Anticipatory Bail - Successive Applications — Filing multiple anticipatory bail petitions in quick succession (e.g., three petitions within three months) after earlier dismissals, without any material change in circumstances, constitutes a clear abuse of process and reduces the extraordinary remedy of anticipatory bail to a mere gamble. Vasantha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw...
Anticipatory Bail - Successive Applications — Filing multiple anticipatory bail petitions in quick succession (e.g., three petitions within three months) after earlier dismissals, without any material change in circumstances, constitutes a clear abuse of process and reduces the extraordinary remedy of anticipatory bail to a mere gamble. Vasantha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 520 : 2026 INSC 513
Bail - An undertrial prisoner who has remained in custody for 9 years is entitled to bail as continued detention amounts to a gross violation of his fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Vickki Yadav @ Vikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 545
Bail - Grant and Cancellation of – Successive Bail Application – Conduct of Accused and Parity - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 437/439 (corresponding to Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Grant of bail by High Court in a successive application after cancellation by the Supreme Court – Sustainability - An order granting bail that fails to engage with the prior bail-cancellation order of the Supreme Court, overlooks the contumacious conduct of the accused in absconding post-cancellation, ignores prima facie incriminating material (such as CCTV footage and recovery of weapons), and blindly applies the principle of parity despite distinct criminal roles, suffers from manifest error of law and perversity. [Paras 22-34] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526
Bail – The Supreme Court, invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed the release of a murder convict on bail who had already undergone more than 22 years of actual imprisonment. The High Court's order dismissing a jail appeal filed by a life convict on the ground of delay of 3157 days, without considering the merits, was described by the Supreme Court as “very disturbing”. When an appeal is filed through jail by a convict serving life sentence, the High Court should adopt a practical and sympathetic approach and, at the very least, condone the delay to afford an opportunity of hearing on merits. The High Court failed to consider that the appellant had already undergone over 12 years of sentence at the time of filing the appeal and that it was a jail appeal. The Court took note of the convict's satisfactory jail conduct for 22 years and the fact that he was never released on parole or furlough even once. The District Legal Services Authority was directed to assist the petitioner in filing an appropriate representation for remission of sentence under the applicable remission policy. The Supreme Court held that remanding the matter to the High Court at this stage (after 22 years) would be a futile exercise. The petitioner was ordered to be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of ₹10,000/-. Arjun Jani @ Tuntun v. State of Orissa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 473
Bail conditions - the Supreme Court strongly deprecated and set aside bail conditions requiring accused persons belonging to Dalit and Adivasi communities to clean police station premises for two months. In Re Condition Being Imposed While Granting Bail, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 472
Bail Jurisdiction - While exercising jurisdiction under Section 483 BNSS, a High Court cannot issue general directions to trial courts regarding service of summons and execution of coercive processes, as such directions fall outside the limited scope of bail proceedings. Rambalak v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 527 : 2026 INSC 511
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 194 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 174 – Scope and Purpose of Inquest Proceedings – Bail Parameters - The Supreme Court held that the scope of an inquiry under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. (now corresponding to Section 194 of the BNSS, 2023) is a preliminary enquiry of a limited and specific character, strictly confined to ascertaining the apparent cause of death - It is neither intended nor required to record a detailed account of the incident or register the names of the accused persons who might have caused the death - The High Court was not justified in drawing an adverse inference to grant bail to the accused merely because the informant and another panch witness had not made specific allegations against the accused during the inquest proceedings - Non-mention of the author of the crime in the inquest report cannot, by itself, be a valid reason to doubt the involvement of an accused who is subsequently named. [Relied on Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P., (1975) 4 SCC 153; Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 518; Paras 12-14] Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2026 INSC 527
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 173(1), Section 173(4), and Section 175(3) [erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 154(1), Section 154(3), and Section 156(3)] — Sequential Mechanism for Criminal Prosecution — Held - The BNSS provides a structured, sequential mechanism for initiating criminal prosecution - If an officer-in-charge of a police station refuses to register an FIR under Section 173(1) BNSS, the informant's recourse lies first in approaching the jurisdictional Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) BNSS, and subsequently, the competent Magistrate under Section 175(3) BNSS - Rushing directly to the High Court under Article 226 without exhausting these structured statutory steps renders the writ petition premature and unfit to be entertained. [Relied on Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. (2021) 6 SCC 771; Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes AIR 1964 SC 1419; Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage (2016) 6 SCC 277; Paras 5-11] Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : 2026 INSC 442
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 2(1)(k) and Section 531(2)(a) — Definition of "Inquiry" — Saving of pending proceedings — Purely ministerial or administrative acts prior to taking cognizance – Held A mere ministerial act, such as a Special Court directing a prosecution complaint to be registered/numbered and fixing a future date for a hearing on cognizance, does not constitute an "inquiry" under Section 2(1)(k) of the BNSS - An inquiry is a judicial act requiring a positive, conscious application of the judicial mind, which commences only when the Court takes judicial notice of an offence - Where a PMLA complaint was filed prior to the commencement of the BNSS but the Special Court took cognizance after the said date without hearing the accused, the saving clause under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS cannot be invoked to apply the old CrPC - Because no "inquiry" or "trial" was pending immediately before the commencement of the BNSS, the substantive right of being heard under the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS must prospectively ensure to the benefit of the accused. [Relied on Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221; Yash Tuteja & Ors. v. Union of India, (2024) 8 SCC 46; Tarsem Lal v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 7 SCC 61; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; Paras 27-36] Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2026 INSC 519
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 223(1) first proviso — Applicability to Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) proceedings — Right of the accused to be heard prior to taking cognizance — Nature of provision – Held that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, which prohibits a Court from taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard, is substantive and mandatory in nature - It confers a vital right upon the accused that forms an integral part of the right to a fair trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - The procedural framework governing complaint cases under the erstwhile CrPC (Sections 200 to 205) and the corresponding provisions of the BNSS (Sections 223 to 228) apply to prosecution complaints filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA, as they are not inconsistent with the special statute - Non-compliance with the mandate of the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS is not a mere procedural irregularity but an illegality that renders the order taking cognizance void ab initio. Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2026 INSC 519
