Anticipatory Bail - Cancellation of - Abuse of Authority by Law Enforcers - The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court granting anticipatory bail to three police officers accused of extorting cash from a citizen in exchange for a gold bar recovered during a search. The anticipatory bail granted by the High Court was cancelled. When police officers, who are duty-bound to...
Anticipatory Bail - Cancellation of - Abuse of Authority by Law Enforcers - The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court granting anticipatory bail to three police officers accused of extorting cash from a citizen in exchange for a gold bar recovered during a search. The anticipatory bail granted by the High Court was cancelled. When police officers, who are duty-bound to protect citizens, themselves indulge in extortion, it creates a serious dilemma for citizens who have no option but to seek protection from the very authority that is abusing its power. The Court expressed strong disapproval of such uniformed excesses. State of Maharashtra v. Rahul Datta Bhosale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 592 : 2026 INSC 596
Bail - Cancellation of - A coordinate Bench of the High Court is not powerless to cancel bail granted by another coordinate Bench where the bail was secured by placing incorrect or wrong facts before the Court. If it comes to the notice of the Court that bail has been obtained by suppression or misrepresentation of material facts, it can always examine the matter and pass appropriate orders, including cancellation of bail. Suraj Mahananda v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 586
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 442 (erstwhile Section 401 of CrPC) — Revisional Jurisdiction of the High Court — Judicial Restraint vs. Indulgence — High Court's order permitting the accused to travel to the USA for medical treatment, on the ground that he appeared before the Magistrate on 12 previous occasions and undertook to return within 6 months, held to be an unsustainable exercise of indulgence rather than judicial restraint - The Supreme Court observed that the trial had not commenced even after 10 years of filing the chargesheet due to the proactive role of the accused in initiating multifarious proceedings and securing interim protections, including the misuse of an order suspending a Look Out Circular (LoC) to leave the country without court permission - comparable medical facilities exist domestically in India. [Paras 8, 9] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628
Civil and Criminal Remedies – Parallel Proceedings – Inordinate Delay in Filing FIR - A long, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR in a case arising from a civil dispute raises strong suspicion of mala fide intent, vengeance, or an attempt to harass the other party after failing or anticipating failure in the civil proceedings. A frustrated litigant cannot be permitted to use criminal machinery as a weapon of harassment. The absence of a limitation period for criminal prosecution does not justify inordinate delay when the facts were known to the complainant for decades. Appeal allowed. Criminal proceedings quashed. [Relied on: Kishan Singh v. Gurpal Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 775] Nazibul Rahim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 608 : 2026 INSC 619
Civil and Criminal Remedies – Parallel Proceedings – Inordinate Delay in Filing FIR - Where civil and criminal remedies are available on the same cause of action and based on the same set of facts, both proceedings can be maintained. However, if an aggrieved person elects to invoke both remedies, there must not be an unreasonable or inordinate delay between the institution of the civil suit and the lodging of the FIR. An unexplained delay of 23 years in filing the FIR after instituting a civil suit on identical allegations is sufficient ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered in 2024 against the appellants in respect of a property dispute involving an allegedly forged Power of Attorney and sale deed, when the respondent-complainant had already filed a civil suit in 2001 raising the very same allegations. Nazibul Rahim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 608 : 2026 INSC 619
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 392 – Anomalous and Irrational Consequences – The Supreme Court pointed out that a mechanical application of Sajjan Singh could lead to highly undesirable or discriminatory results under Article 14 - if a Division Bench unanimously decides to acquit two convicts but divides on the third, sending the entire composite appeal to a third Judge could put the unanimously acquitted persons at risk of conviction - in a State appeal against acquittal, it could risk the conviction of individuals whose acquittals were unanimously favoured by the Division Bench - Expressing its respectful disagreement with the coordinate bench ruling in Sajjan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) 1 SCC 315, the Bench referred the question of whether Sajjan Singh lays down the correct law to a larger Bench to be constituted by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India. [Paras 35-41] Dr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 615 : 2026 INSC 632
