Supreme Court Quarterly Digest Jan - Mar, 2026

Administrative Law

Administrative Law — Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation — Policy Change — Lack of Probity and Transparency - Service/Education Law — Alteration of the "Rules of the Game" - Supreme Court found that the policy modification was prompted by an undisclosed representation from the father of a high-ranking candidate who failed to disclose his private interest - Such a change, introduced after the issuance of the prospectus and the submission of applications, violates the principle of fairness and predictability - Reiterated the well-settled principle that the criteria for selection/admission cannot be altered by the authorities once the process has commenced - Noted that the State adopted "double standards" as the expanded criteria were not applied to other allied medical courses during the same session – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve (2001) 10 SCC 51; K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 3 SCC 512; Tej Prakash Pathak vs. Rajasthan High Court (2025) 2 SCC 1; Mandeep Singh vs. State of Punjab (2025) INSC 834; Paras 20-40] Divjot Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : 2026 INSC 26

Administrative Law – Interest Liability – Delay by Government Authority: The Supreme Court upheld the TDSAT's finding that the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) could not levy interest for the period during which it "slept over the matter." - Interest is only payable from the expiry of the notice period stipulated in the show-cause notice (December 8, 2014), rather than the date of the Court's order in 2013, as the delay in issuing the demand was attributable solely to the DoT - For successful bidders in the fresh auction, the liability to pay the interim reserve price ceases on the date the Letter of Intent (LoI) is issued, as the LoI stipulates the commencement of the new 20-year term – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Centre for Public Interest Litigation and others vs. Union of India and others (2012) 3 SCC 1; Paras 14-17] Union of India v. Sistema Shyam Teleservices, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2026 INSC 174 : AIR 2026 SC 1123

Administrative Law – Publication and Promulgation – Noted that Law, to bind, must first exist and be made known in the manner ordained by the legislature - The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for delegated legislation is not an "empty formality" but a dual-purpose constitutional requirement to ensure accessibility to the governed and accountability in the exercise of executive power - Until publication, a Notification is merely an "intention" and has not crossed the threshold to become a legal "obligation." Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80

Administrative Law – Retrospective Validation – Ex Post Facto Approval – Whether subsequent Board approval can cure a jurisdictional defect in a CLU issued without statutory backing. Held: When a statute prescribes a particular manner for doing an act, it must be done in that manner and no other - A CLU that is unlawful on the date of its grant for want of statutory authority does not become lawful merely because of a later administrative decision, unless the statute expressly confers power for retrospective validation. [Paras 41-48, 53-59] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Administrative Remedy – Representation to Chief Justice – Re-employment – Supreme Court granted liberty to the petitioner to make a representation before the Chief Justice of the High Court - The Chief Justice is requested to gather information regarding disparities in superannuation ages across States and engage with the State Government on the administrative side - Decisions regarding re-employment and continuation in service must be taken by the Chief Justice in consultation with puisne Judges. [Paras 3-5] Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Advocates Act, 1961

Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 35 and Section 38 – Professional Misconduct – Withdrawal of Complaint – Sustainability of Disciplinary Action – The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India (BCI) which had held an advocate guilty of professional misconduct and imposed a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakh – Noted that the BCI failed to consider that the complainant had filed a sworn affidavit seeking to withdraw the complaint, stating the initial grievance arose from a "misunderstanding" regarding the deposit of costs and expressing full satisfaction with the advocate's services. Monty Goyal v. Navrang Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2026 INSC 94

Advocates Act, 1961 - The Supreme Court directed the Bar Council of India to reconsider its rule which bars office bearers of Bar Associations from contesting elections to State Bar Councils. With this direction, the Court disposed of a writ petition challenging Chapter III of the Bar Council of India Uniform Rules (and Mandatory Guidelines) for the Elections of Bar Councils, 2016. Dhanya Kumar Jain v. Bar Council of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 216

Advocates Act, 1961 - The Supreme Court disposed of a plea seeking reservation for advocates belonging to Other Backward Classes in appointments of government pleaders in Madhya Pradesh. While declining to issue binding directions in the absence of a statutory mandate, the Court through its order urged the Advocate General to ensure representation of lawyers from marginalised communities and women. OBC Advocates Welfare Association v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 217

Amicus Curiae

Amicus Curiae - Procedure for Appointing Amicus Curiae for Absentee Appellants – Guidelines – To prevent technical pleas of unfairness, the Supreme Court directed that when appointing an Amicus Curiae due to the absence of a convict's counsel, the Registry should issue notice to the convict's address via the jurisdictional police station - If the convict remains dormant despite service (including service by pasting on the premises), the Supreme Court may proceed to decide the appeal - This process ensures the Court knows if the appeal survives or has abated after long periods. Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257

Anticipatory Bail

Anticipatory Bail – Conditional Orders for Deposit: The Supreme Court criticized the Jharkhand High Court for making the grant of anticipatory bail contingent upon the deposit of a specific sum – Noted that High Court had directed the petitioners to file a supplementary affidavit showing payment of Rs. 9,12,926.84/- to the complainant, failing which the bail application would stand dismissed - Held, that the grant of regular or anticipatory bail should not be subject to the deposit of any amount - If a case for bail is made out, the court should pass an appropriate order; if not, it may decline - the court should not pass a conditional order for deposit and then exercise its discretion. [Relied on: Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra & Another [(2025) SCC Online 1571; Paras 8 - 10] Prantik Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Anticipatory Bail – Grounds for Grant – Civil Dispute and Parity – In a case involving alleged trespass and theft under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Supreme Court found the appellant entitled to anticipatory bail based on three key factors- i. The appellant appeared before the IO as directed by the interim protection order; ii. The nature of the dispute appears to be a civil matter regarding immovable property (possession based on an agreement to sell); iii. Other co-accused in the same FIR had already been granted bail, establishing a ground for parity – Appeal allowed. [Paras 6, 7] Shally Mahant @ Sandeep v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 146

Anticipatory Bail — Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 18 — Cancellation of Anticipatory Bail - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the respondents, observing that a prima facie case under the SC/ST Act was established - noted that while the High Court relied on the absence of casteist slurs in the initial FIR (lodged by a police official based on a social media video), it failed to exercise sufficient caution in examining other records - an affidavit filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and statements of various persons clearly alleged the use of casteist slurs and violence by the upper-caste respondents against marginalized community members over a drainage dispute – noted that the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, which precludes the grant of anticipatory bail, is applicable when the ingredients of the offence are prima facie disclosed - In this case, investigation reports indicated offences under the SC/ST Act, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the Arms Act - noted that mere attempts at reconciliation by the police cannot prevent the taking of cognizance for criminal acts - Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in concluding there was no prima facie culpability, as subsequent investigation reports and affidavits by high-ranking police officials corroborated allegations of caste-based abuse and firearm discharge – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249; Paras 8-15] Kuldeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 239

Arbitration

Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts) Rules, 2001 (Karnataka) – Rule 9(4) – Harmonious Construction with Section 9(2) – Held that while Rule 9(4) uses the term "initiated" and Section 9(2) uses "commenced," the terms must be read harmoniously - "Initiated" in Rule 9(4) must be understood as "commenced" within the meaning of Section 21 to prevent the strict timelines of the parent Act from being rendered otiose. [Relied on Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 479; Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd. (2004) 7 SCC 288; Geo Miller and Company Private Limited v. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (2020) 14 SCC 643; Arif Azim Company Limited v. Aptech Limited (2024) 5 SCC 313; Para 29] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32

Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 2(a) and Section 39 – Absence of Arbitration Agreement – Jurisdiction of State Government – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision setting aside an arbitral award, holding that there was neither a valid arbitration agreement nor informed consent by the Municipal Council to resolve disputes through arbitration - Noted that Clause 22 of the contract, which provided for dispute referral to the Collector with subsequent appeals to the Divisional Commissioner and the State Government, constituted a departmental dispute-resolution mechanism and not an "arbitration agreement". Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288

Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 — Section 11(6A) — Paradigm Shift — The 2015 Amendment introduced Section 11(6A), which limited the Court's inquiry solely to the "existence" of an arbitration agreement, effectively overruling the Patel Engineering dictum for post-amendment cases – Noted for proceedings commenced prior to 23.10.2015, the broader judicial scrutiny and finality of the Section 11 order under the old regime continue to apply – Appeal allowed. [Relied on SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 618; Paras 22-32] Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Part III — Sections 61, 73, and 74 — Challenge to Conciliation Award and Partition Deed — Order VII Rule 11 of CPC — Rejection of Plaint — The Supreme Court set aside the rejection of a suit challenging a partition deed (KBPP) and a subsequent Conciliation Award - held that the Jegatheesan group's challenge based on coercion, undue influence, and misrepresentation regarding the KBPP, and the allegation of fraud/fabrication regarding the Conciliation Award, disclosed a real cause of action that could not be summarily dismissed – Noted that while an execution proceeding under Section 36 is pending, an Execution Court cannot examine the validity of a partition deed or family arrangement; such challenges must be resolved through a properly instituted civil suit. J. Muthurajan & Anr. v. S. Vaikundarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2026 INSC 139

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6-A) — Appointment of Arbitrators — Scope of Judicial Review — The Supreme Court or High Court, while considering a Section 11 application, must strictly confine its examination to the existence of an arbitration agreement - The use of the word "examination" indicates a limit to the court's jurisdiction, intended for a prima facie determination rather than a "laborious or contested inquiry" - Noted that Section 11(6-A) continues to remain in full force as its omission (by the 2019 Amendment) has not yet been notified. [Paras 14–17] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5 : (2026) 2 SCC 801

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 12(5) and Seventh Schedule – Ineligibility of Arbitrator – Unilateral Appointment – The principle of equal treatment of parties under Section 18 applies not only to arbitral proceedings but also to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators - Equal treatment entails that parties must have an equal say in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal - Any person whose relationship with the parties, counsel, or the dispute falls within the Seventh Schedule is ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator by operation of law – Held a person who is statutorily ineligible to act as an arbitrator cannot nominate or appoint another person as an arbitrator - A unilateral appointment by one party, where that party has exclusive power to appoint a sole arbitrator, violates the principle of impartiality and neutrality. Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 12(5) Proviso – Waiver of Ineligibility – “Express Agreement in Writing” – Held that the ineligibility of an arbitrator under Section 12(5) can only be waived by an "express agreement in writing" entered into by the parties subsequent to the disputes having arisen – Supreme Court laid down Parameters of Waiver- i. Mere participation in proceedings, filing a Statement of Claim, requesting an extension of time under Section 29A, or failing to object in the first procedural order does not constitute an "express agreement in writing" ii. Recording "No Objection": A procedural order recording that parties have "no objection" to the appointment is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of a conscious, written waiver under the proviso to Section 12(5). Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 15(2), 15(3), and 15(4) — Substitution of Arbitrator — Validity of prior proceedings — The Supreme Court held that while appointing a substitute arbitrator under Section 15(2), the High Court cannot declare proceedings undertaken by the previous tribunal as a "nullity" on the grounds of an IBC moratorium - Held that Section 15 is a mechanism to preserve continuity; prior proceedings remain valid unless the parties agree otherwise or the substitute tribunal, in its discretion, decides to repeat hearings. Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137 : AIR 2026 SC 1042

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 & 23 - Jurisdiction to decide disputes not specifically mentioned in invocation notice - Unless the arbitration agreement specifically restricts the tribunal to only decided "specifically referred disputes," the claimant is entitled to add or amend claims in the statement of claim, and the respondent is entitled to file counter-claims, provided they are arbitrable and within limitation - Where an arbitration clause is widely worded to cover "any matter arising out of or connected with the agreement," the tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain all such disputes once constituted. Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 — Doctrine of Competence-Competence — Arbitrability of Disputes — The determination of the substantive existence and validity of an arbitration agreement, as well as the arbitrability of the dispute, is the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 - The Referral Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a "mini-trial" regarding the validity of the agreement. [Paras 15–16] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5 : (2026) 2 SCC 801

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 2(1)(e), Section 11, and Section 29A — Jurisdiction to extend the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal — Held that the expression "Court" used in Section 29A for the extension of time or substitution of arbitrators refers strictly to the Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act - This definition encompasses the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes a High Court only if it exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction - The Supreme Court or High Courts exercising power under Section 11 to appoint an arbitrator do not retain supervisory control and become functus officio once the appointment is made. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92 : AIR 2026 SC 666

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 21 & 23 - Object of Section 21 Notice - The object of Section 21 is primarily to determine the commencement of arbitral proceedings for reckoning limitation - It is a procedural rather than a jurisdictional requirement. Failure to issue a Section 21 notice is not fatal to a party's claim if the dispute is otherwise arbitrable and covered by the arbitration agreement - The claims raised in a Section 21 notice do not restrict or limit the claims that can be subsequently raised before the Arbitral Tribunal in the statement of claim under Section 23 - held that an arbitral tribunal cannot decide disputes beyond a specific issue referred to it and that a party cannot raise additional disputes without issuing a separate notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A(4) & 29A(5) - Power of Court to extend mandate after rendering of award – The Supreme Court held that an application for extension of the arbitrator's mandate under Section 29A(5) is maintainable even if it is filed after the expiry of the statutory period (12 months plus optional 6 months) and even after the award has been rendered in the interim - Noted that an award passed after the mandate has expired is unenforceable under Section 36 and "non est," but the arbitrator's indiscretion in passing such an award does not denude or impair the Court's jurisdiction to entertain an extension application. C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A(4) and Section 29A(6) — Extension of Mandate and Substitution of Arbitrator — The Supreme Court clarified that the expression "obligates" used in the Mohan Lal Fatehpuria case regarding the substitution of an arbitrator does not mean that substitution is an inevitable consequence when considering an extension of a mandate that has already expired - Substitution is only required "if the situation so warranted" and is not a mandatory inference following the termination of a mandate under Section 29A(4). Viva Highways Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Statutory Interpretation of Section 29A – The expression "if an award is not made" in Section 29A(4) does not create a threshold bar for cases where a late award has been delivered; rather, it empowers the Court to ensure proceedings reach their logical conclusion of a binding award - Termination of the mandate under Section 29A(4) is "conditional" and not "absolutistic," meaning it is subject to the Court's power to revive and extend the mandate retrospectively – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 SCC Online SC 2494; Paras 13-23] C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A and Section 11 — Jurisdiction — held that Section 11 has no bearing on the provisions of Chapters 5 and 6 (where Section 29A is located) - Noted, an application for extension of time under Section 29A(4) does not lie before the High Court. Viva Highways Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A vs. Section 11 — Separation of Appointment and Supervision — Held that the power of appointment under Section 11 is a "special and limited" jurisdiction - It is a misconception to assume a hierarchy where only the appointing Court can extend the mandate - The extension of a mandate or substitution under Section 29A is a measure of curial supervision, not an "appointment" under Section 11 – Held that applications for extending an arbitral tribunal's mandate under Section 29A (4) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 must be filed exclusively before the 'Court' as defined in Section 2(1)(e) i.e., the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, regardless of which authority appointed the arbitrators - Interpretations based on a perceived "conflict of power" or "hierarchical difficulties" between a Civil Court and a High Court are untenable and opposed to the rule of law. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92 : AIR 2026 SC 666

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 31(7)(a) and 31(7)(b) — General Conditions of Contract (GCC); Clause 16(3) and 64(5) — Pre-award/Pendente lite Interest — Post-award Interest — The Arbitral Tribunal cannot award pre-award or pendente lite interest, even in the form of "compensation," if the contract expressly prohibits interest on amounts payable to the contractor - a contractual bar on pre-award interest does not automatically extend to post-award interest - Post-award interest is a statutory mandate under Section 31(7)(b) and is not subject to "contracting out" by parties unless the exclusion is explicit and unambiguous - The Court retains the power to modify the rate of post-award interest if it is deemed excessive or lacks justification - Key Findings and Relied-on Decisions: i. Contractual Supremacy in Pre-award Interest: Under Section 31(7)(a), the arbitrator's power to award pre-award interest is subordinate to the terms of the agreement. If a contract (like Clause 16(3) of the GCC) bars interest on "amounts payable to the contractor," the arbitrator lacks jurisdiction to grant it. Ii. Rejection of Ejusdem Generis: The phrase "amounts payable to the contractor under the contract" in Clause 16(3) is independent and distinct from "earnest money" or "security deposits." It cannot be read down to only include deposits; iii. Statutory Mandate of Post-award Interest: Section 31(7)(b) is not subject to party autonomy. The expression "unless the award otherwise directs" refers to the rate of interest, not the entitlement to it; iv. Power to Modify Interest Rate: Courts can modify post-award interest rates to avoid excessive financial burdens and ensure "just compensation" based on contemporary economic scenarios – Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises (2022) 2 SCC 331; RP Garg v. Chief General Manager, Telecom Department 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2928; Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2025) 7 SCC 1; Union of India v. Bright Power Projects (India) (P) Limited (2015) 9 SCC 695; Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises (2022) 2 SCC 331; Paras 30-60] Union of India v. Larsen & Tubro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 214 : 2026 INSC 203

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 42 — Inapplicability to Section 11 — Section 42, which mandates that subsequent applications be filed in the same Court where the first application was made, does not apply to Section 11 applications - The Chief Justice or their delegate exercising power under Section 11 is not a "Court" as defined by Section 2(1)(e); therefore, a Section 11 application does not fix the jurisdiction for Section 29A applications – Appeals allowed. [Relied on SBP and Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618; State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors (2015) 1 SCC 32; State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 602; Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C and C JV 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1801; Paras 15-26] Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92 : AIR 2026 SC 666

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 5 and Section 15 — Scope of Judicial Interference — Supreme Court clarified that the jurisdiction under Section 15(2) is limited and must be read with the principle of minimal judicial intervention - A court acting under Section 15(2) cannot exercise powers barred to it under other sections, such as setting aside a Section 16 rejection order (which is not appealable) or interfering with Section 17 orders outside of a Section 37 proceeding. Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137 : AIR 2026 SC 1042

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 14 and 34 – Challenge to Jurisdiction – Stage of Objection – Constitution of India; Article 14 – Public-Private Contracts - Held that an arbitrator falling under the Seventh Schedule becomes de jure unable to perform his functions, and his mandate terminates automatically - An objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction due to such ineligibility can be raised at any stage, including for the first time in an application under Section 34 for setting aside the award – Held that unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts violate Article 14 for being arbitrary and failing to provide the minimum level of integrity required for quasi-judicial functions - Such clauses also violate the nemo judex rule, which constitutes a part of the fundamental policy of Indian law – Appeals allowed. [Relied on TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. (2017) 8 SCC 377; Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd. (2020) 20 SCC 760; Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. (2019) 5 SCC 755; Dharma Prathishthanam v. Madhok Construction (P) Ltd. (2005) 9 SCC 686; Paras 55-107] Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 8 and 11 — Arbitrability and Allegations of Fraud — Whether disputes can be referred to arbitration when the very existence of the arbitration agreement is seriously disputed on allegations of forgery and fabrication — Held: When allegations of fraud are made regarding the arbitration agreement itself, the dispute is generally recognized as non-arbitrable - Arbitration is founded upon consent, and a party can only be bound if it is shown, at least prima facie, that they agreed to the process - Where an arbitration clause is embedded in a document (such as the "Admission Deed") whose existence is stoutly denied and alleged to be forged, the controversy strikes at the root of arbitral jurisdiction – Noted that in such cases, the court must examine the issue as a jurisdictional inquiry rather than referring the matter to an arbitrator - While findings in Section 9 proceedings are prima facie, once they attain finality (e.g., via dismissal of an SLP), they cannot be ignored in subsequent proceedings under Sections 8 and 11 involving the same issue. Rajia Begum v. Barnali Mukherjee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : 2026 INSC 106

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Interpretation of Contracts — Arbitral Autonomy — Patent Illegality — Section 34(2A) - held that the interpretation of the terms of a contract is primarily the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal - Even if a second view is possible, an award cannot be set aside merely because the appellate court prefers an alternative interpretation – Held that the Tribunal's decision to award idling charges for a Backhoe Dredger (BHD) under Clause 51.1 of the License Agreement despite the respondent's claim that Clause 38 only specified charges for "major dredgers" was found to be a logical and reasonable construction of the agreement - For an award to be set aside for patent illegality, the error must be apparent on the face of the award - A speaking award based on logical reasoning and proper interpretation of clauses does not suffer from patent illegality - a mere contravention of substantive Indian law is no longer a standalone ground for setting aside an award – Appeal allowed. [Relied on MMTC Limited vs. Vedanta Limited (2019) 4 SCC 163; UHL Power Company Limited vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022) 4 SCC 116; Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited vs. Samir Narain Bhojwani (2024) 7 SCC 218; National Highways Authority of India v. M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. 2024 INSC 388; Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company vs. Union of India & Ors. (2023) 15 SCC 472; Paras 30-46] Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2026 INSC 34 : AIR 2026 SC 536

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11, Section 16, and Section 34 — Pre-2015 Amendment Regime — Binding Nature of Section 11 Order — Res Judicata — Held that in cases governed by the SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. regime (prior to the 23.10.2015 amendments), the Section 11 Court exercised judicial power to determine the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement - Such a determination, even if implied, is binding on the parties at all subsequent stages, including before the Arbitral Tribunal and the Section 34 Court – Noted that the respondents, having failed to challenge the appointment order in the Supreme Court, cannot subsequently argue that the clause (Clause 23) was not an arbitration agreement. Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 16, Section 4, and Section 34 – Appointment of Presiding Arbitrator – Improper Constitution of Tribunal – Waiver and Conduct – The Appellant challenged the arbitral award on the ground that the Presiding Arbitrator was appointed by the two nominee arbitrators beyond the 30-day period prescribed in Clause 8.3(b) of the Agreement - The Appellant contended that after 30 days, the power of the nominee arbitrators was extinguished, and only the Secretary General of ICSID could make the appointment - Held: Clause 8.3(b) is an enabling provision, not a restrictive one - It provides a "fail-safe" by permitting parties to approach ICSID if the nominee arbitrators reach an impasse, but it does not denude the nominee arbitrators of their power to appoint after the 30-day period unless a request is actually made to ICSID - Since neither party approached ICSID, the appointment by the nominee arbitrators was valid. [Paras 30-34] Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. R.V. Anderson Associates, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2026 INSC 228

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 21 – Interpretation of "Commencement" – Supreme Court emphasized that the commencement of arbitral proceedings is a statutory event defined exclusively under Section 21 - This definition is not limited to calculating limitation under Section 43 but applies to all provisions of the Act unless specifically excluded - The legislature deliberately delinked commencement from judicial proceedings to ensure clarity and party autonomy. [Paras 24, 28, 29] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 & Section 37 – Scope of Judicial Review – Modification of Arbitral Awards – Power to Modify – The Supreme Court upheld the power of a Court under Section 34 to modify an arbitral award to a limited extent, particularly when applying contractually agreed clauses to admitted facts – Noted that a Section 37 Court cannot substitute its own view for a plausible view taken by a Section 34 Court regarding the determination of "reasonable compensation" unless that determination is arbitrary or perverse. Saisudhir Energy Ltd. v. NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 112 : 2026 INSC 103 : AIR 2026 SC 850

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 34 and Section 37 — Scope of Appellate Interference — The Supreme Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of an appellate court under Section 37 is extremely circumscribed and akin to the limited jurisdiction under Section 34 - An appellate court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or reappraise evidence as if it were an ordinary court of appeal - Its primary role is to ascertain whether the court exercising power under Section 34 acted within its prescribed limits or exceeded them - If an Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of a contract is a "plausible view" and is upheld under Section 34, the Section 37 court has no authority to substitute it with a different interpretation. Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2026 INSC 34 : AIR 2026 SC 536

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 36 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 58 and Rule 102 – Execution of Arbitral Award – Transferee Pendente Lite – The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a claim petition filed by a third-party purchaser who acquired property after an arbitral award (money decree) was passed against the vendor – held that an arbitral award is a "deemed decree" enforceable under Section 36 of the 1996 Act - Under Order XXI Rule 102 CPC, the protections for bona fide claimants do not extend to a transferee pendente lite—defined as one to whom property is transferred after the institution of the suit/proceeding. R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150 : AIR 2026 SC 913

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 4 and Section 16(2) – Timelines for Objection vs. Past Conduct – Held that while an objection under Section 16(2) raised before the statement of defence is technically "timely" to prevent statutory waiver under Section 4, the prior conduct and acquiescence of the party remain relevant in adjudicating the merits of the jurisdictional challenge - A party cannot participate in the process, allow multiple appointments of presiding arbitrators without protest, and then "keep a jurisdictional ace up their sleeve" to challenge the final constitution - Supreme Court must respect arbitral autonomy and ensure minimum judicial interference - If the arbitrator's interpretation of a contractual clause is a plausible view, the Court cannot substitute it with another view merely because it is possible – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578; Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v. Software Technology Parks of India (2025 INSC 574); Paras 36, 40-45, 51-54, 61, 66, 67] Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. R.V. Anderson Associates, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2026 INSC 228

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 73 — Authentication of Settlement — A settlement agreement (KBPP) not authenticated by the Conciliator as mandated under Section 73(4) and not signed by the parties at the time of the alleged award (Annexure P-2) raises serious questions regarding its status as an award under the Act – noted that coercion within a family context may not always involve physical threats or "life threats"- It can arise from a feeling of subservience or manifest obedience to an elder's opinion, which are matters of evidence and cannot be peremptorily rejected at the threshold of a suit - The plea of constructive res judicata is not applicable when earlier rounds of litigation specifically reserved liberty for the parties to work out their remedies in accordance with law and challenge the partition deed in a Civil Court. [Relied on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) D. Thr. LRs and Ors. (2020) 7 SCC 366; Paras 23-31] J. Muthurajan & Anr. v. S. Vaikundarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2026 INSC 139

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 9(2) and Section 21 – Commencement of Arbitral Proceedings – Automatic Vacation of Interim Relief – The Supreme Court held that for the purposes of Section 9(2), arbitral proceedings "commence" on the date the respondent receives a request for the dispute to be referred to arbitration, as defined under Section 21 - set aside the High Court's finding that proceedings only commence upon the filing of a Section 11 petition - If a notice invoking arbitration is received by the respondent within 90 days of an interim order, the mandate of Section 9(2) is satisfied, and the interim relief does not stand automatically vacated under Rule 9(4) of the Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts) Rules, 2001. [Paras 23, 24, 31] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Supreme Court drew the following conclusions: i. The principle of equal treatment of parties provided in Section 18 of the Act, 1996, applies not only to the arbitral proceedings but also to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators - Equal treatment of the parties entails that the parties must have an equal say in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal; ii. Sub-section (5) of Section 12 provides that any person whose relationship with the parties or counsel, or the dispute, whether direct or indirect, falls within any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule would be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator - Since, the ineligibility stems from the operation of law, not only is a person having an interest in the dispute or its outcome ineligible to act as an arbitrator, but appointment by such a person would be ex facie invalid; iii. The words “an express agreement in writing” in the proviso to Section 12(5) means that the right to object to the appointment of an ineligible arbitrator cannot be taken away by mere implication - The agreement referred to in the proviso must be a clear, unequivocal written agreement; iv. When an arbitrator is found to be ineligible by virtue of Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, his mandate is automatically terminated - In such circumstance, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 14 read with Section 15 for appointment of a substitute arbitrator - when an award has been passed by such an arbitrator, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 34 for setting aside the award; v. In arbitration, the parties vest jurisdiction in the tribunal by exercising their consent in furtherance of a valid arbitration agreement - An arbitrator who lacks jurisdiction cannot make an award on the merits - an objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage of the proceedings. Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Arbitration – Jurisdiction – Excepted Matters – Rule of Law – Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – The Supreme Court held that one party to a contract cannot be the sole arbiter to decide whether the other party committed a breach when liability is disputed. Such an interpretation violates the fundamental principle that no party shall be a judge in its own cause - Supreme Court clarified that while certain matters may be "excepted" from arbitration, they cannot be "excluded" from judicial remedy entirely, as a vacuum in legal remedies is opposed to the Rule of Law. ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2026 INSC 274

Arbitration — Setting aside of Award — Patent Illegality and Public Policy — Interpretation of Contract: The Supreme Court affirmed that the construction and interpretation of contractual terms are primarily within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal - If an arbitrator adopts one of two plausible interpretations, the court cannot substitute its own view merely because an alternative view is possible - An award is not "patently illegal" or against "public policy" simply because of a mere contravention of law; it must violate fundamental principles of justice. [Paras 26, 29, 33, 59] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Section 14 – Judicial Review of Show Cause Notice – Where a Show Cause Notice for termination (under Regulation 216 of Navy Regulations) is directly premised on the findings and recommendations of an ICC report, the Tribunal cannot dismiss the challenge as "premature" or "merely at the preliminary stage" - The Tribunal is duty-bound to adjudicate upon the correctness of the ICC report and recommendations which form the foundational basis of the termination notice. 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Section 22 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Disability Pension – Broad Banding – Arrears – Delay and Laches – The Supreme Court held that the benefit of arrears of disability pension, including the benefit of "broad banding," cannot be restricted to three years prior to the filing of the application before the Armed Forces Tribunal. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149

Auction Law

Auction Law – Cancellation of Highest Bid – Arbitrariness – Whether a valid auction can be cancelled solely on the expectation of obtaining a higher price in a subsequent auction – Held, No – An auction process has a sanctity attached to it - The highest bid can only be discarded for valid reasons when the auction is otherwise held in accordance with law - Merely because an authority expects a higher bid than what was offered cannot be a reason to discard the highest bid, especially when it is above the reserve price - held that once a person is declared the highest bidder in an auction for a plot, it crystalises the future rights and obligations between the parties. Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)

Criminal Jurisprudence – Bail – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial accused – Appeal against Delhi High Court order denying bail – Appellant in custody since June 4, 2019, with a combined incarceration of 8 ½ years in NIA and ED cases – Trial proceeding at a "snail's pace" with only 34 out of 248 witnesses examined so far – Held, prolonged detention where a trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time results in undue curtailment of personal liberty under Article 21 – Stringent bail provisions in special statutes (UAPA/PMLA) cannot be used to incarcerate an accused indefinitely without trial – The rigours of such statutory provisions melt down when there is no likelihood of the trial completing in a reasonable time and the accused has undergone a substantial part of the sentence – Considering the appellant's advanced age (74 years), medical ailments, and bleak chances of early trial disposal, Supreme Court enlarged the appellant on bail subject to stringent conditions – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 18-20] Shabir Ahmed Shah v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 305

Exceptional Nature of De Novo Trials — A direction for a de novo trial is an exceptional measure and should not be resorted to for mere procedural lapses, especially when a trial has substantially progressed and key prosecution witnesses have since expired - Ordering a fresh trial in the absence of demonstrated prejudice irretrievably prejudices the prosecution and defeats the interests of timely justice. [Relied on Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1956 SC 116); Main Pal v. State of Haryana (2010) 10 SCC 130; Ajay Kumar Ghoshal v. State of Bihar (2017) 12 SCC 699; Paras 14-17] Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : 2026 INSC 301

Investigation – Cooperation of Accused – Cooperation with an investigation does not mean the accused must render a confession to suit the convenience of the prosecution – Noted that the State's claim of "non-cooperation" with "a pinch of salt" when used as a justification for continued custody in the face of successive FIR registrations. [Paras 7-13] Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Legal Aid — Rights of the Accused — Fair Trial — Mandatory Procedure for Trial Courts — The Supreme Court observed that the appellant initially failed to cross-examine witnesses until she engaged her own counsel – Noted that Trial Courts are duty-bound to inform accused persons of their right to legal representation and their entitlement to legal aid counsel if they cannot afford one - Mandatory Directions - Trial Courts must scrupulously adopt a procedure to record in their orders: (i) the offer of legal aid made to the accused, (ii) the response of the accused, and (iii) the action taken thereon, all before commencing the examination of witnesses - This order is to be communicated to the Chief Justices of all High Courts for issuance of suitable instructions to all concerned Trial Courts. Reginamary Chellamani v. State Rep By Superintendent of Customs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2026 INSC 127 : AIR 2026 SC 800

Sanction for Prosecution – Concept of Deemed Sanction – Deemed Sanction not recognized in Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh - The Supreme Court observed that the lead judgment in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh (2012) 3 SCC 64, does not refer to or discuss the concept of "deemed sanction" - While paragraph 81 of the said judgment part of the concurring opinion by Hon'ble A.K. Ganguly, is often cited, a Coordinate Bench in Suneeti Toteja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) SCC OnLine SC 433 has already repelled arguments for deemed sanction, noting that even the Subramanian Swamy decision does not lend credence to such an argument. State v. M. Muneer Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 167

Section 2(1)(r) - "officer in charge of a police station".

Section 2(s) and 2(o) Cr.P.C. – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court of Andhra Pradesh judgment that had quashed several FIRs registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Vijayawada – Held that the High Court had erroneously held that the ACB office in Vijayawada was not a notified "police station" under Section 2(s) of the CrPC following the state's bifurcation - The Supreme Court clarified that under the 2014 Reorganisation Act, existing laws and notifications (including G.O.Ms. No. 268 of 2003) continue to apply to successor states to prevent a legal vacuum - A "police station" under Section 2(s) includes a "post" held by a police officer and does not strictly require a specific physical building declaration in every instance - a subsequent 2022 clarificatory Government Order by the State of Andhra Pradesh did not have retrospective application but merely confirmed the existing legal position under the Reorganisation Act - Section 2(s) of the CrPC is exhaustive and inclusive, meaning any "post" or "place" declared by the State - A post held by a police officer can constitute a police station - Sections 100-102 of the 2014 Act ensure that laws (including notifications) in force before the appointed day continue to apply to the territories of the successor states until altered or repealed - A subsequent Government Order (G.O.Ms. No. 137 of 2022) issued as a clarification does not constitute retrospective application but merely reiterates the statutory position to avoid legal ambiguity. [Relied on Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi and Another vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd. and Others (2004) 6 SCC 689; State of Punjab and Others vs. Balbir Singh and Others (1976) 3 SCC 24; Paras 21-24, 26-29] Anti-Corruption Bureau v. Dayam Peda Ranga Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 24 : 2026 INSC 37 : 2026 CriLJ 708

Section 4 - Trial of offences under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and other laws

Section 4 and 156 Cr.P.C. — Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees — The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - Noted that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (DSPE Act), 1946, is permissive and does not expressly or impliedly divest regular State police authorities of their power to investigate offences under the PC Act - While an internal arrangement exists where the CBI typically handles Central Government employees and the ACB handles State employees to avoid duplication, this does not exclude the State's legal power to investigate - The only mandatory requirement is that the investigating officer must hold the rank specified under Section 17 of the PC Act – Key findings by Supreme Court – i. CrPC as Parent Statute: Unless a special law provides a separate, exclusive procedure for investigation, the general provisions of Section 156 CrPC (powers of police to investigate cognizable offences) prevail; ii. Non-Exclusivity of CBI: The DSPE Act (which governs the CBI) does not impair any other law empowering State police authorities to investigate offences - It is incorrect to claim that only the CBI has the authority to institute such prosecutions; iii. Validity of Charge-sheet: A charge-sheet filed by a State agency against a Central Government employee without the prior consent or approval of the CBI is valid in law – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration (1973) 1 SCC 726; Paras 3-9] Nawal Kishore Meena @ N.K Meena v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 68 : 2026 INSC 71 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 172

Section 35 - When police may arrest without warrant

Quashing of FIR – Validity of interim directions to follow arrest procedures – The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court of Telangana which, while disposing of a petition to quash an FIR on the very first day, directed the Investigating Officer to follow the procedure under Section 35(3) of the BNSS (previously Section 41-A Cr.PC) and the Arnesh Kumar guidelines without hearing the defacto complainant. Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Section 35 BNSS — Arrest — Mandatory issuance of notice for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years — Interplay between Section 35(1)(b) and Section 35(3) to 35(6) — Discretionary nature of arrest - Core Principles and Rulings – i. Rule of Notice vs. Exception of Arrest - The Supreme Court held that for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, issuing a notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS is the rule, whereas effecting an arrest under Section 35(6) read with Section 35(1)(b) is a clear exception; ii. Mandatory Checklist for Arrest - For an arrest to be legally justified in the specified category of offences, compliance with Section 35(1)(b)(i) (reason to believe) along with at least one condition mentioned in Section 35(1)(b)(ii) is a sine qua non; ii. No Automatic Arrest on Non-Compliance - Even if an individual fails to comply with the terms of a notice under Section 35(3) or is unwilling to identify themselves, arrest is not a matter of course - The Investigating Agency must still form an opinion that the arrest is an objective necessity for the investigation; iii. Fresh Materials Required for Subsequent Arrest - If a police officer decides to arrest an individual after having already issued a notice under Section 35(3), such an arrest must be based on materials and factors that were not available at the time the notice was issued; iv. Judicial Scrutiny - Magistrates must not authorize detention in a casual or mechanical manner - They are required to peruse the report and checklist furnished by the police officer to ensure the necessity of arrest is justified under the statutory parameters. [Relied on Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr, (2014) 8 SCC 273; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, (1964) 3 SCR 71; Paras 20-33] Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : 2026 INSC 115

Section 173 - Information in cognizable cases.

Section 173(3) BNSS – Registration of FIR – Preliminary Inquiry – Safeguard against mechanical registration – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR registered against a media executive, holding that the allegations were "absolutely vague," "speculative," and "inherently improbable" – Noted that Section 173(3) BNSS provides an additional safeguard for offences punishable between three and seven years - Unlike Section 154 CrPC, where a preliminary inquiry is limited to ascertaining if a cognizable offence is disclosed, Section 173(3) BNSS empowers police to conduct an inquiry to determine if a prima facie case exists even if the information ostensibly discloses a cognizable offence - The legislative intent is to prevent the registration of frivolous cases. In the instant case, the police acted with "unusual expediency" and registered the FIR in a mechanical manner without exercising the option of a preliminary inquiry despite the indeterminate nature of the allegations. [Paras 23-25] Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 258 : 2026 INSC 244

Section 154, 218, 219, 220, and 223 Cr.P.C. – Registration of FIR and Joinder of Charges– Whether multiple acts of cheating against numerous investors in a criminal conspiracy require separate FIRs or can be clubbed into a single FIR – Held: Where a criminal conspiracy is alleged leading to multiple acts of cheating against different individuals, registering one FIR and treating subsequent complaints as statements under Section 161 CrPC is a correct course of action - The "triple tests" to determine if acts form the 'same transaction' are: (1) unity of purpose and design; (2) proximity of time and place; and (3) continuity of action - If the Magistrate finds the acts constitute the 'same transaction', consolidated charges can be framed under Sections 220(1) and 223(a) & (d) CrPC. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : 2026 INSC 25 : 2026 CriLJ 625

Section 174 - Information as to noncognizable cases and investigation of such cases.

Social Media Posts & Political Speech – Guidelines for Registration of FIRs – Supreme Court refuses to interfere with the Telangana High Court's judgment quashing criminal proceedings and issuing mandatory operational guidelines for police and Magistrates when dealing with complaints based on social media posts – Noted that the High Court's guidelines (Para 29) aim to safeguard fundamental rights and prevent the mechanical or arbitrary invocation of the criminal process - Key Guidelines Upheld – i. Verification of Locus Standi - Police must verify if a complainant is a "person aggrieved" before registering FIRs for defamation or similar offences; ii. High Threshold for Media-Related Offences - Cases involving intentional insult, public mischief, or threat to public order shall not be registered unless there is prima facie material disclosing incitement to violence or hatred; iii. Protection of Political Speech: Constitutional protections under Article must be scrupulously enforced; mechanical registration of cases for harsh or critical political speech is prohibited; iv. Defamation Procedure - As a non-cognizable offence, police cannot directly register an FIR; complainants must be directed to a Magistrate, and action may only follow an order under Section 174(2) of the BNSS; v. Prior Legal Scrutiny: In sensitive cases involving expression, police must obtain a prior legal opinion from the Public Prosecutor before registration. [Relied on Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273; Paras 6,7] State of Telangana v. Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 113

Section 175 - Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case.

Section 175(3) and Section 175(4) BNSS – Interplay and Procedural Safeguards - The Supreme Court clarified that Section 175(4) is not an independent or standalone provision, nor is it a mere proviso to Section 175(3) - the two sub-sections must be read harmoniously. Section 175(4) acts as a procedural adjunct and an additional protective layer for public servants - Supreme Court held that although Section 175(4) uses the term "complaint" (which under Section 2(1)(h) can include oral allegations), in the context of proceedings against public servants, it must be interpreted as a written complaint supported by an affidavit - It is illogical to require an affidavit for allegations against private individuals under Section 175(3) but exempt it for public servants under Section 175(4). [Relied on Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. 2015 6 SCC 287; Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P 2014 2 SCC 1; Radhe Shyam v. Chhabi Nath 2015 5 SCC 423; Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948; Paras 20-29, 37-39, 45-48] xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88

Two-Tier Protection for Public Servants – Noted that BNSS provides a dual-protection mechanism for public officials: i. Threshold Stage: Under Section 175(4), a Magistrate must call for a report from the superior officer and consider the assertions of the accused public servant before ordering an investigation; ii. Cognizance Stage: Under Section 218(1), prior government sanction is required before the Court takes cognizance. xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88

Section 176 - Procedure for investigation

Section 157 Cr.P.C. – Procedural Lapses – Alleged non-compliance with the requirement of sending the FIR to the Magistrate under Section 157 CrPC is not, by itself, fatal to the prosecution case - Such procedural lapses are insufficient to overturn a conviction when the overall evidence establishes the guilt of the accused - The movement of multiple accused persons, arriving together armed with firearms and chasing the deceased into a private residence to execute the killing, is sufficient to draw an inference of a common object - The recovery of 40 pellets from the body and multiple entry/exit wounds corroborated the involvement of multiple shooters. [Paras 13, 17 - 20] Dablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 238 : 2026 INSC 224 : AIR 2026 SC 1319

Section 183 - Recording of confessions and statements

Section 164 Cr.P.C. — Confessional Statements — Retracted and Exculpatory Confessions — Legal Aid — Held: A confession must be a direct acknowledgment of guilt to form the basis of a conviction – noted that in the present case, the confession of A1 was exculpatory (accusing the co-accused), and A2's statement did not admit to murder; thus, they could not be relied upon - the Magistrate failed to inform the accused of their right to legal aid before recording the statements, violating mandatory duties. [Paras 23-28] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 230

Section 218 - Prosecution of Judges and public servants.

Section 197 Cr.P.C. – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 217 – Delay in Sanction – Reference to Larger Bench - While addressing the "lethargy and/or apathy" of competent authorities in granting sanction for prosecution, Supreme Court noted that the High Court of Madras had issued a direction stating that if no decision is taken on a sanction request within one month, "sanction will be deemed to have been granted." - Given the recurring nature of these grievances and existing proceedings before a Bench presided over by the Chief Justice of India, Supreme Court referred the matter for consideration by a Larger Bench – Held that the High Court's direction regarding "deemed sanction" remains stayed pending further orders. [Relied on Suneeti Toteja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. (2025) SCC OnLine SC 433; Paras 5-8 ] State v. M. Muneer Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 167

Section 225 - Postponement of issue of process.

Section 202(1) CrPC vs. Proviso to Section 200 CrPC – Postponement of issue of process – Accused residing beyond territorial jurisdiction – Mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC vs. Proviso to Section 200 CrPC – Public Servant Exemption - The Supreme Court held: The mandatory requirement of conducting an inquiry or investigation under Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) in cases where the accused resides beyond the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction must be construed harmoniously with the proviso to Section 200 CrPC - When a complaint is filed in writing by a public servant acting in the discharge of their official duties, the Magistrate is exempted from examining the complainant and witnesses on oath - the legislature has placed public servants on a "different pedestal," and the lack of a specific Section 202 inquiry does not vitiate the summoning order when the complaint is lodged by a competent official authority (such as a Drugs Inspector). State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200 : AIR 2026 SC 1270 ; 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 285

Section 232 - Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it.

Sections 209 and 323 of CrPC — Jurisdiction — Magistrate's Power to Commit — Noted that High Court's assumption that the case was triable by a Magistrate was premature. Even if a case is initially before a Magistrate, it can be committed to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 or Section 323 of the CrPC if the offences (such as Section 409 or 467 IPC, which carry sentences up to life imprisonment) warrant such a trial – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Dolat Ram and others vs. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349; Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2014) 16 SCC 508; Sudha Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2021) 4 SCC 781; Paras 15-21] Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1117

Section 238 - Effect of errors.

Section 215, 228, 464, and 465 Cr.P.C. — Framing of Charge — Procedural Irregularity vs. Fundamental Illegality — De Novo Trial — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order directing a fresh trial due to an unsigned formal charge-sheet - held that the purpose of framing a charge is to provide the accused with precise notice of accusations to enable an effective defense, rather than being a "mere ritualistic formality" - Where the record indicates that charges were read over and explained to the accused in the presence of counsel, and the accused subsequently participated in the trial for over fourteen years by extensively cross-examining witnesses, there is substantial compliance with Section 228 Cr.P.C. - A procedural lapse, such as the omission of a signature on a formal charge document, constitutes a curable irregularity under Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C. unless it is demonstrated that the accused was misled or that a "failure of justice" was occasioned. Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : 2026 INSC 301

Section 241 - Separate charges for distinct offences

Rights of Complainants/Witnesses – Concern that treating complainants as witnesses in a single FIR deprives them of legal remedies – Held: Complainants treated as witnesses are entitled to file protest petitions if a closure report is filed or if the Magistrate intends to discharge the accused. The Magistrate is bound to consider such petitions on merits – Held: Requiring registration of individual FIRs for every victim in mass-cheating cases would lead to an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings, which is not in the larger public interest or the interest of the State – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mish Devgan vs. Union of India and others (2021) 1 SCC 1; Andhra Pradesh vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (1964) 3 SCR 297; Paras 15-22] State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : 2026 INSC 25 : 2026 CriLJ 625

Section 250 - Discharge.

Sections 227 and 228 – Discharge and Framing of Charge – Noted that a Judge has the power to sift and weigh evidence for the limited purpose of finding a prima facie case, they cannot conduct a "mini-trial" or a roving inquiry at the threshold stage - If two views are possible and one gives rise to only suspicion (as distinguished from "grave suspicion"), the Trial Judge is empowered to discharge the accused - Supreme Court noted that "the process itself can become the punishment" if responsibility at the framing stage is not exercised with care. [Paras 12 - 21] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141 : AIR 2026 SC 1069

Section 330 - No formal proof of certain documents.

Section 294 CrPC — Admissibility of Post-Mortem Report — The non-examination of the medical officer who conducted the post-mortem is not fatal to the prosecution if the defense admits the genuineness of the report under Section 294 CrPC - Once admitted, the report serves as substantive evidence of the correctness of its contents - Intention — Intention is a state of mind gathered from the cumulative effect of circumstances: nature of weapons, body parts targeted, force used, premeditation, and prior enmity - Even if weapons like lathis are used, their lethality is determined by the manner of use and the multiplicity of injuries on vital parts – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Daya Nand v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 717; Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 444; Akhtar v. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 13 SCC 722; Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel (2018) 7 SCC 743; Paras 41-45, 61-67, 69, 70] Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178

Section 337 - Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence

Criminal Prosecution vs. Disciplinary Proceedings — Interplay and Effect of Exoneration - Whether exoneration in a departmental enquiry automatically results in the quashing of parallel criminal proceedings? –Supreme Court discussed following points and held that - i. Standard of Proof: reiterated that disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecutions are independent, governed by different standards of proof: preponderance of probabilities for the former and proof beyond reasonable doubt for the latter; ii. Distinction between Fact-patterns: distinguished between cases where the very "substratum of the allegation" is found non-existent on merits (as in Radheshyam Kejriwal) and cases where exoneration is based on a lack of evidence or technical grounds; iii. Effect of Independent Entities: Where the prosecuting agency (e.g., Anti-Corruption Bureau/Lokayukta) and the disciplinary authority are different entities not in the same hierarchy, the findings of the departmental enquiry do not bind the criminal court; iv. Nature of Exoneration: Exoneration in a departmental proceeding ipso facto does not result in the quashing of criminal prosecution - Quashing is only permissible if the exoneration is on merits, where the allegation is found to be unsustainable and the person is held innocent; v. Specific Findings in This Case: In the present case, the "exoneration" was deemed a "discharge for lack of diligence" because the Inspector who conducted the trap was not examined, rather than a finding that the bribe was never demanded - Supreme Court found sufficient evidence (complainant testimony and independent witnesses) to justify the continuation of the criminal trial – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi (2012) 9 SCC 685; Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B. (2011) 3 SCC 581; P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 1; Paras 12-17] Karnataka Lokayukta Bagalkote District v. Chandrashekar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 15 : 2026 INSC 31

Section 351 - Power to examine the accused.

Section 313 Cr.P.C. – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 21 – Opportunity to Lead Defense Evidence – The appellant contended he was not afforded an opportunity to examine himself as a defense witness - Supreme Court rejected this, noting that the trial record showed the appellant's statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded and he had the opportunity to avail himself of Section 21 of the P.C. Act but failed to do so during the trial. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239 : AIR 2026 SC 1506

Section 313 Cr.P.C. – Examination of the Accused – Failure to put specific material circumstances – Prejudice to the Accused – The underlying object of Section 313 is based on the principle of audi alteram partem to enable the accused to explain incriminating circumstances - a generalized presumption of prejudice cannot be made merely because of inadequate or general questions - To vitiate a trial, the accused must demonstrate that the non-examination on a particular circumstance actually and materially prejudiced them, resulting in a failure of justice - In the present case, while questions were general, the incriminating circumstances were put to the appellants, and no specific prejudice was shown - Held, the testimony of eye-witnesses cannot be discarded merely because they are related to the deceased. If their presence at the site is natural and their testimony remains consistent under cross-examination, minor inconsistencies do not weaken the prosecution's. [Relied on Rakesh and Anr. Vs. State of U.P. and Anr. (2021 INSC 321; Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State of Bihar (1995 Suppl (1) SCC 80); Om Pal and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. (now State of Uttarakhand) (2025 INSC 1262); Para 5-9] Ghanshyam Mandal v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2026 INSC 194 : AIR 2026 SC 1445

Section 313 Cr.P.C. - Examination of Accused – Duty of Court and Prosecutor – Impact of Inadequate Questioning - Held: It is the solemn duty of both the Trial Court and the Prosecutor to ensure all incriminating circumstances (motive, dying declarations, medical evidence) are put to the accused during their Section 313 examination - A casual or "scanty" examination that omits material circumstances falls short of the legal standard and can lead to the failure of the entire prosecution. Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 230 : 2026 INSC 223

Section 313 CrPC — Adverse Inference — Failure to Explain Incriminating Circumstances - Held: When an accused gives incorrect or false answers or maintains complete denial regarding facts within their exclusive knowledge during a Section 313 CrPC statement, the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference - In this case, the Appellant-Accused denied his relationship with the deceased and even his admission to the hospital despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary - Such conduct fails to meet the explanation expected of a person of normal prudence and tilts the case in favor of the prosecution. Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2026 INSC 160 : AIR 2026 SC 950

Section 358 - Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.

Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Principles for Granting Bail to Accused Added via Section 319 – High Standard of Evidence Required - The Supreme Court held that when a person is added as an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and subsequently arrested, the court considering a bail plea must apply a test higher than a mere prima facie case - The relevant consideration is whether there is "strong and cogent evidence" of complicity, rather than a mere probability - While this standard is shorter than the satisfaction required for a conviction if the evidence goes unrebutted, it is significantly higher than the standard required for framing charges against original accused persons - In exercising discretion for bail for an accused summoned under Section 319, the Court must weigh the nature of the offence, the quality of evidence against the newly added accused, and the likelihood of the person absconding or tampering with evidence. [Para 13, 14] Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2026 INSC 36

Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Summoning of additional accused – Standards of Evidence – Three-Tier Threshold – Supreme Court noted three distinct levels of evidence assessment: (i) Prima facie standard(lowest) for framing formal charges; (ii) Strong and cogent evidence (middle) for summoning additional accused under Section 319 CrPC, where evidence must be reliable and reasonably persuasive but not beyond reasonable doubt; and (iii) Proof beyond reasonable doubt (highest) required for conviction. Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251 : AIR 2026 SC 1426

Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Scope of Judicial Scrutiny – Mini-Trial prohibited – The Supreme Court observed that while Section 319 is an extraordinary power to be exercised sparingly, the Trial Court must not conduct a "mini-trial" or a threadbare credibility assessment of minor contradictions at this stage - In the instant case, the Trial Court erred by overemphasizing minor inconsistencies in witness accounts, the absence of jail records, and the physical plausibility of the complainant escaping injury. Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251 : AIR 2026 SC 1426

Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Criminal Trial – Appreciation of Evidence – Fragmented vs. Cumulative Approach – Held, the Trial Court misdirected itself by treating inconsistencies in isolation rather than assessing the cumulative weight of testimonies and circumstances - Testimony on oath by three witnesses, including the complainant, is sufficient to meet the "strong and cogent" standard for summoning additional accused, even if minor inconsistencies exist which are matters for trial. [Relied on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92; Neeraj Kumar v. State of UP 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2639; Paras 7-12] Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251 : AIR 2026 SC 1426

Section 395 - Order to pay compensation

Sentencing Policy — Principle of Proportionality — Modification of Sentence to "Period Already Undergone" — Grounds of Lapse of Time and Victim Compensation — Held: The High Court erred in reducing the sentence of the Private Respondents from three years rigorous imprisonment to the period already undergone (two months) based on the lapse of time (10.5 years) and the willingness of the accused to pay compensation - Punishment must be commensurate with the gravity of the crime and the manner of its commission to maintain public confidence in the efficacy of law - Undue sympathy in awarding inadequate sentences undermines the justice system and fails to respond to society's cry for justice. Parameshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2026 INSC 164 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 307

Section 403 - Court not to alter judgment

Section 362 Cr.P.C. - Bar on Alteration or Review of Signed Orders – The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Patna High Court which had recalled its earlier grant of bail to the appellant - The High Court had reversed the bail order on the grounds of a clerical error by the Court Master, who recorded the petition as "allowed" despite the operative portion allegedly being "rejected" - The Supreme Court held that under Section 362 CrPC, no alteration or review of a signed judgment or order is permissible except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors – Noted that no such error justified the recall, rendering the High Court's action unsustainable in law. Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61

Section 413 - No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.

