the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955, granting seniority to in-service candidates over direct recruits based on prior service instead of competitive examination marks, violates Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. Held, seniority in direct recruitment must be determined solely based on merit, i.e., marks obtained in the competitive examination, and not prior in-service experience. The retrospective application of the 2017 amendment, which favored less meritorious in-service candidates, was arbitrary and unconstitutional, violating Articles 14 (equality before law), 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment), and 21 (due process). The Supreme Court struck down the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) and directed the State to: (i) recast seniority lists for direct recruits from 1995 based exclusively on examination ranks within 60 days; (ii) ensure no reversion of existing promotions but halt further promotions until revised lists are issued; and (iii) grant notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages) to eligible direct recruits based on revised lists. (Para 22–27) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612

Police Service - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Directions – (i) Recast seniority lists for direct recruits (80% open market, 20% in-service) based solely on competitive examination marks within 60 days. (ii) No reversion of officers promoted under prior seniority lists, but no further promotions until revised lists are finalized. (iii) Grant promotions to eligible departmental candidates based on revised seniority lists within two months. (iv) Direct recruits found eligible in revised lists entitled to notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages). (v) Conduct a common competitive examination for 100% direct recruitment, with seniority determined strictly by examination marks/ranks. (Para 28) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612

Prolonged suspension - Reinstatement - Subsistence Allowance - The applicant, an Assistant Superintendent (Jail), sought revocation of his suspension which was extended periodically. The suspension followed allegations of providing undue facilities to ex-promoters/directors of Unitech Ltd. who were under trial for financial misappropriation involving home buyers' funds. The Supreme Court directed the suspension of 32 Tihar Jail officials, including the applicant, pending further proceedings. The applicant argued for reinstatement, citing the prolonged suspension and lack of progress in the criminal case. The Court recalled the suspension order, leaving it to the Competent Authority to decide on reinstatement based on whether it would impede the ongoing departmental proceedings. The Court noted that suspended officials are entitled to 75% of their pay as subsistence allowance after six months of suspension, unless denied for valid reasons. Bhupinder Singh v. Unitech Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 147

Promotion - Direct Recruitment - Procedure - Whether an employee is entitled to claim promotion to a post that is required to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment, and not through promotion from a feeder cadre? Whether a vacancy meant for direct recruitment can be filled merely by issuing an internal circular, without a public advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates? The importance of adhering to statutory rules and proper documentation in judicial proceedings to avoid miscarriage of justice. The petitioner, employed as a peon since 1978, sought promotion to the post of Tracer, claiming eligibility based on a 3-month training course. The Administrative Tribunal initially directed the State to consider her case for promotion. However, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order, holding that the post of Tracer was to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment as per the Orissa Subordinate Architectural Service Rules, 1979. The petitioner challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Held, the post of Tracer, as per the 1979 Rules, is to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment and not through promotion. Rule 5(1)(e) of the 1979 Rules explicitly states that all posts of Tracers in Categories I, II, and III shall be filled by direct recruitment. The petitioner, being a peon, was not eligible for promotion to the post of Tracer, as it is not a promotional post under the Rules. The Court reiterated that direct recruitment to public posts must follow a transparent process, including public advertisements and competitive examinations, as mandated by Rule 7 of the 1979 Rules. The State's failure to issue a public advertisement and follow the prescribed procedure rendered the appointments invalid. Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2025 INSC 87 : AIR 2025 SC 676

Promotion - Eligibility criteria - Medical Education Service - Post of Associate Professor - Distinction Between Administrative and Teaching Cadres - Whether the High Court of Kerala was justified in interfering with the promotion to the post of Associate Professor in the Department of Neurosurgery on the ground of lacking five years of physical teaching experience as an Assistant Professor after acquiring the M.Ch. degree. Whether Government Order (G.O.) dated April 7, 2008, or G.O. dated December 14, 2009, governed the eligibility criteria for promotion to the post of Associate Professor in the Medical Education Service. Whether the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules (KS & SSR), particularly Rule 10(ab), applied to the promotional appointment in question. Held, G.O. dated April 7, 2008, which governed the recruitment and promotion in the Medical Education Service, did not explicitly require five years of teaching experience after acquiring the M.Ch. degree for promotion to the post of Associate Professor. The absence of such a requirement in the Teaching Cadre (Branch-II) was deliberate, as it was explicitly mentioned in the Administrative Cadre (Branch-I). The Court applied the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing excludes the other) to conclude that the omission of the phrase “after acquiring postgraduate degree” in the Teaching Cadre was intentional. Rule 10(ab) of the KS & SSR, which generally requires experience to be gained after acquiring the basic qualification, was held inapplicable to the promotional appointment in question. The Court reasoned that G.O. dated April 7, 2008, being a special rule, superseded the general rules under the KS & SSR. The phrase “unless otherwise specified” in Rule 10(ab) allowed for exceptions, and the specific requirements of G.O. dated April 7, 2008, constituted such an exception. The High Court's reliance on Rule 28(b)(1A) of the KS & SSR was also deemed erroneous, as it applied only when no qualified candidate was available for promotion, which was not the case here. The requirement of post-qualification experience was more relevant for administrative posts (Branch-I) than for teaching posts (Branch-II), where the emphasis was on overall teaching experience. Dr. Sharmad v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2025 INSC 70

Promotion to the post of District Judge – Merit-cum-Seniority – Suitability Test – Seniority - Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal challenging the denial of promotion to the appellants, who were judicial officers in Jharkhand, despite qualifying the suitability test for promotion to the post of District Judge in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service. The appellants were denied promotion on the basis of a merit list, although they had secured more than the requisite minimum marks for suitability. The Court relied on the judgment in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta v. High Court of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 387, holding that under the 65% quota for promotion based on merit-cum-seniority, once a candidate qualifies the suitability test, promotions cannot be denied solely on the basis of a comparative merit list. The suitability of each candidate should be assessed individually, and a comparative assessment is not warranted unless explicitly provided by the applicable rules. Under the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services (Recruitment, Appointment, and Condition of Service) Rules, 2001, promotions under the 65% merit-cum-seniority quota should be based on suitability, not comparative merit. Once candidates qualify the suitability test, they are entitled to promotion without a comparative merit list ranking. The appellants were granted notional promotion from the date on which other officers from the same selection list were promoted (i.e., as per the notification dated 30.05.2019). They were also entitled to all consequential service benefits, including seniority, increments, and notional pay fixation, but without any back wages. Appeal Allowed. Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. Honble High Court of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2025 INSC 72 : AIR 2025 SC 465 : (2025) 6 SCC 460

Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Judicial Review - Courts should scrutinize whether the decision to cancel a selection process is wholly disproportionate to the risk and overly severe. When systemic fraud or irregularities vitiate a recruitment process, the entire process becomes illegitimate. If 2 wrongdoers can be segregated, innocent candidates should not be penalized by the cancellation of the entire process. In cases involving larger public interest, additional grounds can be considered to examine the validity of an order. The court can review the original reasons that caused the cancellation of the select list. (Para 50 & 51) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Judicial Review - Each case regarding the cancellation of a select list must be decided on its own facts. The court must determine if the recruiting authority's decision to cancel the entire process, rather than save a part of it, is disproportionate and irrational. If the selection process borders on fraud, such as through violations of reservation policies, the decision to cancel the entire process can be justified. (Para 50 & 51) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Rights of Empanelled Candidates - Empanelment does not grant an indefeasible right to appointment, but empanelled candidates have a right to challenge adverse decisions. The appointing authority cannot ignore the select panel arbitrarily; there must be cogent reasons for not making appointments. Policy decisions not to carry forward the selection process must be bona fide, justifiable, and free from arbitrariness. (Para 53) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

Public Employment - Interview-Based Selection - Presumption of Favouritism - Arbitrariness and Judicial Review - When a government itself acknowledges that a selection process based solely on interviews carries an inherent risk of arbitrariness and potential for misuse, this perception is a significant factor in judicial review. An assessment of candidates based solely on interview marks can reasonably lead to a presumption of favouritism. In such circumstances, courts should exercise significant restraint in substituting their judgment for the government's decision, especially when the government has acted to rectify a selection process perceived as flawed. (Para 40) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

Public Employment - Recruitment Process - Cancellation of Select List by Successor Government - Judicial Review - Proportionality Test - Scope of Interference - Where a successor government cancels a select list prepared by a previous government due to detected illegalities and irregularities, the judicial review court must apply the proportionality test to assess whether the cancellation was justified. The court should consider whether the government's decision was so disproportionate and incommensurate with the detected illegalities/irregularities as to warrant interference. The court should not substitute its own view for that of the government, especially when the government's decision is not unreasonable or implausible. The government's decision to ensure diversity, inclusivity, and fairness in public service, even if it entails canceling a tainted selection process, should be given due deference. (Para 52) Public Employment - Absence of Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidates - The absence of a challenge from unsuccessful candidates does not preclude the government from addressing perceived arbitrariness or potential for favouritism in a selection process. (Para 40) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

Recruitment Process - Constable positions in the Assam Forest Protection Force (AFPF) - Political Change and Cancellation- The appellants are granted liberty to take forward the process of filling up 104 Constables in the AFPF, in accordance with law, by publishing fresh advertisement. The respondents, if they choose to apply in pursuance of such advertisement, shall be considered for appointment waiving their age bar as well as waiving insignificant minor deficiencies in physical measurement as well as insignificant requirements of the PET. It would be desirable if rules are framed for the purpose of recruitment and such rules are uniformly applied to all and sundry, so as to preempt any allegation of bias or arbitrariness. (Para 63 & 64) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

Recruitment - Qualification - Teacher Eligibility Test - Whether the High Court erred in permitting candidates with Central Teacher Eligibility Test (CTET) or State Teacher Eligibility Test (STET) qualifications to participate in the recruitment process for Assistant Teachers in Jharkhand, despite the Jharkhand Teacher Eligibility Test (JTET) being the prescribed eligibility criterion under the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023? Whether the State of Jharkhand acted arbitrarily by altering the eligibility criteria mid-way through the recruitment process, in violation of the principles laid down in Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 864 ? Whether the State Government has the authority to relax the minimum qualifications for teacher recruitment under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) Guidelines, 2011 ? Held, the Jharkhand High Court erred in permitting CTET and STET qualified candidates to participate in the ongoing recruitment process for Assistant Teachers in Jharkhand. The Court emphasized that the eligibility criteria, as per the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023, required candidates to pass the JTET, and this criterion could not be altered mid-way through the recruitment process. The Court reiterated the principle laid down in Tej Prakash Pathak that the eligibility criteria for recruitment cannot be changed after the recruitment process has commenced, as it would violate the guarantee of equal opportunity under Article 16 of the Constitution. The State's decision to relax the eligibility criteria based on the Advocate General's concession was deemed arbitrary and unfair. The State Government does not have the authority to relax the minimum qualifications for teacher recruitment under the RTE Act and NCTE Guidelines unless the Central Government issues a notification under Section 23(2) of the RTE Act. The State's actions in this case were not in compliance with the statutory framework. The impugned judgment of the High Court permitting CTET and STET holders to participate in the recruitment process was set aside. Only JTET holders who possessed the requisite qualifications under the 2022 Recruitment Rules prior to the 2024 amendment were declared eligible for appointment. CTET and STET holders who applied after the High Court's judgment or the amendment in the rules were deemed ineligible for recruitment under Advertisement No. 13/2023. The appeals were allowed, and the recruitment process was directed to proceed strictly in accordance with the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023, without any mid-way alterations to the eligibility criteria. Parimal Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 142 : 2025 INSC 134

Reservation – Validity of OBC-NCL/MBC-NCL Certificates – Cut-off Date for Eligibility - Split Verdict - The appeals arose from a split verdict by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court on May 18, 2023, concerning the appointment of Civil Judges under the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010. The Supreme Court heard the appeals before a 3-Judge Bench due to the Division Bench's split verdict and held that in the absence of a specified cut-off date in recruitment advertisements, the last date for application submission is the default date for assessing eligibility, including the validity of reserved category certificates. OBC-NCL and MBC-NCL 2 certificates are valid for one year, extendable to three years with an affidavit, as per State circulars. Certificates issued beyond this period are invalid for claiming reservation benefits. Subsequent notice clarifying cut-off date, aligning with existing rules and judicial precedents, is not arbitrary. Appellants' certificates issued between 2012-2018 and after cut-off date were invalid, and no relaxation permissible absent discretionary clause in rules. Appeals dismissed, upholding High Court's exclusion of appellants from interviews for Civil Judge posts. (Para 36 - 39) Sakshi Arha v. Rajasthan High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2025 INSC 463 : AIR 2025 SC 2232

Retired Employees – Recovery of Excess Payment – Principles of Equity - Excess payment made to an employee cannot be recovered if such payment was not on account of any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the employee. Also, excess payment to the employee due to any wrong application of the rule or incorrect calculation on the part of the employer is not recoverable. (Para 9 & 11) Jogeswar Sahoo v. District Judge Cuttack, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2025 INSC 449 : AIR 2025 SC 2291

Retirement Age - Prescribing different retirement ages for employees based on the type of disability is arbitrary and violates Article 14. The Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board retired a locomotor-disabled electrician at 58, while visually impaired employees could serve until 60 under a 2013 state policy (OM 29.03.2013). Such distinctions discriminatory, mandating uniform retirement benefits for all benchmark disabilities under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. The impugned decision was set aside, affirming equal treatment across disability categories and the appellant's legitimate expectation of an extended retirement age until the policy's withdrawal in 2019. Appeal allowed. (Para 14) Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 646 : 2025 INSC 472

Rule Against Bias - Audi Alteram Partem - Cure at Revisional Stage - Whether the selection of Shiksha Karmi Grade III teachers in Janpad Panchayat, Gaurihar in the year 1998 was vitiated due to violation of the rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) ? Whether the cancellation of appointments without affording the appellants an opportunity of hearing (audi alteram partem) violated the principles of natural justice, and whether demonstrating prejudice is necessary to establish such a violation ? Whether the breach of natural justice at the initial stage (Collector's order) can be cured at the revisional stage (Commissioner's order) ? The appellants, relatives of members of the selection committee, were selected for the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade III teachers in 1998. Their selection was challenged by an unsuccessful candidate alleging nepotism and bias. The Collector quashed the selection, citing bias and nepotism, without issuing notice to the appellants. The Commissioner and High Court upheld the decision, despite the appellants' contention that they were denied a fair hearing. Held, the selection was not vitiated by bias. The recusal of committee members with relatives among the candidates, as per the Panchayat's resolution, eliminated any reasonable likelihood of bias. The statutory definition of "relative" was not fully considered by the lower authorities, and the absence of a hearing prevented the appellants from demonstrating the fairness of the selection process. The Court found a gross violation of the principle of audi alteram partem, as the appellants were not given notice or an opportunity to be heard at the initial stage. The breach of natural justice was fundamental, and the prejudice exception did not apply. The Court emphasized that procedural fairness is inherent and cannot be dispensed with, even if no prejudice is demonstrated. The denial of natural justice at the initial stage could not be cured at the revisional stage. The appellate process cannot rectify a fundamentally flawed initial decision, especially when the revisional authority did not conduct a fresh hearing or address the procedural defects. The selection process was not vitiated by bias, but the cancellation of appointments without a fair hearing violated the principles of natural justice. Given the 25-year tenure of the appellants under interim orders, the Court declined to remand the matter for fresh inquiry, deeming it impractical and unjust. The judgment reaffirms the importance of procedural fairness in administrative decisions, emphasizing that the principles of natural justice, particularly the right to a fair hearing, are fundamental and cannot be overlooked. The Court also clarified that the rule against bias must be assessed contextually, and the doctrine of necessity may apply in cases where recusal is impractical due to small jurisdictions or statutory mandates. Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545

Seniority – If a government employee holding a particular post is transferred on public interest, he carries with him his existing status including seniority to the transferred post. However, if an officer is transferred at his own request, such a transferred employee will have to be accommodated in the transferred post, subject to the claims and status of the other employees at the transferred place, as their interests cannot be varied without there being any public interest in the transfer. Subject to specific provision of the Rules governing the services, such transferees are generally placed at the bottom, below the junior-most employee in the category in the new cadre or department. (Para 19) Secretary to Government Department v. K.C. Devaki, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2025 INSC 389

Subordinate Service - Kerala Public Health Engineering Subordinate Service Rules, 1966 (Subordinate Service Rules) and Kerala Public Health Engineering Service Special Rules, 1960 (Special Rules) govern completely separate cadres. Rule 4(b) of the Special Rules applies only after appointment as Assistant Engineer, and cannot be applied for lower promotions. (Para 24) Sajithabhai v. Kerala Water Authority, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2025 INSC 354

Subordinate Service - Re-evaluation of answer sheets - The Supreme Court directed the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Services Selection Commission (UPSSSC) to re-evaluate answer sheets for the 2021–2022 Revenue Lekhpal examination due to ambiguities in three questions from Booklet Series “B.” For Question 58 (Salt Satyagraha Location), the Court held both (A) Dandi and (C) Sabarmati as correct, noting the march started at Sabarmati but the act of defiance occurred at Dandi, and awarded marks for either choice. For Question 63 (Longest National Highway in UP), options (C) NH2 and (D) None of these were accepted due to outdated designations. For Question 90 (Solar Photovoltaic Irrigation Pump Scheme grant), both (B) 30% and (C) 45% were deemed valid due to policy changes. Criticizing UPSSSC for framing ambiguous questions, the Court ordered re-evaluation for affected candidates without disturbing selected candidates. (Para 10 - 12) Reetesh Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 523

Transfer - Distinction between transfers on request and transfers by absorption in public interest - Determination of seniority of employees absorbed from the Directorate of Health Services (DHS) into the Directorate of Medical Education (DME) following the abolition of the dual control system in medical colleges in Kerala - Held, the transfer of employees from DHS to DME was a result of a policy decision by the Kerala government to abolish the dual control system, and the absorption was not based on the employees' request but on their option to join DME. The proviso to Rule 27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules (KS&SS Rules), which applies to transfers on request, does not apply to transfers by absorption made in public interest or administrative exigency. The seniority of the absorbed employees should be maintained as per Rule 27(a) and 27(c) of the KS&SS Rules, meaning their seniority would include their past service in DHS. The Division Bench's judgment was set aside, and the State of Kerala was directed to prepare the seniority list of DME employees, including both original and absorbed employees, in accordance with the Court's ruling. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the absorbed employees, holding that their seniority should include their past service in DHS, as the transfer was a result of a policy decision and not a request-based transfer. Geetha V.M. v. Rethnasenan K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2025 INSC 33 : AIR 2025 SC 824

University - Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976 - Appeal against High Court order dismissing writ petition seeking inclusion in University's General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Appellant, appointed as Junior Scientist cum Assistant Professor in 1987, did not opt for Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) despite opportunities. University statutes provided for two retiral benefit schemes: CPF (opt-in) and General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cumgratuity (default). University issued Office Order dated 21.02.2008, reiterating this, stating non-exercise of CPF option would result in inclusion in the default scheme. Appellant's name was omitted from the list of those included in the default scheme. Whether the appellant, who did not opt for CPF, is entitled to be included in the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Held, Yes. University statutes and Office Order clearly stipulate that non-exercise of CPF option automatically entitles employees to the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cumgratuity scheme. High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition based on nonexercise of option, as non-exercise led to inclusion in the default scheme. Similar relief granted to similarly placed persons by the High Court. High Court order set aside. University directed to provide retiral benefits under the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme within four months, subject to adjustments of CPF benefits, if any, availed by the appellant. Appeal allowed. (Para 12) Mukesh Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Agricultural University, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2025 INSC 312

University - Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976 - the default retiral scheme applicable to the University's employees is General Provident Fund-cumpension-cum-gratuity, unless the employee has specifically opted for the Contributory Provident Fund scheme. (Para 9) Mukesh Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Agricultural University, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2025 INSC 312

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013

Section 11(1), Section 2(o), and Section 9 – Jurisdiction of Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) – Inter-Departmental Complaints – Held, the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman has the jurisdiction to entertain and inquire into a complaint of sexual harassment even if the 'respondent' is an employee of a different department or workplace - Supreme Court rejected the narrow interpretation that an inquiry can only be conducted by the ICC where the respondent is employed. [Relied on Eera v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 15 SCC 133; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241; Balasinor Nagrik Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya, (1987) 1 SCC 606; Paras 44-49, 54-56, 68] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415

