Existence Of Regulation Cannot Fetter Legislature's Power To Amend Statute & Override Regulation: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has held that the existence of a regulation framed under a statute cannot curtail or fetter legislative power to amend the parent enactment in a manner that overrides the regulation.

A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Manoj Misra made the observation while upholding the power of the Commissioner of the erstwhile North Delhi Municipal Corporation to dismiss a Group-A officer from service following his conviction in a corruption case.

This case arises from the Delhi High Court's 2019 order, wherein it had upheld the Appellant's dismissal from service. The appellant, Rajesh Sharma, served as an executive engineer with the North Delhi Municipal Corporation. He was convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the Commissioner dismissed him from service in 2011.

Challenging his dismissal, he argued that he belonged to Group A officer and as per the Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959, the competent authority to impose a major penalty, which included dismissal, was the Corporation and not the Commissioner.

He approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, which set aside his dismissal and ordered the disciplinary authority to pass a fresh penalty order. This was challenged by the respondents before the Delhi High Court, which held that the Commissioner, as the disciplinary authority, was right to dismiss the respondent.

The interpretative conundrum was that the 1957 Act didn't specify the disciplinary authority, and therefore, the 1959 Regulation was enacted, which specified the Corporation as the authority. In 1993, the parent legislation was amended, and it was specified that the disciplinary authority would be the Commissioner. But it also added a phrase to Section 59(d) which said 'subject to any Regulation that may be made in this behalf'.

When the matter was challenged in the Supreme Court, a bench referred to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary on the term 'may be' and said that it infers to a future happening and therefore referred to the future Regulations that are made after the 1993 amendment and not the existing 1959 Regulations. It said that the legislative intention was to replace the disciplinary authority with the Commissioner.

"Use of the words 'may be' before 'made' signifies the legislative intent of not making clause (d) of Section 59 subject to the existing regulations. There is another reason to support the above conclusion, which is, if we interpret clause (d) as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant, it will render the words 'may be made' redundant or superfluous. Any interpretation which would render some of the words in a statutory provision nugatory and/or superfluous must be eschewed."

The Court said that in any case, Regulations are a piece of subordinate legislation framed under the parent legislation. It can't fetter the legislative power to amend the Act in a way that it overrides the Regulations.  It clarified that if the intention of the legislature was not to override the existing 1959 Regulations, they might not have appointed the Commissioner as the disciplinary authority or might not have used the phrase 'any Regulation that may be made'.

"Regulations are piece of subordinate legislation. What can be achieved by a subordinate legislation under the Act can always be achieved by an amendment of the Act by the competent legislature. Moreover, existence of a Regulation framed under the Act cannot fetter the legislative power to amend the Act in a way that it overrides the Regulation."

Concluding, the Court upheld the High Court's order: "In view of the analysis above, we hold that consequent to the substitution of clause (d) of Section 59by Act 67 of 1993, with effect from 01.10.1993, notwithstanding the existing 1959 Regulations, it is the Commissioner who is the disciplinary authority of the appellant and as such competent to impose punishment of dismissal from service."

Headnote

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 – Section 59(d) [as substituted by Amendment Act 67 of 1993] & Section 92, Section 95(1) – Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 – Disciplinary Authority – Competency of the Commissioner to dismiss a Category 'A' Officer – Interpretation of the phrase "subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf" – The short question was whether the Commissioner was competent to inflict the punishment of dismissal upon a Category 'A' officer, given that the Schedule to the 1959 Regulations designated the 'Corporation' as the competent authority for Category 'A' posts – Held that consequent to the substitution of Clause (d) to Section 59 by Act 67 of 1993 (w.e.f. 01.10.1993), the Commissioner was designated as the disciplinary authority for all municipal officers and employees - The phrase "subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf" explicitly refers to regulations framed after the date of the amendment (01.10.1993) and does not subject the statutory power to the pre-existing 1959 Regulations - The use of the future-oriented phrase "may be made" denotes futurity and prevents the 1993 statutory amendment from being tethered to older, inconsistent subordinate legislation - the Commissioner is the competent disciplinary authority to pass dismissal orders. [Paras 63 83]

Interpretation of Statutes – Amendment by Substitution – Retrospectivity – "Pen and Ink" Theory – Mere use of the word "substitute" or "substitution" in an amending Act does not automatically make the substituted provision relate back to the date of enforcement of the original provision - Unless an express or implied legislative intent dictates otherwise, a substituted provision operates prospectively from the date it is introduced into the statute book. [Relied on Ram Narain v. Simla Banking and Industrial Company Limited, (1956) 2 SCC 75; Property Owners Association & Others v. State of Maharashtra & Others, (2024) 18 SCC 1 (Para 43); Shamarao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, (1952) 2 SCC 1; Paras 38, 44, 46 & 52]

Interpretation of Statutes – Meaning of the phrase "May Be" / "May Be Made" – The expression "may be" is predominantly used with reference to the future rather than the past or present - In Section 59(d), the words "may be made" signify the legislative intent to exclude existing regulations - Any interpretation rendering the words "may be made" redundant or superfluous must be avoided. [Relied on Vijay Kumar Shukal v. Lakhpat Ram and Another, (1990) 4 SCC 246; Paras 72-74]

General Clauses Act, 1897 – Section 24 – Continuation of orders/regulations issued under repealed and re-enacted provisions – Section 24 has no application where the existing rules or regulations are completely inconsistent with the newly re-enacted or substituted statutory provision - Subordinate legislation cannot override or fetter the plenary legislative power of Parliament to amend the principal Act. [Paras 76 - 83]

Case Details: RAJESH SHARMA v NORTH DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND ANR|CIVIL APPEAL/ 2026 (SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019)

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640

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