Sections 372 and 378 Cr.P.C. – Appeal against Acquittal – Right of Complainant as 'Victim' – Conflict of Judgments – Reference to Larger Bench – The Supreme Court observed a conflict between a recent co-ordinate Bench decision in Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran (2025 INSC 804) and earlier decisions in Satya Pal Singh vs. State of M.P. and Subhash Chand vs. State (Delhi Administration) regarding whether a complainant in a Section 138 NI Act case must seek special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC or can appeal directly as a 'victim' under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. Everest Automobiles v. Rajit Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 155

Section 415 - Appeals from convictions

Convicts on Bail – Duty of Appellant – Supreme Court noted that convicts often neglect to cooperate with the court once their sentence is suspended - Appellants enlarged on bail have a responsibility to keep track of their appeals; they cannot blame the court or an Amicus Curiae for not raising specific grounds if they failed to engage with the proceedings for decades. [Relied on Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019) 20 SCC 196; Paras 17 - 23] Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257

Criminal Administration of Justice – Fair Trial vs. Expeditious Disposal – Appointment of Amicus Curiae – The Supreme Court emphasized that while fast-tracking criminal appeals is necessary, it must not occur at the expense of basic fairness - Noted that in cases where an appeal is listed after a significant delay (two decades in this instance) and the appellant's counsel is absent, it is a "desirable precaution" for the High Court to issue notice to the appellant regarding the appointment of an Amicus Curiae - While the High Court's intention to render legal assistance is genuine, justice is better served if the convict is informed so they may provide instructions for a "real and meaningful" defence rather than a "token gesture". Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257

Practice of the Court and Interests of Justice — Supreme Court observed that while the general practice is not to release a person sentenced to life imprisonment on bail, such practice cannot prevail if it operates to cause injustice - The underlying postulate of denying bail is that the appeal should be disposed of within a "measurable distance of time" - Keeping a person in jail for 5-6 years for an offence that may ultimately be found not to have been committed is a "travesty of justice" - Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Supreme Court noted that the right of appeal is a statutory right - Serious failure of justice ensues if an appellant remains incarcerated for over a decade only to have their appeal eventually succeed - Unless there are cogent grounds to the contrary, and where the delay is not attributable to the accused, the Court should ordinarily release the accused on bail if the appeal cannot be heard within a reasonable period. [Relied on Kashmira Singh vs. State of Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 291; Paras 5-13] Muna Bisoi v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 176

Section 419 - Appeal in case of acquittal

Appeal Against Acquittal — Circumstantial Evidence — Reversal of Acquittal by High Court — Held: The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned acquittal by the Trial Court without recording a clear finding that the Trial Court's view was not a possible view - An acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence, which should not be displaced lightly by substituting inferences - The "golden principles" for circumstantial evidence were not satisfied as there was no complete chain of incriminating circumstances. Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 230

Section 378 Cr.P.C. – Appeal against Acquittal – Grounds for Reversal – Noted that an order of acquittal may be reversed if the High Court rejects incontrovertible evidence based on unrealistic suspicion or surmises, or if it discounts the testimony of relatives solely on the ground of being 'interested' witnesses – Held that High Court wrongly placed undue reliance on the testimonies of hostile witnesses and contradictory defence evidence while ignoring the cogent testimonies of independent public servants – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471; Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2016) 4 SCC 35; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Phoolchand Rathore 2023 SCC OnLine SC 537; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajmal Beg 2025 SCC OnLine SC 280; Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar (2022) 11 SCC 800; Paras 14-26] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 131 : 2026 CriLJ 823

Section 378 Cr.P.C. – Appeal against Acquittal – Scope of Interference by Appellate Court – The Supreme Court reiterated that an appellate court must exercise caution before reversing an order of acquittal - While the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate evidence, it should not disturb the findings of the Trial Court if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record - Interference is only justified if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is based on a misreading or omission of material evidence, or if the Trial Court's view is "clearly unreasonable" - The acquittal further strengthens the double presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. [Paras 27 - 31] Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : 2026 INSC 67 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 121 ; 2026 CriLJ 534

Section 378(4) & (5) CrPC – Statutory Interpretation – Supreme Court noted that Section 378(4) and (5) were preserved in the Code, making it incumbent upon a complainant who initiated prosecution to obtain leave before filing an appeal against acquittal in the High Court - Supreme Court expressed disagreement with the interpretation that the proviso to Section 372 overrides the requirement of seeking leave under Section 378(4) - Noting the "far-reaching consequences" of the issue and the conflicting precedents, the Bench directed the matter to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for an authoritative pronouncement by a larger Bench. [Paras 2-4] Everest Automobiles v. Rajit Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 155

Section 427 - Powers of the Appellate Court.

Appellate Jurisdiction – Interference with Order of Acquittal – Principles Reiterated – The Supreme Court observed that there is no absolute restriction in law on the appellate court to review and reappreciate the entire evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded - While an appellate court is ordinarily slow to interfere with an acquittal, it must do so if the judgment is manifestly erroneous, perverse, or based on a misreading of evidence or incorrect application of law - Where the High Court adopts a wholly erroneous process of reasoning and ignores vital circumstances resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice, interference is imperative. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 131 : 2026 CriLJ 823

Section 430 - Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail

Attendance of Accused during Appeal/Revision – Suspension of Sentence – Validity of requiring physical presence on every hearing date – The Supreme Court held that once a sentence has been suspended and bail has been granted by an Appellate or Revisional Court, it is "unwarranted" and "burdensome" to require the accused to be present on every date of hearing - Such a practice serves no purpose, as the jurisdictional magistrate remains empowered to secure the accused's presence should the appeal or revision eventually be dismissed - noted that even if the prevalent practice is driven by the terms of Form No. 45 (Schedule II of the CrPC/BNSS) regarding bail bonds, it does not justify mandatory attendance for proceedings that may remain pending for years. [Paras 6 - 8] Meenakshi v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 60

Suspension of Sentence — Grant of Bail pending Appeal — Long Incarceration — Life Imprisonment — The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court of Orissa which had declined the suspension of sentence for an appellant convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act - The appellant had suffered incarceration for over 11 years while his appeal, filed in 2016, remained pending before the High Court. Muna Bisoi v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 176

Section 482 - Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest.

Addition of Graver Offences — Procedure for Arrest — Where an accused is already on bail and new, more serious, cognizable, and non-bailable offences are added, the accused does not automatically lose their liberty but the court must apply its mind afresh. In such cases – i. The accused may surrender and apply for bail for the newly added offences; ii. The investigating agency must obtain an order from the Court that granted bail to arrest the accused; a routine arrest without such an order is not permissible. [Relied on Sushila Aggarwal & Ors. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (2020) 5 SCC 1; Bharat Chaudhary and Anr. vs. State of Bihar and Anr. 2003) 8 SCC 77; Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2022) 1 SCC 676; Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565; Paras 12-25, 31-34] Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145 : AIR 2026 SC 905

Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Anticipatory Bail — Duration of Protection — The Supreme Court reiterated that once anticipatory bail is granted, it should not invariably be limited to a fixed period or restricted to the stage of filing a charge-sheet - The protection should ordinarily enure in favor of the accused without restriction on time and can continue until the end of the trial, unless specific facts or features necessitate a limited tenure. Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145 : AIR 2026 SC 905

Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Anticipatory Bail – Non-Cooperation with Investigation – Scope of Section 438 CrPC / Section 482 BNSS – The Supreme Court held that the mere act of an accused not answering specific questions posed by the Investigating Officer (IO) does not automatically constitute "non-cooperation" with the investigation - Noted that if an accused has appeared before the IO pursuant to interim protection, the failure to provide specific answers is not a sufficient ground ipso facto to deny bail. Shally Mahant @ Sandeep v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 146

Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Anticipatory Bail — Absconding Accused — An absconder is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail as a general rule - The power to grant pre-arrest bail to an absconder may only be exercised in exceptional cases where, upon perusal of the FIR and case diary, the Court is prima facie satisfied that the accusation is false or over-exaggerated - In the present case, the Accused remained untraceable for over six years, a reward was announced for his arrest, and he allegedly threatened a key witness; such conduct makes it an unfit case for the exercise of judicial discretion under Section 438. Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157

Section 438 Cr.P.C. – Anticipatory Bail – Held that where co-accused summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. have already been granted anticipatory bail and have been appearing regularly before the trial court, no case for cancellation is made out unless specific grounds for such cancellation are established by the State. [Para 15, 18, 19] Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2026 INSC 36

Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Effect of Co-accused's Acquittal — The acquittal of co-accused persons during the period an accused was absconding does not automatically entitle the absconder to anticipatory bail on the ground of parity. In a trial against co-accused, the prosecution is not expected to adduce evidence against an absconding party; therefore, findings from that trial have no bearing on the absconder's independent trial - An accused cannot be permitted to "encash" on an acquittal achieved while they were making a mockery of the judicial process by fleeing. Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157

Sections 438 & 439 Cr.P.C. — Appeal Against Grant of Bail vs. Cancellation of Bail — The considerations for an appellate court assessing the correctness of a bail order are distinct from those governing an application for cancellation of bail - While cancellation is based on "supervening circumstances" (e.g., misuse of liberty), an appeal tests whether the original order was perverse, illegal, or unjustified at the time of its passing - the post-bail conduct of an accused is irrelevant when determining the legality of the initial grant of bail in an appeal – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Lavesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 730; Sushila Aggarwal vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1; Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab, (2021) 15 SCC 518; Ashok Dhankad v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690; Paras 37-51] Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157

Section 438 Cr.P.C. (Section 482 BNSS, 2023) — Impact of Charge-sheet — The mere filing of a charge-sheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not automatically terminate the protection granted under Section 438 Cr.P.C. - There is no restriction on granting or continuing anticipatory bail even after a charge-sheet is filed, as the primary objective is to prevent undue harassment through pre-trial arrest. Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145 : AIR 2026 SC 905

Section 483 - Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail – Cancellation of Bail – Dowry Death – Sections 103(1) and 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Appeal by the mother of the deceased challenging the High Court's order granting bail to the husband of the deceased – The deceased died within 1.5 years of marriage in suspicious circumstances with multiple external and internal injuries – Allegations of dowry harassment and threats by the accused prior to the death – High Court granted bail primarily noting the absence of criminal antecedents and the period of custody – Held: The High Court adopted a "mechanical approach" and failed to consider the gravity of the offence and the nature of the accusations – While criminal antecedents are a factor, they cannot outweigh the seriousness of a crime like dowry death where circumstantial evidence strongly points toward the accused – The Supreme Court emphasized that an appellate court can interfere with a bail order if relevant materials were ignored or the gravity of the offence was not considered. [Relied on P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211; Paras 14-27] Lal Muni Devi v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 298

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail Cancellation — POCSO Act — Heinous Offences — Allegations of Gang-rape of a Minor — Grant of bail by High Court without considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the statutory rigour under the POCSO Act, and the filing of the chargesheet — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting bail, observing that the exercise of discretion was "manifestly erroneous"- Noted that while the filing of a chargesheet does not preclude bail, the Court is duty-bound to consider the gravity of the offence and the material collected – Noted that the allegations involved repeated penetrative sexual assault under armed intimidation and blackmail via recorded acts, which have a "devastating impact on the life of the victim and shakes the collective conscience of society" - The High Court failed to apply settled parameters, including the vulnerability of the victim and the likelihood of witness intimidation – Held that the bail order was perverse, unreasonable, and ignored the relevant material – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak and another (2023) 13 SCC 549; State of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad @ Rajballav Pd. Yadav @ Rajballabh Yadav (2017) 2 SCC 178; Deepak Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 8 SCC 559; Paras 12-18] X v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 36 : 2026 INSC 44

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Condition of Upfront Deposit or Undertaking to Pay Arrears/Siphoned Amounts as a Pre-condition for Bail Deprecated - High Courts Must Decide Bail on Merits Rather Than Deferring Due to Non-Payment - The Supreme Court of India has reiterated that the practice of courts insisting on upfront deposits, or undertakings for such deposits, as a condition for considering a bail prayer on merits is improper - Such practices have the potential to derail the criminal justice delivery system by becoming a tool for complainants to extort settlements and forcing the accused to give up their right of defense - In the present case, the appellant was denied an extension of interim bail by the High Court solely because he failed to fulfill an undertaking to deposit the remaining balance of an alleged siphoned subsidy amount (approx. ₹4.10 crore), despite having already deposited over 50% of the amount - The Supreme Court held that – i. In offences under Section 409 IPC, there is no automatic presumption regarding the culpability of a Director; it must be established during the trial; ii. An inability to comply with a financial undertaking is not a valid ground to defer the consideration of a bail prayer on its merits, especially when the investigation is complete and the accused has already suffered significant incarceration; iii. The appropriate course for the High Court was to decide the regular bail application on its own merits rather than keeping the matter pending through repeated interim extensions tied to upfront deposits. [Relied on Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1571; Paras 11-14] Rakesh Jain v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 81

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Disclosure of Material Facts — Duty of the Accused: The Court emphasized that an applicant seeking bail has a "solemn obligation" to make a full, fair, and candid disclosure of all material facts, specifically criminal antecedents. Suppression of such facts constitutes "fraud on the court," attracting the maxim suppressio veri, expressio falsi(suppression of truth is equivalent to expression of falsehood). [Relied On Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha (2024) 4 SCC 432; Saumya Chaurasia v. Enforcement Directorate (2024) 6 SCC 401] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail — Doctrine of Parity — Non-application to History-sheeters — Noted that the High Court erred in blindly extending the principle of parity to the respondent based on the bail granted to co-accused without considering his specific and distinctive features, including his use of 8 to 10 aliases, forged Aadhaar cards, and a history of absconding – Noted that when there is a likelihood of offences being repeated or justice being thwarted, discretion must be exercised cautiously. Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1117

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail – Foreign Nationals – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Financial Constraints in furnishing Surety –The Respondent, a 32-year-old Ugandan national, was granted bail by the High Court on 15.09.2025 in a case involving the NDPS Act - Despite the Trial Court reducing the surety amount progressively from ₹1,00,000 to ₹25,000, the accused remained in Tihar Jail for months due to her inability to furnish a solvent surety - Held: Article 21 of the Constitution, which protects the right to life and personal liberty, applies equally to foreign nationals prosecuted in India - Once an accused has established a case for bail, financial difficulties or the inability to provide a solvent surety should not act as a barrier to their release - In cases where a foreign national cannot meet surety requirements due to financial constraints, they may be released on a personal bond and subsequently housed in a detention center to ensure they do not leave the country - Supreme Court explicitly grounded its reasoning in the constitutional mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, emphasizing its universal application to any person within the territory of India, regardless of nationality. [Paras 4-13] Customs v. Faridah Nakanwagi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Judicial Discretion — Impact of Criminal History: While a history-sheeter is not automatically disentitled to bail, criminal antecedents are a significant factor in judicial discretion, especially when the allegations involve systematic and organized crime (e.g., educational fraud rackets) - that once an investigation is complete and a chargesheet is filed, transfer to a special agency like the CBI should only be directed in exceptional circumstances showing bias, mala fides, or involvement of high-ranking officials – Appeal allowed. [Relied On Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla Babu and another (2012) 9 SCC 446; Paras 28-33, 35- 41] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail Jurisprudence — Distinction between Annulment and Cancellation of Bail - The Supreme Court clarified that an appeal against the grant of bail (annulment) stands on a different footing than an application for cancellation due to post-bail misconduct - While courts are generally slow to interfere with liberty, a bail order is liable to be set aside if it is perverse, illegal, or based on irrelevant material, such as documents whose genuineness is the subject of the trial. [Relied On State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc. (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1702; Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince and another (2025) scc OnLine SC 2580; Paras 13-14, 16-19] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Mandatory Disclosure Framework - To streamline bail proceedings and prevent abuse, the Court provided an illustrative disclosure framework(recommendatory) for all bail applications, which includes – i. Case Details: FIR number, sections, and maximum punishment; ii. Custody Status: Date of arrest and total period of incarceration; iii. Status of Trial: Stage of proceedings and number of witnesses examined; iv. Criminal Antecedents: Detailed list of all FIRs (Pending/Acquitted/Convicted); v. Previous Bail Applications: Details of all prior applications and their outcomes; vi. Coercive Processes: Whether the applicant was ever declared a proclaimed offender or issued Non-Bailable Warrants. [Para 49] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail — POCSO Act — Age Determination — Section 439 CrPC vs. Section 94 JJ Act — Mini-Trial at Bail Stage — The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's directions mandating medical age determination tests in all POCSO cases at the commencement of investigation - held that while exercising bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC, a High Court cannot conduct a "mini-trial" by entertaining challenges to the veracity of age-related documents or ordering roving inquiries. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - The Supreme Court granted regular bail to an accused in the alleged multi-crore Andhra Pradesh liquor scam, invoking its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. Muppidi Avinash Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Grant and Cancellation of Bail – Unlawful Assembly (Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 IPC) – SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Murder (Section 302 IPC) - Bail – Parameters for interference by Superior Court – Distinction between 'cancellation of bail' for misconduct and 'reversal' of an erroneous bail order – Supreme Court held that while cancellation under Section 439(2) CrPC (Section 483(3) BNSS) typically involves the accused misusing liberty, a superior court can reverse a bail order if it ignores relevant material, is based on extraneous considerations, or fails to consider the gravity of the offence. [Para 20] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 278

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Grant of Bail — Cancellation/Setting aside of bail order — Factors to be considered — Criminal Antecedents and Conduct — The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's order granting bail to the first respondent, a "habitual offender" and "career criminal" involved in large-scale cheating and forgery - held that while liberty is a cardinal value, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the potential threat to society and the economic well-being of its members. Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1117

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Grant of Bail – Delay in Trial – Incarceration without trial amounts to punishment – The Supreme Court granted bail to the appellant who had been in custody since April 13, 2024, for offenses under Sections 386, 307, 506, 120-B, 482, and 411 of the IPC, and Sections 25(6) and 27 of the Arms Act - Supreme Court observed that despite the prosecution proposing to examine 23 witnesses, none had been examined after almost two years of incarceration - Noted that when a trial is unlikely to conclude in the near future and the accused has undergone significant pre-trial detention, further detention is unnecessary as incarceration without trial amounts to punishment. [Paras 5-11] Pardeep Kumar @ Banu v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 302

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Scope of Bail Jurisdiction — The jurisdiction of a Court under Section 439 is limited to granting or refusing bail based on prima facie evidence - It is coram non judice for a bail court to issue general mandatory directions to investigating authorities that contravene express legislative intent - Determination of age is a matter of trial and not a "matter of course" step during bail proceedings. [Relied on Chandrapal Singh v. State of U.P. (2022 SCC OnLine All 934); State v. M. Murugesan (2020) 15 SCC 251; Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 13-19] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Section 528 - Saving of inherent powers of High Court.

Section 528 BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC) – Quashing of FIR – Abuse of Process – Supreme Court observed that the FIR was a "glaring example" of an influential media house managing to register a case against its own executive following a fallout - The complaint lacked specific victim names, dates, or instances of the alleged extortion and cheating - If the allegations, even taken at face value, do not constitute an offence or are so absurd that no prudent person could reach a conclusion of sufficient grounds for proceeding, the FIR must be quashed to prevent the abuse of the process of law – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1; Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, (2026) 1 SCC 721; Paras 19-28] Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 258 : 2026 INSC 244

Section 528 BNSS — Quashing of Proceedings — Informant's Right to Hearing — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that quashed an FIR and consequential criminal proceedings without issuing notice to the informant - The High Court had quashed the case based on a general observation in a previous election-related writ petition suggesting parties withdraw all proceedings - The Supreme Court held that since the FIR disclosed a cognizable offence and a charge-sheet had already been submitted following investigation, the proceedings could not be quashed "straight-away" without giving the informant an opportunity to be heard - Matter restored for fresh consideration. [Relied on District Bar Association and Another vs. Bar Council of India Writ (C) No. 5973 of 2025; Paras 11-13] Suman Kumar Raghav v. Ravindra Kumar Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 279

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Quashing of Proceedings - Suicide Note – Held that criminal proceedings quashed where the suicide note lacked material particulars regarding the nature, time, and place of alleged threats – Noted that where a suicide note indicts multiple creditors (nine in this case) without specifying individual roles or showing they acted as a group, a trial based on such a note would be a "futile exercise" and an "abuse of the process of the Court" – Held that Mere evidence of frequency of calls (40 calls in six months) without audio recordings or records of the content of those calls to indicate threats is insufficient to sustain a prosecution under Section 306 IPC – Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-15] Dhirubhai Nanjibhai Patel Lotwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 270

Section 482 of CrPC / Section 528 of BNSS – Quashing of Proceedings – Offences under Sections 341, 323, 498A, and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act – General and Omnibus Allegations – Parity in Relief – The High Court quashed proceedings against the sister-in-law but refused to extend the same relief to the father-in-law and mother-in-law (appellants) despite identical allegations. Held: The Supreme Court found that the allegations against the appellants were general and omnibus, lacking specific dates, places, or overt acts – Held that Relatives of the husband cannot be prosecuted based on vague and general allegations without any specific overt act attributed to them - Supreme Court observed that since the allegations against the appellants and the sister-in-law were identical in substance, the High Court erred in applying different standards. Quashing the proceedings against the appellants - noted that criminal proceedings should not be used as a tool for harassment through improved and supplemental versions of events – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., (2010) 7 SCC 667; Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 741; Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2022) 6 SCC 599; Paras 7 - 11] Dr. Sushil Kumar Purbey v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : 2026 INSC 212 : AIR 2026 SC 1299

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Quashing of Proceedings – Summoning of Accused – Copyright Infringement – Appeal against High Court order refusing to quash criminal proceedings for alleged copyright infringement of a film script - The Supreme Court observed that summoning an accused is a serious matter and should not be done as a matter of course - The Magistrate's order must reflect an application of mind to the facts and law, involving a careful scrutiny of the evidence to determine if an offence is prima facie made out - In the present case, the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) failed to record satisfaction regarding any specific similarities between the appellant's film 'Kahaani-2' and the complainant's script 'Sabak' - The summoning order was passed in a mechanical manner. Sujoy Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 271 : 2026 INSC 267 : AIR 2026 SC 1552

Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of FIR – Forgery and Fraud – High Court quashed FIR at the threshold while investigation was ongoing and vital forensic evidence was awaited - Supreme Court held that when allegations of forgery are made and documents have been sent to a handwriting expert, quashing the FIR without awaiting the report is unjustified - Once the Court is apprised that the genuineness of signatures is under SFSL analysis, there is no reason to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to stifle the probe - Supreme Court's Observations – i. The High Court prematurely terminated the proceedings despite clear allegations establishing fraud, falsification of documents, and criminal breach of trust; ii. Subsequent SFSL reports confirmed that the signatures on bank nomination documents and sale deeds were forged/facsimile stamps and did not match the admitted signatures of the deceased; iii. The High Court's reliance on Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI (2009) 15 SCC 643 was misplaced and irrelevant to the facts of the present case, as the proof of forgery was dependent on the then-pending handwriting expert's report - Held: The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside - The Investigating Officer was directed to conclude the investigation and file the result before the concerned Court – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643; Paras 16-23] Sharla Bazliel v. Baldev Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2026 INSC 252

Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Civil Dispute vs. Criminal Offence – Commercial Risk in Movie Production – Supreme Court observed that movie making is a high-risk business where fulfilment of a promise (sharing profits) is not entirely in the control of the promisor - If a transaction involves inherent risk and the conduct of the parties does not reflect dishonest intention from the beginning, the High Court should exercise its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings and relegate the parties to civil remedies - In the present case, since the movie was actually completed and released, the promise to make the movie was not false, and the dispute regarding profit-sharing remains a civil cause of action. V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265 : AIR 2026 SC 1547

Quashing of FIR – Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, and 471 – Civil Dispute given a criminal cloak – Abuse of process of law – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR lodged 11 years after the execution of a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), holding that the dispute was essentially of a civil nature - While considering a prayer to quash an FIR, allegations are ordinarily taken at face value to assess if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out - where the cause is essentially civil, the Court must assess whether it has been given a "cloak of criminal offence." - In such cases, the Court is not restricted to the FIR's contents but may consider admitted facts and documents recited therein, such as the JVA - A delay of 11 years in lodging the FIR (JVA dated 2010; FIR lodged 2021) indicates the absence of dishonest intention from the inception. If a stark dishonest intention existed, it would have been reported promptly. [Relied on: Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2013) 11 SCC 673; Para 15, 25-27] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Discharge in Police Case vs. Statutory Complaint – A discharge order passed by a Magistrate in a criminal case arising from an FIR (Police Investigation) has no bearing on a separate complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority under Section 28 of the PCPNDT Act - The Act mandates cognizance only upon a complaint by the authorized authority, and police investigation is generally discouraged for these specialized offences – appeal dismissed. [Relied on Ravinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC Online SC 2495; Federation of Obstetrics and Gynaecological Societies of India (FOGSI) v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 283; Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspector (Investigation), New Delhi, (1974) 1 SCC 345; Radha Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 822; Paras 28, 37, 54] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 329

Transfer of Cases – Allegation of Bias – Matrimonial Disputes – Conduct of Parties – Deceitful Litigation – Held that the High Court's order of transfer, based on allegations that the wife's relatives (a Head Constable and a District Court staff member) could exert influence, cannot be sustained - Bias on the part of a Judge cannot be lightly inferred merely because a party's relative is a police officer within the jurisdiction or a staff member in the same District Court - Litigation – Noted that the husband surreptitiously obtained a divorce decree while a compromise was being reached in criminal proceedings, without informing the wife - Such reprehensible conduct by the husband should have restrained the High Court from granting a transfer that increased the travails of a woman with two children – Held that to address the husband's alleged threat to life, he is permitted to seek appearance through counsel or video conferencing - If physical presence is required, the Magistrate may provide necessary protection – Appeal allowed. [Para 5 - 12] Prasanna Kasini v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 16 : 2026 INSC 30

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

Section 61(2) - Criminal conspiracy punishment

Section 120B IPC – Criminal Conspiracy – Demand and Acceptance of Bribe – Individual Liability vs. Collective Culpability – The Supreme Court held that even if a charge of criminal conspiracy (Section 120B IPC) fails due to lack of evidence regarding a prior meeting of minds or demand by one of the accused, the other accused can still be independently convicted for demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the PC Act if the evidence specifically establishes their individual role - The conduct of an accused person—such as turning pale, remaining "mum," or attempting to escape/dispose of the bribe money when challenged by the Trap Laying Officer—is admissible as relevant conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Baljeet Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 228 : 2026 INSC 221

Section 63 - Rape definition

Distinction between False Promise and Breach of Promise — held that a breach of promise (where an initially serious intention is later hindered by unforeseen circumstances) is not a "false promise" (where there is no intention to marry from the beginning) - Supreme Court expressed concern over the "disquieting tendency" of giving broken relationships the color of criminality, noting that such misuse of the justice machinery trivializes the offense of rape and burdens the judiciary – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Naim Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 38; Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 39; Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764; Samadhan vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528; Paras 19-27] Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124 : 2026 CriLJ 1016

Section 64 - Punishment for rape

Section 376(2)(n) IPC — Rape on false pretext of marriage — Consensual relationship vs. Misconception of fact — Quashing of FIR — The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against an advocate-accused where the complainant, also an advocate, was a married woman with a child and had pending divorce proceedings - held that since the complainant was already married and legally ineligible to enter into a second marriage under Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, any alleged promise of marriage by the accused was legally unenforceable and could not be termed a "misconception of fact" to vitiate consent. Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124 : 2026 CriLJ 1016

Scope of Section 376(2)(n) IPC — "Repeatedly" — The provision contemplates a series of separate acts of sexual assault committed at different points in time, often under fear, pressure, or continued deceit - Held that a consensual relationship turning acrimonious does not satisfy the ingredients of this section. Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124 : 2026 CriLJ 1016

Section 376(2)(g) IPC - Solitary Testimony of Prosecutrix — Reliability — While conviction can rest on the solitary version of a prosecutrix, it must inspire the confidence of the Court - Supreme Court found material inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecutrix regarding the location of the incident (room vs. plot) and the distance from her house, which weakened the prosecution's case - held that the defense of prior enmity (water dispute) between the parties was not properly considered by the lower courts, which had given undue weightage to the prosecutrix's emotional outbursts - In the absence of immediate reporting, supporting evidence such as a medical report becomes crucial - there was a total lack of medical or corroborative evidence to prove the act – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vijayan vs. State of Kerala (2008) 14 SCC 763; Paras 13-18] Rajendra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2026 INSC 238 : AIR 2026 SC 1490

Section 376(2)(g) and Section 506 IPC — Rape — Conviction Set Aside — Appreciation of Evidence — Delayed FIR and Solitary Testimony of Prosecutrix — The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellants, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt - Supreme Court observed that the FIR was lodged after a significant delay of over three months without a cogent explanation - noted that the prosecutrix's version failing to disclose the incident even to her husband but allegedly disclosing it later to a stranger who was never produced as a witness was contrary to natural human conduct. Rajendra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2026 INSC 238 : AIR 2026 SC 1490

Section 376 IPC - SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Sexual Offences — Appreciation of Child Witness Testimony — Appeal against acquittal — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment of acquittal, restoring the conviction of the respondent - held that the High Court erred by prioritizing minor inconsistencies and "mathematical precision" regarding travel time over the credible, unshakeable testimony of the nine-year-old victim - Reiterated that there is no hard and fast rule for testing the competency of a child witness; it depends on the trial judge's satisfaction regarding the child's capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood - Corroboration is a rule of practical wisdom, not a legal necessity, and conviction can be based solely on a child's testimony if it inspires confidence and withstands cross-examination. [Para 7, 8, 10] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukum Chand @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : 2026 INSC 290

Section 80 - Dowry death

Section 80(2) and 85 BNS — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; Section 118 — Dowry Death — Grant of Bail — Sustainability of High Court Order — Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's order granting bail to the husband in a dowry death case where the marriage lasted only three months and the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation – Noted that the High Court failed to consider the gravity of the offense and the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (erstwhile Section 113-B of the Evidence Act). Chetram Verma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Section 85 - Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty

Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Delay in Trial – Pendency of Revision Petitions – Judicial Discipline – Rights of Victims - The Supreme Court expressed deep concern over a 23-year delay in the High Court of Rajasthan deciding a Criminal Revision Petition challenging an order of framing charges – Noted that the Revision Petition, filed in 2003 against charges under Sections 498A and 304B IPC, remained pending with an interim stay on trial proceedings until it was finally dismissed by the High Court in 2025 - that if trials for serious offences like murder, dowry death, and rape remain stayed for decades, it results in a "mockery of justice" - Justice must be balanced between the accused and the victim/family members - Noted that "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere" - The Supreme Court requested the Chief Justices of all High Courts to ensure that petitions involving interim stays on trials, particularly in sensitive and serious matters, are prioritized and heard immediately - The Registrar General of the Rajasthan High Court was directed to provide a detailed breakup of Criminal Revision Petitions filed and disposed of between 2001 and 2026, and the State was questioned on its failure to expedite the hearing during the 23-year interregnum. [Paras 21-23, 26-30] Vijay Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 25

Section 100 - Culpable homicide

Section 299, 300 Clause (3), and 304 Part II IPC — Culpable Homicide vs. Murder — Vicarious Liability under Section 149 IPC — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment which had toned down the conviction of 19 accused persons from Section 302/149 IPC to Section 304 Part II/149 IPC - held that when an unlawful assembly waylays a victim with premeditation, uses lathis to inflict 29 injuries (including four bone-deep head fractures), and acts out of caste-based retaliation, the intention to cause such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is clearly established. Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178

Section 101 - Murder

Section 300 Exception 4, Section 302 and Section 304 Part II IPC — Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder — Free Fight and Private Defence — The appellant was initially convicted under Section 302/149 for the death of the deceased during a group clash - The High Court altered the conviction to Section 304 Part II, holding that in a "free fight" involving two rival groups where both sides sustained injuries, a common object for an unlawful assembly cannot be easily inferred - The Supreme Court upheld this alteration, noting that the appellant acted without premeditation in the midst of a sudden commotion - While the appellant's use of a lathi on the deceased's head established "knowledge" that the injury was likely to cause death, the lack of specific intent to cause death in the context of a group fight justifies the invocation of Section 304 Part II. Shrikrishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 35 : 2026 INSC 45 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 242

Section 103 - Punishment for murder

Sections 302, 120-B, 201, 506 r/w 34 IPC – Circumstantial Evidence – Reliability of Sole Eye-Witness – In a case primarily resting on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of a purported eye-witness, Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to sustain conviction - Noted significant discrepancies: the eye-witness failed to report the incident for 21 days, alleged threats were not substantiated, and the witness was treated as partially hostile - medical evidence regarding the time of death (10 days prior to post-mortem) conflicted with the prosecution's timeline (21 days prior) - held that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances - Required – Conspiracy cannot be presumed and requires proof of a meeting of minds, prior agreement, and concerted action - Mere suspicion, association, or the existence of civil disputes cannot substitute for proof of a criminal conspiracy – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 (8) SCC 149; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Ramesh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2020 (20) SCC 522; Paras 7, 24, 25] Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : 2026 INSC 67 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 121 ; 2026 CriLJ 534

Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC – Conviction for Murder – Non-recovery of weapons of assault – Effect of – Held, recovery of the weapons of assault is not a sine qua non for convicting an accused if the evidence on record, particularly reliable ocular testimony, establishes the guilt beyond reasonable doubt - Even if the Investigating Officer fails to bring on record the weapons described by eye-witnesses, this omission cannot benefit the accused when the version of eye-witnesses is found to be consistent, reliable, and corroborated by medical evidence. [Para 7, 8] Ghanshyam Mandal v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2026 INSC 194 : AIR 2026 SC 1445

Sections 302 and 201 IPC — Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 — Circumstantial Evidence — Conviction Upheld — The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against concurrent findings of conviction in a case of abduction, ransom, and murder - held that the prosecution successfully established an unbroken chain of circumstances, including the recovery of the deceased's body and her vehicle at the specific disclosure of the appellant. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Section 302 and Section 498A IPC - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32 - Dying Declaration - Reliability of Dying Declaration in cases of high percentage of burns - Conviction Upheld – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's reversal of an acquittal, affirming the conviction of the appellant for murdering his wife by pouring kerosene and setting her on fire - held that even with 80-90% burn injuries, a dying declaration is reliable if the attending doctors certify the patient was in a fit and conscious state to make a statement - The evidence of the victim's daughter (PW-3), who was an eyewitness to the appellant fetching kerosene and setting the deceased on fire, was found to be "clinchingly" credible - Supreme Court dismissed the defense's argument regarding inconsistencies in witness testimonies (PW-7 and PW-16), noting that the professional medical opinion of the treating doctors (PW-10 and PW-11) carries more weight regarding the deceased's mental capacity than the contradictory statements of other witnesses - noted that a mere discrepancy in the investigation officer's statements would not discredit the dying declaration when the doctor has approved the deceased's fit state of mind to give statements. [Paras 11-23] Subramani v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2026 INSC 249

Sections 302/34 and 201 IPC [Sections 103(1)/3(5) and 238 of BNS, 2023] – Conviction based on circumstantial evidence – Requirements for conviction – Held that the "Panchsheel" principles governing circumstantial evidence - To sustain a conviction, the circumstances must be fully established and form a complete chain that excludes every possible hypothesis except the guilt of the accused - The mental distance between "may be guilty" and "must be guilty" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. [Relied on Harad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 27-28] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Section 105 - Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder

Sentencing Policy — Advanced Age of Appellant — While upholding the conviction under Section 304 Part II, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (approximately six years and three months) – Held that since the appellant is now over 80 years old, sending him back to prison would be "harsh and inadvisable," emphasizing that courts should not be insensitive to the advanced age of convicts – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Kesar Singh and Another vs. State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753; Paras 5, 6] Shrikrishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 35 : 2026 INSC 45 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 242

Section 108 - Abetment of suicide

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide - Debt Recovery – Held a creditor making repeated phone calls or persistent demands for the return of money lent does not, by itself, constitute the offence of abetment of suicide - Such a demand is a lawful act - Supreme Court observed that in the absence of evidence showing the deceased was beaten or physically assaulted, mere demands for dues cannot be inferred as abetment - noted that the deceased might have committed suicide due to depression from being unable to clear the debt rather than due to the actions of the creditors. Dhirubhai Nanjibhai Patel Lotwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 270

Sections 306, 307, and 109 IPC — Abetment of Suicide — Suicide Pacts — Culpability of the Surviving Partner - Held: The survivor of a mutual suicide pact is legally culpable for the abetment of the other's suicide under Section 307 of the IPC - A suicide pact involves mutual encouragement and a reciprocal commitment to die together, where the survivor's presence and participation act as a direct catalyst for the deceased's actions - The resolve of each party is reinforced and strengthened by the participation of the other; if not for the active participation of both parties, the act would not occur - The law treats such conduct as abetment because the State has a fundamental interest in preserving life, and any assistance in ending it is a crime against the State. Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2026 INSC 160 : AIR 2026 SC 950

Section 115 (2) - Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt

Sections 323, 341, 506, and 34 IPC — Quashing of Proceedings — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 — Where allegations of assault and criminal intimidation rest solely on the statement of the complainant without independent corroboration and are contradicted by other witness statements, the basic foundation for the offences is missing - Held, that continuing such proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. [Relied on Punjabrao vs. D.P. Meshram 1964 SCC OnLine 76; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp 1 SCC 335; K.P. Manu vs. Scrutiny Committee forVerification of Community Certificate 2015 4 SCC 1; Paras 40-60] Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283

Section 190 - Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object

Unlawful Assembly – Individual Role Attribution – Noted that the High Court erred in granting bail on the ground that the individual role or specific injury caused by each accused could not be ascertained - The Supreme Court clarified that where an offence is committed by an unlawful assembly, every member is equally responsible for acts done in furtherance of the common object - Under Section 149 IPC, the prosecution is not obligated to identify the specific weapon or injury attributable to a particular member at the bail stage. [Paras 27 - 30] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 278

Section 149 IPC – Unlawful Assembly and Vicarious Liability – Murder – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of four appellants sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of a Watershed Committee Chairman - Noted that to attract Section 149 IPC, two essential elements must be established: an "unlawful assembly" and a "common object" - Even in the absence of a specific overt act attributed to each member, the mere presence of the accused as part of an armed unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction - noted that all accused alighting together from a bus while armed with firearms clearly established their common motive and participation in the unlawful assembly. [Paras 12, 13] Dablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 238 : 2026 INSC 224 : AIR 2026 SC 1319

Section 149 IPC — Vicarious Liability - Individual Attribution — Once the existence of an unlawful assembly and a common object to commit murder is established, the individual attribution of the fatal blow becomes inconsequential - Section 149 IPC fastens constructive liability on every member of the assembly, regardless of who delivered the "crucial act" or fatal injury - The High Court's reasoning that all accused could not be convicted under Section 302 because the specific assailant who caused the fatal head injury was unidentified was held to be "perverse" and "self-contradictory" as it ignored the fundamental principle of vicarious liability. Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178

Section 316 (2) - Punishment for criminal breach of trust

Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, and 471 IPC – Civil Dispute given a criminal cloak – Abuse of process of law – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR lodged 11 years after the execution of a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), holding that the dispute was essentially of a civil nature - While considering a prayer to quash an FIR, allegations are ordinarily taken at face value to assess if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out - where the cause is essentially civil, the Court must assess whether it has been given a "cloak of criminal offence." - In such cases, the Court is not restricted to the FIR's contents but may consider admitted facts and documents recited therein, such as the JVA - A delay of 11 years in lodging the FIR (JVA dated 2010; FIR lodged 2021) indicates the absence of dishonest intention from the inception. If a stark dishonest intention existed, it would have been reported promptly. [Relied on: Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2013) 11 SCC 673; Para 15, 25-27] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Section 406 IPC – Criminal Breach of Trust – Non-refundable Security Deposit – The allegation regarding non-refund of security money does not constitute a criminal offence when the JVA stipulates that the deposit is non-refundable and only adjustable against future sale proceeds - Non-fulfillment of such contractual obligations gives rise to a civil cause of action, not a criminal one. [Para 22 - 28] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Section 318 (4) - Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property

Section 420 IPC – Cheating – Ingredients – Essential requirement of dishonest intention from the inception – The Supreme Court held that to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive must exist at the time the inducement was made - Mere failure to keep a promise subsequently cannot be the sole basis to presume dishonest intention existed from the beginning - Every breach of contract does not give rise to an offence of cheating unless deception was played at the very inception. V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265 : AIR 2026 SC 1547

Section 420 IPC – Cheating – Absence of False Representation – No offence of cheating was made out as there was no false representation in the JVA - The agreement did not contain a specific statement that "no litigation was pending"; rather, it provided an indemnity to the second party for any loss due to disputes - The representation that no "restraint order" existed was not shown to be false. [Paras 20-26] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Section 338 - Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.

Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC – Forgery – Document not traceable in records – Merely because a document (such as a Tehsildar's letter) is not traceable in official records 11 years after its purported issuance, it cannot be deemed "forged" or "false" under Section 464 IPC. Official records are not always maintained in perpetuity. [Para 24] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Section 351 - Criminal intimidation punishment

Section 506 IPC – Criminal Intimidation – Mere threats without intention to cause alarm do not constitute an offence – Vague allegations and delayed improvements in statements weaken the prosecution's case - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed proceedings against the appellant (Accused No. 5), a lawyer, who was primarily charged under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Noted that the prosecutrix's initial statement under Section 161 of the CrPC did not mention any threats from the appellant - after a delay of seven to eight days, she improved her version in a statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC, making a vague reference to "an uncle" (the appellant) threatening her - held that for a charge of criminal intimidation to stand, there must be a clear intention to cause alarm, irrespective of whether the victim was actually alarmed - Vague allegations unsupported by prima facie cogent evidence do not satisfy the requirements of Section 506 IPC - noted that a lawyer discharging professional duties, such as giving advice or suggestions, cannot be deemed to be engaging in intimidation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Naresh Aneja Vs. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604; Sharif Ahmad Vs. State of U.P., (2024) 14 SCC 122; Paras 6-8] Beri Manoj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 92

Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

Admissibility of Documents – Mode of Proof – Distinction between an objection to the "admissibility" of a document and its "mode of proof" - A prompt objection to the mode of proof (e.g., producing photocopies instead of originals) is necessary to allow the party tendering the evidence an opportunity to cure the defect – Noted that in this case, the appellant categorically denied the photocopies and filed applications for the production of originals and cross-examination, which the Commission failed to address - The Supreme Court found the award of ₹2,00,00,000/- unjustified as the respondent failed to establish actual financial loss or a causal link between the haircut and lost career opportunities - The appeal was partially allowed, restricting the compensation to the ₹25,00,000/- already released to the respondent. [Relied on Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee and others (2009) 9 SCC 221; Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and another (2003) 8 SCC 75; Dr. J.J. Merchant and others v. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC 635; Paras 17-22] ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135 : AIR 2026 SC 860

Admissibility of Evidence Collected in Illegal Search – Rule of Relevancy – Even if a search is conducted in infraction of statutory procedures (such as Section 30 of the PCPNDT Act), the materials or records seized during such search are not automatically discarded. Materials gathered in an illegal search remain admissible in evidence subject to the test of relevancy and genuineness – Noted that Court must, however, examine such evidence with greater care. [Paras 50 - 52] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 329

Circumstantial Evidence — Five Golden Principles — For a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence, the conditions outlined in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 must be fulfilled - These include: (1) circumstances from which guilt is drawn must be fully established; (2) facts must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) circumstances must be of a conclusive nature; (4) they must exclude every possible hypothesis except guilt; and (5) the chain of evidence must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for the conclusion of innocence. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Together Theory – Noted that prosecution's "last seen" theory failed due to significant inconsistencies and interpolations in police records regarding the date and time of the accused's prior arrest for a different matter - noted that the child allegedly went missing while the accused may have already been in police custody - Where the investigation is "botched" and "inept," leaving the chain of circumstances incomplete and failing to eliminate other hypotheses, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt - Conviction set aside. [Relied on Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 5 SCC 509; Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 872; Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay (1954) 2 SCC 516; Paras 10-20] Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162 : AIR 2026 SC 1095

Distinction between "Preparation" and "Attempt" – Section 376 r/w Section 511 of the IPC and Section 18 of the POCSO Act – The Supreme Court set aside an Allahabad High Court order that had downgraded a summons from "attempt to commit rape" to a lesser charge of Section 354B IPC - held that when accused persons act with pre-determined intent, execute mens rea through overt acts (such as dragging a victim toward a culvert), and are only stopped by the intervention of third parties, the stage of "preparation" has concluded and an "attempt" has commenced. In Re: Order Dated 17.03.2025 Passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : 2026 INSC 165

Evidence and Pleadings – Oral Evidence vs. Pleadings – Supreme Court noted that a party asserting a competing claim to hereditary rights must specifically plead material particulars, such as when they entered possession and when obstruction began - The Appellants' written statement was silent on these aspects – Noted that the settled legal principle that oral evidence cannot serve as a substitute for pleadings, and a case not made out in the pleadings cannot be established through evidence alone. [Para 23] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191

Evidentiary Value of Confessional Statements – noted that the conviction was not based solely on confessions, but was supported by the discovery of incriminating material (contraband and money) documented via panchnamas - Such discoveries constitute independent and relevant evidence under Sections 6, 10, and 11 of the Evidence Act. Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180

Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) Report – Chain of Custody – Sanctity of Samples. For an FSL report to be reliable, the prosecution must prove an unbroken chain of custody from seizure to laboratory - In this case, contradictions between the Malkhana In-charge and Carrier Constable regarding the dates the samples were sent and returned from the FSL (due to unspecified "defects") breached the chain of custody – Noted that even if blood groups match, this circumstance in isolation cannot link the accused to the crime without other cogent evidence. [Relied on Karandeep Sharma alias Razia alias Raju v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 SCC OnLine SC 773; Paras 41-44] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Identification of Decomposed Body — Medical Jurisprudence — Absence of DNA testing does not vitiate identification when credible and consistent testimonies of witnesses who knew the deceased personally are available - Relying on Modi's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, Supreme Court noted that putrefaction in water is slower than in air, especially when the body is protected by clothing - Identification based on clothing and recognizable facial features by familial and close witnesses is legally sustainable. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Last Seen Together Theory — Proximity to Death — Held: For the "last seen together" theory to hold weight, it must be proximate to the time of death – Noted that in this case, there was no proof the deceased was with the accused immediately before death, and the identification of the accused by an auto-driver in a police station (without a Test Identification Parade) was unreliable. [Paras 13-15] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 230

Motive in Circumstantial Evidence — While motive is significant in cases of circumstantial evidence, it is not an absolute necessity when the chain of circumstances is otherwise complete - Failure to prove motive is not fatal to the prosecution's case if the facts clearly point to the accused's guilt - A delay of three days in lodging a missing person report is neither excessive nor unusual, as family members often conduct their own search before approaching the police; such delay does not, by itself, vitiate the prosecution's case – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Mulakh Raj and Others vs. Satish Kumar and Others (1992) 3 SCC 43; Paras 13-17, 20-29] Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Ocular Evidence vs. Unnatural Conduct – held that the testimony of related witnesses (brother, son, and nephews of the deceased) could not be discarded merely because they failed to intervene or take the victim to the hospital after the shooting - Such "unnatural behavior" does not invalidate their evidence when consistent with other facts, such as the established political rivalry and the forensic evidence of multiple gunshot wounds. [Paras 11 - 15] Dablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 238 : 2026 INSC 224 : AIR 2026 SC 1319

Production of Material Objects – Tainted Currency Notes – The appellant argued that the failure to produce tainted currency notes before the Court was fatal to the prosecution - Supreme Court dismissed this contention as it was raised for the first time during oral arguments at the Supreme Court and was never pleaded in the Trial Court, High Court, or the Special Leave Petition. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239 : AIR 2026 SC 1506

Witness Testimony – Hostile Witnesses – The testimony of "hostile" independent witnesses cannot be discarded in toto - Supreme Court must consider parts of the testimony that are creditworthy and corroborated by other evidence, such as the Trap Laying Officer's account and the recovery of marked currency. [Relied on Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Administration), (1979) 3 SCC 90; State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 500; Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om Prakash, (1972) 1 SCC 249; Paras 15-30] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Baljeet Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 228 : 2026 INSC 221

Section 6 - Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct

Section 8 IEA – Admissibility as Conduct – Even if a recovery is not admissible under Section 27 due to a lack of formal custody, the fact that the accused led the police to a location where incriminating items were found can be admitted as "conduct" under Section 8 - such evidence is considered "weak" and can only offer corroboration; it cannot, by itself, result in a conviction without other proven links in the chain of circumstances. Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162 : AIR 2026 SC 1095

Section 23 - Confession to police officer

Section 27 IEA — Discovery of Fact — Doctrine of Confirmation by Subsequent Events — Section 27 is a proviso to Sections 25 and 26 - The "fact discovered" embraces not merely the object recovered, but the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence - The actual discovery of the body from the exact location disclosed by the appellant (a well) serves as a guarantee of the truthfulness of the information supplied. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Section 27 IEA – Recovery of remnants of deceased – Requirement of "Custody" – Information leading to a discovery is admissible under Section 27 only if it comes from a person who is in the custody of the police at the time the statement is made - In the present case, the Section 27 memorandum was drawn at 10:30 AM on 13.10.2018, whereas the formal arrest of the accused occurred later that night at 22:00 hrs - As the accused was not in police custody when the statement was made, the recovery cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 27. Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162 : AIR 2026 SC 1095

Section 27 IEA [Proviso to Section 23 of BSA, 2023] – Recovery of currency notes and blood-stained shirt – Reliability - Currency Notes: A discrepancy in the amount recovered (Rs. 46,000/- vs Rs. 46,145/- counted in Court) casts a "grave cloud of doubt" on the factum of recovery - Mere recovery of money, without a clear nexus to the crime, is not an incriminating circumstance – Noted that it "highly improbable and unnatural" that an accused, who was at liberty for days, would meticulously conceal a blood-stained shirt in an iron box rather than destroying it or washing it. Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Section 27 IEA — Recovery of Weapon and Discovery of Body — Held: Recoveries made from open spaces or crime scenes already searched (like a graveyard) without a recorded disclosure statement are suspect - Since the rope was not linked to the crime through forensic evidence (no blood, skin, or hair detected), it failed as an incriminating circumstance. [Paras 17-19] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 230

Section 26 - Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant

Section 32 IEA – Dying Declaration – Credibility and Corroboration – held that a dying declaration, if found to be true and voluntary, can form the sole basis for conviction without any further corroboration – Held that High Court erred in discarding a dying declaration recorded by a Tehsildar (PW-1) after obtaining a medical certificate of fitness - Discrepancies regarding the exact time of the Tehsildar's arrival at the hospital were minor and did not justify discarding a clear and consistent statement by the deceased identifying her husband as the perpetrator. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 131 : 2026 CriLJ 823

Section 32 IEA - Dying Declaration – Conviction on the sole basis of dying declaration – Requirements and Caution - Held: While a dying declaration is a crucial piece of evidence that can form the sole basis for conviction without corroboration, it must inspire full confidence in the Court – Supreme Court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind, and the statement was not the result of tutoring, prompting, or imagination - If the declaration is suspicious or the deceased's physical/mental capacity is in doubt, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence - In the present case, multiple inconsistencies, the presence of interested relatives during recording, and the lack of medical certification regarding the victim's fit state of mind rendered the declarations unreliable. Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 230 : 2026 INSC 223

