Administrative Law — Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation — Policy Change — Lack of Probity and Transparency - Service/Education Law — Alteration of the "Rules of the Game" - Supreme Court found that the policy modification was prompted by an undisclosed representation from the father of a high-ranking candidate who failed to disclose his private interest - Such a change,...
Administrative Law — Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation — Policy Change — Lack of Probity and Transparency - Service/Education Law — Alteration of the "Rules of the Game" - Supreme Court found that the policy modification was prompted by an undisclosed representation from the father of a high-ranking candidate who failed to disclose his private interest - Such a change, introduced after the issuance of the prospectus and the submission of applications, violates the principle of fairness and predictability - Reiterated the well-settled principle that the criteria for selection/admission cannot be altered by the authorities once the process has commenced - Noted that the State adopted "double standards" as the expanded criteria were not applied to other allied medical courses during the same session – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve (2001) 10 SCC 51; K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 3 SCC 512; Tej Prakash Pathak vs. Rajasthan High Court (2025) 2 SCC 1; Mandeep Singh vs. State of Punjab (2025) INSC 834; Paras 20-40] Divjot Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : 2026 INSC 26
Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts) Rules, 2001 (Karnataka) – Rule 9(4) – Harmonious Construction with Section 9(2) – Held that while Rule 9(4) uses the term "initiated" and Section 9(2) uses "commenced," the terms must be read harmoniously - "Initiated" in Rule 9(4) must be understood as "commenced" within the meaning of Section 21 to prevent the strict timelines of the parent Act from being rendered otiose. [Relied on Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 479; Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd. (2004) 7 SCC 288; Geo Miller and Company Private Limited v. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (2020) 14 SCC 643; Arif Azim Company Limited v. Aptech Limited (2024) 5 SCC 313; Para 29] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 12(5) and Seventh Schedule – Ineligibility of Arbitrator – Unilateral Appointment – The principle of equal treatment of parties under Section 18 applies not only to arbitral proceedings but also to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators - Equal treatment entails that parties must have an equal say in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal - Any person whose relationship with the parties, counsel, or the dispute falls within the Seventh Schedule is ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator by operation of law – Held a person who is statutorily ineligible to act as an arbitrator cannot nominate or appoint another person as an arbitrator - A unilateral appointment by one party, where that party has exclusive power to appoint a sole arbitrator, violates the principle of impartiality and neutrality. Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 12(5) Proviso – Waiver of Ineligibility – “Express Agreement in Writing” – Held that the ineligibility of an arbitrator under Section 12(5) can only be waived by an "express agreement in writing" entered into by the parties subsequent to the disputes having arisen – Supreme Court laid down Parameters of Waiver- i. Mere participation in proceedings, filing a Statement of Claim, requesting an extension of time under Section 29A, or failing to object in the first procedural order does not constitute an "express agreement in writing" ii. Recording "No Objection": A procedural order recording that parties have "no objection" to the appointment is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of a conscious, written waiver under the proviso to Section 12(5). Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 14 and 34 – Challenge to Jurisdiction – Stage of Objection – Constitution of India; Article 14 – Public-Private Contracts - Held that an arbitrator falling under the Seventh Schedule becomes de jure unable to perform his functions, and his mandate terminates automatically - An objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction due to such ineligibility can be raised at any stage, including for the first time in an application under Section 34 for setting aside the award – Held that unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts violate Article 14 for being arbitrary and failing to provide the minimum level of integrity required for quasi-judicial functions - Such clauses also violate the nemo judex rule, which constitutes a part of the fundamental policy of Indian law – Appeals allowed. [Relied on TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. (2017) 8 SCC 377; Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd. (2020) 20 SCC 760; Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. (2019) 5 SCC 755; Dharma Prathishthanam v. Madhok Construction (P) Ltd. (2005) 9 SCC 686; Paras 55-107] Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 21 – Interpretation of "Commencement" – Supreme Court emphasized that the commencement of arbitral proceedings is a statutory event defined exclusively under Section 21 - This definition is not limited to calculating limitation under Section 43 but applies to all provisions of the Act unless specifically excluded - The legislature deliberately delinked commencement from judicial proceedings to ensure clarity and party autonomy. [Paras 24, 28, 29] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 9(2) and Section 21 – Commencement of Arbitral Proceedings – Automatic Vacation of Interim Relief – The Supreme Court held that for the purposes of Section 9(2), arbitral proceedings "commence" on the date the respondent receives a request for the dispute to be referred to arbitration, as defined under Section 21 - set aside the High Court's finding that proceedings only commence upon the filing of a Section 11 petition - If a notice invoking arbitration is received by the respondent within 90 days of an interim order, the mandate of Section 9(2) is satisfied, and the interim relief does not stand automatically vacated under Rule 9(4) of the Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts) Rules, 2001. [Paras 23, 24, 31] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Supreme Court drew the following conclusions: i. The principle of equal treatment of parties provided in Section 18 of the Act, 1996, applies not only to the arbitral proceedings but also to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators - Equal treatment of the parties entails that the parties must have an equal say in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal; ii. Sub-section (5) of Section 12 provides that any person whose relationship with the parties or counsel, or the dispute, whether direct or indirect, falls within any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule would be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator - Since, the