Interpretation of Statutes – Use of the word 'Where' in Section 11(1) – Held, the expression "where the respondent is an employee" in Section 11(1) of the POSH Act is a procedural trigger and not a jurisdictional constraint - The word 'where' functions as a 'conditional conjunction' (meaning 'in case' or 'if') to denote different scenarios (employee vs. domestic worker) and the corresponding procedure to be followed. [Relied on Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. and Davies (Inspector of taxes) 1968 AC 1097; Paras 37-44, 47-50, 60-67] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415

Service Rules and Disciplinary Action – Two-Stage Inquiry Process – Held that in cases involving Central Government employees, the inquiry proceeds in two stages: (i) A fact-finding or preliminary inquiry by the ICC at the aggrieved woman's workplace under the POSH Act ; and (ii) If the allegations are proved, the report is sent to the respondent's employer, who may then initiate formal disciplinary proceedings under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, where the ICC of the respondent's department acts as the inquiring authority. [Paras 60-63] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415

Social Welfare Legislation – Purposive Interpretation – Held that the POSH Act is a social welfare legislation intended to uphold fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution - Any interpretation that compels an aggrieved woman to pursue her remedy at an "alien workplace" of the respondent would create procedural and psychological barriers, defeating the Act's remedial intent. [Relied on Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan 1957 SCC OnLine SC 8; Paras 32-35, 72] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415

Section 2(n), 3(2), 9 - Complaint of sexual harassment filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 9 - Whether the subsequent administrative actions against the appellant would constitute sexual harassment under the Act to extend the limitation period – Held, a complaint of sexual harassment must be filed within 3 months of the last incident, or within an extended period of 3 months, for a total of 6 months - the definition of sexual harassment includes unwelcome acts of a sexual nature as well as circumstances such as implied or explicit threats of detrimental treatment in employment or creating a hostile work environment - For subsequent actions to be considered part of the sexual harassment, there must be a direct link between the new action and a prior overt act of sexual harassment - A distinction exists between a 'continuing wrong' where the injury persists, and a 'recurring wrong', where a fresh cause of action arises each time - Administrative actions taken against the appellant, such as her removal as Director, were collective decisions of the Executive Council based on an independent complaint - These actions were administrative in nature and did not create a gender-based hostile environment - they were not directly linked to the prior sexual harassment and did not constitute a continuing wrong - the last incident of sexual harassment was in April 2023 and the complaint filed in December 2023 was time-barred - Directed VC-respondent no. 1 to mention judgment in his resume - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 14 - 32] Vaneeta Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 902 : 2025 INSC 1106

Slum Areas

Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance And Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (Maharashtra) - Section 14 - Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRA) - Acquisition of Land - Preferential Right of Owner - Recreational Ground (RG) – Held, the power of the State Government to acquire land under Section 14 read with Section 3D(c)(i) of the Slum Act for the purpose of a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme is subject to the preferential right, if any, of the owner to redevelop the Slum Rehabilitation Area - Supreme Court declined to grant the appellant's prayer for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to acquire the subject property under Section 14 of the Slum Act, holding that the owner's preferential right had not been extinguished - The subject property, which is reserved for Recreational Ground (RG), cannot be constructed upon - The subsequent developer (Respondent No. 4) is directed not to put up any type of construction on the subject property, and the same shall be utilized only as a Recreational Ground (RG) - The appellant (Jyoti Builders) was held to have been fully compensated by the grant of adequate area/FSI for sale, and is entitled to the Occupation Certificate for the Final Sale Building upon handing over its own plot reserved for RG - It is well settled that the power of the State Government to acquire land under Section 14 read with Section 3D(c)(i) of the Slum Act is subject to preferential right, if any, of the owner. [Relied on Tarabai Nagar Co-Op. Hog. Society (Proposed) v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 LiveLaw SC 832; Paras 63, 71-77] Jyoti Builders v. Chief Executive Officer, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1158 : 2025 INSC 1372

Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (Maharashtra); Section 14 - Land Acquisition - Preferential Right of Owner - Primacy of owner's right over SRA's power - Validity of acquisition of land in a Slum Rehabilitation Area (SR Area) when the landowner is willing to redevelop it – Held, owner of a plot of land within a SR Area has a preferential right to redevelop the land - Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) can only undertake development if the landholders or occupants do not come forward with a proposal within reasonable time - Publication of the Section 3C(1) Declaration in Official Gazette is not sufficient to fulfil the requirement of inviting a landowner to redevelop the land - Without special notice-cum-invitation from SRA to the landowner, the owner may be unable to prepare an SR Scheme due to the inaccessibility of technical information and surveys - A specific notice-cum-invitation to the owner is a necessary procedural requirement to ensure the owner's preferential right is not frustrated - State Government's power to acquire land under Section 14 is subject to the landowner's preferential right to redevelop - Acquisition process must be held in abeyance until the owner's preferential right is extinguished - Acquisition cannot proceed as long as the owner is willing to undertake development - There appears no cogent reason as to why, instead of enacting a self-contained code within Section I-A, the drafters of this legislation chose to incorporate an entirely distinct slum rehabilitation mechanism by amending the existing legislation through Section 3D - Court granted landowner a period of 120 days to submit a fresh SR Scheme for redevelopment - Upheld order of High Court - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 45- 48, 50-53, 64- 65, 68, 74, 84] Tarabai Nagar Co-Op. Hog. Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2025 INSC 1015

Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance, and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (Maharashtra) Once a slum area is declared as 'censused slum' i.e., the slums located on land belonging to government or municipal undertaking, then such slums are automatically eligible for redevelopment under the Slum Act without the need for a separate notification. (Para 16) Mansoor Ali Farida Irshad Ali v. Tahsildar-I, Special Cell, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 308 : 2025 INSC 276

Society

Self-Supporting Cooperative Societies Act, 1996 (Jharkhand) – Section 5(7) – Conclusive Evidence of Registration – Held, once a certificate of registration is issued and sealed by the Registrar, it serves as conclusive proof of the society's existence and its continuation as a body corporate - The requirement of an additional "recommendation" letter from an Assistant Registrar to prove the society is not "fake" is superfluous and redundant in light of this statutory declaration - Supreme Court emphasized that simplicity in administrative procedures is a virtue of good governance. Procedures should be clear and straightforward to allow for effortless compliance; redundant hurdles waste time, increase expense, and disturb the peace of mind of citizens - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 15] Adarsh Sahkari Grih Nirman Swawlambi Society Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1175 : 2025 INSC 1389

Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra); Section 48(e) – Alienation of Charged Property – Not Void Ab Initio – Voidable at Society's Instance – Held, Alienation of property charged in favor of a Co-operative Society under Section 48(e) of the Act, 1960, is not void ab initio but voidable only if the Society seeks nullification. A third party cannot challenge the transaction as void if the Society does not enforce the charge. Section 48(e) is directory, and the transaction remains valid unless the Society, as the aggrieved party, contests it. The plaintiff, having alienated the charged property, cannot seek to nullify his own actions to gain relief, as courts will not reward a party for their own wrong. (Paras 20-25, 32) Machhindranath v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Dhamne, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2025 INSC 795 : (2025) 7 SCC 456

Societies Registration Act, 1860 - Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 - Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 - ISKCON Mumbai, founded in 1966 by Srila Prabhupada with its registered office in Juhu, Mumbai, claimed ISKCON Bangalore (registered July 1978) operated solely as its subordinate branch, with all properties vesting in Mumbai. - ISKCON Bangalore acquired the disputed Hare Krishna Hills property (Schedule 'A') via allotment to it specifically, constructing the temple using devotee funds; it sought declarations of independent ownership, administrative autonomy, and injunctions against Mumbai's interference in a suit filed in 2001 (Suit No. 7934/2001, City Civil Court, Bengaluru). Trial court decreed in favor of ISKCON Bangalore on April 17, 2009, rejecting Mumbai's counterclaim for injunction. Karnataka High Court, on May 23, 2011, reversed this, holding ISKCON Bangalore as a branch and vesting title in Mumbai, prompting ISKCON Bangalore's appeal to the Supreme Court. An oversight committee under former Justice R.V. Raveendran supervised temple affairs for 14 years per interim Supreme Court orders. Issues 1. Whether ISKCON Bangalore constitutes an independent juristic entity or merely a branch of ISKCON Mumbai, affecting property vesting and administrative control. 2. Ownership and title to the Hare Krishna Hill temple property, allotted explicitly to ISKCON Bangalore—does it vest in the allottee society or the alleged "parent" trust (ISKCON Mumbai)? 3. Validity of the July 1, 1984, General Body meeting electing Madhu Pandit Dasa and others as ISKCON Bangalore's governing body, challenged by Mumbai faction. Held, Allowed the appeal filed by ISKCON Bangalore; set aside the Karnataka High Court's May 23, 2011, judgment and restored the trial court's April 17, 2009, decree in full. Declared ISKCON Bangalore the absolute owner and possessor of the Hare Krishna Hills property; ISKCON Mumbai has no title, control, or authority to interfere in its administration or remove office-bearers. Upheld the 1984 General Body election as valid, dismissing challenges by the Mumbai faction (represented by earlier members like Amiya Vilas Swami). Directed dissolution of the R.V. Raveendran oversight committee within one month of the judgment. No costs awarded; urged both parties to resolve future disputes amicably, noting the Hare Krishna movement's spiritual ethos should preclude such litigation. International Society For Krishna Consciousness, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2025 INSC 717

Societies Registration Act, 1860 - Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 - Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 - In a 24-year dispute over the ownership and control of the iconic Hare Krishna Hill temple complex in Bengaluru (approximately 6 acres of land allotted by the Bangalore Development Authority in 1988), the Supreme Court upheld the independent legal status of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Bangalore ("ISKCON Bangalore"), registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960. The Court set aside the Karnataka High Court's 2011 judgment favoring the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Mumbai ("ISKCON Mumbai"), a public trust registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, restoring the trial court's 2009 decree declaring ISKCON Bangalore as the absolute owner and restraining ISKCON Mumbai from interference. The ruling emphasizes the primacy of statutory registration and title over affiliative claims, dissolving a long-standing oversight committee and closing the chapter on intra-organizational litigation. International Society For Krishna Consciousness, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2025 INSC 717

Societies Registration Act, 1860 - Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 - Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 - Property Title - Juristic Personality - Religious Institutions - Branch vs. Independent Entity - Injunction Against Interference - Primacy of Statutory Title - Independence of Registered Entities - Evidentiary Burden - Equity in Religious Disputes - Property allotted by a public authority (e.g., Bangalore Development Authority) to a specifically named registered society vests exclusively in that society as a separate juristic person. Historical affiliation or proof of a "branch" existence does not confer automatic title to a "parent" organization absent explicit transfer or vesting provisions. Mere use of a common name (e.g., "ISKCON") does not imply subordination if registrations are distinct under applicable laws. Societies registered under state-specific acts (like Karnataka's) enjoy autonomy; claims of overarching control by a national-level trust must be substantiated by bylaws, agreements, or conduct, not presumed from origins. Concurrent trial and appellate findings on entity independence are not to be lightly disturbed. High Court erred in inferring branch status and property vesting from isolated documents (e.g., early correspondence); comprehensive records, including allotment letters and society bylaws, confirm ISKCON Bangalore's standalone status and title. Courts must balance legal rights with organizational harmony but cannot rewrite statutory titles; prolonged litigation (over 20 years) warrants finality to prevent further schisms in spiritual movements like ISKCON, founded on devotional principles. International Society For Krishna Consciousness, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2025 INSC 717

Societies Registration Act, 1975 (Tamil Nadu) - Whether prior approval from the District Registrar is required before passing a Special Resolution for the amalgamation of societies under Section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. Whether societies with divergent objectives can amalgamate under the Act. Held, Section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, requires approval from the District Registrar for amalgamation but does not mandate such approval before passing the Special Resolution by the societies. There is no statutory requirement that societies seeking amalgamation must have identical objectives. The Inspector General of Registration and the High Court erred in interpreting the statutory provisions and imposing additional conditions not prescribed by the law. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Single Judge, Division Bench of the High Court, and the Inspector General of Registration, restoring the District Registrar's approval of the amalgamation. Appeal allowed. Manurkula Devanga Vasaga Salai v. Inspector General of Registration, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 70

Special Investigation Team

The petitioners sought anticipatory bail involving allegations of corruption and fraudulent compensation payments by NOIDA officials. The Court noted that the interim protection granted to the petitioners had been confirmed as they had joined the investigation. The Court expressed dissatisfaction with the earlier Fact-Finding Committee's investigation, which had deviated from its mandate by questioning judicial orders on compensation. Consequently, the Court constituted a Special Investigation Team (SIT) comprising senior IPS officers from outside Uttar Pradesh to ensure transparency and fairness. The SIT was tasked with investigating: (1) whether compensation payments exceeded legal entitlements, (2) identifying responsible officials, (3) examining collusion between beneficiaries and NOIDA officials, and (4) assessing NOIDA's overall transparency and public interest commitment. The SIT was directed to submit its report within two months, and no coercive action was to be taken against landowners/farmers without the Court's prior permission. Virendra Singh Nagar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Special Leave Petition

Maintainability of Second Special Leave Petition – Held, withdrawal of a special leave petition (SLP) without obtaining liberty to file a fresh petition bars a subsequent challenge to the same order, as the principle of public policy embodied in Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to SLPs under Article 136 of the Constitution - Second SLP is not maintainable when the earlier petition was unconditionally withdrawn, particularly where no liberty was granted to approach the Court again, and the litigant seeks to re-agitate the same issue after exhausting review remedies. [Paras 19-21] Satheesh V.K. v. Federal Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 934 : 2025 INSC 1140

Specific Relief Act, 1963

2018 Amendment - Supreme Court clarified that the 2018 amendment to the Act of 1963, which made the grant of specific performance of contracts a mandatory relief, has no retrospective effect and does not apply to suits or transactions that arose before its enforcement on October 1, 2018. [Relied on Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd. 2023 1 SCC 355; Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P.) Ktd. V. Katta Sujatha Reddy 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214; Paras 34-38] Annamalai v. Vasanthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1041 : 2025 INSC 1267

Nature of a Decree for Specific Performance — Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 54 — Interest in Immovable Property- Held, a decree for specific performance merely recognizes a claim for specific performance of a contract and does not elevate the status of a decree-holder to that of the owner of the property in question - Neither a contract for sale nor a decree passed on that basis for specific performance gives any right or title to the decree-holder; the right and title passes only on the execution of the deed of sale (conveyance) and its registration - A contract for the sale of immovable property, by itself, does not create any interest in or charge on such property - The personal obligation created by an agreement of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of a contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein - The contract between the parties is not extinguished by the passing of the decree for specific performance, and it subsists notwithstanding the decree - The suit is deemed to be pending even after such a decree, and the Court passing the decree continues to retain control - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Amol and others vs. Deorao and others 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 11; Paras 16-21, 27] Rajeswari v. Shanmugam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1122 : 2025 INSC 1329

Requirement of Declaration of Title and Recovery of Possession – Held where the plaintiff asserts title based on a Will but does not have possession (which is admitted to be with the defendant), a suit for injunction simpliciter cannot be maintained - The plaintiff should have sought a declaration of title and consequential recovery of possession - This is especially true when the defendant claims possession as a co-owner with absolute rights, having made valuable improvements - Appeal is disposed of with reservation of liberty to both parties to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. [Paras 10-13] S. Santhana Lakshmi v. D. Rajammal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1059 : 2025 INSC 1197

Section 10, Section 14, Section 20 (as prior to 2018 Amendment) - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 100 - Agreement for Sale of Immovable Property - Suit for Specific Performance - Readiness and Willingness - When should a plaintiff seeking specific performance of contract must also seek a declaration that the termination of the contract by the other party was invalid – Held, a suit for specific performance is maintainable without seeking a declaration that the termination of the agreement was invalid where the contract did not confer a right to unilaterally terminate, or where the right conferred was waived, and the termination was a unilateral act - The vendors, by accepting the additional amount, waived their right to forfeit the advance consideration and acknowledged the contract's subsistence; thus, their subsequent termination notice was a void act and a breach of contract by repudiation. The Plaintiff-Appellant had the option to treat the contract as subsisting and sue for specific performance. [Paras 31-33] Annamalai v. Vasanthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1041 : 2025 INSC 1267

Section 12 - Specific Performance of Part of Contract - Legal Principle - Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 allows specific performance of part of a contract only if: The plaintiff is ready and willing to perform their obligations. The contract terms are severable, and the plaintiff relinquishes all claims to the performance of the remaining part and to any compensation. Inability to perform may arise due to various factors, including legal prohibitions or deficiencies in quantity or quality of the subject matter. Vijay Prabhu v. S.T. Lajapathie, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 59

Section 12 (3) – Specific Performance of Part of Contract – Readiness and Willingness to Perform - The petitioner filed suit for specific performance of an agreement and delivery of possession of the suit property. In the alternative, he claimed damages of Rs. 60,00,000/- with interest. The Trial Court dismissed the prayer for specific performance, finding the petitioner was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but directed a refund of Rs. 20,00,000/- with 12% interest. The High Court affirmed this decision, holding that Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act was not applicable as the petitioner had not relinquished all claims and was seeking damages. Whether the petitioner was entitled to specific performance of part of the contract under Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act despite not relinquishing all claims to performance of the remaining part of the contract or compensation. Held, Section 12(3) is a discretionary relief and cannot be invoked where the terms of the contract are not severable or when the plaintiff has not relinquished all claims to performance and compensation. Section 12(3) could not be invoked as the petitioner sought damages in addition to specific performance, indicating non-relinquishment of claims. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, upholding the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court that the petitioner was not ready and willing to perform his contractual obligations. Vijay Prabhu v. S.T. Lajapathie, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 59

Section 16(c) and 34 - Cancellation of Agreement to Sell - Maintainability of Suit - A suit for the specific performance of an agreement to sell, filed after its cancellation, is not maintainable unless it includes a prayer for declaratory relief under Section 34 of the Act challenging the validity of the cancellation. Declaratory relief challenging the validity of the cancellation was essential when seeking specific performance of the agreement to sell, as the suit could not be sustained without a valid and subsisting agreement. (Para 24, 26 & 27) Sangita Sinha v. Bhawana Bhardwaj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 378 : 2025 INSC 450

Section 20 - Discretionary Relief of Specific Performance – Held, the High Court erred in declining the discretionary relief under Section 20 (pre-2018 Amendment) based on the unsustainable grounds of the plaintiff setting up a false claim of additional payment and of possession - The failure to prove possession alone does not make the claim false - Considering the payment of over 90% of the agreed consideration, the additional payment, and the non-bona fide conduct of the vendors in selling part of the property to a related party even before termination, the relief of specific performance should not have been denied - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 245; Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal, (1982) 1 SCC 525; Para 25-32, 38, 39] Annamalai v. Vasanthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1041 : 2025 INSC 1267

Section 22 - Refund of Advance Payment - Necessity of Specific Prayer in Plaint - Held, a refund of advance payment or earnest money as part of sale consideration cannot be granted unless specifically prayed for in the plaint or sought through an amendment under Section 22(2). The Court cannot suo moto grant such relief, as the inclusion of a specific prayer is a sine qua non. However, no express prayer is required for ancillary reliefs, such as delivery of possession, which naturally flow from a decree of specific performance, as clarified in Manickam @ Thandapani v. Vasantha, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 395. The forfeiture of earnest money is not penal under Section 74 of the Contract Act in the ordinary sense. In the present case, the appellant's failure to pay the balance sale consideration or fulfill the agreement terms necessitated a specific prayer for refund, which was absent, leading to dismissal of the claim. (Paras 34, 36, 37, 40 & 510) K.R. Suresh v. R. Poornima, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2025 INSC 617