Section 58 - Secondary evidence

Sections 63, 64, and 65 IEA – Admissibility of Secondary Evidence – Photocopy of Power of Attorney – Primary evidence is the "best evidence" rule, and secondary evidence is an exception admissible only upon laying a factual foundation. A photocopy is a mechanical copy and constitutes secondary evidence - It cannot be admitted as evidence unless the party establishes the legal right to lead secondary evidence by proving the original's existence and providing valid reasons for its non-production under the specific exceptions of Section 65 - A photocopy is no evidence unless proved by following the prescribed procedure. [Paras 20 - 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134 : AIR 2026 SC 938

Section 63 - Admissibility of electronic records

Section 65-B IEA [Section 63 of BSA, 2023] – Admissibility of Electronic Evidence (Call Detail Records) – Held that the certificate required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of electronic records. Oral evidence cannot substitute this mandatory requirement - Since the prosecution failed to prove the Section 65-B certificate, the CDRs indicating frequent contact between the accused were rendered inadmissible. [Relied on Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1; Paras 49-52] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Section 65-B IEA – Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302/34 and 201 [Sections 103(1)/3(5) and 238 of BNS, 2023] – Circumstantial Evidence – Recovery of Articles – Call Detail Records (CDR) – Conviction based on circumstantial evidence – Requirements for conviction – Held that the "Panchsheel" principles governing circumstantial evidence - To sustain a conviction, the circumstances must be fully established and form a complete chain that excludes every possible hypothesis except the guilt of the accused - The mental distance between "may be guilty" and "must be guilty" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. [Relied on harad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 27-28] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Section 84 - Presumption as to powers-of-attorney

Section 85 IEA – Registration Act, 1908 – Section 33 – Presumption as to Power of Attorney – The presumption of valid execution and authentication under Section 85 of the Evidence Act or Section 33 of the Registration Act applies only when the original document or legally admitted secondary evidence is produced - In the absence of an original or properly adduced secondary evidence, it is impermissible to apply these sections to conclude the extent of authority granted to an agent. [Para 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134 : AIR 2026 SC 938

Section 94 - Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document

Sections 91 and 92 IEA – Admissibility of Oral Evidence – Where the terms of a written registered document are clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence to ascertain the true intention of the parties is inadmissible - While oral evidence may be admissible to show a document is a "sham," the threshold for such a claim is extremely high and must be supported by strong evidence of surrounding circumstances, not subsequent conduct - Supreme Court suggested an urgent need for the Union and State Governments to digitize land records and registered documents using secure, tamper-proof technologies like Blockchain to minimize forgery and "clever drafting" that clogs the judicial system – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Prem Singh and Ors. vs. Birbal and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 353; Rattan Singh and Ors. v. Nirmal Gill & Ors., (2021) 15 SCC 300; Gangabai w/o Rambilas Gilda (Smt.) vs. Chhabubai w/o Pukharajji Gandhi (Smt.), (1982) 1 SCC 4; Paras 35, 41-47, 76, 77] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

Section 118 - Presumption as to dowry death

Section 118 BSA — Parameters for Granting Bail in Serious Offenses — The Supreme Court emphasized that while considering a bail application in cases of dowry death, the High Court must consider: (i) the nature of the crime; (ii) the prescribed punishment; (iii) the relationship between the parties; (iv) the place of incident; (v) the postmortem report; and (vi) the statutory presumption of commission of offense – Held that under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, if a woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death, the Court shall presume the person caused the dowry death. [Paras 15-20] Chetram Verma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Border Security Force Act, 1968

Border Security Force Act, 1968; Section 40, 48(1)(c) and 50 — Dismissal from Service — National Security — Proportionality of Punishment — The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a BSF Sub-Inspector with 36 years of service who was convicted of facilitating illegal cattle smuggling at the Indo-Bangladesh border - Noted that when national security is paramount, infractions by officers manning the borders cannot be viewed lightly - held that under Section 50 of the BSF Act, 1968, a Security Force Court is permitted to impose a composite sentence, including both imprisonment and dismissal, as contemplated under Section 48(1)(c). Bhagirath Choudhary v. Border Security Force, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 165

Campus Suicide

Campus Suicide – Mandatory registration of FIR – Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) - Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - The Supreme Court addressed the alarming rise in student suicides across Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) in India - Recognized student suicide as the "visible tip of a much larger iceberg of student distress," Supreme Court noted that the legal and moral obligation of educational authorities to create safe, inclusive, and nurturing environments - Supreme Court reviewed an interim report by a National Task Force (NTF) and issued several mandatory directions under Article 142 of the Constitution to address structural, social, and academic stressors - Key Legal Issues & Rulings held – i. Mandatory Registration of F.I.R. for Campus Suicides – Noted that educational institutions have an unequivocal legal obligation to promptly lodge an F.I.R. with appropriate authorities if an incident of suicide occurs on campus - This follows the clarification of law regarding mandatory registration of F.I.R.s in the event of disclosure of a cognizable offence; ii. Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Supreme Court criticized the tendency of HEIs to "shift the blame" onto the individual autonomy of the deceased student to avoid institutional responsibility - held that HEIs cannot shirk their fundamental duty to ensure institutions are safe and conducive spaces for learning; iii. Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - Data Maintenance: SRS data on suicides for the 15-29 age group must be centrally maintained - The NCRB must distinguish between school-going and higher education students in its reports; iv. Reporting Protocol - HEIs must report all student suicides or unnatural deaths (on or off-campus) to police immediately - Annual reports of such incidents must be submitted to regulatory bodies like UGC, NMC, BCI, etc; v. Faculty Vacancies - All vacant faculty positions, with priority to reserved categories (SC/ST/OBC/PwD), must be filled within four months; vi. Scholarship Disbursements: Pending scholarship backlogs must be cleared within four months - HEIs are strictly prohibited from barring students from exams or hostels due to administrative delays in scholarship disbursals; vii. Regulatory Compliance - HEIs must strictly adhere to UGC regulations concerning Ragging (2009), Equity (2012), Sexual Harassment (2016), and Grievance Redressal (2023); viii. Accessibility and Mental Health - Supreme Court mandated accessibility audits for marginalized groups (PwDs and Transgender students) and emphasized the need for student-friendly mental health services provided by qualified professionals rather than untrained faculty members. [Relied on Sukdeb Saha v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1515; Paras 19-39; 44, 45] Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 56 : 2026 INSC 62

Central Excise Act, 1944

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 11A(1) Proviso – Extended Period of Limitation – Suppression of Facts – Revenue Neutrality – The Revenue invoked the extended period of five years alleging suppression of actual use of Naphtha - held that "suppression" requires a deliberate act to escape payment of duty - Where the assessee is a Public Sector Undertaking receiving subsidies from the Central Government, any excise duty paid would be reimbursed as a subsidy, making the entire exercise "revenue neutral" - In cases of revenue neutrality where no benefit is derived by the assessee from evading duty, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked. [Relied on Steel Authority of India v. Collector of Central Excise (1996) 5 SCC 484; State of Haryana v. Dalmia Dadri Cement Limited 1987 Supp SCC 679; Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company v. Collector of Central Excise (1995) Supp 3 SCC 462; Nirlon Limited v. Chief Commissioner of Excise (2015) 14 SCC 798; Paras 38-45, 52-54, 56-58] Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 295 : 2026 INSC 285

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 5A – Exemption Notifications (No. 75/84-CE and No. 4/97-CE) – Naphtha used in the manufacture of Fertilizer – Interpretation of "Intended Use" – The Supreme Court held that when an exemption notification is conditioned on the "intended use" of a product, the benefit is attracted if the goods are used for the purpose and with the intention of manufacturing the specified product (fertilizer/ammonia) – Noted that the mere fact that a fraction of the procured Naphtha was used for generating electricity (steam), a portion of which was used in a chemical plant or supplied to the electricity board, does not disentitle the assessee from the exemption - Once eligibility for exemption is established, the notification must be construed liberally. Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 295 : 2026 INSC 285

Certified Copy

Certified Copy - The Supreme Court has reiterated that a statutory appeal cannot be entertained without a certified copy of the impugned judgment. Central Bank of India v. Bijendra Kumar Jha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 273

Cinema Law

Cinema Law - The Supreme Court dismissed a writ petition seeking a stay on release of the film “Yadav Ji ki Love Story”, holding that the title of the movie does not portray the Yadav community in a negative manner. A bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan noted that the title did not contain any adjective or word that attached any negative meaning to the community. Awdesh Kumar Yadav v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 215

Civil Law

Civil Law – Hereditary Pujari Rights – Suit for Possession – Effect of Withdrawing Previous Suit – The Appellants claimed hereditary pujariki (priest) rights based on a 1901 decree - noted that the Appellants' predecessor had filed a subsequent suit specifically seeking possession of the temple and an injunction - This subsequent filing constituted a categorical admission that the Appellants were not in possession at that time - held that a party in settled possession does not sue for possession - the Appellants withdrew the 1944 suit with liberty to file a fresh one but failed to do so for 36 years, leading to an "inevitable inference" that they had reconciled with the factual reality of not having possession. [Paras 18–20] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Concurrent Findings — Scope of Interference by Supreme Court — While the Supreme Court ordinarily does not reappreciate facts where the NCLT and NCLAT have recorded concurrent findings, an exception exists when the perversity of such findings is clearly established – Noted that the NCLT and NCLAT erred by ignoring binding contractual terms of the DTD based on "surmises, conjectures and assumptions"- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Innoventive Industries Limited vs. ICICI Bank and another (2018) 1 SCC 407; Indus Biotech Private Limited vs. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund and others (2021) 6 SCC 436; Para 18-22] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186 : AIR 2026 SC 1311

Section 11 - Res judicata

Sections 11, 151, and 152 CPC – Res Judicata between stages of the same proceeding – Clerical Errors – Once a High Court holds at an intermediate stage that an appeal has not abated because the deceased's interest is sufficiently represented, it cannot revisit and reverse this finding at a later stage of the same proceeding - Such a reversal is barred by the principle of res judicata - a typographical error in a court order directing the deletion of the original party instead of a deceased legal representative is a clerical mistake that can be corrected under Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC and should not be used to the disadvantage of a party. [Paras 41-44] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48

Section 100 - Second Appeal

Section 100 CPC — Second Appeal — Interference with concurrent findings — Held that the High Court is justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal if such findings are found to be perverse, contrary to the statutory framework, or based on a misapplication of settled legal principles - The absence of cogent evidence regarding the exact location and measurements of the disputed property renders a decree for mandatory injunction legally unsustainable - A suit filed by partners of an unregistered firm for the protection of property rights (common law action) rather than the enforcement of a contractual right is maintainable and not barred by Section 69. [Relied on Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 594; Para 13, 24 - 27] Sanjay Paliwal v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 54 : 2026 INSC 61

Section 100 CPC – Second Appeal – Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact – Possession and Injunction – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had dismissed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction despite concurrent findings of possession in favor of the appellant by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court – Noted that the High Court failed to frame a specific substantial question of law regarding the correctness or validity of the findings on possession returned by the lower courts - The Supreme Court held that interference with concurrent findings of fact under Section 100 CPC is permissible only on limited grounds, such as perversity, misreading of evidence, or consideration of inadmissible evidence. P. Elaiyappan v. Natarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 219

Sections 100 and 103 CPC – Jurisdiction of High Court in Second Appeal – Interference with Findings of Fact – Held that the High Court generally does not disturb findings of fact, it is well within its jurisdiction to interfere if such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, founded on conjectures, or result from a misconstruction of documents/inadmissible evidence - Relying on a photocopy (no evidence) to accept the existence of a power to alienate is an error of law that the High Court may rightly correct - Courts should not, by themselves, compare disputed signatures without the assistance of an expert, especially when the signatures used for comparison are not admitted signatures – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Smt. J. Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani (2007) 5 SCC 730; Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh (2020) 5 SCC 178; O. Bharathan v. K. Sudhakaran (1996) 2 SCC 70; Para 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134 : AIR 2026 SC 938

Section 151 - Saving of inherent powers of Court

Sections 151 and 152 CPC – Scope of "Clarification" vs. Substantive Modification – High Courts cannot make substantive changes to the quantum of compensation or redistribute liability under the guise of a "clarification" application - Section 152 CPC is strictly confined to correcting clerical or arithmetical mistakes arising from accidental slips - Any modification affecting substantive rights amounts to a review in substance and must meet the requirements of Order XLVII CPC. Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188 : AIR 2026 SC 1188

Order I Rule 10 - Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.

Order I Rule 10 CPC – Dominus Litis – Joinder of Parties – Noted that the petitioner is dominus litis and has the right to decide who to join as a party - The Registry cannot make inroads into judicial domains by questioning why a particular party was arrayed as a respondent - If unnecessary parties are joined, Supreme Court can delete them under Order I Rule 10 CPC or deal with it judicially if done with ill-motive - Supreme Court observed with "pain" that there was an "abandonment of its judicial role by the High Court" in rejecting the petition in such an unjust manner – Appeal allowed. [Paras 7-13] Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84

Order I Rule 10 CPC – Impleadment of Parties – Necessary vs. Proper Party – Dominus Litis – Suit for recovery of service charges – Twin Tests for Necessary Party – Held: A plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to add a third person as a defendant against their wishes unless that person is a necessary party without whom no effective decree can be passed - In a suit for recovery of service charges against a partnership firm, a third-party company claiming to be a "successor" is not a necessary party if the plaintiff seeks no relief against them and the original firm continues to exist- Held: To be a "necessary party," two tests must be satisfied: (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved; and (2) no effective decree can be passed in their absence - A "proper party" is one whose presence enables the court to adjudicate completely, even if no decree is made against them. Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 5 : 2026 INSC 8

Order VI Rule 4 - Particulars to be given where necessary.

Order VI Rule 4 CPC – Pleading Standards – Rule Against "Clever Drafting" – A party alleging that a registered Deed is a sham must satisfy a rigorous standard of pleading by providing clear, cogent, and convincing averments with material particulars - Adopting a test akin to Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC, Supreme Court held that "clever drafting" creating an illusion of a cause of action is impermissible - Mere suspicion or nebulous averments without material particulars are insufficient to dislodge the presumption under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. [Paras 34, 35] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

Order VII Rule 7 - Relief to be specifically stated

Order VII Rule 7 and Order VI Rule 17 CPC – Pleadings and Reliefs – Multiple reliefs and defective prayers –Rejection of a writ petition because multiple reliefs were claimed in a single prayer is "perhaps, unprecedented" - If a prayer is defective or does not conform to Writ Rules, the High Court should permit amendments under principles of Order VI Rule 17 CPC or mould the relief - A claim cannot be dismissed simply because a suitor claims a wider relief than they are entitled to; the court remains free to grant a lesser relief. Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84

Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of plaint

Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Where a property is neither notified in the official list of auqaf nor registered with the Waqf Board, a suit for injunction simpliciter regarding such property cannot be entertained by the Waqf Tribunal – noted that the plaint is liable to be rejected as the Tribunal lacks the mandatory statutory requirement to adjudicate the property's status – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf (2010) 8 SCC 726; Paras 20-50] Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90

Order XXII Rule 4 - Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant

Order XXII Rule 4 – Abatement of Appeal – Substantial Representation of Estate – Suit for Specific Performance – Appeal does not abate if the estate of the deceased party is sufficiently represented by other legal heirs already on record - In the present case, while the vendor (Kishorilal) died during the appeal, all his four legal heirs were initially substituted - Upon the death of one of those heirs (Murarilal), the appeal could not be declared to have abated because the remaining three heirs and the lis pendens transferees (who held the title) remained on record, ensuring the estate was sufficiently represented. [Paras 30 - 40] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48

Order XXI Rule 95 - Delivery of property in occupancy of judgment-debtor

Order 21 Rule 95 CPC - Possession of Auction Purchaser – Supreme Court observed that while Order 21 Rule 95 CPC provides a procedure for an auction purchaser to take possession, if the purchaser actually gains possession and maintains it on the date of the suit's institution, they cannot be denied an injunction against a party with no title who seeks to interfere - Even if a specific issue on possession was not formally framed by the Trial Court, since the parties went to trial fully aware that the issue was central and led evidence accordingly, they cannot later claim prejudice - Held – The High Court erred by not considering the extensive documentary evidence (e.g., revenue records, factory registrations, tax payments) relied upon by the First Appellate Court to establish the appellant's possession - The matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration within the scope of Section 100 CPC. [Relied on Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B. Shama Rao & Ors., (1956) 1 SCC 698; B. Arvind Kumar v. Govt. of India & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 745; Paras 19-25] P. Elaiyappan v. Natarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 219

Order XXI Rule 97 - Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property

Order XXI Rules 97-101 – Execution of Decree – Obstruction by Third Party – Abuse of Process – Re-litigation – Res Judicata – Appellants obtained a decree for specific performance and initiated execution - Respondents 1-3 (third parties) filed objections under Order XXI Rules 99-101 claiming independent title - During the pendency of the specific performance suit, the appellants had also filed separate suits against the same respondents for injunction/possession but allowed those suits to be dismissed for default and failed to restore them - Held: The appellants, having abandoned their earlier independent suits against the respondents for the same subject matter without seeking liberty to file afresh, are precluded from contesting the respondents' rights in execution proceedings - To permit the appellants to reap the benefits of the decree against these respondents through execution, after having failed to pursue direct legal remedies against them, would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and "re-litigation" - The principle of nemo debet bis vexari (no one should be twice troubled for the same cause) applies. [Paras 32-54] Sharada Sanghi v. Asha Agarwal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2026 INSC 292

Order XLI Rule 27 - Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court

Order XLI Rule 27 CPC — Exercise of Judicial Discretion — Noted that power to allow additional evidence is discretionary and must be used sparingly to remove a lacuna in the evidence, not to allow a party to fill gaps in their case at their "leisure or sweet will." - If the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory and reasoned judgment based on the existing record, the provision has no application. [Para 11] Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211 : AIR 2026 SC 1303

Order XLI Rule 27 CPC — Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court — Scope and Conditions Precedent — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence as a matter of right - The provision is couched in negative terms and applies only in three specific contingencies: (a) refusal by the trial court to admit evidence that ought to have been admitted; (aa) the party establishing that despite due diligence, such evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced at the trial stage; or (b) the Appellate Court itself requiring the evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211 : AIR 2026 SC 1303

Company Law

Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 – Rule 3 – Transfer of proceedings to NCLT – Where a "second motion" for a Scheme of Arrangement was pending and not "reserved for orders" at the time the 2016 Rules came into effect (December 15, 2016), the High Court was mandated to transfer the proceedings to the Tribunal - In this case, a second motion filed belatedly in 2009 and left pending for years should have been transferred to the NCLT. Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189 : AIR 2026 SC 1205

Companies Act, 2013; Section 58(3) and Section 433 — Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Condonation of Delay by Company Law Board (CLB) — Applicability of Limitation Act to Quasi-Judicial Bodies - The Supreme Court examined whether the CLB, as a quasi-judicial body, possessed the inherent or statutory power to condone delay in filing an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013, particularly for appeals filed between 12.09.2013 and 01.06.2016 (before the constitution of NCLT/NCLAT) – Held that the settled principle that the Limitation Act, 1963, applies only to "courts" in the traditional sense and not to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals unless expressly extended by statute - While Section 433 of the Act, 2013 now expressly applies the Limitation Act to proceedings before the NCLT and NCLAT, this power cannot be retroactively borrowed to signify a similar power for the erstwhile CLB - held that Section 58(3) is a simpliciter provision prescribing a mandatory limitation period - The absence of peremptory language such as "but not thereafter" does not render the prescribed period merely directory – Held that Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations which saves the inherent power of the CLB would not enable the CLB to extend time for the filing of the appeal or the application itself, as the case may be. [Relied on Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli (1969) 1 SCC 873, Paras 42-44, 69, 70, 90-93, 108, 161] Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2026 INSC 33

Companies Act, 2013 – Section 418A & 419 – Composition of NCLAT Benches – Validity of Technical Member Majority - Supreme Court rejected the challenge to a three-member NCLAT Bench comprising two Technical Members and one Judicial Member - held that while a Bench must have at least one Judicial Member, the current law does not mandate a majority of Judicial Members in larger Benches - Technical and administrative members are not to be treated with "disdain" or labeled lower in status, as their expertise aids in holistic adjudication - A notice is "tricky" if it is artfully framed to mislead or conceal material facts from shareholders - the disclosure of the exit price and the availability of valuation reports at the registered office satisfied the requirements of Section 102. [Relied on: Kaye v. Croydon Tramways & Co. Ltd.; Baillie v. Oriental Telephone and Electric Co. Ltd.; In Re: Cadbury India Limited; Mihir H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. 2014 SCC Online Bom 4934; Paras 18-22, 23-37, 48, 50] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213

Companies Act, 2013 – Section 66 – Reduction of Share Capital – Validity of Selective Reduction and Forced Exit of Minority Shareholders - The Supreme Court upheld the reduction of share capital under Section 66, even if selective and resulting in an involuntary exit of minority shareholders – Held that reduction of share capital is a domestic concern of the company decided by the majority - As long as the procedure is followed and the transaction is not unfair, inequitable, or against public interest, the majority has the right to decide how to carry out the reduction, including extinguishing certain shares while retaining others. [Relied on: Re: Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd.; British and American Trustee and Finance Corporation v. Couper 2005 SCC Online Del 674; Paras 42-47] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213

Companies Act, 2013 – Section 66 – Requirement of Valuation Report – Statutory Interpretation – Held that unlike Sections 62, 230, and 232, Section 66 does not statutorily mandate a valuation report from a registered valuer for the reduction of share capital - The primary safeguards are a special resolution and confirmation by the Tribunal - The absence of a valuation report being sent with the notice does not constitute a "tricky notice" if the fair value and methodology are disclosed or made available for inspection. [Paras 24-37] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213

Companies Act, 2013 — Sections 212(6), 447, 448, 451 — Cognizance of offences involving fraud — Bar on private complaints — Whether a Special Court can take cognizance of offences under Sections 448 (false statement liable to punishment for fraud) and 451 (repeated default) of the Companies Act, 2013 on the basis of a private criminal complaint. Held, an offence under Section 448 is an "offence covered under Section 447" within the meaning of Section 212(6), as it prescribes punishment in terms of fraud as defined and punishable under Section 447. Consequently, the second proviso to Section 212(6) bars the Special Court from taking cognizance of such offences except upon a written complaint by the Director of the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) or an officer authorised in writing by the Central Government. This statutory bar serves as a safeguard against frivolous or motivated complaints by disgruntled shareholders, members, or competitors in corporate disputes. It rejected the contention that the 2015 amendment to Section 212(6) limited the bar solely to the offence under Section 447 itself, holding that offences inextricably linked to fraud (such as under Section 448) attract the same restriction. The ancillary offence under Section 451 was also held to be covered by the bar. However, aggrieved persons are not remediless: they may approach the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 213 for an order directing investigation into the affairs of the company by SFIO, upon satisfying the eligibility criteria under clauses (a) or (b) thereof. (Para 26, 35) Yerram Vijay Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : 2026 INSC 42

Companies Act, 2013 — Sections 212(6), 447, 448, 451 — The case arose from a management dispute in a Hyderabad-based real estate company, where the original promoter (complainant) filed a private complaint alleging that former directors (appellants), after removal, fraudulently convened an EGM, passed forged resolutions, appointed new directors, and filed false Form DIR-12 with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. The Special Court took cognizance of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act and various IPC sections (including 420, 468, etc.). The High Court declined to quash the proceedings, leading to the appeal. Allowing the appeals in part, the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings and cognizance to the extent of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act. The Court directed transfer of the remaining complaint (IPC offences) to the appropriate court having territorial jurisdiction for trial on merits. It set aside the High Court's order. (Para 26, 35) Yerram Vijay Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : 2026 INSC 42

Companies Act, 2013 – Valuation – Discount for Lack of Marketability (DLOM) – Applicability in Unlisted Companies - held that the application of a Discount for Lack of Marketability (DLOM) is a valid accounting principle for valuing shares of unlisted or delisted companies - While DLOM may be declined in court-ordered buyouts involving "oppression," it is applicable in a standard Section 66 reduction where no oppression is proved and the shares lack liquidity - noted that "Fair Value" under Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS 113) is a market-based measurement that accounts for restrictions on sale. [Relied on: Liew Kit Fah v. Koh Keng Chew [2020] 1 SLR 275; Paras 39-45] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213

Company Law – Control and Management – "Head and Brain" Test – In determining the residence and commercial substance of the respondents, the AAR applied the "head and brain" test - It was found that though the companies were incorporated in Mauritius, the real control over transactions exceeding USD 250,000 rested with a non-resident individual in the USA – Held that if the board of directors of a subsidiary is reduced to "puppets" and the steering interference of the parent/owner is such that the subsidiary does not perform activities on its own authority, the corporate veil can be pierced - It held that the AAR's findings on the lack of commercial substance and the centralized control in the USA were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of tax avoidance - the applications for advance rulings were not maintainable. Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Condonation of Delay

Condonation of Delay – Special Leave Petition – Consistent Negligence by Statutory Body – The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) due to an unexplained and "fatal" delay of 235 days - noted a pattern of consistent delay by the DDA, highlighting prior delays of 685 days in filing a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) and 577 days in filing a review petition before the High Court - clarified that a development authority cannot be granted special indulgence or immunity from limitation periods simply by virtue of its status - The explanation provided for the delay was deemed neither satisfactory nor sufficient in law – Noted that that the DDA should implement a robust litigation policy and screening process for cases before filing them belatedly, noting that such actions contribute to "docket explosion" and the unnecessary consumption of judicial time - The petition was dismissed on the grounds of delay with a cost of Rs. 10,000/- to be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within six weeks. Delhi Development Authority v. Shilya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Constitutional Law

Article 12 and Article 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition against a Society – Fiduciary Duty of Government Officers in Governing Bodies – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable against a Society (HEWO) comprising government employees, especially when issues of lack of transparency, unfairness, and unreasonableness in the allotment of housing facilities are raised - Noted that ex-officio members of a Governing Body, who are responsible government officers, must act in a fiduciary capacity for the common good, ensuring fairness, transparency, and accountability while eschewing favoritism, bias, and arbitrariness. [Para 5]. Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163 : AIR 2026 SC 1495

Article 12 – Definition of 'State' – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) - The Supreme Court held that the Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) constitutes 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, writ petitions filed by its employees under Article 226 of the Constitution are maintainable - Key Determinants for Article 12 Status – Supreme Court observed that while no single test is exhaustive, the cumulative effect of the following factors established AFGIS as an instrumentality of the State - i. Deep and Pervasive Control - The Society was established with the sanction of the President of India, who also approved its deputation rules; ii. Administrative Dominance - The Board of Trustees and Managing Committee consist entirely of serving senior officers of the Indian Air Force (IAF); iii. Compulsory Nature - Membership and premium deductions are mandatory for all IAF personnel as an integral part of their service conditions, leaving no choice to the individual; iv. Public Function - The Society performs a public duty by providing insurance and welfare to armed forces personnel, which is a core government function linked to national sovereignty and security; v. Self-Representation - The Society had previously represented itself as 'Government' to seek exemptions from service tax under the Finance Act, 1994 – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111; Paras 15-19] Ravi Khokhar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2026 INSC 233

Article 14 — Admission to Medical Courses — Sports Quota — Change in Rules after commencement of process — Transparency and Fair Play — The Supreme Court quashed the Punjab Government's decision to expand the "zone of consideration" for sports achievements from Classes XI & XII to include Classes IX & X for MBBS/BDS admissions - Granted — To avoid unsettling admissions of third parties not before the Court, the relief was restricted to the appellants – directed that the appellants are to be accommodated in government medical college seats previously allotted to Respondents 4 and 5, while the respondents are to be moved to the seats vacated by the appellants in a private medical college. Divjot Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : 2026 INSC 26

Articles 14 and 16 - Retrospective Application of Recruitment Rules — Change in the "Rules of the Game" — The Supreme Court set aside the retrospective application of the Bihar Engineering Service Class-II Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 2022, which introduced a 25% weightage for contractual work experience after the selection process (written examination and provisional merit list) had already commenced under the 2019 Rules – Supreme Court laid down key legal principles – i. Recruitment Process Sanctity: Eligibility criteria notified at the start of a recruitment process cannot be changed midway unless the extant rules or the advertisement explicitly permit such changes; ii. Vested Rights vs. Selection Criteria: While the State has the power to legislate retrospectively under Article 309, this power cannot be used to arbitrarily disrupt a selection process or alter the "eligibility criteria for being placed in the merit list" once the "game" has already been played; iii. Executive Instructions vs. Statutory Rules: The State cannot rely on executive memos (2018 and 2021) to override statutory recruitment rules that were in force at the time of the advertisement, particularly to the detriment of candidates who had no prior notice of such weightage - Supreme Court directed the State to finalize appointments based on the original merit lists from June/July 2022, strictly following the unamended 2019 Rules, within two months. [Relied on Tej Prakash Pathak and Others v. Rajasthan High Court and Others, (2025) 2 SCC 1; K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (2008) 3 SCC 512; Paras 25-45] Abhay Kumar Patel v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : 2026 INSC 24

Article 14 and 16 — Regularization of Service — Model Employer — The Supreme Court set aside the Jharkhand High Court's refusal to regularize contractual employees who had served for over a decade in sanctioned posts - held that the State, as a "model employer," cannot exploit the unequal bargaining power of employees by keeping them in perpetual contractual roles to evade regular employment obligations - Abruptly discontinuing long-serving employees solely based on "contractual nomenclature" without a speaking order is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99

Article 14 – Discrimination – noted that the respondents failed to show that any similarly situated candidates (those admitted after the 2010-11 session) were given direct appointments - noted that the last direct appointments (made in 2015) were pursuant to Court orders and limited to batches admitted prior to the 2011 policy change - Noted that the Uttar Pradesh Ayush Department (Ayurved) Nursing Service Rules, 2021 now govern the post, and recruitment must be conducted through the UPSSSC to select the most meritorious candidates. [Relied on Sivanandan C T and Others vs. High Court of Kerala and Others (2023 INSC 709; Paras 19-27] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38

Article 14 — Manifest Arbitrariness — Executive memoranda issued by the State that departed from the AICPI-linked formula stipulated in the ROPA Rules without an independent study or rational basis were held to be "manifestly arbitrary" - Noted that State action must be governed by reason and the "lacking in reasoned principle" prong of manifest arbitrariness applies when a State ignores its own statutory stipulations. State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123 : AIR 2026 SC 1213

Article 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 – Unconstitutionality – Held: The impugned Act, which provides for the complete takeover of the management and assets of a private trust-run institution (Sinha Library) without a principled framework for compensation or a demonstration of mismanagement, is "manifestly arbitrary" - The State cannot use its legislative power to single out a specific institution for takeover without an intelligible basis or fair process - The Act fails the test of reasonableness and non-confiscatory nature required under Article 300A. Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2026 INSC 219

Article 14 — Substantive Equality — The principle of substantive equality requires the State to remedy structural, institutional, and systemic disadvantages - Mere equal treatment is insufficient when individuals are placed in unequal positions due to biological, social, or economic factors. Inaccessibility of MHM measures converts a biological reality into a structural exclusion, violating the right to participate in education on equal terms. [Paras 41- 65] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Articles 14, 15(3), 21, and 21A — Right to Education and Menstrual Health — The Supreme Court held that the right to education is a "multiplier right" that enables the exercise of other human rights and forms an integral part of the right to life and human dignity - Noted that inaccessibility to Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) measures including clean gender-segregated toilets, sanitary napkins, and safe disposal mechanisms constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights of adolescent girl students. [Paras 20-40] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Articles 14, 21, and 41 – Directive Principles of State Policy – Article 142 of the Constitution – Supreme Court noted that Fundamental Rights (Part III) and Directive Principles (Part IV) are "two wheels of a chariot," where the principles of Article 39(a) (right to livelihood) and Article 41 (right to work in cases of disablement) must guide the interpretation of fundamental rights - The right to work is recognized as a precious liberty that enables a person to live with dignity beyond "mere animal existence." – Exercising its power to do complete justice, directed the creation of a supernumerary post for the appellant at North Eastern Coalfields CIL - The employer was directed to provide "reasonable accommodation" in the form of a suitable desk job with a computer and keyboard designed as per "universal design" under Section 2(ze) of the RPwD Act. [Relied on Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India; 2024 INSC 775; Anmol v. Union of India 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387; Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130; Rajive Raturi v. Union of India 2024 16 SCC 654; Paras 13- 24] Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53 : AIR 2026 SC 454

Articles 14 and 21 - Classifying widowed daughters-in-law based solely on the timing of their husband's death (before or after the father-in-law) is arbitrary and lacks a rational nexus with the Act's object of securing maintenance for vulnerable dependants - Denying maintenance on such technical grounds would expose them to destitution, violating the right to life with dignity under Article 21 - Section 19 casts a personal obligation on the father-in-law to maintain his daughter-in-law during his lifetime - Section 22 creates an obligation on the heirs of the deceased to maintain dependants out of the estate - A claim under Section 22 arises only after the death of the father-in-law – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011) 4 SCC 266; Vinod Kumar v. DM, Mau (2023) 19 SCC 126; Paras 16-28] Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2026 INSC 54

Articles 14 and 21 – Environmental Law – Precautionary Principle – Sustainable Development – Validity of Industrial Reclassification – The Supreme Court quashed the Central Pollution Control Board's (CPCB) January 2025 revised industrial categorization which downgraded "stand-alone cement grinding units without Captive Power Plants (CPP)" from 'Red' to 'Orange' category - Held: A regulatory downgrade that weakens environmental protection must bear a rational nexus to the object of safeguarding life and health - In the absence of proportionate and scientifically substantiated justification, such dilution is arbitrary and infringes the right to a clean and healthy environment under Article 21. [Paras 58, 65, 66] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Articles 14 and 21 – Judicial Review of Executive Policy – Separation of Powers – While acknowledging the executive's competence in drafting health policies, Supreme Court maintained that the separation of powers cannot prevent judicial intervention when fundamental rights are violated due to the absence of a structured relief framework in exceptional circumstances. Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218

Article 16 – Recruitment Process – Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidate – Estoppel – All India Council for Technical Education (Career Advancement Scheme for the Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions) (Degree) Regulations, 2012 – Scope and Applicability – Direct Recruitment vs. Career Progression - Held that it is a settled principle that a candidate who participated in the selection process without protest cannot challenge the "rules of the game" after being declared unsuccessful – Noted that the respondent participated in the interview held on 17.12.2015, secured 28 marks against the qualifying 45, and only challenged the process after failing to secure a recommendation – Held that to apply AICTE Regulations to a candidate participating in recruitment for the post of Professors in the Engineering Colleges in the State conducted by the Commission under State Rules framed by the State, would be to stretch the AICTE Regulations beyond its text, context, and purpose - The law does not permit a regulation crafted as a ladder to be used as a gate – Held that the AICTE Regulations do not apply to the process of direct recruitment under the State Rules - The AICTE Regulations of 2012 are not "Recruitment Rules" but are "Promotion and Progression Rules" - They apply to individuals already within the institutional framework (incumbents or newly appointed staff) for the purpose of career advancement - Suitability for a post determined by a committee of experts does not warrant interference in the exercise of powers of judicial review – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Anupal Singh & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 173; Paras 13 – 18] Gujarat Public Service Commission v. Gnaneshwary Dushyantkumar Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : 2026 INSC 70

Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression – Article 19(2) – Reasonable Restrictions – Cinematograph Act, 1952 – Film Certification – Judicial Interference – Petition filed seeking to restrain the release of the film "Ghooskhor Pandat," alleging offensive stereotyping against the Brahmin community - The Respondent/Producer filed an affidavit unequivocally withdrawing the title and undertaking that any new title would not be evocative of the earlier one - Supreme Court disposed of the petition, noting that the grievances were suitably addressed by this undertaking. Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193

Article 19(1)(c) – Right to Form Associations – Regulatory Control over Sports Bodies –The Supreme Court reaffirmed that while the right to form an association includes its continued existence with its original voluntary composition, it does not extend to an uninhibited right to pursue goals free from regulatory control - So long as the initial voluntary composition remains unaffected, regulatory measures do not violate Article 19(1)(c). Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 - Right to Property and Burden of Proof – i. Burden of Proof - In cases alleging fundamental rights violations, the initial burden lies on the petitioner to establish the existence and invasion of such rights; ii. Title over Land - held that the petitioner failed to prove that Mizo Chiefs were absolute owners of the land under the British regime - Documents (boundary papers) suggested they functioned as administrative heads rather than proprietary owners; iii. Privy Purses - rejected the plea of discrimination comparing Mizo Chiefs to rulers of Princely States, noting that privy purses were outcomes of specific pre-constitutional contractual arrangements and not a legally enforceable fundamental right - the petitioner failed to establish a clear title to the lands or a specific breach of fundamental rights under the erstwhile Articles 19(1)(f) and 31, the petition was dismissed. [Relied on Tilokchand and Motichand & Ors v. H.B. Munshi & Anr (1969) 1 SCC 110; Rabindranath Bose & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (1970) 1 SCC 84; Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors vs Union of India & Ors (2015) 3 SCC 1; G.P. Doval & Ors v. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. (1984) 4 SCC 329; Paras 27-64] Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Article 20(3) – Right Against Self-Incrimination – Anticipatory Bail – NDPS Act – Held that State cannot insist that an accused hand over his mobile phone as a condition for "cooperating with the investigation" if doing so forces the accused to incriminate himself - The Supreme Court held that while an appellant must join the investigation, the obligation to cooperate does not extend to a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Vinay Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 180

Article 21A and Article 23 – Right to Education and Prohibition of Forced Labour – Contractual Teachers – Honorarium Revision – The Supreme Court held that part-time contractual instructors appointed under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (now Samagra Shiksha Scheme) in Upper Primary Schools are entitled to periodic revision of their honorarium – Noted that keeping such teachers on a stagnant, meager honorarium (initially ₹7,000/-) for over a decade, while prohibiting them from taking other employment, amounts to "economic coercion" and "forced labour" (Begar) prohibited under Article 23. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Article 21 – Right to Life and Dignity – The guarantee of life and personal dignity extends beyond prison gates; incarceration must not degenerate into inhumanity - Convicts are not denuded of all fundamental rights by mere reason of conviction. OCIs, based on trust and self-discipline, align with the constitutional vision of viewing prisons as institutions of correction and social reintegration - Exclusion of women prisoners from OCIs in several states (e.g., Assam, Gujarat, UP, West Bengal) or failing to transfer eligible women constitutes blatant gender discrimination - States directed to develop gender-sensitive protocols to ensure women have equal access to reformative facilities. Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198

Article 21 – Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right to a clean and healthy environment is an inseparable part of the Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21 – Held that the State has an affirmative duty to protect the environment to ensure the well-being of all citizens, noting that the time is ripe for the rigorous implementation of this constitutional guarantee. Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182

Article 21 – Right to Die with Dignity – Passive Euthanasia – Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment – Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) – Supreme Court allowed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, specifically CANH administered through a PEG tube, for a patient in an irreversible Permanent Vegetative State (PVS) for over 12 years - Held: The right to live with dignity under Article 21 includes the right to die with dignity - In cases where medical treatment is futile and serves no therapeutic purpose other than artificially prolonging a mindless biological existence, its withdrawal is constitutionally permissible. [Paras 29, 52, 72, 91] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Article 21 — Right to Dignity, Privacy, and Health — The right to life includes the right to a dignified existence and the right to menstrual health - Dignity is undermined when girl children are subjected to stigma or compelled to adopt unsafe practices due to a lack of facilities - Privacy is a concomitant of dignity, imposing a positive obligation on the State to facilitate a private space for menstrual management. [Paras 70 -80, 85 – 96] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Article 21 – Right to Life and Health – COVID-19 Vaccination – Adverse Events Following Immunization (AEFI) – Compensation Policy – The Supreme Court directed the Union of India to formulate a "no-fault" compensation framework for serious adverse events or deaths resulting from COVID-19 vaccinations - held that while the state-led vaccination program was a vital public health intervention, the State bears a positive obligation under Article 21 to ensure that families suffering grave harm are not left without an accessible mechanism for redress. Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218

Article 32, 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e), and 19(1)(g) – Judicial Service – Migration to another State Service – Right to Profession – Petitioners, serving as Civil Judges in Uttarakhand, sought permission to join the Delhi Judicial Service after being declared successful in the recruitment examination - The High Court of Uttarakhand rejected their request, citing concerns over judicial vacancies and the impact on the litigant public - Held: The interest of the individual officers to advance their careers has an overriding effect over the administrative concerns of the parent High Court regarding vacancies - Denial of such permission results in "negativity, frustration," and a violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution - The Supreme Court directed the High Court of Uttarakhand to pass orders for the cessation of their services to enable them to join the Delhi Judicial Service by the stipulated deadline - Supreme Court clarified that while the petitioners' joining was delayed due to the pending legal challenge, their seniority in the Delhi Judicial Service must be maintained as per their original position in the Select List - held that permission cannot be denied to a judicial officer to join the service of another State merely on the ground that migration will give rise to vacancies in the first State - The delay caused by the litigation shall not adversely affect their merit-based seniority – Petition allowed. [Paras 13-18] Anubhuti Goel v. High Court of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 67

Article 32 and Article 14 – Declaration of Public Holidays – Judicial Review of Policy Decisions – Writ petition seeking directions to the Union and State governments to frame uniform guidelines for declaring public/gazetted holidays and to declare Guru Gobind Singh's 'Prakash Parv' as a nationwide gazetted holiday - Held: Dismissing the petition, the Court observed that the declaration of public holidays is a policy decision involving administrative efficiency, economic implications, and the balancing of diverse socio-cultural practices – Noted that i. Executive Domain: Matters of policy determination regarding governance and administrative exigencies lie within the exclusive domain of the executive. Any judicial mandate to increase non-working days involves a line-drawing exercise that is inherently policy-driven and not amenable to judicial determination; ii. Article 14 (Equality): The absence of a uniform policy does not amount to discrimination under Article 14. Absolute uniformity is not mandated where differentiation is founded on rational considerations, such as regional socio-cultural needs in a federal structure; iii. Article 25 (Religious Freedom): Freedom of religion does not extend to a right to seek State recognition of a religious occasion in the form of a compulsory nationwide public holiday; iv. Administrative Impact: Expanding the list of gazetted holidays would adversely impact governance and public productivity - In a developing nation, the focus must remain on the dignity of labor and continuity of work; v. Floodgates Argument: Granting such relief would open the floodgates to similar claims from diverse sections of society, leading to an impractical expansion of holidays; vi. Legacy of Guru Gobind Singh Ji: Supreme Court recorded deep reverence for the Tenth Guru, noting that his teachings of 'Kirat Karo' (honest living) and 'Vand Chakko' (sharing) emphasize active engagement with responsibilities - His legacy is best honored through the dedicated performance of duties rather than a symbolic show of respect by demanding a holiday. [Paras 11-18] All India Shiromani Singh Sabha v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : 2026 INSC 289

Article 32 and Article 21 – Right to Legal Representation and Personal Liberty – Transfer of Criminal Case – The Supreme Court deprecated the acts of hooliganism and violence by the District Bar Association, Barabanki, where members passed a resolution to not represent the accused and physically assaulted the office of an advocate who filed a bail application - held that the denial of bail for over two months in a case arising from a trivial scuffle at a toll plaza was unjustified and violative of Article 21 – Noted that denial of bail to the petitioners and the curtailment of their liberty for a period exceeding two months is absolutely unjustified and violative of the Fundamental Right of Liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India warranting exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article 32 of the Constitution of India - To ensure a fair trial and proper legal representation - the Supreme Court directed the immediate release of the petitioners on bail and transferred the proceedings from Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh, to Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi. Vishvjeet v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2026 INSC 254

Article 32 – Enforcement of Fundamental Rights – Abuse of Criminal Process – Successive FIRs – The Supreme Court allowed a Writ Petition where the State registered multiple FIRs in quick succession to ensure the petitioner remained in custody despite being granted bail in earlier matters – Noted that such conduct by the prosecution established a conscious effort to keep the petitioner incarcerated, amounting to a violation of personal liberty. Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Article 32 – Powers of the Supreme Court – Article 32 is the "heart and soul" of the Constitution as it empowers citizens to directly approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights – Noted that it will not readily refuse to hear a petition under Article 32 if a violation of a fundamental right is prima facie established. Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Article 32 – Writ Jurisdiction – Principles of Natural Justice – Doctrine of Bias – Selection Process – Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) – Bias and Malafides in Service Matters - The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the SCSC's decision to reject the petitioner's candidature - held that the inclusion of an officer as a member of the selection committee who had been personally arraigned as a contemnor by the candidate in the same dispute violates the principles of natural justice - Such participation creates a "reasonable apprehension of bias" in the mind of the candidate, rendering the decision-making process vulnerable and a nullity, regardless of whether actual bias is proven – Noted that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done, and authorities must appear to act fairly to preserve public confidence in the impartiality of the selection process – Supreme Court directed the DoPT to convene a fresh SCSC meeting within four weeks, excluding "the Officer" in question, and imposed costs of Rs. 5 lakhs on the respondents for "rank procrastination" and "deliberate obstacles" bordering on vendetta. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta, (2013) 3 SCC 1; A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262; S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P., (1974) 3 SCC 459; Paras 41-46] Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2026 INSC 101

Article 32 – Writ Jurisdiction vs. High Court Administration – While the Supreme Court does not ordinarily function as a supervisory forum over the day-to-day administration or rosters of High Courts, it may intervene in "rare and exceptional situations" where continuing inaction results in a demonstrable infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 – Supreme Court noted that pending revisions must be decided by giving full effect to the legal and constitutional observations of the Supreme Court - The failure to implement specific directions regarding the re-evaluation of withdrawal of prosecution (Section 321 CrPC) implicated the credibility of the criminal process. [Paras 3-9] Jaideep Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Article 32 – Writ Petition – Delay and Laches – Right to Property – Writ petition filed by Mizo Chief Council seeking compensation for lands allegedly acquired without due process in 1954-55 - Respondents raised preliminary objection regarding inordinate delay of nearly six decades - The Supreme Court reiterated that while Article 32 is a fundamental right, it is not immune from general principles of law and reasonable procedure - Petitions agitating stale claims ought not to be entertained to prevent disturbing settled positions and causing prejudice to third parties - Supreme Court clarified that the operative test is not "unreasonable delay" but "unexplained delay. Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Article 32 – Writ Petition – Domestic Workers' Rights – Minimum Wages – Separation of Powers – Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus declaring that domestic workers have a fundamental right to minimum wages under Articles 21 and 23 and challenging their exclusion from the Minimum Wages Act and Code of Wages, 2019 - Held: Supreme Court declined to issue a positive mandamus for the enactment of law, emphasizing the doctrine of separation of powers - While acknowledging the vulnerable status of domestic workers and the lack of legislative protection, noted that an enforceable decree cannot be passed if it requires the legislature to enact a specific law - Supreme Court impressed upon State Governments to consider the grievances highlighted by the petitioners and urged the development of suitable mechanisms to prevent exploitation and ensure minimum wages. [Relied on Ajay Malik vs. State of Uttarakhand and another [(2025) INSC 118]; Paras 2-8] Penn Thozhilalargal Sangam v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 124

Article 32 – Writ Petition seeking directions regarding alleged violations of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) – Import of animals by private facilities – Legality of CITES permits – Held: The subject matter was previously examined by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) in W.P. (C) No. 783 of 2025, which found no violation of domestic or international law - The CITES Secretarial Document relied upon by the petitioner explicitly records that no evidence was found regarding imports without requisite documentation or for commercial purposes - Once an import is effected under valid permission, it cannot be subsequently treated as prohibited merely because objections are raised later - Disturbing the settled environment, custody, and care of living animals (including rescued animals) after lawful import may itself result in cruelty. [Relied on East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Vs. The Collector of Customs, 1962 AIR 1893; Paras 2-5] Karanartham Viramah Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 266

Article 39(b) – Public Trust Doctrine – Spectrum as a Natural Resource – Spectrum is a finite, scarce, and renewable natural resource - The State holds spectrum in trust for the people and is constitutionally obligated to ensure its distribution subserves the common good and generates adequate compensation for the public - The grant of a license is a "State largesse" and does not result in the transfer of proprietary interest or ownership to private entities. [Paras 15, 16, 33] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Articles 48A, 51A(g), 226, and 32 – Environmental Law – Protection of Reserved Forests – Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants – Due Process – Rule of Law – The Supreme Court addressed the State's obligation to protect reserved forests while balancing the rights of long-standing human habitations - Noted that while forests are vital ecological systems and carbon sinks, and the State has a constitutional mandate to safeguard them, such protection must be pursued through lawful, non-arbitrary means. Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140 : AIR 2026 SC 933

Articles 51A and 51A(e) – Fraternity and Constitutional Duty – Supreme Court noted that fraternity is a guiding philosophy of the Constitution - It is the fundamental duty of every citizen to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood - Vilifying or denigrating any community based on religion, language, caste, or region is constitutionally impermissible. [Para 11-14] Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193

Article 91 – Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3(1) – Competence of Deputy Chairman – Held that the office of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha is vacant, the Deputy Chairman is constitutionally mandated under Article 91(1) to perform all duties of the office - The statutory powers vested in the "Chairman" under Section 3 of the Inquiry Act are inseparable from the office of the Presiding Officer and must be read in harmony with the Constitutional scheme - the Deputy Chairman is competent to consider a notice of motion and exercise discretion to admit or refuse it under Section 3(1) of the Act. [Paras 17 - 22] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Article 136 – Concurrent Findings of Fact – The Supreme Court reiterated that its jurisdiction under Article 136 should be exercised sparingly, particularly when dealing with concurrent findings of fact from the courts below - Interference is only warranted if such findings are "manifestly perverse" - In this case, the findings of the First Appellate Court and the High Court in favor of the Respondents were found to be legally sound and based on a careful appreciation of the factual matrix – Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16 - 24] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191

Article 136 — Scope of Interference — Contract Law — Unconscionable Agreements — "Lion and Lamb" Analogy - While the Court is cautious with concurrent findings, it can interfere under Article 136 if findings are perverse, disregard statutory provisions, or result in substantial and grave injustice – Noted that an appellant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances for such review - Where a "mighty" State (the lion) contracts with an individual job seeker (the lamb), the inequality is structural - Clauses barring claims for regularization in such standard-form contracts are unconscionable if the employee had no meaningful choice but to "sign on the dotted line." - Acceptance of such terms does not amount to a waiver of fundamental rights - Continuous service for over a decade, supported by repeated extensions and satisfactory performance, nurtures a legitimate expectation of recognition - The bar against this doctrine for contractual workers only applies if the initial appointment lacked a proper selection process - directed the respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed - The appellants shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits accruing from the date of this judgment. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1; Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) 3 SCC 156; Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC 545; Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma (2024) 16 SCC 598; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 11-14] Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99

Article 139A(1) – Withdrawal of cases from High Court – Substantial questions of general importance – Stagnation of Trial – Failure to pronounce judgment after reserving it – The Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary power under Article 139A(1) to withdraw three criminal revision petitions pending before the Allahabad High Court to itself – Noted that the revisions had been heard and judgment reserved on 05.02.2020, but no judgment had been pronounced for several years - The continuing stay on trial proceedings arising from a 1994 incident resulted in a "standstill" of the criminal process for decades, infringing upon the right to speedy justice. Jaideep Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Precedent – Nature of Orders – Article 141 – that the High Court relied on Ram Naresh Singh v. Bokaro Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017) as a binding precedent to direct the release of gratuity with only nominal rent deductions - Held: The order in Ram Naresh Singh was passed on grounds of equity in specific facts and did not purport to lay down a binding precedent - An order passed on facts cannot be elevated to the status of a precedent by operation of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. [Para 17] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown – Exercise of Extraordinary Jurisdiction despite opposition by one spouse - The Supreme Court dissolved a marriage that had lasted only 65 days of cohabitation followed by over a decade of separation and excessive litigation - held that where a marriage is wrecked beyond salvage, maintaining a formal legal relationship is unjustified and the Court can exercise its power under Article 142 to do "complete justice," even if one spouse opposes the divorce. Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2026 INSC 73