ineligibility stems from the operation of law, not only is a person having an interest in the dispute or its outcome ineligible to act as an arbitrator, but appointment by such a person would be ex facie invalid; iii. The words “an express agreement in writing” in the proviso to Section 12(5) means that the right to object to the appointment of an ineligible arbitrator cannot be taken away by mere implication - The agreement referred to in the proviso must be a clear, unequivocal written agreement; iv. When an arbitrator is found to be ineligible by virtue of Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, his mandate is automatically terminated - In such circumstance, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 14 read with Section 15 for appointment of a substitute arbitrator - when an award has been passed by such an arbitrator, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 34 for setting aside the award; v. In arbitration, the parties vest jurisdiction in the tribunal by exercising their consent in furtherance of a valid arbitration agreement - An arbitrator who lacks jurisdiction cannot make an award on the merits - an objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage of the proceedings. Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6
Auction Law – Cancellation of Highest Bid – Arbitrariness – Whether a valid auction can be cancelled solely on the expectation of obtaining a higher price in a subsequent auction – Held, No – An auction process has a sanctity attached to it - The highest bid can only be discarded for valid reasons when the auction is otherwise held in accordance with law - Merely because an authority expects a higher bid than what was offered cannot be a reason to discard the highest bid, especially when it is above the reserve price - held that once a person is declared the highest bidder in an auction for a plot, it crystalises the future rights and obligations between the parties. Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order I Rule 10 – Impleadment of Parties – Necessary vs. Proper Party – Dominus Litis – Suit for recovery of service charges – Twin Tests for Necessary Party – Held: A plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to add a third person as a defendant against their wishes unless that person is a necessary party without whom no effective decree can be passed - In a suit for recovery of service charges against a partnership firm, a third-party company claiming to be a "successor" is not a necessary party if the plaintiff seeks no relief against them and the original firm continues to exist- Held: To be a "necessary party," two tests must be satisfied: (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved; and (2) no effective decree can be passed in their absence - A "proper party" is one whose presence enables the court to adjudicate completely, even if no decree is made against them. Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 5 : 2026 INSC 8
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 319 – Principles for Granting Bail to Accused Added via Section 319 – High Standard of Evidence Required - The Supreme Court held that when a person is added as an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and subsequently arrested, the court considering a bail plea must apply a test higher than a mere prima facie case - The relevant consideration is whether there is "strong and cogent evidence" of complicity, rather than a mere probability - While this standard is shorter than the satisfaction required for a conviction if the evidence goes unrebutted, it is significantly higher than the standard required for framing charges against original accused persons - In exercising discretion for bail for an accused summoned under Section 319, the Court must weigh the nature of the offence, the quality of evidence against the newly added accused, and the likelihood of the person absconding or tampering with evidence. [Para 13, 14] Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2026 INSC 36
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 438 – Anticipatory Bail – Held that where co-accused summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. have already been granted anticipatory bail and have been appearing regularly before the trial court, no case for cancellation is made out unless specific grounds for such cancellation are established by the State. [Para 15, 18, 19] Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2026 INSC 36
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Rights of Complainants/Witnesses – Concern that treating complainants as witnesses in a single FIR deprives them of legal remedies – Held: Complainants treated as witnesses are entitled to file protest petitions if a closure report is filed or if the Magistrate intends to discharge the accused. The Magistrate is bound to consider such petitions on merits – Held: Requiring registration of individual FIRs for every victim in mass-cheating cases would lead to an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings, which is not in the larger public interest or the interest of the State – Appeal allowed. [Relied on mish Devgan vs. Union of India and others (2021) 1 SCC 1; Andhra Pradesh vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (1964) 3 SCR 297; Paras 15-22] State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : 2026 INSC 25
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 154, 218, 219, 220, and 223 – Registration of FIR and Joinder of Charges– Whether multiple acts of cheating against numerous investors in a criminal conspiracy require separate FIRs or can be clubbed into a single FIR – Held: Where a criminal conspiracy is alleged leading to multiple acts of cheating against different individuals, registering one FIR and treating subsequent complaints as statements under Section 161 CrPC is a correct course of action - The "triple tests" to determine if acts form the 'same transaction' are: (1) unity of purpose and design; (2) proximity of time and place; and (3) continuity of action - If the Magistrate finds the acts constitute the 'same transaction', consolidated charges can be framed under Sections 220(1) and 223(a) & (d) CrPC. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : 2026 INSC 25
Companies Act, 2013; Section 58(3) and Section 433 — Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Condonation of Delay by Company Law Board (CLB) — Applicability of Limitation Act to Quasi-Judicial Bodies - The Supreme Court examined whether the CLB, as a quasi-judicial body, possessed the inherent or statutory power to condone delay in filing an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013, particularly for appeals filed between 12.09.2013 and 01.06.2016 (before the constitution of NCLT/NCLAT) – Held that the settled principle that the Limitation Act, 1963, applies only to "courts" in the traditional sense and not to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals unless expressly extended by statute - While Section 433 of the Act, 2013 now expressly applies the Limitation Act to proceedings before the NCLT and NCLAT, this power cannot be retroactively borrowed to signify a similar power for the erstwhile CLB - held that Section 58(3) is a simpliciter provision prescribing a mandatory limitation period - The absence of peremptory language such as "but not thereafter" does not render the prescribed period merely directory – Held that Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations which saves the inherent power of the CLB would not enable the CLB to extend time for the filing of the appeal or the application itself, as the case may be. [Relied on Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli (1969) 1 SCC 873, Paras 42-44, 69, 70, 90-93, 108, 161] Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2026 INSC 33