Section 28 - Doctrine of Merger - Whether the trial court's decree merges with the appellate court's decree, and whether the time limit for depositing the balance sale consideration, as stipulated in the trial court's decree, revives after the appellate court's decision. The plaintiffs filed suits for specific performance of agreements to sell, which were decreed by the trial court in 1994, directing the plaintiffs to deposit the balance sale consideration within 20 days. The defendants appealed, and the first appellate court reversed the trial court's decision. The plaintiffs then filed second appeals, which were allowed by the High Court in 2018, restoring the trial court's decree. The plaintiffs deposited the balance sale consideration in 2018, and the defendants filed applications under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking rescission of the contract, which were rejected by the executing court. The High Court upheld the executing court's decision, leading to the present appeals. Held, the doctrine of merger applies irrespective of whether the appellate court affirms, modifies, or reverses the trial court's decree. The doctrine of merger ensures that only one operative decree exists at any given time, and the appellate court's decree supersedes the trial court's decree. The trial court's decree merged with the High Court's decree in the second appeals. Since the High Court did not specify a time limit for depositing the balance sale consideration, the 20-day period stipulated by the trial court did not revive. The executing court has the discretion to extend the time for depositing the amount, and there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiffs. Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : (2025) 3 SCC 543

Section 28 – Execution of Decree for Specific Performance – Extension of Time for Deposit – Doctrine of Merger – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had dismissed an execution petition due to a delay in depositing the balance sale consideration - held that the non-payment of balance consideration within the time fixed by the Trial Court does not automatically result in the rescission of the contract or make the decree inexecutable – The real test for the court is to determine if the plaintiff's conduct amounts to a positive refusal to perform their part of the contract - A "hyper-technical approach" regarding time limits should be eschewed if readiness and willingness are otherwise established. In this case, a delay of 27 days beyond the two-month period was held not to strike at the heart of the agreement – Held that the decree of the Trial Court merges with the final decision of the High Court in the appellate proceedings - Once the superior court disposes of the matter, its decree becomes the final, binding, and operative order – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 584; Balbir Singh & Anr. v. Baldev Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 103; Ramankutty Gupta v. Avara, (1994) 2 SCC 642; Paras 7-12] Dr. Amit Arya v. Kamlesh Kumari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1240 : 2025 INSC 1486

Section 28 - Rescission of Contract - Whether the defendants (judgment debtors) were entitled to rescind the contract on the grounds that the plaintiffs (decree holders) failed to deposit the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time. Held, under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the executing court retains jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration, even after the decree for specific performance has been passed. The court's power to extend time is discretionary and must be exercised based on the conduct of the parties and the facts of the case. The defendants were not entitled to rescind the contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as the plaintiffs had deposited the balance sale consideration promptly after the High Court's decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the High Court committed no error in rejecting the defendants' applications for rescission of the contract. The Court reaffirmed the principles of the doctrine of merger and the discretionary powers of the executing court under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : (2025) 3 SCC 543

Section 31 and 34 - Plaintiff seeking declaration of title over a property is not required to seek cancellation of a sale deed executed by another party with whom the plaintiff has no privity of contract. Declaration of title is sufficient and equivalent to seeking cancellation of such a sale deed, as the proviso to Section 34 does not mandate seeking all possible reliefs, only those directly flowing from the declaration. A non-executant of a deed need only seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, void, or non-binding, not its cancellation under Section 31. The Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of the suit for not seeking cancellation of the sale deed, restoring the trial court's ruling upholding the plaintiff's title via a Gift Deed and declaring the defendant's sale deed void ab initio. (Referred: Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh, (2010) 12 SCC 112; Paras 28 - 30 & 36) Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 466 : 2025 INSC 553

Section 38 (Perpetual Injunction) - Suit for Injunction Simpliciter - Declaration of Title - Recovery of Possession – Held, a suit filed for an injunction restraining alienation/encumbrance and interference with peaceful possession is an injunction simpliciter - When the plaintiff admits in the pleadings and oral evidence (witness box) that possession is with the defendant, an injunction against the interference of peaceful enjoyment of the property ought not to have been granted - Possession was admitted to be with the defendant in the original plaint on the basis of a tenancy arrangement and later in evidence as well. [Para 11] S. Santhana Lakshmi v. D. Rajammal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1059 : 2025 INSC 1197

Section 39 - Mandatory Injunction - High Court granted relief to respondents by allowing their suit for mandatory injunction – Held, a grant of mandatory injunction under Section 39 of SRA is discretionary and can be granted only upon the breach of an enforceable legal obligation - It cannot be granted unless there exists a legal right and there's a breach of that legal right - Plaintiff in a suit instituted by him under Section 39 of SRA is obliged to satisfy the court with appropriate evidence that the defendant is committing breach of a particular obligation which is binding on him - If a scheme specifically provides that an oustee shall file an application in a specified format with certain deposit towards earnest money then it is obligation of allottee to do so - Conditions for granting a mandatory injunction - Obligation, breach, necessity, enforceability, balance of convenience, irreparable injury - Respondents instituted suit for mandatory injunction under section 39 SRA after 14-20 years, hence, suit is not maintainable on ground of limitation. Appeal allowed. [Para 74-76, 92, 93, 95] Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Nirmala Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2025 INSC 843

Specific Performance — Agreement to Sell (ATS) — Subsequent Purchaser — Deemed Notice — Section 19(b) – Held, a subsequent purchaser cannot claim the protection of a 'bona fide purchaser for value without notice' under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act if they had prior knowledge of the earlier Agreement to Sell (ATS) and were aware that the original vendees were still litigating to protect their rights under the Agreement to sell, even after the vendor claimed to have terminated the agreement - A subsequent purchaser who chooses to remain content with the unilateral assertions of the vendor regarding the termination of the ATS, and consciously abstains from making further inquiry into the subsisting interest of the original vendee, cannot escape the consequences of deemed notice - To invoke section 19(b) protection, a purchaser must establish - i. purchase for value; ii. Payment made in good faith; iii. Absence of notice of the earlier contract. [Relied on Manjit Singh v. Darshana Devi 2024 SCC OnLine 3431; Ram Niwas v. Bano 2000 6 SCC 685; Para 73-80] K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa @ Muttanna Chennappa Batil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1084 : 2025 INSC 1298

Specific Performance – Limitation – Impleadment – Where defendants sought to raise a counter-claim for specific performance regarding an agreement dated 02.12.2002 in an impleading application filed only in the year 2006, Supreme Court held the claim was grossly delayed and hit by limitation – No liberty granted to file a separate suit as the claim could not survive. [Para 13, 15] Sanjay Tiwari v. Yugal Kishore Prasad Sao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1097 : 2025 INSC 1310

Specific Performance — Termination of Agreement to Sell (ATS) — Failure to Seek Declaration of Invalidity — Maintainability – Held, where the vendor's notice of termination is based on their own inability and inconvenience rather than any breach by the vendee, and the vendee immediately replies challenging the termination and asserting the continuance of the contract, the subsequent suit for specific performance is not rendered non-maintainable solely because the plaintiff/vendee failed to include a specific prayer for a declaration that the termination notice is bad in law. The failure to specifically frame an issue on the maintainability of the suit for want of such declaration does not preclude an Appellate Court from examining whether the jurisdictional fact necessary for granting the relief of specific performance exists - A party cannot unilaterally terminate a non-determinable agreement to sell, except where the contract itself is expressly determinable in nature under Section 14 of the Act - Such invalid termination does not oblige the aggrieved party to first seek a separate declaration challenging the termination before pursuing a claim for specific performance -Appeal dismissed. [Relied on R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) v. T.R.K. Sarawathy, (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3377); Para 54-70] K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa @ Muttanna Chennappa Batil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1084 : 2025 INSC 1298

Speedy Trial

Supreme Court issues guidelines and suggested that the High Courts Chief Justices on their administrative side to issue circular for the District Judiciary - i. Proceedings in every trial shall be held expeditiously; ii. When stage of examination starts that shall be continued from day-to day until all the witnesses in the attendance have been examined; iii. When the witnesses are in attendance before Court no adjournment or postponement shall be granted without examining them; iv. Court should not grant adjournment to suit the convenience of the advocate concerned except on very exceptional grounds like bereavement in the family; iv. Presiding Officer of each Court may evolve the system for framing a schedule of constructive working days for examination of witnesses in each case; v. Summons or process could be handed over to the public Prosecutor in-charge of the case to cause them to be served on the witnesses, as per schedule fixed by the Court. [Paras 35-37] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2025 INSC 1155

Stamp

Stamp Act, 1899 – Section 9A (Bihar Amendment Act, 1988) – Exemption of Stamp Duty for Cooperative Societies – Held, Section 9A provides complete exemption of stamp duty on instruments relating to the transfer of premises by a Cooperative Society to its members - Supreme Court observed that this section creates a statutory right for societies and a corresponding duty for authorities to register such instruments without further requirements once the society's status is established. Adarsh Sahkari Grih Nirman Swawlambi Society Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1175 : 2025 INSC 1389

Stamp Act, 1899 – Schedule 1-B – Articles 40 and 57 – Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed – Chargeability of Stamp Duty - Issue- Whether the stamp duty on the instrument "Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed" is chargeable under Article 40 or Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Held, Principle of Chargeability, in matters of stamp duty, the decisive factor is not the nomenclature assigned to the instrument, but the substance of rights and obligations it embodies - The Court is duty-bound to ascertain the true legal character of the instrument - Definition of Mortgage-Deed - Held that the instrument, in both cases, fulfils the essential characteristics of a mortgage deed as defined under Section 2(17) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, because it transfers, or creates, a right over specified property in favour of the creditor to secure the performance of an engagement (or repayment of a loan). Godwin Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2025 INSC 1207

Stamp Act, 1899 – Scope of Article 57 - Held that Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, operates in two distinct limbs - The second limb, which refers to a deed "executed by a surety to secure the due performance of a contract," is restricted in its application to the execution of a security bond or mortgage deed by a surety to secure the obligations of another, and does not extend to cases where the principal itself executes the deed to secure its own obligations - Definition of Surety - Held that the term "surety" must be strictly understood in accordance with Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which establishes that a contract of guarantee is inherently tripartite (surety, principal debtor, and creditor) - the essential requirement for invoking Article 57 is the presence of a surety distinct from the principal debtor - Where the principal debtor itself executes a deed mortgaging its own property, Article 57 is inapplicable - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 14-29] Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2025 INSC 1207

Stamp Act, 1899; Section 47-A – Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 1968; Rules 3, 4, 6, 7 – Forms I & II – Undervaluation of property in sale deeds – Reference to Collector for determination of market value – Validity of proceedings – Held, in case of undervaluation of property sale's price, the Registering Authority under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 cannot mechanically make reference to the Collector (stamps) for determination of the correct market value of the property. Instead, an opportunity is to be provided to the party, and reasons have to be furnished by the Registering Authority for arriving at a conclusion that the property is undervalued. The Registering Officer must record reasons for believing undervaluation before referring the instrument to the Collector. A roving inquiry is impermissible. Form I notice must contain reasons for considering the document undervalued. Absence of reasons vitiates the inquiry. Collector (Stamps) must pass a provisional order under Rule 4(4) indicating the basis of valuation before issuing Form II. Issuing a final order directly without a provisional order and opportunity for representation violates Rules 4 and 6. "Reason to believe" under Section 47-A is not subjective satisfaction but must be based on material having a rational connection to the belief of undervaluation. The Registering Officer cannot refuse registration merely because the document is undervalued. Their power is limited, and they cannot conduct a detailed inquiry, which is the Collector's prerogative. The Collector's power to determine market value is quasi-judicial, requiring adherence to procedural rules and principles of natural justice. The High Court's view that Form I must contain reasons for undervaluation and the Collector must follow the prescribed procedure is upheld. Appeals dismissed. Chief Revenue Controlling Officer Cum Inspector General of Registration v. P. Babu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 40

Stamp Act, 1958 (Maharashtra); Section 48(1) - Refund of stamp duty - Cancellation Deed - Applicability of Limitation Period - The Appellants entered into an Agreement to Sell on August 30, 2014, for the purchase of a residential flat in Mumbai, paying ₹27,34,500 as stamp duty. Due to delays in possession, the Appellants canceled the agreement, and a Cancellation Deed was executed on March 17, 2015, but registered on April 28, 2015. The Appellants applied for a refund of the stamp duty on August 6, 2016, contending that their case fell under the pre-amendment regime, which allowed a two-year window for refund claims. The CCRA initially granted the refund on January 8, 2018, but later recalled the order on March 3, 2018, citing the amended six-month limitation period. The High Court dismissed the Appellants' writ petition, holding that the amended limitation period applied, and the CCRA's recall of the refund order was valid. Whether the amended six-month limitation period under Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, introduced on April 24, 2015, applies to the Appellants' claim for stamp duty refund, given that the Cancellation Deed was executed before the amendment but registered thereafter. Held, technicalities of limitation should not defeat legitimate claims, especially when the claimant is not at fault. The Appellants' right to claim a refund accrued on the date of execution of the Cancellation Deed (March 17, 2015), which was before the amendment. Therefore, the unamended two-year limitation period under Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, applied. The Court emphasized that amendments reducing limitation periods cannot extinguish vested rights retrospectively. Harshit Harish Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 110 : (2025) 3 SCC 365

Stamp Act, 1958 (Maharashtra); Section 48(1) - Refund of stamp duty - Whether the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (CCRA) had the statutory power to review and recall its earlier order granting a refund of stamp duty. Held, the CCRA lacked statutory authority to review or recall its earlier order granting the refund. The subsequent orders recalling the refund were vitiated in law, as the CCRA had no express power of review under the Act. The statutory authorities cannot exercise powers not conferred upon them, such as reviewing their own orders without express statutory mandate. Harshit Harish Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 110 : (2025) 3 SCC 365

States Reorganisation Act, 1956

Judicial Administration – Consultation and Chief Justice's Primacy – While internal consultation with the Full Court is a matter of "sound institutional practice," it is not a mandatory legal requirement under Section 51(3)- The Chief Justice, as the head of the institution, is the sole authority to exercise this power with the Governor's approval- Past administrative rejections of similar proposals (in 1996, 1997, 2006, and 2018) do not operate as a legal bar or estoppel, as administrative decisions are contextual and may be revisited based on changed circumstances like increased litigation volume or improved infrastructure. Ranjeet Baburao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1222 : 2025 INSC 1460

Section 51(3) – Appointment of Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting for the Bombay High Court – Validity – The Supreme Court upheld the administrative notification dated 01.08.2025 issued by the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court appointing Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting- held that Section 51(3) is an independent and continuing source of power vested in the Chief Justice to appoint additional places of sitting for the more convenient transaction of judicial business, subject only to the approval of the Governor. Ranjeet Baburao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1222 : 2025 INSC 1460

Statutory Interpretation – Section 51(2) vs. Section 51(3) – Territorial Bifurcation – Held that while a permanent Bench established under Section 51(2) by a Presidential Order results in territorial bifurcation and exclusive jurisdiction, an appointment under Section 51(3) does not- Judges sitting at an additional place under Section 51(3) continue to function as Judges of the same High Court, and the administrative control remains with the Chief Justice. Ranjeet Baburao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1222 : 2025 INSC 1460

Stay

Unconditional Stay - Supreme Court laid down the concrete criteria for when unconditional stay may be justified - Held that such a stay is permissible where the order - i. is egregiously perverse; ii. Is riddles with patent illegalities; iii. Is facially untenable and/or; iv. Such other exceptional causes similar in nature. Lifestyle Equities C.V. v. Amazon Technologies Inc., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 974 : 2025 INSC 1190

Succession Act, 1925

Succession Act, 1925; Section 63(c) — Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 — Proof of Execution of Will — Examination of Attesting Witness — Leading Questions in Cross-Examination — Probative Value — Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court which had disbelieved a registered Will on the ground that the attesting witness did not explicitly depose to the attestation of the other witness in his examination-in-chief- Held that High Court erred in holding that an answer elicited through a leading question in cross-examination lacks probative value- If the cross-examiner puts a positive suggestion to a witness regarding the signatures of the testator and other attesting witnesses, and the witness affirms it, such testimony effectively supplies any "missing link" from the examination-in-chief. K.S. Dinachandran v. Shyla Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1218 : 2025 INSC 1451

Suspicious Circumstances vs. Rule of Prudence — Held that the exclusion of one child (who married outside the community) from a Will does not, by itself, constitute a suspicious circumstance that invalidates the document if the testator's desire is prompted by his own justifications- The "judicial conscience" must be satisfied by stepping into the "arm-chair of the testator" rather than substituting the Court's opinion for that of the testator- Held that when a witness is examined many years after the execution of a Will (24 years in this case), it is "puerile" to expect mathematical precision regarding dates or specific visits to the testator's house- Appeals allowed. [Relied on H. H. Maharaja Bhanu Prakash Singh v. Tika Yogendra Chandra (1989 Supp (1) SCC 16); H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma (1959 Supp (1) SCR 426); Paras 15-29] K.S. Dinachandran v. Shyla Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1218 : 2025 INSC 1451

Section 2(h) – Will - A will is a legal declaration of a testator's wishes regarding their property, to be carried out after their death - A will is not a transfer inter vivos, it is a posthumous disposition and can be revoked at any time during the testator's lifetime - A will must be attested by two or more witnesses - To be proven in Court, at least one attesting witness must be called to prove its execution - The propounder of the will must also remove any legitimate suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution such as an unfair or unjust disposition circumstances surrounding its execution, such as an unfair or unjust disposition of property or the propounder themselves taking a substantial benefit - The mere fact that a will is registered does not automatically grant it validity - Suspicious circumstances surrounding the will has not been removed by the plaintiff - Appeal allowed and suit dismissed. [Paras 23-27] Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2025 INSC 1059

Sections 67 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100 – Held, High Court should not frame and answer an additional substantial question of law under the proviso to Section 100(5) of CPC without a foundation in the pleadings, issues or evidence presented by the parties - Introducing a new legal argument, such as the applicability of Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act, at the stage of second appeal creates an entirely new case for the plaintiffs and is improper - The court must record specific reasons for framing such a question and the opposite party must be given a fair opportunity to respond - The Trial Court and the First appellate Court had already established that the testators had a sound mind and the will was validly executed without any suspicious circumstances - The valid and genuine will which was duly executed and proved must be given effect - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17 - 23] C.P. Francis v. C.P. Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2025 INSC 1071

Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - Validity of a Will - Partition of Property – The Trial Court rejected the Will, holding it was not proved in accordance with the law, and granted the plaintiffs a 1/6th share in the properties. The High Court reversed this decision, upholding the validity of the Will and restricting the plaintiffs' share to Schedule A property alone. Held, a propounder who substantially benefits from a Will and participates in its execution raises suspicion, which must be dispelled with clear evidence. The propounder is expected to testify about the proper execution, the presence of attesting witnesses, and other key details. Under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, presenting one attesting witness is insufficient to prove execution unless they confirm the presence and actions of the other attesting witnesses. The Will was not proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of the attesting witnesses was insufficient, and the propounder of the Will failed to establish its due execution. The Court noted suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, including the lack of proper attestation and the involvement of the propounder in its preparation. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's decision, granting the plaintiffs a 1/6th share in both Schedule A and Schedule B properties. The judgment reiterates the strict requirements for proving a Will under the Indian Succession Act and the Evidence Act, emphasizing the need for proper attestation and the removal of suspicious circumstances by the propounder. It also highlights the Court's role in ensuring that testamentary documents are executed freely and voluntarily by the testator. Chinu Rani Ghosh v. Subhash Ghosh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 56

Section 63(c) - Requirement of attestation "by the direction of the testator." - Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of explicit testimony from the attesting witness regarding the testator's direction. Facts: Sanjhi Ram, the testator, executed a Will on November 7, 2005, bequeathing his property to his nephew, Gopal Krishan (Appellant No. 1). He passed away the next day. The Respondents (legal heirs of Sanjhi Ram) challenged the Will, alleging it was forged and the subsequent mutation of property was illegal. The Trial Court and the High Court held the Will invalid, citing suspicious circumstances, including the absence of testimony from the attesting witness that the testator directed the signing of the Will. The Lower Appellate Court, however, upheld the validity of the Will, ruling that the testator's mental faculties were sound, and the Will complied with legal requirements. Supreme Court's Decision: Interpretation of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925: The Court clarified that Section 63(c) provides alternative conditions for attestation: (a) The attesting witness must have seen the testator sign or affix their mark to the Will; or (b) The witness must have seen another person sign the Will in the presence and by the direction of the testator. The use of the word "or" is disjunctive, meaning compliance with either condition suffices. The High Court erred in interpreting "or" as "and," thereby imposing an unnecessary requirement that the attesting witness explicitly state the testator's direction. Validity of the Will: The testimony of the attesting witness (DW-1) confirmed that he had seen the testator affix his mark to the Will. This alone satisfied Section 63(c). The requirement of the testator's direction applies only when another person signs the Will on the testator's behalf, which was not the case here. The High Court's finding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of testimony regarding the testator's direction was incorrect. Restoration of Lower Appellate Court's Judgment: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Lower Appellate Court's decision, holding the Will valid. Consequently, the subsequent sale deeds executed by Gopal Krishan were also upheld. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the Will executed by Sanjhi Ram was valid and complied with the requirements of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The High Court's interpretation of the attestation requirements was erroneous, and the Lower Appellate Court's judgment was reinstated. Gopal Krishan v. Daulat Ram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : (2025) 2 SCC 804