Article 142 – Gender Equality in Armed Forces – Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Women Officers (SSCWOs) – Assessment of Merit – Casual Grading of ACRs – The Supreme Court held that the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of women officers commissioned between 2010 and 2012 were authored under the systemic assumption that they were ineligible for career progression beyond 14 years - This institutional mindset resulted in "middling" or "average" grades being assigned to women while "outstanding" grades were reserved for male counterparts whose future depended on them - Supreme Court observed that such a structural disadvantage, embedded in years of service assessments, cannot be neutralized by mere procedural safeguards like anonymization of data at the final evaluation stage. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Article 142 — Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage — Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees — Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had dismissed a divorce petition in India on the grounds of a pre-existing US divorce decree - held that the foreign decree was not binding as it was granted on a ground (irretrievable breakdown) not recognized under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the husband had not effectively submitted to the foreign jurisdiction - Exercising its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court granted a decree of divorce to bring a quietus to the 18-year-long separation - Key Legal Points – i. Non-Binding Nature of Foreign Decrees: A foreign decree of divorce is not conclusive or binding if it is granted on grounds not available under the matrimonial law governing the parties (in this case, the Hindu Marriage Act) and where the opposite party did not voluntarily or effectively submit to the foreign court's jurisdiction; ii. Effective Participation: Mere service of summons or filing a jurisdictional objection by post does not constitute "effective participation" or "voluntary submission" to a foreign forum - Principles of natural justice require a meaningful opportunity to contest the proceedings; iii. Article 142 Power: Where a marriage has irretrievably broken down and parties have been separated for a prolonged period (nearly 18 years), the Supreme Court can exercise its plenary power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage directly to ensure justice. [Relied on Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi (1991) 3 SCC 451; Paras 8-11] Kishorekumar Mohan Kale v. Kashmira Kale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 259

Article 142 – Restoration of Withdrawn Petitions – National Highways Act, 1956 – Sections 3G and 3J – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 – The Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to set aside an order of the Trial Court, which had allowed land owners to withdraw their Section 34 petitions following a High Court judgment declaring Sections 3G and 3J of the National Highways Act unconstitutional - noted that since the High Court's judgment was subsequently stayed, the land owners were left "remediless" as fresh petitions would be barred by limitation under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act - Supreme Court has raised concerns over the deep structural flaws in determining the land acquisition compensation acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956. The Court said that land owners whose lands were acquired under the 1956 Act faces significant disadvantage when compared to land owners whose lands were acquired under different laws. [Para 1-3] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Article 226(3) – Vacation of Interim Orders – Mandatory Timeline for Disposal – Special Leave Petition filed against an interim order of status quo – Petitioner submitted that an application for vacating the interim order had been pending since January 2025 – Held, Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India mandates that upon an application for vacating an interim order being filed, the High Court is required to dispose of the same within a period of two weeks – In light of this provision, the Supreme Court requested the High Court to take up and dispose of the pending application on its own merits. [Paras 3, 4] Giriraj v. Mohd. Amir, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 66

Article 226 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 528 — Quashing of FIR — Duty of High Court to Decide on Merits - The Supreme Court held that when a petitioner seeks the quashing of an FIR, the High Court must consider the merits of the challenge based on available material and applicable law, rather than disposing of the petition with general directions to follow arrest guidelines or concluding it without addressing the underlying grievance - Once jurisdiction for quashing is invoked, the High Court should decide the matter "one way or the other" on its merits. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948; Paras 5-8] Md. Mashood v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2026 INSC 259

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Disputed Questions of Fact and Delay – Held that High Court erred in entertaining a writ petition filed in 2015 challenging construction activities that commenced in 2002 and were completed by 2007-2008 - Held: Gross delay in approaching the Court disentitles a petitioner to discretionary relief under Article 226 – Noted that in writ proceedings decided on affidavits, the burden of proof lies on the petitioner to specifically plead and substantiate facts with cogent material; mere abstract points of law without evidence are insufficient. [Paras 66 - 70] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Interim Relief – Alternative Remedy – The Supreme Court reiterated that once a High Court declines to entertain a writ petition on the ground of an available efficacious alternative remedy, it cannot pass interim orders (such as a stay or status quo) to operate until the petitioner approaches the alternative forum - Order – Interim relief can only be granted in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief available upon the final determination of rights - It is impermissible for a High Court to grant interim relief as the "only and final relief" while simultaneously declining to decide on the merits of the case or the rights of the parties. Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2026 INSC 185

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Rejection of Writ Petition at the threshold on technical office objections – Sustainability of – High Court rejected a writ petition arising under the SARFAESI Act based on Registry objections regarding prayer revision, multiple reliefs in a single prayer, and joinder of parties – Held that the High Court erred in sustaining these technical objections to "nip a proceeding in the bud" - When fraud and collusion are alleged specifically regarding the conduct of a Commissioner appointed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act; the court must remember the maxim "fraus omnia corrumpit" (fraud unravels everything) - Allegations of fraud should not be buried without an examination of merits due to mere technicalities. Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84

Article 227 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order VII Rule 11 and Order VI Rule 16 — Supervisory Jurisdiction vs. Statutory Remedy — The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot invoke its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to strike off a plaint when a specific statutory remedy for rejection of the plaint exists under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC - The existence of an alternative remedy under the CPC acts as a "near total bar" against the exercise of powers under Article 227 - Noted that Order VI Rule 16, which pertains to striking out specific "pleadings" (parts or sections), cannot be utilized as a tool to strike down an entire plaint - Supervisory power is intended to keep subordinate courts within their bounds, not to serve as an "appeal in disguise" or to circumvent statutory law - Key Principles held – i. Alternative Remedy as a Bar - Where a specific remedy is provided under the CPC, the High Court should, as a matter of discipline and prudence, desist from exercising its power of superintendence; ii. Factual Inquiry - Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 often requires factual inquiries (e.g., disclosure of cause of action, valuation disputes) which are inappropriate for summary determination under Article 227; iii. Scope of Order VI Rule 16 - This provision is for removing unnecessary, scandalous, or vexatious matters within a pleading, not for the wholesale dismissal of a suit – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 32; Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai vs. Tuticorin Educational Society (2019) 9 SCC 538; Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423; State vs. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641; Paras 6-11] P. Suresh v. D. Kalaivani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 116 : 2026 INSC 121

Article 227 – Supervisory Jurisdiction – Interference with Interlocutory Orders – Held: While the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory and it should generally not intervene in interlocutory orders like impleadment, the Supreme Court will not restore an incorrect Trial Court order if the High Court has rightly interfered to prevent an illegality – Held that an impleadment application filed nearly nine years after acquiring knowledge of the suit (as evidenced by the applicant's seal on the original summons) is liable to be rejected on the ground of silence and delay. [Relied on Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524; Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733; Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417; Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384; Paras 33-44] Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 5 : 2026 INSC 8

Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction — The jurisdiction under Article 227 is not an appellate jurisdiction in disguise and does not permit the reappreciation of evidence – Held that the High Court was not justified in dislodging concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court to refer a dispute to arbitration when the existence of the agreement was under serious doubt. [Relied on: Managing Director Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation Limited v. Sanjay Kumar, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1604; Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 713; Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar, (2019) 8 SCC 710; A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Others, (2016) 10 SCC 386; Paras 16- 23] Rajia Begum v. Barnali Mukherjee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : 2026 INSC 106

Article 233(2) – Eligibility of Judicial Officers for District Judge Recruitment – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion – Practice Requirement - Held: In-service judicial officers are eligible for appointment as District Judges through direct recruitment - Their past service as a judicial officer must be counted toward the minimum practice requirement of seven years as stipulated under Article 233(2) - Categories of Relief held – i. Category A (Appointed but Reverted): Officers whose appointments were reversed due to an erroneous interpretation of law are deemed to have continued in service without a break - They are entitled to seniority and notional pay fixation but no arrears of pay; ii. Category B (Selected but not Formally Appointed): Selected candidates whose appointments were stalled by judicial intervention must be immediately offered appointments, subject to vacancy availability. Seniority will be determined by a committee of three senior High Court judges; iii. Category C & D (Ongoing or Future Selection): Officers currently in the selection process or seeking to participate must be treated as eligible; iv. Age Relaxation: Candidates who crossed the age limit while erroneously considered ineligible are granted a one-time relaxation to participate in the next selection process; v. Cadre Management: All officers benefiting from these directions shall be treated as District Judges appointed through direct recruitment. [Overruled Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, (2020) 7 SCC 401; Paras 5-22] Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 306

Article 309 – Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 (as amended in 2024) – Rule 6(1) – Validity of Minimum Qualification – The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Rule 6(1) and the "Note" in Appendix-I of the Cadre Rules, which prescribes Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy - It is the exclusive prerogative of the State, as an employer, to determine the most suitable qualifications for public posts based on its independent assessment - The power of judicial review is limited and cannot be used to rewrite service rules, determine equivalence of qualifications, or substitute the Court's assessment for that of the employer – Appeal dismissed. MD. Firoz Mansuri v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2026 INSC 68

Article 311(2)(b) – Dismissal from service without departmental inquiry – Scope of "Reasonably Practicable" – Requirement of Objective Satisfaction – The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal of a Delhi Police Constable, holding that the power to dispense with a regular departmental inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) cannot be exercised based on mere "assumptions and conjectures" - Supreme Court noted that the disciplinary authority must record satisfaction based on independent material showing that holding an inquiry is not "reasonably practicable" - Key Observations held – i. Judicial Review and Satisfaction - The finality given to the disciplinary authority's decision under Article 311(3) is not binding on the Courts - The scope of judicial review is open to strike down orders dispensing with an inquiry if the reasons are irrelevant, arbitrary, or lack a factual basis – Held that court must consider whether a "reasonable man acting in a reasonable way" would have reached the same conclusion in the prevailing situation; ii. Absence of Material Evidence: In the present case, the Preliminary Inquiry (PE) report failed to record any specific instances of the appellant who was in custody at the time—threatening or intimidating witnesses - The Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) relied on the ACP's "presumption" of potential witness tampering without any supporting material, which the Court deemed a failure of application of mind; iii. Custody as a Factor: It was incumbent upon the authority to demonstrate how the appellant, while in jail, posed a threat that made an inquiry "not reasonably practicable"; iv. Adherence to Circulars: noted that the Delhi Police's own circulars (dated 31.12.1998 and 11.09.2007) mandate that Article 311(2)(b) should not be used as a "short cut" and requires "cogent and legally tenable reasons". [Relied on Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398; Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 36; Paras 23-40] Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2026 INSC 234

Mitigating Factors for Delay - Supreme Court observed that delay is not a rigid rule of law but a flexible rule of practice guided by judicial discretion - In the present case, Supreme Court declined to dismiss the petition at the threshold despite a 60-year delay due to: i. The unique historical trajectory and political insurgency in Mizoram; ii. Continuous agitation of claims by the Chiefs before various forums; iii. Official assurances and conduct of the State Government that engendered a legitimate expectation of an amicable resolution, thereby dissuading immediate litigation. Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Standards for Judging Film Content – "The Ordinary Reasonable Man" – The effect of words or expressions in a movie must be judged by the standards of "reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men," and not by those of weak or hypersensitive minds – Noted that the "man on the top of a Clapham omnibus" standard - Freedom of expression cannot be held to ransom by an intolerant group of people – Noted that if the rights of artists were subjected to popular notions of what is acceptable, the constitutional guarantee would be rendered illusory - Once a competent statutory Board grants a certificate, no individual or group can create disturbances in the exhibition of the film - Courts must be at the forefront to zealously protect the freedom of speech and expression, even if Judges personally dislike the spoken or written words. [Para 19, 22-24, 32-34] Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193

Construction of Documents

Construction of Documents — Literal Rule vs. Purposive Construction — Supreme Court emphasized that a contract must first be constructed in its plain, ordinary, and literal meaning - If the words are clear, the intention of the parties must be derived directly from the text. Reliance on the ex-post facto conduct of parties (such as the lessor continuing to occupy a portion not demised) is unnecessary and improper when the literal expression is unambiguous – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262; Paras 15-21] General Secretary, Vivekananda Kendra v. Pradeep Kumar Agarwalla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2026 INSC 199

Consumer Law

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d) and 2(1)(g) — Maintainability of Complaint — Commercial Purpose vs. Banking Service — Summary Proceedings — Fraud and Forgery - Commercial Purpose and Bank Deposits - The Supreme Court held that the mere earning of interest on a Fixed Deposit Receipt (FDR) does not automatically categorize the banking service as being for a "commercial purpose." - Parking surplus funds for safe custody or statutory compliance is not reflective of a commercial intent - if a deposit is made specifically to leverage credit facilities for business augmentation, it would have a direct nexus with profit-generating activity and thus fall under "commercial purpose." Sant Rohidas Leather Industries v. Vijaya Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 267 : 2026 INSC 264

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d) - Statutory Interpretation - Definition of "Consumer" - Commercial Purpose - Onus of Proof - The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC's dismissal of a consumer complaint, holding that the mere act of leasing out a residential flat does not, by itself, classify the purchase as being for a "commercial purpose" – Noted that the onus of proving that a complainant falls within the exclusion clause of Section 2(1)(d) (i.e., that the goods or services were obtained for a commercial purpose) rests squarely upon the service provider and not the complainant - This burden must be discharged based on a "preponderance of probabilities". Vinit Bahri v. Mgf Developers Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : 2026 INSC 114

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Dominant Purpose Test - To exclude a person from the definition of a 'consumer', it must be proved that the dominant intention or purpose behind the purchase was to facilitate profit generation through commercial activity, showing a close and direct nexus between the transaction and such profit-generating activity - The mere purchase of immovable property, or even multiple units, does not ipso facto attract the exclusion clause unless a commercial dominant purpose is established – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti Developers and Others (2020) 2 SCC 265; Shriram Chits (India) Private Limited vs. Raghachand Associates (2024) 9 SCC 509; Laxmi Engineering Works vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute (1995) 3 SCC 583; Paras 11-17] Vinit Bahri v. Mgf Developers Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : 2026 INSC 114

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 14 – Award of Interest beyond Contractual Terms – Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contention that compensation should be restricted to the nominal rate (Rs. 10/- per sq. ft.) specified in Clause 10(c) of the Flat Buyer Agreement - It held that where a clause is found to be unfair, one-sided, or oppressive especially when compared to the high interest (24% p.a.) charged to consumers for defaults—consumer fora are not bound to mechanically enforce it and may award higher interest to prevent manifest injustice. [Paras 15 - 18] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Sections 13 and 22 – Procedure and Evidence – Applicability of Indian Evidence Act – Held that the Indian Evidence Act (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam) is not strictly applicable to Consumer Forums, the Principles of Natural Justice must be followed - If a party seeks to cross-examine a witness or expert whose affidavit is on record, the Commission should evolve a procedure to permit such cross-examination—via written questions, video conferencing, or a court-appointed Commission to ensure fair play. ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135 : AIR 2026 SC 860

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Sections 2(1)(g), 2(1)(o), 2(1)(r), and 14 – Housing Construction and Delay in Possession – Held that housing construction falls within the ambit of "service" under Section 2(1)(o), and failure to deliver possession within the stipulated period constitutes "deficiency" under Section 2(1)(g) - held that the jurisdiction of consumer fora is statutory and not merely contractual; therefore, one-sided or oppressive contractual terms cannot curtail the power of the NCDRC to award just and reasonable compensation. [Paras 10 - 18] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Summary Jurisdiction and Complex Facts – Noted that proceedings before Consumer Fora are summary in nature and not intended to adjudicate complex factual disputes involving criminal or tortious acts like fraud, cheating, or forgery - Where a Bank sets up a subsequent contract of pledge against an FDR which the complainant alleges is fraudulent or based on forged documents such a dispute must be addressed in a regular civil or criminal proceeding rather than under the 1986 Act - The burden to prove that services were availed for a "commercial purpose" lies on the respondent (Bank), whereas the burden to prove "deficiency in service" lies on the complainant. [Relied on Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti Developers and Others (2020) 2 SCC 265; Chairman and Managing Director, City Union Bank Limited and Another v. R. Chandramohan (2023) 7 SCC 775; Paras 21-31] Sant Rohidas Leather Industries v. Vijaya Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 267 : 2026 INSC 264

Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – Section 71 – Execution of Orders – Liability of Directors/Promoters – The Supreme Court held that an order passed by a Consumer Forum against a company (Corporate Debtor) cannot be executed against its Directors or Promoters if they were not parties to the original complaint and no specific findings of liability were recorded against them - Noted that execution must strictly conform to the decree and cannot be used to enlarge liability to bind persons who were not parties to the adjudication. Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 40 : 2026 INSC 51

Consumer Protection – Deficiency in Service – Quantum of Compensation – Evidence and Proof – Challenge to the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) order awarding ₹2,00,00,000/- compensation for a faulty haircut – Held that while the finding of deficiency in service was upheld in the first round of litigation, the quantum of compensation must be based on "material evidence and not on the mere asking" - Compensation to the tune of crores cannot be awarded based on unauthenticated photocopies of documents, especially when their authenticity is denied by the opposite party. ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135 : AIR 2026 SC 860

Consumer Protection – Insurance Claim – Fraud and Arson – Repudiation of Claim – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC order that had partially allowed an insurance claim despite evidence of fraud - held that once a claim is established to be founded on fraud, the entire claim collapses, and no relief partial or equitable can be granted - Key Findings: i. Deliberate Arson: Forensic analysis (Truth Labs) identified hydrocarbon residues (kerosene) at the seat of the fire, while electrical examinations ruled out a short circuit; ii. Fabricated Evidence: The respondent relied on invoices from non-existent or unrelated suppliers and manipulated VAT returns to inflate the claim; iii. Suspicious Proximity: The enhancement of insurance coverage and procurement of an additional policy occurred in close proximity to the fire incident, raising serious doubts about the bona fides of the claim; iv. Legal Principle: Fraud vitiates all solemn acts - An insurance contract cannot be used as an instrument for unjust enrichment - directed the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, to form a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate the orchestrated fraud. [Relied on S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1; A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2007) 4 SCC 221; Paras 15-26] United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sayona Colors Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 303 : 2026 INSC 287

Consumer Protection – Joint Development Agreement (JDA) – Liability of Landowners for Delay in Construction – Held: Landowners cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the developer for deficiency in service arising from construction delays if the obligation to construct rests solely with the developer under the JDA and the General Power of Attorney (GPA) - The developer's right to enter into sale agreements and undertake construction for their share of the property, coupled with indemnity clauses protecting landowners from the developer's breaches, shifts the liability for delay compensation exclusively to the developer. Sriganesh Chandrasekaran v. Unishire Homes Llp, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2026 INSC 172 : AIR 2026 SC 1081

Consumer Protection – Principal and Agent Relationship – General Power of Attorney – Held: The execution of a GPA by landowners in favor of a developer to facilitate sale agreements and title transfers does not automatically make the landowners liable for the developer's specific failures in construction, especially when no acts or omissions are attributed to the landowners regarding the delay - Held: While landowners are not liable for construction delay compensation, they remain jointly responsible with the developer to ensure the transfer of title and execution of sale deeds in favor of the flat buyers – Appeals dismissed. [Paras 12-16] Sriganesh Chandrasekaran v. Unishire Homes Llp, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2026 INSC 172 : AIR 2026 SC 1081

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Contempt Jurisdiction – Interim Orders – Noted that the High Court's order directing the framing of charges in a contempt petition while a fresh, detailed government rejection order remained unchallenged was found improper - Contempt should not be a shortcut for relief when appealable orders exist - The Supreme Court permitted the respondents to challenge the latest government order via a fresh writ petition to be heard alongside the contempt proceedings - The High Court is directed to pass a final order on merits and strictly prohibited from remanding the matter back to the authorities for further reconsideration, given the government's clear stance. [Paras 14-18] Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175

Contempt Jurisdiction – Non-compliance with directions for payment of salary to part-time teachers – Opportunity of hearing - the Supreme Court allowed certain part-time teachers in the State of West Bengal to make a fresh representation before the School Education Department Secretary for pay parity with full-time teachers teaching in non-government aided higher secondary schools - ordered that the competent authority shall pass a reasoned order on the representations within 4 months - Failure of Due Process – Held that while deciding representations, the authorities failed to afford the petitioners an opportunity of hearing or summon relevant school records as directed by the High Court - Directions – The Supreme Court granted liberty to the petitioners to file fresh representations within six weeks and directed the Secretary, School Education Department, is directed to: i. Afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners (in person or through an advocate); ii. Summon and allow inspection of engagement records from respective schools; iii. Pass a detailed reasoned order within four months. [Paras 12-15] Gurupada Bera v. Binod Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 9 : 2026 INSC 20

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 12 & 15 - Article 215 of the Constitution of India - Doctrine of Merger - Maintainability of Contempt Petition in High Court after Supreme Court affirmation - High Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt of its own order does not cease to operate merely because said order has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in appeal - Even if the doctrine of merger applies, the order to be executed remains the directions issued by the High Court - Held: If contempt petitions were driven to the Supreme Court in every case of affirmation by a non-speaking order, the Apex Court would be flooded with such petitions - The legal provisions cannot be used to coerce a litigant to approach the Supreme Court without resorting to filing a Contempt Petition in the High Court. [Paras 13-14] United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2026 INSC 204

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Civil Contempt – Intentional Delays and Administrative Hurdles – The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of government departments seeking "guidance" or citing "administrative hurdles" and "internal correspondence" as excuses for the non-compliance of clear court orders - Supreme Court noted that such actions are often a "calculated strategy" to delay or defeat the implementation of judicial directions. Israr Ahmed Khan v. Amarnath Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 209 : 2026 INSC 209

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Liability of Non-Parties – Reiterated that even a third party or an officer not originally impleaded in the main proceedings can be held liable for contempt if they have knowledge of the court's order and act in a manner that willfully prevents its compliance or aids and abets its violation - Supreme Court emphasized that in contempt proceedings, the court cannot traverse beyond the original order or supplement its directions - The focus remains strictly on whether the specific directions issued in the judgment have been willfully disobeyed. [Relied on Sita Ram v. Balbir, (2014) 13 SCC 489; J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar, (1996) 6 SCC 291; Snehasis Giri v. Subhasis Mitra, (2023) 18 SCC 529; Paras 9-29] Israr Ahmed Khan v. Amarnath Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 209 : 2026 INSC 209

Contract Law

Contract Act, 1872; Section 133 - Discharge of surety by variance in terms of contract - The Supreme Court held that any variance made in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor without the surety's consent discharges the surety only as to transactions subsequent to the variance - The discharge of the surety is not absolute; they remain liable for the original amount for which they stood as guarantee before the unauthorized variance occurred. Bhagyalaxmi Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Babaldas Amtharam Patel, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 210 : 2026 INSC 205

Contract Act, 1872 - Error by Bank and Third-Party Decree – Held that the Bank committed a clear breach of duty by unilaterally remitting the amount to the vessel owner despite receiving specific instructions (Form A-2) to remit it to the Plaintiff - The Bank, not being a party to the underlying Charter Party Agreement, could not rely on its terms to ignore the customer's mandate - Under the third-party procedure (Order VIII-A CPC / Order V-A Madras High Court Original Side Rules), the Bank was held liable to indemnify the customer (Defendant No. 1) for this erroneous transfer. [Relied on Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Damodar Prasad and others (1969) 1 SCR 620; Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Electrosteel Castings Ltd. (2026) 264 Comp Cas 11; Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. (2010) 7 SCC 417; Paras 35, 36] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247 : AIR 2026 SC 1566

Contract Act, 1872 - Liability of Guarantors - Bifurcation of Liability - Supreme Court set aside the High Court's finding that guarantors are either liable for the entire amount or not at all. It held that liability can be bifurcated; sureties are liable to the extent of their original engagement (plus applicable interest) but are not liable for excess amounts permitted to be withdrawn by the creditor in connivance with the principal debtor without the sureties' intimation or consent - The cardinal rule is that a guarantor must not be liable beyond the terms of his engagement – noted that unless there is bad faith, misrepresentation, or a material variation to the prejudice of the surety, the creditor's actions within the contract terms do not automatically discharge the surety – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Maharashtra vs. Dr. MN Kaul (D) by his LRs, AIR 1967 SC 1634; Syndicate Bank vs. Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors., (2006) 11 SCC 506; Paras 4-7] Bhagyalaxmi Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Babaldas Amtharam Patel, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 210 : 2026 INSC 205

Contract Act, 1872 - Necessary Parties and Dominus Litis - Supreme Court rejected the contention that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the vessel owner (principal debtor) - It reaffirmed that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom they seek no relief, unless that person is an indispensable "necessary party" without whom no effective decree can be passed. [Paras 27-32] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247 : AIR 2026 SC 1566

Contract Act, 1872 – Section 74 – Liquidated Damages – Public Utility Projects – Proof of Actual Loss –In projects involving public utility or public interest (such as solar power projects under the National Solar Mission), it is not mandatory to prove actual loss for the award of liquidated damages - The delay in commissioning such a utility itself constitutes a loss to the public. The burden shifts to the party in breach to prove that no loss was caused - Key Findings held – i. Admitted Breach - The Solar Power Developer (SEL) admitted to delays in commissioning the 20 MW project (two months for the first 10 MW and five months for the balance); ii. Public Interest - The project, executed under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM), was a public utility activity aimed at promoting green energy; thus, the strict proof of financial loss by the nodal agency (NVVNL) was unnecessary; iii. Jurisdictional Error by Division Bench - The Division Bench, acting under Section 37, erred by recalculating and reducing the compensation from 50% of the contractual claim (as awarded by the Single Judge) to a lower amount, as this amounted to a merits-based substitution of a plausible view. [Relied on Gayatri Balasamy vs. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2025 INSC 605); AC Chokshi Share Broker Private Limited vs. Jatin Pratap Desai and another (2025 INSC 174); Paras 12-18] Saisudhir Energy Ltd. v. NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 112 : 2026 INSC 103 : AIR 2026 SC 850

Contract Act, 1872 - Sections 126, 127, 128, and 140 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII-A – Key Issues – i. Whether a "Corporate Guarantee" issued by a charterer (Defendant No. 1) to a ship repairer (Plaintiff) to pay outstanding dues from freight amounts constitutes a valid, independent guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act; ii. Whether a bank is liable to indemnify its customer under third-party procedure when it erroneously remits funds to the wrong party contrary to express customer instructions – Held that the "Corporate Guarantee" (Exhibit P11) and related communications (Exhibit P10) constituted a valid, independent contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act - It was not merely a freight-sharing arrangement as contended by the Appellant – Noted that a guarantee is a voluntary act of taking up the burden of a third party who failed to make payment - Under Section 128, the liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor - The creditor is entitled to proceed against the surety without first exhausting remedies against the principal debtor. [Paras 21-25] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247 : AIR 2026 SC 1566

Contract Law - Procedural Prerequisites and Waiver - A party at fault cannot be permitted to set up a bar of non-performance of prerequisite obligations to exclude the operation of an arbitration clause - If a party's conduct such as failing to adhere to strict timelines for Engineer decisions or Adjudicator recommendations disables preceding steps, those procedural prerequisites are deemed waived. [Relied on M.K. Shah Engineers & Contractors vs. State of M.P. (1999) 2 SCC 59; ASF Buildtech Private Limited vs. Shapoorji Pallonji & Company Private Limited (2025) 9 SCC 76; State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises (2012) 12 SCC 581; Paras 16-20] Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4

Contract Law – Apartment Buyers' Agreement – Dominant Position and Fraud – The High Court's finding that flat owners were made to "sign on the dotted line" due to the developer's dominant position was held to be conjectural – Held - In the absence of foundational pleadings alleging fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion at the time of execution, a decade-old registered agreement cannot be disregarded or held to be executed under misrepresentation. [Paras 61, 62] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

Contract Law - Interpretation of Contracts – Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence – Sections 92 and 94 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Supreme Court emphasized that when the language of a contract is plain and applies accurately to existing facts, evidence cannot be given to show it was not meant to apply to such facts - under Section 92, factual context and correspondences between parties can be used to make ambiguous terms certain. [Paras 21-22] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202 : AIR 2026 SC 1340

Contract Law - Shortfall in Tapering Linkage – Indemnity Clauses – Supreme Court set aside the compensation awarded for the period prior to the coal block cancellation (pre-25.08.2014) - It held that Article 2.5 of the PPA/PSA acted as an indemnity clause, stipulating that if coal was procured from alternative sources (e-auction/import) to meet shortfalls in tapering linkage before the captive source became operational, such coal would be deemed to be from the captive source with no separate cost escalation allowed. [Paras 19-23, 25-26] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202 : AIR 2026 SC 1340

Contractual Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Clauses 3.20 and 3.22 – Supreme Court noted that a widely worded arbitration clause (Clause 3.22) must be read in conjunction with restrictive default clauses (Clause 3.20) - Clause 3.20, which accorded finality to the Administration's decision and barred legal proceedings, was interpreted to apply only where liability is admitted and only the quantification is at issue - Where liability is disputed, the matter falls within the ambit of the arbitration clause. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills Thirthahalli, (1987) 2 SCC 160; J.G. Engineers Private Limited v. Union of India, (2011) 5 SCC 758; Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru Pattabhirami Reddi, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 243; Paras 25-38] ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2026 INSC 274

Contractual Interpretation — Subsequent Legislation Clause: In contracts where the bid was submitted before the actual implementation of the BOCW machinery in a specific State, the introduction of cess collection via subsequent State Notifications/Rules qualifies as "subsequent legislation." - Contractors could not have factored in the 1% cess component in their bids when no mechanism for collection existed at the time of submission (28 days prior to the bid deadline). [Relied on A. Prabhakara Reddy and Company vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (2016) 1 SCC 600; Paras 38, 51, 52] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – Section 10 – Sham vs. Genuine Contracts – Following the Constitution Bench in SAIL, Supreme Court reiterated that the prohibition of contract labour does not lead to automatic absorption - if a contract is found to be a "sham" or "camouflage" intended to bypass labour laws, the workers are treated as de facto employees of the principal employer - Such a determination involves disputed questions of fact that must be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal/Court, not a Writ Court – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) v. National Union Waterfront Workers (2001) 7 SCC 1; Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda (1978) 2 SCC 353; Paras 24-40] Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87

Contract Labour – Sham Contracts and Regularization – If a contract is proved to be a "camouflage" or "sham" to hide a real employer-employee relationship where the principal employer retains full control, the workers must be treated as direct employees and regularized - determining whether a contract is "sham" or "genuine" involves disputed questions of fact that must be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal/Court, not by Writ Courts under Article 226 – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others v. National Union Waterfront Workers and others (2001) 7 SCC 1; Paras 8-11] Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87

Co-operative Societies

Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra) — Section 154 — Revisional Powers — Maintainability — Supreme Court ruled that the revisional power under Section 154 is "extremely wide" and is not denuded by the availability of alternative remedies under Rule 107(13) or (14) - A revision to annul a sale confirmation that is void ab initio (due to violation of mandatory rules) does not require a pre-deposit of the decretal amount under Section 154(2A)- that Rule 107(11)(h) serves a larger public purpose beyond the interest of the creditor, ensuring the sanctity of public auctions and preventing price manipulation by non-serious bidders - Supreme Court set aside the auction sale dated 29.01.2005 and the confirmation order dated 18.03.2005, declaring them null and void - directed a fresh auction for the property and ordered the Bank to refund the auction purchaser's deposit with 6% interest per annum. [Relied on Shilpa Shares & Securities and others vs. National Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others (2007) 12 SCC 165; Paras 39-42, 55-58] Adishakti Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2026 INSC 197

Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra) — Section 23(2) and Section 154 — Membership of Housing Society — Delay in Payment of Contribution — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had quashed the grant of membership to the legal heirs of a long-term tenant - held that since the Society had passed a resolution in 2005 to admit the predecessor-in-interest as a member upon payment, and that resolution was never revoked, the heirs were entitled to membership upon depositing the amount with interest - Supreme Court noted that denying membership while the parties remained in peaceful, undisputed possession of the flat would create a "serious anomaly" and "subsisting tussle". [Paras 41-45] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125

Cooperative Societies — Interplay between Reorganisation Act and 2002 Act — Legislative Continuity — Section 87 of the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000, embodies the doctrine of legislative continuity, allowing for the adaptation of laws for two years following bifurcation - Actions taken during this transitional period to reorganize societies to fit single-state boundaries are valid and cannot be retrospectively invalidated by Section 103 of the 2002 Act. Registrar Cane Cooperative Societies v. Gurdeep Singh Narval, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2026 INSC 216

Co-operative Societies — Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 — Rule 107(11)(g) and (h) — Mandatory Nature of Deposit Timelines — The Supreme Court held that the requirement to deposit the remainder of the purchase money within fifteen days (as per the Rule at the relevant time) from the date of auction sale is mandatory - Failure to deposit the full purchase money within this prescribed period renders the auction sale a nullity and not a mere irregularity. Supreme Court clarified that the Recovery Officer has no discretion to extend the time for making payment of the remainder of the purchase money, unlike the extension permitted for the cost of stamp duty. [Paras 47-55] Adishakti Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2026 INSC 197

Cooperative Societies — Non-obstante Clause — Section 93 of the Reorganisation Act provides that its provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any other law - The deeming fiction of Section 103 of the 2002 Act cannot override the express statutory scheme of the Reorganisation Act where reorganisation actions were already completed – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary and Others v. Milkiyat Singh and Others; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2802; Paras 13-24] Registrar Cane Cooperative Societies v. Gurdeep Singh Narval, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2026 INSC 216

Cooperative Societies — Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 — Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 — Section 103 — Status of Sugarcane Cooperative Societies upon State Bifurcation — The Supreme Court held that the Sugarcane Growers Cooperative Societies of Bajpur and Gadarpur are not Multi-State Cooperative Societies – Held that the deeming fiction under Section 103 of the 2002 Act is neither automatic nor universal; it requires a factual determination of whether a society's objects (distinguished from its area of operation) extend to more than one State. Registrar Cane Cooperative Societies v. Gurdeep Singh Narval, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2026 INSC 216

Custody of Minors

Custody of Minors – Paramount Consideration vs. Holistic Factors - The Supreme Court held that while the welfare of the child is the "paramount consideration" in custody disputes, the High Court erred in holding that other factors—such as the conduct of the parents, financial capacity, standard of living, and the child's education are not relevant – Noted that these factors have a cumulative effect and are necessary for determining a custody arrangement - noted that the respondent-wife had removed the children from Qatar to India mid-academic session without the father's consent or original passports, using "fake or duplicate" documents - This conduct, coupled with her violation of a court undertaking to return the children to Qatar for which she was found guilty of contempt constituted material aspects that the High Court failed to consider - Supreme Court highlighted that the High Court ignored the impact of the Qatar Court's order (dated 31.10.2023), which had revoked the wife's custody due to her misconduct in removing the children from its jurisdiction - The Supreme Court observed that, at the time of the High Court's judgment, there was no subsisting order of custody in favor of the mother; rather, an order existed in favor of the father as the guardian - Relying on mediation reports and interviews, noted that both minor children expressed an inclination to join their father in Qatar, despite limited memory of life there - The elder child felt his father's presence was sufficient for his care, and both appeared comfortable being without their mother - The High Court judgment was set aside for ignoring "material and crucial aspects." The matter was remanded for reconsideration on merits within four months – Appeal allowed. [Paras 22-33] Mohtashem Billah Malik v. Sana Aftab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 115

Customs Act, 1962

Customs Act, 1962; Section 28, 46 — Customs Tariff Act, 1975; General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) — Classification of "Aluminium Shelving for Mushroom Growing" - The Supreme Court set aside the CESTAT order that had classified aluminium shelves as "parts of agricultural machinery" under CTI 84369900 - held that the subject goods are "Aluminium Structures" classifiable under CTI 76109010 - 1. Analysis of General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) – i. Sequential Application: The Court reiterated that GRIs 1 to 4 must be applied sequentially; ii. Primacy of GRI 1: Classification begins and often ends at GRI 1, which prioritizes the terms of headings and relevant Section or Chapter Notes; iii. GRI 3 (Specific vs. General): GRI 3 is a "tie-breaker" invoked only if GRI 1 and GRI 2 result in a tie between two or more headings - The CESTAT erred by jumping to GRI 3 to prefer a "specific" heading without first exhausting the mandatory sequential inquiry of GRI 1; iv. Reliance on HSN Explanatory Notes - These notes are the foundation for interpreting the HSN-based tariff - affirmed that HSN notes have binding force when the domestic tariff is aligned with HSN – Held that the 'Aluminum Shelves' imported for mushroom cultivation cannot be classified as 'parts of agricultural machinery' but are liable to be classified as 'aluminium structures', attracting a customs duty. [Relied on Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem v. Madhan Agro Industries (India) Private Ltd. (2024); Paras 117- 142] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Act, 1962 - Analysis of "End Use" and "Intended Use" – Held that the taxable event is the time of import - The condition of the article at import not its eventual use is the crucial factor – Held that holding that "use" is relevant only if the tariff entry itself explicitly refers to use or adaptation; iii. Objective Characteristics: Classification must be based on objective characteristics and properties to ensure legal certainty and prevent subjectivity. [Relied on Dunlop India Ltd v. Union of India (1976); Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd v. Union of India (1985), Paras 69-83, 87-93] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Act, 1962 - Analysis of the Common Parlance Test – i. Restrictive Application: The "common parlance" or "trade parlance" test is not a measure of first resort in the HSN era; ii. Conditions for Invocation - It can only be invoked if: (i) the statute/notes provide no explicit definition; (ii) the heading lacks scientific/technical terms; and (iii) it does not contradict the statutory framework; iii. Exceptions - Where a term is used in a scientific or technical sense, common parlance is irrelevant - held that technical meanings must prevail over commercial nomenclature if the statute implies a technical sense. [Relied on Akbar Badrudin Giwani v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (1990); Paras 63-68] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Act, 1962 - Definition and Characteristics of "Machine" – i. Essential Features: A machine must consist of moving parts and utilize power (mechanical or electrical) to perform a specific task; ii. Support Structures vs. Parts: Static structures that merely support a plant are not "parts" of the machine itself – Held that All of the individual machines are already complete and fully operational on their own; their mechanical and electrical functions do not rely on aluminium shelves - These shelves do not contribute to their operation; they merely serve as a surface for the devices to perform their functions. [Relied On Saraswati Sugar Mills v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-III (2014); Paras 124-140] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Act, 1962 – Section 135(1)(b)(i) – Smuggling of foreign wrist watches – Admissibility of Section 108 statements – Sentencing – Reduction of sentence to period already undergone – The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellants for the illegal import and handling of 777 foreign-made wrist watches and 879 straps - upheld the High Court's finding that statements recorded by Customs Officers under Section 108 are substantive pieces of evidence and are not barred by Sections 24, 30, or 34 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provided they are voluntary. Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180

Customs Act, 1962 - Specific Application to Aluminium Shelves – Held that i. Heading 7610: The HSN Explanatory Notes characterize "structures" as items that generally remain in position once installed and are made of bars, rods, plates, etc., joined by riveting or bolting - The subject goods fulfilled all these criteria; ii. Heading 8436: The shelves lacked moving parts and independent mechanical functions - Integrating them post-import with watering systems did not change their character at the time of import into "agricultural machinery" – Held that the subject goods are correctly classifiable under CTI 7610 90 10 - The CESTAT judgment was set aside for misapplying the General Rules of Interpretation and over-relying on the end-use/common parlance tests in the face of clear statutory guidance – Appeal allowed. [Paras 96, 100, 117-130, 142] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Duty – Special Economic Zone (SEZ) – Electrical Energy – Supply to Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) – Levy of Customs Duty – The appellant challenged the levy of customs duty on electrical energy generated in its SEZ unit and supplied to the DTA for the period between 16 September 2010 and 15 February 2016 - The High Court of Gujarat had previously in 2015 struck down a similar levy for an earlier period (June 2009 to September 2010), holding that such a supply does not constitute an "import into India" under Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 - in the impugned 2019 judgment, the High Court declined to extend this relief to the subsequent period, reasoning that the later notifications (Notification Nos. 91/2010-Cus. and 26/2012-Cus.) were not specifically challenged - The Supreme Court held that the 2015 judgment had correctly identified that there was no identifiable charging event to attract customs duty under Section 12 for electricity generated within India in an SEZ and wheeled to the DTA - An SEZ is not a foreign territory, and the legal fiction in Section 30 of the SEZ Act ("as if imported") is for the purpose of determining the rate of duty and does not convert an intra-national supply into an act of import - Observed that Section 25 of the Customs Act is a power to relax or exempt duty, not a power to create or invent a new tax - The use of an "exemption" notification to introduce a fresh liability is a colourable exercise of delegated authority and is ultra vires – Appeal allowed. [Paras 45-85] Adani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : 2026 INSC 1

Delay

Delay - Important Observations on Incarceration & Procedural Delay - i. Attribution of Delay - noted that procedural history did not support the claim that delay was solely due to prosecutorial or judicial inaction. It observed that at various stages, the prosecution was ready to proceed, while the defense raised objections, requested deferments, or filed successive applications; ii. Complexity of the Case - noting the volume of documentary and electronic evidence and the nature of the "structured and continuing conspiracy," noted that the proceedings are inherently time-consuming; iii. Threshold for Constitutional Intervention- held that for constitutional intervention to override a statutory embargo, there must be a finding that continued detention has become "punitive or unconscionable". [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1; Union of India v. Saleem Khan (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1754; Paras 104-106, 387-390, 430, 431] Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2026 INSC 2 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 32

Urban Areas

Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (Haryana) – Section 3(3A) – De-licensing and Validation – Power to grant a license includes the implied power to withdraw, modify, or de-license, as supported by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 – Held - The 2020 Amendment to the 1975 Act retrospectively validated de-licensing actions taken by the authorities. [Para 71, 72] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

Digitalization

Digitalization of Judiciary — e-Courts Project — Handwritten Orders — Supreme Court expressed concern over Tribunals continuing to use handwritten, illegible order sheets despite the national e-Courts project started in 2007 - High Courts directed to ensure computers provided are utilized and that officers' names and UID numbers are clearly mentioned on orders. [Relied on Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal and Others, 2025 INSC 361: (2025) 9 SCC 539; Paras 10-18] National Insurance Company Ltd v. Rathlavath Chandulal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 149 : 2026 INSC 146

Disciplinary Inquiry – Standard of Proof and Perversity – Administrative Law – Maxim “Nemo Firut Repente Turpissimus” - While a Court does not typically act as an appellate authority over an inquiry report, it can interfere if the findings are "perverse," meaning no reasonable person would have reached such a conclusion on the available material – Held in this case, neither the complainant nor the stenographer (alleged to be the conduit for bribes) was examined, and the Public Prosecutor testified that the bail orders were proper- Held that Authorities should not ignore the long-standing reputation of an officer when evaluating a sudden allegation of "doubtful integrity" based on a mere hunch or hypothesis. [Relied on Sadhna Chaudhary v. State of U.P. (2020) 11 SCC 760; R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat (2016) 14 SCC 1; Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56; Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 370; Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2019) 10 SCC 640; Paras 29-40] Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7

Discretionary Toolkit of the Court – Held that while exercising power under Section 29A, the Court must examine "sufficient cause" and may deploy several measures to ensure integrity and efficiency – i. Reduction of arbitrator fees (up to 5% per month of delay); ii. Substitution of one or all arbitrators; iii. Imposition of actual or exemplary costs on parties; iv. Imposition of specific terms and conditions for the conduct of proceedings. C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112

Distinction Between Precedent and Res Judicata — Section 11(7) — Held that while a "precedent" operates in rem and serves as a source of law for other parties, "res judicata" operates in personam between the same parties to ensure finality in litigation - Even if other benches of a High Court interpreted an identical clause differently in separate litigations (precedent), the specific order appointing the arbitrator between the current parties constitutes res judicata regarding the existence of the arbitration agreement - The correctness of the initial decision is immaterial unless it relates to a lack of inherent jurisdiction. Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116

Doctrines

Doctrine of Manifest Arbitrariness – Evolution and Application – Held: Manifest arbitrariness is a well-settled ground for striking down plenary legislation under Article 14. A law is manifestly arbitrary when it is "capricious, irrational, or not guided by any principle" or is "excessive and disproportionate" - A legislative enactment that targets a specific entity for total deprivation of management and property rights without following due process, providing adequate compensation, or establishing a clear public necessity (beyond mere "better management") is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248; Paras 35-50] Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2026 INSC 219

Doctrine of Estoppel – Participation in Selection Process – The Supreme Court rejected the High Court's view that the appellant was estopped from challenging the allotment simply because he participated in the draw of lots. The Court held that participation does not bar a challenge when the process is marred by bias and arbitrary exercise of power - Supreme Court imposed costs of ₹1 lakh on the Society (HEWO), ₹50,000 on Respondent No. 3, and ₹25,000 on Respondent No. 4. It directed a fresh draw of lots among the four eligible applicants who were available at the earlier point of time – Appeal allowed. [Paras 15 - 18] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163 : AIR 2026 SC 1495

Doctrine of Lis Pendens in Money Decrees – Supreme Court rejected the argument that lis pendens does not apply to simple money suits - If Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act were excluded from money suits, a judgment-debtor could easily defeat the decree by alienating property before execution, rendering the judicial process meaningless - Noted that "the true difficulties of a litigant begin only after they have obtained a decree". R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150 : AIR 2026 SC 913

Doctrine of Merger - Effect of Granting Leave - Once the Supreme Court grants leave in a Special Leave Petition and the appeal is thereafter decided, the doctrine of merger applies, whether the Supreme Court's order is one of reversal, modification, or mere affirmation - Distinguished cases where SLP is dismissed without granting leave, where no merger occurs – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359; Khoday Distilleries Limited & Ors. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal, (2019) 4 SCC 376; Paras 11-12] United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2026 INSC 204

Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel — Statutory Power — The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to manifest an outcome that precludes the State from exercising its statutory power to withdraw an exemption in the public interest - While the State can withdraw a concession, the principles of fairness and legitimate expectation require that such withdrawal should not cause "undue hardship" to those who structured their financial planning based on the earlier concession. State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 34 – Vicarious Liability – Directors' Responsibility - The Supreme Court held: Whether Directors of a company were "in charge of" and "responsible to" the company for the conduct of its business at the time of the offense is a question of fact - Quashing a complaint at the threshold on the ground of insufficient compliance with Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is premature; such determinations are best left to the Trial Court to be decided at the appropriate stage based on evidence – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Cheminova India Limited v. State of Punjab, (2021) 8 SCC 818; Paras 32-59] State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200 : AIR 2026 SC 1270 ; 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 285

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Rule 49 – Power of the State Government to prescribe essential qualifications for the post of Drug Inspector (DI) or Drug Control Officer (DCO) - Key Issues – i. Whether the State Government, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India (or State Acts), can prescribe "experience" as an essential qualification for appointment to the post of Drug Inspector when such qualification is absent in the Central Rules; ii. Applicability of the Doctrine of Occupied Field where the Central Government has already exercised its rule-making power under Section 33 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (D&C Act) – Held that when a field prescribing a qualification for a public post is occupied by the Union, then it is impermissible for the States to impose additional qualifications, observed the Supreme Court - Main Findings & Ratio – i. Doctrine of Occupied Field - The D&C Act is a "central law" that occupies the field regarding the prescription of qualifications for Inspectors under Section 33(2)(b) and Section 33(2)(n) - The State Government's power to appoint persons "as it thinks fit" under Section 21 does not extend to altering the "prescribed qualifications" set by the Central Government; ii. Interpretation of Rule 49 - The substantive part of Rule 49 of the Drug Rules, 1945, mandates specific educational degrees as the only essential qualifications for appointment - The 18-month experience mentioned in the proviso to Rule 49 is not a condition for eligibility for appointment; rather, it is a condition precedent for authorizing an already appointed Inspector to inspect the manufacture of substances listed in Schedule C; iii. Constitutional Supremacy - Rules framed by the State under the proviso to Article 309 or State enactments (like the Karnataka State Civil Services Act) cannot override or be inconsistent with the Central Drug Rules in an occupied field. [Relied on A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka (1998) 3 SCC 495; Paras 38 – 63] State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : 2026 INSC 63

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 18(a)(vi) read with Rule 74, 18-B, 22(1)(cca), 27(d), and 28-A – Record Maintenance – Limitation for Filing Complaint – Jurisdiction of Courts – Held that i. Non-Maintenance of Records as a Substantive Offence: The Appellants were prosecuted for failing to maintain records as stipulated under Schedule M and Schedule U of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, specifically regarding the drug Pseudoephedrine - held that allegations regarding the contravention of Section 18(a)(vi) of the Act (manufacturing/stocking in contravention of rules) are punishable under Section 27(d); ii. Limitation Period for Prosecution: The Appellants argued that the offence fell under Section 18-B (punishable under Section 28-A), which carries a maximum punishment of one year, thus attracting a one-year limitation period under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. - The Supreme Court rejected this, clarifying that since the allegations included violations of Section 18(a)(vi) punishable under Section 27(d) (imprisonment up to two years), the limitation period is three years as per Section 468 Cr.P.C; iii. Jurisdiction and Committal to Special Court/Sessions: Under Section 32(2), no court inferior to a Court of Session shall try an offence punishable under Chapter IV of the Act - While Section 36-A allows for summary trials by a Magistrate for certain offences, it explicitly excludes those triable by the Special Court or Court of Session - the committal of the case to the Special Judge-I (a Court of Session) was legally sound – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Miteshbhai J. Patel Vs. Drug Inspector, 2025 SCC online SC 2203; Paras 27-32] SBS Biotech v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 181 : 2026 INSC 171

Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Directions issued by the Court – i. Selection Criteria - Public Service Commissions (HPSC and KPSC) must complete selections based strictly on educational qualifications in Rule 49, ignoring the "experience" requirement added by State Rules; ii. Redrawing Merit List - Lists must be redrawn within eight weeks; iii. Protection of Existing Appointees (Haryana) - Selected candidates who remain in the new merit list shall continue in service - Those who fall out of the merit list may be continued only at the State's discretion via supernumerary posts, placed at the bottom of the seniority list. State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : 2026 INSC 63

Drugs - Legal Definition of "Drugs" vs. "New Drugs" regarding Stem Cells - While autologous stem cells used in ASD treatments (not undergoing substantial manipulation) may not qualify as "new drugs" under the New Drugs and Clinical Trial Rules, 2019 (NDCT Rules), they fall under the broader definition of "drug" as "substances" under Section 3(b)(i) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 - stem-cell derived products involving "substantial manipulation" are perpetually categorized as "new drugs" under Rule of the NDCT Rules. [Relied on Chimanlal Jagjivan Das Sheth v. State of Maharashtra 1962 SCC OnLine SC 16; Ishwar Singh Bindra and Others v. State of U.P. 1968 SCC OnLine SC 98; Paras 101 – 109] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96

Economic Policy

Economic Policy and Legislative Intent — Excessive Judicial Review — Supreme Court cautioned against the strategic use of litigation by unsuccessful resolution applicants to delay the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). Excessive judicial scrutiny beyond narrow statutory boundaries leads to value destruction, erodes the going-concern status of the Corporate Debtor, and discourages future bidders by introducing legal uncertainty - The IBC prioritizes speed, finality, and predictability to ensure efficient resource allocation in the economy. [Relied on Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531; Kalyani Transco vs. Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2093; Swiss Ribbons Private Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Pratap Technocrats Private Ltd. vs. Monitoring Committee of Reliance Infratel Limited, (2021) 10 SCC 623; Paras 7-14] Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Economic Viability and Fiscal Prudence – Comparative data from Rajasthan reveals OCIs are significantly more cost-effective than closed prisons - Per-prisoner per-day expenditure in closed prisons is approximately Rs. 333.12, whereas in open prisons, it is only Rs. 49.60 - Staffing ratios also show marked efficiency: 6:1 in closed prisons versus 80:1 in open camps - While "Prisons" is a State subject (Schedule VII, List II), States are urged to implement the Model Prison Manual, 2016 and the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023 to ensure uniformity and modernization - Specific Directions – i. Establishment of High-Powered Committee (HPC): Constituted under the Executive Chairmanship of Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat (Retd.) to formulate Common Minimum Standards for OCI governance, eligibility, and management; ii. Expansion of Infrastructure: States lacking OCIs (e.g., Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Telangana) must assess feasibility and develop protocols for establishment within three months; iii. Mandatory Monitoring: All High Courts directed to register a suo motu writ petition as a continuing mandamus to oversee compliance; iv. State Monitoring Committees: Every State/UT to constitute a committee headed by the Executive Chairman of the State Legal Services Authority within four weeks. [Relied on D. Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 185; Mohammed Giasuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1977) 3 SCC 287; Dharambir v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 3 SCC 645; Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar (1988) SCC OnLine SC 450; Paras 33-36, 47-51, 67-71, 73] Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198

Election

Election - The Supreme Court urged the Election Commission of India to consider the suggestions put forth by a petitioner regarding measures to curb excessive election expenditures observing that the suggestions given by the petitioner are "worth consideration". Prabhakar Deshpande v. Chief Election Commissioner of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Election - Where only two candidates contested an election, setting aside the winning candidate's election does not warrant a fresh poll; instead, the runner-up should be declared elected. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision to direct a fresh election, after the winning candidate's election as Panchayat Samiti Chairperson was declared null and void. Ramadebi Rautray v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2026 INSC 243

