BREAKING| Pedestrians Have Fundamental Right To Have Footpath; Motorists Can't Negate Right To Walk : Supreme Court
The Court held that authorities have the corresponding duty to construct and safeguard demarcated footpaths for walking.
In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court today held that the right to walk on a demarcated footpath is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution, which includes the right to access safe and well-demarcated footpaths. This right shall have priority over movement by motorised vehicles.
This has been held as a fundamental right considering that the right to walk has always been "inextricably" connected to our daily life.
The Court observed that the duty to demarcate, construct, maintain and safeguard footpaths and other pedestrian infrastructure rests with urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities and panchayats. Emphasising that walking often remains "invisible to the light", the Court held that a violation of the right to walk on demarcated footpaths would entitle citizens to invoke constitutional remedies against the concerned authorities for restitution and compensation. The Court clarified that such remedies would be independent of those available under the Motor Vehicles Act.
A bench comprising Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Atul S Chandurkar held: "The absence of safe and comfortable footpaths to walk on and even when they exist, their subjugation to motorised transport has been a civilizational problem. We have dealt with the right under Article 21 and finally declared that the right to walk is a fundamental right and a part of the Constitution. It is integral to the right to movement guaranteed under Article 19. The fundamental right to walk will take within itself the right to demarcated footpaths."
The Court has recognised that despite the primacy of the right to walk, it has been overtaken by movement by motorised vehicles to the extent that walking has now been considered as a nuisance by drivers.
" It is rather strange that we fail to focus on recognising and securing the right to walk. It may be because wheels eclipsed our imagination, and our municipal authorities were busy creating roads that were suitable for motorized people. It could also be elitism to start with machines with wheels who are only for the rich, but as economies progressed and cheaper motor vehicles were introduced, the entire spectrum of motorized transportation dominated the roads, which pushed aside the walkers to the extent that they are treated as a nuisance for the drivers who routinely run over the walkers and their footpaths."
Holding that this should stop now, the bench also stated that the Motor Vehicle Act has also caused impediment in recognising this right to walk: "This should stop from now on as we declare the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths. Motor Vehicles Act has not been and has never been a statute that recognized the fundamental right to walk. In fact, Motor Vehicles Act has been an impediment and in many ways undermines the precious rights of the walkers."
It has been said that these rights are primary and shall have priority over movement by motorised vehicles. The fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths has a correlated duty. If the road exists, there must be a duty to ensure that there are demarcated, well-maintained footpaths for walkers.
Violation of this right would entitle for constitutional remedies: "The duty bearers are the urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities and even panchayats who must endeavor to demarcate, construct, maintain and safeguard footpaths and other necessary pedestrian infrastructure as walking is invisible to the light. The violation of the right to walk on demarcated footpaths will entitle constituents to invoke constitutional legal remedies against duty bearers for restitution and compensation. This remedy is independent of the remedies that are available under the Motor Vehicles Act.
Case Details: MANIYAR ILIYAZ SHAIK RIYAZ Vs P. AYYAPPAN|C.A. No. 4665-4666/2025