Section 63(c) - Requirement of attestation "by the direction of the testator." Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of explicit testimony from the attesting witness that the Testator directed the signing of the Will. The testator executed a Will bequeathing his property to his nephew. He passed away the next day. The Respondents challenged the Will, alleging it was forged and the subsequent mutation of property was illegal. The Trial Court and the High Court held the Will invalid, citing suspicious circumstances, including the absence of a death certificate and irregularities in the Will's execution. The Lower Appellate Court, however, upheld the Will, finding no evidence that the testator was of unsound mind or that the Will was fabricated. Held, the High Court erred in interpreting Section 63(c). The phrase "by the direction of the testator" applies only when an attesting witness sees someone other than the testator sign the Will. In this case, the attesting witness had seen the testator affix his mark, which was sufficient to comply with Section 63(c). The Court emphasized that the word "or" in Section 63(c) is disjunctive, and the requirement of "direction" is not applicable when the witness has seen the testator sign the Will. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Lower Appellate Court's decision, declaring the Will valid and the subsequent sale deeds executed lawful. The appeal was allowed, and the Will was upheld as valid. The Supreme Court clarified the interpretation of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, emphasizing that the requirement of "direction" is not necessary when the attesting witness has seen the testator sign the Will. Gopal Krishan v. Daulat Ram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : (2025) 2 SCC 804

Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - A finding of valid execution does not automatically imply genuineness. Suspicious circumstances must be addressed before concluding the genuineness of a Will. Mere registration of a Will does not validate it; it must be proved in accordance with legal mandates. Lilian Coelho v. Myra Philomena Coalho, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 15 : (2025) 2 SCC 633

Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - Requirements of - Validity of the Will – Mere proof of execution of a Will does not make it genuine if it is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The defendants failed to prove that the testator executed the Will with a sound disposing mind and understood its contents. The stamp papers for the Will were purchased in the name of the first defendant and she played an active role in its execution, which cast doubt on its authenticity. The defendants' claim under the Will was rejected due to the suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution. Leela v. Muruganantham, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 8 : (2025) 4 SCC 289

Special Investigation Team (SIT)

Special Investigation Team (SIT) Report on Noida functioning & land compensation - Supreme Court appreciated SIT's efforts and acknowledged the fair and impartial opinion - Issued following directions - i. DGP (U.P.) is directed to constitute a new SIT with two IPS officers from different states to investigate issues involved; ii. New SIT is to immediately register an FIR and proceed with an inquiry into the points highlighted by previous SIT; iii. Any competent authority required to provide prior sanction to prosecute an officer under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is directed to do so within two weeks of the application; iv. Head of the new SIT, who must be an officer not below the rank of Commissioner of Police, shall place the outcome of the investigation on record via a Status Report; v. New SIT is to submit a copy of its report to the Chief Secretary, who will place it before the Council of Ministers to enable them to make a decision on policy recommendations such as formation of a Metropolitan Corporation; vi. Chief Secretary is directed to ensure a Citizen Advisory Board is constituted within 4 weeks; vii. Principal Secretary, Dept. of Environment, Forest & Climate change and CEO of Noida are directed to ensure project is implemented without environmental impact assessments and approval from Green Bench of the Court - Directed Status Report on the follow-up actions to be placed on record on next date of hearing on October 28, 2025. [Paras 7-10] Virendra Singh Nagar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 807

Stray Dogs

Stray Dog - Directions issued to all States and UTs - i. Identification - Identify all Government and private educational institutions, hospitals, public sports complexes/stadia, bus stands/depots, and railway stations within two weeks; ii. Securing Premises: Administrative heads, under the supervision of the District Magistrate, must secure premises using adequate fencing, boundary walls, and gates to prevent the ingress of stray dogs within eight weeks; iii. Nodal Officer: Management of each institution shall designate a Nodal Officer responsible for cleanliness and preventing the entry/habitation of stray dogs; iv. Inspections: Local municipal authorities/panchayats shall carry out regular inspections (at least once in three months) to ensure no stray dog habitats exist; v. Removal and Non-Release: Jurisdictional municipal bodies shall forthwith remove every stray dog found within these institutional premises and shift the animal(s) to a designated shelter after sterilisation and vaccination; The stray dogs so picked up shall not be released back to the same location from which they were picked up; vi. Medical Stock: All Government and private hospitals must maintain a mandatory stock of anti-rabies vaccines and immunoglobulin; vii. Waste Management and Security: Railway authorities and State transport corporations/municipal authorities over bus stands/depots must ensure premises are effectively secured, implement proper waste-management systems to eliminate food sources, and conduct regular inspections; viii. SOPs: Animal Welfare Board of India (AWBI) shall issue detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) within four weeks for the management of stray dogs in institutional premises, to be uniformly adopted. [Para 25] In Re 'City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price', 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1072 : (2025) 9 SCC 1

Stray Dog Menace in Institutional Areas (Educational Institutions, Hospitals, Sports Complexes, Bus Stands/Depots, Railway Stations) — Directions for Securing Premises and Management of Stray Dogs - The Supreme Court, acknowledging the alarming rise in dog-bite incidents in institutional areas and the systemic failure to secure these premises, observed that the persistence of dog bites constitutes not merely a public-health challenge but a matter of human safety, compromising the constitutional mandate of safeguarding the right to life under Article 21 - noted that despite the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023, the implementation has been ineffective, and the high frequency of incidents in places like schools and hospitals reflects deficiencies in institutional responsibility and municipal oversight. [Para 14 - 24] In Re 'City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price', 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1072 : (2025) 9 SCC 1

Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 (Rules, 2023) - Animal welfare - Public Safety - Directions issued - Supreme Court clarified, supplemented and modified the previous directions, noting that a complete prohibition on releasing vaccinated and sterilized dogs is 'too harsh' and potentially impossible to comply with due to lack of infrastructure - Conflict between the previous order and the Rules, 2023, specifically Rule 11(19), which requires that sterilized and immunized stray dogs be released back into the same area from which they were picked up. In Re : 'City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 825 : 2025 INSC 1018 : (2025) 9 SCC 12

Stray Dogs - Directions issued by Supreme Court are as follows - i. Municipal authorities must continue to pick up and round up stary dogs from Delhi and the NCR and create designated shelters; ii. Previous direction prohibiting the release of picked-up strays is kept in abeyance-instead, dogs that have been sterilized, dewormed and vaccinated must be released back into the same area from which they were captured; iii. Relocation mandate does not apply to dogs that are rapid, suspected to having rabies or display aggressive behaviour - These dogs should be kept in separate shelters after being sterilized and immunized and should not be released back onto the streets; iv. Municipal Authorities are directed to create dedicated feeding spaces for stray dogs in each municipal ward, with notice boards indicating that dogs should only be fed in these areas - Feeding dogs on the streets is not permitted, and those found in violation will face legal action; v. A dedicated helpline must be established by each municipal authority to report violations; vi. No individual or organization shall obstruct the implementation of these new directions - Anyone who obstructs a public servant in the discharge of their duties will be prosecuted; vii. Intervening individuals and NGOs who are considered 'animal lovers' must deposit Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 2,00,000, respectively, with the court Registry within 7 days - Money will be used for creating infrastructure and facilities for stray dogs; viii. Animal lovers may apply to the municipal body to adopt street dogs, and it will be their responsibility to ensure the adopted dogs do not return to the streets; ix. Scope of the matter beyond Delhi & NCR, directing the impleadment of all States and UTs to seek information on their on their compliance with the Rules, 2023; x. Court ordered the transfer of all similar pending writ petitions from various High Courts to the Supreme Court for analogous consideration. [Paras 24-35] In Re : 'City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 825 : 2025 INSC 1018 : (2025) 9 SCC 12

Stray dogs - Supreme Court directs immediate pickup, shelter creation and no release back to streets - Warns of strict action against non-compliance and obstruction - Court emphasized the grim situation and the urgent need for action to combat dog bites and rabies, stating that the prevailing circumstances indicate a “systematic failure of the concerned authorities over the past two decades”- Directed government of NCT Delhi, MCD, NDMC and authorities of Noida, Ghaziabad, Gurugram and Faridabad to immediately start picking up stary dogs from all localities and relocate them to designated shelters - Held that there shall be no lethargy or compromise in this exercise and strict action will be taken against any individual or organization obstructing the forceful pickup of stray dogs - Directed to immediately create dog shelters across the NCR and report their creation to Court within 8 weeks - Shelters must have sufficient personnel to sterilize, deworm and immunize stray dogs and provide care - Dogs detained there are explicitly not to be released back onto the streets - Shelters will be monitored by CCTV to prevent unauthorized release of dogs - Directed that two responsible personnel must be present at shelters at all times with proper duty schedules - Helpline number to be created within 1 week for immediate reporting of dog bite cases - Directed Government NCT Delhi to provide detailed information on availability of genuine rabies vaccines - Rounding-up of stray dogs and creation of necessary infrastructure shall be undertaken simultaneously - Directed that the matter again be notified after four weeks with Status Report. [Paras 8-11] In Re : 'City Hounded By Strays, Kids Pay Price, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2025 INSC 977 : (2025) 9 SCC 12

Supreme Court Rules, 2013

Appearances of only Senior Advocates or Advocateon-Record or Advcoate, who are physically present and arguing in the Court at the time of hearing of the matter and one Advocate/Advocate-on-Record each for assistance in Court to such arguing Sr Advocate, Advocate-on-Record or Advocate, as the case may be, will be recorded in the record of proceedings. The Appearance Slip as per Form 30 prescribed by the SC Rules only allowed the recording of these appearances. (Para 20) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2025 INSC 364

A strange practice was being followed in the Supreme Court regarding the marking of the presence of the number of advocates for the party, without anybody certifying whether they all are authorised to appear for the party. In most of the matters, simple or complicated, a number of appearances of advocates would be shown in the proceedings, running into pages and pages, without any verification as to whether such advocates were in fact present in the Court or were in fact authorised to appear for a particular party. Every vakalatnama or Memorandum of Appearance filed in the case carries a lot of responsibility and accountability. (Para 5 & 17) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2025 INSC 364

No advocate, other than the Advocate-on-Record for a party, can appear, plead and address the Court in a matter unless he is instructed by the AOR or permitted by the Court. A Senior Advocate shall not appear without an AOR in the Supreme Court. Though an advocate is entitled to appear before the Supreme Court, his appearance would be subject to the 2013 Supreme Court Rules. As per Rule 1(b) of Order IV, no advocate other than AOR can appear for the party. On a conjoint reading of this Rule along with Rule 20, no AOR can authorise any person except another AOR to act for him in any case. Similarly, Rule 1(b) has to be read with Rule 2(b), which says that no Senior Advocate can appear without an AOR. (Para 13) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2025 INSC 364

Order IV Rule 18 - Advocates on Record (AoRs) who are designated as Senior Advocates must inform their clients about their designation and submit a report to the Registry confirming that alternate arrangements have been made for their clients' representation. Failure to comply with this obligation would bar such Senior Advocates from appearing before the Court. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dileep, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 146

Order VI Rule 3 - Appeals seeking restoration of death sentence commuted by High Court - In criminal appeals arising from the 2002 Godhra train burning case, where the trial court awarded death sentence to 11 accused (later commuted to life imprisonment by the High Court) and life imprisonment to 20 others, the Supreme Court rejected the convicts' preliminary objection that the State's appeal for restoration of capital punishment must be heard by a three-Judge Bench in light of Mohd. Arif v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9 SCC 737 and Order VI Rule III of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. The Court held that the cited judgment and Rule apply only where the High Court has confirmed or awarded the death sentence; here, the High Court had commuted it. Accordingly, a two-Judge Bench was competent to hear the State's appeal for restoration of the death sentence along with the convicts' appeals against conviction. (Para 3 & 4) Abdul Raheman Dhantiya @ Kankatto @Jamburo v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 575

Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021

Section 4(iii)(c)(I) — Retrospective Application — Vested Rights — Reproductive Autonomy — Article 21 – Held, the age-restriction prescribed for 'intending couples' under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 (which limits the female age to 50 years and the male age to 55 years for eligibility certification) does not have retrospective operation and, consequently, does not apply to intending couples who had commenced the surrogacy procedure prior to the Act's commencement on January 25, 2022 - Right to Surrogacy & Article 21 - The right of a couple, medically incapable of conceiving/bearing children naturally, to pursue surrogacy is an exercise of their decisional and reproductive autonomy, which is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990 : 2025 INSC 1209

Commencement of Procedure – Held, for the purpose of non-retrospective application, the 'commencement' of the surrogacy process is defined as the stage where the intending couple has completed the extraction and fertilisation of gametes and has frozen the embryo with the intention of transfer to the womb of the surrogate mother - This stage constitutes the crystallization of the process - The age restriction under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) will not apply if an intending couple had: (i) commenced the surrogacy procedure prior to January 25, 2022; (ii) were at the stage of creation and freezing of embryos after extraction of gametes; and (iii) were on the threshold of transfer of embryos to the uterus of the surrogate mother. Such couples are exempted from seeking certification on the qualifying age. [Relied on A vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 6 SCC 32; K. Gopinathan Nair vs. State of Kerala, (1997) 10 SCC 1; Paras 7, 9-18] Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990 : 2025 INSC 1209

Rule Against Retrospectivity – Held, the Act does not contain a manifest intention to apply the age-limits retrospectively. Where a statutory provision which is not expressly made retrospective seeks to affect vested rights and corresponding obligations, such a provision cannot be said to have any retrospective effect by necessary implication - The right to make autonomous decisions regarding the age at which one wished to pursue surrogacy had already vested in the intending couples. Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990 : 2025 INSC 1209

Sustainable Development

Supreme Court reiterated the principle of 'sustainable development' which balances environmental protection with developmental activities – Held, any construction activity over 20,000 sq. mtr. would affect the environment, regardless of its purpose, and saw no rational basis for discriminating between different types of buildings - Supreme Court noted that education has become a flourishing industry and should not be exempt - Upheld Office Memorandum dt. 30th , January, 2025 stating that it was conducive to environmental interests as it clarifies that the 2025 notification also applies to State of Kerala. [Paras 22-24, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45] Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 808 : 2025 INSC 961

Tax

Service Tax – Exemption - Ministry of Finance in 2012 Notification - Clause 2(t) - Healthcare services - Cord blood Banking Services – Whether stem cell banking services constitute 'Health care Services” and are exempted from service tax – Held, stem banking service including enrolment, collection, processing and storage of umbilical cord blood cells, constitute “healthcare services” which are exempted from service tax as per notification issued by the Ministry of Finance in 2012 and 2014 under the Finance Act, 1994 - Appellant is involved in post-transplant monitoring, clinical trials and collaborations with international medical experts, these services are preventive and curative in nature - Healthcare services include preventive services - Demand for service tax, interest and penalties was unsustainable and arbitrary, as appellant's conduct was bonafide. [Relied on M. Satyanarayana Raju Charitable Trust v. UOI, 2017 SCC Online Hyd. 168; Para 10-13] Stemcyte India Therapeutics Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 707 : 2025 INSC 841

Goods and Services Tax - GST Exemption - Renting of Residential Dwelling - Hostel Accommodation - Entry 13 of Notification No. 9/2017 - Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 – Held, the service of leasing residential premises as a hostel to students and working professionals qualifies for GST exemption as "renting of residential dwelling for use as resident the term "residential dwelling" is not defined under GST laws - Relying on normal trade parlance and the CBIC Education Guide (2012), it held that "residential dwelling" means any residential accommodation intended for long-term stay, excluding places meant for temporary stay like hotels or inns - A hostel is a "house of residence" and does not lose its residential character merely because the owner charges a fee - clarified that Entry 13 does not mandate that the lessee must use the dwelling as their own residence; it only requires that the dwelling be used for residence - Since the ultimate occupants (students/working professionals) used the property for eating, drinking, and sleeping, the condition of "use as residence" stood satisfied - adopted the principle of 'Purposive Interpretation,' stating that the legislative intent was to ensure that rented properties used for residential purposes do not suffer the burden of 18% GST - Narrowing the exemption to only cases where the service recipient is the resident would defeat this objective and pass costs onto students - While an exemption notification must be construed strictly at the threshold, once the subject falls within the ambit of the notification, it must be construed liberally to give full effect to the benefit - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Bandu Ravji Nikam v. Acharyaratna Deshbushan Shikshan Prasark Mandal; Kishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Babu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat AIR 1954 SC 316; Union of India v. Wood Papers Limited 1990 4 SCC 256; Paras 42-64] State of Karnataka v. Taghar Vasudeva Ambrish, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1167 : 2025 INSC 1380

Valuation – Inclusion of Bought-out Items – bought-out items delivered directly to site not includable- Held that the final product (erected boiler) is immovable and not excisable, the Court held that the value of duty-paid bought-out items (delivered directly to the buyer's site and not brought to the assessee's factory) cannot be included in the assessable value of the boiler parts cleared in CKD condition- The base value for duty cannot be equated with the total contract price. [Paras 64, 82] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297

Value Added Tax (VAT) - Input Tax Credit (ITC) - Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 (DVAT Act) - Section 9(2)(g) - Entitlement of Purchasing Dealer when Selling Dealer Fails to Deposit Tax - Whether the benefit of Input Tax Credit (ITC) is available to registered purchaser dealers who paid taxes to registered seller dealer(s) through valid invoices, even though the seller dealer(s) did not deposit the collected tax with the Government – Held, the Input Tax Credit (ITC) on goods purchased from registered dealers cannot be denied to bona fide purchasers merely because the seller failed to deposit - There is no dispute that the selling dealer was registered on the date of transaction and neither the transactions nor invoices were doubted, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding no good reason to interfere with the High Court's order directing the grant of ITC benefit after due verification. [Relied on Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors., 2017 SCC OnLine Delhi 13037; Paras 3-7] Commissioner Trade and Tax Delhi v. Shanti Kiran India (P) Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1008

Permanent Establishment (PE) / Business Connection (BC) – Held, absence of a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India is not mandatory for a non-resident company to be considered as carrying on business or to have a Business Connection (BC) in India - A non-resident can be in business "de hors" the permanent establishment - The issue of PE is primarily relevant for availing the beneficial provisions of the Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA), which was not the core consideration for allowing deductions under the Income Tax Act in this case - The High Court's view that business communications from a foreign office meant the non-resident was not carrying on business in India was held to be "wholly fallacious and contrary to the very scheme of the Act" and "wholly anachronistic" with the modern globalized trade environment - Appeals allowed. [Relied on CIT v. Vikram Cotton Mills ((1988) 169 ITR 597 (SC); Paras 11, 12, 14, 15. 17-21] Pride Foramer S.A. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1015 : 2025 INSC 1247

Trade Tax Act, 1948 (Uttar Pradesh) - Core legal test - Transfer of goods not consumption - 1948 Act - Section 3f(1)(B) - Held that three conditions must be fulfilled - i. there must be a works contract; ii. The goods should have been involved in execution of the works contract; and iii. Property in those goods must be transferred to a third party either as goods or in some other form - The Court said that the moment the ink (a composite of ink and chemicals) is applied to the paper, the property in that good is transferred to the customer. The subsequent drying or chemical change is irrelevant, as the transfer has already happened - The judicial reasoning focused on how the inherent properties of the goods were physically incorporated and remained as a component of the works delivered to the customer. [Relied on Xerox Modicorp Ltd. v. State of Karnataka 2005 7 SCC 380] Aristo Printers Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2025 INSC 1188