Constitution of India, 1950 – Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 – Section 2(f), 100, 101, and 102 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 2(s) and 2(o) – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court of Andhra Pradesh judgment that had quashed several FIRs registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Vijayawada – Held that the High Court had erroneously held that the ACB office in Vijayawada was not a notified "police station" under Section 2(s) of the CrPC following the state's bifurcation - The Supreme Court clarified that under the 2014 Reorganisation Act, existing laws and notifications (including G.O.Ms. No. 268 of 2003) continue to apply to successor states to prevent a legal vacuum - A "police station" under Section 2(s) includes a "post" held by a police officer and does not strictly require a specific physical building declaration in every instance - a subsequent 2022 clarificatory Government Order by the State of Andhra Pradesh did not have retrospective application but merely confirmed the existing legal position under the Reorganisation Act - Section 2(s) of the CrPC is exhaustive and inclusive, meaning any "post" or "place" declared by the State - A post held by a police officer can constitute a police station - Sections 100-102 of the 2014 Act ensure that laws (including notifications) in force before the appointed day continue to apply to the territories of the successor states until altered or repealed - A subsequent Government Order (G.O.Ms. No. 137 of 2022) issued as a clarification does not constitute retrospective application but merely reiterates the statutory position to avoid legal ambiguity. [Relied on Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi and Another vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd. and Others (2004) 6 SCC 689; State of Punjab and Others vs. Balbir Singh and Others (1976) 3 SCC 24; Paras 21-24, 26-29] Anti-Corruption Bureau v. Dayam Peda Ranga Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 24 : 2026 INSC 37
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Admission to Medical Courses — Sports Quota — Change in Rules after commencement of process — Transparency and Fair Play — The Supreme Court quashed the Punjab Government's decision to expand the "zone of consideration" for sports achievements from Classes XI & XII to include Classes IX & X for MBBS/BDS admissions - Granted — To avoid unsettling admissions of third parties not before the Court, the relief was restricted to the appellants – directed that the appellants are to be accommodated in government medical college seats previously allotted to Respondents 4 and 5, while the respondents are to be moved to the seats vacated by the appellants in a private medical college. Divjot Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : 2026 INSC 26
Constitution of India; Article 14 – Discrimination – noted that the respondents failed to show that any similarly situated candidates (those admitted after the 2010-11 session) were given direct appointments - noted that the last direct appointments (made in 2015) were pursuant to Court orders and limited to batches admitted prior to the 2011 policy change - Noted that the Uttar Pradesh Ayush Department (Ayurved) Nursing Service Rules, 2021 now govern the post, and recruitment must be conducted through the UPSSSC to select the most meritorious candidates. [Relied on Sivanandan C T and Others vs. High Court of Kerala and Others (2023 INSC 709; Paras 19-27] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38
Constitution of India – Article 227 – Supervisory Jurisdiction – Interference with Interlocutory Orders – Held: While the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory and it should generally not intervene in interlocutory orders like impleadment, the Supreme Court will not restore an incorrect Trial Court order if the High Court has rightly interfered to prevent an illegality – Held that an impleadment application filed nearly nine years after acquiring knowledge of the suit (as evidenced by the applicant's seal on the original summons) is liable to be rejected on the ground of silence and delay. [Relied on Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524; Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733; Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417; Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384; Paras 33-44] Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 5 : 2026 INSC 8
Constitution of India - Retrospective Application of Recruitment Rules — Change in the "Rules of the Game" — Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India — The Supreme Court set aside the retrospective application of the Bihar Engineering Service Class-II Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 2022, which introduced a 25% weightage for contractual work experience after the selection process (written examination and provisional merit list) had already commenced under the 2019 Rules – Supreme Court laid down key legal principles – i. Recruitment Process Sanctity: Eligibility criteria notified at the start of a recruitment process cannot be changed midway unless the extant rules or the advertisement explicitly permit such changes; ii. Vested Rights vs. Selection Criteria: While the State has the power to legislate retrospectively under Article 309, this power cannot be used to arbitrarily disrupt a selection process or alter the "eligibility criteria for being placed in the merit list" once the "game" has already been played; iii. Executive Instructions vs. Statutory Rules: The State cannot rely on executive memos (2018 and 2021) to override statutory recruitment rules that were in force at the time of the advertisement, particularly to the detriment of candidates who had no prior notice of such weightage - Supreme Court directed the State to finalize appointments based on the original merit lists from June/July 2022, strictly following the unamended 2019 Rules, within two months. [Relied on Tej Prakash Pathak and Others v. Rajasthan High Court and Others, (2025) 2 SCC 1; K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (2008) 3 SCC 512; Paras 25-45] Abhay Kumar Patel v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : 2026 INSC 24