Electricity Act, 2003

Electricity Act, 2003 – Regulation as an "Enterprise" – Duty of Regulators – While SERCs possess plenary power, they must not act in silos - Supreme Court adopted the model of "Regulation as an Enterprise," where regulators act as "Governments in Miniature" to balance efficiency with distributive and environmental goals - Regulatory power must be exercised as a collaborative project with other stakeholders to subserve the purpose of the Act, including energy security and the transition to renewable energy. Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294

Electricity Act, 2003 – Sections 61, 62, 64, and 86 – Tariff Determination – Generation Based Incentive (GBI) – Power and Jurisdiction of State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) – Whether an SERC, while exercising its exclusive power to determine tariff, can "consider and factor in" the GBI granted by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) to renewable energy generating companies (GENCOs) - Held, there is no unallocated regulatory residue left outside the SERC's jurisdiction; tariff determination is its exclusive province - The power of the Commission to determine tariff includes the authority to consider the impact of incentives or subsidies, such as GBI, that affect the economic position of a GENCO - This authority flows directly from the Electricity Act and relevant Regulations (e.g., Regulation 20 of APERC Regulations, 2015) and is not denuded by the mere existence of a Union grant under Article 282 of the Constitution. Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294

Electricity Act, 2003 – Treatment of GBI – Mandatory Deduction vs. Contextual Application – Held, the requirement to "take into consideration" an incentive under Regulation 20 does not mechanically translate into a mandatory deduction from the tariff - If an incentive (like GBI) is designed as a "generator-focused incentive" to encourage investment in renewable energy and not as a "consumer subsidy," the Commission must respect its underlying objective - Factoring GBI into the tariff in a manner that effectively redirects the benefit from the generator to the consumer nullifies the policy intent of the grant. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh v. JSW Hydro Energy Ltd., 2025 INSC 857; Paras 15-46] Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294

Electricity Duty Act, 1958 (Bombay); Section 5A — Exemption from Electricity Duty — Withdrawal of Exemption — Power of State Government — The State Government, having the statutory power to grant exemptions in the public interest under Section 5A, also possesses the inherent power to withdraw or modify such exemptions - The power to grant an exemption is a policy decision in the realm of fiscal administration, and the State must retain flexibility to recalibrate such policies based on changing economic circumstances and public finance management. State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296

Electricity – Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) – Change in Law – Cancellation of Coal Blocks – The Supreme Court upheld the grant of compensation to the power generator (APNRL) for additional costs incurred due to "Change in Law" events resulting from the cancellation of the Ganeshpur captive coal block – Noted that the judgment in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secy. & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 516 and the subsequent enactment of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015 constituted a "Change in Law" under Article 10 of the PPA - These events altered the legal regime for coal allocation, thereby entitling the generator to be restored to the same economic position as if the Change in Law had not occurred. [Para 24] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202 : AIR 2026 SC 1340

Electricity - Reasonable Notice Period — Fiscal Implications — Where captive power generators have made significant investments based on duty exemptions, a sudden withdrawal can be disruptive - In the interest of justice, a "reasonable notice period" must be granted to allow affected industries to adjust their financial planning - A period of one year from the date of the notifications is considered a reasonable notice period. [Relied on Shri Bakul Oil Industries & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (1987) 1 SCC 31; Kasinka Trading and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., (1995) 1 SCC 274; State of Rajasthan & Another v. J K Udaipur Udyog Ltd. & Another, (2004) 7 SCC 673; Paras 15-24] State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296

Employees' Compensation Act, 1923

Employees' Compensation Act, 1923; Section 4A(3)(b) — Liability to pay Penalty — The Supreme Court reiterated that while an Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the employer for the principal compensation amount and interest, it cannot be fastened with the liability to pay the penalty component - Noted that the penalty under Section 4A(3)(b) is imposed due to the "personal fault and negligence" of the employer for failing to deposit compensation within the stipulated one month. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2026 INSC 177

Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 - Statutory Interpretation — Section 4A — Following the 1995 Amendment, the components of compensation/interest (Clause 'a') and penalty (Clause 'b') have been severed - The legislative intent behind this severance was to ensure that the burden of penalty which is not a natural corollary of the indemnity contract remains a deterrence for the employer rather than being passed onto the insurer - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order regarding the penalty. It held that the employer (Respondent No. 4) is solely liable to pay the penalty amount of Rs. 2,57,838/- within eight weeks. [Relied on Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi (1997) 8 SCC 1; Paras 10-22] New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2026 INSC 177

Employer-Employee Relationship – Sham or Camouflage – Held that mere fact that the same individuals continued to work for the principal employer despite periodic changes in contractors does not, by itself, establish a direct relationship or prove a "sham" arrangement - Contractors may retain existing personnel to ensure continuity and prevent complaints from the principal employer - Regularization – Despite allowing the appeals, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to direct the appellant to consider the respondents' cases for regularization on a sympathetic basis, given their decades of uninterrupted service in jobs that appear perpetual in nature - This direction was issued under the "special facts and circumstances" of the case and is not to be treated as a precedent. Municipal Council v. K. Jayaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 38

Environmental Law

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 – Section 5 – Directions for Implementation – To bridge significant implementation gaps and ensure readiness for the 2026 Rules, Supreme Court issued nationwide directions: i. Three-Tier Enforcement: Failure to comply shall be treated as more than an administrative lapse, involving: Tier 1 (immediate fines), Tier 2 (criminal prosecution), and Tier 3 (prosecution of responsible officials for neglect of oversight duties); ii. Role of Elected Representatives: Mayors, Councillors, and Ward Members are designated as lead facilitators for source-segregation education; iii. Infrastructure and Monitoring: Mandated infrastructure audits by District Collectors and the establishment of multi-tier monitoring task forces by 15.03.2026; iv. Bulk Waste Generators (BWGs): Must register on a centralized portal and operate on-site wet waste processing facilities or procure EBWGR certificates by 31.03.2026. [Paras 12-19] Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182

Environmental Law – CPCB Methodology for Environmental Compensation – Scope and Applicability – The Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) is a facilitative and indicative tool, not a rigid or exhaustive code - While primarily designed for industrial sectors, its adoption by the NGT for residential projects is not legally impermissible, especially when the resulting quantification is not arbitrary or disproportionate. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

Environmental Law – Principle of Correlation – Actual Damage vs. Statutory Violation – While mere violation of law without demonstrable harm may not automatically warrant compensation in all cases, activities with the potential to degrade the environment or those involving "flagrant violations" (such as continuing construction despite stop-work orders) justify the imposition of deterrent and restorative damages – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M/s. Goel Ganga Developers India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2018) 18 SCC 257; Deepak Nitrite Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (2004) 6 SCC 402; Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha (2022) 13 SCC 401; Research Foundation for Science (18) v. Union of India (2005) 13 SCC 186; Paras 21-46] Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

Environmental Law – Siting Norms – Proximity to Schools and Habitations – Mandatory nature of buffer zones and siting distances. Held: Preventive safeguards and siting norms (e.g., PPCB notification dated 02.09.1998) are designed to operate in advance to prevent avoidable risk to sensitive receptors - Demonstrable compliance based on objective, verified measurements of emission sources is required at the threshold; assumptions of compliance to be tested at a later stage (Consent to Operate) are legally insufficient. [Relied on Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647; K. Ramadas Shenoy v. Town Municipal Council, Udipi (1974) 2 SCC 506; A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (1999) 2 SCC 718; Paras 26-33] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Equitable Relief

Equitable Relief — Enhanced Interest for Delay — While recognizing the membership, Supreme Court provided liberty to aggrieved members to seek "enhanced interest" or "additional amounts" due to the significant delay (from 1995/2005 to 2025) in making the contribution – Appeals allowed. [Para 47] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125

Equity – Fixation of Reasonable Penal Rent – While upholding the right to deduct penal rent, the Supreme Court noted that full enforcement of the management's penal policy might entirely extinguish the gratuity of retired skilled/semi-skilled workers - In an equitable exercise of jurisdiction, the Court fixed a reasonable sum of Rs. 1,000 per month as penal rent for the period beyond the grace period, balancing the interests of both parties. [Relied on Secretary, ONGC Ltd. v. V. U. Warrier (2005) 5 SCC 245; Paras 16 - 21] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Essential Commodities Act, 1955

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 – Sections 3 and 7 – Prosecution for cement black-marketing – Effect of decontrol – The appellants were convicted for the unauthorized possession and intended sale of government-quota cement in 1994, allegedly violating the Maharashtra Cement (Licensing and Control) Order, 1973 - The Supreme Court held that since the Central Government had substantially withdrew price and distribution control over cement via S.O. 168(E) dated 01.03.1989 and rescinded state licensing powers via S.O. 624(E) dated 07.08.1990, no valid control order under Section 3 was in force on the date of the alleged offense (24.03.1994) - In the absence of a subsisting statutory order, a conviction under Section 7 is legally impermissible. Manoj v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2026 INSC 152

Estates Acquisition

Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal) – Sections 6(1)(j), 53, 57A, and 57B – Power of Review – Jurisdiction of Revenue Officer – Quasi-Judicial Authorities – Separation of Powers - Whether a Revenue Officer, as a quasi-judicial authority under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (WBEA) Act, 1953, possesses the inherent or statutory power to review a vesting order that has attained finality, especially in the absence of an express legislative mandate - Key Findings of the Court – i. No Inherent Power of Review - Supreme Court reiterated that the power of review is not an inherent power; it must be expressly conferred by statute or by necessary implication - Quasi-judicial authorities can only exercise those powers specifically bestowed upon them by law; ii. Interpretation of Section 57A - held that Section 57A, which allows the State to invest authorities with the "powers of a Civil Court," does not amount to a blanket conferment of the power of substantive review - Such an interpretation would conflict with Section 57B(3), which expressly prohibits Revenue Officers from reopening matters already decided or determined; iii. Separation of Powers & Basic Structure - Conferring judicial functions like the power of review upon executive functionaries (like Revenue Officers), who lack judicial training or independence from executive control, blurs the demarcation between the executive and judiciary - This encroaches upon the Separation of Powers, which is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution; iv. Failure on Merits of Review – Held that even if jurisdiction existed, the 2008 review failed the criteria under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC - The respondent-company failed to prove it was "exclusively engaged in farming" as of January 1, 1952, despite ample opportunities in 1971 - Subsequent economic considerations or "amicable settlements" are not legally sustainable grounds for review – v. Nullity of Orders without Jurisdiction - An order passed by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction is void ab initio and a nullity. Its invalidity can be challenged at any stage, including collateral proceedings. [Relied on: Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji, (1971) 3 SCC 844; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437; Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn., (2010) 11 SCC 1; Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706; Paras 31-89] State of West Bengal v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 126 : 2026 INSC 132

Estoppel

Estoppel and Participation – Jurisdictional Nullity – Participation in arbitral proceedings does not confer jurisdiction where an arbitration agreement is inherently absent. Since the arbitrator lacked inherent jurisdiction, the proceedings were a nullity (coram non judice) and the award was non-est - The Municipal Council was not estopped from challenging the award as it was "forced" into arbitration without consent while functioning under a State-appointed Administrator - Supreme Court rejected the application of these precedents, affirming the High Court's finding that there is no acquiescence or estoppel where a party is compelled to participate in proceedings that are a jurisdictional nullity. [Relied on N. Chellappan v. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. (1975) 1 SCC 289; Inder Sain Mittal v. Housing Board, Haryana and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 175; Paras 19-26] Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288

Eviction

Eviction Procedure – Procedural Safeguards – Supreme Court recorded and approved a policy mechanism evolved by the State of Assam to ensure fairness in removing encroachments: i. Committee Constitution: A committee comprising forest and revenue officials will be formed to oversee the process; ii. Notice and Hearing: Alleged unauthorized occupants must be served a notice and granted an opportunity to produce evidence of their right to occupy the land; iii. Revenue vs. Forest Land: If land is found within revenue limits and outside notified forest areas, the matter must be referred to the Revenue Department; iv. Speaking Order: If an occupation is found to be unauthorized after scrutiny, a speaking order must be passed and served; v. Grace Period: A 15-day notice period must be granted to vacate the premises after the speaking order is served. Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140 : AIR 2026 SC 933

Exam

Exam Rules, 2013 & Cadre Allocation Policy – Rule 1, 13, 14, and 17 of Exam Rules read with Paragraph 9 of the Policy – Interpretation of "General Standards - Emphasized that the IFS examination is a "two-tier" process where the Preliminary Examination is an integral stage - Under the proviso to Rule 14(ii), a reserved category candidate can only be adjusted against unreserved vacancies if they have been recommended without resorting to any relaxation/concession in eligibility or selection criteria at "any stage of the examination" – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Deepa E.V. v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 12 SCC 680; Gaurav Pradhan v. State of Rajasthan (2018) 11 SCC 352; Niravkumar Dilipbhai Makwana v. Gujarat Public Service Commission (2019) 7 SCC 383; Union of India v. Sajib Roy (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1943; Paras 25-36] Union of India v. G. Kiran, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Execution

Execution of Award — Procedure of Attachment — Fairness — The Tribunal issued warrants for the attachment of office furniture, fixtures, and computers of a Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) shortly after the execution petition was filed - Held: Such a process paralyzes the working of the company – Noted that while awards must be satisfied, the Executing Court should adopt fair procedures, such as the attachment of bank accounts, rather than coercive attachment of essential office equipment without judicial mind. National Insurance Company Ltd v. Rathlavath Chandulal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 149 : 2026 INSC 146

Factories Act, 1948

Factories Act, 1948; Section 59(2) — Overtime Wages — Definition of "Ordinary Rate of Wages" — Inclusion of Compensatory Allowances — The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that compensatory allowances such as House Rent Allowance (HRA), Transport Allowance (TA), Small Family Allowance (SFA), and Clothing and Washing Allowance (CWA) must be included in the "ordinary rate of wages" for the purpose of calculating overtime wages - noted that Section 59(2) provides for only two specific exclusions: bonus and wages for overtime work - In the absence of statutory rules, the Executive cannot use Office Memorandums to read additional exclusions into the Act that the Legislature did not contemplate - Noted that different Ministries cannot assign different meanings to the same statutory provision, noting that the Ministry of Railways was already including such allowances in its calculations. [Paras 14, 15] Union of India v. Heavy Vehicles Factory Employees Union, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 70

Factories Act, 1948; Sections 64, 65, 112, & 113 — Rule-making Power — Jurisdiction of Central Government — Under Chapter VI and Chapter XI of the 1948 Act, the power to frame exempting rules or general rules is vested primarily with the State Governments - The Central Government's role is limited to issuing directions to State Governments for the execution of the Act's provisions - various Ministries (Defence, Labour, and Finance) lack the legal authority to issue clarifications or Office Memorandums that modify the definition of "ordinary rate of wages" under Section 59(2) – Held that The Factories Act, 1948, is a beneficial legislation intended to protect workers from exploitation and ensure their health and safety - Any interpretation that restricts or curtails benefits admissible to workers under the Act must be avoided - Executive instructions that lack statutory force cannot override the law or run contrary to literal statutory mandates – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. v. State of Gujarat (2020) 10 SCC 459; Paras 9 - 13] Union of India v. Heavy Vehicles Factory Employees Union, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 70

Foreign Trade

Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 – Section 3 – Minimum Import Price (MIP) – Commencement of Delegated Legislation – The Supreme Court held that a Notification issued under Section 3 of the Act acquires the force of law only upon its publication in the Official Gazette - The expression "date of this Notification" used in such instruments must necessarily be construed as the date of its publication in the Gazette (in this case, 11.02.2016), rather than the date it was signed or uploaded on a website (05.02.2016). Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80

Foreign Trade Policy (2015-2020) – Paragraph 1.05(b) – Transitional Protection – Importers who opened irrevocable Letters of Credit prior to the actual date of Gazette publication (11.02.2016) are entitled to the transitional protection under Para 1.05(b) of the FTP - Supreme court rejected the argument that "uploading" a notification on a website constitutes sufficient notice to curtail rights before formal Gazette publication – Appeal allowed. [Relied on B.K. Srinivasan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 658; Paras 16-23] Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80

Forest Law

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Ecological Balance vs. Invasive Species – Held that the mere presence of dense vegetation does not automatically signify a natural forest ecosystem, especially if the growth consists primarily of invasive alien species like Prosopis juliflora (Vilayati Kikar), which can disrupt native biodiversity - Environmental management should prioritize the restoration of native/indigenous species over the protection of harmful invasive monocultures - reiterated that tribunals and courts should not interfere with the implementation of a long-approved Master Plan under the guise of environmental principles once that plan has attained statutory finality - Harmonizing the right to a clean environment under Article 21 with the right to development, the Court noted that integrated transport projects (like the Bijwasan Railway Station redevelopment) serve public interest by decongesting urban zones and optimizing land use. [Relied on The Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody and Others (2025) 4 SCC 150; Paras 42-65] Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2026 INSC 270

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Section 2 – Deemed Forest – Interplay between Statutory Master Plan and Subsequent Vegetation Growth – The Supreme Court held that land earmarked for a project under an approved Master Plan, which was not recorded as forest or deemed forest at the time the Plan came into force, cannot be subsequently declared a "deemed forest" due to the natural proliferation of vegetation or invasive species over time - Noted that the statutory binding force and sanctity of a Master Plan must prevail to ensure certainty and stability in urban planning - The relevant date for determining whether a parcel of land qualifies as a "deemed forest" is the date of the coming into force of the Master Plan, not the date when project work actually commences on the ground. Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2026 INSC 270

Forest Rights – Recognition of Legal Occupation – Supreme Court noted that certain residents, such as those in "Forest Villages" listed in the 'Jamabandi Register' or title holders under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, are legally authorized and not liable for eviction - directed the parties to maintain status quo regarding the land in occupation until a speaking order is passed and the subsequent 15-day notice period expires. [Paras 9-13] Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140 : AIR 2026 SC 933

Frivolous and Vexatious Proceedings

Frivolous and Vexatious Proceedings – Duty of Court – Held that when quashing is sought on grounds that proceedings are frivolous or malicious, the Court must examine the matter with "greater care" - The Court is not restricted to the averments in the complaint alone but must look into attending circumstances and "read in between the lines" - Noted that the appellant had registered the synopsis and scripts for the film between 2012 and 2013, well before the complainant allegedly met the appellant in June 2015 or registered his script in July 2015 - Since the appellant's work preceded the complainant's script, the question of infringement does not arise - the Screen Writers Association (SWA) Dispute Settlement Committee had already found no similarity between the works, a fact suppressed by the complainant - The proceedings were found to be manifestly frivolous and vexatious - The summoning order and the High Court's judgment are quashed and set aside - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mohd. Wajid & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2023) 20 SCC 219; Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749; Paras 13-20] Sujoy Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 271 : 2026 INSC 267 : AIR 2026 SC 1552

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Joint Meeting Requirement – Under Section 5(3) of the Rules, the approval of the Gang Chart must occur after a joint meeting between the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police – Held that no indication of such a meeting in the records, which constitutes a violation of the prescribed rules - Relying on the principle that when a statute prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all - Noted that since the Act permits the mere naming of a person as a "gangster" with "perilous consequences" to individual liberty, the prescribed procedure must be followed scrupulously – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vinod Bihari Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2025 SCC Online SC 1216; Paras 8-12] Gabbar Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2026 INSC 271

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Section 3(1) – Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021 – Rules 5 and 16 – Quashing of FIR – Procedural Irregularity in Gang Chart – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR registered under the Act of 1986 on the grounds that the accompanying Gang Chart was not prepared in accordance with the statutory mandate – Held that a valid Gang Chart requires the recommendation of the Nodal Officer (SHO) and the Additional Superintendent of Police, followed by approval from the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate - These recommendations must be in written form and approvals must be evidenced by signatures - In the present case, a certified copy of the Gang Chart obtained from the Court lacked these necessary signatures and recommendations. Gabbar Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2026 INSC 271

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; Sections 21(vii) and 22 — Maintenance of Dependants — Whether a daughter-in-law who becomes a widow after the death of her father-in-law is a 'dependant' entitled to claim maintenance from his estate? - Held that a plain and literal reading of Section 21(vii) makes it crystal clear that "any widow of his son" is a dependant - The legislature deliberately avoided using the word "predeceased" before "son" in this section, unlike other statutes – At the time of the son's death, whether before or after the father-in-law's demise is immaterial for determining the status of the widow as a dependant - When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its natural meaning – Held that Courts cannot "add, and mend" or supply assumed omissions to the text of the law - Departure from the literal rule is only permissible in rare cases, as the exclusive domain to legislate lies with the legislature. Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2026 INSC 54

Hindu Law

Hindu Law – Alienation – Legal Necessity – Karta's Power - held that alienations by a Karta in favor of a single coparcener must be strictly proved to be for legal necessity - Vague or general recitals in sale deeds regarding "family needs" or "debts" are insufficient to bind the interests of other coparceners - upheld the item-wise scrutiny performed by the lower courts to distinguish between proved legal necessity and impermissible alienations. [Para 33] Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126

Hindu Law – Joint Family Property – Burden of Proof - Supreme Court affirmed that while the mere existence of a joint family does not render all properties joint, once it is established that ancestral properties yielding income existed and acquisitions were made during the subsistence of the joint family, the burden shifts to the person asserting self-acquisition to prove the same - noted that Hindu law does not require coparceners to establish the exact source of funds for every acquisition made by the Karta if a sufficient nucleus is shown. [Relied On Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and Ors. (1954) 1 SCC 544; Pattusami Padayachi v. Mullaiammal and others MLJ (II) 1976 225; Paras 29, 30] Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126

Hindu Law – Wills – Suspicious Circumstances - upheld the rejection of an unregistered Will executed 72 hours prior to the testator's death - Key suspicious circumstances included the use of a thumb impression by a testator who was literate and habitually signed documents, the involvement of a close relative as a scribe instead of a professional, and the exclusion of natural heirs - since the Appellant did not challenge the Trial Court's rejection of the Will at the First Appeal stage, the finding attained finality - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding no ground to interfere with the High Court's judgment, which had correctly applied principles of Hindu Law regarding coparcenary property and legal necessity – Appeals dismissed. Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 25 – Permanent Alimony – Enhancement Of Maintenance – The Supreme Court Enhanced The Permanent alimony awarded to the appellant-wife from ₹15,000/- to ₹30,000/- per month - Noted that the initial amount was inadequate considering the respondent-husband's profession as a doctor with an approximate monthly income of ₹1,60,000/-, the current cost of living, and the impact of inflation – Held that a woman Is Entitled To Live A life consistent with the standard of living she was accustomed to during the subsistence of the marriage - The obligation of the husband to ensure the wife lives with dignity does not end merely because she is educated or has parental support - Sustenance does not mean mere survival; it means leading a life in a similar manner as she would have lived in the house of her husband. Anamika Jain v. Dr. Atul Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Income Tax Act, 1961

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) – India-Mauritius Treaty – Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) – Held that the limited evidentiary role of a TRC in proceedings under Section 245R(2) - While a TRC establishes residency, it does not prevent the Revenue from examining whether an entity is a mere "conduit" or a "see-through entity" used as a device for tax avoidance – Held that the applications were rightly rejected by the AAR as being hit by the threshold jurisdictional bar under proviso (iii) to Section 245R(2) – Supreme Court concluded that capital gains arising from transfers effected after the cut-off date of 01.04.2017 are taxable in India under the Income Tax Act read with the DTAA – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613; Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2023) SC 5551; Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan (2004) 10 SCC 1; LIC v. Escorts Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264; McDowell & Company Ltd v. Commercial Tax Officer (1985) 3 SCC 230; Paras 12-25; 40-50] Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 245R(2) Proviso (iii) – Advance Rulings – Chapter X-A (GAAR) – General Anti-Avoidance Rules - Rejection of application on the ground of being prima facie designed for the avoidance of tax – held that the use of the term "prima facie" in Section 245R(2) implies that the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR) needs only an initial examination of documents to be satisfied that a transaction is for tax avoidance - The level of satisfaction for a prima facie conclusion is much lower than what is required for final proof – Held that that where evidence prima facie establishes that transactions do not qualify as lawful and are impermissible tax-avoidance arrangements, Chapter X-A becomes applicable. Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 260A – Jurisdiction of High Court – Substantial Question of Law – Whether the High Court can decide an issue (taxability under Section 28) not specifically framed as a substantial question of law – Held: Issues incidental or collateral to the main formulated question, on which parties have been heard and which go to the root of the matter, can be considered by the High Court - The absence of a formal formulation does not vitiate the judgment if no prejudice is caused and parties had the opportunity to address the dispute – Appeal dismissed. [Para 9] Jindal Equipment Leasing Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi – II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2026 INSC 46

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 28 and Section 47(vii) – Amalgamation – Substitution of Shares held as Stock-in-Trade – Whether the receipt of shares of an amalgamated company in lieu of shares of an amalgamating company held as stock-in-trade gives rise to taxable business income – Held: Amalgamation is a statutory process of substitution - While Section 47(vii) exempts capital gains arising from such substitution if the shares are "capital assets," it does not apply if they are held as "stock-in-trade" - Taxable business income under Section 28 arises when an assessee receives a real and presently realisable commercial benefit - In the context of amalgamation, the charge under Section 28 crystallises only upon the allotment of new shares, as this is when the assessee receives realisable instruments capable of valuation in money's worth - At the stages of the "appointed date" or "date of court sanction," no such benefit accrues or is received - The profit arising on receipt of the amalgamated company's shares may be taxed under Section 28 where the shares allotted are tradable and possess a definite market value - This is a fact-sensitive test to be determined based on the realisability of the shares in each case. [Relied on Commissioner of Income-tax, Cochin v. Grace Collis and others (2001) 3 SCC 430; Orient Trading Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1997) 3 SCC 340; R. Nagaraj v. Rajamani 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 416; Shiv Raj Gupta v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi (2020) 425 ITR 420 (SC); Paras 18 - 31] Jindal Equipment Leasing Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi – II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2026 INSC 46

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 90 – Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) – India-Mauritius Treaty – Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) – Supreme Court clarified that while a TRC is a valid piece of evidence to establish residence in a contracting state, it does not act as a complete bar to further enquiry by the Revenue - If the Revenue establishes that a Mauritian company was interposed merely as a "conduit" or a "device" to avoid tax, the tax authorities are entitled to "look through" the entity and discard the device to tax the real transaction - The dispute involved the sale of shares of a Singapore-based entity (Flipkart) that derived its value substantially from assets located in India - held that even if the transfer involved shares of a non-resident company (Singapore), the capital gains are taxable in India if the value is derived from Indian assets - The AAR found that the exemption under the India-Mauritius DTAA was intended for the alienation of shares of an Indian company and did not automatically extend to shares of a company resident in a third country (Singapore). Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 2(j) – Definition of "Industry" – Temple/Charitable Trust – The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the findings of the Labour Court and High Court which held that the respondent-Trust, being a temple and a charity-based institution with no object of earning profit or manufacturing activity, does not fall within the definition of "industry". Indravadan N. Adhvaryu Pipala Fali Modhvada v. Laxminarayan Dev Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 102

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(k), Section 10(1), and Section 12 – Existence of Industrial Dispute – Requirement of Prior Demand – The Supreme Court held that a formal written demand by a workman/Union to the employer is not a sine qua non (indispensable condition) for an industrial dispute to exist under Section 2(k) - The ID Act does not prescribe a specific manner for a dispute to arise - Supreme Court distinguished between an existing dispute and an "apprehended" dispute, noting that under Section 10(1), the appropriate Government has the administrative power to refer a matter if it forms an opinion that a dispute is either existing or apprehended – Held that the initiation of conciliation proceedings via a representation to the Conciliation Officer without a prior demand notice to the Management is not ex-facie illegal. Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 33(1) – Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – Interim Relief – Status of Workman – The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Industrial Court and the High Court which had directed the Management to provide work and pay wages to contract labourers during the pendency of a dispute - held that the restrictions under Section 33 of the ID Act against changing service conditions are attracted only if the relationship of "workman" and "management" is established - Where workers are engaged through a registered contractor, their status as direct employees of the management is a matter of adjudication - Granting interim relief that directs continuation or regularization at the preliminary stage amounts to a "virtual pre-judgment" of the main dispute. Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 33(1) – Interim Relief for Contract Labour – Supreme Court set aside interim orders directing the Management to provide work and pay wages to contract labourers during the pendency of a dispute regarding their status - held that the restrictions under Section 33(1) regarding changes to service conditions are only attracted if a direct master-servant relationship is established - Granting such interim relief amounts to a "virtual pre-judgment" of the main dispute where the workers' status as "workmen" of the principal employer is still under adjudication. Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Termination – Grant of Monetary Compensation – Where a permanent employee (Accountant) was orally terminated after twelve years of unblemished service without an inquiry, the Court directed the payment of a lump-sum compensation of ₹12,00,000/- in full and final settlement, even without deciding on the merits of the "industry" status, to lay the entire issue to rest. [Relied on Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa and Others (1978) 2 SCC 213; Paras 2-5] Indravadan N. Adhvaryu Pipala Fali Modhvada v. Laxminarayan Dev Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 102

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vs. CLRA Act, 1970 – Comparative Scope of "Workman" – Supreme Court observed that while the definition of "workman" in Section 2(1)(i) of the CLRA is textually derived from Section 2(s) of the ID Act, they differ in juridical scope - The ID Act requires a direct master-servant relationship (privity of contract), whereas the CLRA recognizes a tripartite relationship where the workman is hired through a contractor - Unlike the ID Act, the CLRA specifically excludes "out-workers" and does not extend the definition to include terminated employees for the purpose of locus standi in disputes. Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87

Industrial Policy

Industrial Policy – New Industrial Unit vs. Expansion - Amalgamation and Transfer of Rights to Subsidies - Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectation- Determination of whether an industrial unit qualifies as a "new industrial unit" under the Industrial Policy of 1989 - held that even if an entity has existing units, a newly established unit with fresh capital investment, separate registration, independent industrial license, and distinct physical location must be treated as a "new industrial unit" – Held that upon the amalgamation of companies, all properties, rights, and interests, including sanctioned subsidies and incentives, stand transferred to the successor-in-interest (the amalgamated company) as per the scheme sanctioned by the High Court - The State and its instrumentalities are bound by unequivocal promises made in Industrial Policies and specific sanction letters - Once an entrepreneur acts upon such promises by making substantial investments and setting up a unit, the authorities cannot arbitrarily resile from or retrospectively amend the policy to deny sanctioned benefits - Supreme Court noted that the MM Plant unit satisfied all criteria for a new unit: investment made after the policy's effective date, independent license, separate electricity connection, and distinct physical location (Sheds 19 & 22 vs. the old unit's Sheds 7 & 8) - The rejection based on an internal instruction from 1994 and a retrospective amendment in 2008 was held to be illegal, as the MM Plant was a "new industrial unit" and not an expansion/modernization project - Noted that the respondents' "volte-face" after sanctioning the subsidies and allowing the appellant to continue production was unfair and untenable - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed the respondents to disburse ₹11,14,750 with 9% p.a. interest within three months. [Relied on Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 2 SCC 409; Gujarat State Financial Corpn. v. Lotus Hotels (P) Ltd. (1983) 3 SCC 379; State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. (2004) 6 SCC 465; State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. (2023) 10 SCC 634; Paras 75-80, 90- 93, 103, 135] IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 18 : 2026 INSC 18

Informed Consent vs. Patient Choice - Supreme Court clarified that while patients have the autonomy to "opt in" or "opt out" of offered treatments, they do not have a right to demand a particular form of treatment - Valid "informed consent" requires "adequate information" concerning the nature, risks, and benefits of a treatment - Because scientific evidence for stem cell therapy in ASD is currently non-existent or inconclusive, practitioners cannot provide the "adequate information" necessary for a valid consent. [Relied on Samira Kohli v. Dr. Prabha Manchandra and Another (2008) 2 SCC 1; Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India and Another, reported in (2018) 5 SCC 1; Paras 92-95, 131, 151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 — Moratorium — Appropriation of Security Deposit against pre-CIRP dues — Held: The appropriation of a cash security deposit available with a creditor after the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) towards dues that arose prior to the CIRP is impermissible and contrary to the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the IBC - Such a deposit remains the property of the Corporate Debtor until a valid adjustment is made - While payments for maintaining the supply of goods and services during the moratorium period (post-CIRP) to keep the Corporate Debtor as a going concern are permissible under Section 14(2A), the recovery of pre-CIRP dues must strictly follow the claim procedure envisaged in the IBC. Central Transmission Utility of India v. Sumit Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : 2026 INSC 284

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 — Moratorium vs. Arbitral Continuity — Noted that the High Court erred in nullifying arbitral orders passed during a moratorium period while exercising jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act - The Supreme Court used its powers under Article 142 to declare transactions (sale of flats) made pursuant to such arbitral orders as lawfully valid to protect third-party homebuyer rights. [Relied on Yashwith Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Simplex Concrete Piles India Ltd. & Anr. (2006) 6 SCC 204; Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578; Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, 1968 SCC Online SC 103; Paras 28-47] Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137 : AIR 2026 SC 1042

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 31(1) — Arbitral Proceedings — Counterclaim vs. Set-off — 'Clean Slate' Principle — Whether a respondent can raise a plea of set-off in arbitration proceedings after the approval of a Resolution Plan, even if its counterclaim was not part of the plan and stands extinguished - Held, that once a Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the IBC, all claims not included in the plan stand extinguished - a respondent cannot seek any affirmative relief through a counterclaim that was not part of the approved plan - if the specific terms of the Resolution Plan only bar payments or settlements and do not expressly or impliedly exclude the plea of set-off as a defense, such a plea can be raised to defend against the appellant's claim - The plea of set-off is permitted only as a defensive tool to prevent the appellant from succeeding entirely or in part - If the amount due to the respondent exceeds the amount awarded to the appellant, the surplus is not recoverable. If the appellant's proceedings are withdrawn, the counterclaim/set-off defense fails. [Relied on Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2021) 9 SCC 657; Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Aircel Ltd. & Dishnet Wireless Ltd. (Resolution Professional) (2024) 4 SCC 668; Paras 21-27] Ujaas Energy Ltd. v. West Bengal Power Development Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 272 : 2026 INSC 268 : AIR 2026 SC 1541

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 61(3)(ii) — Material Irregularity — Seeking clarifications from resolution applicants by the Resolution Professional (RP) under the specific instructions of the CoC does not constitute "material irregularity." - The RP acts as a communicator for the CoC's queries to ensure a comprehensive evaluation of the feasibility and viability of resolution plans - Such conduct does not amount to an independent or unilateral modification of the process by the RP. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7(2) and 7(5)(b) — Adherence to Form — An application under Section 7 is not liable to be rejected for insignificant omissions or technical errors if it is substantially in conformity with Form 1and discloses the essential ingredients: (a) applicant is a financial creditor, (b) existence of a financial debt, (c) occurrence of default, and (d) default meets the threshold under Section 4 - The Adjudicating Authority may allow the rectification of applications and the filing of additional documents at any time before the final order. B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 and Section 31 — Contract Act, 1872; Section 126 — "See to it" Guarantee — Distinction between an Undertaking to Infuse Funds and a Contract of Guarantee — Extinguishment of Debt against Third-Party Sureties - Contract of Guarantee vs. Deed of Undertaking - A "Deed of Undertaking" requiring a promoter to arrange for the infusion of funds into the borrower to comply with financial covenants does not, by itself, constitute a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - To constitute a guarantee, there must be a direct and unambiguous promise to the creditor to perform the promise or discharge the liability of the third person in case of default - An obligation to facilitate the borrower's compliance with covenants is not equivalent to a promise to discharge the borrower's liability to the lender. [Para 20-22] UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Electrosteel Castings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : 2026 INSC 14 : AIR 2026 SC 439

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 — Effect of Counterclaims and Criminal Proceedings — Mere pendency of a counterclaim for damages or the institution of criminal proceedings against the officials of a Financial Creditor does not bar the initiation of CIRP - Such proceedings have no bearing on the existence of the financial debt or the right of the creditor to invoke IBC – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal & Anr. (2021) 6 SCC 366; Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy (2021) 10 SCC 330; M. Suresh Kumar Reddy v. Canara Bank (2023) 8 SCC 387; Paras 31, 37-40, 45-51, 54, 55] B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 — Limitation Act, 1963; Section 18 and Article 137 — Acknowledgement of Debt — The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT's finding that a Section 7 application was within limitation despite the initial default occurring years prior - held that entry of debt in the Corporate Debtor's (CD) balance sheets serves as a valid acknowledgement under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provided it is signed by a director (who acts as an agent of the company) – Noted that how a bank classifies its debt for asset classification (NPA) under RBI norms is not a determining factor for the starting point of limitation if the debt is subsequently restructured and acknowledged in fresh agreements. B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Sections 30(2), 31, 61(3), and 62 — Doctrine of Commercial Wisdom — Scope of Judicial Review — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) is paramount and non-justiciable - The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) and Appellate Authority (NCLAT) have limited jurisdiction to interfere with the CoC's decision, restricted strictly to ensuring compliance with statutory requirements under Section 30(2) and identifying material irregularities under Section 61(3) – Held that courts cannot act as courts of equity or substitute their commercial assessment for that of the CoC, which comprises financial creditors who bear the economic consequences of the corporate debtor's failure. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Debenture Trust Deed (DTD) — Modification of Terms — Procedure for Restructuring — Supreme Court observed that the Corporate Debtor's claim of an existing moratorium was based on unilateral e-mail exchanges with only one debenture holder (ECLF) – Held that such negotiations could not bind other debenture holders or the Debenture Trustee in the absence of express authorization - Any modification, amendment, or waiver of the DTD terms must strictly adhere to the procedure prescribed within the deed itself—specifically requiring a "Special Resolution" passed by a three-fourths majority of debenture holders and a written document signed by all parties. [Paras 13-15, 18] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186 : AIR 2026 SC 1311

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Discretion of Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – Section 7 vs. Section 9 – Held: The use of the word "may" in Section 7(5)(a) confers a degree of discretion upon the NCLT to admit a financial creditor's application, whereas "shall" in Section 9(5)(a) for operational creditors is mandatory - this discretion must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily – Noted that the NCLT should admit a Section 7 application upon satisfaction of financial debt and default, unless there are "good reasons" to the contrary. [Relied on BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. & Anr. (2025) 1 SCC 456; Maitreya Doshi v. Anand Rathi Global Finance Ltd. (2023) 17 SCC 606; Axis Bank Ltd. v. Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 352; Paras 77-104] ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Doctrine of Election – Applicability to IBC Claims – Held: The doctrine of election is not attracted in the context of filing claims against both the debtor and the guarantor - Restricting a creditor to elect between the two would defeat the purpose of a guarantee and potentially lead to the loss of rights under the "clean slate" principle if the full debt is not claimed in a concluding CIRP - There is no statutory proscription in the IBC against filing such simultaneous claims. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Double Enrichment – Safeguards under 2016 Regulations – Held: While concerns regarding double enrichment (recovering more than the total debt) are well-founded, they do not justify a bar on simultaneous proceedings - Sufficient safeguards exist in Regulation 12A (obligation of the creditor to update claims upon partial satisfaction from any source) and Regulation 14 (duty of the Resolution Professional to revise admitted claim amounts based on new information) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Extinguishment of Debt under Resolution Plan - The approval of a Resolution Plan under Section 31 of the IBC does not ipso facto result in the extinguishment of the entire debt against third-party sureties or security providers unless expressly provided for in the plan - Where a Resolution Plan (specifically Clause 3.2(ix) in this case) explicitly reserves the rights of financial creditors to proceed against third parties or promoters for the "unsustainable debt" portion, the discharge of the Corporate Debtor does not bar claims against such third-party security providers – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India (2021) 9 SCC 321; Paras 23-25] UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Electrosteel Castings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : 2026 INSC 14 : AIR 2026 SC 439

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Interaction between IBC and Benami Act – Overriding Effect – Held: While the IBC is a later and special enactment, it does not displace the statutory mechanism of the Benami Act regarding the determination of "tainted" assets - The "residuary jurisdiction" of the NCLT under Section 60(5) cannot be used to "short-circuit" the specialized adjudicatory hierarchy (Adjudicating Authority, Appellate Tribunal, and High Court) established under the Benami Act. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Key Directions issued by the Supreme Court – i. Engagement of NBCC: NBCC is directed to complete the pending projects within stipulated timelines using its own resources and 70% of project receivables; ii. Protection for Home Buyers: Existing allottees shall not be subjected to any cost escalation beyond the original Builder Buyer Agreements; iii. Administrative Oversight: Constitution of an Apex Court Committee and Project-wise Court Committees to monitor progress and approve fund transfers between projects; iv. No Judicial Interference: No Court or Tribunal shall pass interim orders stopping projects commenced by NBCC; any grievances must be brought directly to the Supreme Court; v. Appointment of Amicus Curiae: Mr. Rajiv Jain, Senior Counsel, and Mr. Amarendra Kumar are appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Tribunal and monitor ongoing projects. [Paras 15-22] Apex Heights Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishor Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Liquidation Estate and Beneficial Ownership – Section 36 IBC – Held: Only assets beneficially owned by the corporate debtor form part of the liquidation estate - Since a benamidar (the corporate debtor in this case) possesses no beneficial interest and holds property in a fiduciary capacity, such property is expressly excluded from the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(a)(i) and cannot be distributed to creditors. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Moratorium – Section 14 IBC – Scope – Held: The moratorium under Section 14 is intended to protect the corporate debtor from "creditor actions" for debt recovery -It does not act as an automated stay against sovereign in rem proceedings initiated for the attachment or confiscation of property under penal statutes like the Benami Act - The protection under Section 32A is "event-based" and only triggered upon the approval of a resolution plan or a liquidation sale to an unconnected third party -It does not validate a defective title or retrospectively convert benami property into assets of the corporate debtor during the pendency of proceedings. [Relied on Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2020) 13 SCC 308; State Bank of India v. Union of India (2026 INSC 153); Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021) 7 SCC 209; Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke Mitra (1981) 2 SCC 121; Paras 13-24] S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Object of Code – Resolution vs. Recovery – The fundamental object of the IBC is resolution and revival, not mere recovery - the concept of revival does not exclude recovery altogether; it only excludes the abuse of insolvency as a pressure tactic - Alternative remedies under SARFAESI or RERA remain available, but the presence of such recovery proceedings does not bar the initiation of CIRP under Section 7. [Para 10, 12] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Protection of Homebuyers – Specific Directions – To ensure transparency and safeguard homebuyer interests during CIRP - issued mandatory directions: (i) The Information Memorandum must disclose comprehensive details of all allottees; (ii) The CoC must record specific written reasons if they find it not viable to approve handover of possession under Regulation 4E; and (iii) Any recommendation for liquidation must be accompanied by a reasoned justification. [Relied on Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank (2018) 1 SCC 407; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC 416; GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. BYJU Raveendran (2025) 3 SCC 625; Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17; Para 15] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Real Estate Project – Default in Possession – Completion Certificate – Where a developer fails to obtain a final completion certificate and fails to execute tripartite sublease deeds as required by the lessor (UPSIDA), physical delivery of possession without such legal formalities has no legal import - The existence of a financial debt and default is established when units are not made ready or delivered in a fit state for occupation despite payment of consideration. [Relied on Manish Kumar vs. Union of India (2021) 5 SCC 1; Surendra Trading Company vs. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Company Limited (2017) 16 SCC 143; Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited vs. Sachet Infrastructure Private Limited (2019) SCC OnLine NCLAT 592; Paras 31 - 37] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Resolution Plan — Modification vs. Clarification — Clarifications that reaffirm existing terms of a Resolution Plan—such as confirming the treatment of Bank Guarantees or the Net Present Value (NPV) of deferred payments—do not amount to an unauthorized enhancement or modification of a commercial offer after the conclusion of negotiations. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 12A – Recall of Order – Maintainability – Commercial Wisdom of CoC - The Supreme Court dismissed a Miscellaneous Application (MA) seeking to recall a prior order dated 25.02.2025 that had dismissed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) - The applicant sought recall based on subsequent events, specifically a settlement reached under Section 12A of the IBC and the withdrawal of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Supreme Court reiterated that the decision to accept a settlement or a commercial course of action under Section 12A falls within the "collective commercial wisdom" of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) - held that a higher offer by an applicant does not, by itself, provide a ground to unsettle steps taken within the insolvency framework or to reopen the dismissal of an SLP. Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2026 INSC 275

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 14 – Moratorium – Liability of Natural Persons – While a moratorium under Section 14 shields the corporate debtor, it does not extend to its directors or promoters - the mere absence of a moratorium-related bar does not automatically make directors liable in execution proceedings unless their independent liability was established during the adjudicatory process - A company is a distinct legal entity from its shareholders and directors - The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" is an exceptional measure that requires specific pleadings and a determination of fraud or dishonest misuse of the corporate personality, which cannot be introduced for the first time at the execution stage. [Relied on Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan (2022) 14 SCC 609; Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. (1999) 4 SCC 458; Paras 11-20] Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 40 : 2026 INSC 51

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 60(5)(c) – Jurisdiction of Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – Declaration of Title to Assets – Held, the NCLT cannot exercise its residuary jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) to adjudicate upon complex disputes of title to property (such as trademarks) that are dehors the insolvency proceedings - The nexus with the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor must exist for the NCLT to exercise power under this section – Noted that in the present case, where the approved Resolution Plan itself recognized rival claims and "beliefs" regarding the ownership of the "Gloster" trademark rather than an undisputed assertion of title, the NCLT exceeded its jurisdiction by recorded a finding that the trademark was an asset of the Corporate Debtor. Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81 : AIR 2026 SC 748

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7(1) Second Proviso – Threshold of 100 Allottees – Relevant Date for Calculation – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the crucial date for ascertaining whether the minimum threshold of 100 allottees (or 10% of total allottees) is met is the date of filing of the petition, and not the date of its admission or hearing - Any subsequent settlements or withdrawals during the pendency of the proceedings do not render the petition non-maintainable if the threshold was met at the time of presentation. [Para 9, 21] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Admission of CIRP – Mandatory Nature – Discretion of Adjudicating Authority – Supreme Court issued a set of directions regarding the functioning of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) under the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, noting that while the commercial wisdom of the CoC is paramount, such power must be exercised with responsibility, transparency and proper application of mind, particularly in real estate insolvencies where homebuyers' interests are deeply involved - Held, the inquiry under Section 7(5)(a) is confined strictly to the determination of debt and default - Once the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that a financial debt exists and a default has occurred, it must admit the application unless it is incomplete - Considerations such as project viability, business status (going concern), stage of completion, or perceived prejudice to homebuyers are extraneous and irrelevant at the admission stage. [Para 12] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Real Estate Projects – Role of Third-Party Entities – National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) Jurisdiction – Article 142 of the Constitution of India – The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT's direction to engage NBCC India Ltd., a Government of India entity, to complete 16 stalled residential projects of M/s. Supertech Limited - held that the primary consideration in insolvency proceedings involving real estate companies is to protect the interests of home buyers who have waited decades for shelter - Claims of secured creditors, operational creditors, and land authorities (Noida, Greater Noida, and Yamuna Expressway) are, for the time being, considered secondary to the delivery of units with basic amenities – Held that such an equitable mechanism, aimed at completing construction on a "war footing," does not violate the IBC and warrants protection under the umbrella of Article 142 of the Constitution. Apex Heights Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishor Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 7 — Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) — Admissibility of Application — Existence of Debt and Default — The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the NCLT and NCLAT which had refused to initiate CIRP against the Corporate Debtor - held that for admission of an application under Section 7, the adjudicating authority is only required to examine and satisfy itself that a financial debt exists and there is a default in relation thereto - The concept of a "pre-existing dispute," relevant for operational creditors under Section 9, has no bearing on applications filed by financial creditors under Section 7. [Para 12] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186 : AIR 2026 SC 1311

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Locus Standi of Homebuyer Societies – Held, a society or Resident Welfare Association (RWA) does not possess locus standi to intervene in Section 7 proceedings at the pre-admission stage - At this stage, proceedings are in personam between the applicant creditor and the corporate debtor - While individual allottees are "financial creditors" under the Explanation to Section 5(8)(f), this status does not automatically extend to a society unless it is a creditor in its own right or a statutorily recognized authorized representative. [Para 13] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Maintainability of Joint Petition – Multi-Corporate Entities – Threshold Requirement – Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of a single Section 7 application against two separate corporate entities (Grand Venezia Ltd. and Bhasin Ltd.) where they were found to be "intrinsically linked" in the construction and implementation of a real estate project -Noted that interlinkage of related corporate debtors is beneficial for value maximization and for continuing companies as going concerns. [Para 11 - 16, 20 - 26] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 vs. Companies Act, 1956 – Sections 391-394 – Overriding effect of IBC – Redundancy of Scheme of Arrangement (SOA) due to gross delay – The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC cannot be stalled on the grounds of "judicial discipline" due to a pending Scheme of Arrangement under the Companies Act, especially when such a scheme has become defunct and inoperative due to a decade-long delay and non-compliance with statutory timelines - Noted that the IBC is a special statute aimed at the revival of companies, and its provisions prevail over inconsistent provisions in other laws by virtue of Section 238. Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189 : AIR 2026 SC 1205

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 14, 36, 60(5), and 238 – Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Sections 24 and 27 – Jurisdiction of NCLT/NCLAT over Benami Proceedings – Held: The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) do not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legality or validity of provisional attachment orders or confiscation proceedings initiated under the Benami Act - Such proceedings fall within the realm of public law and sovereign functions of the State, which are distinct from private proprietary disputes or debt recovery actions. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 18(f) and 36(4) – Applicability to Spectrum – Ownership vs. Right to Use – Held, Spectrum allocated to Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) cannot be subjected to proceedings under the IBC - While spectrum may be recorded as an "intangible asset" in the TSPs' books of account for accounting purposes in compliance with AS 26 and Ind AS 38, such recognition is not determinative of ownership - The IBC explicitly excludes assets owned by a third party but held by the corporate debtor under contractual arrangements from the insolvency/liquidation estate - Since the Union of India retains exclusive privilege and ownership over spectrum as a trustee for the public, the TSPs hold only a limited, conditional, and revocable "right to use". [Paras 60, 61, 63, 69] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 31, 43, and 45 – Modification of Resolution Plan – Avoidance Transactions – Noted that the NCLT cannot, while adjudicating a miscellaneous application, grant rights to a Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) that are better than or different from those recognized in the Committee of Creditors (CoC) approved Resolution Plan - Any such declaration amounts to an impermissible modification of the approved plan - the NCLT cannot suo motu or "by a sidewind" neutralize transactions as preferential (Section 43) or undervalued (Section 45) without a formal application by the Resolution Professional (or under Section 47 by a creditor) and without providing the affected party clear notice and a fair opportunity to respond - Such summary findings are perverse and violate principles of natural justice. Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81 : AIR 2026 SC 748

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 7, 60(2), and 60(3) – Simultaneous Proceedings – Maintainability of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Principal Debtor and Corporate Guarantor – Held: Simultaneous proceedings for CIRP under the IBC against both the principal debtor and its corporate guarantor (or vice-versa) are maintainable - The liability of a surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - The IBC permits separate or simultaneous proceedings to be initiated by a financial creditor against both entities. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Set-off in CIRP — Pari Passu Principle — Held - The principle of insolvency set-off as permitted in liquidation regulations cannot be applied to CIRP - Set-off of dues payable by the Corporate Debtor for a period prior to the commencement of the CIRP cannot be made from dues (or assets) payable to or belonging to the Corporate Debtor post the commencement of the CIRP - Allowing such a set-off would mitigate against the pari passu principle essential to the scheme of the IBC. [Relied on Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Aircel Ltd. & Dishnet Wireless Ltd. (Resolution Professional), (2024) 4 SCC 668; Paras 15-25] Central Transmission Utility of India v. Sumit Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : 2026 INSC 284

Interest Act, 1978

Interest Act, 1978; Section 3(3) - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 34 - Contractual Bar on Interest - Sustainability of interest on delayed payments when specifically excluded by contract – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had granted interest for delayed payments to a government contractor - held that when parties explicitly agree via a contract clause (such as Clause 5 of the preliminary agreement) that no interest or damages shall be claimed for belated settlement of bills, such terms are binding - The Interest Act, 1978, mandates interest only in the absence of an agreement or where terms are contrary to law - Section 3(3) of the Interest Act, 1978, ensures that contractual prohibitions on interest are respected, and Section 34 of the CPC does not have an overriding effect on this provision. [Paras 6 - 10] Kerala Water Authority v. T.I. Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 172

Interpretation of Statutes

Interpretation of Statutes – Omission of Provisions – Where a statutory provision is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause, all proceedings founded upon such provision must lapse - noted that while the diversion of government property might attract the Indian Penal Code, the investigating agency failed to invoke those provisions, and the High Court cannot substitute a conviction under a distinct statutory offense for the first time in appeal – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India (2000) 2 SCC 536; Paras 16-25] Manoj v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2026 INSC 152