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 528 [Inherent Powers / Quashing of Criminal Proceedings] – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) – Sections 3 & 4 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Sections 65, 74, 115, 351, 352 – Vexatious and Frivolous Matrimonial Litigation - Appeal against the High Court's refusal to quash criminal proceedings involving grave allegations of rape and sexual assault under the POCSO Act and BNS filed by the wife/complainant against her estranged husband, brother-in-law, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law - The Supreme Court observed that the parties were heavily embroiled in multiple civil and criminal matrimonial disputes, with more than ten cases pending between them - Supreme Court noted that the allegations of rape against the father (appellant No. 1) and uncle (appellant No. 4) were completely generic, blanket statements lacking specific factual details or chronological backing - a close inspection of the statements of the complainant and the minor daughter revealed that they were virtually identical and reproduced verbatim, indicating a strong probability of tutoring and concoction due to pre-existing bad blood - highlighted the total absence of any medical examination or report, which was fatal to the prosecution's case given the gravity of the alleged physical injuries (such as the insertion of a hammer handle) - Held, allowing the continuation of such a trial on the basis of vague, omnibus, and improbable allegations would tantamount to an abuse of the process of law - The impugned order of the High Court was set aside, and the entire criminal proceedings arising out of the complaint case were quashed. [Paras 7 – 11] Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 566 : 2026 INSC 587
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) - Section 63(4) - Supreme Court upholds constitutional validity of Section 63(4) BSA mandating certificate with hash value and expert certification for admissibility of secondary electronic evidence. Pune Bar Association v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 551
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 — Section 227 and Section 482 — Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 471, 477-A, and 120-B — Orissa Forest Act, 1972 — Section 27 — Discharge — Vague and General Allegations — Principle of Parity - Held, that the presence of general allegations without any overt act or specific imputations against the accused is insufficient to proceed to trial - While a detailed appreciation of evidence is not warranted at the stage of framing charges, Supreme Court must be satisfied that there exists a sufficient ground or grave suspicion against the accused - Broad and joint accusations cast in a wide net, without defining individual roles or culpability, are impermissible under law - Held, that when similarly situated co-accused persons prominently placed in the administrative chain have already been discharged under similar allegations, the principle of parity requires that the Appellant be treated alike - Continuing proceedings against one accused while discharging others on indistinguishable facts would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - Continuation of such vague criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law - The High Court's order dismissing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is set aside, and the Appellant is discharged. [Relied on Neelu Chopra and another Vs. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Yogesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394; Paras 15-24] Susanta Kumar Dalei v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2026 INSC 510
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 156(3) and 200 - The parameters and fields of operation of Section 156(3) CrPC (direction for registration of FIR) and Section 200 CrPC (private complaint) are distinct and different. Once an application under Section 156(3) CrPC has been dismissed and the High Court, while dealing with a subsequent challenge, grants liberty to the complainant to file a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC, the complainant cannot file a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC by taking advantage of such liberty. Filing a second Section 156(3) application in such circumstances amounts to an impermissible attempt to review or override the earlier order of the High Court and is not maintainable in law. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Magistrate directing registration of an FIR on a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC. The Court held that after the High Court had expressly granted liberty to file a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC against the police closure report, the Magistrate could not have entertained a fresh application under Section 156(3). The Court directed the Magistrate to treat the said second application filed under Section 156(3) CrPC as a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC and proceed in accordance with law. Mohan Karthik v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 458
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 173(8) - In the absence of express permission from the concerned Magistrate, the police cannot proceed with further investigation after filing a closure report/final report. The requirement of obtaining leave of the Court/Magistrate, though not expressly provided in the statute, has been read into Section 173(8) CrPC as a necessary safeguard through consistent judicial pronouncements. [Relied on: Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2013) 5 SCC 762, Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad, (2013) 5 SCC 762, Peethambaran v. State of Kerala, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 402, Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511] Paliniswamy Veeraraja v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 557 : 2026 INSC 561
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 195 read with Section 340 – Prosecution for Perjury in Matrimonial Disputes – Scope of – Application filed by husband seeking prosecution of wife for making allegedly false statements on oath during interim maintenance proceedings - Held: The allegations do not disclose the necessary ingredients of the offence of perjury - The husband's grievances stem from a hyper-technical dissection of the material on record and appear to be instigated by personal vendetta, anger, and pent-up frustration arising out of escalated matrimonial acrimony - Recourse to criminal prosecution under Section 340 CrPC cannot be permitted to satisfy a spiteful approach. Special Leave Petition filed by the husband dismissed. [Paras 36, 37] Ann Saurabh Dutt v. Lieutenant Colonel Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur Dutt, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 489 : 2026 INSC 475
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 294 and 296 - Scope and Distinction – Admissibility of documents without formal proof vs. Evidence of formal character on affidavit – The High Court dismissed the application under Section 294 Cr.P.C. by erroneously relying on a precedent concerning Section 296 Cr.P.C. – Held: Section 294 Cr.P.C. deals with documentary evidence where the court calls upon parties to admit or deny the genuineness of documents to dispense with formal proof - In contrast, Section 296 Cr.P.C. relates to evidence of a formal character given by affidavit - The ratio of a judgment concerning Section 296 cannot be applied to reject an application under Section 294 - It is the duty of the Court to uphold the spirit of Section 294 by ascertaining the genuineness of documents through admission or denial. [Relied on State of Punjab Vs. Naib Din (2001) 8 SCC 578; Para 6-9] R. Ganesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 471
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 432 (now Section 473 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Premature Release / Remission – Automation of Process – Automatic Triggering of Eligibility - It is the bounden obligation of the appropriate Government to consider the cases of all convicts for the grant of premature release as and when they become eligible for consideration in terms of the state policy - It is not necessary for the convict or their relatives to file a specific application for permanent remission; instead, the process must be automatically triggered and initiated a few months prior to their date of eligibility – Held that endorsing the implementation of the National Legal Services Authority's (NALSA) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of 2022, the Supreme Court directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to roll out the 'E-Prisons Early Release Processing Module' (developed by the NIC) as a pilot project in Central Jail, Agra, and District Jail, Lucknow to automate premature release processing, eradicate administrative delays, and eliminate the physical movement of files. [Relied on: In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 349; Paras 14 - 22] Surendra @ Sunda v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : 2026 INSC 414
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 - Maintainability of second quash petition – Dismissal of earlier petition as withdrawn without merits – Held - There is no inviolable rule that a second quash petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable - Where the earlier petition was withdrawn without any discussion on the merits, the second petition cannot be thrown out purely on the ground of maintainability, especially when the facts reveal that the alleged offence is not made out. [Paras 15 - 22] Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 459