Contempt Jurisdiction – Non-compliance with directions for payment of salary to part-time teachers – Opportunity of hearing - the Supreme Court allowed certain part-time teachers in the State of West Bengal to make a fresh representation before the School Education Department Secretary for pay parity with full-time teachers teaching in non-government aided higher secondary schools - ordered that the competent authority shall pass a reasoned order on the representations within 4 months - Failure of Due Process – Held that while deciding representations, the authorities failed to afford the petitioners an opportunity of hearing or summon relevant school records as directed by the High Court - Directions – The Supreme Court granted liberty to the petitioners to file fresh representations within six weeks and directed the Secretary, School Education Department, is directed to: i. Afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners (in person or through an advocate); ii. Summon and allow inspection of engagement records from respective schools; iii. Pass a detailed reasoned order within four months. [Paras 12-15] Gurupada Bera v. Binod Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 9 : 2026 INSC 20
Criminal Law – Delay in Trial – Pendency of Revision Petitions – Judicial Discipline – Rights of Victims - The Supreme Court expressed deep concern over a 23-year delay in the High Court of Rajasthan deciding a Criminal Revision Petition challenging an order of framing charges – Noted that the Revision Petition, filed in 2003 against charges under Sections 498A and 304B IPC, remained pending with an interim stay on trial proceedings until it was finally dismissed by the High Court in 2025 - that if trials for serious offences like murder, dowry death, and rape remain stayed for decades, it results in a "mockery of justice" - Justice must be balanced between the accused and the victim/family members - Noted that "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere" - The Supreme Court requested the Chief Justices of all High Courts to ensure that petitions involving interim stays on trials, particularly in sensitive and serious matters, are prioritized and heard immediately - The Registrar General of the Rajasthan High Court was directed to provide a detailed breakup of Criminal Revision Petitions filed and disposed of between 2001 and 2026, and the State was questioned on its failure to expedite the hearing during the 23-year interregnum. [Paras 21-23, 26-30] Vijay Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 25
Criminal Procedure – Transfer of Cases – Allegation of Bias – Matrimonial Disputes – Conduct of Parties – Deceitful Litigation – Held that the High Court's order of transfer, based on allegations that the wife's relatives (a Head Constable and a District Court staff member) could exert influence, cannot be sustained - Bias on the part of a Judge cannot be lightly inferred merely because a party's relative is a police officer within the jurisdiction or a staff member in the same District Court - Litigation – Noted that the husband surreptitiously obtained a divorce decree while a compromise was being reached in criminal proceedings, without informing the wife - Such reprehensible conduct by the husband should have restrained the High Court from granting a transfer that increased the travails of a woman with two children – Held that to address the husband's alleged threat to life, he is permitted to seek appearance through counsel or video conferencing - If physical presence is required, the Magistrate may provide necessary protection – Appeal allowed. [Para 5 - 12] Prasanna Kasini v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 16 : 2026 INSC 30
Criminal Prosecution vs. Disciplinary Proceedings — Interplay and Effect of Exoneration - Whether exoneration in a departmental enquiry automatically results in the quashing of parallel criminal proceedings? –Supreme Court discussed following points and held that - i. Standard of Proof: reiterated that disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecutions are independent, governed by different standards of proof: preponderance of probabilities for the former and proof beyond reasonable doubt for the latter; ii. Distinction between Fact-patterns: distinguished between cases where the very "substratum of the allegation" is found non-existent on merits (as in Radheshyam Kejriwal) and cases where exoneration is based on a lack of evidence or technical grounds; iii. Effect of Independent Entities: Where the prosecuting agency (e.g., Anti-Corruption Bureau/Lokayukta) and the disciplinary authority are different entities not in the same hierarchy, the findings of the departmental enquiry do not bind the criminal court; iv. Nature of Exoneration: Exoneration in a departmental proceeding ipso facto does not result in the quashing of criminal prosecution - Quashing is only permissible if the exoneration is on merits, where the allegation is found to be unsustainable and the person is held innocent; v. Specific Findings in This Case: In the present case, the "exoneration" was deemed a "discharge for lack of diligence" because the Inspector who conducted the trap was not examined, rather than a finding that the bribe was never demanded - Supreme Court found sufficient evidence (complainant testimony and independent witnesses) to justify the continuation of the criminal trial – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi (2012) 9 SCC 685; Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B. (2011) 3 SCC 581; P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 1; Paras 12-17] Karnataka Lokayukta Bagalkote District v. Chandrashekar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 15 : 2026 INSC 31
Customs Act, 1962; Section 28, 46 — Customs Tariff Act, 1975; General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) — Classification of "Aluminium Shelving for Mushroom Growing" - The Supreme Court set aside the CESTAT order that had classified aluminium shelves as "parts of agricultural machinery" under CTI 84369900 - held that the subject goods are "Aluminium Structures" classifiable under CTI 76109010 - 1. Analysis of General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) – i. Sequential Application: The Court reiterated that GRIs 1 to 4 must be applied sequentially; ii. Primacy of GRI 1: Classification begins and often ends at GRI 1, which prioritizes the terms of headings and relevant Section or Chapter Notes; iii. GRI 3 (Specific vs. General): GRI 3 is a "tie-breaker" invoked only if GRI 1 and GRI 2 result in a tie between two or more headings - The CESTAT erred by jumping to GRI 3 to prefer a "specific" heading without first exhausting the mandatory sequential inquiry of GRI 1; iv. Reliance on HSN Explanatory Notes - These notes are the foundation for interpreting the HSN-based tariff - affirmed that HSN notes have binding force when the domestic tariff is aligned with HSN – Held that the 'Aluminum Shelves' imported for mushroom cultivation cannot be classified as 'parts of agricultural machinery' but are liable to be classified as 'aluminium structures', attracting a customs duty. [Relied on Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem v. Madhan Agro Industries (India) Private Ltd. (2024); Paras 117- 142] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19