General Sales Tax Act, 1993 (Assam) - Sections 19, 21 - Reassessment after time - barred assessment - Scope and limitation – Held, on Tax matters, strict letter of law must be followed - No tax can be imposed by inference or analogy - Where initial assessments for the relevant years were held to be time-barred under Section 19, subsequent reassessment with prior sanction under Section 21 is not permissible - Section 21 applies only where no assessment has been made within the time limits specified under Section 19, not where time-barred assessments have already occurred - High Court erred in its interpretation by permitting reassessment post time-barred determination merely on the basis of Commissioner's sanction - Strict construction must be applied for fiscal statutes, and tax liability can be imposed only if the case falls strictly within the statutory provisions - No tax can be imposed by inference, analogy or presumed legislative intent - Appeal allowed. [Para 12-15] Shiv Steels v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 921 : 2025 INSC 1126

Tax Law - Direct Tax - International Taxation - Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) - Article 5 - Permanent Establishment (PE) - Strategic Oversight Services Agreement (SOSA) - Appellant is a company incorporated in Dubai and is a tax resident of UAE and is engaged in rendering consultancy services in the hotel sector – Held, Foreign Entity doing business through temporary premises in India liable to tax - Article 5(1) - Existence of a Permanent establishment (PE) is sufficient to attract tax liability for a foreign entity in India, even in the absence of exclusive possession of a fixed place of business - The appellant has a fixed place PE in India within the meaning of Article 5(1) of DTAA - The income received under the SOSA is attributable to such PE and is therefore taxable in India - That appellant's role was not confined to mere policy formulation but conferred a continuing and enforceable right to implement policies and ensure compliance in all operational aspects of the hotel - The degree of control and supervision exercised by the appellant is beyond mere advisory role thereby qualifying as a PE for purposes of taxation under Indian Law - Hotel premises were effectively at the disposal of Hyatt-appellant due to its continuous and substantial control over key operational aspects of the hotel business, therefore exclusive ownership or physical possession is not a precondition for establishing a PE and even shared or temporary access to premises can constitute PE if the foreign entity conducts business through them - Supreme Court reiterated the two essential conditions essential for the existence of a fixed place of business PE- i. the place must be “at the disposal” of the enterprise and; ii. The business of the enterprise must be carried on through that place, along with the core attributes of stability, productivity and a degree of independence. Upheld order of High Court- Appeals dismissed. [Paras 8, 11-13, 17-22] Hyatt International Southwest Asia Ltd. v. Additional Director of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 738 : 2025 INSC 891

Tax Law - Madhya Pradesh Sthaniya Kshetra Me Mal ke Pravesh Par Kar Adhiniyam, 1976 (M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976) - Sections 2(1)(aa), 2(1)(b), 2(3), 3(1)(a) - Liability of Manufacturer - M.P. VAT Act, 2002 - Section 2(i) – Dealer - Entry tax on IMFL – Issue - Liability of payment of 'entry tax' lies on the Manufacturer or the State - Appellant contended that goods are transported to State government warehouse and transportation pass is issued in name of warehouse, sales are made by the State warehouse, making state warehouse also a dealer - Supreme Court Held that Manufacturers are liable for payment of 'entry tax' on beer and IMFL for transporting goods into local areas for sale - the term “has effected entry of goods” shall be construed as including a reference to “has caused to be effected entry of goods” - the liquor manufacturers 'cause entry' of goods into local areas, making them liable for tax under section 2(3) of M.P. Entry Tax Act, even if sales occurred through state - controlled warehouses - Held that tax incidence attaches at the point of immediate causation and it was the manufacturers who triggered the entry into local areas - that procedural or supervisory role of the state warehouses did not shift the point of tax incidence. [Relied on K. Gopinathan Nair & Ors. v. State of Kerala (1997) 10 SCC 1; Coffee Board, Bangalore v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras & Anr. (1969) 3 SCC 349; Paras 24, 28, 30, 31] United Spirits v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 727 : 2025 INSC 833

Constitution of India – Article 14, Entry 97, List I (Union List), Entry 62, List II (State List) – Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006 – Constitutional Validity – Cable TV Services – Legislative Competence – Aspect Theory – Held, cable TV services qualify as a “luxury” under Entry 62, List II, enabling State taxation. No conflict exists between State's luxury tax on entertainment and Central service tax on broadcasting under Entry 97, List I. Initial arbitrary exemptions under the Act violated Article 14, but the revised framework rectified these issues. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Kerala's luxury tax on cable TV services under the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006, affirming the State's legislative competence under Entry 62, List II. Applying the aspect theory, the Court distinguished the State's luxury tax on entertainment (cable TV services) from the Central tax on broadcasting services under the Finance Act, finding no constitutional overlap. The aspect theory, in India, focuses on the taxable event's nature, not legislative competence, unlike its Canadian application. The High Court's ruling striking down exemptions for smaller cable operators (under 7,500 connections) as violative of Article 14 was upheld, but the revised framework was deemed constitutionally valid. The tax was not discriminatory against cable TV operators compared to DTH providers. The appeal was allowed, reversing the High Court's decision to strike down the tax. (Para 17) State of Kerala v. Asianet Satellite Communications Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2025 INSC 757

Constitutional Law – Taxation - Sales Tax - Purchase Tax - Validity of Provisions Imposing Purchase Tax on Exempted Transactions - In a reference to resolve conflicting views on the interpretation of "levy" in sales tax exemptions, the Supreme Court (3 Bench) upheld the constitutional validity of Section 5A, Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (KGST Act), and the pari materia Section 7A, Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (TNGST Act). The provisions impose purchase tax on purchasers who acquire goods from sellers exempted from sales tax under notifications issued pursuant to Section 10, KGST Act (or equivalent), and subsequently dispatch such goods outside the state via stock transfer (not constituting inter-state sale). Facts: The appellants, registered dealers, purchased voltage stabilizers from small-scale industrial (SSI) units and charitable institutions within Kerala, which were exempt from sales tax liability under Section 10 notifications. The goods were then dispatched outside Kerala by way of branch/stock transfer. The revenue authorities levied purchase tax under Section 5A, KGST Act, treating the purchases as "liable to tax." The appellants contended that the exemption under Section 10 rendered the transactions non-liable to tax altogether, excluding the operation of Section 5A. A 2009 Division Bench of Supreme Court, in a lead case, distinguished between "leviability" (imposition of tax liability) and "payability" (actual payment), holding the goods liable but exempt from payment. Due to a contrary view in Peekay Re-rolling Mills (P) Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner, (2007) 4 SCC 30 (interpreting "levy" to include collection/payment), the matter was referred to a larger Bench. Issues Referred: 1. Whether purchases from tax-exempt dealers under the KGST/TNGST Acts constitute purchases "liable to tax" within the meaning of Section 5A/7A. 2. Whether such purchasers are liable to pay purchase tax under Section 5A/7A despite the exemption. 3. Whether the purchase tax under Section 5A/7A is ultra vires the Constitution, being in the nature of a manufacture tax, consignment tax, or inter-state levy beyond state legislative competence. Held, Issues (i) and (ii) answered in the affirmative; issue (iii) in the negative. Appeals dismissed; judgments of Kerala and Madras High Courts affirmed. Held, Sections 5A/7A are independent charging provisions levying purchase tax solely where no sales tax is payable on the underlying sale, ensuring the transaction is not taxed twice. Such tax is triggered in three scenarios: (a) goods used in manufacture without sales tax payment; (b) goods dispatched outside the state (other than inter-state trade/commerce); or (c) goods disposed of otherwise than by intra-state sale. The charge remains a tax on purchase, with satisfaction of these conditions merely delineating its applicability. "Levy" denotes the imposition or exigibility of tax liability (authorization to tax), distinct from assessment (quantification) and collection/payment. An exemption under Section 10 affects only payability, not the underlying leviability; goods remain "liable to tax" in principle, though payment is deferred or waived. The provisions do not encroach on Union powers under Entries 52/54, List I (inter-state sales) or Entry 52A, List II (declared goods), as they target intra-state purchases followed by non-sales dispositions or out-of-state dispatches that do not qualify as inter-state sales. Inter-state movement of goods (sans sale) falls within state legislative domain under Entry 54, List II. States retain prerogative to levy such taxes for revenue generation, warranting interpretive leeway absent clear constitutional overreach. Peekay Re-rolling Mills, (2007) 4 SCC 30 distinguished as pertaining to declared goods under Entry 52A, List II, where exemption impacts the charge itself; the ratio in Kandaswami, (1975) 4 SCC 745; Hotel Balaji, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 536 and Devi Dass, (1994) Supp 2 SCC 59 (upholding similar provisions) prevails, overruling Goodyear, (1990) 2 SCC 71 to the extent of conflict. (Para 30 - 33) C.T. Kochouseph v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2025 INSC 661

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 – Section 132 – Bail should be normally granted for offences u/s. 132 CGST Act unless extraordinary circumstances exists. Vineet Jain vs Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 513

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956; Section 13 – Central Sales Tax (Rajasthan) Rules, 1957; Rule 17(20) – State Rules Cannot Override Central Rules under CST Act – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision striking down Rule 17(20) of the Central Sales Tax (Rajasthan) Rules, 1957, as ultra vires the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The Court held that the State Government, under its delegated powers, cannot frame rules inconsistent with the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957. Rule 17(20) permitted the cancellation of Form C in cases of fraud, misrepresentation, or legal contravention, a provision absent in the Central Rules, which prescribe Form C but do not provide for its cancellation. The Court clarified that only the Central Government has the authority to prescribe the form of declaration and its particulars, and State rules cannot derogate from Central Rules. The State's appeal, challenging the High Court's declaration of Rule 17(20) as ultra vires due to inconsistency with Central law, was dismissed. (Para 16) State of Rajasthan v. Combined Traders, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 432 : 2025 INSC 496

Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (Uttar Pradesh); Section 7 (c) and 13 (7) - A dealer cannot claim Input Tax Credit (ITC) on purchases linked to tax-exempt sales under Section 7(c), as per Section 13(7). Emphasizing strict construction of tax statutes, the Court rejected the appellant's claim for ITC of ₹6.42 lakh on exempt sales of ₹1.89 crore to a manufacturer-exporter, prioritizing statutory language over policy intent to boost exports. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the disallowance of ITC. (Para 10) Neha Enterprises v. Commissioner, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2025 INSC 476

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; Section 39 (9) - Denial of Input Tax Credit (ITC) due to clerical or arithmetical errors - Examination of timelines for correction of bona fide mistakes in tax filings - Judicial observations on software limitations in tax compliance. Held, timelines for rectifying bona fide errors in tax filings should be realistic, as denial of ITC due to inadvertent mistakes unfairly burdens taxpayers. Denying correction rights in cases of genuine errors contradicts the fundamental right to conduct business. Software limitations cannot justify denying taxpayers the right to correct mistakes, as compliance mechanisms should facilitate, not hinder, rectifications. Special Leave Petition dismissed declining to interfere with the High Court's judgment, as there was no loss of revenue. 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 361

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 246A - Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act); Sections 69 and 70 - Constitutionality of - Power to Arrest and Summon - Legislative Competence under Article 246A - Incidental Powers for Tax Evasion. The constitutional validity of Sections 69 (power to arrest) and 70 (power to summon) of the CGST Act, and analogous provisions in State GST Acts, was challenged. Petitioners contended that Article 246A, which empowers Parliament and State Legislatures to levy and collect GST, does not authorize criminalization of violations, such as through arrest and summons. They argued these powers fall outside legislative competence, being neither ancillary to GST levy nor covered by Entry 93 of List I (offences against laws of the Union) in the Seventh Schedule. Whether Sections 69 and 70 of the CGST Act are constitutionally valid and within Parliament's legislative competence under Article 246A. Held, Provisions upheld as constitutionally valid. Challenge to vires rejected; provisions do not violate constitutional limits. (Para 75) Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2025 INSC 272 : (2025) 6 SCC 545

Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (Punjab) - Held, Rule 21(8) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Rules, 2005, notified on January 25, 2014, cannot be applied to transactions prior to April 1, 2014, as the enabling amendment to Section 13(1) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005, came into effect only on that date. The benefit of Input Tax Credit (ITC) cannot be reduced without statutory sanction. Rule 21(8), which limits ITC to the reduced tax rate for goods in stock following a tax rate reduction, lacked statutory backing before April 1, 2014. Applying it retroactively would cause financial loss to taxable persons who purchased goods at a higher tax rate, as ITC is a statutory right accrued at the time of purchase. The Court dismissed the State's appeals, upholding the High Court's decision that Rule 21(8) applies only to transactions on or after April 1, 2014. (Para 41.1) State of Punjab v. Trishala Alloys Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2025 INSC 231

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Section 8 - The amendment to Section 8(5) of the Act, 1956, introduced by the Finance Act, 2002—making state-granted exemptions from inter-state sales tax subject to production of declarations in Forms 'C' or 'D' under Section 8(4)—operates prospectively and does not retrospectively nullify or revoke absolute exemptions already accrued and granted under pre-amendment incentive schemes, such as the Maharashtra Package Scheme of Incentives, 1993. The respondent assessee, eligible under the 1993 Scheme and issued an Eligibility Certificate for full/partial sales tax exemption without Form 'C'/'D' requirements, faced trade circulars from the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Mumbai, demanding refund of exempted tax post-2002 amendment and revising assessments for non-submission of declarations. The High Court set aside the circulars, holding the amendment prospective. Whether the 2002 amendment to Section 8(5) applies retrospectively to deprive assessees of vested exemption rights under unamended provisions empowering states to grant absolute exemptions in public interest, dispensing with Section 8(4) formalities. Held, every statute is prima facie prospective unless expressly or by necessary implication retrospective; absent clear legislative intent to affect existing rights, prior exemptions persist. Premature deprivation of accrued exemption benefits is arbitrary; states cannot unilaterally revoke vested substantive rights without notice or hearing. Unrevoked Eligibility Certificates preserve accrued rights; post-amendment Form 'C'/'D' requirements apply only from May 11, 2002, onward. Appeal dismissed; impugned High Court order upheld. [Para 17, 23, 28] State of Maharashtra v. Prism Cement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2025 INSC 199 : (2025) 4 SCC 300

Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Karnataka) repealed the Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 (Karnataka), which had nationalized private contract carriages, and delegated the power to issue non-stage carriage permits (including contract carriages, special, tourist, and temporary vehicles) from the State Transport Authority (STA) to its Secretary under Section 68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) read with Rule 56(1)(d) of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (KMV Rules). The High Court struck down the delegation provision as unconstitutional, holding it required fresh presidential assent akin to the 1976 Act and that quasi-judicial permit-granting powers could not be delegated to a single officer. Aggrieved private operators appealed to the Supreme Court – Issues - 1. Whether Section 3 of the 2003 Act, repealing the 1976 Act (previously upheld by the Supreme Court), is constitutionally valid absent fresh presidential assent. 2. Whether the STA's delegation of routine non-stage carriage permit-granting authority to its Secretary violates administrative law principles, given the quasi-judicial nature of such functions. Held (Appeal Allowed): The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 2003 Act and the delegation, dismissing the challenge by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC). On Issue 1: The State Legislature possesses plenary power to repeal its enactments, including those previously assented to by the President, as a repeal merely extinguishes operative provisions without recreating a new framework or overriding judicial precedents. The 2003 repeal was a valid policy shift to liberalize the transport sector, address public transport shortages, and enhance private participation; no fresh presidential assent was required, as it fell squarely within legislative competence under Article 245 of the Constitution. On Issue 2: Delegation of quasi-judicial functions is permissible under administrative law if expressly authorized by the enabling statute, distinguishing between complex adjudicatory tasks (e.g., stage carriage permits, reserved for the full STA) and routine administrative functions (e.g., non-stage carriage permits). Section 68(5) of the MV Act and Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules explicitly permit such delegation to the STA Secretary—a senior expert officer—ensuring efficiency, timely service delivery, and oversight without arbitrary discretion. Prohibiting delegation would overburden the STA, causing delays and inefficiencies contrary to legislative intent. The Secretary is empowered to grant such permits subject to prescribed conditions. S.R.S. Travels v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2025 INSC 152 : (2025) 3 SCC 491

Disproportionate Assets - Income Tax Returns - Quashing of FIR - Economic Inflation - Long-Term Asset Valuation - The Appellant argued that his wife's income and other declared sources of income were not properly considered in the calculation of assets. The Appellant submitted income tax returns and other supporting documents to justify the declared assets. Held, the income of the Appellant's wife and other declared sources were not adequately considered by the Vigilance Department. It was observed that while calculating disproportionate assets over a long period (1996-2020), inflation and economic changes should be considered. Referring to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 the Court noted that powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could be exercised when allegations in the FIR do not constitute any offence. The Court found that the alleged disproportionate assets were not substantiated when the Appellant's and his wife's declared income was properly accounted for. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered against the Appellant. Consequently, the appeal was allowed. Nirankar Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 90

Teacher

Teacher Deficiency - The State may take a policy decision to engage retired teachers on a contract basis for a period not exceeding one year to address deficiencies in the cadre of teachers while regular recruitment takes place - held that directions shall not be construed as an obligation on the State to release grant-in-aid or additional funds to any private institute / management / society / trust for the establishment or construction of a school - Held that the State is at liberty to formulate a policy inviting charitable institutions to establish schools, with or without governmental aid, in areas lacking Government Lower/Upper Primary Schools, provided they strictly comply with conditions such as transparency in admissions, appointment of qualified teachers, provision of requisite infrastructure, and strict prohibition on charging capitation fee or excess fees - Directed the State of Kerala and its General Education Department to comply with the directions within a period of three months. [Paras 9-13] State of Kerala v. T. Muhammed Faisi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1162

Telegraph Act, 1885

Section 16(5) - Supreme Court recommends creation of statutory appeal over District judge's compensation order under Section 16(3) - Noted that there is no provision for an appeal against District judge's compensation order forcing parties to resort to the extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court which typically does not resort to evidence or disturb findings of fact - First Appellate Court is required to address all issues considered in order impugned and decide the same by giving reasons - Held that there is a significant gap in the law, especially given the increase in litigation related to power and electrical projects and that there is no amendment in sections 10 & 16 of the 1885 Act - Supreme Court noted lack of uniformity in how cases under Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 are registered and handled - Referred different statutes like Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, etc. wherein remedy of appeal has been provided. [Paras 23, 27-36] Kalpataru Power Transmission Ltd. V. Vinod, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2025 INSC 1004

Telegraph Act, 1885 - Uniform Compensation Rate – Held, it was a 'glaring error' for the High Court to apply a uniform compensation rate for land in different districts (Sonepat & Jhajjar) with varying characteristics and market values - A 100 km transmission line passes through areas with vastly different characteristics, such as proximity to highways and that a uniform rate is not a proper methodology for fair compensation - Correct method is to firstly assess the value of land and thereafter determine compensation payable to landowners - Set aside High Court's order and remitted matter for fresh consideration. [Paras 16, 19, 20] Kalpataru Power Transmission Ltd. V. Vinod, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2025 INSC 1004

Temple

Cochin Devaswom Board - License fee – Held, appellants herein only challenged specific fee enhancement orders - By directing fresh fixation and inquiry, High Court introduced new issues outside the pleadings, in violation of judicial discipline and the principle of natural justice, as the appellants were not put to notice before passing an adverse direction against them - If without putting parties on notice, the Court travels beyond the scope of the petition, takes parties by surprise and makes any strong observations and directions, it will create a chilling effect on other prospective litigants too - Even if in exceptional case, Court feels the need to travel beyond the scope of writ petition and make observations, the least a party is entitled to, is an opportunity to explain and defend themselves - The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India, (2005) 12 SCC 219; Ashok Kumar Nigam v. State of U.P., (2016) 12 SCC 797; Paras 23-32] P. Radhakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2025 INSC 1183