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 — Quashing of FIR and Chargesheet — Absence of necessary ingredients - An FIR is liable to be quashed if its bare reading does not disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offences - When the basic constituents of the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act (i.e., occurrence in a place within public view) and Section 506 IPC (i.e., intent to cause alarm) are conspicuously missing from the contents of the FIR and the chargesheet, the framing of charges is unsustainable in the eyes of law. [Relied on Swaran Singh and Others vs. State through Standing Counsel and Another (2008) 8 SCC 435; Karuppudayar vs. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy and Others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 215; State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Amar Nath Jha vs. Nand Kishore Singh and Others (2018) 9 SCC 137; Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2023) 17 SCC 615; Paras 9 - 11] Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 484 : 2026 INSC 468
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 154 & Section 173 – Registration of Multiple FIRs for the Same Transaction / Occurrence – Permissibility of Parallel Investigations – Clubbing and Transfer of FIRs – The petitioners sought the clubbing and transfer of multiple FIRs registered against them across Delhi and Haryana, arising out of the same real estate project ("Brahma City/Krrish World") on identical allegations of cheating, non-delivery of plots/flats, and siphoning of homebuyer funds – Held - There cannot be multiple FIRs and parallel investigations in different jurisdictions concerning the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to cognizable offences - The scheme of the CrPC mandates a single, comprehensive investigation - Permitting parallel and overlapping investigations on identical facts leads to an avoidable multiplicity of proceedings, potential for conflicting findings, and manifest prejudice to the accused - the subsequent FIR registered in Gurugram, Haryana, was ordered to be clubbed and transferred to be investigated alongside the primary FIR in Delhi - A blanket protective order restraining coercive steps for potential future FIRs was declined. [Relied on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181; Paras 21 - 28] Amit Katyal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 516 : 2026 INSC 509
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 319 – Subsequent Summoning of Quashed Accused – Doctrine of Double Jeopardy (Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India & Section 300 CrPC) – Held - Quashing of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC at the threshold does not amount to an acquittal on merits and does not trigger the bar of 'double jeopardy' - Supreme Court clarified that if strong and cogent evidence emerges during the trial of the husband implicating the present appellants, the trial court remains fully competent to exercise its powers under Section 319 CrPC to summon them to face trial. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1; Paras 22-57] Arti Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2026 INSC 533
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 304-A – Medical Negligence – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Exoneration on Merits in Civil/Consumer Proceedings – Effect on Parallel Criminal Prosecution – The appellant, a senior anaesthetist, challenged the criminal prosecution initiated against her under Section 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC for alleged gross negligence leading to the death of a patient post-surgery - The prosecution alleged that the appellant orally instructed an inexperienced staff nurse to administer a specialized analgesic injection ('sensorcaine') instead of doing it personally, which allegedly did not enter the epidural space, failing to alleviate pain and triggering a fatal cardiac event - Held, allowing the appeal and quashing the criminal proceedings, that for a criminal charge under Section 304-A of the IPC to survive, the negligence or recklessness must be of such a high degree as to be "gross" - An anaesthetist whose duty hours have concluded cannot be held criminally liable for a subsequent procedural error committed by a staff nurse in the mechanical execution of a standard post-operative pain management instruction - the family of the deceased pursued a parallel civil claim before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, which categorically exonerated the appellant on merits, finding that she had not given instructions to the nurse to administer the injection - This exoneration remained unchallenged and attained finality. Once an accused is exonerated on merits in civil proceedings, allowing a criminal prosecution to continue on identical allegations and facts constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law, as the standard of proof required in criminal cases is higher than that in civil cases. [Paras 18, 21-29] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Inherent Powers of High Court – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Banking and Commercial Disputes – Approved Compromise Settlement – Impact on Prosecution - A criminal prosecution initiated under Sections 420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) cannot be allowed to continue after a full and final settlement of the loan account by way of an approved compromise that has received the imprimatur of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) - Banking transactions arising out of loan facilities are commercial transactions having an overwhelmingly and predominantly civil flavour - Where the dispute has been amicably resolved, the settlement amount has been fully deposited, a "No Dues Certificate" has been issued, and recovery proceedings before the DRT have been consequently withdrawn, the possibility of a conviction becomes remote and bleak - In such circumstances, allowing the belated criminal prosecution to continue would cause grave prejudice, oppression, and injustice to the accused, and would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Vijay Kumar Kela v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2026 INSC 588
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Quashing of FIR and Criminal Proceedings – Matrimonial Disputes – Omnibus and Generalised Allegations against In-laws – Criminal proceedings under Section 498A/34 IPC, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) quashed against the sister-in-law, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law of the complainant – Held - While criminal law protects women from domestic abuse, it cannot be weaponised against every relative of the husband based on sweeping, vague, and omnibus allegations lacking specific factual foundation - A close reading of the FIR and the complainant's own divorce petition revealed that the core allegations of physical assault, verbal abuse, and surveillance were exclusively directed against the husband at his place of posting (Sheopur), while the appellants resided separately at Shivpuri - Mere familial association or failure to intervene in a marital discord does not automatically attract criminal culpability without active, specific involvement in the alleged offences. Arti Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2026 INSC 533
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 167(2) read with Section 43-D(2) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Extension of time for investigation — Right to Default Bail — Mandatory requirement of production and notice to the accused - The Supreme Court set aside the orders extending the time for completing the investigation and granted default bail to the accused - held that the initial order extending the time to file the chargesheet was passed without procuring the presence of the accused (either physically or virtually) and without giving him an opportunity of being heard or raising objections - This constitutes a gross illegality that violates the fundamental rights of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Supreme Court reiterated that the extension of time for completing an investigation is not an empty formality - Any direction to extend the period for filing a chargesheet encroaches upon personal liberty and must be preceded by due application of mind by recording justifiable, cogent, and valid reasons - Extension orders passed in an absolutely mechanical or perfunctory manner merely noting that "investigation is still pending" are legally unsustainable - Since the first extension order was declared illegal and arbitrary, the subsequent chargesheet filed after the expiry of the statutory period of 90 days could not defeat the right of the accused - The appellant's right to claim default bail stood crystallized upon the filing of his application under Section 167(2) CrPC before the chargesheet was submitted. [Relied on Jigar v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484; Paras 24 - 36] Md. Ariz Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : 2026 INSC 456