Code of criminal procedure, 1973 – section 392 – scope of referee judge's jurisdiction in composite appeals – difference of opinion – Whether a third Judge, upon a reference under Section 392 CrPC due to a division of opinion regarding one co-accused, can reopen and examine the case of other co-accused whose convictions were unanimously upheld by the Division Bench – Supreme Court doubted the correctness of its two-judge bench decision in Sajjan Singh v. State of M.P. (1999) – Matter referred to a larger Bench - Statutory Interpretation of Section 392 CrPC – "An Appeal" vs "The Appeal" – The Supreme Court highlighted the significant linguistic shift from Section 429 of the 1898 Code (which used "the case") to Section 392 of the 1973 Code (which uses "an appeal" and "the appeal") - Highlighting the anaphoric use of the definite article, the Supreme Court observed that while the indefinite article "an appeal" triggers the provision for any appeal resulting in a divided opinion, the definite article "the appeal" limits the referee Judge's jurisdiction strictly to the specific instance or individual appeal where the division occurred - Merely because multiple convicts file a composite joint appeal, it cannot mean that a unanimous decision dismissing the appeal against some convicts can be reopened by the third Judge if the division of opinion relates only to another co-accused. [Relied Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (1972) 2 SCC 466; Paras 29 – 32] Dr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 615 : 2026 INSC 632
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 464 — Defect, Omission, or Irregularity in Charge — Absence of Prejudice - No finding or sentence is invalid due to an error, omission, or defect in the framing of charges unless a failure of justice has been occasioned - Where the accused's name was initially included in the charge framing order for offenses under Sections 302/120-B IPC, and the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, they were fully cognizant of the case against them - If the witnesses were thoroughly cross-examined by the defense counsel regarding the murder charge, no prejudice is caused to the accused, and the trial is not vitiated. [Paras 41 - 43] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of FIR — Civil Dispute Given a Criminal Colour — Extraordinary Delay — Improvement in Subsequent Complaint - Criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to become a weapon of harassment and coercion in disputes predominantly concerning title over immovable property - High Court erred in refusing to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC where a long-standing property dispute pending before civil courts since the year 2000 was converted into criminal proceedings - In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Supreme Court owes a duty to look into attending circumstances emerging from the record over and above the averments in the FIR - Where the initial complaint dated 21.05.2009 did not contain any allegation of extortion, demand of money, or criminal intimidation, but a subsequent FIR lodged after seven months introduced these grave allegations for the first time, such material improvements support the contention that the criminal proceedings are an afterthought to criminalize a civil dispute - An unexplained and extraordinary delay of nearly eight to nine years in registering the FIR (incidents pertaining to 2001, FIR registered in 2009), coupled with circumstances creating serious doubt about the genuineness of the prosecution, warrants quashing - A State Government Circular discouraging registration of FIRs in civil disputes cannot justify the complete inaction of the complainant who was actively litigating before civil courts and had alternative legal remedies available under Sections 154(3), 156(3), and 200 of the CrPC. [Relied on Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604; Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315; Paras 30-60] Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Constitution of India – Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Right to Speedy Trial and Timely Investigation – Duty of Constitutional Courts - Inordinate Delay in Investigation – Appeal against High Court order dismissing a writ petition seeking directions to file a charge-sheet in a criminal complaint pending for nearly two decades – Constitutional courts cannot remain mute spectators to prolonged and endless investigations – Right to speedy trial is an intrinsic facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, which inherently includes the timely completion of investigations – If an investigation continues for an unduly long period without adequate justification, the High Court ought to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to intervene instead of dismissing the plea on technical or alternative-remedy grounds. [Paras 10 - 13] Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri v. Safimahamad Fafirbhai Mansuri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2026 INSC 626
Criminal Jurisprudence – Pre-marital and Consensual Relationships – Offence of Cheating based on False Promise to Marry - Physical relationships between consenting unmarried adults do not automatically warrant an adverse inference against a candidate's character - Where a relationship spans a considerable period, a presumption of valid consent arises - Merely because a long-standing relationship between adult neighbors does not culminate in marriage, it cannot be logicized that an offence of cheating was committed or that a subsequent compromise before a Lok Adalat amounts to an admission of guilt. [Paras 18-20] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493
Criminal Jurisprudence – Presumption of Innocence – Evidentiary Value of Police Report in Compounded Cases - Unless a charge is proven in a court of law, the presumption of innocence prevails - Where an offence like cheating depends entirely on the subjective deception of the prosecutrix, and the prosecutrix chooses to compound the matter before a Lok Adalat without any evidence of coercion or threat, a mere indictment in a police report (based on statements recorded during investigation) cannot form the sole basis for an employer to draw an adverse inference regarding the candidate's character. [Relied on Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471; Ravindra Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2024) 5 SCC 264; Commissioner of Police v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685; Paras 22 - 25] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493