Temple Administration - Supreme Court appoints Ex-Allahabad HC Judge Ashok Kumar as Head of Committee to administer Bankey Bihari Temple - Supreme Court modifies previous order regarding the use of temple funds for land acquisition, restoring the position to status quo ante, where the State cannot use temple funds for land acquisition - Stays operation of the ordinance's provisions that grants the State powers to constitute a Trust for managing the temple's affairs, specifically Sections 3 & 5, until the validity of the Ordinance is resolved by the High Court - Supreme Court directs establishment of a High-powered Temple Management Committee to oversee the day-to-day functioning of the Thakur Shree Bankey Bihari Ji Maharaj Temple, noting the ineffectiveness of previous management - The Committee is tasked with planning the holistic development of the Temple and its vicinity, including privately negotiating and land purchases or directing the State Government to acquire land - Held that apart from 4 Goswami members on the Committee, no other Goswami or sevayat is permitted to interfere in the Temple's critical functions, except for puja/sewa and offering prasad to the deity - Supreme Court stays operation and further proceedings of Single judge of High Court in a matter concerning the Ordinance's constitutionality to avoid parallel proceedings, requesting the Chief Justice of High Court to list such petitions before a Division Bench. [Paras 16-36] Management Committee of Thakur Shree Bankey Bihari Ji Maharaj Temple v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 785

Modifying the Allahabad High Court's order dated November 8, 2023, which had barred the use of temple funds for land acquisition, the Supreme Court permitted the State of Uttar Pradesh to utilize fixed deposits held in the name of Shri Banke Bihari Ji Temple (Vrindavan) to purchase approximately 5 acres of land for developing a ₹500 crore corridor around the temple. The Court mandated that the acquired land be registered solely in the name of the deity or the temple trust, ensuring the funds' proceeds remain dedicated to the temple's perpetual benefit. The ruling was prompted by the urgent need for infrastructure overhaul in Mathura and Vrindavan—key pilgrimage sites attracting millions annually—following incidents like the 2022 stampede at the temple, which highlighted maladministration and safety risks. Citing the Uttar Pradesh Braj Planning and Development Board Act, 2015, the Court underscored the State's statutory duty to prioritize heritage conservation, devotee amenities (e.g., parking, roads, dharamshalas, hospitals, toilets, and security posts), and beautification of sites like Yamuna River ghats and Kusum Sarovar. Development was deemed a collective responsibility involving government, temple trusts, and communities to facilitate safe, spiritually enriching pilgrimages without discomfort. Ishwar Chanda Sharma v. Devendra Kumar Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 576 : 2025 INSC 700

Tenancy

Tenancy - Supreme Court sends tenant to Jail for not vacating premises and imposes Rs. 5 lakhs fine on aged co-tenant - Found guilty of deliberate and wilful non-compliance of Supreme Court orders dt. 20.09.2024 and 09.09.2025 - Direction were given to the District Judge to appoint a bailiff with police help to take possession of the premises within two weeks - An inventory of tenant articles shall be prepared and kept in safe custody for delivery, if demanded - Appellate authority shall report action to the Supreme Court Registrar. [Paras 3 - 7] Laxmi Construction v. Harsh Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 956

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997; Sections 7 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 - Whether the provision of Section 7 of the Tenancy Act regarding the deposit of rent and filing of an application within the specified time, are mandatory or directory, and whether the benefit of Section 5 of the limitation Act, can be invoked by the tenant for condonation of delay – Held, the compliance required under by the tenant under Sections 7(1) and the first part of section 7(2) of the Tenancy Act regarding the deposit of rent and the filing of an application within the specified time is mandatory - Applicability of the limitation Act to proceedings under the Tenancy Act is subject to the provisions of this Act relating to Limitation - This means that if a shorter time period is specified for a proceeding under the Tenancy Act cannot be used to extend it - The term 'shall' in section 7(1) and first part of section 7(2) indicates a mandatory obligation on the tenant to pay or deposit rent - Section 7(2) allows for a one-time extension of upto 2 months, applies only to the payment of the amount specified in a Court Order after the rent has been determined - Since the tenant is required to 'deposit the amount admitted him to be due' together with an application for rent determination within specified time, the deposit and the application are considered a precondition for avoiding eviction - The term 'together' means 'simultaneously' or 'conjointly' - Therefore, a tenant cannot invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a delay in filing the application - Consequences for non-compliance are specified in Section 7(3) which mandates the tenant's defence against eviction “shall be struck out” if they fail to deposit or pay the required amount within the specified time or any granted extension - The consequences further reinforces the mandatory nature of provision - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 17, 19-21, 22-24, 28, 29, 33-35] Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School v. Ismat Ahmed, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 811 : 2025 INSC 984

Tender

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 14 – Administrative Law – Tender Process – Eligibility Criteria – Experience Gained as Joint Venture Partner – The Supreme Court set aside the disqualification of a bidder who was declared technically ineligible because its primary experience certificate pertained to work executed as a partner in a Joint Venture (JV) rather than in its individual capacity- held that unless there is an explicit and specific exclusion in the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT), a constituent of a joint venture is entitled to rely on its proportionate experience share for the purpose of meeting eligibility requirements. Surguja Bricks Industries Company v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1221 : 2025 INSC 1456

Tender Interpretation – Meaning of "Prime Contractor" – The expression "prime contractor" used in a tender document must be interpreted from the standpoint of a prudent businessman- In the absence of a formal definition in the NIT, it refers to the primary entity responsible for the contract offer- Experience gained by a company as a member of a JV represents the actual experience of its constituents and cannot be disregarded by the tendering authority as being in a "different name and style". Surguja Bricks Industries Company v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1221 : 2025 INSC 1456

Judicial Review of Tender Conditions – Legal Certainty – While the tendering authority is generally the best judge of its requirements, its interpretation must conform to "legal certainty" to avoid arbitrary exercise of power - If an interpretation is irrational, absurd, or leads to discriminatory treatment, it is the duty of the Constitutional Court to interdict such a decision-making process. [Relied on New Horizons Limited v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 478; Paras 20-30] Surguja Bricks Industries Company v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1221 : 2025 INSC 1456

Letter of Intent (LoI) – Cancellation of LoI – Arbitrariness in State Action – Judicial Review in Contractual Matters – Public Interest – Quantum Meruit- Held that an LoI is, in the ordinary course, a precursor to a contract and not the contract itself- A Letter of Intent merely conveys the Government's intention to enter into an agreement and creates no enforceable obligation until a Letter of Acceptance (LoA) or contract is executed- It is a provisional communication signifying the State's intent to enter into a formal arrangement upon the fulfilment of certain technical and procedural conditions- The acceptance of a tender and the consequential formation of a binding contract are contingent upon the satisfaction of these prerequisites- An LoI creates no vested right until it passes the threshold of final and unconditional acceptance; it is but a "promise in embryo". [Relied on resser Rand S.A. v. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. [(2006) 1 SCC 751; Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy Federation Ltd. v. Maha Laxmi Mingrate Marketing Service (P) Ltd. [(1996) 10 SCC 405] State of Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1142 : 2025 INSC 1355

Technical Bid Disqualification — 'Haisiyat Praman Patra' (Solvency Certificate) Requirement - Principle of Judicial Review in Tender Matters – Held, neither Clause 18 nor any other condition in the NIT (Notice Inviting Tender) specified that the 'haisiyat praman patra' must be issued only by a District Magistrate in terms of the Uttar Pradesh government notification dated 29.10.2018. Since the terms of an NIT must be clear and unambiguous, if the Mandi Parishad intended for the certificate to be issued by the District Magistrate alone, it ought to have specified so in the NIT conditions - Having failed to specify the issuing authority, the 1st respondent-Mandi Parishad could not have rejected the certificate simply because it was not issued by a District Magistrate - The appellant's certificate was issued by an experienced valuer registered with the Income Tax Department, who is otherwise competent to issue such a certificate - The power of judicial review should only be exercised if the tendering authority's decision is dehors the terms of the NIT or is patently arbitrary - The rejection of the appellant's technical bid on the ground that the certificate was not issued by the District Magistrate was held to be dehors the terms of the NIT and is liable to be quashed - Set aside the order of High Court and remanded the same - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651; Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., (1978) 1 SCC 405; Paras 12-18] Kimberley Club Pvt. Ltd. v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1054 : 2025 INSC 1276

Bid Disqualification - Judicial Review – Held, a bid pursuant to a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) can't be rejected solely for non-production of the document that was not prescribed in the NIT - The tender authorities cannot impose conditions not expressly stated in the tender document - The disqualification was invalid for the following reasons- i. Clause 5(D) of the NIT did not explicitly mandate the submission of the JV agreement itself to prove proportionate share; the work execution certificate provided by the appellant, which clearly stated its 45% share in the JV (Joint Venture), was a valid document for this purpose; ii. The tender's conditions must be clear and unambiguous - Since NIT did not explicitly require the JV agreement, the tendering authority could not reject the bid for its nonsubmission; ii. Rejection of the bid as 'incomplete' under Clause 8.1 was contrary to NIT's terms because the required work execution certificate had been submitted; iv. High Court's decision to go beyond the reasons provided by the Tender Evaluation Committee and disqualify the appellant based on the washery committee under Clause 5(B) was improper - Partly allowed and remanded the matter to High Court for a fresh determination. [Paras 13 - 24] Maha Mineral Mining & Benefication v. Madhya Pradesh Power Generating Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 885 : 2025 INSC 1085

Rectification of financial bid after opening - Inadvertent mistake – Permissibility - Judicial Interference - Whether a bidder, after the financial bids have been opened and the bidder declared as lowest, can be allowed to rectify its financial bid by treating a per day rate quoted erroneously as the total contract period rate, thus potentially becoming the highest bidder – Held, financial bids in public tenders can't be altered after opening - Sanctity of process can't be compromised for more revenue - The Division Bench erred in allowing rectification of the bid after opening the financial bids, holding that the tendering authority had the discretionary power under Clause 5B(v) of Instructions to Bidders to seek clarifications at any stage of the tender evaluation process, which when extended to allow rectification of BOQ rates, unsettles the tender process - The principle that rectification of financial bids is impermissible post-opening is fortified by the facts that the bidder filled both figures and words pertaining to 1095 days, and the alleged mistake was not a bona fide inadvertent error but indicates negligence - Judicial interference in tender processes warrants utmost restraint and is only justified when there is mala fide, arbitrariness, or public interest is adversely affected. Mere error or procedural irregularity does not justify interference, especially if it affects the sanctity and finality of the tender - Non-joinder of the highest bidder (appellant) during the High Court proceedings, whose interests were adversely affected due to the rectification allowed to the respondent, vitiated the impugned order, violating principles of natural justice - The public interest in contractual commercial transactions is not confined to the quantum of revenue but also includes adherence to tender conditions and ensuring finality in the tendering process - Appeal allowed. [Paras 20, 30, 32-34, 40, 41. 43-44, 50] Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways v. Mandeepa Enterprises, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 911 : 2025 INSC 1108

Arbitrariness in Pre-Qualification—Judicial Review - The appellant, an Indian elevator manufacturer, challenged its exclusion from a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) issued by the Gwalior Municipal Corporation (GMC) for the supply, installation, testing, commissioning, and maintenance of lifts under the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana. The GMC had arbitrarily pre-selected only 10 multinational corporations based outside India as eligible bidders, presuming them to be the "most reputed firms" to ensure quality, thereby excluding domestic entities. The Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition, relying on Global Energy Ltd. v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2005) 4 SCC 435, holding that courts should not interfere with tender conditions absent arbitrariness, discrimination, or malice. On appeal, the Supreme Court held the GMC's process conjectural and presumptive, implying an untenable belief that Indian manufacturers are inherently incapable of competing with or providing services comparable to international firms. Such practices were disapproved in strong terms as wholly untenable and violative of principles of fair competition. Relying on Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437, the Court affirmed that while judicial restraint is warranted in tender matters, powers of review may be exercised to invalidate processes tainted by arbitrariness or favouritism. However, as the contract had been fully executed by the successful bidder, the appeal was disposed of as infructuous, without further relief. Tender conditions restricting participation to foreign multinationals on presumptive grounds of superior repute are arbitrary and impermissible; domestic firms cannot be excluded on the sole basis of nationality. Appeal disposed of as infructuous with costs. Omega Elevators v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 230

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987

Section 15 - Rule 15 of TADA Rules - Confession to Police Officer - Admissibility - Procedural Safeguards - Kartar Singh Guidelines - Issue Estoppel - Confessional statements were unreliable and failed to meet the procedural safeguards under the Act, as the recording officer failed to ensure the voluntariness of the accused while taking confessions. The statements of the accused did not contain the time of recording of the confession or indicate from where they were produced. No time was given to the accused for reflection before the recording of the confessional statements, which vitiated the said statements. There was nothing on record to suggest that the witness who recorded the statement was authorized to do so. The procedure laid down in the Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 (e.g., voluntariness, free atmosphere, reflection time) regarding the recording of confessional statements in coercive environments (BSF camp, Joint Interrogation Centres) under the TADA was violated. Accused confession further barred by issue estoppel from prior acquittal in 2002. Eyewitnesses failed to identify accused, and unrecovered murder weapon weakened prosecution case. Special Court's acquittal upheld as no evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt; no error or perversity found. (Para 22 - 27) State (CBI) v. Mohd. Salim Zargar @ Fayaz, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : 2025 INSC 376

Town Planning

Constitution of India; Article 21 - U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973; Section 27 and 43 - Right to Shelter - Illegal Demolition of Residential Structures – Compensation – Held, demolition of appellants' residential structures by Prayagraj Development Authority (PDA) was illegal and arbitrary due to non-compliance with procedural safeguards under Sections 27 and 43 of the 1973 Act. Show-cause notice and demolition order affixed without multiple attempts at personal service, violating requirement to ensure person “cannot be found”. Demolition within 24 hours of serving subsequent communication denied appellants opportunity to appeal under Section 27(2). Action breached principles of natural justice, right to shelter under Article 21, and rule of law. PDA ordered to pay Rs. 10 lakh compensation to each of six individuals for illegal demolition of their homes. The Court directed the PDA to scrupulously follow the directions in the case of In Re: Directions in the Matter of Demolition of Structures, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 884 which laid down guidelines for serving notices and carrying out demolitions, in the future. Zulfiquar Haider v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2025 INSC 480

Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 - Section 49 and 127 - Reservation of land under development plan - Lapse due to failure to acquire within timelines – Held, Reservation for public purpose lapses if land not acquired within 10 years of plan finalisation or 12 months of purchase notice; timelines sacrosanct and mandatory; indefinite restraint on owner's use impermissible; lapse operates for all intents, freeing land for permissible development even for bona fide purchasers. In 1993, portion of appellants' 2.47-hectare plot reserved for private school in sanctioned development plan; no acquisition till 2006. Original owners served purchase notice u/s 49 MRTP Act, confirmed 02-01-2007; no proceedings initiated within one year. Land sold to appellants in 2015. Writ petition seeking lapse declaration dismissed by High Court with liberty to pursue remedies; appeal to Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allows appeal, declares reservation lapsed on 02-01-2008 u/s 49(7). Even absent statutory aid, 33-year delay warrants lapse u/Art. 142 for complete justice. [Relied on: Chabildas v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 3 SCC 500; Kolhapur Municipal Corpn. v. Vasant Mahadev Patil, (2022) 5 SCC 758; Para 38, 50, 52] Nirmiti Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 248 : 2025 INSC 265

Trade Marks Act, 1999

Section 2(1)(h) - Deceptively similar - Defined as those that so nearly resemble another mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion – Held, appellants failed to establish a prima facie case for an interim injunction and that there was no deceptive similarity between appellant's mark 'Blenders Pride', 'Imperial Blue' and 'Seagram's' and respondent's mark 'London Pride'- Supreme Court applied holistic comparison test, examining the visual, phonetic, structural and conceptual elements of marks on following grounds - i. It concluded that overall commercial impression of 'London Pride' is substantially different from the appellant's marks; ii. Anti-dissection Rule which requires a mark to be considered as a whole, it does not prevent a court from identifying the “dominant” element that influences consumer perception; iii. Publici Juris (common to trade) - The term 'Pride' was found to be a common, laudatory or non-distinctive term that cannot be monopolized - Noted that dominant components of appellants' marks were 'Blenders' and 'Imperial', while the respondent's dominant component was 'London', which introduces a distinct geographical identifier; iv. Consumer Perception - Products in question are premium and ultra-premium whiskies, suggesting that consumers are discerning and likely to exercise greater care in their purchases - This reduces likelihood of confusion - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 21- 35, 36, 45, 51] Pernod Ricard v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 803 : 2025 INSC 981

Transfer of Property Act, 1881

Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – The doctrine applies to suits where a right to immovable property is "directly and specifically in question"- This includes mortgage suits where the prayer is for the sale of the property to satisfy a debt- A pendente lite transferee is bound by the result of the litigation regardless of notice- held that the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies even to a money recovery suit where the debt is secured by a mortgage over immovable property, and that the bar on transfer operates irrespective of whether the proceedings are contested or ex parte- Section 52 casts an embargo on the parties to the suit from transferring the property in question, in order to preserve the subject matter of the lis and to prevent the rights of the parties from being defeated by alienations pendente lite. If the doctrine were made inapplicable to ex-parte proceedings, a party would deliberately abstain from appearing before the court, transfer the property during the pendency of the suit, and thus, render the adjudication of rights in the said suit, infructuous- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Celir LLP V. Sumati Prasad Bafna 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727; Mahesh Prasad v. Musammat Mundar (1950 SCC OnLine All 16; Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy (2006) 13 SCC 608; Paras 70-75, 220-222] Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1211 : 2025 INSC 1434

Section 3 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order 7 Rule 11 - Suit filed after 45 Yrs - Limitation - Registered Sale Deeds - Constructive Notice - Property was partitioned orally in 1968 and subsequent registered sale deeds executed in 1978. Predecessors never challenged the partition or sale deeds during their lifetime. Held, party interested in property deemed to know about sale deed from registration date. Registered documents provide constructive notice, and a suit filed decades later without evidence of recent knowledge is barred by limitation. Plaintiffs' failure to address prior knowledge of the sale deeds and the long delay rendered the suit vexatious and meritless. The Trial Court correctly dismissed the suit, and the High Court erred in remanding it, as no triable issues existed. (Para 13 & 17) Uma Devi v. Anand Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2025 INSC 434 : [2025] 4 SCR 521 : (2025) 5 SCC 198

Section 10 - Applicability to Government Land Allotments - Restrictive Conditions - Resumption of Land - Held, Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which prohibits absolute restraints on alienation, does not apply to government land allotments, as these are not inter vivos or commercial transactions but are governed by public interest. The Telangana government validly imposed conditions on land allotted for charitable purposes in 2001. The Respondent-Trust's subdivision and sale of the land breached these conditions, justifying the State's 2012 resumption order. The High Court's 2022 decision, which invalidated the resumption order as violating Section 10, was set aside, as government allotments are regulated by specific statutory frameworks (Rules 1975 and Board of Revenue Standing Orders), not the Transfer of Property Act. The appeal was allowed, affirming the State's authority to enforce conditions and resume land for public welfare. (Para 23) State of Telangana v. Dr. Pasupuleti Nirmala Hanumantha Rao Charitable Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2025 INSC 679 : AIR 2025 SC 2874

Section 41 and 122 - When a property transfer involves considerations such as love and affection while the donor retains a life interest, it qualifies as a settlement deed in the form of a gift. Once the donee accepts the gift through the settlement deed, the donor cannot unilaterally revoke it. Mere reservation of life interest of the donor and the postponement of the delivery of the possession to the donee would not make the document a Will. Delivery of possession is not sine qua non to validate a gift or settlement. Upon the retention of the life interest, the donor will continue only as an ostensible owner of the property. Delivery of possession is only one of the methods to prove acceptance and not the sole method. The receipt of the original document by the plaintiff and registration of the same, would amount to acceptance of the gift and the transaction satisfies the requirement of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (Para 18) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2025 INSC 388 : AIR 2025 SC 1987 : (2025) 7 SCC 502