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 235(2) and Section 386(a) — Procedure on reversing an acquittal — Appellate Court's power and obligation to sentence — When an Appellate Court reverses a judgment of acquittal and convicts an accused for the first time, it has a bounden duty to hear the convict on the question of sentence and impose an appropriate sentence itself - The Appellate Court cannot abdicate its judicial function or relegate the matter to the Trial Court solely for the purpose of pronouncing and imposing a sentence - Such a course of remanding the matter for sentencing is alien to the scheme of Section 386(a) of the Cr.P.C - The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's direction to the Trial Judge to impose the sentence - The matter was remitted back to the High Court with a direction to fix a date, hear the convict on the issue of sentence, and pass an appropriate sentence in accordance with law. [Relied on Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513; Dagdu and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 3 SCC 68; Allauddin Mian and Others Sharif Mian and Another v. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5; Kamalakar Nandram Bhavsar and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 10 SCC 192; Paras 14 - 20] Mukesh Kumar Yadav v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 546 : 2026 INSC 559
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 82 – Delay in Surrendering after Bail Cancellation – Effect of Pending Review Petition - The filing of a Review Petition before the Supreme Court does not operate as an automatic stay of a surrender direction - Evading arrest for 42 days, necessitating the issuance of a Non-Bailable Warrant (NBW) and initiation of proclamation proceedings under Section 82 CrPC, constitutes contumacious conduct that heavily weighs against the fresh grant of bail. [Para 26-27] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526
Constitution of India – Article 20(3) – Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 25 & 26 – Crime Scene Re-enactment – Right Against Self-Incrimination - The Supreme Court corrected the High Court's finding that compelling an accused to re-enact a crime scene per se violates the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution or constitutes an inadmissible confession under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act - The core test is whether the exercise compels the disclosure of incriminating information from the personal knowledge of the accused, or merely requires him to mimic a visual sequence or perform physical movements - A directed re-enactment staged by the Investigating Officer to analyze physical attributes does not amount to a personal testimony - While a re-enactment is merely "created evidence" and not substantive proof of the actual crime, expert assessments derived from it—such as gait analysis—are admissible as corroborative evidence of identity. [Paras 86-90] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Constitutional Law – Article 226 vs Section 528 BNSS (Section 482 CrPC) – Quashing of FIR – Distinguishing the scope of jurisdiction, the Court observed that so long as cognizance of an offence is not taken, a writ to quash an FIR/charge-sheet can be issued under Article 226 - once a judicial order of taking cognizance intervenes, the power under Article 226 is not available, though the inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (erstwhile Section 482 CrPC) can be invoked to quash the proceedings. Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482
Criminal Administration – Special Investigation Team (SIT) – Land Scams – In view of organized criminal activities involving the forgery of documents and unauthorized sale of a spiritual society's freehold lands across multiple states, Supreme Court directed the constitution of an SIT supervised by the Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh - The SIT, including the Registrar of Societies, is mandated to conduct a fact-finding inquiry into the alienation of society lands and submit a report to the police for further action. [Relied on Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra (2025) SCC Online 1948; Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401; Pratibha Manchanda & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. (2023) 8 SCC 181; Paras 14 -19] Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482
Criminal Evidence — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together Theory — Extra-judicial Confession — Recovery under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act — Absence of Motive — Conviction set aside - Last Seen Together Theory — Time Gap & Proximity - What assumes significance in placing reliance on the 'last seen together' theory is the gap between the time the accused and the deceased were seen together and the occurrence of death - The proximity of the death having occurred within a short time after they were last seen together is most relevant for that fact to be taken as an incriminating circumstance - When the time gap is large, intervening circumstances can snap the link and prevent an adverse inference against the accused, even if the accused fails to explain when they parted company. [Relied on State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Another, (2007) 3 SCC 755; Para 7-10] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528
Criminal Evidence – Testimony of Hostile Witness – Evidentiary Value for Acquittal – The Supreme Court ruled that just as the dependable part of a hostile witness's testimony can be used to convict an accused if corroborated by reliable evidence, the reverse is also true - The testimony or statement in the deposition of a hostile witness can be properly employed to discredit the prosecution's case and support a conclusion of acquittal, especially when it inspires credibility and aligns with other evidence on record to cast serious doubt on the occurrence of the incident - Held: The evidence of a hostile witness does not get completely washed off the record - If such evidence discredits the very fulcrum and genesis of the prosecution's story (such as the holding of a village panchayat or the presence of eyewitnesses), and is supported by unexplained medical discrepancies and a failure to examine independent public witnesses at a busy crime scene, the benefit of the doubt must go to the accused - The concurrent convictions by the Trial Court and High Court were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. [Relied on Ghulam Hassan Beigh vs. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey and Others, (2022) 12 SCC 657; Bhaskarrao and Others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 591; Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai vs. State of Gujarat, (1999) 8 SCC 624; Himanshu alias Chintu vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2 SCC 36; Paras 6-10] Talari Naresh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 496 : 2026 INSC 486
Criminal Jurisprudence — Circumstantial Evidence — Recovery of bloodstained articles — Chain of custody — Failure to conduct Test Identification Parade (TIP) — Suppression of material witnesses - Key Rulings – i. Circumstantial Evidence - In a case resting solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution carries the onerous burden of establishing each incriminating circumstance independently beyond reasonable doubt - The cumulative effect of the proved circumstances must form a complete and unbroken chain pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused alone, while excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; ii. Recovery of Bloodstained Articles - The sole circumstance of recovering a bloodstained article matching the blood group of the deceased, in isolation, cannot be considered sufficient to link the accused with the crime - Blood group 'O' is a common blood group, and its mere presence on recovered articles cannot be treated as a determinative incriminating circumstance without establishing an uncompromised connection to the crime; iii. Chain of Custody - The failure of the prosecution to lead cogent and reliable evidence establishing an unbroken chain of custody of seized forensic articles from the stage of recovery till their examination at the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) diminishes the scientific value of such reports, as the possibility of tampering or contamination cannot be reasonably ruled out; iv. Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Where the accused persons are complete strangers to the material witnesses, a Test Identification Parade assumes considerable significance to provide assurance to the dock identification - The rank failure of the investigating agency to hold a TIP, combined with showing the accused to witnesses while in police custody, substantially diminishes the evidentiary value of subsequent dock identification; v. Suppression of Material Witness - The non-examination of a natural, material witness closely related to the deceased whose statement was recorded during the investigation, without any plausible explanation, amounts to the suppression of the best available evidence and casts a serious cloud of doubt on the fairness of the investigation. [Relied on Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 16 SCC 357; Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, (2024) 9 SCC 546; Paras 40-86] Mehtab v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 560 : 2026 INSC 578