Customs Act, 1962 - Analysis of "End Use" and "Intended Use" – Held that the taxable event is the time of import - The condition of the article at import not its eventual use is the crucial factor – Held that holding that "use" is relevant only if the tariff entry itself explicitly refers to use or adaptation; iii. Objective Characteristics: Classification must be based on objective characteristics and properties to ensure legal certainty and prevent subjectivity. [Relied on Dunlop India Ltd v. Union of India (1976); Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd v. Union of India (1985), Paras 69-83, 87-93] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19
Customs Act, 1962 - Analysis of the Common Parlance Test – i. Restrictive Application: The "common parlance" or "trade parlance" test is not a measure of first resort in the HSN era; ii. Conditions for Invocation - It can only be invoked if: (i) the statute/notes provide no explicit definition; (ii) the heading lacks scientific/technical terms; and (iii) it does not contradict the statutory framework; iii. Exceptions - Where a term is used in a scientific or technical sense, common parlance is irrelevant - held that technical meanings must prevail over commercial nomenclature if the statute implies a technical sense. [Relied on Akbar Badrudin Giwani v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (1990); Paras 63-68] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19
Customs Act, 1962 - Definition and Characteristics of "Machine" – i. Essential Features: A machine must consist of moving parts and utilize power (mechanical or electrical) to perform a specific task; ii. Support Structures vs. Parts: Static structures that merely support a plant are not "parts" of the machine itself – Held that All of the individual machines are already complete and fully operational on their own; their mechanical and electrical functions do not rely on aluminium shelves - These shelves do not contribute to their operation; they merely serve as a surface for the devices to perform their functions. [Relied On Saraswati Sugar Mills v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-III (2014); Paras 124-140] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19
Customs Act, 1962 - Specific Application to Aluminium Shelves – Held that i. Heading 7610: The HSN Explanatory Notes characterize "structures" as items that generally remain in position once installed and are made of bars, rods, plates, etc., joined by riveting or bolting - The subject goods fulfilled all these criteria; ii. Heading 8436: The shelves lacked moving parts and independent mechanical functions - Integrating them post-import with watering systems did not change their character at the time of import into "agricultural machinery" – Held that the subject goods are correctly classifiable under CTI 7610 90 10 - The CESTAT judgment was set aside for misapplying the General Rules of Interpretation and over-relying on the end-use/common parlance tests in the face of clear statutory guidance – Appeal allowed. [Paras 96, 100, 117-130, 142] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19
Customs Duty – Special Economic Zone (SEZ) – Electrical Energy – Supply to Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) – Levy of Customs Duty – The appellant challenged the levy of customs duty on electrical energy generated in its SEZ unit and supplied to the DTA for the period between 16 September 2010 and 15 February 2016 - The High Court of Gujarat had previously in 2015 struck down a similar levy for an earlier period (June 2009 to September 2010), holding that such a supply does not constitute an "import into India" under Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 - in the impugned 2019 judgment, the High Court declined to extend this relief to the subsequent period, reasoning that the later notifications (Notification Nos. 91/2010-Cus. and 26/2012-Cus.) were not specifically challenged - The Supreme Court held that the 2015 judgment had correctly identified that there was no identifiable charging event to attract customs duty under Section 12 for electricity generated within India in an SEZ and wheeled to the DTA - An SEZ is not a foreign territory, and the legal fiction in Section 30 of the SEZ Act ("as if imported") is for the purpose of determining the rate of duty and does not convert an intra-national supply into an act of import - Observed that Section 25 of the Customs Act is a power to relax or exempt duty, not a power to create or invent a new tax - The use of an "exemption" notification to introduce a fresh liability is a colourable exercise of delegated authority and is ultra vires – Appeal allowed. [Paras 45-85] Adani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : 2026 INSC 1
Delay - Important Observations on Incarceration & Procedural Delay - i. Attribution of Delay - noted that procedural history did not support the claim that delay was solely due to prosecutorial or judicial inaction. It observed that at various stages, the prosecution was ready to proceed, while the defense raised objections, requested deferments, or filed successive applications; ii. Complexity of the Case - noting the volume of documentary and electronic evidence and the nature of the "structured and continuing conspiracy," noted that the proceedings are inherently time-consuming; iii. Threshold for Constitutional Intervention- held that for constitutional intervention to override a statutory embargo, there must be a finding that continued detention has become "punitive or unconscionable". [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1; Union of India v. Saleem Khan (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1754; Paras 104-106, 387-390, 430, 431] Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2026 INSC 2
Disciplinary Inquiry – Standard of Proof and Perversity – Administrative Law – Maxim “Nemo Firut Repente Turpissimus” - While a Court does not typically act as an appellate authority over an inquiry report, it can interfere if the findings are "perverse," meaning no reasonable person would have reached such a conclusion on the available material – Held in this case, neither the complainant nor the stenographer (alleged to be the conduit for bribes) was examined, and the Public Prosecutor testified that the bail orders were proper- Held that Authorities should not ignore the long-standing reputation of an officer when evaluating a sudden allegation of "doubtful integrity" based on a mere hunch or hypothesis. [Relied on Sadhna Chaudhary v. State of U.P. (2020) 11 SCC 760; R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat (2016) 14 SCC 1; Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56; Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 370; Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2019) 10 SCC 640; Paras 29-40] Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7
Exam Rules, 2013 & Cadre Allocation Policy – Rule 1, 13, 14, and 17 of Exam Rules read with Paragraph 9 of the Policy – Interpretation of "General Standards - Emphasized that the IFS examination is a "two-tier" process where the Preliminary Examination is an integral stage - Under the proviso to Rule 14(ii), a reserved category candidate can only be adjusted against unreserved vacancies if they have been recommended without resorting to any relaxation/concession in eligibility or selection criteria at "any stage of the examination" – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Deepa E.V. v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 12 SCC 680; Gaurav Pradhan v. State of Rajasthan (2018) 11 SCC 352; Niravkumar Dilipbhai Makwana v. Gujarat Public Service Commission (2019) 7 SCC 383; Union of India v. Sajib Roy (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1943; Paras 25-36] Union of India v. G. Kiran, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 8