Criminal Jurisprudence — Sentencing — Principle of Proportionality — Mitigating Circumstances — Reduction of Sentence to Period Already Undergone — Appeal confined strictly to the quantum of sentence - The appellant was convicted under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for using a forged revenue document (Bhu Adhikar Rin Pustika) to furnish surety/bail in judicial proceedings, and was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment on each count – Held that while offences involving forgery and the production of fabricated documents before a Court of law strike at the purity of the administration of justice and cannot be treated lightly, the sentencing process must remain central to the principle of proportionality - It cannot be reduced to a purely retributive exercise divorced from the factual matrix of the case and the overall circumstances of the offender - The Supreme Court observed that the occurrence pertained to the year 2014, and the appellant had endured the rigors of criminal proceedings for more than a decade - there were no subsequent criminal antecedents, the appellant was not a habitual offender, and the forgery was detected at the threshold stage during bail scrutiny, avoiding irreversible pecuniary or proprietary losses - Noting that the appellant had already undergone over two years of actual incarceration, the Supreme Court found it fit to modify the substantive sentence to the period already undergone while keeping the fine unaltered. [Relied on Padum Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 35; Paras 13-26] Israfil @ Pappu @ Naimuddin Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 639 : 2026 INSC 654
Criminal Justice Administration – Loss of Case Records during Active Investigation – Misplacement of original case papers and FSL reports in transit between police station and Magistrate – Held, such incidents strike at the very core of the criminal justice system and render bona fide complaints inactionable – Even if records are lost or witnesses are untraceable, the investigating agency cannot keep the investigation pending indefinitely; it must either reconstruct records or file an appropriate closure report before the Magistrate – State directed to conclude the investigation within six weeks and file an explanatory compliance affidavit. [Relied on Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511; Paras 16, 17, 18] Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri v. Safimahamad Fafirbhai Mansuri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2026 INSC 626
Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR - Recording of FIR Contents in Quashing Orders - Delay not a Ground for Quashing FIR - Duty of High Court while Quashing FIR - While quashing an FIR, the High Court must give a fair idea in its order regarding the contents of the FIR and the nature of allegations levelled therein. Reproduction of the entire FIR is not necessary, but sufficient reference to the nature of the crime and allegations is expected so that the higher courts can meaningfully assess whether there was proper application of mind by the High Court. Delay in lodging the FIR by itself, without anything more, cannot be a ground to quash the FIR. Delay is a factor that may be considered by the Trial Court while appreciating evidence during trial. At the stage of considering a petition for quashing of FIR, the High Court is required to examine whether the FIR discloses the commission of any cognizable offence. The Court must advert to the nature of the crime and the allegations made in the FIR. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court which had quashed an FIR registered under Sections relating to attempt to murder and other offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) solely on the ground of 24 days' delay in lodging the FIR, without examining the contents of the FIR or the nature of allegations. The Supreme Court restored the FIR and allowed the police to proceed in accordance with law. Pushpendra v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 584
Criminal Procedure – Faulty Investigation – Impact on Prosecution Case - Supreme Court further observed that while the investigating agency was expected to act with greater sensitivity given that it was a case of multiple murders, a faulty or sub-standard investigation cannot be a sole ground to discard other reliable, substantial material evidence brought on record by the prosecution - The concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court were based on a proper appreciation of circumstantial evidence and called for no interference. [Relied on Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 11 SCC 111; Modan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1978) 4 SCC 435; Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 657; Mallikarjun v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 8 SCC 359; Paras 12-20] Uperndra Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2026 INSC 538
Criminal Procedure — Release of Passport vs. Permission to Travel Abroad — Reversal of High Court and Sessions Court orders - The Supreme Court restored the Magistrate's order directing the release of the passport to the accused, while clarifying that such release does not automatically amount to a permission to leave the country - The accused is restricted from flying out of India without obtaining the express permission of the Sessions Court post-committal of the case. [Relied on Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI, (2007) 1 SCC 70; Paras 11 - 14] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628