Criminal Jurisprudence - Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Summarized principles governing interference by the Supreme Court in a criminal appeal by special leave against concurrent findings of the courts below - Supreme Court would not normally interfere with a concurrent finding of fact based on pure appreciation of evidence or enter into a re-appraisement unless the assessment of the High Court is vitiated by an error of law or procedure, misreading of evidence, or is manifestly perverse and based on no evidence. [Relied on Dalbir Kaur & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 158; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554; Bipin Bihari v. State of M.P. (2006) 8 SCC 799; Para 30-40] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524
Criminal Law – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 503 & Section 506 Part II – Criminal Intimidation to Impute Unchastity – Appeal against conviction for threatening to upload a video of the prosecutrix bathing on Facebook if she insisted on continuing their relationship – Non-recovery of mobile phone/videography – Held: Law does not mandate that the recovery of an article of crime is sine qua non for conviction if there is other credible evidence to prove its existence - What is relevant is that the threat was issued, and the victim truly believed and felt threatened that such a threat could be carried out - The genuine perception of the prosecutrix that such a video exists and that the appellant threatened to upload it on social media constitutes key ingredients to invoke Section 503 IPC - Non-recovery of the device is not fatal to the prosecution's case. [Relied on Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; Paras 46, 53, 54 - 87] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Criminal Law – Proximate Cause (Causa Causans) – To fasten criminal liability under Section 304-A IPC, there must be a direct and proximate nexus between the alleged negligent act and the death - Where the post-mortem report conclusively establishes that the immediate cause of death was acute coronary insufficiency resulting from an underlying, undisclosed 80% blockage in the coronary artery, the actions of an off-duty anaesthetist are far too remote to attract criminal culpability. [Relied on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1; Radheyshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581; Videocon Industries Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2016) 12 SCC 315; Prem Raj v. Poonamma Menon, (2024) 6 SCC 143; Para 20-28] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537
Criminal Procedure – Grant of Bail – Judicial Discretion and Duty to Consider Material Evidence - The Supreme Court observed that while the judicial discretion to grant bail is wide, it must be exercised in a judicious, reasoned manner by adverting to the settled parameters, especially where accusations are grave - The High Court erred in isolating the omission in the inquest proceedings while completely ignoring vital material collected during the investigation - A specific overt act attributed to the accused in the FIR, the corroborative post-mortem report showing firearm injuries, the recovery of the weapon at the instance of the accused, and the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS, 2023 constitute material circumstances that cannot be brushed aside - Assigning reasons not in consonance with settled bail principles in serious offences renders the order unsustainable. [Paras 14-16] Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2026 INSC 527
Criminal Procedure – Inherent Powers – Quashing of Proceedings – Right to Speedy Trial as a Fundamental Right under Article 21 - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the appellant for 35 years arising out of a dispute over food in a police mess involving minor offences under Sections 147, 323, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 120 of the Railways Act - Supreme Court emphasized that a quick trial is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Keeping a public servant in suspended animation for 35 years without any fault on his part runs completely contrary to the spirit of the "procedure established by law" - Right to speedy trial is not an abstract or illusory safeguard; it is a fundamental right and a human right that no civilized society can deny to an accused - If the continuation of proceedings amounts to a violation of Article 21, the High Court should not hesitate to exercise its inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) or its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. [Paras 30 - 42] Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : 2026 INSC 473
Criminal Procedure – Remission / Premature Release – Rejection of Remission Proposal by Central Government – Investigation by CBI – Requirement of Concurrence – Speaking Order – Application of Mind – Parity – Reformative Theory of Punishment – Writ Petition challenging the letter dated 09.07.2025 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Union of India, which disallowed the recommendation of the State of Uttarakhand for the premature release of the petitioner who had been incarcerated for over 22 years in a murder case investigated by the CBI – Held that i. Cryptic and Non-Speaking Orders Invalidation: The impugned letter issued by the MHA rejecting the remission recommendation was ex-facie non-speaking, cryptic, and failed to disclose any reasons for its disagreement with the State Government's proposal - Recording of reasons is an essential safeguard against arbitrariness, ensures transparency, and reflects due application of mind - Absence of reasons violates the principles of natural justice and frustrates the convict's right to seek effective judicial review; ii. Heinousness of Offence Not the Sole Ground for Denial: Denial of remission cannot rest solely on the gravity or heinous nature of the original crime - The heinousness of the offence stands exhausted at the stage of sentencing and judicial determination of punishment - Remission is a distinct executive function concerned with the present and the future specifically the prisoner's conduct, evidence of reformation, and prospects of reintegration into society - Permanent incarceration under the shadow of a past worst act is impermissible in a liberal constitutional order; iii. Principle of Parity: Where a co-accused in the very same offence and incident has already been granted premature release after a lesser period of actual incarceration (17 years), denying similar consideration to the petitioner without any cogent, rational, and discernible distinguishing circumstances violates the constitutional requirements of fairness and non-arbitrariness under Article 14; iv. Futility of Remand: While a non-speaking order is ordinarily remanded for fresh consideration, a mechanical remand is unnecessary where the authority has already fully articulated its firm stand on merits before the Court - Relegating a convict who has served over 22 years to another round of administrative proceedings would prolong incarceration unnecessarily and fail the interests of justice - The impugned letter is quashed - The Writ Petition is allowed, and the petitioner (already on interim bail) is directed to be treated as prematurely released without requiring him to surrender. [Relied on Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B., (2000) 7 SCC 626; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121; Satish v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580; Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 481; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath, AIR 1961 SC 334; Paras 5 - 10] Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 501 : 2026 INSC 490
Criminal Procedure – Section 162 Proviso CrPC r/w Section 145 of Evidence Act – Impeaching Credibility vs. Omissions in FIR – Defense merely cross-examined the prosecutrix by suggesting that the details of the videography threat were not mentioned in her initial complaint/FIR – Held: The FIR is primarily meant to set the criminal investigation into motion and is not an encyclopedia of all relevant facts - An omission in the FIR is not fatal unless it goes to the root of the case - To properly contradict and discredit a witness under the proviso to Section 162 CrPC, the defense must draw the witness's attention to significant omissions or contradictions in their previous statements recorded by the police under Section 161 CrPC during investigation - Suggestions of oral denial and reference only to the FIR do not invoke the statutory mechanism required to shake the veracity of the deposition. [Relied on Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 and Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365; Paras 74, 76, & 77, 90-100] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Criminal Procedure – Stay of Investigation/Charge-sheet – Interim Orders in Writ Jurisdiction – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court's interim direction that restrained the police from filing a charge-sheet while allowing the investigation to continue - Supreme Court held that while a High Court can exercise discretion to grant protection from coercive steps during the pendency of a petition under Article 226, a blanket stay on filing the report under Section 193(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is "wholly unjust" when the facts involve repeated fraudulent sale of society lands. Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482