Interpretation of Statutes - Statutory Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Conflict between IBC and Telecommunication Laws – Where two special statutes contain non-obstante clauses, the court must analyze the dominant purpose of each - The IBC focuses on the reorganization of the corporate debtor, whereas the Telegraph Act, Wireless Telegraphy Act, and TRAI Act form an exhaustive code for the telecom sector - The IBC cannot be permitted to make inroads into the telecom sector to restructure rights and liabilities arising from the administration of spectrum, which falls under the exclusive legal province of the Union and the Regulator. [Relied on Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1; Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1; Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 13 SCC 308; Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India, (2011) 10 SCC 543; Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Paras 64, 66, 67] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Intervenors/Non-Parties

Intervenors/Non-Parties — Right to Seek Review — Even a non-party to the proceedings can seek a review of an order if they perceive themselves to be an "aggrieved person" and satisfy the court of such a standing - Judgments in service matters often affect a class of employees beyond the immediate parties. Such judgments are not strictly in personam and can adversely affect the rights of others who were not joined in the original litigation. [Relied on Union of India v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad (2019) 18 SCC 586; Ajit Babu v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 473; K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 473; Paras 13-20] Dr. Jiji K.S. v. Shibu K., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 212 : 2026 INSC 207

Investigation

Investigation - Lapses in Investigation – Failure to Secure Crime Scene and Independent Witnesses - Held: Overzealous or lethargic investigations are equally fatal to the prosecution - The failure of the Investigating Officer (I.O.) to draw a scene mahazar, conduct forensic examinations to rule out accidental fire (e.g., cylinder burst), or examine independent witnesses despite their presence at the scene constitutes a serious lacuna – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2010) 9 SCC 1; Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710; Paras 10-31] Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 230 : 2026 INSC 223

Judiciary

Guide for Judicial Magistrates – Discretionary Power - The use of the word "may" in Section 175(4) signifies discretionary power- i. If the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied the act was in the discharge of official duty, they must follow the Section 175(4) procedure; ii. If they are satisfied the act had no reasonable nexus to official duty, they may proceed under the general procedure of Section 175(3); iii. Magistrates are not required to wait indefinitely for a report from superior officers; if a report is not submitted within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may proceed based on the public servant's version if available - Supreme Court reiterated that a judicial order passed by a Magistrate in criminal matters (such as calling for a report under Section 175(4)) cannot be challenged through a writ petition under Article 226 - The appropriate remedy is a petition under Section 528 of the BNSS or Article 227 of the Constitution. [Paras 46-55] xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3(2) First Proviso – Interpretation – Joint Committee – Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition filed by Justice Yashwant Varma of the Allahabad High Court challenging the Lok Sabha Speaker's decision to form an inquiry committee as per the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, in the impeachment motion moved against him in relation to the discovery of unaccounted cash at his official residence - The first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act mandates the constitution of a Joint Committee only in the specific situation where notices of motion are given in both Houses of Parliament on the same day and are subsequently admitted by both Houses - The proviso is situational and not exhaustive; it does not contemplate or govern scenarios where a notice is admitted in one House but rejected in the other - Rejection of a motion in one House does not render the other House incompetent to proceed independently - To hold otherwise would allow for the scuttling of proceedings through the deliberate introduction of defective notices in one House to frustrate a valid motion in the other. [Relied on Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699; Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, (1991) 3 SCC 442; Amina Marwa Sabreen v. State of Kerala, (2018) 14 SCC 193; Paras 12, 14-22, 29- 45] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3 – Role of the Secretariat – The Secretariat of a House should exercise restraint and confine its role to administrative scrutiny, such as verification of procedural compliance (e.g., signature verification) - It cannot assume quasi-adjudicatory functions by performing a substantive assessment of the merits of allegations or the correctness of facts pleaded in a notice of motion - The final decision on the admission of a motion rests solely with the Speaker or the Chairman as the case may be. [Paras 49 - 54] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Judicial Conduct – Appellate Court's handling of Non-Appearance – The Supreme Court expressed that it was "appalling and shocking" for an Appellate Court to insist on the appearance of an appellant on every date despite a suspension of sentence - If a counsel is not assisting or has been changed frequently, the appropriate course is for the Court to appoint an amicus curiae or allow the accused to make alternative arrangements, rather than immediately cancelling bail and issuing Non-Bailable Warrants (NBW). Meenakshi v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 60

Judicial Discipline and Binding Precedents – Noted that Subordinate authorities must follow the orders of higher appellate authorities unreservedly - Disregarding the law laid down in previous decisions or overreaching superior court orders subverts the Rule of Law and undermines constitutional authority. [Relied on Baradakanta Misra v. Bhimsen Dixit, (1973) 1 SCC 446; Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corpn. Ltd., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 443; C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, (1995) 5 SCC 457; Paras 11- 15] Rajesh Goyal v. Laxmi Constructions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2026 INSC 299

Judicial Discipline and Precedent – Supreme Court emphasized that once a declaration of law is made by a High Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court, it acquires binding normative force - A coordinate Bench of the High Court cannot deny relief for a subsequent period when the underlying legal framework and factual footing remain unchanged - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's 2019 judgment and directed the refund of customs duty collected for the period from 16 September 2010 to 15 February 2016. [Paras 89-91] Adani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : 2026 INSC 1

Judicial Discipline – Supreme Court observed that when proceedings are terminated due to the existence of an alternative remedy, the proceedings do not survive and must end immediately - Passing interim orders in such circumstances "circumvents" statutory provisions and exceeds the scope of Article 226. [Relied on State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta (1952) AIR 1952 SC 12; Paras 6, 7, 8] Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2026 INSC 185

Judicial Discipline vs. Economic Implications – While judicial discipline is a cornerstone of justice, it cannot be used by "tardy litigators" to jeopardize public funds or put the economy in a "hostage situation." - In cases with significant economic implications, the larger national interest of rehabilitating an industry and ensuring financial probity takes pre-eminence – Appeals allowed. [Relied on A. Navinchandra Steels (P) Ltd. v. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. (2021) 4 SCC 435; Paras 13-20] Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189 : AIR 2026 SC 1205

Judicial Independence – Fearless Trial Judiciary – Role of High Courts – Held that fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary - High Courts, while exercising supervisory control, must ensure that judicial officers are not put through the ordeal of disciplinary proceedings for mere errors of judgment - The "lurking fear" of administrative action often leads trial judges to shirk their responsibility in bail matters, resulting in the flooding of High Courts and the Supreme Court with bail applications. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7

Judicial Propriety – Right of Hearing – Held, that the High Court should not have entertained and disposed of the matter without issuance of notice to either the State or the Defacto Complainant – Noted that in petitions praying for the quashing of an FIR, the High Court should not pass orders directing compliance with Section 41-A Cr.PC (or Section 35(3) BNSS) as it indirectly amounts to granting relief that should only be considered if a prima facie case for quashing is established. [Relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401; Paras 9-13] Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Judicial Review – Recruitment Process – Interference with Answer Key – Power of High Court to act as Subject Expert – Held: The High Court, while exercising its power of judicial review, cannot assume the role of a "super-examiner" or subject expert - Even in examinations for judicial services where Judges may have vast legal experience, the exercise of re-evaluating or re-considering an answer key should ordinarily be left to domain experts. Jharkhand Public Service Commission v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Judicial Scrutiny of Bail Orders – Held that the High Court's decision to grant bail by dissecting medical evidence and questioning the "intent to kill" due to a gap between the assault and death (septicaemia) was found to be premature - Such detailed analysis is reserved for the trial - The presence of multiple injuries, including cerebral damage from blunt trauma, outweighed the "extraneous considerations" of pending civil litigation and lack of specific role attribution – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 320; Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172; Victim 'XX' v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2025) INSC 877; Paras 21, 22, 29 - 31] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 278

Judicial Sensitivity – Protection of Vulnerable Victims – Guidelines – Taking note of the "insensitivity" and "impassive judicial decisions" in cases involving sexual offences, the Supreme Court directed the National Judicial Academy to constitute a Committee of Experts to draft comprehensive guidelines - These guidelines aim to inculcate compassion and empathy into the judicial process, specifically for cases involving children and women. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mahendra alias Golu, (2022) 12 SCC 442; Paras 11-24] In Re: Order Dated 17.03.2025 Passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : 2026 INSC 165

Juvenile Justice

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Section 94 — Mandatory Procedure for Age Determination — The procedure for determining the age of a victim or juvenile is strictly governed by Section 94(2) of the JJ Act - Priority must be given to: (i) school/matriculation certificates, or (ii) birth certificates from local authorities - Medical age determination (ossification test) can only be resorted to in the absence of such documentary evidence – Held that the High Court erred in holding that medical reports could prevail over school records at the bail stage. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Labour Law

Labour Law — The Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 (BOCW Act) and The Building and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Cess Act, 1996 (Cess Act) — Implementation and Levy: Held, that although the BOCW Act and Cess Act were enacted in 1996, they remained "dormant" in various states until the necessary machinery, specifically the Welfare Boards under Section 18, was constituted - The constitution of Welfare Boards is a sine qua non (condition precedent) for the levy and collection of cess - While the registration of workers is not a prerequisite for collecting cess, the existence of a Board to receive and utilize the funds is essential. [Paras 36, 50, 59] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76

Land Acquisition

Land Acquisition (Special Railway Projects) Rules, 2016 — Railways Act, 1989 — Section 20-F — Setting aside of Award — Scope of judicial interference — Representative Capacity — The Supreme Court held that the setting aside of a compensation award on grounds of excessive payment, collusion, or "colourable exercise of powers" against specific land owners does not ipso facto result in the entire acquisition award being set aside for all beneficiaries - Noted that out of 550 land owners, only a few were specifically impleaded and alleged to have received unjust enrichment - Since the appellant was not part of the inquiry report, not arrayed as an accused in the FIR, and his specific award was not challenged by the Railways, the High Court erred in applying a blanket cancellation of his award based on a separate judgment involving different parties - noted that the Railways Act, 1989, does not confer any power of review on the Competent Authority or the Arbitrator appointed under the Rules of 2016 - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders and restored the initial award and the arbitral enhancement in favor of the appellant, directing disbursement within three months with interest and solatium – Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-14] Niraj Jain v. Competent Authority-cum-Additional Collector, Jagdalpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 83 : 2026 INSC 86

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A - Delay and Redetermination – Noted that the fact that landowners received compensation based on an earlier Section 28-A application is irrelevant to their right to seek further parity with enhanced awards passed by higher courts for similarly placed landowners - The purpose of Section 28-A is to remove inequality between affluent landowners who can afford litigation and poor landowners who cannot - Acquisition – When an appeal is preferred against an award of the Reference Court, the High Court's decision becomes the operative award - The principle of merger ensures that the finality of the compensation is determined by the highest court that has adjudicated the matter. [Relied on Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736; Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 92; Paras 15-27] Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2026 INSC 293

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A - Re-determination of Compensation - Maintainability of second application - Doctrine of Merger – The Supreme Court held that landowners are entitled to seek re-determination of compensation based on a subsequent High Court award even if they had previously filed an application based on a Reference Court award – Noted that once a Reference Court's award is challenged and decided by the High Court, the lower award merges into the High Court's judgment - there is no legal bar for appellants to seek re-determination based on the High Court's award, as the earlier Reference Court award no longer exists independently. Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2026 INSC 293

Land Acquisition – Disparity in Compensation Mechanism – National Highways Act, 1956 vs. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Supreme Court observed a lack of "intelligible differentia" in the treatment of land owners whose land is acquired under the 1956 Act compared to those under the 2013 Act - While 2013 Act acquisitions involve judicial oversight by District Judges, the 1956 Act relies on administrative officers (Collectors/Commissioners) acting as arbitrators who may lack a "judicially trained mind" to adjudicate complex market value issues – Noted that the Union of India to revisit the legislative scheme to bring parity in the mechanism for determining market value with reference to Article 300-A of the Constitution – Supreme Court directed that the Interim orders to continue; Registry directed to forward the order to the Attorney General and Solicitor General of India for consideration. [Relied on Union of India & another vs. Tarsem Singh & others, (2019) 9 SCC 304; Para 5-12] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Legal Profession

Legal Profession – Professional Misconduct – Supreme Court expressed concern over the "sorry state of affairs" where legal professionals turned into perpetrators of violence - noted that while fraternity among lawyers is understandable, it cannot justify lawlessness or the burning of a colleague's property for defending an accused - The Bar Council of India was directed to take appropriate action against the erring members. [Paras 12-17] Vishvjeet v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2026 INSC 254

Legitimate Expectation

Legitimate Expectation – Duty to Allot – In the absence of fraud, collusion, or material irregularity, the highest bidder whose bid exceeds the reserve price has a legitimate expectation to receive an allotment letter. The returning of earnest money does not legitimize an arbitrary cancellation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Eva Agro Feeds (P) Ltd. vs. Punjab National Bank (2023) 10 SCC 189; K. Kumara Gupta vs. Sri Markendaya & Sri Omkareswara Swamy Temple (2022) 5 SCC 710; Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour vs. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (2024) 15 SCC 461] Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22

Limitation Act, 1963

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Condonation of Delay — State/Government Litigants — The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Odisha, refusing to condone a delay of 123 days in filing and 96 days in re-filing – Held that while a liberal approach and certain latitude ("play at the joints") are traditionally extended to the State due to procedural red tape, there is a limit to such indulgence – Noted that the State's explanation—citing "procedural delay in obtaining approval from the higher authority"—as a "lame excuse" rather than a "sufficient cause." – Noted that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretionary power, and the State had shown "utter lethargy" throughout the proceedings in both the High Court and the Supreme Court. State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2026 INSC 148

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Sufficient Cause vs. Bureaucratic Indifference — Relying on its previous observations in Amateur Riders Club, reiterated that "there is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference." - noted that despite decades of judicial optimism that governmental promptitude would improve, there has been no conspicuous change, leading to the exhaustion of judicial patience regarding stereotyped explanations for delay. [Relied on Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107; G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142; Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563; Paras 12-20] State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2026 INSC 148

Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 135 of the Schedule – Execution of Decree for Mandatory Injunction – Period of Limitation – The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of an execution application filed beyond the prescribed three-year period - Under Article 135, the limitation for enforcing a decree granting a mandatory injunction is three years, commencing from the date of the decree or the date fixed for performance - Where the decree does not specify a particular date for performance, the limitation period begins from the date of the decree itself - The petitioners sought to execute a mandatory injunction part of a decree dated 06.01.2005 - The execution application was filed on 12.08.2010 - As the decree did not specify a performance date, held that the application was barred by limitation under Article 135, as it was filed more than three years after the decree was passed. [Paras 4, 5] Babu Singh v. Jalandhar Improvement Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 175

Limitation Act - Distinction Between Section 5 and Section 14 of Limitation Act — Supreme Court highlighted a "vital distinction": Section 5 involves a discretionary power to extend time based on "sufficient cause," whereas Section 14 is a mandatory provision for the exclusion of time if specific conditions are met - Principles of Section 14 may be applied by analogy to tribunals to prevent manifest injustice, but the discretionary power under Section 5 must be specifically granted by the legislature - Procedural laws like limitation can have substantive effects by depriving a party of an accrued right to plead a time-bar - Since the respondent's remedy was already time-barred under the old regime before Section 433 of the Act, 2013 came into force, the change in law cannot ensure to their benefit – Held that The High Court erred in affirming the CLB's order condoning a 249-day delay - The CLB lacked the authority to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 – The mechanism envisaged under Section 5 is proximally bound and tethered to the discretion with which a civil court is empowered and that under Section 14 is anchored on restoring the right of a litigant to institute an appeal or application, as the case may be, within the prescribed period of limitation - Both provisions work in the interest of the litigant and seek to further the cause of substantive justice, the kind and nature of the power exercised under the two provisions, as well as the mechanism envisaged therein, are quite distinct - Appeal allowed. Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2026 INSC 33

Limitation and Accrual of Right – The right to approach the Tribunal for broad banding of disability pension effectively accrued on 10.12.2014 (the date of the Ram Avtar judgment), which removed previous legal impediments – noted that claims filed thereafter are not barred by the Limitation Act or Section 22 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act - Supreme Court maintained its consistent stance that the right to receive disability pension is a valuable right, and once found due, the benefit must be granted from the date it became due without being curtailed by a three-year limitation period. [Relied on Union of India & Others v. Ram Avtar, 2014 SCC Online SC 1761; Paras 15-22]. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149

Limitation – Commencement of Period – Identity of Offender – Section 468 & 469(1)(c) CrPC - The Supreme Court held: In cases involving misbranded or substandard drugs where an investigation is necessary to establish the exact chain of supply and the identity of the manufacturers/distributors, the limitation period for taking cognizance commences from the date the identity of the offender is known to the aggrieved person or the investigating officer, as per Section 469(1)(c) of the CrPC - The three-year limitation period under Section 468(2)(c) is computed from the date the identity of all accused persons is clearly established by the competent authority, not necessarily from the date of the initial tip-off or the date of the offense. State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200 : AIR 2026 SC 1270 ; 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 285

Maternity Benefit

Maternity Benefit – Adoptive Mothers – Constitutional Validity of Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 (pari materia with Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961) – Age Limit for Adoption – The Supreme Court struck down the three-month age limit prescribed for an adopted child to entitle the adoptive mother to maternity benefits - held that the distinction between women adopting a child below three months and those adopting an older child lacks a rational nexus with the object of the legislation, which is to dignify motherhood and ensure child welfare - Key Findings noted – i. Motherhood vs. Childbirth: Supreme Court emphasized that maternity benefit is associated with the process of motherhood rather than the biological process of childbirth - Motherhood is a gradual process that takes shape in the heart, and the bond formed outside the womb is as crucial as that formed inside; ii. Article 14 (Equality): The three-month cap was found to be discriminatory and under-inclusive - Adoptive mothers are similarly situated regardless of the child's age, as the need for emotional bonding, nurturing, and family integration remains constant; iii. Article 21 (Reproductive Autonomy): Adoption is an expression of reproductive and decisional autonomy - Denying benefits based on an arbitrary age threshold violates the mother's right to a dignified life and the child's right to holistic care; iv. Practical Unworkability: noted that the legal procedure to declare a child "legally free for adoption" under the Juvenile Justice Act and CARA Regulations typically exceeds two to three months - Thus, the age limit rendered the statutory benefit illusory and otiose in practice; v. Best Interest of the Child: The principle of "best interest" is a continuing obligation that persists throughout the integration period; vi. Judicial Redrafting of Section 60(4): directed that the provision must now be meaningfully read as: "A woman who legally adopts a child or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over"; vii. Paternity Leave: Supreme Court urged the Union of India to recognize paternity leave as a social security benefit, noting that shared parenting is essential for a child's development and for dismantling gendered roles. [Relied on Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), (2000) 3 SCC 224; Deepika Singh v. PGIMER, Chandigarh, (2023) 13 SCC 681; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656; Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 244; State of Kerala v. Unni, (2007) 2 SCC 365; Paras 66-69, 75-82, 131-136, 146-152, 155-158, 166] Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 250 : 2026 INSC 246

Matrimonial Litigation

Matrimonial Litigation – Misuse of Courts – Perjury and Costs - Supreme Court criticized the practice of warring couples treating courts as "battlefields" to settle scores, noting that the parties had filed over 40 cases against each other - While disposing of all matrimonial disputes, the Court specifically directed that applications related to perjury (Section 340 CrPC / Section 379 BNSS) must continue, as no one can be permitted to "pollute the stream of justice" - imposed a token cost of ₹10,000 on each party for choking the judicial system with numerous litigations - Supreme Court emphasized that earnest efforts should be made for pre-litigation mediation and counselling - It observed that the immediate initiation of criminal proceedings often destroys any chance of reconciliation and leads to a "point of no return," especially if arrests occur. [Relied on Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana, (2024) 6 SCR 129; Rakesh Raman vs. Kavita, (2023) 3 SCR 552; Paras 11 – 15, 26-32] Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2026 INSC 73

Medical Law

Medical Ethics – Best Interest Principle – Substituted Judgment Standard – For incompetent patients, the decision to withdraw treatment must be grounded in the "best interest of the patient" - Held: The inquiry is not whether it is in the patient's best interest to die, but whether it is in their best interest to prolong life artificially through futile treatment - The "Substituted Judgment" standard—ascertaining what the patient would have wanted if competent is a critical component of determining their best interest from a dignity-centric lens. [Paras 131, 228, 229] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Medical Ethics – Procedural Guidelines – Minimal Judicial Intervention – Supreme Court emphasized that judicial intervention under Article 226 is only a fallback mechanism when medical boards disagree or hospitals fail to act. In the ordinary course, hospitals must constitute Primary and Secondary Medical Boards as per the Common Cause framework - Implementation of the boards' decision must follow a mandatory "Reconsideration Period" of 30 days to allow aggrieved parties to seek legal recourse. [Relied on Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1; Paras 23, 109, 274, 322] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Testimony — Victim Anonymity — Section 228-A IPC — Held that medical evidence is corroborative and an expert opinion - While it may be ignored if it contradicts credible ocular evidence, in this case, the medical findings of lacerated wounds and a torn hymen squarely supported the victim's version - Supreme Court deprecated the practice of freely using the victim's name in court records, despite the 1983 amendment and subsequent mandates intended to prevent social stigma - Directed all Registrars General of High Courts to ensure strict compliance with the proscription of disclosing a victim's identity. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Chatra (2025) 8 SCC 613; State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh (2025) 8 SCC 545; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh (2019) 16 SCC 759; State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2801; State of U.P. v. M. K. Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505; Para 12- 15] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukum Chand @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : 2026 INSC 290

Medical Jurisprudence — Postmortem Examination — Professional Misconduct — Premature Disclosure to Media - Held: The conduct of an autopsy surgeon in furnishing an erroneous report based on "naked eye" observations—without waiting for forensic (FSL) results and publicizing sensational claims to the media constitutes professional misconduct and contempt of court - Such actions spread misinformation, erode trust in investigative agencies, and violate the sub judice rule - Justice is served by truth established through impartial investigation, not by following majority sentiment or public pressure amplified by premature media reports. [Relied on Munna Kumar Upadhyay Alias Munna Upadhyaya vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC 174; State of W.B. vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 382; Raj Kumar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 353; Abhinav Mohan Delkar vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC Online SC 1725; Patel Babubhai Manohardas vs. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC Online SC 503; Paras 102-106, 110, 117-119] Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2026 INSC 160 : AIR 2026 SC 950

Medical Law – Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) – Definition of "Medical Treatment" – Supreme Court clarified that CANH (enteral or parenteral nutrition via tubes) is a technologically mediated medical intervention, not mere basic care or sustenance - Held: Since CANH involves specialized medical protocols, risks of complications, and clinical assessment, it constitutes "medical treatment" amenable to withdrawal or withholding under the Common Cause guidelines. [Paras 118, 125, 128, 130] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Medical Negligence and Standard of Care: Permissibility of Stem Cell "Therapy" for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) - held that every medical practitioner owes a fiduciary duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill, and knowledge expected of a prudent practitioner - A practitioner fails to meet this standard if they administer an intervention that lacks credible scientific evidence of safety and efficacy, or is explicitly not recommended by authoritative medical bodies - Since therapeutic use of stem cells in ASD is not recognized as a "sound and relevant medical practice" by the ICMR or NMC, offering it as a routine clinical service outside an approved clinical trial constitutes a failure to meet the reasonable standard of care. [Relied on Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha and others (1996) 86 COMP 806; Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1; M.A. Biviji v. Sunita and Others, reported in (2024) 2 SCC 242; Paras 59, 61, 63, 70, 90, 151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96

Medical Termination of Pregnancy – Reproductive Autonomy and Bodily Integrity – Right to Life and Liberty under Article 21 – Supreme Court allowed the medical termination of a 30-week pregnancy of a girl who conceived as a minor – Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court's order which had declined termination on the grounds of foetal viability and the possibility of adoption - Key Principles Established – i. Priority of Maternal Rights: held that the reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity of the pregnant woman must be given sufficient emphasis over the rights of an unborn foetus; ii. Decisional Autonomy: A woman's right to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to term is firmly rooted in her right to bodily autonomy – Noted that forcing a woman to continue an unwanted pregnancy causes "visceral" trauma and ignores the physical and mental transformations a woman's body undergoes; iii. Irrelevance of Foetal Viability: When a pregnant woman is determined to terminate and has detached herself from the pregnancy, considerations such as whether the child would be born healthy or is viable are not relevant; iv. Status of the Mother: The fact that the daughter had crossed 18 years of age by the time of the High Court order was deemed "irrelevant," as she was a minor at the time of conception and the pregnancy resulted from a relationship outside of wedlock. [Relied on X vs. Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1321; Paras 15-17] A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 160

Military

Military Pension – Disability Pension – Attributes of Service – Impact of Lifestyle Habits – The Supreme Court upheld the denial of disability pension to an army personnel suffering from "Stroke Ischemic RT MCA TERRITORY" - Noted that the disease was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service, as the Medical Board clearly opined that the condition could have been occasioned by the appellant's habit of smoking ten bidis per day. Sarevesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 163

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

No-Fault Liability – Principle and International Precedent – Supreme Court emphasized that requiring proof of negligence through civil courts or consumer fora imposes an "onerous burden" on families in complex scientific matters - Relying on the principle of no-fault liability (similar to Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), Supreme Court noted that global jurisdictions, including Australia, the UK, and Japan, have implemented dedicated COVID-19 vaccine injury compensation schemes - Supreme Court declined to appoint an independent medical board, finding the existing National and State AEFI Committees adequate for scientific assessment - it reaffirmed the state's duty to maintain transparent surveillance and ensure AEFI data is accessible in the public domain. [Relied on Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India (2022 SCC OnLine SC 533); In re: Distribution of Essential Supplies and Services During Pandemic (2021 SCC OnLine SC 372); Gaurav Kumar Bansal v. Union of India (W.P.(C) No. 539/2021); Paras 27-37] Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218

Motor accident compensation — Procedural Lapses — Non-joinder of driver — Held: The provision for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to enhance social justice, the rigours of procedure, such as not adding a driver as a party, cannot be allowed to defeat the purpose of the Act, especially as the trial is summary in nature. [Relied on Helen C. Rebello & Ors. Vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (1999) 1 SCC 90; Sebastiani Lakra vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2019) 17 SCC 465; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Patricia Jean Mahajan & Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 281; Paras 12-17] Managing Director, KSRTC v. P. Chandramouli, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 245 : 2026 INSC 241 : AIR 2026 SC 1441

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 2(28) — Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958; Section 3 — Constitution of India; Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 57 — Taxability of Heavy Earth Moving Machinery/Construction Equipment Vehicles - The Supreme Court held that heavy earth moving machinery and construction equipment vehicles (such as Dumpers, Loaders, Excavators, etc.) designed for off-road use within factory or enclosed premises are excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" under the second part of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Supreme Court made following findings- i. Definition of Motor Vehicle: While such vehicles may fall under the inclusive first part of Section 2(28), they are specifically excluded by the second part of the definition, which omits "a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises"; ii. Constitutional Limitation: Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule only permits states to tax vehicles "suitable for use on roads”- Noted that if a vehicle is designed for off-road operations and does not derive benefit from public road infrastructure, it cannot be burdened with motor vehicle tax; iii. Gujarat Tax Act Deficiency: noted that Schedule I of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958, mentions construction equipment vehicles but prescribes no corresponding rate of tax for them - no tax can be levied or collected from such vehicles; iv. Status of Registration: Merely because such vehicles are registered under the Act does not estop the owner from challenging the liability to pay road tax if the vehicles do not ply on public roads – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bolani Ores Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1974) 2 SCC 777; Tarachand Logistic Solutions Limited vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1851; Paras 37-39, 42-45, 55] Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 27 : 2026 INSC 43

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Assessment of Disability and Loss of Earning Capacity – Functional Disability vs. Physical Disability – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision to reduce the functional disability of the appellant-claimant from 63% to 30% - held that the High Court failed to provide cogent reasons for disregarding the Medical Board's certificate and the neuropsychological report which evidenced severe cognitive impairment, partial blindness, and intellectual disability resulting from a head injury - Noted that for a professional like a Manager, whose role depends on memory and analytical skills, such neurological deficits lead to a profound erosion of faculties essential for employment - the Supreme Court enhanced the functional disability to 100% for the purpose of computing compensation - Supreme Court increased the compensation from ₹35.61 lakh (as fixed by the Madras High Court) to ₹97.73 lakh, restoring and expanding the approach adopted by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT). [Paras 21 - 30] R. Halle v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2026 INSC 260 : AIR 2026 SC 1511

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Conventional Heads – Loss of Consortium vs. Loss of Love and Affection – Subsumption of Heads – Held: Compensation in death cases is restricted to three conventional heads: loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses. "Loss of love and affection" is not a distinct head of compensation and is comprehended within the broader head of "consortium," which encompasses spousal, parental, and filial consortium. [Paras 22 - 29] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131 : AIR 2026 SC 840

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Duties of Appellate Courts – When an appellate court interferes with the findings of fact recorded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), especially regarding disability assessment, it must undertake a thorough reappreciation of evidence and assign clear, convincing reasons - Mechanical reductions of compensation without independent analysis of medical records are not sustainable in law – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343; Paras 22 - 35] R. Halle v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2026 INSC 260 : AIR 2026 SC 1511

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Procedural Safeguards for Deductions – Proof of Receipt – Deductions from MVA compensation cannot be made based on mere assumptions of eligibility - The Tribunal must first determine the full compensation; claimants must then file an affidavit/declaration regarding the receipt of benefits under the 2006 Rules before the executing court - Adjustments to prevent double recovery are to be made only after receipt is established – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Reliance General Insurance v. Shashi Sharma (2016) 9 SCC 627; Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho (2001) 4 SCC 181; State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh (2004) 1 SCC 328; Paras on 6, 7, 8] Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188 : AIR 2026 SC 1188

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Quantum of Compensation – Evidence of Income – Salary Certificate – Held: Determination of income must be founded on proof placed on record and cannot rest on conjecture. Where a salary certificate (Exhibit P-14) and corroborating employer affidavit (PW-3) establish a fixed monthly salary, it is impermissible for courts to assess income at a lower figure without evidence impeaching such documents - Held: Considering the dependents had been pursuing legal proceedings for 15 years since the death of the victim in 2011, the Court enhanced the interest rate to 9% p.a. from the date of filing the claim petition till realization. [Para 32] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131 : AIR 2026 SC 840

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 147 — Liability of Insurer — Gratuitous Passenger in Goods Vehicle — "Pay and Recover" Principle — The Supreme Court restored the Tribunal's order directing the Insurance Company to first pay the compensation to the claimants and subsequently recover the same from the vehicle owner – Noted that the deceased had hired a tempo primarily to transport a Ganesh idol for immersion, making the act of travelling incidental to the transport of goods - In such circumstances, the deceased is treated as a gratuitous passenger travelling with his goods - Supreme Court distinguished this from cases where a vehicle is hired solely for passenger travel, reaffirming that the benevolent object of the Act justifies the "pay and recover" direction even when the insurer is not otherwise liable under the policy – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Manuara Khatun & Ors. v. Rajesh Kumar Singh & Ors. (2017) 4 SCC 796; National Insurance Company Limited v. Saju P. Paul & Anr. (2013) 2 SCC 41; Paras 10-13] Kaminiben v. Oriental Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 174

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 and 168 – Just Compensation – Future Prospects – Held: The addition of future prospects to the established income of the deceased is not a matter of judicial discretion but a mandatory legal requirement. For a deceased who was self-employed or on a fixed salary and below the age of 40 years, an addition of 40% towards future prospects is compulsory. The High Court erred in failing to apply this binding precedent. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680; Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121; Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram (2018) 18 SCC 130; Paras 17, 18, 19] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131 : AIR 2026 SC 840

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Compensation — Deduction of Group Insurance Scheme (GIS) benefits — Held: Amounts received by the dependents of a deceased under an employer-provided group insurance scheme or other contractual/social security benefits cannot be deducted from the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act - These benefits arise from an independent contractual relationship and lack the requisite nexus with the statutory compensation payable for death in a motor vehicle accident - The principle of balancing loss and gain cannot be invoked to diminish the statutory entitlement to "just compensation." [Paras 14 - 16] Managing Director, KSRTC v. P. Chandramouli, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 245 : 2026 INSC 241 : AIR 2026 SC 1441

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 173 — Appeal against Award — Dismissal on ground of Undertaking — Legality of — High Court dismissed the Insurance Company's appeal merely because a local manager had given an undertaking to the Executing Court to satisfy the award - Held: An undertaking to comply with an award, often given under pressure of execution proceedings (such as attachment of office furniture), does not deprive the insurer of its statutory right to challenge the award on merits - The High Court, as the First Appellate Court, is duty-bound to consider the appeal on both law and facts, especially when patent errors in compensation calculation are alleged - Dismissed an appeal without touching the merits caused grave injustice. National Insurance Company Ltd v. Rathlavath Chandulal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 149 : 2026 INSC 146

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 173 – Compensation – Deduction of Compassionate Financial Assistance – Haryana Compassionate Assistance to Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 – Rule 5 – The Supreme Court reiterated that financial assistance received under the 2006 Rules which directly replaces "pay and allowances" (loss of income) must be deducted from the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act to prevent double recovery - components such as family pension, life insurance, and provident fund are not deductible as they do not correspond to the specific head of loss of income. Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188 : AIR 2026 SC 1188

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 2(30) and 147 – Requisition of Vehicle for Election Duty – Determination of Liability – Whether the registered owner/insurer or the requisitioning authority (State) is liable for compensation in case of an accident involving a vehicle requisitioned under statutory orders - Held: When a public authority requisitions a privately owned vehicle for public purposes (such as Gram Panchayat Elections), the nature of possession and control changes entirely - The registered owner is divested of custody and decision-making power, and the vehicle is placed at the disposal of the State for governmental functions – Held that the requisitioning authority assumes the role of the "owner" for the period of requisition. District Magistrate v. National Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : 2026 INSC 279

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Shifting of Liability from Insurer to State – The insurance policy obtained by the owner covers "regular and lawful use" in the ordinary course - Compelled deployment under statutory command cannot be characterized as "regular use" within the usual contemplation of the insurance contract - To fasten liability on the insurer for risks generated exclusively by governmental action would be to extend the contract beyond the agreed risk - responsibility for accidents occurring during the requisition period rests with the requisitioning authority (State) and not the insurer – Although Section 160 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1950, does not expressly authorize requisitioning manpower, if the authority utilizes the services of the driver provided with the vehicle, it implicitly recognizes the driver's competence to operate the vehicle under its control - The liability remains with the State even if the driver is an employee of the original owner, as the driver operates under official directions during the requisition period. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepa Devi (2008) 1 SCC 414; Purnya Kala Devi v. State of Assam (2014) 14 SCC 142; Paras 8-12] District Magistrate v. National Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : 2026 INSC 279

Municipality

Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 (Maharashtra) – Section 143-A(3) – The State Government lacks the authority under Section 143-A(3) to unilaterally "foist" arbitration on parties governed by a concluded contract - The power of the State to issue directions under this section is limited to regulating the manner and procedure of octroi collection and does not extend to appointing an arbitrator for the Municipal Council and its agent. Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Co-accused Statements – Noted that the appellant was arraigned as an accused solely on the basis of a statement made by a co-accused (who was apprehended with 6.330 kg of Ganja) - noted that the actual complicity of the appellant is a matter to be thrashed out during trial - Supreme Court restored the bail and directed that the appellant be released on anticipatory bail by the jurisdictional Investigating Officer – Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-8] Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 50 – Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted – Non-compliance with mandatory requirements – Provision of "Third Option" for search – Noted that the High Court's acquittal of the accused was upheld where the Investigating Officer, while apprising the accused of his rights, provided a "third option" to be searched by the Police Officer instead of only a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer - Such an option is contrary to the statutory mandate of Section 50, which only allows for search before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate – Held that although the contraband (11 kg 50 grams of Charas) was recovered from a bag carried by the accused, Section 50 was attracted because a personal search was also conducted alongside the search of the bag – noted that the prosecution's case was further weakened by the testimony of PW-8 (shopkeeper), who denied providing an electronic weighing scale as claimed by the police, stating he only possessed traditional scales - This discrepancy rendered the prosecution's version of events doubtful and untrustworthy. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand and Another (2014) 5 SCC 345; Suresh and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013) 1 SCC 550; Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat (2011) 1 SCC 609; Paras 17-18] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Surat Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 246 : 2026 INSC 240 : AIR 2026 SC 1420

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Sections 8, 21, and 22 – Drugs (Control) Act, 1950 – Sections 5 and 13 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Appellant sought anticipatory bail in a case involving the seizure of 710 bottles of cough syrup from a car registered in his name, though he was not named in the FIR - Noted that since the appellant had already joined the investigation and was cooperating within the limitations prescribed by law, custodial interrogation was not warranted at this stage - allowing the appeal and setting aside the High Court's denial of bail, the Supreme Court directed that in the event of arrest, the appellant be released on terms fixed by the trial court, subject to compliance with conditions stipulated under Section 482(2) of the BNSS. Vinay Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 180

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(b), 22(c), 25, 27-A, and 29 — Grant of Bail — Prolonged Incarceration vs. Seriousness of Offence — Prosecution's Intention to Examine 159 Witnesses — The petitioner was arrested on March 29, 2022, in connection with the recovery of approximately 2428 Kilograms of Mephedrone - Despite the seriousness of the crime, Supreme Court noted that the petitioner remained in judicial custody as an undertrial prisoner for over 3 years and 6 months - the charge was only framed on January 16, 2026, after the Court's previous intervention. Chintan Rajubhai Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 99

Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 22(c), 23, 28, and 29 — Bail — Commercial Quantity — Prolonged Incarceration — Parity — The Supreme Court granted regular bail to the appellant despite the seizure of a commercial quantity of contraband - noted that the appellant had been in custody for 4 years, 1 month, and 28 days - Relief was further justified on the grounds of parity, as an identically situated accused person traveling on the same flight had already been granted bail by the Court – Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order denying bail and directed release on stringent terms, including the surrender of her passport. Reginamary Chellamani v. State Rep By Superintendent of Customs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2026 INSC 127 : AIR 2026 SC 800

National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016

National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 – Rule 28 – Amendment of Petition before Registration – Abuse of Process – held that alterations or substitutions in the memorandum of parties (names of allottees) made after the initial filing but before formal "registration" by the Registrar do not constitute an abuse of process - Under Rule 28(3), a party is allowed to rectify and amend a returned petition - An application is only treated as "validly filed" once it is complete in every respect and registered under Rule 28(4). [Paras 23, 24] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 14, 2(m) and Schedule I - Jurisdiction of NGT - Removal of Encroachment - The Supreme Court set aside an NGT order directing the removal of a temple and associated structures allegedly built on land earmarked for a park/open space - held that for the NGT to exercise jurisdiction under Section 14, there must be a "substantial question relating to environment" involving the implementation of specific enactments listed in Schedule I of the Act - Since the dispute involved alleged violations of Municipal Laws and Town Planning Acts which are not included in Schedule I, the NGT lacked the jurisdiction to order the removal of the encroachment. Narender Bhardwaj v. 108 Super Complex R.W.A., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 249

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(m) - Substantial Question Relating to Environment - Definition includes instances of direct violation of specific environmental statutory obligations affecting the community at large, substantial damage to environment/property, or measurable damage to public health. Jurisdiction is strictly limited to the seven central environmental laws specified in Schedule I. [Paras 7-10] Narender Bhardwaj v. 108 Super Complex R.W.A., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 249

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 14 – Jurisdiction – Substantial Question Relating to Environment –The NGT's jurisdiction is limited to civil cases involving a "substantial question relating to environment" arising from enactments in Schedule I - Held: Issues intrinsically connected to building plan violations and land-use disputes already under adjudication by the High Court do not qualify as substantial environmental questions for NGT intervention - Every dispute pertaining to the environment is not a "substantial question" under Section 2(1)(m) of the Act. [Relied on Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 534; Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody, (2025) 4 SCC 150; State of M.P. v. Centre for Environment Protection Research & Development, (2020) 9 SCC 781; Paras 104 - 106] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 15 – Remedial Jurisdiction – Enhancement of Compensation – The NGT is competent to enhance compensation recommended by a Joint Committee if it finds the amount inadequate to reflect the scale and impact of violations - Such an exercise of informed discretion, where expert findings are filtered and integrated into a reasoned outcome, does not amount to an abdication of adjudicatory functions. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Sections 15 and 20 – Environmental Compensation – Quantification Metrics – Project Cost and Turnover – The Supreme Court upheld the power of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) to use project cost or turnover as a relevant yardstick for calculating environmental compensation - held that while a uniform formula is not prescribed by statute, linking the scale of operations to environmental harm is a permissible exercise of discretion under the 'Polluter Pays' principle - Larger operations signify a larger environmental footprint, and it is logical for companies profiting from scale to bear higher responsibility for environmental costs. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

National Highways Act, 1956

National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3-J — Entitlement to Solatium and Interest — Nature of Application of Tarsem Singh-I — The Supreme Court clarified the temporal application of its decision in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304 - While the declaration of Section 3-J as unconstitutional operates from the inception of the provision, Supreme Court issued specific directions to prevent the reopening of long-settled cases and to manage the financial implications on the public exchequer – Key Points – i. Settled Cases: Landowners whose claims were concluded prior to the date of the Tarsem Singh-I judgment (September 19, 2019) without any pending litigation (Appeals, Writ Petitions, or SLPs) are not entitled to reopen their cases to claim solatium or interest; ii. Pending Litigation: In cases where litigation was pending as of September 19, 2019, landowners are entitled to 'solatium' and 'interest' as per the 1894 Act standards; iii. Interest on Solatium: Landowners are entitled to 'interest on solatium' only from the date such specific claims were raised; iv. No Recovery: The Supreme Court clarified that these directions do not authorize the NHAI or the Union of India to seek refunds or recovery of solatium or interest already paid to landowners. [Relied on Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304; Paras 13-17] National Highways Authority of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2026 INSC 291

Navy Act, 1957

Navy Act, 1957 – Section 15(2) read with Regulation 216 of Navy (Discipline and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations, 1967 – Termination of Service – While the Government/Chief of Naval Staff has the power to terminate services for misconduct, such power must be exercised based on specific foundational facts: (i) meaningful consideration of misconduct reports, (ii) satisfaction that a court-martial is inexpedient, and (iii) an opinion that further retention of the officer is undesirable – Appeal allowed. [Paras 20 - 27] 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 and 142(1)(b) - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Karnataka High Court that had treated the sequence of condoning delay and taking cognizance as interchangeable or a "curable irregularity" – Noted that under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act, the power to take cognizance of a complaint filed after the prescribed period is expressly subject to the complainant first satisfying the Court that there was sufficient cause for the delay – Held that an order taking cognizance before the delay is formally condoned is legally unsustainable and satisfaction of the Court regarding sufficient cause for delay must precede the act of taking cognizance of a belated complaint - Supreme Court made following Findings: i. Mandatory Sequence: The satisfaction of the Court regarding "sufficient cause" resulting in the condonation of delay must precede the act of taking cognizance; ii. Irregularity not Curable: Held that High Court's view that taking cognizance before condoning delay is a "curable irregularity" is not in keeping with the statutory mandate of the proviso to Section 142(1)(b); iii. Impact of Misrepresentation: noted that the respondent (complainant) contributed to the procedural error by erroneously stating in her complaint that it was filed within time – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2014) 9 SCC 129; Paras 13-15] S. Nagesh v. Shobha S. Aradhya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : 2026 INSC 27 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 12

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 372 and 378 – Appeal against Acquittal – Right of Complainant as 'Victim' – Conflict of Judgments – Reference to Larger Bench – The Supreme Court observed a conflict between a recent co-ordinate Bench decision in Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran (2025 INSC 804) and earlier decisions in Satya Pal Singh vs. State of M.P. and Subhash Chand vs. State (Delhi Administration) regarding whether a complainant in a Section 138 NI Act case must seek special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC or can appeal directly as a 'victim' under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. Everest Automobiles v. Rajit Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 155

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Dishonour of Post-dated Cheques – Presumption of Cheating – Dishonour of a post-dated cheque by itself is not sufficient to presume the existence of a dishonest intention at the time of issuance - Post-dated cheques are often issued to discharge existing or future liabilities and do not carry a representation of sufficient funds at the time of issuance - While dishonour may trigger proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, it does not ipso facto amount to cheating under Section 420 IPC unless dishonest intention is proved from the start. [Relied on Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. (2011) 1 SCC 74; Vesa Holdings Private Limited and Another v. State of Kerala and others (2015) 8 SCC 293; Paras 12-20] V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265 : AIR 2026 SC 1547

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Separate Cause of Action – Held that a separate cause of action arises upon each dishonour of a cheque, provided the statutory sequence of presentation, dishonour, notice, and failure to pay is complete - The fact that multiple cheques arise from a single transaction does not merge them into a single cause of action - Once a cheque is issued in discharge of liability and subsequently dishonoured, a presumption of liability in favour of the complainant arises - The burden of proving the absence of a debt or liability lies with the accused and must be discharged during the trial – Noted that the High Court, while exercising power under Section 482, must avoid conducting a "mini-trial" or usurping the function of the Trial Court when disputed factual questions exist - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's finding that maintaining two separate complaints for the same underlying debt (one for personal cheques and one for firm cheques) amounted to parallel prosecution - held that since the instruments were distinct, drawn on different accounts, and presented on different dates, the law does not bar separate prosecutions - Questions regarding whether cheques were issued as alternative securities or in substitution of one another are mixed questions of fact that cannot be resolved at the threshold under Section 482 - Noted that statutory weight must be given to the presumption under Section 139 - Quashing proceedings prematurely overlooks this legal presumption which operates in favor of the complainant. [Relied on State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2021) 19 SCC 401; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 745 M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Another vs. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 234; Paras 26-45] Sumit Bansal v. MGI Developers and Promoters, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2026 INSC 40

Onus of Proof and Collusion

Onus of Proof and Collusion – Noted that appellant, being the mother of the Managing Director of the judgment-debtor company, failed to produce the tripartite agreement that allegedly facilitated the sale - Held that the sale cannot be deemed to be "without notice" of the existing liability, especially given the relationship between the parties and the long-standing nature of the dispute – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Danesh Singh and others v. Har Pyari (Dead) Thr. LRs. (2025 INSC 1434); Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram (2008) 7 SCC 144; Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew (2023) 20 SCC 76; Paras 10-13] R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150 : AIR 2026 SC 913

Other Backward Classes (OBC)

Other Backward Classes (OBC) – Reservation – Creamy Layer Exclusion – Validity of Clarificatory Letter dated 14.10.2004 vs. Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 – Equality Doctrine - Key Principles Held – i. Primacy of the 1993 Office Memorandum (OM): A mere executive letter of clarification (dated 14.10.2004) cannot override or alter the substantive framework of a parent policy like the 1993 OM - If a clarification introduces new conditions that alter rights, it ceases to be clarificatory and becomes an impermissible amendment; ii. Exclusion of Salary and Agricultural Income: Under the 1993 OM, income from salaries and agricultural land must be excluded from the "Income/Wealth Test" (Category VI) - Supreme Court affirmed that income from salaries alone cannot be the sole criterion for Creamy Layer status; parental status and category of post are essential factors; iii. Hostile Discrimination: Denying OBC-Non-Creamy Layer (NCL) status to children of PSU/private employees based on salary while granting it to similarly placed Government servants (Group C and D) who reach similar income levels is "hostile discrimination." - It treats equals as unequals; iv. Constitutional Imperative: The exclusion of the creamy layer is a constitutional necessity to ensure benefits reach the truly backward - this exercise must be rational and non-arbitrary - directed the Union of India/DoPT to consider the claims of respondent candidates and intervenors based on these principles and to create supernumerary posts as required to accommodate those who satisfy the NCL criteria. [Relied on Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310; Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1; Paras 24 33, 37-43] Union of India v. Rohith Nathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : 2026 INSC 230

Other Backward Classes (OBC) – Reservation – Creamy Layer Exclusion – Validity of Clarificatory Letter dated 14.10.2004 vs. Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 – Equality Doctrine - The Supreme Court dismissed a batch of appeals filed by the Union of India against various High Court judgments which had ruled in favor of candidates from the OBC category - The central controversy was whether the salary of parents employed in Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) or private sectors could be the sole basis for "Creamy Layer" exclusion in the absence of established "equivalence" with government posts - held that treating PSU/private employees differently from Government servants (where salary is excluded from the income test) constitutes hostile discrimination and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Union of India v. Rohith Nathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : 2026 INSC 230

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Jurisdictional Fact – Applicability of Statutes – The applicability of the PG Act depends on "jurisdictional facts" - facts that must exist before an authority can assume jurisdiction - If an employee falls under the exclusionary clause of Section 2(e), the Controlling Authority lacks jurisdiction to award benefits under the PG Act - – Section 14, which provides an overriding effect to the PG Act over other enactments, can only be invoked by those who first qualify as "employees" under Section 2(e) – Noted that since the appellants were excluded by the definition itself, the overriding clause cannot be applied to defeat the specific exclusion. N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143 : AIR 2026 SC 1061

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 2(e) – Definition of "Employee" – Exclusionary Clause – Employees of Heavy Water Plant (HWP), Tuticorin – The Supreme Court held that retired employees of the Heavy Water Plant (HWP), which functions under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), are not covered under the Payment of Gratuity Act (PG Act) - Noted that HWP is an adjunct or ancillary of the DAE and is not a separate corporate entity or PSU - Since the appellants held civil posts under the Central Government and were governed by the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, they fall squarely within the exclusionary limb of Section 2(e) of the PG Act – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Arun Kumar v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 732; Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P., (1989) 1 SCC 164; Paras 12, 13] N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143 : AIR 2026 SC 1061

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Statutory Interpretation – Section 2(e) of PG Act – Use of "Means" and "Does Not Include" – The use of "means" coupled with "does not include" signifies exclusionary language that strictly removes certain classes from the scope of the provision – Noted that a person holding a post under the Central or State Government who is governed by any other Act or Rules providing for gratuity is excluded at the threshold from the definition of "employee". N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143 : AIR 2026 SC 1061

Pension

Pension as Property – Article 300A of the Constitution of India – Pension is not a bounty or a matter of largesse; it is a deferred portion of compensation for past service that matures into a vested and enforceable right - Withholding accrued arrears of disability pension, which became due following judicial determination and government policy, constitutes a deprivation of property under Article 300A – Noted that the decision in Union of India v. Ram Avtar (2014) is a judgment in rem - Therefore, the Union of India should have extended the benefit of broad banding to all eligible ex-servicemen automatically rather than requiring them to file individual applications. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149

Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 125 & 266 – Pension Regulations for the Army, 2008 – Regulation 44, 173 & 175 – Defence Security Corps (DSC) – Second Service Pension – Condonation of Deficiency in Service – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Union of India, holding that personnel of the Defence Security Corps (DSC) are entitled to seek condonation of shortfall in their qualifying service (up to one year) for the purpose of a second service pension - Key Findings – i. DSC as Part of Armed Forces: DSC constitutes a "Corps" of the Indian Army under the Army Act, 1950, and its personnel are recognized as "Armed Forces personnel"; ii. Applicability of General Rules: Paragraph 266 (1961 Regulations) and Paragraph 173 (2008 Regulations) stipulate that pensionary awards for DSC shall be governed by the same rules applicable to the Regular Army, unless specifically inconsistent; iii. No Inconsistency: There is no "inconsistency" or express prohibition in the DSC - specific chapters against the condonation of shortfall provided in Regulation 125 (1961) or Regulation 44 (2008); iv. Calculation of Service: Before applying condonation, the length of service must be determined by treating a fraction of a year between 3 to 6 months as a completed half-year, as per Note 5 of the MoD letter dated 30th October 1987; v. Executive Letters vs. Regulations: The Government cannot override or amend statutory Pension Regulations through administrative letters (such as those dated 20th June 2017 and 22nd March 2022) to bar condonation benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Surender Singh Parmar, (2015) 3 SCC 404; Paras 31-48] Union of India v. Balakrishnan Mullikote, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2026 INSC 286

Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 173 – Guide to Medical Officers, 2002 – Paragraph 6 – Supreme Court noted that compensation cannot be awarded for any disablement or death arising from intemperance in the use of alcohol, tobacco, or drugs, as these are matters within the member's own control – Appeal dismissed. Sarevesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 163

Pharmacy Act, 1948

Pharmacy Act, 1948 – Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015 – Repugnancy – Classification and Equality – Articles 14 and 16 - Supreme Court ruled out repugnancy between the State Cadre Rules and Central legislation/regulations - While the Pharmacy Act and 2015 Regulations govern professional standards and create a "pool" of registered pharmacists, they do not mandate that every registered pharmacist must be considered for public employment. The State Cadre Rules operate in the distinct domain of public recruitment – The prescription of a Diploma as an essential qualification is not arbitrary or irrational - noted a valid "intelligible differentia" based on:i. Course Structure: Diploma holders undergo 500 hours of compulsory hospital training compared to 150 hours for B.Pharma students; ii. Employment Avenues: Diploma holders have more limited career opportunities compared to degree holders, who can apply for higher posts like Drug Inspectors or industrial roles. [Relied on Zahoor Ahmad Rather & Ors. v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad & Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 404; Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. Sandeep Shriram Warade & Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 362; &K Service Selection Recruitment Board & Anr. v. Basit Aslam Wani & Ors. (2020); Paras 47-55, 59 – 64] MD. Firoz Mansuri v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2026 INSC 68