Criminal Trial – Interested / Related Witness - Testimony of the victim's father (PW-1) and sisters (PW-2 and PW-3) cannot be discarded solely on account of relationship - Relationship is not a ground to affect the credibility of a witness if the ocular testimony is otherwise natural, trustworthy, and cogent – Held that the appellants cannot claim the benefit of parity merely because some co-accused were acquitted - An order of acquittal for other co-accused does not lead as a necessary corollary to the acquittal of the convicts if the evidence against the latter stands on a substantially distinct and higher footing (direct eyewitness accounts and precise Section 27 recoveries). [Relied on Shaik Ahmed v. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 59; Willian Stephen v. The State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (2024) 5 SCC 258; Wahid v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 3 SCC 341; Goverdhan & another v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; Paras 21-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569
DNA test - Paternity Disputes - An acquittal in a criminal prosecution for rape under Section 376 IPC does not operate as a bar to the determination of paternity in a civil suit and does not preclude the court from directing a DNA test. An acquittal in a criminal case merely means that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt; it does not conclusively negate the existence of a biological relationship between the parties. In paternity disputes, especially where inheritance rights are claimed, DNA profiling constitutes the most reliable and scientific method of determining biological parentage when other evidence is inconclusive. The right to know one's biological father and the consequent legal rights flowing therefrom must be balanced against the alleged father's right to privacy. In appropriate cases, the interest of the child in establishing parentage outweighs privacy concerns, particularly when there is no material to show that the mother had any other relationship during the relevant period. Chaturbhuj Pradhan v. Amar Pradhan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 612 : 2026 INSC 600
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) vs. Dock Identification & Section 27 Recoveries - The appellants contended that the absence of a formal TIP vitiated their identification – Held that A TIP is corroborative and not a substantive piece of evidence - The eyewitnesses (PW-2 and PW-3) had a clear daylight opportunity to observe the kidnappers - More crucially, the identity is decisively cemented by infallible recoveries made pursuant to disclosures under Section 27 of the Evidence Act specifically, the recovery of the living child at the behest of one appellant and the recovery of the crime weapon (.315 bore pistol) at the behest of the other. These direct recoveries negate the necessity of a formal TIP. [Paras 26 - 28] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Recovery of Incriminating Articles – Hostile Panch/Seizure Witnesses – Value of Investigating Officer's Testimony - Appeal against the dismissal of a criminal appeal by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which upheld the Trial Court's order convicting the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC for the murder of four family members - The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing inter alia that the recovery of the incriminating articles (empty phials of Calmpose injection, clothes, and rope) under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was unreliable because the independent panch/seizure witnesses turned hostile – Held that dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that it is a well-settled principle of law that a recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be discarded or vitiated merely because the panch witnesses turned hostile, provided that the recovery is otherwise convincingly proved through the testimony of the Investigating Officer - The prosecution successfully proved the recovery at the instance of the appellant through the credible testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-24), which was further corroborated by the postmortem and viscera reports showing traces of "Diazepham" (Calmpose). Uperndra Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2026 INSC 538
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 133 r/w. 114, Illustration (b) — Accomplice/Approver Testimony — Worthiness of Credit and Prudence of Corroboration - The combined result of Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 is that an accomplice is a competent witness, and a conviction based on uncorroborated testimony is not illegal per se - as a rule of prudence, courts require corroboration in material particulars to safely connect the accused with the crime - The corroboration need not be direct and can be circumstantial, nor must it confirm every single material fact independently Creditworthiness is evaluated cumulatively, the approver must not be a planted witness, their testimony must be intrinsically natural, and it must be inculpatory rather than exculpatory - If the disclosure is complete and inspires confidence, it cannot be discarded merely because the approver did not inflict the fatal blow or implicate himself to the exact same extent as the other co-accused. [Paras 24 - 36] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Criminal Antecedents Relevant - Previous involvements in similar NDPS offences are a strong indicator that the accused is likely to indulge in similar offences if released on bail, thereby failing the second condition under Section 37. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Prolonged Incarceration - Mere detention for a period of one year and seven months, where the accused faces a possible sentence of up to 20 years, does not by itself justify grant of bail on the ground of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly when statutory restrictions under special enactments like the NDPS Act are in play. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Sovereignty over Personal Liberty in Drug Cases - In matters involving the supply of narcotic drugs, which constitute a war against the nation affecting public health and the national economy, the sovereignty of the country must prevail over the personal liberty of the accused. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Strict Compliance with Section 37 NDPS Act - While dealing with applications for bail in cases involving commercial quantities of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, courts are mandatorily required to satisfy the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 — i.e., (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence, and (ii) that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Failure to record such satisfaction renders the order granting bail unsustainable. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act for dishonour of cheque can be quashed, if the parties enter into a settlement and the offence is compounded under Section 147 of the NI Act. Parsharvanath Weld Wires v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 585
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 - When a company or NGO authorises a specific individual to sign and issue cheques on its behalf, along with the responsibility of making payments under an agreement, such person is treated as the 'drawer' of the cheque and attracts criminal liability under S. 138 NI Act, upon dishonour. The Treasurer of an NGO, who was appointed as the authorised signatory to execute an MoU, sign cheques, and make payments to the respondent, was the 'face' of the organisation and solely responsible for the consequences of the dishonoured cheque. The Court clarified that the liability arises when the conditions under Section 141 NI Act are satisfied, even for authorised signatories. Mere designation as an authorised signatory does not automatically absolve personal liability if the person is the one who actually signed the cheque and was entrusted with the payment obligation. Reliance on Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh (2024) was held to be misplaced in the facts of this case. The conviction was upheld; however, considering the appellant was only the Treasurer, the sentence was modified. The appellant was directed to pay a fine of ₹1.5 crore to the respondent (TSSPDCL) within two months, with default rigorous imprisonment of one year. K. Ranganayakulu v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 605 : 2026 INSC 555
Official Secrets Act, 1923 - The appellant, a retired Major General and former Joint Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat (R&AW), was prosecuted under Sections 3 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 read with Sections 409 and 120B IPC for publishing a book containing allegedly classified information relating to India's external intelligence. The CBI filed a chargesheet and sought to keep the relied-upon classified documents in a sealed cover. The Trial Court directed supply of the documents to the accused under Section 207 Cr.P.C. The High Court modified this order and permitted only inspection of the documents. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order. Documents forming part of the chargesheet which are relied upon by the prosecution must ordinarily be supplied to the accused. Withholding them merely on the ground that the case involves the Official Secrets Act is impermissible. The Court relied upon Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Satyen Bhowmick, (1981) 2 SCC 109, held that Section 14 of the OSA does not take away the valuable right of the accused to receive copies of relied-upon documents. The apprehension of the prosecution regarding national security is not sufficient to override this right. Adequate safeguards exist under Section 5 of the OSA, which penalises any unauthorised disclosure of such documents even by the accused or his lawyers outside the court proceedings. The Supreme Court directed the CBI to supply typed copies of the documents sought by the appellant under Section 207 Cr.P.C. within two months. Inspection of the documents, if required, may be permitted during court proceedings by the Trial Court. This judgment reinforces the primacy of fair trial rights even in cases involving national security and official secrets. V.K. Singh v. CBI, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : 2026 INSC 614
Official Secrets Act, 1923 - the invocation of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 does not bar or justify the denial of supply of documents relied upon by the prosecution in the chargesheet to the accused. Mere apprehension that supply of such documents would endanger the safety and security of the country is not a valid ground to withhold them. An accused has a statutory and fundamental right under Section 207 Cr.P.C. to receive copies of the documents relied upon in the chargesheet, as denial of the same would cause serious prejudice to his right to a fair trial and effective defence. V.K. Singh v. CBI, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : 2026 INSC 614