Section 52 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order I Rule 10 or Order XXII Rule 10 - Rights of transferees pendente lite - A transferee pendente lite is bound by the outcome of the litigation and may seek leave to appeal if their interests are affected. While a transferee pendente lite is not automatically entitled to be impleaded as a party, they may seek leave to appeal if their interests are prejudicially affected by the decree. However, such leave is discretionary and must be granted judiciously. In the present case, the Court found that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who purchased the suit property during the pendency of litigation and while an injunction was in force, failed to establish a valid case for leave to appeal. The Court set aside the High Court's order granting leave, holding that the Respondents could pursue separate legal remedies if they believed they were defrauded by the original owner. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Section 53A - Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 - The appellant, already in possession of the suit property as a tenant, entered into an agreement to sell with the respondent-landlord. The agreement stipulated that physical possession remained with the appellant as tenant, with ownership-based possession to transfer only upon execution of the sale deed. The appellant filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement, while the respondent sought eviction. The trial court and High Court levied stamp duty on the agreement under the Bombay Stamp Act, treating it as a 'conveyance' due to the grant of possessory rights under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Whether an agreement to sell, executed when the purchaser is already in physical possession as a tenant and contemplating future ownership transfer, constitutes a 'conveyance' exigible to stamp duty under Explanation I to Article 25, Schedule I of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958. Held, An agreement to sell granting or recognizing possession (including pre-existing tenancy possession intended for ownership conversion) is stampable as a conveyance under the Bombay Stamp Act, irrespective of deferred title transfer. The Supreme Court upheld the levy of stamp duty, observing stamp duty is levied on the instrument (agreement), not the underlying transaction. Where an agreement to sell includes delivery or prior grant of possession (even as tenant), it qualifies as a 'conveyance' under the Act, as it confers protected possessory rights under Section 53A of the TPA. The timing of possession transfer (before, during, or after the agreement) is immaterial; the instrument's effect—securing possession pending sale deed execution—triggers the duty. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Veena Hasmukh Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 5 SCC 725; Shyamsundar Radheshyam Agrawal v. Pushpabai Nilkanth Patil, (2024) 10 SCC 324] Ramesh Mishrimal Jain v. Avinash Vishwanath Patne, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2025 INSC 213

Section 53A – Doctrine of Part Performance – Availability of Defence – Readiness and Willingness to Perform – Held, the defence of part performance under Section 53A of the TPA is only available if the transferee proves that he has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract - Noted that appellant, by refusing the extraordinary monetary award granted by the Court and obstructing the execution of the decree, demonstrated a lack of willingness to perform, thereby disentitling himself to any equitable relief or protection under Section 53A - The Executing Court and the High Court were correct in directing the issuance of warrants of possession with police assistance, as the litigant had exhausted all remedies and was simply attempting to delay the inevitable execution - The maxim Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit is intended to ensure that no party suffers due to a mistake of the court and must be exercised in furtherance of justice, not to the disadvantage of litigants - The maxim cannot be invoked by a party who seeks to exploit the process of law to perpetuate injustice and retain possession while spurning a court-moulded equitable relief - Appeal dismissed with costs of Rs. 10 Lakhs. [Relied on Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi and another vs. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (dead) by LRS. And others 2002 3 SCC 676; Jang Singh v. Brij Lal 1963 SCC ONLine SC 219; Paras 6-10, 15, 16] Prem Aggarwal v. Mohan Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 996 : 2025 INSC 1214

Section 53A - Lis Pendens - Protection under Section 53A for a person possessing a property under part performance of a contract, is not available to a party who knowingly entered into the agreement despite being aware of pending litigation. (Para 9) Raju Naidu v. Chenmouga Sundra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2025 INSC 368

Section 53A - Part Performance - Difference between a registered sale deed and an agreement for sale or a contract for sale – Held, the doctrine of part-performance can be invoked as a defence against a transferor trying to eject a transferee - A key requirement for this defence is that the transferee must have taken or continued possession of property in part performance of the contract - A contract for sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties - While a sale is a transfer of ownership; a contract for sale is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document, namely a registered sale deed to complete the transaction of sale of an immovable property. [Paras 12-16, 30, 31] Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2025 INSC 1059

Section 54 - Agreement to Sell - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100 - An agreement to sell does not, in itself, create any interest in or charge on the immovable property - A transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a registered deed of conveyance (sale deed) - An agreement to sell, whether with or without possession, is not a conveyance and will not confer any title or transfer any interest in the immovable property (except for the limited right under Section 53-A of the TP Act) - Held that an Agreement to Sell does not confer any title, the property agreed to be sold but for which the sale deed was executed after the owner's death, was still the property of the deceased at the time of death and would be subject to division - When a Court forms the view that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in a Second Appeal, it has no choice but to dismiss the appeal in limine, though it must still give reasons for the dismissal. [Relied on Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656; Para 7] Zoharbee v. Imam Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1014 : 2025 INSC 1245

Section 54 - An agreement for sale of immovable property does not transfer title under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Title can only be transferred by a registered sale deed as per the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Indian Overseas Bank v. M.A.S Subramanian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 77

Section 54 - Registration Act, 1908; Section 17, 49- In a dispute concerning an agreement to sell dated 24.05.2014, the appellant argued that the agreement was a security for a loan, akin to a mortgage, and sought to repay the loan to redeem the property. However, the agreement to sell, along with an unregistered power of attorney and related documents, was held incapable of conferring title, interest, or ownership rights in the immovable property, as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. These documents were revoked by the appellant on 24.05.2022 and 27.05.2022, prior to the execution of the impugned sale deeds. The absence of a suit for specific performance by Respondent No. 1 further weakened their claim, as an agreement to sell, without registration, does not convey title or create any interest in the property. This position was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656, which clarified that unregistered agreements to sell, even with possession, do not transfer title or interest, except to the limited extent provided under Section 53-A of the TP Act. The Court further held that a power of attorney does not transfer title and is revocable unless coupled with interest, and a will is not a transfer inter vivos, taking effect only post the testator's death. Transactions like SA/GPA/WILL do not constitute valid transfers of immovable property and cannot be relied upon for claiming ownership or effecting mutations in records. This legal position was reiterated in Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 352 and Shakeel Ahmed v. Syed Akhlaq Hussain, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1526, emphasizing that only a registered deed of conveyance can legally transfer title in immovable property, and unregistered documents cannot confer enforceable rights under the Registration Act, 1908, and the TP Act. (Para 9.2,9.3) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 772 : AIR 2025 SC 2933

Section 54 - Sale of immovable property with a value over Rs. 100 must be made by a registered instrument - A contract for sale (agreement to sell) does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on the property - At best, it gives the buyer the right to file a suit for specific performance if the seller avoids executing a sale deed - A GPA (General Power of Attorney) is an instrument that creates an agency, authorizing the grantee to perform specific acts on behalf of the grantor - A GPA does not, by itself, constitute an instrument of transfer of immovable property, even if it contains clauses making it irrevocable or authorizing the attorney to sell the property. [Paras 18-22] Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2025 INSC 1059

Section 54 - The appellant, Indian Overseas Bank, challenged the findings of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) regarding the ownership of a property allegedly agreed to be sold to a company in exchange for shares. The NCLAT held that the company was in possession of the property by way of part performance of the contract and that the sale deed executed by legal representatives was not binding on the company. Whether the NCLAT was correct in holding that the sale deed was not binding on the company based on the company's possession under part performance of an unregistered agreement. Held, the NCLAT exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring the sale deed as not binding, as no registered sale deed was executed. The Court reiterated that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, an agreement for sale does not transfer ownership rights. Consequently, the legal owner remained the same until a registered sale deed was executed. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, setting aside the NCLAT's declaration regarding the non-binding nature of the sale deed. However, the Court clarified that no adjudication was made on the ownership rights claimed by the parties, and all remedies for seeking declarations or enforcing rights were kept open. This judgment reinforces the principle that title to immovable property can only be transferred through a duly registered sale deed and not merely by possession under an agreement for sale. Indian Overseas Bank v. M.A.S Subramanian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 77

Sections 54, 58(e), and 78 - A mortgage created by deposit of title deeds constitutes a legal mortgage and prevails over an equitable mortgage created by deposit of an unregistered agreement to sell, as the latter does not create any interest or charge on the property. An equitable mortgage operates in personam and does not bind third parties, unlike a legal mortgage, which creates a charge enforceable in rem. The equitable mortgage of the Central Bank of India (Respondent No. 1), based on an unregistered agreement to sell, was subservient to the legal mortgage of Cosmos Co-operative Bank Ltd. (Appellant), created by deposit of a share certificate equivalent to title deeds. Under Section 78 of the TP Act, the respondent's equitable charge was postponed due to lack of public notice and failure to deposit title deeds, prioritizing the appellant's legal mortgage. Appeal allowed. (Para 42, 43, 47, 52) Cosmos Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2025 INSC 243

Section 55 - Specific Relief Act 1963; Sections 22 and 28(3) - Specific Performance - Possession of Suit Property - In a suit for specific performance, where exclusive possession of the suit property is with the defendant at the time of the decree, the relief of transfer of possession is implicit in the decree directing the execution of a sale deed in favor of the plaintiff. A separate claim for possession is not mandatory in such cases, as per the combined reading of Sections 22 and 28(3) of the Specific Relief Act and Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. (Para 64, 65) Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2025 INSC 764 : AIR 2025 SC 2979

Section 122 - Once the document is declared as “gift”, Defendant No.1 had no right to cancel the same unilaterally and the Sub Registrar had no right to register the cancellation deed. Once the document is categorized as a gift, in the absence of any clause or reservation to cancel, the executant has no right to cancel the same. The reasons for cancellation or revocation of gift have to be proved in a court of law. Therefore, the unilateral cancellation of the document is void and as a natural corollary, the sale deed dated 19.10.1993 executed by Defendant No.1 / father also, is invalid. (Para 18) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2025 INSC 388 : AIR 2025 SC 1987 : (2025) 7 SCC 502

Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019

Substantive Equality – Reasonable Accommodation – Held, the concept of 'Reasonable Accommodation' is an implied obligation under the 2019 Act and a non-negotiable facet of Substantive Equality under Article 14 of the Constitution – The duty to provide such accommodation, which involves providing additional support to vulnerable persons, applies horizontally to both State and non-State actors – The Court analysed the doctrine through the four-dimensional approach to substantive equality propounded by Sandra Fredman - Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights – The statutory prohibitions against discrimination in the 2019 Act, particularly Section 3, act as a vehicle for the indirect horizontal application of Fundamental Rights, thereby binding private institutions (like schools/employers) to the constitutional ethos of Articles 14, 15, and 21 – The obligations of equality and non-discrimination bind both State and non-State actors - The failure of the Union and State Governments to implement the mandatory provisions of the 2019 Act and its Rules (such as establishing Welfare Boards, Protection Cells, and designating Complaint Officers) amounts to 'omissive discrimination', violating the fundamental rights of transgender persons – Such inaction is liable for judicial scrutiny - Supreme Court held that transgender persons Act reduced to dead letter and inaction seems intentional. [Relied on National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438 (NALSA); Paras 52, 125-127] Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1018 : 2025 INSC 1248

Transgender Persons – Held, transgender and gender-diverse persons are not required to seek permission from their employers to undergo gender affirmation or surgical intervention - asserting that the right to self-determination of gender is a matter of personal autonomy and dignity - the employers must be given a reasonable notice, but that should purely be to make the requisite changes and modifications in documents, etc. Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1018 : 2025 INSC 1248

Trust

Constructive Trust - Supreme Court laid down tentative list which may signify that the society may be considered as a 'constructive trust' - i. the method of devolution of property to the institution or its acquisition and circumstances along with the intention behind the grant of property i.e. whether it was for the benefit of the organization/public beneficiaries or for the personal benefit of any particular individual/family; ii. Whether grant is accompanied with any obligation or qualified with a condition, either express or implied, regarding its use by the grantee; iii. Whether the 'dedication' was complete i.e. whether there was an absolute cessation or complete relinquishment of ownership of property on part of the grantor and subsequent vesting of the property in another individual for the said object; iv. Whether public user or an unascertained class of individuals could exercise any 'right' over the organization and its properties; v. the manner of use of profits accrued, more particularly, whether it is applied/re-applied towards the benefit of the organization and its objectives etc. [Para 137] Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

Systemic Directions To High Courts In All UAPA Matters - Supreme Court relied on NCRB's Crimes in India Report 2023 showing 3,949 UAPA cases pending trial and 4,794 pending investigation to underline the magnitude of delay - It asked all Chief Justices of High Courts to: (a) to examine the number of cases pending within their States under laws such as the UAPA, posing a reverse burden of proof on the accused; (b) to ascertain the number of special courts designated to try the said offences, and if special courts have not been designated, the number of Sessions courts dealing with matters under these legislations and to take up the matter with the appropriate authority if it is found that they are not sufficient; (c) to discern, whether posting of judicial officers in these courts as also staffing is sufficient, thereby foreclosing a ground for delay and adjournment, and if not, then suitable order for posting be issued expeditiously- Supreme Court directed- a) that the list prepared in accordance with- shall be organised in order of case registered, to the extent possible and permissible, from the earliest to latest- Requisite directions be issued to the special courts/sessions courts to take up the matters registered earliest, first, unless otherwise warranted; (b) In consultation with the appropriate authority, the High Court to ascertain the position with respect to appointment/allotment of prosecutors/special public prosecutors, as may be applicable, to ensure that the matters, once taken up, are not further delayed on that count; (c) For those cases that have been pending for more than five years, the concerned court be directed to take stock of the situation as and when they are taken up, record detailed order taking note of the previous reasons for adjournment if available, refrain from granting adjournments on routine requests and take up the matter on a day-to-day basis; (d) The High Court concerned will periodically, seek reports from the concerned Courts dealing with these matters and take up issues that may be confronting the said courts, on the administrative side so as to ensure smooth functioning. [Relied on Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496; Paras 23-24] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Dayamoy Mahato, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1196 : 2025 INSC 1418

Section 43B - Arrest - Furnishing of Grounds of Arrest - Constitutional Mandate – Held that the explanation given by the jurisdictional Court at the time of remand, followed by the remand order which indicates that the grounds of arrest were explained, is not sufficient compliance with the mandatory requirement of furnishing the grounds of arrest at the time of securing the accused. Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026

Section 18-20 – Bail – Held, no UAPA offence over attending meeting of organization which isn't banned - Upheld the order of granting bail to the accused by High Court citing it to be fully justified and reasonable citing that allegations against him were related to his connections with an organization named AL-Hind, which is not a banned organization under UAPA - High Court's order was passed in April 2022, and it would not be 'just and proper to interfere with the same at this stage'- Charges had not been framed and the trial had not yet commenced, despite the accused having been in custody for 5.5 years - The trial had not commenced despite a lapse of 5.5 years and that 'accused cannot be allowed to languish in jail without being given a fair and speedy trial' - Directed Trial Court to expedite and conclude the trial within 2 years, noting that there were more than 100 witnesses to be examined - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 8-13] Union of India v. Saleem Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 833 : 2025 INSC 1008

Section 44 - National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, Section 17 - Blanket orders prohibiting disclosure of witness statements under the UAPA are impermissible without an individualized threat assessment for each witness. Restrictions on the accused's access to witness statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC require a reasoned judicial order establishing a specific threat to the life or safety of identified witnesses. Such orders must evaluate tailored protective measures and ensure the accused's right to a fair trial, including effective cross-examination, is not compromised. The Court set aside a Special Court's blanket order, affirmed by the High Court, withholding statements of 15 prosecution witnesses in a UAPA case investigated by the NIA, directing a fresh application within 8 weeks for individualized judicial scrutiny. (Para 10, 11) Mohammed Asarudeen v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 636 : 2025 INSC 746

University

Cochin University of Science and Technology Act, 1986; Section 31(10) and 31(11) — Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958; Rules 14 and 15 — Harmonious Construction of Rank List Validity vs. Communal Rotation — The Supreme Court held that while a Rank List remains valid for two years under Section 31(10), every appointment made during this period must adhere to the communal rotation mandated by Section 31(11)- rejected the argument that communal rotation should remain in abeyance until the Rank List expires. Radhika T v. Cochin University of Science and Technology, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1225 : 2025 INSC 1462

Reservation Satisfied upon Appointment and Completion of Probation — Held that where a candidate from a reserved category (Scheduled Caste) is appointed, completes their probation, and subsequently resigns, the reservation for that specific turn is deemed "satisfied in form and substance - " Any vacancy arising from such a resignation during the currency of the Rank List is a "fresh vacancy" that must be filled according to the next turn in the communal rotation roster (in this case, Latin Catholic/Anglo Indian). Radhika T v. Cochin University of Science and Technology, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1225 : 2025 INSC 1462

Doctrine of Harmonious Construction — Supreme Court emphasized that sub-sections (10) and (11) of Section 31 must be read as simultaneously operative-Interpreting the law to mean that rotation only applies after the list expires would render Section 31(11) "otiose" or a "dead letter" during the list's two-year lifespan - A lien represents the right of a civil servant to hold a post substantively. Once an employee resigns and accepts a substantive appointment elsewhere, the lien on the previous post is automatically terminated. Denying a waitlisted candidate appointment on the ground that a resigned employee still holds a "lien" is legally erroneous - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Gujarat State Dy. Engineers' Assn. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591; CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57; Ramlal Khurana (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1989) 4 SCC 99; Paras 5-10] Radhika T v. Cochin University of Science and Technology, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1225 : 2025 INSC 1462

University - A.J. Abdul Kalam Technological University Act, 2015; Section 13(7) - Kerala University of Digital Sciences, Innovation and Technology Act , 2021 - Section 11(10) - Appointment of Vice-Chancellor - Supreme Court forms Search Committee headed by Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia (Chairperson) for Kerala University Vice-Chancellor appointments - The chairman is authorized to constitute separate or joint committees - including 2 members from Chancellor's list and 2 from the State's list - Held that Chairperson must be paid an honorarium of Rs. 3 lakhs for every day of proceedings of Search-cum-Selection Committee - Supreme Court laid down appointment process - i. Committee's recommendations endorsed by Chairperson, will be submitted to CM of Kerala; ii. CM can recommend shortlisted names in order of preference, if he believes a candidate is unsuitable their remarks and supporting materials must be sent to Chancellor; iii. The Chancellor will appoint VC from empanelled names, following CM's order of preference; iv. If Chancellor has any reservations against the names or CM's remarks, they can record their opinion with supporting reasons; v. any file where the CM & Chancellor have a disagreement will be sent to SC for a final decision - While this process in underway, Chancellor can issue fresh notifications to continue the current temporary VC in office in accordance with 6 month limit stipulated by Section 13(7) and 11(10) of the respective acts. [Paras 10-22] Chancellor, Apj Abdul Kalam Technological University v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 815

Appointment of Chancellor—Mandatory Approval by Visitor - Under Section 14(1) of the Chandra Mohan Jha University Act, 2009, the appointment of the Chancellor by the Sponsor is "subject to" the approval of the Visitor (Governor of Meghalaya), which is mandatory and conditional. The phrase "subject to" means "conditional upon" such approval, rendering the appointment invalid and void ab initio in its absence. No doctrine of deemed approval applies absent a statutory legal fiction, as judicially creating one would encroach on legislative domain. Held, the self-appointment of Chander Mohan Jha as Chancellor without Visitor's approval was illegal, vitiating subsequent actions of the University. [Relied on: K.R.C.S. Balakrishna Chetty & Sons & Co. v. State of Madras (1960 SCC OnLine SC 179); Sant Lal Gupta & Ors. v. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. and Ors. (2010 SCC OnLine SC 1169)] CMJ Foundation v. State of Meghalaya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2025 INSC 211

Dissolution of University—Procedural Compliance under Section 48 - The State Government's power to dissolve a private university for "mismanagement, maladministration, indiscipline, fraudulent intent and failure in the accomplishment of the objectives" under Section 48 of the 2009 Act must follow natural justice principles, including show-cause notices, opportunity to respond, and a reasoned order evaluating evidence. Compliance with this Court's prior directions in SLP(C) No. 19617 of 2013 (requiring notice and hearing) is also essential. Held: The dissolution order dated March 31, 2014, adhered strictly to procedure—two show-cause notices issued, appellants' replies examined, and irregularities (e.g., illegal admissions, non-submission of reports, fraudulent degrees) exhaustively reasoned in the order. The Visitor's pivotal role under the Act was not nominal, justifying invocation of dissolution powers. CMJ Foundation v. State of Meghalaya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2025 INSC 211

University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 - The term 'degree' is defined under Section 22(3) the UGC Act, which states that the 'degree' means the 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' and the 'Doctorate Degree'. Thus, wherever the word 'degree' is used, unless a specific exclusion is provided, the same would include within its scope and ambit all three, 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' and a 'Doctorate Degree'. (Para 29) Chandra Shekhar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2025 INSC 372 : (2025) 9 SCC 740