Criminal Proceedings - Sanctity of Settlements before Judicial/Quasi-Judicial Fora – Economic Implications - Allowing a bank to initiate criminal prosecution long after entering into a voluntary and approved compromise settlement before a judicial/quasi-judicial forum like the DRT severely undermines the sanctity of such settlements - Overlooking such conduct would make commercial entities hesitant to seek resolutions for banking disputes, causing a debilitating effect on the overall economy, especially when the institutional focus remains on the swift settlement of commercial disputes. [Relied on K. Bharthi Devi Vs. State of Telangana, (2024) 10 SCC 384; Paras 17-28] Vijay Kumar Kela v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2026 INSC 588
Criminal Trial – Appreciation of Approver's Evidence – Object of Granting Pardon - The Supreme Court observed that the testimony of an approver must be evaluated with caution and requires due corroboration on material particulars - the High Court adopted an infirm approach by rejecting the approver's testimony on the sole ground that it contradicted his previous statement given to the police when he was an accused - The very object of granting pardon under the law is to elicit a "true and full disclosure" in aid of the prosecution, which inherently acknowledges that the individual had concealed the truth prior to the pardon - Rejection of post-pardon testimonies based mechanically on pre-pardon contradictions would effectively frustrate the statutory purpose of pardon in criminal trials. [Relied On: Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637; Paras 39, 64-67] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Elastic Time of Death - Extra-Judicial Confession - Exculpatory Statements - Where the postmortem report indicates an elastic timeframe for the time of death (e.g., '24 hours not passed during examination') and the time gap between when the deceased was last seen with the accused and the recovery of the body is large, death cannot be termed as proximate. Consequently, no conviction can be sustained solely based on the last seen together theory - An exculpatory statement made by an accused absolving himself and accusing the co-accused is, by its very nature, unreliable. It cannot be used against co-accused persons as they have no opportunity to cross-examine the maker, nor does it incriminate the maker since it lacks an element of confession. Furthermore, a statement made while being detained by a mob under pressure, undue duress, or threat of violence lacks credibility and is a weak piece of evidence. [Paras 9-11] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528
Evidence Act — Section 27 - Recoveries under - Essential Ingredients - Concealment and its knowledge, revealed from the statement of the accused, are the crucial ingredients of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act - In the absence of a recorded statement showing that the concealment was effected by the accused, a mere recital in the seizure list that objects were recovered "on being shown and certified" by the accused does not qualify as a valid recovery under Section 27 - Assault: Where weapon recoveries lack clarity, are made from open spaces with free access, are not produced or confronted before the witnesses in Court, and are not shown to the medical officer to elicit an opinion on whether they could cause the injuries found on the deceased, such recoveries do not form a clinching incriminating circumstance – Motive - While the absence of motive is not imperative when the chain of circumstances is so complete as to establish only a hypothesis of guilt, its absence raises a reasonable doubt when the individual links in the chain of circumstances are weak, unproven, or not incriminating. [Paras 12 - 19] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528
Evidence Act, 1872 — Appreciation of Evidence — Canon of Common Sense — The dictum of common sense and common wisdom serves as a vital canon for evaluating evidence and judging human conduct in criminal trials - Applying the yardstick of common sense to day-to-day affairs and natural human activities helps the court look past technical assumptions and arrive closer to the truth. [Para 7-9] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 101 & 102 – Burden of Proof – Allegation of fraud and misuse of fiduciary position – Power of Attorney – Held, the burden of establishing that transactions executed under registered General Powers of Attorney (GPAs) were not genuine sale transactions, but merely security arrangements for loans, rests upon the plaintiff/appellant - Mere allegations of fraud or misuse of fiduciary position are not sufficient unless supported by reliable and cogent evidence - Before the burden can shift onto the beneficiaries/respondents to establish their bona fides, the plaintiff is required to first establish foundational facts constituting fraud or fiduciary misuse - In the absence of documentary material substantiating the alleged loan transactions or repayment/discharge, the initial burden continues to remain upon the plaintiff. [Paras 45, 46] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge — Matrimonial Home Death — Circumstantial Evidence — Appeal against the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court convicting the appellant-husband under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for the murder of his wife - The deceased died an unnatural death inside her matrimonial home - The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence - The medical reports and autopsy indicated the cause of death as "asphyxia due to strangulation" based on a fractured hyoid bone and trachea, a fresh bruise mark on the cheek, and multiple ligature marks - A critical circumstance relied upon was that the deceased's left earring, right leg anklet, and toe rings were missing—articles unlikely to be displaced in a case of suicide by hanging - The appellant set up a defense of suicide based on a recovered chit (suicide note) - handwriting experts and evidence established that the chit was forcibly written by the accused prior to the strangulation - The appellant also failed to explain why, after being told by the first doctor that the victim was dead, he rushed her to another private clinic instead of a civil hospital – Held that the death occurred under suspicious circumstances inside the matrimonial home where the appellant-husband resided with the deceased - This fact was within the special knowledge of the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act - The appellant utterly failed to provide any justifiable or plausible explanation to discharge this statutory burden - When a case rests on circumstantial evidence, the failure of the accused to offer a reasonable explanation under Section 106 provides an additional link to the chain of circumstances established by the prosecution - The prosecution successfully established a complete, unbroken chain of circumstances pointing unerringly to the guilt of the appellant - No interference is warranted under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against concurrent findings of fact. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725; Mulakh Raj and Others v. Satish Kumar and Others, (1992) 3 SCC 43; Paras 16, 19 - 26] Chetan Dashrath Gade v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 526 : 2026 INSC 522
