Police Recruitment Can Be Denied To Person Acquitted In Heinous Crime Only On Benefit Of Doubt : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has observed that an acquittal based on the benefit of doubt does not confer upon a candidate an automatic right to appointment in public service.

“…mere involvement of a person in an offence or in a conduct amounting to moral turpitude without anything else may become relevant consideration to judge his fitness to the post and to assess credentials for allowing such a person into the employment.”, observed a bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and NV Anjaria, while restoring the MP Police Screening committee's decision to declare the Respondent unfit to join the services because of his involvement in the serious offences of kidnapping and rape of a minor girl.

The Court asserted that the “recruitees in the disciplined force should be the persons beyond reproach and men with rectitude” as the “quality of law and order in the society and maintenance thereof depends upon the character of the persons serving in the police force.”

The respondent had applied for recruitment to the post of constable (driver) in 2016 and qualified in the selection process. During verification, he disclosed that he had previously been prosecuted in a criminal case registered in 2012 involving serious offences, including kidnapping and rape of a minor girl under the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Although the trial court acquitted him in 2014, the acquittal was granted on the benefit of the doubt rather than a clean finding of innocence. On examining the nature of the allegations and the trial court judgment, the police screening committee declared him unsuitable for appointment in the force.

The respondent challenged this decision before the High Court. While a Single Judge upheld the rejection of his candidature, the Division Bench later treated the acquittal as “clean and honourable” and directed the authorities to reconsider his candidature, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court by the State.

Setting aside the Division bench judgment, the judgment authored by Justice Anjaria held that the High Court erred in categorising the acquittal of the Respondent as a 'honourable acquittal'. The Court said that the trial court had clearly acquitted the respondent because the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. Such an acquittal, the Court held, cannot be equated with complete exoneration, as “an honourable acquittal may be one where court comes to a definitive conclusion at the end of the trial upon full-fledged appreciation of evidence that the accused had not committed an offence for which he was charged.”

“What weighed with the screening committee was that the respondent was found to be involved in serious offences such as kidnapping and abducting a minor girl and raping her, which was a conduct undoubtedly amounting to moral turpitude. The respondent, though acquitted in the criminal case, was exonerated only on the ground of benefit of doubt.”, the court said.

Further, the Court rejected the Respondent's argument that truthful disclosure of a criminal case by a candidate create an entitlement to appointment. It said that the employer is entitled to evaluate the candidate's antecedents and decide whether the individual is fit to join a disciplined force, and retains the discretion to assess whether the antecedents raise concerns about integrity and public confidence.

“…whether it is a question of recruiting a person into the service or continuing him in service or extending an employee some service benefit, his criminal antecedents, involvement in criminal activity, the conduct amounting to moral turpitude, registration of a criminal case as well as nature of his acquittal in a criminal case are all germane considerations to be applied. The employer who would be acting through a screening committee to sift such cases, has fairly a large realm of freedom to act, though without becoming arbitrary.”, the court observed.

“In a given case where the facts are stark, mere involvement of a person in an alleged offence or in the act of moral turpitude may become sufficient enough to apply it as debilitating factor for such candidate to be offered employment. Antecedents of a candidate play an important role in the decision-making process by the screening committee. This dictum would operate with greater rigour when it comes to the recruitment and appointment to the disciplined force like police.”, the court added.

Since the screening committee's findings were not arbitrary, perverse, nor illegal, the Court refused to interfere with its findings, thereby quashed and set aside the High Court's Division bench order, which had overturned the Respondent's rejection of candidature.

Cause Title: THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. VERSUS RAJKUMAR YADAV

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234

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Appearance:

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Sarthak Raizada G.A., Adv. Mr. Sarad Kumar Singhania, AOR Mr. Anil Hooda, Adv. Ms. Mrigna Shekhar, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Santosh Kumar, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rajiv R. Mishra, Adv. Mr. Suruchi Yadav, Adv. Mr. Ashutosh Yadav, AOR