Unauthorized Construction

Unauthorized Construction - Howrah Zilla Parishad Bye-laws, 2005 - Regulation 2015 - Supreme Court appreciated High Court's action in addressing unauthorized constructions and emphasized that it is 'high time' for the High Court to handle such issues across the city of Calcutta in larger public interest - Held that it is high time that the High Court in larger public interest takes up this issue and ensures that each and every unauthorized construction across the city is dealt appropriately inn accordance with law - Held that High Court has looked into the Resolution dt. 12.08.2024, passed by the Howrah Zilla Parishad - Petition dismissed. T.S Construction v. Howrah Zilla Parishad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 858

Demolition - Unauthorized constructions must be demolished without exception, and judicial regularization is impermissible. Courts must adopt a strict approach to uphold the rule of law, as leniency would undermine the deterrent effect of laws and foster a culture of impunity. State laws permitting regularization through impact fees were criticized, as they weaken legal deterrence. The High Court's decision refusing regularization and ordering demolition was upheld. Appeal dismissed; demolition of unauthorized construction upheld. [Referred: Rajendra Kumar Barjatya and Another v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1009 (Paras 6, 7)] Kaniz Ahmed v. Sabuddin, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 514 : 2025 INSC 610

Vicarious Liability

Whether the complaint under Section 4 read with Section 19 of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 (PLPA) discloses any prima facie offence against the appellants. Whether the directors and officers of a company can be held vicariously liable in the absence of specific allegations. Held, vicarious liability does not automatically attach to directors or officers of a company unless there are specific allegations of personal involvement in the alleged offence. In the present case, there were no direct accusations against the appellants regarding their role in the alleged illegal uprooting of trees using JCBs. The complainant failed to array the company as an accused despite it being the entity responsible for obtaining necessary permissions for land development. The Court reaffirmed that mere designation as a director or officer does not suffice to establish liability unless there is material evidence of direct involvement in the offence. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and quashed the complaint against the appellants, reiterating that liability for environmental violations under the PLPA, 1900, cannot be imputed without clear allegations of direct participation in the offence. Sanjay Dutt v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 32

Vexatious Litigation

If the parties misuse the process and attempt to obtain an order by "trick and strategem", the Courts would be justified in imposing the costs for igniting such vexatious litigation. (Para 9) Leelawati v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 321

Voice Sample Test

Power of Magistrate to Direct a Witness to Give Voice Sample - Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) – Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) - Rule against Self-Incrimination – Held, the Magistrate has the power to order any person (not just an accused) to give a voice sample for the purpose of investigation - Reiterated that compelling a person to give a specimen handwriting, signature, finger impression, or a voice sample does not amount to 'testimonial compulsion' and thus does not violate the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) - These samples are considered "material evidence" for comparison, not oral or documentary testimony which would, by itself, have the tendency to incriminate the accused - Held that CrPC lacked an explicit provision, whereas precedents conceded the power to the Judicial Magistrate to order a voice sample by adopting the identical principle from Kathi Kalu Case, which dealt with handwriting, signature and finger impressions - This power was conceded to the Magistrate until explicit provisions were incorporated - With the advent of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, Section 349 now specifically incorporates the provision empowering the Magistrate to direct a person to provide a voice sample - Held that whether the CrPC or BNSS is applicable, the Magistrate was empowered to pass the order. [Relied on Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2019) 8 SCC 1; State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (AIR 1961 SC 1808); Paras 4-11] Rahul Agarwal v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1002 : 2025 INSC 1223

Waiver and Estoppel

Interpretation of Contract – No Oral Modification Clause – Requirements for Valid Waiver – Estoppel Distinguished from Waiver – Jurisprudence Clearly Restated - that waiver under Section 63 of Contract Act is intentional relinquishment of rights by the promisee without need for consideration or agreement, requiring deliberate, explicit intention - Estoppel and waiver distinguished - Estoppel is predicated on conduct and representation, while waiver is intentional abandonment. Estoppel barred by No Waiver/No Oral Modification clauses unless unequivocal representation and detrimental reliance are established. [Paras 29–31, 33-34, 74, 86] Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation v. GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 963 : 2025 INSC 1171

Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025

Constitutional validity of the Act - Amendments were challenged primarily on the grounds of violation of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30 and 300A of the Constitution - Composition of the Central Waqf Council and State Boards allowing non-Muslim majorities, and scrutiny on discriminatory provisions such as those requiring demonstrable practice of Islam for 5 years - Supreme Court upheld the legislative competence of Parliament and found no manifest arbitrariness warranting interim relief, underscoring protections for government properties from wrongful Waqf declarations, the secular nature of Board and Council functions, and wider remedies available under the Amended Waqf Act - Supreme Court stayed this provision till the State Governments frame rules for providing a mechanism to determine the question as to whether a person has been practising Islam for 5 years or more - Without such a mechanism, the provision will lead to an 'arbitrary exercise of power - Held that objections to inclusion of non-Muslims in statutory councils did not transgress religious freedoms as the functions are secular and advisory - Held no prima facie ground for interim stay and upheld the Act's constitutionality, emphasizing the need to respect legislative intent and due process in safeguarding Waqf properties. [Paras 34, 35, 38-41, 43-54, 72-80, 111-124, 182-186] In Re the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 909 : 2025 INSC 1116

Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 - Exclusion of rights of STs and restricted applicability in tribal areas - Government properties Exemption - Held that it was justified on constitutional protections under Article 244 and special legislative measures recognized in judgement of Amrendra Pratap Singh Case and 5th and 6th Schedules - Held that registration provisions are not arbitrary and registration is necessary to check misuse - Upheld provisions excluding government properties declared as Waqf, allowing inquiry by designated officers - This protects government interests - Appointment of CEO not necessarily Muslim was allowed as the CEO functions under Board Control, which retains Muslim majority - Deletion of provisions permitting non-Muslims to create Waqf- supporting trusts was upheld as consistent with Islamic nature Waqf and availability of alternative trust forms - Upheld the provision that waqf can be created only by a person showing or demonstrating that he is practicing Islam for at least 5 years - Upheld that deletion of section 104 of the original Waqf Act is not arbitrary - Supreme Court stops government from denotifying Waqf Lands disputed as encroachments till Tribunal's decision on Title. [Paras 51-53, 102, 131-136, 177-179, 189-190, 194-197] In Re the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 909 : 2025 INSC 1116

Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 - Waqf by user - Section 3(r)(i) - Waqf Act, 1995 - Deletion of this section - Supreme Court upheld deletion of 'waqf by user' concept - Held that if Mutawallis for a period of 102 years could not get the waqf registered, as required under the earlier provisions, they cannot claim that they be allowed to continue with the waqf even if they are not registered - Now they cannot be heard to say that the provision which now requires the application to be accompanied by a copy of the waqf deed is arbitrary - Held that if the legislature in 2025 finds that on account of the concept of 'Waqf by User', huge governments properties have been encroached upon and to stop the menace, it takes steps for deletion of the said provision, the said amendment, prima facie, cannot be said to be arbitrary - Registration of Waqfs was upheld - ample time of 6 months was provided. [Paras 107, 143, 145, 150-152] In Re the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 909 : 2025 INSC 1116

Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution Act, 1974

Procedure for sample collection - The results of an analysis of a sewage or trade effluent sample are not admissible as evidence in a legal proceeding unless the statutory procedure under Section 21(3), (4) and (5) is strictly complied with - Rigor of Section 19(1) of National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 is qua the procedure to be adopted by the NGT in conducting its proceedings - It cannot be stretched to abandon the statutory procedure laid down under Section 21 and 22 of the Water Act and by outsourcing investigation to administrative committees by overlooking the statutory provisions and basing its decisions on the recommendation of such administrative committee - This includes serving a notice to the occupier, taking and dividing the sample in their presence, and sealing and signing the containers by both parties - Held that NGT's order were vitiated due to the non-compliance with the principles of natural justice and the mandatory procedure under the Water Act - Set aside NGT's orders and clarifies that it is open to U.P. Pollution Control Board to carry out a fresh inspection, provided it adheres to the due process and statutory procedures - Appeal allowed. [Para 10, 21, 22, 27, 29-33] Triveni Engineering and Industries Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 863 : 2025 INSC 1060

Wildlife Protection Act, 1972

Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Central Zoo Authority (CZA) - Translocation of Captive Animals - IUCN Guidelines - Central Empowered Committee (CEC) - A.N. Jha Deer Park - Supreme Court acknowledged that the Deer Park suffered from chronic managerial deficiencies and persistent non-compliance with statutory standards, leading to an exponential increase in the deer population, far exceeding the carrying capacity of the 10.97-acre enclosure- The DDA's lack of requisite capacity and the risks of overcrowding (stress, weakened immunity, disease) made scientific population management through regulated translocation "indispensable" for the welfare of the deer- noted the serious and prima facie credible allegations made by the petitioner-Society regarding gross irregularities in the translocation of 261 deer already undertaken to Rajasthan- These violations included- i. Transporting vulnerable categories (pregnant females, juveniles, antlered males); ii. Severe overcrowding in vehicles, such as 40 deer and a fawn in one truck; iii. Absence of veterinary assistance, sedation, food, or water during long journeys; iv. Lack of pre-translocation genetic screening, tagging/identification, tranquilisation protocols, veterinary fitness certification, or behavioural acclimatisation; v. No scientific assessment of the recipient sanctuaries' carrying capacity, predator-prey dynamics (the reserves are tiger-bearing), or habitat suitability; vi. No post-release tracking mechanisms (telemetry collars/radio chips) were used. [Paras 17-21] New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Hotriculture Dda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1145 : 2025 INSC 1358

Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Principles of environmental protection and humane treatment of wildlife- Directions- Articles 48A, 51A(g), and 21 of the Constitution- Supreme Court gave following directions- i. Supreme Court directed the Central Empowered Committee (CEC), working under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, to conduct two comprehensive, on-ground surveys and file detailed reports within eight weeks; ii. To enumerate the present deer population, ecological carrying capacity, veterinary infrastructure, and the maximum number of deer that can be sustainably and humanely maintained; iii. To inspect Ramgarh Vishdhari Tiger Reserve and Mukundra Hills Tiger Reserve in Rajasthan, and report on the number of deer surviving, habitat suitability, predation risks, and compliance with CZA and IUCN Guidelines; iv. The CEC shall prepare a comprehensive roadmap for any future translocation, ensuring strict conformity with statutory and IUCN Guidelines, covering methodology, tagging, transportation, and post-release monitoring; v. Directed DDA to refrain from organising or permitting any commercial events, private parties, or non-conservation-related gatherings within the Deer Park premises or its surrounding buffer zones, and instead develop educational outreach programmes; vi. The DDA must place a report on record detailing the past and present status of the land formerly designated for deer enclosures, including the "unexplained reduction of more than 20 acres". [Para 18-23] New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Hotriculture Dda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1145 : 2025 INSC 1358

Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 (WP Act)—Section 24(2)(c)—Continuance of Rights—Forest Rights Act, 2006 (FRA)—Section 3, 4(1)—Protection of Tribal/Forest Dweller Rights—State's apprehension that declaration of a Wildlife Sanctuary would adversely affect the rights of tribals and traditional forest dwellers rejected—Held, the contention that existing rights, including those relating to public infrastructure like roads and schools, would be lost is a "bogey" and a "figment of imagination"- Provisions contained in Section 24(2)(c) of the WP Act (allowing for continuance of rights) read with Section 3 and 4(1) of the FRA amply protect the rights of forest dwellers and Scheduled Tribes, as the FRA is a non-obstante clause- The necessity to strike a balance between environmental protection and the need for development emphasized- Supreme Court directs the State Government of Jharkhand to notify the area comprising of 126 compartments as notified in the 1968 notification, excluding six compartments as a Wildlife Sanctuary within a period of three months from the date of the judgment. [Relied on Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India and Others (1996) 5 SCC 1; Centre for Environmental Law, World Wide Fund-India v. Union of India and Others 2013 8 SCC 234; Paras 68-104] In Re Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1099 : 2025 INSC 1311

Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972—Section 26A—Declaration of Sanctuary in Reserve Forest—Delay by State Government in notifying the Saranda Game Sanctuary (31,468.25 hectares, notified in 1968) as a Wildlife Sanctuary under the WP Act—Held, the State of Jharkhand's "totally unfair" and "dilly dallying tactics" over a period of time, especially after giving multiple assurances to the Court about its intent to notify the area- that the declaration of the area as a Wildlife Sanctuary will not affect ancillary activities permissible under Sections 3 and 4 of the FRA- The Supreme Court issued a Mandamus directing the State to proceed with the notification of the 31,468.25 hectares as the Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary- Directed that no mining activities shall take place within national parks and wildlife sanctuaries and within an area of 1 kilometre from such national park or wildlife sanctuary. In Re Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1099 : 2025 INSC 1311

Recognition of Zoo Rules, 2009 (Rules 2009) - Central Zoo Authority Guidelines – Held, Vantara's acquisition of animals in Green Zoological Rescue and Rehabilitation Centre run by Reliance Foundation at Jamnagar, Gujarat is as per regulations - SIT was constituted including retired judges and senior officials - As per SIT Report - all animal acquisitions, imports and welfare practices strictly confirmed to statutory requirements under the WP Act, 1972, Rules 2009, CITES, Customs Act, 1962, and PMLA, 2002 - SIT noted that specific animal transfers like that of 'Madhuri' elephant and held that such transfers were effected in compliance with High Court and Supreme Court orders and were found lawful - Import permits and statutory documentation were held to be conclusive - Neither Courts not authorities could re-examine underlying foreign legal compliance after valid CITES and Indian permits were issued -  Noted that facilities exceeded statutory and international benchmarks, mortality rates were consistent with global averages, and allegations of cruelty, trafficking, misuse of funds or commercial trade were dismissed as baseless - Supreme Court directed closure of all complaints or proceedings on the same set of allegations, barring further judicial or administrative scrutiny on issues for furnishing the full SIT report to Vantara - Petitions dismissed. [Paras 4-7, 9-12, 14, 17] C.R. Jaya Sukin v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 913

Will

Moulding of relief - The concept of moulding of relief refers to the ability of a court to modify or shape a relief sought by a party in a legal proceeding based on the circumstances of the case and the facts established after a full-fledged trial. The principle enables the court to grant appropriate remedies even if the relief requested in the pleading is not exact or could not be considered by the court or changed circumstances have rendered the relief obsolete. The court aims that justice is served while taking into account the evolving nature of a case. The above road map is pursued by a court based on the notion of flexibility in relief, equitable jurisdiction, and is tempered by judicial discretion. When moulding the relief, the court considers the issues and circumstances established during the full-fledged trial, looks at shortening the litigation, and then in its perspective, renders complete justice to the issue at hand. The converse of the above is that the moulded relief should not take the aggrieved party by surprise or cause prejudice. The relief is moulded as an exception and not as a matter of course. (Para 20) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2025 INSC 395

Moulding of relief - Shortening Litigation - It would not be in the interest of justice to make the executor-HBN Shetty (80 years) to file another suit to oblige the terms of the Will of the testatrix, who was found as a real owner of the property. Therefore, instead of asking him to file another suit, the High Court was justified in moulding the relief in favor of the executor so that the fruits of the Will could be reaped by the beneficiary- Vinayagamurthy and his children. (Para 22 & 24) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2025 INSC 395

Witness Protection Scheme, 2018

Nature & Scope – Held, Witness Protection Scheme is a remedial and curative measure designed to neutralize the effects of threat that have already materialized - Bail cancellation is a preventive and supervisory function of the Court, aimed at ensuring the trial proceeds without being gendered by intimidation - The scheme addresses the psychological impact of fear on witnesses, but it does not displace or dilute the established law of bail - Substituting the scheme for a bail cancellation application would render the court's authority and bail conditions meaningless - Supreme Court expressed dismay at the practice of Allahabad High Court of passing 'cyclostyled template order' in at least forty recent cases - Matter remanded for fresh hearing - Appeal allowed. [Paras 18, 36-38, 47, 61] Phireram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2025 INSC 1074

Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923

Section 19 – Liability of Insurer – Compensation Claim – Scope of Commissioner's power – Whether an insurer can be made jointly and severally liable with the employer despite the absence of a provision like Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Held, the issue is no longer res integra and stands settled by the decision in Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju - The Commissioner has the power to determine the liability of a person who is required to indemnify the employer - The 1923 Act is a social welfare legislation, and its object is to provide a speedy and efficacious remedy to the workman - While Section 3 fixes liability on the employer, excluding the insurer from being jointly and severally liable, where the liability is covered by insurance, would have a deleterious effect and render the remedy illusory - If the insurer is only liable to reimburse the employer, the workman would be left without compensation if the employer fails to pay due to financial incapacity - By virtue of the power to determine liability under Section 19, the Commissioner has the power to make the insurer jointly and severally liable with the employer to pay compensation if it falls within the scope of the contract of insurance - The High Court's modification, substituting the direction to the insurer to pay with a direction to the employer to pay and seek reimbursement, was held to be unjustified - The appropriate course was to make the employer and the insurer jointly and severally liable - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju and others v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2007) 13 SCC 446; Mahendra Rai vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. (Civil Appeal No.6697 of 2014; Paras 10-20] Alok Kumar Ghosh v. New India Assurance Company Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1022 : 2025 INSC 1239

Writ Jurisdiction

Writ Petition - Alternative Remedy of Appeal to High Court - Dismissal - Rule of Self-Imposed Restriction - Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition filed under Article 226, primarily due to the appellant's failure to pursue the alternative remedy of appeal provided under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962, to the High Court itself - When the statutorily designated alternative forum happens to be the High Court itself (and not an ordinary functionary/tribunal), refusal to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 should be the rule, and entertaining it an exception - Where a remedy is available to a party before the High Court in another jurisdiction (like a reference/appeal provided by statute), the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should not normally be exercised, as that would allow the machinery set up by the statute to be bypassed – Held, If a petitioner has disabled himself from availing the statutory remedy by his own fault, he cannot use that as a ground for the High Court to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 - The appellant approached the High Court in writ jurisdiction well after the 180-day limitation period prescribed for an appeal under Section 130 - The High Court was justified in refusing to entertain the writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari, especially since the appellant had an equally efficacious remedy before the High Court in a separate jurisdiction which he failed to avail - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419; Paras 9-16] Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1129

Money Claim - Availability of Alternative Remedy – Long Pendency – Held, merely because an alternative remedy was available, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petitions after a delay of over a decade, particularly when the parties had already exchanged affidavits. Non-payment of admitted dues could be seen as arbitrary action, justifying the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court restored the writ petitions to their original numbers for fresh adjudication by the High Court, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction could be exercised even in money claims under certain circumstances. Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors v. Chief General Manager, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 63

Writ Petition - High Court Jurisdiction & Propriety - Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Rallies – Supreme Court expressed concern and sought an explanation from the Registrar (Judicial) of the Madras High Court as to how a Writ Petition (Criminal) was entertained for the relief of framing SOP/Guidelines for political rallies, which affects the general public at large, and why such matters were not treated as Public Interest Litigation (PIL) and listed before a Division Bench - Noted the impropriety of a Single Judge entertaining a matter, the cause of action of which (Karur stampede) fell under the jurisdiction of the Madurai Bench, without the Chief Justice's order, especially when similar matters were pending before the Division Bench in Madurai. Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam v. P.H. Dinesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2025 INSC 1224

Z+ Security

The determination of threat perception for Z+ security cover is made by the Government of India and State authorities based on agency inputs and falls outside the judiciary's purview. The Supreme Court dismissed the Application seeking to revoke the Z+ security cover provided to the Ambani family, reiterating that the applicant lacked locus standi to challenge the security arrangement. The Court upheld its prior orders dated July 22, 2022, and February 2023, directing that Z+ security cover for the family continue in India and abroad, with costs borne by the Ambanis. The Court cautioned the applicant against filing further frivolous applications, warning of exemplary costs for future violations. The Court rejected arguments that security personnel were required for national security purposes, finding no material change in threat perception to justify altering the security cover. (Para 3, 4) Union of India v. Bikash Saha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 689