Forest Service (IFS) – Cadre Allocation – Migration of Reserved Category Candidate to Unreserved Vacancy – Effect of relaxation at Preliminary Examination stage – The Supreme Court held that a reserved category candidate who avails "relaxed standards" (concessions) at the Preliminary Examination stage cannot be treated as a candidate selected on "General Standards" for the purpose of cadre allocation against an unreserved vacancy, even if they secure higher marks than a general category candidate in the final merit list - rejected the High Court's view that "General Standards" only refers to the qualifying marks in the Main Examination - If a candidate's entry into the Main Examination was made possible only through a relaxed cut-off in the Preliminary Examination, they are ineligible to claim an unreserved/General Insider vacancy. Union of India v. G. Kiran, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 8
Industrial Policy – New Industrial Unit vs. Expansion - Amalgamation and Transfer of Rights to Subsidies - Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectation- Determination of whether an industrial unit qualifies as a "new industrial unit" under the Industrial Policy of 1989 - held that even if an entity has existing units, a newly established unit with fresh capital investment, separate registration, independent industrial license, and distinct physical location must be treated as a "new industrial unit" – Held that upon the amalgamation of companies, all properties, rights, and interests, including sanctioned subsidies and incentives, stand transferred to the successor-in-interest (the amalgamated company) as per the scheme sanctioned by the High Court - The State and its instrumentalities are bound by unequivocal promises made in Industrial Policies and specific sanction letters - Once an entrepreneur acts upon such promises by making substantial investments and setting up a unit, the authorities cannot arbitrarily resile from or retrospectively amend the policy to deny sanctioned benefits - Supreme Court noted that the MM Plant unit satisfied all criteria for a new unit: investment made after the policy's effective date, independent license, separate electricity connection, and distinct physical location (Sheds 19 & 22 vs. the old unit's Sheds 7 & 8) - The rejection based on an internal instruction from 1994 and a retrospective amendment in 2008 was held to be illegal, as the MM Plant was a "new industrial unit" and not an expansion/modernization project - Noted that the respondents' "volte-face" after sanctioning the subsidies and allowing the appellant to continue production was unfair and untenable - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed the respondents to disburse ₹11,14,750 with 9% p.a. interest within three months. [Relied on Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 2 SCC 409; Gujarat State Financial Corpn. v. Lotus Hotels (P) Ltd. (1983) 3 SCC 379; State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. (2004) 6 SCC 465; State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. (2023) 10 SCC 634; Paras 75-80, 90- 93, 103, 135] IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 18 : 2026 INSC 18
Judicial Discipline and Precedent – Supreme Court emphasized that once a declaration of law is made by a High Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court, it acquires binding normative force - A coordinate Bench of the High Court cannot deny relief for a subsequent period when the underlying legal framework and factual footing remain unchanged - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's 2019 judgment and directed the refund of customs duty collected for the period from 16 September 2010 to 15 February 2016. [Paras 89-91] Adani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : 2026 INSC 1
Judicial Independence – Fearless Trial Judiciary – Role of High Courts – Held that fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary - High Courts, while exercising supervisory control, must ensure that judicial officers are not put through the ordeal of disciplinary proceedings for mere errors of judgment - The "lurking fear" of administrative action often leads trial judges to shirk their responsibility in bail matters, resulting in the flooding of High Courts and the Supreme Court with bail applications. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7
Legitimate Expectation – Duty to Allot – In the absence of fraud, collusion, or material irregularity, the highest bidder whose bid exceeds the reserve price has a legitimate expectation to receive an allotment letter. The returning of earnest money does not legitimize an arbitrary cancellation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Eva Agro Feeds (P) Ltd. vs. Punjab National Bank (2023) 10 SCC 189; K. Kumara Gupta vs. Sri Markendaya & Sri Omkareswara Swamy Temple (2022) 5 SCC 710; Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour vs. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (2024) 15 SCC 461] Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22
Limitation Act - Distinction Between Section 5 and Section 14 of Limitation Act — Supreme Court highlighted a "vital distinction": Section 5 involves a discretionary power to extend time based on "sufficient cause," whereas Section 14 is a mandatory provision for the exclusion of time if specific conditions are met - Principles of Section 14 may be applied by analogy to tribunals to prevent manifest injustice, but the discretionary power under Section 5 must be specifically granted by the legislature - Procedural laws like limitation can have substantive effects by depriving a party of an accrued right to plead a time-bar - Since the respondent's remedy was already time-barred under the old regime before Section 433 of the Act, 2013 came into force, the change in law cannot ensure to their benefit – Held that The High Court erred in affirming the CLB's order condoning a 249-day delay - The CLB lacked the authority to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 – The mechanism envisaged under Section 5 is proximally bound and tethered to the discretion with which a civil court is empowered and that under Section 14 is anchored on restoring the right of a litigant to institute an appeal or application, as the case may be, within the prescribed period of limitation - Both provisions work in the interest of the litigant and seek to further the cause of substantive justice, the kind and nature of the power exercised under the two provisions, as well as the mechanism envisaged therein, are quite distinct - Appeal allowed. Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2026 INSC 33