Police

Police Manual - Media Briefing - The Supreme Court directed all States to formulate a policy for police media briefing, taking into account a "Police Manual for Media Briefing" furnished before it by amicus curiae. The Court has given 3 months' time to the states to do the needful. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 77

Practice and Procedure

Practice and Procedure – Miscellaneous Application for Recall – An application for recall of an order dismissing an SLP cannot be used as a "second innings" to litigate issues that were not part of the original proceedings - noted that the original SLP arose from a suit for specific performance, whereas the MA attempted to introduce new grievances related to separate insolvency proceedings - While fraud can vitiate proceedings, such a claim must be proven and cannot be invoked on mere assertion. [Paras 10-15] Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2026 INSC 275

Practice and Procedure – Misconceived SLPs – Article 136 – The Supreme Court observed that the petitions were "misconceived at the threshold" as they combined a challenge to a High Court order with a prayer to secure the benefits of that very same order - Discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 cannot be invoked to grant relief that does not arise from an adjudication of the petitioners' rights on merits. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Practice and Procedure – Remand by High Court – Requirement of Deciding All Issues – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had remanded a service matter to the School Tribunal based on a single technical point regarding the Secretary's authorization to initiate proceedings - Held: When several issues arise for determination, a Court should ideally record findings and reasons for each issue rather than focusing on just one "decisive" point - This approach ensures clarity, provides finality for litigants, and assists the appellate court with a reasoned decision. Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147

Practice and Procedure – The "Consider Jurisprudence" – The Supreme Court criticized the routine practice of courts issuing directions to "consider" or "reconsider" claims as a means to "throw the ball out of the Court" - Such practice is counterproductive, harms the legal system, and delays justice - Courts must articulate directions in clear terms, specifying the method and manner of compliance to leave the government with no choice but to comply, appeal, or face contempt. Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Section 30(1) – Search and Seizure – Collective Decision Required – The power to authorize a search under Section 30(1) must be exercised by the "Appropriate Authority" collectively as defined under Section 17 - An individual member, including the Chairperson/Civil Surgeon acting alone, cannot legally authorize a search – Noted that in this case, the search was directed solely by the Civil Surgeon without the association of the other two members (District Programme Officer and District Attorney), rendering the search technically illegal. [Paras 41 - 50] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 329

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996 – Rule 9 and Rule 10 – Maintenance of Form F – Maintenance of records in "Form F" is mandatory and not a mere procedural formality - Non-maintenance or inaccurate maintenance of records constitutes a "springboard" for the offence of female foeticide and amounts to a contravention of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act - Even if sex determination is not proven, the failure to maintain statutory records is a punishable offence under Section 23. [Paras 33 - 54] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 329

Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882

Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882; Section 41 — Non-arbitrability and Public Policy — Merely because a statute (like Section 41 of the 1882 Act) confers exclusive jurisdiction on a specific court for certain types of disputes (licensor-licensee/landlord-tenant), it does not ex proprio vigore (by its own force) neutralize arbitration clauses in private agreements. The Court distinguished the present case - where possession had already been handed over and the dispute was purely a monetary claim from cases requiring special statutory protection - Arbitration clauses find their roots in Section 28 of the Contract Act - Exceptions 1 and 2 to Section 28 expressly provide that a contract to refer disputes to arbitration is not rendered illegal or void as a restraint of legal proceedings – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on In re Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Paras 19–26] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5 : (2026) 2 SCC 801

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 – Section 2(f), 100, 101, and 102 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 2(s) and 2(o) – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court of Andhra Pradesh judgment that had quashed several FIRs registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Vijayawada – Held that the High Court had erroneously held that the ACB office in Vijayawada was not a notified "police station" under Section 2(s) of the CrPC following the state's bifurcation - The Supreme Court clarified that under the 2014 Reorganisation Act, existing laws and notifications (including G.O.Ms. No. 268 of 2003) continue to apply to successor states to prevent a legal vacuum - A "police station" under Section 2(s) includes a "post" held by a police officer and does not strictly require a specific physical building declaration in every instance - a subsequent 2022 clarificatory Government Order by the State of Andhra Pradesh did not have retrospective application but merely confirmed the existing legal position under the Reorganisation Act - Section 2(s) of the CrPC is exhaustive and inclusive, meaning any "post" or "place" declared by the State - A post held by a police officer can constitute a police station - Sections 100-102 of the 2014 Act ensure that laws (including notifications) in force before the appointed day continue to apply to the territories of the successor states until altered or repealed - A subsequent Government Order (G.O.Ms. No. 137 of 2022) issued as a clarification does not constitute retrospective application but merely reiterates the statutory position to avoid legal ambiguity. [Relied on Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi and Another vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd. and Others (2004) 6 SCC 689; State of Punjab and Others vs. Balbir Singh and Others (1976) 3 SCC 24; Paras 21-24, 26-29] Anti-Corruption Bureau v. Dayam Peda Ranga Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 24 : 2026 INSC 37 : 2026 CriLJ 708

Article 14 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Section 17A - Vires of Section 17A - Whether the requirement of prior approval for conducting an enquiry, inquiry, or investigation into offences relatable to recommendations made or decisions taken by a public servant is unconstitutional? - Held (per Nagarathna, J.) - Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is unconstitutional and is liable to be struck down - The provision is a resurrection of the Single Directive 4.7(3) and Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946, both of which were previously struck down by the Supreme Court - Resurrection of Struck-down Provisions: Section 17A is an attempt to reintroduce a prior approval regime that was already declared unconstitutional in larger bench decisions. It is "old wine in a new bottle" and does not remove the basis on which Section 6A of the DSPE Act was invalidated - The primary object of the Act is to effectively curb the "cancerous growth of corruption" - Section 17A forestalls even a bare preliminary enquiry, thereby protecting corrupt officials rather than merely honest ones - The provision is arbitrary because it requires approval from the very government department to which the public servant belongs - This creates a "policy bias" and a "conflict of interest," as the authority granting approval may have been involved in the same decision-making process, leading to a lack of objectivity and neutrality - The classification based on the nature of duties (recommendations or decisions) to protect a certain class of public servants is illegal and violates the mandate of equality before the law - The expression "Government" or "competent authority" in Section 17A cannot be substituted with "Lokpal" or "Lokayukta" through interpretation, as such substitution would amount to impermissible judicial legislation. [Relied on Vineet Narain vs. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226; Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 68; Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1; Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 2 SCC 532; Paras 19-22] Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A — Constitutional Validity — Reading Down (per K.V. Viswanathan; J) — The Supreme Court delivered a split verdict, holding the constitutional validity of Section 17A but read it down to mandate an independent screening mechanism - held that the "previous approval" of the Government/Competent Authority for conducting an enquiry, inquiry, or investigation must be preceded by an independent screening of the information/complaint by the Lokpal (for Central Government employees) or Lokayukta (for State Government employees) - The recommendation of the Lokpal/Lokayukta shall be binding on the Government/Authority. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A – Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees – The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - It is incorrect to contend that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) holds exclusive jurisdiction or that its prior consent is mandatory for the ACB to proceed. [Para 3] Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2026 INSC 72 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 170

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A – Scope of Previous Approval – Demand of Illegal Gratification –The protection under Section 17A, which requires previous approval for enquiries or investigations into decisions taken or recommendations made by a public servant in the discharge of official duties, does not apply to cases involving the demand of illegal gratification - Noted that Section 17A was enacted with a specific object and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be applied to bribery/extortion cases as these do not constitute "official functions or duties." [Paras 6-7] Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2026 INSC 72 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 170

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 4 and 156 — Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees — The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - Noted that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (DSPE Act), 1946, is permissive and does not expressly or impliedly divest regular State police authorities of their power to investigate offences under the PC Act - While an internal arrangement exists where the CBI typically handles Central Government employees and the ACB handles State employees to avoid duplication, this does not exclude the State's legal power to investigate - The only mandatory requirement is that the investigating officer must hold the rank specified under Section 17 of the PC Act – Key findings by Supreme Court – i. CrPC as Parent Statute: Unless a special law provides a separate, exclusive procedure for investigation, the general provisions of Section 156 CrPC (powers of police to investigate cognizable offences) prevail; ii. Non-Exclusivity of CBI: The DSPE Act (which governs the CBI) does not impair any other law empowering State police authorities to investigate offences - It is incorrect to claim that only the CBI has the authority to institute such prosecutions; iii. Validity of Charge-sheet: A charge-sheet filed by a State agency against a Central Government employee without the prior consent or approval of the CBI is valid in law – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration (1973) 1 SCC 726; Paras 3-9] Nawal Kishore Meena @ N.K Meena v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 68 : 2026 INSC 71 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 172

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Difference between Section 6A (DSPE Act) and Section 17A (PC Act) — While Section 6A was struck down in Subramanian Swamy for being discriminatory (protecting only high-ranking officers), Section 17A is applicable to all levels of public servants - the requirement for an independent screening mechanism remains a constitutional necessity to prevent the "chilling effect" on honest officials while ensuring the accountability of the corrupt - In cases where the public servant is not covered under the jurisdiction of the Lokpal/Lokayukta, the competent authority must commission an appropriate independent investigative agency to screen the information before granting or refusing approval. [Relied on Vineet Narain vs. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226; Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, CBI (2014) 8 SCC 682; K. Veeraswami vs. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655; Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1: Paras 50, 81, 93, 98-100] Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Rule of Law — Independence of Investigative Agency — The executive cannot have the unbridled power to foreclose an enquiry into corruption allegations against its own officials, as this would violate the "rule of law" and the principle of independent investigation - Any decision to block an enquiry must be taken by a body independent of the executive - SOP) — Held that the existing SOP (dated 03.09.2021) governing Section 17A to be "wholly unsatisfactory" as it failed to provide for an independent screening mechanism and allowed the executive to judge the actions of its own limbs. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 7 – Penal Code, 1860 – Section 120B – Criminal Conspiracy – Demand and Acceptance of Bribe – Individual Liability vs. Collective Culpability – The Supreme Court held that even if a charge of criminal conspiracy (Section 120B IPC) fails due to lack of evidence regarding a prior meeting of minds or demand by one of the accused, the other accused can still be independently convicted for demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the PC Act if the evidence specifically establishes their individual role - The conduct of an accused person—such as turning pale, remaining "mum," or attempting to escape/dispose of the bribe money when challenged by the Trap Laying Officer—is admissible as relevant conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Baljeet Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 228 : 2026 INSC 221

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7 and 13(2) – Illegal Gratification – Trap Proceedings – Evidentiary Value of Shadow Witness – Credibility of Independent Witnesses – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an Excise Constable caught in a trap for demanding and accepting a bribe of ₹500 - held that the testimony of a shadow witness (PW-2) cannot be branded as "interested" merely because they are acquainted with the complainant - To disqualify a witness as interested, the defense must provide specific material demonstrating actual hostility. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239 : AIR 2026 SC 1506

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 2(1)(u) – "Proceeds of Crime" – The definition is wide enough to include property equivalent in value to the property obtained from criminal activity - This allows for the attachment of alternate property if the direct proceeds of crime are unavailable – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1; Paras 37-52] Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 258

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 45 – Grant of Regular Bail – Right to Speedy Trial – The Supreme Court granted bail to accused, emphasizing that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without the commencement of trial violates the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Supreme Court observed that statutory restrictions under special acts like the PMLA cannot be permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention - Noted that the trial had not yet commenced and was only at the stage of scrutiny of documents - A significant delay of eight months was attributed to the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) due to its challenge of a procedural order by the Special Judge, which was later withdrawn - With 208 witnesses cited and over 63,000 pages of documents, there was no likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future – Held that the appellant had joined the investigation on multiple occasions even prior to his arrest - found the ED's allegations of witness tampering and dissipation of properties to be "incredulous" and "untenable," as the appellant was in custody when these alleged events occurred, and no material link was established between the appellant and the entities involved in the property transfers – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2622; Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51; P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791; Paras 15- 23] Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : 2026 INSC 12

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(3), 8(7), and 8(8) – Interplay between Adjudication, Confiscation, and Restoration – Finality of Confirmation Order – Held: Section 8(7) and Section 8(8) are stand-alone provisions - An application for confiscation under Section 8(7) can only be decided by the Special Court once the confirmation order passed under Section 8(3) attains finality - If a confirmation order is challenged before a higher forum (Appellate Tribunal or High Court), a "deemed embargo" operates on the conclusion of proceedings under Section 8(7) until that challenge is resolved - The Special Court must refrain from deciding Section 8(7) applications while an appeal under Section 26 is pending, as the doctrine of merger applies. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 258

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(7) – "Material before it" – The expression "material before it" in Section 8(7) has a limited import, primarily to demonstrate the contingency (death of accused, proclaimed offender, etc.) and entitlement to possession - A party who suffered an adverse order under Section 8(3) can only seek relief under Section 8(7) if there is "new material" not previously considered by the Adjudicating Authority or higher forums. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 258

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(8) and 2016 Rules – Claim for Restoration – An application under the second proviso to Section 8(8) for restoration of property during trial is maintainable only if the claimant satisfies the essential conditions under Rule 2(b) and Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Restoration of Confiscated Property) Rules, 2016 - This includes acting in good faith, not being involved in money laundering, and suffering a quantifiable loss. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 258

Preventive Detention

Preventive Detention – Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offender Act, 1986 – Section 2(a), 2(f) and 3 – Detention of "Drug Offender" – Law and Order vs. Public Order - Subjective Satisfaction and Extraneous Factors - Supreme Court observed that the Detaining Authority manifested an intention to detain the detenu "at any cost" - held that preventive detention should not be used as an alternative to the ordinary criminal law or to "clip the wings" of an accused when the State fails to resist bail – Held that if the detenu violated bail conditions, the appropriate remedy was to seek cancellation of bail under ordinary law, which the State failed to do - Resorting to the extraordinary measure of preventive detention to circumvent ordinary criminal procedure is unsustainable – Held that mere registration of three criminal cases involving "Ganja" does not automatically impact "public order" unless there is specific material showing the activities caused harm, danger, or a feeling of insecurity among the general public - The detention order failed to indicate how the detenu's acts were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as opposed to mere "law and order" - Law of preventive detention is a "hard law" and must be strictly construed - Liberty cannot be jeopardized unless the case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant statute – Held that simply declaring the detenu a 'habitual drug offender' was not sufficient for preventive detention unless shown how detenu's actions specifically threatened public order – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana and Others 2023 INSC 788; Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar 1984 3 SCC 14; Paras 8-10] Roshini Devi v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2026 INSC 41 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 161

Primacy of Statutory Rules over Executive Orders - Supreme Court addressed a conflict between the NDCT Rules, 2019 and a DHR Order dated March 3, 2024, which attempted to remove the Department of Health Research (DHR) from its regulatory role in stem cell research - held that executive instructions cannot supplant or whittle down the effect of statutory rules - Clause 2(vi) of the March 3, 2024 order was declared non est to the extent of its conflict with Rules 17 and 18 of the NDCT Rules - The administration, promotion, or advertisement of stem cell therapy for ASD outside an approved clinical trial setting is categorized as "professional misconduct" under Regulation 7.22 of the IMC (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 - Errant clinics are liable for cancellation of registration and penalties under the Clinical Establishments Act, 2010 - Held that stem cell therapies for ASD cannot be offered as a commercial service and must be restricted to clinical trial settings - To protect patients currently undergoing treatment, the Secretary, MoHFW is directed to consult with AIIMS and the NMC to provide a solution for re-routing these patients to institutions conducting legitimate clinical trials, with a compliance report due within four weeks. [Relied on State of M.P. v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills 1992 Supp (1) SCC 150; Paras 136-138, 151, 123, 145-151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96

Prison Reforms

Prison Reforms – Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) – Overcrowding – Constitutional Rights of Prisoners – Gender Discrimination – Cost-Effectiveness – Supreme Court issues comprehensive directions for the assessment, establishment, and expansion of Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) and open/semi-open barracks across all States and Union Territories to address chronic prison overcrowding (occupancy rate of 120.8% nationally) and facilitate the reformative objective of punishment. Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Effect of Probation on Conviction and Departmental Action – The Supreme Court reiterated that the release of an offender on probation does not obliterate the stigma of conviction - The conviction of the accused or the finding of the court that he is guilty remains untouched, as it is the sine qua non for an order of release on probation – Held that in a case where a workman obtained employment as a Helper by using his brother's educational certificates and impersonating him, Supreme Court held that such misconduct justifies departmental action - that Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act does not preclude a department from taking action for misconduct leading to an offence or conviction – Noted that Section 12 only removes "disqualifications" provided by other laws (e.g., for holding office or seeking elections) but does not sweep away the factum of guilt or the misconduct resulting in conviction - a person dismissed from service due to conviction is not entitled to reinstatement merely because they were granted the benefit of probation - While the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's observation that conviction alone is not a ground for removal, it declined to interfere with the modified punishment of "compulsory retirement" in this specific instance, noting that the respondent-workman had since passed away and the appellant did not wish to unsettle benefits accrued to the family. [Relied on Union of India Vs. Bakshi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 426; Paras 9-13] Superintending Engineer v. Labour Court Madurai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 78

Procedural Fairness

Procedural Fairness – Right to Cross-Examination – Supreme Court noted that the finding of professional misconduct was based merely on "bald allegations" in the complaint without the complainant being examined on oath or the appellant-advocate being afforded the right of cross-examination – Held that such findings are legally unsustainable when the substratum of the complaint has ceased to exist due to an amicable settlement between the parties. [Paras 7- 10] Monty Goyal v. Navrang Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2026 INSC 94

Property Law

Property Law — Declaration of Title — Adverse Possession — A claim for perfection of title by adverse possession cannot be sustained against the State/Union regardless of the duration of possession if the claimant fails to prove the specific point of time and basis upon which their predecessors entered possession - a decree obtained in an earlier suit where the true owner (Union of India) was not impleaded is non-est and not binding upon the Union – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148; State of Karnataka v. K.C. Subramanya, (2014) 13 SCC 468; Paras 7- 11] Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211 : AIR 2026 SC 1303

Public Auction

Public Auction – Duty of Disclosure – Failure to disclose pending litigation – Refund with Interest – The Supreme Court set aside a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment that had dismissed a writ petition filed by an auction purchaser - The appellant had purchased property in an open auction conducted by The Improvement Trust, Ludhiana, but the Trust failed to disclose that the property was subject to a pending lawsuit - Held, it is the legal duty of authorities (such as banks, recovery officers, or state bodies) conducting public auctions to disclose all known encumbrances and litigation in the auction notice - Suppressing such material facts invalidates the sale and renders the auction fraudulent or vitiated by material irregularity - Public auctions must ensure fairness, objectivity, and be free from suspicion or bias - emphasized that restitution is a "moral imperative" and an inherent jurisdiction of every court to prevent unjust enrichment - An innocent auction purchaser who acts in good faith and pays hard-earned money should be restored to their original position if the auction lacks legitimacy - directed the Trust to refund the deposit of Rs.1,57,04,580/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of deposit (19.07.2021) within six weeks – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Delhi Development Authority vs. Corporation Bank & Ors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 953; Paras 9 – 13] Viney Kumar Sharma v. Improvement Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 69

Public Interest Litigation (PIL)

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Property Rights - The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court judgment that had ordered the demolition of a residential building constructed by the appellant near Visva-Bharati University – Noted that the High Court had initially ruled the construction illegal on the grounds that it was raised on preserved "khoai" land and lacked approval from the competent authority (Panchayat Samiti) - Supreme Court found that the High Court's conclusions were based on conjectures rather than scientific evidence and failed to account for the appellant's right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution - Key Legal Issues & Findings – i. Burden of Proof in PIL and Disputed Facts: The Court emphasized that in a PIL, the burden lies squarely on the petitioners to provide clear, cogent, and reliable material - held that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to resolve contested factual issues—such as the geological nature of land—which cannot be determined solely on affidavits; ii. Nature of "Khoai" Land - noted that "khoai" is not a recognized category under West Bengal revenue laws but a colloquial term for geological formations - Reports from the District Magistrate and the West Bengal Pollution Control Board (WBPCB) failed to provide objective or scientific evidence that the specific subject plot was "khoai" land; iii. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; iv. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; v. Bona Fides and Concealment of Facts: Noted that the PIL lacked bona fides as several writ petitioners owned existing residential structures within the same tract of land, a fact they failed to disclose - The petition "selectively targeted" the appellant's construction while ignoring similar surrounding structures - set aside the High Court's demolition order, and expunged adverse remarks against the Sriniketan Santiniketan Development Authority (SSDA). Due to the lack of bona fides and non-disclosure of material facts, the Court imposed costs of ₹1,00,000 on the writ petitioners. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sushanta Tagore and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 16; Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) v. Sukamani Das, (1999) 7 SCC 298; Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, (2021) 20 SCC 454; Paras 36, 45 - 47, 49 – 52, 58] Aarsuday Projects & Infrastructure v. Jogen Chowdhury, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : 2026 INSC 93

Quantum Of Maintenance

Quantum Of Maintenance – Factors To Be Considered – While Fixing the quantum, courts must consider the status of the parties, reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children, the husband's actual income, and his liabilities - The financial position of the wife's parents is immaterial - The fact that a wife is educated or capable of earning is not a sufficient ground to deny or reduce maintenance if her independent income is insufficient to maintain the lifestyle of the matrimonial home – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and others (2015) 6 SCC 353; Rajnesh v. Neha and another (2021) 2 SCC 324; Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain (2017) 15 SCC 801; Shailji v. Khobbanna (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 712; Paras 10-15] Anamika Jain v. Dr. Atul Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Railway

Railway - Passengers purchasing railway tickets over the counter cannot be denied the benefit of travel insurance when the same facility is available to those booking tickets online. Union of India v. Radha Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 231

Real Estate

Real Estate and Statutory Compliances – Occupancy Certificate (OC) – A developer cannot compel a purchaser to accept possession without a valid Occupancy Certificate - Obtaining an OC is a statutory pre-condition integral to the lawful delivery of possession - Failure to obtain the same constitutes a deficiency in service. [Paras 25 - 29] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101

Real Estate - Subsequent Purchasers – Right to Compensation – A subsequent purchaser is entitled to seek the same relief as the original allottee - The right to claim compensation for deficiency in service travels with the allotment and cannot be denied merely because the party stepped into the shoes of the original allottee at a later stage – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Govindan Raghavan (2019) 5 SCC 725; IREO Grace Realtech Private Limited v. Abhishek Khanna (2021) 3 SCC 241; Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank (2007) 6 SCC 71; Samruddhi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction (P) Ltd. (2022) 4 SCC 103; Dharmendra Sharma v. Agra Development Authority 2024 INSC 667; Para 18-22] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 – Auction Sale – Finality of Sale vs. Adequacy of Valuation – Limited Remand – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to remit the matter to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) for the limited purpose of reconsidering the valuation of properties, even after the auction sale was confirmed - While the rights of a bona fide auction purchaser deserve protection, this protection is not absolute - If credible issues regarding the adequacy of valuation or the fairness of the reserve price fixation arise, the court may invoke its supervisory jurisdiction to ensure the recovery process realized the maximum possible value for the secured asset. Om Sakthi Sekar v. V. Sukumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : 2026 INSC 237 : AIR 2026 SC 1460

Recovery Proceedings

Recovery Proceedings – Objective of Auction – The primary goal of an auction is to obtain the most remunerative price for a property through competitive bidding, ensuring transparency and fairness - A process that compromises competitive bidding increases the risk of underbidding or inadequate pricing - The principle of finality in judicial sales does not shield the process from examination regarding valuation or reserve price fixation - Recovery processes must be fair, transparent, and based on proper value assessments to balance the interests of both creditors and borrowers – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Rajiv Kumar Jindal v. BCI Staff Welfare Association (2023) 238 Comp Cas 227: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 507; Paras 15-19] Om Sakthi Sekar v. V. Sukumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : 2026 INSC 237

Recruitment and Selection

Recruitment and Selection — Migration from Reserved to General Category — Teachers Recruitment — The principal issue is whether candidates belonging to reserved categories, who have availed relaxation in a qualifying examination (TET) to become eligible for the main selection process (TAIT), are entitled to migrate to the open/unreserved category on the basis of merit secured in the main examination - Held - The requirement of obtaining 60% marks in the Teachers Eligibility Test (TET) is not an essential eligibility condition, as the NCTE guidelines permit the appropriate Government to grant relaxation to reserved category candidates - Relaxation in qualifying marks for an eligibility test merely creates a "level playing field" and does not amount to a concession in the actual selection process - If a reserved category candidate secures higher marks in the final merit list (TAIT) than the last selected candidate in the general category, they are entitled to be adjusted against the general category - The High Court's view that such candidates are ineligible for the open category is erroneous. [Relied on Jitendra Kumar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 119; Vikas Sankhala & Ors. v. Vikas Kumar Agarwal & Ors. (2017) 1 SCC 350; Paras 22-32] Chaya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 281 : 2026 INSC 277

Re-evaluation

Re-evaluation of Answer Sheets – Absence of Statutory Provision – Held: The High Court rightly restated the settled legal position that re-evaluation of an answer sheet is impermissible unless the governing rules, regulations, or policy expressly provide for it – Held that if an answer key has been vetted by the High Court on the administrative side, any judicial challenge to its correctness should ideally be referred back to an administrative committee or a committee of subject experts (including eminent law professors and language experts) for reassessment – Supreme Court should not take the responsibility of determining the correctness of specific answers itself - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's directions to award marks for specific questions and delete others - The matters were referred to an administrative committee of the High Court to re-examine the disputed questions (Nos. 8, 74, and 96) and provide an opinion to the Public Service Commission. [Paras 7-9] Jharkhand Public Service Commission v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Town Planning

Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (Punjab) – Sections 70, 75, 76, 79, 80 and 81 – Master Plan – Change of Land Use (CLU) – Legality of granting CLU for a 'Red' category industry in a 'Rural Agricultural Zone' contrary to the notified Master Plan. Held: A Master Plan is a statutory instrument, not a mere policy document. Once published in the Official Gazette, it binds both authorities and the public - Land use permissibility must be determined with reference to operative zoning; it cannot be displaced by ad hoc permissions or internal administrative file notings. Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Registered Documents

Registered Documents – Presumption of Validity – Standard of Proof to Declare a Registered Sale Deed as "Sham" – A registered Sale Deed carries a formidable presumption of validity and genuineness. Registration is a solemn act imparting a high degree of sanctity to the document; therefore, courts must not lightly or casually declare it a "sham" - The burden of proof to displace this presumption rests heavily upon the challenger, requiring material particulars and cogent evidence to demonstrate that the Deed was never intended to operate as a bona fide transfer of title. [Paras 31 - 33] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

Representation of the People Act, 1951

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Section 8A, Section 99, and Section 123 – Corrupt Practices – Power of Disqualification – Issue- Whether the High Court, while setting aside an election on the grounds of corrupt practices, has the jurisdiction to directly disqualify a candidate for a specific period? - Held: No, The power to pass an order of disqualification under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, rests solely with the President of India and not with the High Court – Held that - i. Statutory Procedure for Disqualification - Under Section 8A of the RP Act, 1951, once a person is found guilty of a corrupt practice by an order under Section 99, the case must be submitted to the President of India for determination of whether the person shall be disqualified and for what period; ii. Role of the President and Election Commission - The President must obtain the opinion of the Election Commission before making a decision and is bound to act according to such opinion; iii. Excess of Jurisdiction - In the instant case, the High Court erred by directly disqualifying the appellant for six years in its operative order - By doing so, the High Court exercised powers and jurisdiction that are statutorily reserved for the President of India; iv. Operative Portion Set Aside - The Supreme Court set aside Clause 2 of the High Court's order which had disqualified the appellant for six years - noted that since the 2016-2021 term had already lapsed, the challenge to the setting aside of the election was no longer a "live issue". [Paras 7-12] K.M. Shaji v. M.V. Nikesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 107 : 2026 INSC 111

Reservation

Reservation – Purpose and Function of Roster/Register – Supreme Court clarified that a reservation roster or register is an administrative, post-based instrument maintained to record cadre composition and monitor representation over time - It is not a parallel selection mechanism used during the recruitment process to displace candidates who secure an unreserved place on their own merit – Noted that the roster defines the number of vacant posts for advertisement and ensures that the lawful quota for specific categories is not exceeded within the cadre. [Relied on Rajasthan High Court & Anr. v. Rajat Yadav & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 14112 of 2024); Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; Saurav Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 4 SCC 542; Paras 27 – 34] Airport Authority of India v. Sham Krishna B, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 63 : 2026 INSC 69 : AIR 2026 SC 463

Retrospective Application

Retrospective Application of Cess — Execution Proceedings: Noted that in the case of Prakash Atlanta (JV), the Court held that NHAI could not unilaterally deduct cess during execution proceedings for a contract that was terminated in 2008, based on a State notification issued in 2010 - Such a deduction was an "afterthought" and lacked contractual or statutory basis for retrospective application to a closed contract. [Paras 43, 54, 60] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76

Revision

Revisional Jurisdiction of High Court — Failure to Apply Judicial Mind — Held: The High Court "ignominiously" reduced the sentence without stating cogent reasons or considering that the Trial Court had already shown leniency by awarding only three years against a maximum of ten years under Section 307 IPC - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's sentence, directing the respondents to surrender within four weeks. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Saleem Alias Chamaru and Another (2005) 5 SCC 554; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Suresh (2019) 14 SCC 151; Shivani Tyagi vs. State of U.P. & Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 842; Hazara Singh vs. Raj Kumar and others (2013) 9 SCC 516; Paras 22-34] Parameshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2026 INSC 164

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Five Duty Bearers – Supreme Court identified five core duty bearers responsible for the realization of the right to education: (i) the appropriate government, (ii) local authority, (iii) neighbourhood schools, (iv) parents/guardians, and (v) primary school teachers. [Para 6, 15] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) – Admission of children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups – Constitutional Mandate and Fraternity – The Supreme Court issued a slew of directions for the effective implementation of Section 12(1)(c) of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) - Noted that the 25% reservation in unaided neighbourhood schools is a deliberate constitutional strategy to operationalize equality of status and social integration - It seeks to concretize the principle of fraternity by creating shared institutional spaces where children from diverse socio-economic backgrounds can form solidaristic bonds and "lose suspect identities" based on caste or class. [Paras 7–10] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) – Implementation Hurdles – Digital Literacy and Transparency – Supreme Court noted significant barriers to accessing the 25% quota, including digital illiteracy regarding online application processes, language barriers, and a lack of information on seat availability - Noted that despite RTI information showing vacant seats, eligible children are often turned away due to procedural technicalities. [Paras 5-7] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 38 – Direction to Frame Rules –Finding that the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued by the NCPCR are merely guidelines and lack the character of enforceable rules, Supreme Court directed "appropriate authorities" to prepare and issue necessary rules and regulations under Section 38 of the Act - Such subordinate legislation must prescribe the specific method and manner for admissions under Section 12(1)(c) to ensure the statutory policy does not remain a "dead letter." [Paras 15–16] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 7(5) and Rule 20(3) – The State Government has an "onerous duty" to provide funds for the Act's implementation - Under Rule 20(3), instructors must be paid at par with regular teachers having similar qualifications and experience - The State cannot deny payment citing the Central Government's failure to release its 60% share; the State must "pay and recover" the balance from the Union - Reaffirmed that the existence of an alternative remedy (under Section 24(3) of the Act) is a rule of "prudence and self-restraint," not an absolute bar - Since the matter was already adjudicated on merits by the High Court, relegating parties to an alternative forum would defeat the ends of justice - directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to pay an honorarium of ₹17,000/- per month to all instructors with effect from 2017-18. [Relied on Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Union of India (2008) 5 SCC 632; Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107; Jaggo v. Union of India and Ors. 2024 SCC Online SC 3826; People's Union For Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235; Paras 41-69] U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 — Sections 3 and 19 — Mandatory Norms and Standards — Held that "Free education" under Section 3 includes the removal of any financial or gender-specific barrier, such as the cost of sanitary napkins, that prevents a child from pursuing education - The provision of separate toilets and "barrier-free access" under Section 19 and the Schedule is a mandatory constitutional and statutory obligation that cannot be avoided by pleading a paucity of funds - Key Directions Issued by the Court: i. Toilets - Provision of functional, gender-segregated toilets with usable water and hand-washing facilities in all schools; ii. Menstrual Absorbents - Free distribution of oxo-biodegradable sanitary napkins and the establishment of "MHM Corners" with spare uniforms and innerwear; iii. Disposal - Installation of safe, hygienic, and environmentally compliant disposal mechanisms; iv. Awareness - Integration of gender-responsive curricula by NCERT/SCERT and sensitization of both male and female teachers; v. Monitoring - Periodic inspections by District Education Officers (DEO) including anonymous student feedback. [Relied on: Right to Education: Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka (1992) 3 SCC 666; Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P.(1993) 1 SCC 645; Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39; Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 1; Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC 641; Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC 1; Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India (2024) 16 SCC 654; Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 1; State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty(2011) 3 SCC 436; Paras 159 – 172, 173-180] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Appointment to Public Posts – Suitability of Posts for Mental Illness and Specific Learning Disabilities (SLD) – Change in Rule Position during Pendency of Litigation – The Supreme Court directed the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) to accommodate candidates suffering from 'mental illness' and 'Specific Learning Disability' (SLD) in Group 'C' posts - Although the posts of 'Auditor' were initially identified as unsuitable for these specific benchmark disabilities in 2018, a subsequent Gazette Notification dated 04.01.2021 by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment expressly identified Group 'C' posts as suitable for such categories – Supreme Court directed the Staff Selection Commission (SSC) to forward the dossiers of the candidates within two weeks - It further ordered that if the posts advertised in 2018 are already filled, the respondents must create supernumerary posts to accommodate the candidates. [Paras 17-21] Sudhanshu Kardam v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 237 : 2026 INSC 232

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Intersectionality and Gender Justice – Supreme Court highlighted that disability-based discrimination is often intersectional, particularly for women, who face multiple axes of discrimination. Redressal of disadvantage must account for these intersecting identity markers to ensure substantive equality is not rendered unworkable by a "parochial understanding of discrimination." - Disability inclusion is a vital component of the "Social" dimension in the Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) framework - Enterprises have an obligation to view disability rights from a non-discrimination angle and as a strategic advantage rather than just a compliance issue. Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53 : AIR 2026 SC 454

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Section 2(y) and Section 2(s) – Concept of Reasonable Accommodation – Intersectionality of Disability and Gender – The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench order of the Calcutta High Court which had denied employment to a female candidate with 57% disability (visual impairment and partial hemiparesis) on the technical grounds of the recruitment panel having expired - held that "reasonable accommodation" is a fundamental "gateway right" rooted in Articles 14, 21, and 41 of the Constitution, essential for substantive equality - Technicalities such as the expiry of a recruitment panel cannot obstruct "complete justice" when the denial of employment was due to the employer's failure to recognize multiple disabilities and provide necessary adjustments. Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53 : AIR 2026 SC 454

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Sections 2(r) and 33 – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Arbitrary Ceiling on Disability – Validity of fixing a 60% maximum disability limit for the post of Assistant District Attorney (ADA) - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment that upheld the denial of appointment to a candidate with 90% locomotor disability – Held that the RPwD Act, 2016 establishes a "floor" (minimum 40%) for benchmark disability but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary "ceiling" that excludes those with higher degrees of disability, provided they can perform the functional requirements through reasonable accommodation - Key Principles – i. Arbitrariness of Disability Caps: Prescribing an upper limit of 60% disability for a legal professional role (ADA) has no rational nexus with the nature of duties, which primarily require mental alacrity and legal acumen; ii. Reasonable Accommodation: The State has a positive obligation to make necessary modifications to ensure persons with disabilities enjoy rights on an equal basis - A candidate's capability must be assessed on actual functional competence rather than an abstract medical percentage; iii. Statutory Misinterpretation: By fixing a maximum limit, the respondents essentially "rewrote" the statutory definition of "benchmark disability" to the detriment of the protected class – Directed Respondent No. 1 directed to issue an appointment letter to the appellant within two weeks and the State of Himachal Pradesh is directed to pay Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant for unjust denial of appointment and prolonged litigation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vikash Kumar v. U.P.S.C. (2021 5 SCC 370); Paras 22-40] Prabhu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2026 INSC 253

Rights of Persons with Disabilities – All India Bar Examination (AIBE) and Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) – Provision of Scribes – Eligibility Criteria for Scribes - The Supreme Court directed the Bar Council of India and the Consortium of NLUs to revisit and modify existing policies regarding the provision of scribes for specially-abled candidates - Supreme Court accepted the petitioners' suggestion that specially-abled candidates (specifically those with visual impairment) are entitled to scribe assistance, provided the scribe is an undergraduate not pursuing law or humanities – Noted that there is no bar on using a scribe who possesses qualifications higher than 10+2 schooling - Key Directives: i. Implementation: The Bar Council of India and the Consortium of NLUs must implement and formally notify these modifications well before the next examination cycle; ii. Compliance: A compliance affidavit is required to be filed within two weeks. [Paras 2-4] Yash Dodani v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 150

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act) – Statutory Interpretation - Interplay with Limitation Act, 1963 - Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 74 of the 2013 Act – i. The Supreme Court held that Section 74 of the 2013 Act, which provides for appeals to the High Court, does not "expressly exclude" the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 of the Limitation Act (Condonation of Delay) is applicable to appeals filed under Section 74 of the 2013 Act; ii. Mandatory nature of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act – Supreme Court emphasized that for a special law to oust the Limitation Act, the exclusion must be "clear, apparent and manifest." Mere prescription of a specific period of limitation in a special statute does not amount to an express exclusion of the 1963 Act; iii. Interpretation of Section 103 of the 2013 Act - Section 103, which states the Act is "in addition to and not in derogation of any other law," facilitates borrowing from the Limitation Act to ensure the 2013 Act functions as a complete code - Barring the application of the 1963 Act would render Section 103 redundant and otiose; iv. Nature of the Authority under the 2013 Act - The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority is treated as a "Civil Court" and its proceedings are "judicial proceedings" - An award passed by the Authority under Section 69 partakes the character of a "decree" and a "judgment" under the CPC - This reinforces the judicial nature of the appellate remedy under Section 74; iv. Land Acquisition Initiated under 1894 Act (Section 24(1)(a)) - In cases where proceedings began under the 1894 Act but no award was passed before January 1, 2014, all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation apply - This includes the appellate mechanism under Section 74 of the 2013 Act - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, condoned the delays, and directed the High Courts to adjudicate the first appeals on their merits. [Relied on Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392; Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020) 8 SCC 129; H.S.I.I.D.C. Ltd. v. Deepak Agarwal (2023) 6 SCC 51; Paras 59-85] Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. S.V. Global Mill Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 130 : 2026 INSC 138

Role of the Bar

Role of the Bar – Professional Ethics – Supreme Court emphasized that the Bar has an important role in ensuring litigation does not become endless - Counsel are expected to place the full procedural history with clarity and advise litigants against pursuing repetitive proceedings that seek to reopen concluded issues. [Relied on Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347; Paras 7-9] Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Quashing of Prosecution – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) – Essential Ingredients - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal prosecution against the appellant, holding that the mere presence of an accused at the scene of an incident, without a specific overt act or intentional insult directed at the complainant's caste, does not satisfy the statutory requirements for an offense under the SC/ST Act – Noted following points – i. Ingredients of Section 3(1)(r) - To constitute an offense under this section, there must be an intentional insult or intimidation with the specific intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in a place within public view Noted that mere fact that a complainant belongs to a protected community is insufficient; the insult must be because of their caste identity - Even knowledge of the complainant's caste is not enough to attract this section without the intent to humiliate; ii. Ingredients of Section 3(1)(s) - This section requires the accused to abuse a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe "by the caste name" in public view - noted that the intent behind the abuse must be found to be denigrating toward the caste, resulting in a feeling of caste-based humiliation - Merely saying a caste name or simple abuse does not automatically constitute an offense; iii. Application to Facts - Held that neither the FIR nor the chargesheet contained allegations of the appellant uttering any specific words or performing overt acts - The allegations were deemed general in nature and failed to prima facie constitute an offense – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shajan Skaria v. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 224; Paras 11-20] Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 62

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Section 14-A – Nature of Appellate Jurisdiction – Held that an appeal under Section 14-A is a statutory first appeal on both facts and law – Noted that High Court does not function merely as a revisional or supervisory court but as a first appellate court obliged to independently evaluate the material on record - A mechanical affirmation of a Trial Court's order without independent scrutiny is inconsistent with settled appellate jurisprudence. [Paras 17, 18] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141 : AIR 2026 SC 1069

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3 — Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 — Clause 3 — Effect of conversion to Christianity on Scheduled Caste status —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to quash criminal proceedings under the SC/ST Act initiated by a person who had converted to Christianity and was practicing as a Pastor - Held, that as per Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu, Sikh, or Buddhist religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste - Since the appellant indubitably professed Christianity by performing pastoral duties for over a decade, his caste status as a member of the Madiga community stood "eclipsed in the eyes of law" upon conversion - once the foundational requirement of caste status is extinguished, the statutory protection under the SC/ST Act is no longer available. Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) – Quashing of Charges – Requirement of Knowledge – The Supreme Court quashed charges under the SC/ST Act against the appellant, observing that "knowledge" of the victim's caste is an essential ingredient for attracting liability under Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) – Held that where the FIR and Section 161 CrPC statements are silent on the use of casteist slurs or the specific identity of the victims as SC/ST members, the charge cannot stand - Allowing proceedings to continue without a prima facie disclosure of statutory ingredients amounts to an abuse of the process of law. [Relied on Sajjan Kumar v. CBI (2010) 9 SCC 36; Bani Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1996) 4 SCC 720; State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39; Paras 14, 15, and 19] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141 : AIR 2026 SC 1069

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Statutory vs. Non-Statutory Benefits — Reliance on State Government Orders (G.O.Ms. No. 341) extending benefits to converts is misplaced regarding central statutory enactments - Held, that such executive orders only apply to "non-statutory concessions" like economic support schemes and cannot override the Presidential Order or apply to statutory benefits/protections under Central Acts like the SC/ST Act. Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283

Securities Law

Securities Law – SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP) – Regulations 3 and 4 – Fraudulent Diversion of Funds – Ratification by Shareholders – Legality of Post-Facto Approval - Core Issue: Whether a company that raises funds through preferential allotment for specific disclosed objects can, after immediately diverting those funds for unauthorized purposes, legitimize the illegality through a subsequent shareholders' resolution – Supreme Court noted the following – i. PFUTP and Fraud: The definition of "fraud" under PFUTP Regulations is expansive and does not require a strict "deceit" element as per common law - Diversion of funds raised for a specific object to an undisclosed purpose constitutes a breach of Regulation 3 and Regulations 4(2)(f), (k), and (r); ii. Irregularity vs. Illegality: Supreme Court distinguished between an "irregularity," which can be regularized, and an "illegality," which cannot - An act that is "ultra vires" or violates statutory regulations impacting public interest and multiple stakeholders cannot be ratified even if all shareholders agree; iii. Public Interest Dimensions: SEBI Regulations have public law dimensions designed to protect the integrity of the market - A private resolution by shareholders cannot wipe off a crystallized liability or waive rights involving public policy; iv. Parallel Proceedings: Held, that the Whole Time Member (WTM) and the Adjudicating Officer (AO) operate in separate fields the former for protective measures/disgorgement and the latter for imposing penalties and both proceedings are maintainable on the same set of facts. [Relied on SEBI v. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel (2017) 15 SCC 1; Shri Lachoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam (1971) 1 SCC 619; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Brahmanandam (2008) 5 SCC 241; SEBI v. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368; Paras 41-66] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Terrascope Ventures, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 248 : 2026 INSC 245

Sentencing

Sentencing Discretion – While the statutory minimum was six months, Supreme Court exercised its discretion to reduce the three-year rigorous imprisonment sentence to the period already undergone (approximately one year) - This decision was based on the advanced age of the surviving appellants, the fact that the incident occurred nearly four decades ago (1985), and the prolonged pendency of the proceedings – Appeals partly allowed. [Relied on K.I. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin (1997) 3 SCC 721; Paras 20-22, 27-28] Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180

Sentencing – Mitigating Circumstances – Delay and Age – While sustaining the conviction, the Court modified the sentence due to the passage of time and the appellant's advanced age - The appellant was approximately 40 years old at the time of the offense (1990) and 75 years old at the time of the final judgment – Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the statutory minimums: 6 months for Section 7 and 1 year for Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. [Paras 15-25] Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239 : AIR 2026 SC 1506

Service Law

Accelerated Promotion – Counter-Extremism/Naxal Activities – Parity in Treatment – Judicial Review of Committee Decisions – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to grant accelerated promotion to a police constable (Respondent) who resisted a Naxalite attack on a police station - The State had denied the promotion claiming the Respondent's role was "nominal" compared to a colleague (G. Venkat Reddy) who received the benefit – Supreme Court found the Committee's assessment "perverse" as it was admitted that the Respondent, while on roof-top guard sentry duty, fired more rounds at the Naxalites than the promoted colleague and was instrumental in repelling the attack - Held, when collective efforts repel an attack, it is unfair to belittle the role of individual personnel to deny them benefits intended to boost the morale of the force - While the Court's intervention in decisions taken by specialized Committees for out-of-turn promotion is minimal, such decisions are not immune to interference if they are found to be unfair or based on perverse findings – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. vs. Sanjay Shukla (Civil Appeal No. 2040 of 2023, decided on March 27, 2023; Paras 9, 10] State of Telangana v. P. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 263 : 2026 INSC 258

Allocation of Cadre – Indian Police Service (IPS) – Request for re-allocation to 'insider' vacancy – Finality of Selection – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of an IPS officer seeking re-allocation from the Tamil Nadu cadre to an 'insider' vacancy in the Rajasthan cadre from the 2004 examination batch - held that cadre allocation cannot remain fluid indefinitely, as it would lead to a "chain reaction" of reshuffling among selected candidates from the same batch – Noted that the appellant, who was third in the merit list for the 'insider' vacancy, raised his grievance in 2010, six years after the selection process - noted that the appellant had already served in the Tamil Nadu cadre for over two decades by the time of the final hearing. Rupesh Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2026 INSC 119 : AIR 2026 SC 900

Allotment of Housing – Eligibility Criteria – Nepotism and Self-Aggrandizement – Supreme Court set aside the allotment of super deluxe flats to a Governing Body member (Respondent No. 3) and his subordinate (Respondent No. 4) – i. Ineligibility of Respondent No. 3: The allotment was deemed a "blatant display of self-aggrandizement" as the respondent did not satisfy the mandatory six-month deputation period at the time of application and had not submitted a timely application or earnest money deposit (Para 13, 14); ii. Ineligibility of Respondent No. 4: The Court found that Respondent No. 4 did not fall within the stipulated pay-band level (Level 10 to 20) and that the Governing Body's decision to "regularize" the allotment by carving out an exception was an arbitrary exercise of power. [Paras 15, 16] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163 : AIR 2026 SC 1495

Appointment of Director General of Police (DGP) – Role of UPSC and State Government – Delay in submitting proposals – Selection Guidelines – i. Mandate for Regular Appointment: The Supreme Court reiterated the necessity of appointing a regular Director General of Police (Head of Police Force) in accordance with the time-frame and scheme established in Prakash Singh vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 1; ii. Obligation of UPSC: Despite inordinate delays by State Governments in submitting proposals, the UPSC is obligated to convene the Empanelment Committee Meeting (ECM) to prevent further aggravation of the situation and to ensure meritorious senior officers are not overlooked; iii. Ad hoc Arrangements Criticized: The Supreme Court expressed concern over States preferring ad hoc arrangements (appointing acting DGPs) instead of regular appointments, which led to the UPSC inserting paragraph 4(xii) into its guidelines requiring States to seek leave from the Supreme Court for delayed submissions; iv. Enforcement Mechanism: To ensure compliance with the Prakash Singh mandate, the UPSC is authorized to: a. Write to State Governments for timely proposals whenever a vacancy arises; b. Move an application before the Supreme Court for enforcement if a State fails to submit a timely proposal; v. Accountability: held that those responsible for the delay in submitting proposals shall be held accountable. [Paras 7-11] Union Public Service Commission v. T. Dhangopal Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Appointment of Vice-Chancellor – Conflict between State/UT Act and UGC Regulations – Legislative Competence – Doctrine of Repugnancy - The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to strike down Section 14(5) of the Puducherry Technological University Act, 2019 (PTU Act) for being inconsistent with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018 - held that since UGC Regulations trace their source to Entry 66 of List I (Union List), they possess an overriding effect over State/UT legislations enacted under Entry 25 of List III (Concurrent List) - The Search-cum-Selection Committee for a Vice-Chancellor must necessarily include a nominee of the Chairman, UGC, and its members must not be connected with the University - Key Legal Issues & Rulings – i. Primacy of Entry 66 List I over Entry 25 List III - Supreme Court reiterated that while both the Union and States can legislate on "Education" under Entry 25 of List III, such power is expressly subject to Entry 66 of List I (Coordination and determination of standards) - Any State legislation that impinges upon or dilutes the standards prescribed by the Union under Entry 66 is ultra vires; ii. Mandatory Nature of UGC Regulations - Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018, which mandates the inclusion of a UGC nominee in the Search-cum-Selection Committee, is an integral component of "standards in higher education." - Section 14(5) of the PTU Act, which omitted this requirement and included a government official (Pro-Chancellor) in the committee, was declared invalid; iii. Doctrine of Repugnancy and Article 254(2) - noted that the doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254 and the need for Presidential assent apply only when both Central and State legislations operate within the Concurrent List - Since the UGC Act and Regulations are referable to List I (Entry 66), the question of curing repugnancy via Article 254(2) does not arise; iv. Exercise of Article 142 Powers - Despite finding the appointment procedure illegal, Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to allow the appellant to complete his tenure (ending December 2026) - This was done to avoid "grave stigma" to the academician and administrative disruption, noting there were no allegations against the appellant's integrity or merit. [Relied on Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45; Gambhirdhan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC 179; Paras 37-43, 46-48, 51-52] Dr. S. Mohan v. Puducherry Technological University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 96 : 2026 INSC 100 : AIR 2026 SC 730

Character and Suitability for Disciplined Force – Held that a candidate for the police force must possess impeccable character, rectitude, and integrity - The employer, through a screening committee, has a wide realm of discretion to assess the suitability of a candidate based on their criminal antecedents, even if an acquittal has been recorded - An acquittal based on technical grounds or "benefit of doubt" does not automatically entitle a candidate to appointment. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Consumption of Vacancy – Supreme Court observed that even if a senior candidate (Rishikesh Meena or Rajesh Kumar) does not join or accept an 'insider' vacancy, the next candidate in the merit list does not gain an automatic right to claim allocation to that specific post - Finality must be attached to the selection and allocation process to prevent administrative instability – Appeals dismissed. [Paras 9-12] Rupesh Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2026 INSC 119 : AIR 2026 SC 900

Contractual Employment through Third-Party Contractor vs. Direct Contractual Employment – Claim for Minimum Time Scale of Pay – Distinction in Law – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order directing the Municipal Council to pay the minimum time scale of pay to workers engaged through third-party contractors - held that a valid distinction exists between persons employed directly by a State entity and those engaged through an intermediary contractor - While regular employment involves transparent, merit-based procedures open to all citizens, contractors have absolute discretion in selecting personnel to be sent to the principal employer - Granting equal benefits and status to contractor-engaged workers would sanction an arbitrary recruitment process and bypass constitutional safeguards for public employment. [Relied on Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs. Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola and others, (2019) 13 SCC 82; Joint Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education and Another Vs. Raj Kumar Mishra and Another, Civil Appeal No. 4014 of 2025; Paras 8-11] Municipal Council v. K. Jayaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 38

Dearness Allowance (DA) — Legally Enforceable Right — Financial Inability of State — The Supreme Court held that the right to receive Dearness Allowance is a legally enforceable right that accrued in favor of the employees of the State of West Bengal – Held that while the State has the discretion to formulate its pay structure, once it incorporates a specific standard (like the All-India Consumer Price Index - AICPI) into its statutory rules (ROPA Rules, 2009), it cannot deviate from that mechanism through executive memoranda. State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123 : AIR 2026 SC 1213