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 106 & Section 114 – Burden of Proof & Special Knowledge in Interpersonal Relationships – Applicability of Section 106 to private moments within a romantic relationship – Held: The "especial knowledge" contemplated under Section 106 is not confined strictly to physical spaces (like a domestic house) - It extends to intimate interpersonal relationships where only the accused and the victim are privy to conversations and transactions - Once the foundational fact of a long-term physical relationship is established by the prosecution, the court can draw reasonable inferences under Section 114 regarding human conduct - The burden then shifts to the accused to provide an explanation or an alternate version of facts within his special knowledge - A generalized, studied silence or a stock reply of "false evidence" during Section 313 CrPC examination fails to discharge this burden or create reasonable doubt against an otherwise unimpeached, credible testimony of the prosecutrix. [Relied on Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 15 SCC 48 and Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 626; Paras 62, 63, 66, 68, & 81] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 114(g) – Adverse Inference – Non-examination of a party – Held, where serious allegations of fraud, forgery of receipts, misuse of signed blank papers, and collusive transfers are levelled, and the party possessing special knowledge of facts fails to enter the witness box, an adverse inference may legitimately be drawn against such party. [Paras 48, 49] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 25, 26, 27 & 161 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 161 & 162 – Approver/Accomplice Evidence – Use of Previous Statement for Contradiction - The Supreme Court held that a non-confessional statement of an accused recorded by an Investigating Officer during investigation qualifies as a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C - If the accused subsequently turns into an approver and steps into the witness box as a prosecution witness, such a statement can be put to him for the purpose of contradiction under Section 162 Cr.P.C - A confessional statement made while in police custody remains strictly barred by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be used for any purpose other than what is permissible under Section 27. State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 65-B – Call Detail Records (CDRs) – Mode of Proof and Chain of Custody - The Supreme Court upheld the rejection of Call Detail Records (CDRs) filed by a Cyber Unit Police Officer who took printouts of data sent via email by telecom service providers and certified them under Section 65-B - Because the officer was merely a recipient and not the person having lawful control over the computer systems that generated the original records, he was incompetent to prove their contents - The prosecution's failure to examine the concerned Nodal Officers of the telecom companies or to produce the routing emails created a fatal gap in the chain of custody of the electronic data. [Paras 80, 81] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32(1) - Oral Dying Declaration - Reliability and Evidentiary Value – Held - The legal position with regard to dying declarations is well settled by a catena of decisions - A truthful and voluntary dying declaration, if found to be reliable, can by itself form the sole basis of conviction without the necessity of corroboration - Simply because the deceased subsequently became unconscious by the time he reached the hospital or the doctor, it cannot be presumed that he was unconscious even when the witness initially reached the spot and asked him about the incident immediately after the occurrence - the non-mentioning of the name of the assailant in the medical history papers pales into insignificance, as medical history is recorded by doctors primarily to understand how the incident occurred and what type of weapon was involved, rather than investigating who caused the injury. [Relied on P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 44; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Others, (1985) 1 SCC 552; Paras 13-15] Mitesh @ T.V. Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : 2026 INSC 469
Expert Evidence – Forensic Science – Gait Analysis – Admissibility and Reliability Standards - The Supreme Court noted that while gait analysis is an evolving scientific technique useful for corroborating a suspect's identity and physical attributes, its validity relies entirely on a comparison between two independently admissible and reliable pieces of visual evidence - Where the original hard disk and DVR of a CCTV system were mishandled, delayed in extraction, and ultimately corrupted or destroyed by the investigating agency, a gait analysis report prepared by a private laboratory using an unverified backup copy cannot be safely relied upon. [Paras 91-93, 95-102] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Bail — Prolonged incarceration and inordinate delay in trial — Grant of regular bail in commercial quantity case - The Supreme Court granted regular bail to an accused charged under Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(c) and 29(1) of the NDPS Act for allegedly possessing nearly 22 kg of ganja (commercial quantity), primarily on the ground of delay in trial and the accused having already undergone more than one year of incarceration. Rajadurai v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 462
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Sections 138 and 141 – Offences by Companies/Societies – Vicarious Liability of Office Bearers – Scope of Quashing under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. – Mere designation as an office bearer of a society/company is insufficient to attract vicarious liability under Section 141 of the NI Act in the absence of specific averments disclosing an active role in the conduct of its business affairs - a hyper-technical approach should not be adopted while construing a complaint. If the complaint, read as a whole alongside the documentary material on record, discloses a sufficient factual foundation and prima facie participation of the office bearers in the underlying financial transactions (such as being signatories to the MoU, cheques, or promissory notes), the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed at the threshold - in the absence of any specific factual foundation connecting an office bearer to the transaction beyond a general assertion of their official status, prosecution against such person cannot be sustained – Held that the High Court erred in quashing the proceedings against respondents 1, 2, and 4 (Vice-President, Treasurer, and Manager) whose active involvement was prima facie established through their signatures on the financial documents/cheques related to the transaction - the quashing of proceedings against respondent No. 3 (Executive Member) was justified as no specific role or signing of documents was attributed to him beyond a general assertion of his designation - Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Another (2005) 8 SCC 89; National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Harmeet Singh Paintal and Another (2010) 3 SCC 330; Ashok Shewakramani and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another (2023) 8 SCC 473; S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan (2023) 10 SCC 685; Paras 28 - 42] Mansi Finance v. M. Lalitha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 559
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 & Section 141 — Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Part III (Sections 96, 101, 124, 128) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 357) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Section 395) — Interplay between Individual Moratorium and Cheque Bounce Proceedings - Core Principles Enunciated by Supreme Court - i. Predominantly Criminal Character of Section 138 - Although arising out of an inherently civil dispute or transaction, the "deeming fiction" under Section 138 of the NI Act attaches strict criminal liability as a measure of public policy and deterrence to maintain commercial integrity. It cannot be treated on par with a mere civil recovery mechanism; ii. Tiered/Bifurcated Approach to Section 138 - Proceedings under Section 138 must be bifurcated into two tiers - Tier-I (Criminal Aspect) which is mandatory and results in personal criminal liability (imprisonment or fine); and Tier-II (Compensatory Aspect) which is a discretionary exercise of power under Section 357 CrPC / Section 395 BNSS aimed at victim reparation; iii. Inapplicability of Moratorium on Criminal Aspect (Tier-I) - The interim moratorium under Section 96 and statutory moratorium under Section 101 of the IBC (Part III) do not stay the criminal aspect of Section 138 proceedings - Liability to pay a fine is an "excluded debt" under Section 79(15)(a) of the IBC, and the moratorium cannot be used to evade personal criminal accountability; iv. Applicability of Moratorium on Compensatory Aspect (Tier-II) - The moratorium provisions under Part III of the IBC apply strictly to the compensatory aspect of Section 138 - If a criminal court adjudicates that compensation is payable, the recovery and enforcement of such compensation against the debtor or his property must be temporarily halted during the moratorium period to prevent the depletion of the asset pool and allow breathing space; v. Vicarious Liability of Directors Undergoing Personal Insolvency - Where a corporate entity cannot be proceeded against due to a legal snag, the personal criminal liability of its Directors under Section 141 survives - if such a Director is undergoing personal insolvency or bankruptcy under Part III of the IBC, the expression "any debt" under Sections 96 and 101 is broad enough to include the statutory compensatory liability shifted onto him - while the criminal trial against the Director continues, the recovery of any ordered compensation from him or his properties remains stayed under Sections 96, 101, 124, and 128 of the IBC - Finding a deep-seated systemic conflict between the literal procedural mechanisms and the overarching social objective of penal deterrence under the NI Act, the Division Bench referred the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of a three-judge Bench to conclusively determine the precise penal orientation of Section 138 and the exact extent of moratorium protections applicable over it. [Relied on P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258; Rakesh Bhanot v. Gurdas Agro Private Limited, (2025) 6 SCC 781; Ajay Kumar Radheshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 545; Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, (2025) 4 SCC 629; Paras 141-185, 186 - 211] Dineshchand Surana v. UCO Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2026 INSC 579