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 2(28) — Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958; Section 3 — Constitution of India; Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 57 — Taxability of Heavy Earth Moving Machinery/Construction Equipment Vehicles - The Supreme Court held that heavy earth moving machinery and construction equipment vehicles (such as Dumpers, Loaders, Excavators, etc.) designed for off-road use within factory or enclosed premises are excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" under the second part of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Supreme Court made following findings- i. Definition of Motor Vehicle: While such vehicles may fall under the inclusive first part of Section 2(28), they are specifically excluded by the second part of the definition, which omits "a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises"; ii. Constitutional Limitation: Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule only permits states to tax vehicles "suitable for use on roads”- Noted that if a vehicle is designed for off-road operations and does not derive benefit from public road infrastructure, it cannot be burdened with motor vehicle tax; iii. Gujarat Tax Act Deficiency: noted that Schedule I of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958, mentions construction equipment vehicles but prescribes no corresponding rate of tax for them - no tax can be levied or collected from such vehicles; iv. Status of Registration: Merely because such vehicles are registered under the Act does not estop the owner from challenging the liability to pay road tax if the vehicles do not ply on public roads – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bolani Ores Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1974) 2 SCC 777; Tarachand Logistic Solutions Limited vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1851; Paras 37-39, 42-45, 55] Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 27 : 2026 INSC 43
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 and 142(1)(b) - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Karnataka High Court that had treated the sequence of condoning delay and taking cognizance as interchangeable or a "curable irregularity" – Noted that under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act, the power to take cognizance of a complaint filed after the prescribed period is expressly subject to the complainant first satisfying the Court that there was sufficient cause for the delay – Held that an order taking cognizance before the delay is formally condoned is legally unsustainable and satisfaction of the Court regarding sufficient cause for delay must precede the act of taking cognizance of a belated complaint - Supreme Court made following Findings: i. Mandatory Sequence: The satisfaction of the Court regarding "sufficient cause" resulting in the condonation of delay must precede the act of taking cognizance; ii. Irregularity not Curable: Held that High Court's view that taking cognizance before condoning delay is a "curable irregularity" is not in keeping with the statutory mandate of the proviso to Section 142(1)(b); iii. Impact of Misrepresentation: noted that the respondent (complainant) contributed to the procedural error by erroneously stating in her complaint that it was filed within time – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2014) 9 SCC 129; Paras 13-15] S. Nagesh v. Shobha S. Aradhya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : 2026 INSC 27
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 45 – Grant of Regular Bail – Right to Speedy Trial – The Supreme Court granted bail to accused, emphasizing that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without the commencement of trial violates the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Supreme Court observed that statutory restrictions under special acts like the PMLA cannot be permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention - Noted that the trial had not yet commenced and was only at the stage of scrutiny of documents - A significant delay of eight months was attributed to the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) due to its challenge of a procedural order by the Special Judge, which was later withdrawn - With 208 witnesses cited and over 63,000 pages of documents, there was no likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future – Held that the appellant had joined the investigation on multiple occasions even prior to his arrest - found the ED's allegations of witness tampering and dissipation of properties to be "incredulous" and "untenable," as the appellant was in custody when these alleged events occurred, and no material link was established between the appellant and the entities involved in the property transfers – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2622; Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51; P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791; Paras 15- 23] Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : 2026 INSC 12
Service Law – Departmental Enquiry – Post-Superannuation – Lack of Jurisdiction – Adoption of Rules – The Supreme Court quashed a departmental enquiry initiated against a retired employee of the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (MSWC) approximately 11 months after his superannuation - Held that in the absence of specific provisions in the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (Staff) Service Regulations, 1992, the Corporation could not ipso facto apply the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, to initiate proceedings against a retired employee without a conscious decision or resolution by the Board of Directors to adopt such rules - that a public-sector corporation cannot initiate or continue disciplinary proceedings against an employee after retirement in the absence of an express enabling provision in its service regulations. Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16
Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings against Judicial Officers – Removal from service based solely on judicial orders – Permissibility – Appellant, a judicial officer with 27 years of unblemished service, was removed for granting bail in four cases under the M.P. Excise Act without expressly mentioning the "twin conditions" of Section 59-A - Held: Merely because a judicial order is wrong, erroneous, or fails to refer to a statutory provision, it cannot be the basis for disciplinary action unless there is evidence of corrupt motive or extraneous consideration - The High Court must exercise great caution and protect honest officers from unmerited onslaughts based on motivated complaints. Order of removal set aside with full back wages. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7