Departmental Enquiry – Post-Superannuation – Lack of Jurisdiction – Adoption of Rules – The Supreme Court quashed a departmental enquiry initiated against a retired employee of the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (MSWC) approximately 11 months after his superannuation - Held that in the absence of specific provisions in the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (Staff) Service Regulations, 1992, the Corporation could not ipso facto apply the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, to initiate proceedings against a retired employee without a conscious decision or resolution by the Board of Directors to adopt such rules - that a public-sector corporation cannot initiate or continue disciplinary proceedings against an employee after retirement in the absence of an express enabling provision in its service regulations. Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16

Departmental Inquiry — Proof of Misconduct — Fabrication of Medical Certificate — Graver the charge, greater the need for caution and circumspection — Findings of Inquiry Officer based on "word against word" without expert verification held perverse — Where a charge of forgery entails mandatory dismissal, fair play requires a thorough investigation consistent with principles of natural justice – Facts - The appellant, a Court Attender, was dismissed from service on charges of unauthorized absence and submitting a fabricated medical certificate. The Inquiry Officer relied on the statement of a Medical Practitioner (PW-2) who denied issuing the certificate, despite admitting the appellant consulted him and that the letterhead belonged to him - The High Court upheld the dismissal - Supreme Court Findings – i. Perversity in Findings: The Supreme Court held that the Inquiry Officer's conclusion was perverse as it was based on no credible evidence - noted that the rubber stamp on the disputed certificate was identical to the one used by the doctor on official notices; ii. Need for Handwriting Expert: Since the certificate was fully handwritten and the doctor's undisputed signatures varied, the Inquiry Officer should have referred the matter to a handwriting expert before recording a finding of forgery; iii. Standard of Proof for Grave Charges: When charges involve consequences like loss of livelihood, investigations must be consistent with the requirement of the situation and fair play. [Relied on Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454; Paras 31-45] K. Rajaiah v. High Court for the State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 140 : 2026 INSC 142 : AIR 2026 SC 890

Disciplinary Inquiry – Principles of Natural Justice – The appellant alleged a gross breach of natural justice, claiming the inquiry officer abruptly closed proceedings on August 1, 2017, preventing the completion of cross-examination of management witnesses - The High Court erred by not considering these allegations of procedural lapses and the merits of the Tribunal's original findings while ordering a remand. Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147

Disciplinary Proceedings against Judicial Officers – Removal from service based solely on judicial orders – Permissibility – Appellant, a judicial officer with 27 years of unblemished service, was removed for granting bail in four cases under the M.P. Excise Act without expressly mentioning the "twin conditions" of Section 59-A - Held: Merely because a judicial order is wrong, erroneous, or fails to refer to a statutory provision, it cannot be the basis for disciplinary action unless there is evidence of corrupt motive or extraneous consideration - The High Court must exercise great caution and protect honest officers from unmerited onslaughts based on motivated complaints. Order of removal set aside with full back wages. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7

Disciplinary Proceedings – Continuance after Superannuation – Permissibility of Punishment – Punjab and Sind Bank Officers' Service Regulations, 1982; Regulation 20(3)(iii) – Punjab and Sind Bank Employees' Pension Regulations, 1995; Regulation 48 - The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a writ petition filed by a retired bank officer challenging a punishment of "reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay" imposed after his superannuation - Key Findings by Supreme Court – i. Continuance of Proceedings: If service rules permit, disciplinary proceedings initiated before superannuation can be continued and brought to a logical conclusion even after the employee attains the age of superannuation; ii. Legal Fiction of Service - Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulations creates a legal fiction where the officer is deemed to be in service until the proceedings are concluded; iii. Implementability of Punishment - The Court rejected the argument that only penalties under Pension Regulations could be imposed post-retirement - held that a punishment of reduction in pay scale relates back to the date of superannuation and is implementable because pension is computed based on the salary last drawn/payable; iv. Misconduct by Bank Officers: A bank officer holds a position of trust - Failure to ensure the end-use of a loan constitutes a financial irregularity that exposes the bank to risk and amounts to misconduct, regardless of whether an actual loss was suffered. [Relied on Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs. Rabindranath Choubey (2020) 18 SCC 71; Ramesh Chandra Sharma vs. Punjab National Bank and Another (2007) 9 SCC 15; State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar (2011) 10 SCC 249; Paras 25-37] Virinder Pal Singh v. Punjab and Sind Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 268 : 2026 INSC 266

Distinction between "Honourable Acquittal" and "Acquittal on Benefit of Doubt" – An honourable acquittal occurs when the court definitively concludes that the accused did not commit the offence - In contrast, an acquittal based on a "benefit of doubt" due to a weak prosecution case or lack of credible evidence is a technical consideration and does not constitute a "clean chit". [Para 5] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Equitable Relief – Creation of Supernumerary Post – To balance the equities between a candidate already in service (Appellant) and a deserving candidate deprived of selection due to a contested answer (Respondent No. 3), Supreme Court directed the creation of a supernumerary post – Appellant to retain seniority over the new appointee. [Relied on Vikas Pratap Singh and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others (2013) 14 SCC 494; Paras 7 - 11] Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248 : AIR 2026 SC 1436

Forest Service (IFS) – Cadre Allocation – Migration of Reserved Category Candidate to Unreserved Vacancy – Effect of relaxation at Preliminary Examination stage – The Supreme Court held that a reserved category candidate who avails "relaxed standards" (concessions) at the Preliminary Examination stage cannot be treated as a candidate selected on "General Standards" for the purpose of cadre allocation against an unreserved vacancy, even if they secure higher marks than a general category candidate in the final merit list - rejected the High Court's view that "General Standards" only refers to the qualifying marks in the Main Examination - If a candidate's entry into the Main Examination was made possible only through a relaxed cut-off in the Preliminary Examination, they are ineligible to claim an unreserved/General Insider vacancy. Union of India v. G. Kiran, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 8

General Provident Fund (Central Service) Rules, 1960 – Rule 33(ii) – Provident Funds Act, 1925 – Sections 4 & 5 – Rights of Nominee – Release of GPF Dues – The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India challenging a High Court order that directed the release of GPF amounts to the nominee of a deceased employee - The Government argued that under Section of the Provident Funds Act, 1925, amounts exceeding Rs. 5,000/- require a succession certificate/probate even for a nominee – Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the Rs. 5,000/- threshold established in 1925 has lost relevance due to inflation - held that Rule 33(ii) of the 1960 Rules, framed by the Government itself, stipulates that GPF amounts shall be payable to the nominee regardless of the amount – Held that Section 5(1) of the Act contains a non-obstante clause giving primacy to a valid nominee to receive the funds to the exclusion of others - Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and Rule 33(ii) must be construed harmoniously to avoid rendering the nomination process "otiose" – Noted that a nominee is a "mere trustee" to collect funds and not the beneficial owner - Releasing funds to a nominee does not bar other legal heirs from claiming their share in a competent court – Noted that the Government should not involve itself in protracted litigation regarding the estates of deceased employees, as requiring probate in cases of valid nominations unnecessarily makes the state a party to private disputes – Petition dismissed. [Relied on CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 5; Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424; Paras 9-15] Union of India v. Paresh Chandra Mondal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 42

Indian Navy – Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) – Selection Process Fairness – Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) – Appeal against Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) order directing fresh Selection Boards for SSCOs who were denied PC in 2020 and 2022 – Appellants contended that ACRs were "casually graded" during periods when they were ineligible for PC, leading to an inherently skewed merit assessment - Held, the appraisal process was inevitably affected from its inception because Reporting Officers were conscious that these officers had no avenue for career progression – High gradings in a bell-curve system were reserved for those with future prospects, while ineligible officers received average marks serving no institutional purpose – The conversion of "Not Recommended for PC" endorsements (recorded when officers were ineligible as a matter of policy) into substantive disqualifications once they became eligible is arbitrary – This circularity, where past ineligibility was transformed into "deemed unsuitability," resulted in an uneven playing field. [Para 16-17] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282

Interpretation of "Ratio" vs "Quota" – The Supreme Court clarified that the 11% allocation was intended to upgrade the cadre by ensuring experienced graduates are appointed to Supervisor posts, previously filled from the open category direct recruitment - This earmarking did not reduce the chances of SSLC-only holders, as their 29% ratio remained intact and was not reduced by the amendment. Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242 : AIR 2026 SC 1452

Inter-se Seniority – Direct Recruits vs. Internally Selected Candidates – Reckoning of Seniority from Date of Appointment/Training vs. Date of Commencement of Probation - Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (Service Regulations), 1967 – Regulations 10(9), 87(1), and 97 – Determination of Seniority: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's judgment which had ruled that seniority for direct recruits should only commence from the date their probation started (after completion of training) - held that according to the plain language of the Regulations, a person is considered to be "on duty" and "appointed to a class of service" from the moment they perform duties or commence prescribed training/instruction. [Relied on Govt. of A.P. v. P. Bhaskar (2008) 11 SCC 687; 2008 INSC 267; Paras 19-24] M. Thanigivelu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2026 INSC 229

Key Directions issued – i. Deemed Service for Pension: SSCWOs released from service during the pendency of litigation (excluding JAG and AEC cadres) are deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service and are entitled to pension and consequential benefits; ii. Grant of PC: SSCWOs currently in service who secured the 60% cut-off in the 2020/2021 Selection Boards shall be granted Permanent Commission, subject to medical and disciplinary clearance; iii. Policy Review: The Army is directed to review the method of evaluation of ACRs and cut-offs for future batches to address the disproportionate impact on women officers. [Para 66, 67] Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Limited Scope of Judicial Review – Held that courts should not override the wisdom of the employer or substitute their own view regarding a candidate's suitability unless the decision is demonstrably mala fide, arbitrary, or whimsical - The Division Bench erred by intruding into the functional realm of the screening committee – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685; Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. Vs. Pradeep Kumar & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 797; State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591; Para 7-9] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Merit-Based Selection – No Edge for Graduates – The selection process, involving an OMR and main written test focusing on pediatric health, provided a level playing field - The fact that non-graduates significantly outnumbered graduates in the final selection (235 out of 317) dispelled any apprehension that graduation conferred an unfair advantage or "edge" in the examination – Noted that The High Court's interpretation that the quotas were mutually exclusive was termed a "judicial fiat" that interfered with the executive's rule-making authority. "What the executive did not think fit to do by prescription in the Rules, could not have been done by a judicial fiat" – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sanjay Kumar v. Narinder Verma (2006) 6 SCC 467; Paras 13-23] Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242 : AIR 2026 SC 1452

Paucity of Funds as a Defense — Supreme Court categorically rejected the State's plea of financial inability or paucity of funds as a ground to deny the payment of statutory dues like DA - Once a legal right is established, the State, as a "model employer," must honor its obligations regardless of the financial burden - Findings returned in the first round of litigation, which declared DA a legally enforceable right and were reaffirmed by the dismissal of a review petition, attain conclusive finality and bind the parties. [Relied on Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608; Sivanandan CT v. High Court of Kerala (2024) 3 SCC 799; Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana (2008) 2 SCC 161; hayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; Assn. for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024) 5 SCC 1; Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224; Paras 39-59] State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123 : AIR 2026 SC 1213

Payment of Gratuity – Retention of Staff Quarters – Adjustment of Penal Rent from Gratuity – Reciprocal Obligations – The management of Steel Authority of India (SAIL) challenged the High Court's direction to release the full gratuity with interest to retired employees who had failed to vacate official accommodation – Held that the obligation of an ex-employee to vacate staff quarters and the obligation of the management to release gratuity are mutual and reciprocal - Neither can be enforced in isolation - Under Rule 3.2.1(c) of the SAIL Gratuity Rules, 1978, the management is expressly empowered to withhold gratuity for non-vacation of company accommodation - no interest is payable on the gratuity amount withheld during the period of unauthorized occupation. [Paras 19 & 20] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Pensionary Benefits — Representation for Compassionate Consideration — While refusing to interfere with the dismissal order due to the appellant's history of multiple offenses (imprisonment in 1980 and severe reprimands in 1989 and 1994), Supreme Court permitted the appellant to submit a representation to the authorities for the grant of pension - The authorities are at liberty to consider this on its own merits, taking into account the appellant's 36 years of service, though this is not a mandatory direction to grant such pension. [Relied on Yasodhar Kamat Vs. Director General, Border Security Force and Ors., (2021) 13 SCC 333; Para 7]. Bhagirath Choudhary v. Border Security Force, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 165

Recruitment and Selection – Right to Appointment – Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Change in Policy – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction to appoint candidates who completed the Ayurvedic Nursing Training Course from Government institutions without a fresh selection process - held that mere admission to a training course does not confer an automatic right to appointment, especially when the policy environment has shifted – noted that respondents claimed a right to appointment based on a decades-old practice where all 20 candidates from the sole Government college were absorbed into service - Supreme Court noted that since 2012, the State permitted private institutions to impart the same training, leading to an exponential increase in candidates (from 20 seats to 311 institutions by 2019-20) – Held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be applied where a substantial shift in circumstances and limited vacancies make the earlier practice impossible to sustain. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38

Recruitment – Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) – Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Services – Selection to the post of Supervisor – Eligibility of Graduate Anganwadi Workers to compete in the 29% quota reserved for SSLC holders - Special Rules for the Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Services, 2010 – Amendment effective from 01.01.2014 – Distribution of Vacancies – Held that the 11% ratio carved out specifically for Anganwadi Workers with a graduate degree does not exclude such graduates from applying under the 29% quota earmarked for Anganwadi Workers with SSLC and 10 years' experience - held that graduates naturally possess the lower SSLC qualification; therefore, unless the rules expressly prohibit higher qualifications or exclude graduates from the general pool, they are eligible to compete in both categories. Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242 : AIR 2026 SC 1452

Recruitment – Judicial Review of Answer Keys – Ambiguity in Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs) – Selection for the post of Law Officer – Dispute over the correct answer to a question regarding the immunity of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution from judicial review – Recruiting body considered "Ninth Schedule" (Option B) as correct, while the respondent claimed "None of the above" (Option D) was correct based on the 'Basic Structure' doctrine – Held: When High Court Judges themselves hold divergent views on the interpretation of Constitutional provisions and Supreme Court precedents spanning decades, law graduates appearing for a recruitment exam cannot be expected to reach a singular "correct" conclusion by such complex interpretation – Both candidates found to be deserving of accommodation as both answers could be considered correct from different perspectives. Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248 : AIR 2026 SC 1436

Recruitment – Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 – Additional/Waiting List – Key Principle – Absence of Waiting List – Under the 1997 Rules, there is no provision for the preparation or operation of an additional or waiting list - A vacancy arising from a selected candidate's failure to report for duty or complete pre-appointment formalities must be treated as a fresh vacancy for subsequent recruitment – Noted that once a select list is exhausted or finalized as per the statutory rules, its operation cannot be enlarged to fill vacancies caused by non-joining – Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-21] State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 282 : 2026 INSC 276

Recruitment – Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 – Additional/Waiting List – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that directed the State to consider a candidate for a post left vacant due to the non-joining of a selected candidate - held that when recruitment rules specifically define the contours of a select list and do not provide for a reserve or additional list, a post left unfilled cannot be claimed as a right by the next candidate in line. State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 282 : 2026 INSC 276

Recruitment – Reserve List/Waiting List – Validity Period – Locus Standi of Public Service Commission (PSC) – The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the Rajasthan High Court which had directed the appointment of wait-listed candidates after the statutory expiry of the reserve list – Supreme Court noted down following points- i. Locus Standi of PSC to Appeal - held that the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC) has the locus standi to maintain a writ appeal even if the State (Appointing Authority) does not challenge the order - As a constitutional body under Article 315, the PSC is a "person aggrieved" when judicial directions mandate recommendations that bypass statutory rules or its independent advisory role; ii. Nature of Waiting List: A waiting list is not a perennial source of recruitment and does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment - Its purpose is to address contingencies such as non-joining of selected candidates within the same recruitment cycle; iii. Operation and Expiry of Reserve List (Rule 24/Rule 21): Under Rule 24 of the Rajasthan Legal State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1981, and Rule 21 of the Rajasthan Agriculture Subordinate Service Rules, 1978, the reserve list remains valid for only six months from the date the original list is forwarded to the Appointing Authority; iv. held that the period of validity must be calculated from the date of recommendation, not from the date a vacancy arises due to non-joining; v. Mandamus cannot be issued to "pick up" names from a list that has already expired by the time the writ petition is filed – Supreme Court rejected the plea that because some candidates were recommended after the expiry of the list, others must also be recommended - Article 14 constitutes a positive concept; a court cannot mandate the State to perpetuate an illegality or irregularity committed in favour of others – Appeals allowed. [Relied on U.P. Public Service Commission v. Surendra Kumar, (2018) 10 SCC 535; A.P. Public Service Commission v. Baloji Badhavath, (2009) 5 SCC 1; Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 INSC 72; Paras 46-90] Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Yati Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2026 INSC 64

Recruitment to Police Force – Criminal Antecedents and "Honourable Acquittal" – Scope of Judicial Review – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's order which had directed the State to treat a candidate's acquittal as "honourable" and reconsider him for the post of constable (driver) - The respondent was previously charged with serious offences involving moral turpitude, including kidnapping and rape (Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(c) IPC), but was acquitted by the trial court by being given the "benefit of doubt". State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Regularization of Casual Workers - Parity in Treatment - Irregular vs. Illegal Appointment - The Appellants, engaged as daily-wage workers (Sweepers and Cook) with the Income Tax Department since the 1990s, sought regularization of their services - The Tribunal and High Court denied relief, citing non-fulfillment of the 10-year continuous service criteria as of 10.04.2006 per the Umadevi (3) judgment - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, noting that the Appellants were similarly situated to other daily-wage workers whose services were already regularized under Court orders – Noted that "irregular" appointments (where procedures like interviews were followed) should be distinguished from "illegal" backdoor entries - It observed that the perennial nature of the work, evidenced by subsequent outsourcing, necessitated regular posts - Denying regularization by misapplying Umadevi (3) to long-serving employees performing indispensable duties is contrary to equity - Services ordered to be regularized from 01.07.2006 with consequential benefits – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ravi Verma and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 2795-2796 of 2018); Raman Kumar and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 4146 of 2023); Jaggo Vs. Union of India and Ors. (2024 INSC 1034); Paras 7-10] Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 159 : 2026 INSC 156 : AIR 2026 SC 997

Relief – One-time Measure to Prevent Protracted Litigation – Supreme Court noted this was the third round of litigation and a fourth round (fresh Selection Board) would not yield equitable results due to inherently skewed ACRs – Supreme Court modified AFT directions to grant PC directly to specific categories: (a) SSCWOs inducted prior to January 2009; (b) SSCWOs inducted after January 2009 in branches other than Law, Education, and Naval Architecture; and (c) Male SSCOs barred by initial terms, subject to medical and disciplinary clearance – Released officers within these categories deemed to have completed 20 years of service for pensionary benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Annie Nagaraja (2020) 13 SCC 1; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125; Amit Kumar Sharma v. Union of India (2023) 20 SCC 486; Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47; Para 54-56] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282

Relief – Superannuation during Pendency – Held that since the appellant has reached the age of superannuation, reinstatement is no longer possible - The High Court, on fresh consideration, must determine: (i) whether the Tribunal's interference with the disciplinary action was justified, and (ii) the appellant's entitlement to back wages and retiral benefits – Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-11] Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147

Reopening of Concluded Litigation – Delay and Laches – "Fence-sitters" – The Supreme Court dismissed Special Leave Petitions filed by primary school teachers seeking to revive a service dispute that had attained finality over a decade ago - The petitioners sought directions similar to a 2021 High Court order which directed the consideration of a representation for higher grade pay scales - held that the petitioners, whose services were terminated in 1994 and whose prior challenges were dismissed in 2009 and 2011, were not "identically situated" to the 2021 petitioner who was still in service. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Rule 27 of Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 – Mandatory Requirement of Sanction – Held that even if assumed that the 1982 Pension Rules were applicable through the residuary Clause 110 of the 1992 Regulations, observed that Rule 27(2)(b)(i) mandates prior sanction of the Government for instituting proceedings after retirement - rejected the Corporation's argument that a "general sanction" was accorded at the time the 1992 Regulations were originally approved, clarifying that the word 'shall' in the rule implies a mandatory safeguard for each specific case to prevent unwarranted proceedings against superannuated employees – Regulation 110 of the 1992 Regulations is a miscellaneous/residuary provision intended to cover silent areas - it does not confer automatic jurisdiction to initiate departmental enquiries against retired employees unless the Corporation has formally adopted the relevant Government rules at an appropriate level – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 666; Girijan Cooperative Corporation Limited Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana Rao, (2010) 15 SCC 322; Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and Others, (2013) 6 SCC 515; Paras 18-30] Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16

Salary Payment and Creation of Posts – Private Aided vs. Self-Financed Schemes – Respondents (lecturers) sought government salary payments and post sanctions for subjects run under a self-financed scheme - The High Court had repeatedly issued "reconsideration" directions without deciding the existence of a legal right, leading to a "Second Season" of episodic litigation spanning 16 years - Held: Constitutional and statutory remedies are not for academic discourse; if a case deserves relief, it must be granted "then and there, unflinchingly". Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175

Selection and Recruitment – Migration of Reserved Category Candidates to Unreserved Category – Own Merit – The Supreme Court reiterated the settled legal position that a candidate belonging to a reserved category (SC/ST/OBC) who secures marks higher than or equal to the cut-off marks of the General (Unreserved) category, without availing any concession or relaxation, must be treated as a General category candidate and adjusted against unreserved posts - Such candidates are "own merit" candidates and their selection does not count against the quota earmarked for the backward classes - Migration or "Merit Induced Shift" of reserved category candidates to the open category is a manifestation of the principle of equality - The "Open Category" is not a quota but is available to all candidates regardless of their social category, provided they meet the criterion of merit. Airport Authority of India v. Sham Krishna B, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 63 : 2026 INSC 69 : AIR 2026 SC 463

Selection Criteria – Criteria Appointments and Career-Enhancing Courses – Supreme Court found that SSCWOs were systematically denied criteria appointments and access to important courses (e.g., Junior Command Course) due to their perceived lack of a "future" in the Army - While these may not have a high numerical weightage in computerized evaluation, they significantly influence the "Value Judgement" component (5 marks), which often becomes determinative when officers miss the cut-off by narrow margins. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Seniority from Initial Joining - Administrative Instructions vs. Statutory Regulations - Supreme Court clarified that the period of training is an integral part of service and must be counted for seniority - Regulation 97 specifies that seniority is determined by the rank in the list of approved candidates, and the date of joining duty marks the commencement of the relationship with the service, regardless of whether the candidate is on a consolidated pay during training or a regular scale during probation - rejected the application of the "cyclic order" (Proviso to Regulation 97) because the direct recruits were selected/appointed in 2000 and 2001, while the internal candidates were promoted in May 2002 - Since they were not recruited in the same calendar year, the direct recruits appointed earlier maintain their seniority over those appointed later - noted that any Board Proceedings (BPs) or terms in appointment letters that run contrary to the statutory Regulations (10(9) and 87) cannot override the legal position that seniority counts from the first date of joining for training. M. Thanigivelu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2026 INSC 229

Service Jurisprudence – Deemed Permanency and Substantive Appointment – Supreme Court ruled that instructors continuing for over ten years in a row against mandatory student-teacher ratio requirements acquire a degree of permanency - Even if originally contractual, these appointments are treated as "substantive in character" because they were made through a public selection process and the nature of work is permanent and integral to the institution - The PAB is the sole central authority with financial powers to approve budgets and fix honoraria under the scheme - Once the PAB approved a proposal to pay ₹17,000/- per month, the State Executive Committee had no authority to unilaterally reduce or ignore this determination. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Superannuation Age of Judicial Officers – Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 – Article 233 and 309 of the Constitution of India – Petitioner, a Principal District and Sessions Judge, sought enhancement of retirement age to 61 or 62 years - Held, enhancement of retirement age requires a policy decision and consequential amendment in Service Rules - While some States have enhanced the age to 61/62 years to match government departments, such issues should not be resolved through judicial orders for individual benefit - A holistic view is required by stakeholders to ensure parity across States - Writ Petition under Article 32 not entertained. Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Termination of Service – Validity of Degrees – Prospective Application of Judicial Declaration – Protection of Students' Careers - The appellants were appointed as librarians by the State of Bihar in 2010 based on Bachelor of Library Science (B.Lib) degrees obtained in 2004 from the University of Technology and Science, Raipur - This university was established under the Chhattisgarh Niji Kshetra Vishwavidyalaya Act, 2002 - in Professor Yash Pal v. State of Chhattisgarh (2005) 5 SCC 420, the Supreme Court had declared the 2002 Act ultra vires, resulting in the cessation of all universities established under it - Relying on this, the State of Bihar terminated the appellants' services in 2015, contending their degrees were unrecognized - The Patna High Court upheld the termination - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and the termination orders – i. Protection of Students' Interests: In Professor Yash Pal, Supreme Court specifically directed the State to protect students currently studying by affiliating their institutions with existing State universities - held that this logic extends to students who had already passed out before the Act was struck down, provided the university was not bogus and actual study was imparted; ii. No Fault of Appellants: The appellants could not be held at fault for studying in a university established under a then-valid State law - the State of Bihar appointed them in 2010—years after the Yash Pal judgment—meaning the State was or should have been aware of the legal status but allowed them to work for over five years; iii. Relief: directed the reinstatement of the appellants with continuity of service - back wages were denied as the appellants had not performed duties during the intervening period and the State was not solely at fault – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Prof. Yashpal and Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 420; Paras 12-18] Priyanka Kumari v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 173 : 2026 INSC 167 : AIR 2026 SC 1500

Vacancy Cap – Sanctity of 250-Vacancy Ceiling – Supreme Court rejected the Union's contention that the annual cap of 250 vacancies for PC is sacrosanct - Historical data revealed the cap was frequently breached for exigencies like the Kargil War or policy transitions - held that the vacancy cap cannot act as a shield against remedial action where the method of assessment is found to be unfair and discriminatory - Male officers cannot claim a legitimate expectation to compete only against other males for PC vacancies - Following the Delhi High Court's 2010 judgment in Babita Puniya, all parties were aware that women were entitled to PC consideration - Any expectation that runs contrary to the constitutional mandate of gender equality is inherently illegitimate. [Relied on Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125; Paras 32-64] Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Vacancy Computation – Dynamic Vacancy Model – Validity of the methodology used in the December 2020 Selection Board – Held, the "Dynamic Vacancy Model" was a rational one-time mechanism to distribute vacancies across 24 batches while maintaining the Navy's pyramidal structure and operational agility – The use of '15' as a divisor is anchored in service realities, representing the approximate years of service accompanying a grant of PC – The methodology does not suffer from arbitrariness or discrimination - Held, unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy's failure to disclose the evaluation framework and vacancy computation methodology prior to the 2020 and 2022 Boards violated basic norms of fairness and transparency. [Para 25, 38-48] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282

Service Tax

Service Tax — Finance Act, 1994 — Sections 65(40), 65(41), 65(105)(zu), 66A — Reverse charge — “Event Management Service” — Fees paid to foreign booking agencies for procuring speakers for Hindustan Times Leadership Summit — HELD: Not taxable as Event Management Service — Booking of speakers is distinct from managing, organizing, planning, or presenting an event — Mere procurement of speakers does not amount to “event management” — Presence of speakers being essential to the Summit does not convert booking agents into “event managers” — Tax cannot be imposed by stretching the statutory definition — Strict interpretation of taxing statutes must prevail – Further held that i. The contracts with Washington Speakers Bureau and Harry Walker Agency were speaker-booking contracts, not contracts for event management; they did not involve management of venue, logistics, stage, publicity, sound, light, security, invitations, or coordination of the event; ii. “Event management” under Section 65(40) requires services relating to planning, promotion, organizing, or presentation of an event; mere facilitation of a speaker's appearance does not satisfy this test; iii. The CBIC/TRU Circular dated 08.08.2002 supports the assessee, as it contemplates an event manager as one who manages venue, stage, artists, logistics, and production of the event — functions absent in the present case; iv. Even if speakers are central to the Summit, participation in the event is not equivalent to managing the event; booking agents cannot be treated as “event managers”; v. Applying the principle of strict interpretation of taxing statutes, tax cannot be imposed by analogy or inference if the service does not fall squarely within the statutory entry; vi. Applying the common parlance test, ordinary understanding of “event management” does not cover speaker-booking services – Appeals allowed. [Relied on: Shiv Steels v. State of Assam, 2025 SCC Online SC 2006; CST v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, 1967 SCC Online SC 154 (Para 46); Indo International Industries v. CST, (1981) 2 SCC 528; Paras 28, 37-41, 44-48] HT Media Ltd. v. Principal Commissioner Delhi South Goods and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 55 : 2026 INSC 66 : AIR 2026 SC 560

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Section 18 – Appeal against ICC Recommendations – Jurisdiction of Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) – The Supreme Court held that an appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act is maintainable before the Armed Forces Tribunal when read in juxtaposition with Section 14 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Held that the High Court erred in holding that the appellant had no right of appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act against the recommendations of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC). 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107

Short Service Commission

Short Service Commission — Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) — Indian Air Force — Retrospective evaluation based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) — Validity of Minimum Performance Criteria — Pregnancy and Medical Category - Key Findings - i. Structural Distortion in Evaluation: ACRs authored in an environment where SSCOs had no future in the service are "structurally distorted" and cannot be deployed to their disadvantage when they are suddenly placed in a competitive fray for PC; ii. Arbitrary Implementation of Policy: The hurried implementation of Human Resource Policy (HRP) 01/2019, which introduced new criteria like "Categorisation" and "Mandatory In-Service Courses" (MISCs) without providing a reasonable gestation period, deprived officers of a meaningful opportunity to meet eligibility requirements; iii. Pregnancy and Gender Equality: The failure to accommodate officers who lost a round of consideration due to a temporary lowering of medical category on account of pregnancy amounts to arbitrariness - The choice to become a parent cannot be equated with an unwillingness to pursue professional advancement. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India and Ors (Civil Appeal No. 14681/2024); AU Tayyaba v. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 688; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (2021) 15 SCC 125; Paras 14-17, 26-32, 35-39] Wg Cdr Sucheta EDN v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2026 INSC 280

Short Service Commission — Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) — Indian Air Force — Retrospective evaluation based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) — Validity of Minimum Performance Criteria — Pregnancy and Medical Category - The Supreme Court has held that evaluating Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) for Permanent Commission based on ACRs authored during a period when they were ineligible for PC is inherently unfair and arbitrary - Supreme Court held that the evaluative lens applied by assessing officers is conditioned by the available career trajectory; thus, reports intended only to assess suitability for short-term extension cannot be retrospectively treated as reliable indicators for long-term retention or advanced leadership potential - While declining reinstatement for released officers due to operational effectiveness, Supreme Court directed that SSCOs considered in the 2019–2021 Boards be deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service for pensionary benefits as a one-time measure - For future Boards, the Air Force must disclose vacancies and detailed evaluation criteria prior to the selection process. Wg Cdr Sucheta EDN v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2026 INSC 280

Society

Society - Autonomy of Society — General Body Resolutions — Supreme Court emphasized that the Society's General Body, in an AGM held on September 30, 2025, had ratified the membership of the appellants and the subsequent purchaser – Noted that the High Court's conclusion that the Revisional Authority acted in excess of jurisdiction was unsustainable, especially since the appellants had initially approached the Society's Authorised Officer and only then availed statutory remedies under the MCS Act. [Paras 43-44] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125

Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026

Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026 – Statutory Nature and Enforcement – Supreme Court observed that the SWM Rules, 2026 (effective from 01.04.2026), framed under Sections 3, 6, and 25 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and placed before Parliament as per Section 26, are not mere delegated legislation but represent the "will expressed by the parliament" - The transition to a "digital-first circular economy framework" introduces Extended Bulk Waste Generator Responsibility (EBWGR) and mandates a four-stream waste segregation (Wet, Dry, Sanitary, and Special Care). Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182

Special Courts

Special Courts Act, 2009 (Bihar) — Confiscation of Property — Death of Public Servant during pendency of Appeal — Effect on Confiscation Proceedings against spouse/relative - The Supreme Court held that confiscation proceedings initiated under the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 (BSCA) do not automatically abate or get set aside upon the death of the public servant if the property is held by a relative or spouse who was also put to notice – Noted that "abatement" in criminal proceedings discontinuation due to the death of the accused is distinct from "acquittal" and does not constitute a comment on the merits of the case - Under Section 19 of the BSCA, confiscated property can only be returned in two specific scenarios: (a) modification or annulment of the order by the High Court, or (b) acquittal by the Special Court - Since the Act does not account for the death of a public servant as a ground for returning property, and because non-public servants can be proceeded against for holding illegally acquired assets, the High Court is required to decide such appeals on their merits rather than dropping them due to the death of the primary accused. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2016) 3 SCC 183; Gurmail Singh v. State of U.P. (2022) 10 SCC 684; P. Nallammal v. State (1999) 6 SCC 559; Para 8-12] State of Bihar v. Sudha Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : 2026 INSC 272

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 41(h) — Injunction when refused — Maintainability of suit for injunction simpliciter when title and possession are in dispute — The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision that a suit for a bare mandatory injunction is not maintainable when there is a serious cloud over the title and possession of the property - the appropriate and efficacious remedy is to seek a decree for possession and declaration of title, rather than mere injunction - A suit for mandatory injunction without seeking possession is barred under Section 41(h) as an equally efficacious relief can be obtained through the usual mode of a suit for possession. [Para 13, 16, 22, 23] Sanjay Paliwal v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 54 : 2026 INSC 61

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Sham and Nominal Documents – Loan Transaction vs. Sale Agreement – Probative Value of Contemporaneous Documents – Held that where a registered sale agreement and a separate MoU are executed on the same day, purchased from the same stamp vendor, and witnessed by the same individuals, such facts strongly probablize the defense that the sale agreement was merely security for a loan transaction rather than a genuine sale. [Paras 10-12] Muddam Raju Yadav v. B. Raja Shanker, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2026 INSC 214

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Discretionary Relief – Bona Fides of Plaintiff – Suppression of Material Facts – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss a suit for specific performance where the plaintiff suppressed the existence of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) executed on the same day as the sale agreement - held that specific performance is an equitable and discretionary relief that must be denied if there is even a slight doubt regarding the plaintiff's bona fides or if material facts have been withheld from the Court - A plaintiff approaching the Court with "unclean hands" by failing to mention a contemporaneous document that characterizes the sale agreement as a sham/nominal document for a loan transaction is not entitled to relief. Muddam Raju Yadav v. B. Raja Shanker, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2026 INSC 214

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Necessary Parties – While a lis pendens transferee is not a necessary party, the vendor remains a necessary party in a suit for specific performance to fulfill contractual obligations and special covenants - if the vendor's estate is represented by multiple substituted heirs, the death of one such heir without timely substitution of their own LRs does not lead to the abatement of the entire appeal if other heirs of the vendor are still on record – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram & Others (1971) 1 SCC 265; Bhurey Khan v. Yaseen Khan (Dead) by LRs & Ors. 1995 Supp (3) SCC 331; Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Deorajin Debi (Smt.) & Anr. AIR 1960 SC 941; Lala Durga Prasad and Others v. Lala Deep Chand and Others (1953) 2 SCC 509; Shivashankara v. H.P. Vedavyasa Char 2023 LiveLaw SC 261; Paras 36 - 44] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Equitable Relief – Refund and Restitution – Complete Justice - In a suit for specific performance concerning an Agreement to Sell from 2008, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness as he lacked the financial wherewithal to pay the balance consideration of Rs. 5.21 crores on the due date and failed to visit the Sub-Registrar's office - Noted that the respondents also failed to fulfill contractual obligations regarding property mutation and conversion - Holding that the grant of specific performance is not an equitable relief after a passage of seventeen years – Supreme Court emphasized that equity must prevent unjust enrichment and restore parties to their original positions when both are at fault - To adjust equities and bring quietus to a dispute protracted for over a decade, the Supreme Court modified the High Court's order (which had allowed forfeiture of Rs. 60 lakhs earnest money) and directed the respondents to pay a lumpsum amount of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores) to the appellant for full restitution – Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 5-8] Subhash Aggarwal v. Mahender Pal Chhabra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 6 : 2026 INSC 11

Sports Law

Sports Administration – Applicability of S. Nithya Directions to Cricket Associations – Mandatory Inclusion of Sports Persons – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's directions which had applied the mandate from S. Nithya v. Union of India (requiring 75% of members and key office bearers to be eminent sports persons) to a District Cricket Association - Held, the directions in S. Nithya arose from the specific context of athletics governance and are inapplicable to Cricket associations, which are governed by the specialized regulatory framework established in the BCCI case. Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Sports - Cricket Administration – District Cricket Associations – Conformity with BCCI Constitution – Held, the judgment in BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar does not mandate that District Associations must model their regulations and bye-laws on the exact lines of the BCCI Constitution - While State Associations are required to bring their constitutions in conformity with the BCCI, this requirement does not automatically extend to the internal composition and business of District-level bodies through judicial review. Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Sports - Public Character of Sports – Material Resources of the Community – The Court emphasized that sporting facilities and opportunities are "material resources of the community" under Article 39(b) and organizers are "institutions of the national life" under Article 38 - District Associations should volunteer to adopt "Sadhana" (endeavor) toward good governance, transparency, and the exclusion of conflicts of interest to ensure sports do not remain a privilege of the urban economic elite – Appeal allowed. [Relied on BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar (2016) 8 SCC 535; Paras 13-23] Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Sports - The Supreme Court lifted the ban imposed on BJP Leader Anurag Thakur from holding office in the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI). Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 143

Stale Claims and Representations – The Supreme Court reiterated that the practice of reviving stale or dead claims by making repeated representations followed by a prayer to "consider" them is disapproved - Rejection of a belated representation does not furnish a fresh cause of action - Courts must satisfy themselves that a claim relates to a "live issue" before issuing directions for consideration. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Stamp Act

Stamp Act - Agreement to Sell - Stamp Duty - Possession - Relationship between Landlord and Tenant - Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 - The Supreme Court addressed whether an agreement to sell, entered into by a tenant who had been in possession of the property for fifty years, should be treated as a "conveyance" for the purpose of charging stamp duty under Explanation I to Article 47A of Schedule I-A of the Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 – Supreme Court noted Key Findings – i. Nexus of Possession: For Explanation I to Article 47A to apply, the delivery of possession must have a nexus to the agreement to sell meaning it must "follow" the agreement or be "evidenced" by it as a result of the sale transaction; ii. Continuance of Tenancy: Supreme Court noted that the appellant's possession remained that of a tenant and was not converted to that of a vendee - This was evidenced by the fact that the respondent successfully pursued an eviction order against the appellant as a tenant even after the agreement to sell was executed; iii. Nature of Agreement: Since the possession was not "followed by" or "evidenced" as a result of the agreement to sell, but rather preceded it by fifty years due to a pre-existing tenancy, the agreement did not constitute a "deemed conveyance" - The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and High Court, ruling that the appellant was not liable for additional stamp duty or penalty and directing the Trial Court to mark the agreement as an Exhibit. [Distinguished from Ramesh Mishrimal Jain vs. Avinash Vishwanath Patne, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 329; Paras 6-12] Vayyaeti Srinivasarao v. Gaineedi Jagajyothi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 49 : 2026 INSC 59 : AIR 2026 SC 637

Telecom Law

Telecom Law – Spectrum Allocation – Liability for Reserve Price – Effective Date for Commencement of Liability - The Supreme Court held that telecom licensees whose Unified Access Service (UAS) licences were quashed by the Court on February 2, 2012, but who continued operations to ensure non-disruption of services to the general public, are liable to pay the reserve price fixed for the November 2012 auction starting from February 2, 2012 – Held that the liability commences from the date the original licences were declared illegal and quashed, not from the date of subsequent orders or the date of fresh auctions. Union of India v. Sistema Shyam Teleservices, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2026 INSC 174 : AIR 2026 SC 1123

Telegraph Act, 1885

Telegraph Act, 1885 – Section 4 – Nature of Telecom License – The Central Government possesses the exclusive privilege of establishing and operating telecommunications - A license granted under the proviso to Section 4 is a contract between the licensor and licensee but is not an ordinary commercial agreement; it is a statutory grant shaped by public law obligations. [Paras 18, 32] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Tender Process

Tender Process – Comparison of Dissimilar Plots – Irrationality – the Ghaziabad Development Authority (GDA) cancelled the appellant's bid for a 3150 sq. metre plot on the ground that smaller plots (123-132 sq. metres) fetched higher rates per square metre - Held, the subject plot (large industrial area) cannot be compared with smaller plots as demand for the former is scarce - Cancelling a bid based on such comparison constitutes an "irrelevant consideration" and is "arbitrary, whimsical, and irrational". Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22

Trademarks Act, 1999

Trademarks Act, 1999 – Title and Registration – The Supreme Court clarified that the NCLT and NCLAT are not the appropriate fora to decide highly contentious issues of trademark title involving technical collaboration agreements, contingent assignments, and the effect of BIFR restraint orders - Supreme Court set aside findings on title from both the NCLT and NCLAT, leaving the parties free to litigate the issue of title before a competent civil court or authority. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021) 7 SCC 209; Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. SK Wheels (P) Ltd. (2022) 2 SCC 583; SREI Multiple Asset Investment Trust Vision India Fund v. Deccan Chronicle Marketeers (2023) 7 SCC 295; Ebix Singapore (P) Ltd. v. Educomp Solutions Ltd. (CoC) (2022) 2 SCC 401; Paras 26- 47] Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81 : AIR 2026 SC 748

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 105 and Section 108 — Indian Easements Act, 1882; Section 52 — Lease vs. Licence — Interpretation of Deeds — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had re-characterized a registered 99-year lease deed as a licence - held that when the nomenclature, text, and context of a document clearly indicate a "lease simpliciter," courts should not resort to purposive construction or ex-post facto circumstances to infer a different intention - A unilateral cancellation of such a registered lease deed, without bilateral agreement or meeting conditions under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, is illegal and non-est. General Secretary, Vivekananda Kendra v. Pradeep Kumar Agarwalla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2026 INSC 199

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Specific Performance – Execution of Decree – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 35, 97, 98, 101, and 102 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 19(b) – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a purchaser who acquires property during the pendency of litigation, as a transferee pendente lite, has no right to obstruct the execution of the decree and remains bound by the outcome of the proceedings, holding the transfer strictly subservient to the decree - Key findings held i. Doctrine of Lis Pendens and Transferee Pendente Lite: The principle of lis pendens enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is based on equity, good conscience, justice, and public policy - A transferee pendente lite is bound by the ultimate decree of the court, irrespective of whether they had notice of the pending suit or acted in good faith; ii. Registration of Lis Pendens (Bombay Amendment): Under the Maharashtra amendment to Section 52, once a notice of lis pendens is registered, the property cannot be transferred or dealt with so as to affect the rights of any party under a subsequent decree - The lack of knowledge of the proceedings is not a valid defense against the application of this doctrine; iii. Execution against Obstructionists: In execution proceedings for the delivery of immovable property, the Executing Court has the mandate under Order XXI Rule 97 and Rule 98 CPC to remove any person bound by the decree, including a transferee pendente lite, who resists or obstructs possession; iv. Adjudication of Rights in Execution: All questions relating to the right, title, or interest of an obstructionist arising under Order XXI Rule 97 must be determined by the Executing Court under Rule 101 and not by a separate suit - For transferees pendente lite, their title is subservient to the decree and is effectively extinguished by the court-executed sale deed; v. Interplay between Specific Relief Act and Transfer of Property Act: While Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act protects subsequent transferees for value without notice at a stage prior to the institution of a suit, it must give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act once a suit is instituted – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Celir LLP v. Somati Prasad Bafna (2024 SCC Online SC 3727); Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy (2006) 13 SCC 608; Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (2008) 5 SCC 796; Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami (1972) 2 SCC 200; Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2805); Paras 41-64] Alka Shrirang Chavan v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 44 : 2026 INSC 52

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 58(c) – Mortgage by Conditional Sale vs. Outright Sale – No transaction shall be deemed a mortgage by conditional sale unless the condition for reconveyance is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale - In the absence of such a clause in the registered Sale Deed, the transaction cannot be construed as a mortgage by conditional sale. [Paras 44 - 49] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

Trial Delay and Witness Management

Trial Delay and Witness Management — Noted that the prosecution expressed intent to examine 159 witnesses - noted that even examining 50% of these witnesses would take a "pretty long time" and questioned the necessity of multiplying witnesses on the same issues – noted that the prosecution should focus on important witnesses to establish its case rather than prolonging the trial - While acknowledging the gravity of the NDPS charges, exercised its discretion in favor of the petitioner due to the overall delay and the age of pending cases in the Trial Court - Bail granted subject to terms imposed by the Trial Court and specific conditions including a travel restriction to Ankleshwar, Gujarat, and surrender of passport. [Paras 5-11] Chintan Rajubhai Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 99

University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956

University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 — Direction to Universities — Respondent – Supreme Court directed the Universities to furnish information to the UGC regarding students who obtained questionable degrees in technical branches - The UGC shall then take decisions based on the principles laid down in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Rabi Sankar Patro - Order passed in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction to do complete justice in the specific facts and circumstances of the case. [Relied on Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. VS. Rabi Sankar Patro & Ors., (2018) 1 SCC 468; Paras 6-8] University Grants Commission v. Annamalai University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 183

University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 — Distance Education — Technical Degrees — Validity of Degrees — Primacy of Statutory Bodies — The Supreme Court upheld the primacy of the UGC in making regulations for distance education - it modified a High Court order that had validated technical degrees obtained via distance learning through interim orders – Held that technical education (Engineering) requires practical, hands-on training and cannot be conducted via distance mode without express AICTE approval - Following the precedent in CMJ Foundation & Ors. vs. State of Meghalaya & Ors., Supreme Court held that the UGC is the appropriate statutory authority to consider the consequences of its orders and take necessary actions regarding the annulment of illegal degrees. University Grants Commission v. Annamalai University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 183

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 43D(5), 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18 – Grant of Bail – Prolonged Incarceration vs. Statutory Bar – Constitutional Perspective under Article 21 – Role Differentiation in Conspiracy – Governing Principles for Bail under UAPA - emphasized that the "prima facie true" standard under Section 43D(5) does not reduce the judicial role to a mechanical acceptance of prosecution assertions, but requires a threshold inquiry of real content- i. Contextual Inquiry into Delay - that the constitutional inquiry into delay is not an inquiry into guilt, but whether continued detention remains constitutionally permissible. This is "necessarily contextual" and includes factors like the nature of allegations, the trial's realistic trajectory, and causes contributing to delay – ii. Individualized Role Differentiation- Supreme Court rejected a "case-centric" approach in favor of an "accused-specific" one. It distinguished between those with "strategic, organisational, or ideological centrality" and those whose roles were "peripheral or episodic"- iii. Speedy Trial vs. Statutory Embargo - While recognizing the right to a speedy trial as a foundational guarantee under Article 21, the Court held that "delay simpliciter" does not automatically eclipse the statutory regime enacted by Parliament for special category offences. Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2026 INSC 2 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 32

Land Law

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULC Act) — Section 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) — Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 — Sections 3 and 4 — Mandatory requirement of notice for taking possession - The Supreme Court examined whether the mere "paper possession" recorded by the State, without serving the mandatory notice under Section 10(5) to the actual possessors of the land, would prevent the abatement of proceedings under Section 4 of the Repealing Act – Supreme Court of India has held that proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 would abate under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 if the State failed to take actual physical possession of the excess land in accordance with law, including by serving mandatory notice on the persons in possession under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act - Held that section 10 of the ULC Act distinguishes between the "vesting" of land (acquisition of title/interest) and the "taking of possession." Under Section 10(3), what vests is de jure possession, not de facto (actual physical) possession – For the State to acquire de facto possession, it must follow one of three methods: i. Voluntary surrender by the landholder; ii. Peaceful surrender following a mandatory written notice under Section 10(5) served upon the person in possession; iii. Forceful dispossession under Section 10(6) only if the person fails to comply with the Section 10(5) notice - In the absence of evidence showing actual physical possession was taken after serving notice on the appellants (who were in actual possession), the State's claim of "paper possession" is insufficient. Consequently, the proceedings relating to the land abate by operation of law under Section 4 of the Repealing Act – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280; AP Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Tahsildar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 447; Paras 19-23] Dalsukhbhai Bachubhai Satasia v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : 2026 INSC 21

Rent Control

Urban Premises Rent Control Act, 2021 (UP); Section 38(2) - Jurisdiction of Rent Authority - Judicial Discipline - The Supreme Court censured the Rent Authority for entertaining a restoration application and staying eviction after the Supreme Court had already dismissed the tenant's Special Leave Petition and Review Petition with a direction to vacate - Supreme Court emphasized that under Section 38(2), the Rent Authority's jurisdiction is limited to tenancy agreements and does not extend to questions of title or ownership. An order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. Rajesh Goyal v. Laxmi Constructions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2026 INSC 299

Value Added Tax

Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (UP) – Schedule II, Part A, Entry 103 vs. Schedule V, Entry 1 (Residuary Entry) – Classification of "Sharbat Rooh Afza" - The Supreme Court held that "Sharbat Rooh Afza" is classifiable as a "fruit drink" under Entry 103 of Schedule II, Part A of the UPVAT Act, taxable at the concessional rate of 4%, rather than as an unclassified item under the residuary entry taxable at 12.5%; held that - 1. Inclusive Nature of Entry 103 - Supreme Court observed that Entry 103 is an inclusive and umbrella entry covering "processed or preserved vegetables and fruits, fruit drink and fruit juice."- Since the entry does not prescribe a minimum quantitative threshold for fruit content, it is improper to read a rigid percentage requirement into it that the Legislature did not provide; 2. Essential Character Test - Supreme Court applied the "Essential Character Test" as embodied in Rule 3(b) of the HSN Explanatory Notes - It held that while invert sugar syrup constitutes 80% of the volume, it merely acts as a carrier and preservative - The flavor, aroma, and beverage identity are derived from the 10% fruit juice and herbal distillates, which impart the product's distinctive character as a refreshing drink; 3. Common Parlance vs. Regulatory Classification - Supreme Court clarified that regulatory classifications under food safety laws (like the Fruit Products Order, 1955) are intended for quality control and safety, not fiscal classification - A fiscal statute must be interpreted based on how the product is understood in common or commercial parlance; 4. Burden of Proof on Revenue for Reclassification - Supreme Court reiterated that the burden of proof lies squarely on the Revenue to establish that a product falls within a residuary entry or an entry different from that claimed by the assessee - In this case, the Revenue failed to produce trade inquiries or market evidence to displace the appellant's classification; 5. Avoidance of Residuary Clause - Recourse to a residuary entry is impermissible when a commodity can reasonably be brought within the ambit of a specific entry. Denying a product "parentage" in a specific entry and consigning it to the "orphanage of the residuary clause" is against the principles of classification – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Dunlop India Ltd v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 241; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424; Hindustan Ferodo Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise (1997) 2 SCC 677; CCE v. Connaught Plaza Restaurant (P) Ltd (2012) 13 SCC 639; Paras 16, 19-22, 24-27, 30] Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2026 INSC 195

Victimology vs. Penology

Victimology vs. Penology — Compensation as a Substitute for Punishment — Held: Victim compensation under Section 395 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (or Section 357 CrPC) is an addition to, and not an alternative for, the sentence imposed - Compensation is restitutory, whereas punishment is punitive and intended to create deterrence - Reducing a sentence for a grave offence (Section 307 IPC) in exchange for monetary payment is a "dangerous" practice akin to "Blood Money" and is not acceptable in the Indian criminal justice system. Parameshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2026 INSC 164

Waqf Act, 1995

Waqf Act, 1995 – Effect of 2013 Amendment – Overruling of Precedents – Noted that the 2013 Amendment removed the sub-stratum of the decision in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf only regarding the Tribunal's lack of power to remove encroachers (now covered under Section 54) - the larger principle that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to specific statutory powers remains valid - Supreme Court found the expansive interpretation of Section 83 in Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari to be divergent from the correct legal position established in Ramesh Gobindram. Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90

Waqf Act, 1995 – Sections 6, 7, 83, and 85 – Jurisdiction of Waqf Tribunal vs. Civil Court – Ouster of Civil Court Jurisdiction – Rejection of Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal to determine whether a property is a waqf property or not is limited to properties specified in the "list of auqaf" - The "list of auqaf," as expanded by the 2013 Amendment, includes both lists published after a survey under Chapter II and registrations made under Chapter V (Section 37) - Section 83 is not an omnibus provision conferring expansive jurisdiction on the Tribunal for any dispute relating to waqf; rather, it enables the constitution of the Tribunal for matters specifically required "under the Act" to be determined by it - The ouster of Civil Court jurisdiction under Section 85 is not absolute and is confined only to matters expressly conferred upon the Tribunal by the statute. Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90

Water Disputes

Water Disputes - The Supreme Court directed constitution of a Tribunal for resolving disputes pending between the States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka over sharing of Pennaiyar river water resources. The Court ordered the constitution of a Water Disputes Tribunal by the Central Government within 1 month. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 106