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 498A - Mere refusal by a husband to talk to his wife for 13 days does not, by itself, constitute “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Differences and occasional non-communication are natural parts of marital life and cannot be treated as wilful conduct driving the wife to suicide unless supported by cogent evidence of persistent harassment or cruelty. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the husband under Section 498A IPC, holding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged non-communication caused the wife's suicide. Jayesh Kanna v. Assistant Commissioner Law and Order (West), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 620 : 2026 INSC 615
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 364A – Demand for Ransom – Proof through Oral Testimony - The defence argued that the absence of Call Detail Records (CDRs) and a Section 65-B certificate under the Evidence Act was fatal to establishing a ransom demand – Held that Unlike cases purely dependent on electronic evidence, the present case features consistent, unshaken, and corroborative oral testimonies from multiple witnesses (PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3) coupled with the Investigating Officer's testimony (PW-7) proving a ransom demand of Rs. 5 Lakhs - The lack of a CDR from a rural telephone exchange in 2003 cannot paralyze the criminal justice system when substantive oral evidence remains cogent and unimpeached. [Paras 23-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 364A & Section 368 – Kidnapping for Ransom – Ingredients and Proof – Arms Act, 1959 – Section 25 – Conviction Upheld -– Threat to Life or Hurt – Firearm Usage - The appellants challenged their conviction under Section 364A IPC contending that no explicit threat to cause death or hurt was administered to the 8-year-old victim - Held that stopping young, defenceless children on their way to school by brandishing a .315 bore country-made pistol inherently constitutes a severe threat to cause death or hurt - The active use of a lethal weapon satisfies the statutory requirement of a threat under Section 364A IPC. [Paras 21-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 120-B — Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Murder — Liability for Foreseeable Crimes - To establish criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A, a meeting of minds to execute an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is vital - Direct evidence is rarely available, and conspiracy can be inferred from surrounding circumstances and conduct - One who enters into a conspiratorial relationship is jointly liable for every reasonably foreseeable crime committed by other members in furtherance of the common design, irrespective of whether they directly participated in or had specific knowledge of the collateral act - Where a group forcefully separates victims to steal a vehicle using deadly weapons (Gandasa), causing grievous hurt or murder is a foregone, foreseeable conclusion - The conspirator maintaining a vigil while co-participants execute the killings is justifiably liable under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC. [Paras 50 – 55] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 420 — Cheating — Essential Ingredients - To constitute the offence of cheating, there must exist deception, fraudulent inducement, and consequential delivery of property coupled with dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction - A disputed civil claim pending before a competent civil court cannot automatically be treated as a fraudulent misrepresentation so as to attract Section 420 of the IPC, especially in the absence of any allegation that the complainant delivered any property, money, or valuable security to the accused. Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 384, 504, 506, and 511 — Extortion & Criminal Intimidation — Vague Allegations - Where the FIR fails to specify the date, place, or exact circumstances of the alleged demand of money, and no property or money was actually delivered pursuant to such a threat, the ingredients of extortion under Section 384 are absent - General observations that the accused "tried" to extort money cannot automatically attract Section 511 of the IPC when the substantive allegations are completely vague - allegations under Sections 504 and 506 fail when the FIR does not disclose the exact words uttered or the surrounding circumstances of intimidation - when substantive offences are not made out, the charge of conspiracy under Section 120-B necessarily fails - Criminal antecedents cannot constitute the sole or even the primary basis to decline the quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC - It is the duty of the Court to see whether the essential ingredients of the alleged offences in the impugned FIR are prima facie made out - General observations regarding the "modus operandi" or "proclivity" of the accused cannot replace the requirement of fulfilling the basic ingredients of the offences. Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, and 471 — Forgery — Making of a "False Document" — Disputed Claim of Title - The essential ingredient of forgery is the making of a "false document" as defined under Section 464 of the IPC - When a person executes a document (such as a Power of Attorney) claiming a property as their own or asserting a share pursuant to revenue entries, they are not pretending to be someone else, nor is it a case of impersonation or forged signatures - A disputed claim of title, whether ultimately sustainable in law or not, cannot be equated with the making of a false document - If the document is not a false document, there is no forgery, and Sections 467 and 471 of the IPC are not attracted. [Relied on Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751] Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Maintenance of Records under PCPNDT Act - Reaffirming the earlier judgment in Federation of Obstetrics & Gynaecological Societies of India v. Union of India, the Court held that non-maintenance or deficiencies in mandatory records (particularly Form F) is not a mere technical or clerical lapse, but a serious violation that serves as a springboard for the offence of female foeticide. Proper record-keeping is essential to prevent misuse of diagnostic techniques for illegal sex determination. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Sex Ratio Data & Continuing Concern - While acknowledging improvement in sex ratio at birth (from 896 females per 1,000 males in 2015-17 to 918 in 2022-24 and NFHS-5 figures showing 929), the Court noted that it still remains below the biologically expected level (~950+). Several States continue to report below-national-average ratios. The progress was described as “incomplete and uneven” and only a “partial course correction.” The Court referred to the decline in India's ranking in the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report 2025. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Societal Change Required - The Court observed that true equality and change in societal mentality — where the birth of a girl child is no longer considered a matter of concern — is still a distant goal. Government schemes such as Beti Bachao Beti Padhao, Sukanya Samriddhi Yojana, and others reflect continued efforts to combat systemic bias, but these do not warrant any relaxation in the enforcement of the PCPNDT Act. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Strict Enforcement of PCPNDT Act - the PCPNDT Act must continue to be enforced with utmost strictness. Despite improvement in overall sex ratio, sex-selection practices and deep-rooted patriarchal preference for the male child persist in the country. Dilution of the provisions or leniency towards infractions cannot be countenanced. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - The appellant-doctor faced prosecution under Section 23 of the PCPNDT Act for alleged violations of Sections 4(3), 5, 6, 29 and the Rules, due to deficiencies and blanks in Form F maintained at his sonography centre. The Supreme Court upheld the cognisance taken by the Judicial Magistrate and the refusal of the High Court to quash the proceedings, finding no merit in the challenge regarding the competence of the Appropriate Authority (District Civil Surgeon) or the nature of the violations. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed. The criminal proceedings against the appellant were allowed to continue. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Criminal courts cannot, by judicial directions, introduce a new procedural stage not contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)/Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) for the conduct of trials. The procedure for criminal trials, including prosecutions under the PC Act, must be strictly followed as laid down in the CrPC/BNSS read with the provisions of the PC Act. Courts cannot create an additional pre-charge stage for examining sanctioning authorities. Section 311 CrPC, being a general provision relating to inquiries and trials, cannot be interpreted to override or bypass the specific stages of trial prescribed in the Code, particularly the stage of framing of charges. A High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot rewrite the procedural law or issue directions that require all Sessions Courts/Special Courts to examine sanctioning authorities before framing of charge or commencement of trial. The Supreme Court emphasised that while the validity of sanction can be challenged at appropriate stages as per law (including under Section 19(4) of the PC Act), it does not warrant creation of a mandatory pre-trial examination procedure through judicial fiat. Directions issued by the High Court were accordingly set aside. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ravi Shankar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 647 : 2026 INSC 650
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Demand of Bribe - Mere presence of a public servant at the place where a superior officer allegedly accepts a bribe is not enough to infer criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. The prosecution must establish a prior meeting of minds and a shared criminal intent through cogent and substantive evidence. In the absence of proof of demand of illegal gratification by the accused, conviction under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be sustained. State of Uttar Pradesh v. A.K. Gaba, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 644 : 2026 INSC 568
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Ingredients of Criminal Conspiracy — Conspiracy cannot be inferred on the basis of suspicion or mere association. There must be clear material showing a meeting of minds to commit an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. The offence is complete only when such a meeting of minds is established. The prosecution failed to produce any evidence of prior agreement or concert between the respondents and the principal accused. Mere presence during the alleged transaction does not establish the necessary mens rea for criminal conspiracy. Additionally, the withholding of the tape recording of the alleged demand justified drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution. The appeals were dismissed. State of Uttar Pradesh v. A.K. Gaba, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 644 : 2026 INSC 568
