RPwD Act Doesn't Allow State To Impose Ceiling To Exclude Persons With Higher Disabilities : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has held that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 defines the “floor” for reservation eligibility but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary “ceiling” excluding persons with higher degrees of disability, so long as they are capable of performing the functional requirements of the post with reasonable accommodation.

Applying this principle, the Court directed the State of Himachal Pradesh to appoint a 90% locomotor-disabled advocate as Assistant District Attorney (ADA), setting aside the High Court's judgment which had upheld his exclusion.

Background

The case arose from a 2018 recruitment process conducted by the Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission for 24 ADA posts, including two reserved for persons with disabilities. The advertisement, however, restricted eligibility to candidates with disability between 40% and 60%.

The appellant, Prabhu Kumar, a practising advocate since 2015 with 90% permanent locomotor disability, applied under the disabled category. He cleared the written examination, topped among the candidates in the disabled category, and was recommended for appointment after interview.

Despite this, the State withheld his appointment on the ground that his disability exceeded the prescribed upper limit of 60%. His writ petition challenging this decision was dismissed by the Himachal Pradesh High Court.

Supreme Court's Analysis

Allowing the appeal, the bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta held that the statutory framework under the RPwD Act only prescribes a minimum threshold of 40% disability to qualify as a “person with benchmark disability”, and does not permit the State to impose an upper cap.

By introducing a 60% ceiling, the State had effectively curtailed the scope of the statute and excluded a class of persons whom the law seeks to protect.

"The RPwD Act, 2016 defines the “floor” for reservation eligibility but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary “ceiling” that excludes those with higher degrees of disability, provided they are otherwise capable of performing the functional requirements of the role through reasonable accommodation," the judgment authored by Justice Mehta stated.

The Court found that by prescribing a 60% cap, the State had effectively “rewritten the statutory definition” to the detriment of persons with disabilities.

"By fixing a 60% maximum limit, the respondents have essentially rewritten the statutory definition of “benchmark disability” to the detriment of those very persons whom the Act aims to protect. This restrictive interpretation finds no sanctuary within the four corners of the RPwD Act, 2016, and fails to align with the objective of ensuring full and effective participation of specially-abled persons in the process of public employment."

The Court underscored that the principle of reasonable accommodation is central to the 2016 Act, and that eligibility must be assessed based on functional competence rather than the percentage of disability alone.

The High Court had denied relief relying on the Suprem Court's judgment in V. Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2019) which upheld a 50% disability limit on hearing and visually impaired candidates for District Judge appointments. However, the bench noted that V. Surendra Mohan was overruled by the Supreme Court in its 2021 judgment in  Vikash Kumar v. UPSC.

"Seen on the touchstone of the principles laid down in Vikash Kumar (supra) to the present case, the stipulation prescribing a maximum disability limit of 60% for appointment to the post of ADA is clearly arbitrary, having no nexus with the nature of duties to be performed. This upper limit of disability has clearly been prescribed in sheer ignorance of the principle of reasonable accommodation and hence the same cannot be sustained in law."

“The percentage of disability, by itself, cannot be determinative of suitability,” the Court held, adding that the State is under a positive obligation to ensure equal opportunity by making necessary adjustments.

The Court found no rational basis for prescribing a 60% upper limit for the post of ADA. It noted that the role primarily involves legal practice, advisory functions, and court appearances, requiring “mental alacrity, legal acumen and analytical ability”.

The appellant's nearly decade-long legal practice, despite his disability, demonstrated that a higher degree of locomotor disability did not impair his professional competence.

"The fact that the appellant has been practicing law successfully for nearly a decade despite suffering from 90% locomotor disability in his left shoulder, clearly demonstrates that a higher degree of locomotor disability does not necessarily translate into compromising the functionality of a law professional."

Holding the State's action to be manifestly arbitrary, the Court ruled that denying appointment despite successful selection violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

It further observed that a candidate qualifying under the general category could not be denied appointment solely due to disability, highlighting the inconsistency in applying such a restriction only within the reserved category.

The Court directed the State to issue the appointment letter to the appellant within two weeks. It ordered that his appointment would relate back to September 19, 2019, with entitlement to all notional benefits. If the vacancy is unavailable, the State has been directed to create a supernumerary post.

In view of the prolonged denial of appointment, the Court imposed costs of ₹5 lakh on the State, to be paid  to the appellant within four weeks.

Senior Advocate PV Dinesh appeared for the appellant.

Case : Prabhu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 254

Click here to read the judgment