Service Law – Recruitment and Selection – Right to Appointment – Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Change in Policy – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction to appoint candidates who completed the Ayurvedic Nursing Training Course from Government institutions without a fresh selection process - held that mere admission to a training course does not confer an automatic right to appointment, especially when the policy environment has shifted – noted that respondents claimed a right to appointment based on a decades-old practice where all 20 candidates from the sole Government college were absorbed into service - Supreme Court noted that since 2012, the State permitted private institutions to impart the same training, leading to an exponential increase in candidates (from 20 seats to 311 institutions by 2019-20) – Held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be applied where a substantial shift in circumstances and limited vacancies make the earlier practice impossible to sustain. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38
Service Law – Rule 27 of Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 – Mandatory Requirement of Sanction – Held that even if assumed that the 1982 Pension Rules were applicable through the residuary Clause 110 of the 1992 Regulations, observed that Rule 27(2)(b)(i) mandates prior sanction of the Government for instituting proceedings after retirement - rejected the Corporation's argument that a "general sanction" was accorded at the time the 1992 Regulations were originally approved, clarifying that the word 'shall' in the rule implies a mandatory safeguard for each specific case to prevent unwarranted proceedings against superannuated employees – Regulation 110 of the 1992 Regulations is a miscellaneous/residuary provision intended to cover silent areas - it does not confer automatic jurisdiction to initiate departmental enquiries against retired employees unless the Corporation has formally adopted the relevant Government rules at an appropriate level – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 666; Girijan Cooperative Corporation Limited Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana Rao, (2010) 15 SCC 322; Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and Others, (2013) 6 SCC 515; Paras 18-30] Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Equitable Relief – Refund and Restitution – Complete Justice - In a suit for specific performance concerning an Agreement to Sell from 2008, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness as he lacked the financial wherewithal to pay the balance consideration of Rs. 5.21 crores on the due date and failed to visit the Sub-Registrar's office - Noted that the respondents also failed to fulfill contractual obligations regarding property mutation and conversion - Holding that the grant of specific performance is not an equitable relief after a passage of seventeen years – Supreme Court emphasized that equity must prevent unjust enrichment and restore parties to their original positions when both are at fault - To adjust equities and bring quietus to a dispute protracted for over a decade, the Supreme Court modified the High Court's order (which had allowed forfeiture of Rs. 60 lakhs earnest money) and directed the respondents to pay a lumpsum amount of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores) to the appellant for full restitution – Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 5-8] Subhash Aggarwal v. Mahender Pal Chhabra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 6 : 2026 INSC 11
Tender Process – Comparison of Dissimilar Plots – Irrationality – the Ghaziabad Development Authority (GDA) cancelled the appellant's bid for a 3150 sq. metre plot on the ground that smaller plots (123-132 sq. metres) fetched higher rates per square metre - Held, the subject plot (large industrial area) cannot be compared with smaller plots as demand for the former is scarce - Cancelling a bid based on such comparison constitutes an "irrelevant consideration" and is "arbitrary, whimsical, and irrational". Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 43D(5), 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18 – Grant of Bail – Prolonged Incarceration vs. Statutory Bar – Constitutional Perspective under Article 21 – Role Differentiation in Conspiracy – Governing Principles for Bail under UAPA - emphasized that the "prima facie true" standard under Section 43D(5) does not reduce the judicial role to a mechanical acceptance of prosecution assertions, but requires a threshold inquiry of real content- i. Contextual Inquiry into Delay - that the constitutional inquiry into delay is not an inquiry into guilt, but whether continued detention remains constitutionally permissible. This is "necessarily contextual" and includes factors like the nature of allegations, the trial's realistic trajectory, and causes contributing to delay – ii. Individualized Role Differentiation- Supreme Court rejected a "case-centric" approach in favor of an "accused-specific" one. It distinguished between those with "strategic, organisational, or ideological centrality" and those whose roles were "peripheral or episodic"- iii. Speedy Trial vs. Statutory Embargo - While recognizing the right to a speedy trial as a foundational guarantee under Article 21, the Court held that "delay simpliciter" does not automatically eclipse the statutory regime enacted by Parliament for special category offences. Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2026 INSC 2
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULC Act) — Section 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) — Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 — Sections 3 and 4 — Mandatory requirement of notice for taking possession - The Supreme Court examined whether the mere "paper possession" recorded by the State, without serving the mandatory notice under Section 10(5) to the actual possessors of the land, would prevent the abatement of proceedings under Section 4 of the Repealing Act – Supreme Court of India has held that proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 would abate under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 if the State failed to take actual physical possession of the excess land in accordance with law, including by serving mandatory notice on the persons in possession under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act - Held that section 10 of the ULC Act distinguishes between the "vesting" of land (acquisition of title/interest) and the "taking of possession." Under Section 10(3), what vests is de jure possession, not de facto (actual physical) possession – For the State to acquire de facto possession, it must follow one of three methods: i. Voluntary surrender by the landholder; ii. Peaceful surrender following a mandatory written notice under Section 10(5) served upon the person in possession; iii. Forceful dispossession under Section 10(6) only if the person fails to comply with the Section 10(5) notice - In the absence of evidence showing actual physical possession was taken after serving notice on the appellants (who were in actual possession), the State's claim of "paper possession" is insufficient. Consequently, the proceedings relating to the land abate by operation of law under Section 4 of the Repealing Act – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280; AP Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Tahsildar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 447; Paras 19-23] Dalsukhbhai Bachubhai Satasia v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : 2026 INSC 21