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 7 read with Explanation 2 – Liability of public servant for indirect demand of bribe through subordinates – Scope of “attempt to obtain undue advantage for another person - A public servant is liable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 even if he does not personally demand or receive the bribe, provided he attempts to obtain an undue advantage through a third party or for the benefit of another person (including subordinates). Explanation 2 to Section 7 expressly covers situations where the illegal gratification is sought indirectly or for another person, and the actual receipt of the bribe is not essential for attracting liability at the prima facie stage. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court which had quashed an FIR against a Police Sub-Inspector on the ground that there was no direct demand or acceptance of bribe by him. The Court held that the Sub-Inspector's alleged instructions to the complainant to “do something for the other police officials” or “make those boys happy”, coupled with a demand of ₹50,000 routed through a third person and subordinates, constituted a veiled demand and an “attempt to obtain undue advantage for another person” within the meaning of Section 7(a) read with Explanation 2 of the PC Act. State by Lokayuktha Police v. Sri K. Rangayya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : 2026 INSC 574
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 7 read with Explanation 2 – The requirement of a direct, personal and express demand by the public servant himself is not warranted by the statute. Explanation 2 broadens the scope to include indirect demands and benefits to others. Senior public servants cannot escape liability by orchestrating the collection of bribes through subordinates while maintaining personal deniability. A narrow interpretation of Section 7 would create a dangerous loophole in anti-corruption law and render Explanation 2 redundant. At the stage of quashing an FIR, the Court must examine whether the allegations prima facie disclose commission of the offence. Questions of guilt or innocence are to be decided at trial. The FIR and all consequential proceedings against the accused public servant were restored. State by Lokayuktha Police v. Sri K. Rangayya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : 2026 INSC 574
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Custody and Child Psychological Evaluation – Child-Centric Jurisprudence - Sections 24, 33(5), 36, and 39 – Family Courts Act, 1984 – Section 12 – Psychological Evaluation of a Child Victim Intersecting with Custody/Visitation Disputes - The High Court modified its initial order for a single independent expert by constituting a four-member multi-layered panel of experts to evaluate a 10-year-old child victim for facilitating reconnection with the father, who is facing active criminal prosecution under the POCSO Act – Held that the High Court's approach suffered from a fundamental flaw as it failed to examine the detrimental impact that a multi-layered evaluative process conducted by numerous professionals could have on the psychological well-being of the child - Legal procedures involving child victims must remain child-sensitive, trauma-informed, and protective of their emotional security - The statutory framework of the POCSO Act, particularly the principle of minimum exposure under Section 33(5), consciously recognizes that repeated legal or forensic engagement carries a severe risk of "secondary victimisation" and "re-traumatisation" - While courts exercising parens patriae jurisdiction are not altogether precluded from seeking expert psychological assistance when POCSO allegations are pending, any such process must strictly adhere to the requirements of demonstrable necessity, institutional neutrality, proportionality, and minimum intrusion – The Supreme Court further emphasized that the emotional growth and welfare of a child are deeply intertwined with the parental subsystem - courts should focus on calling for psychological assessment reports of the parents themselves before subjecting the child to further forensic or clinical scrutiny - The impugned orders of the High Court were modified, and the matter was remitted to the Family Court to evaluate the parent's mental health first and coordinate with the child's existing therapeutic counsellor. [Paras 31, 41- 82, 85-93] Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 618 : 2026 INSC 638
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - In exercise of its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 5(1) and 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 (10 years rigorous imprisonment) after the appellant and the victim solemnised their marriage following the victim attaining the age of majority and the appellant paid ₹10,00,000 as compensation to the victim. The Court took note of subsequent events, including the victim's statements expressing her desire to settle the matter and live with the appellant as his spouse, and the absence of any objection from the State (subject to the order not being treated as a precedent). The appeals were allowed and the judgments of the Trial Court and Madras High Court were set aside. The appellant and the victim were left free to live peacefully as spouses in society. Maruthupandi v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 614
Sentence Modification — Substitution of Life Imprisonment with Period Already Undergone - While maintaining the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC, the Supreme Court took into account that the incident dated back to 1984, the co-convicts had been granted state remission, and the appellant had served over 18 years of actual imprisonment - Modifying a life sentence to a fixed-term sentence or the period already undergone is permissible provided the sentence served exceeds 14 years - Sentence modified to the period already undergone, and immediate release directed. [Paras 45 - 62] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598