Penal Code, 1800; Section 307 vs Section 325 - Attempt to Murder vs Voluntarily Causing Grievous Hurt - Essential Ingredients - Intention or Knowledge - The essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to murder is the intention or knowledge to cause death, which must be established independently of the act itself - The gravity of the injury by itself cannot be determinative of an offence under Section 307 IPC unless the prosecution establishes the requisite mens rea - The intention to commit murder cannot be presumed merely because the injuries were ultimately opined to be dangerous to life - In the absence of evidence showing prior motive, premeditation, repeated deliberate blows with deadly weapons, or any conduct indicative of a determined effort to cause death, a conviction under Section 307 IPC cannot be sustained - Since the incident occurred suddenly when the injured intervened in an altercation, and the weapons used were ordinary lathis without showing brutal persistence, the conviction was altered from Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC to Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC. [Paras 26, 31-38] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 279 & Section 304A — Rash and Negligent Driving — Liability of a Bus Driver — A passenger bus driver cannot be attributed with culpable negligence or rashness if he moves or restarts the vehicle strictly in accordance with the indicative instructions or whistling signals of the bus conductor - The driver is duty-bound to concentrate on driving for safety stakes and naturally relies on the conductor who is the person in charge of regulating passenger movement to monitor when to stop or move the bus - The driver is not expected to turn his head back to personally verify if the passengers have safely alighted - Acting bona fide on the conductor's signals negates the element of criminal negligence or recklessness. [Paras 5, 6] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 and Section 498A — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Murder in the privacy of a house — Custodial death of wife — Burden of proof on inmates — Homicidal vs. Suicidal Hanging — Medical Evidence — Sustained dowry harassment and torture established against the husband – Held - Where an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house, though the initial burden to establish the case rests on the prosecution, Section 106 of the Evidence Act casts a corresponding burden on the inmates to give a cogent explanation as to how the victim succumbed. If the husband does not offer any explanation regarding how his wife received fatal injuries in their shared dwelling home, or offers an explanation found to be false, it serves as a strong circumstance indicating his responsibility for the crime. Inmates cannot escape liability by simply keeping quiet on the premise that the burden lies entirely on the prosecution. [Relied on Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681; Paras 20 - 31] Gour Acharjee v. State of Tripura, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 538 : 2026 INSC 535
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 304A — Culpable Rashness and Negligence — To attract punishment under Section 304A, the rashness or negligence must be attributable to a state of mind involving a "deliberation in mind" risking the crime and the life of a person, rather than a mere error of judgment or acting bona fide under regulatory operational instructions - Highlighting the concept of "culpable rashness", negligence cannot be presumed merely from an accident but must be inferred from the distinct attendant circumstances. [Relied On Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284; State of Karnataka v. Satish, (1998) 8 SCC 493; Para 7-10] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 376(2)(n), 377, and 506 – Rape on false promise of marriage – Consent given under misconception of fact versus breach of promise – Prolonged physical relationship with full knowledge of marital status – Held: If a physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the relationship was purely because of the alleged promise of marriage - Unless it is shown that the physical relationship had a direct nexus with the promise of marriage, without being influenced by any other consideration, there can be no vitiation of consent under a misconception of fact - In the present case, both parties were fully aware that they were married to different spouses - The complainant uploaded her profile on a matrimonial site and established a physical relationship even before her divorce was finalized - The parties happily cohabited and travelled together for over 4 years without any complaint of force - This is a case of a relationship turning sour, rather than a promise of marriage resulting in deception - Criminal proceedings quashed. [Relied on Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2024) 11 SCC 398; Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385; M.C. Ravi Kumar v. D.S. Velmurugan & Ors., [2025] SCC Online SC 1498; Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal v. Mohan Singh and Others, (1975) 3 SCC 706; Paras 18 - 21] Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 459
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 506 Part II – Evolving Understanding of "Chastity" and "Unchastity" – Meaning of threatening to "impute unchastity to a woman" in the digital age – Held: Chastity is not to be considered purely from a traditional moral perspective focused on virtue alone; it must be viewed through the prism of an individual woman's dignity, privacy, and sexual autonomy under Article 21 of the Constitution - "Unchastity" encompasses any action or unwarranted interference that disrupts a woman's control over her own sexual choices and dissemination of personal information - The act of secretly video-recording a victim in a naked state in a bathroom, and threatening to publish it online, directly assaults her sexual autonomy, undermines her dignity, and violates her privacy - Such a threat squarely constitutes an act to "impute unchastity" within the meaning of Part II of Section 506 IPC, irrespective of whether the parties were in a long-term consensual physical relationship. [Relied on Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39; Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 Paras 31 - 41] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 506 read with Section 34 — Criminal Intimidation — Sine qua non of "intent to cause alarm" — Absence of common intention - The pivotal aspect to establish an offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC is the "intent to cause alarm" to the complainant. Where allegations do not demonstrate that the threats exerted by the accused were intended to cause such alarm, and there is no evidence of a common intention to commit a criminal act under Section 34 IPC, prosecuting the accused would amount to an abuse of the process of law. [Para 10] Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 484 : 2026 INSC 468
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 53 & Section 302 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 433-A — Modification of Life Sentence to Fixed Term — Constitutional courts (the High Courts and the Supreme Court) possess the power to modify a sentence of life imprisonment to a fixed-term sentence or to the period already undergone, provided that the period imposed is not less than 14 years of imprisonment - Such modification of a life sentence to a specific term of incarceration does not amount to an enhancement of the sentence - Held: When a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed, Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC conveys the meaning that it is for the rest of the natural life of the prisoner, subject to the right of claiming remission - Modifying a sentence of life imprisonment and imposing a fixed sentence is fully permissible as long as the period imposed exceeds fourteen years of imprisonment - Considering that the appellant was 21 years old at the time of the incident in 1998 and has already undergone 23 years, 6 months, and 3 days of imprisonment without remission, the Supreme Court modified the life sentence to the period already undergone and directed his immediate release. [Relied on Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Shiva Kumar alias Shiva alias Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817; Paras 10-18] Munna Moyuddin Shaikh v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 548 : 2026 INSC 558
Penal Code, 1860; Section 307 (corresponding to Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) – Attempt to Murder – Absence of Firearm Injury - The mere absence of firearm injuries does not negate a charge under Section 307 IPC - The essential ingredient is the act being done with the requisite intent or knowledge that it could cause death; if the victims escape by chance, the offence is complete - The principle of parity is not an inflexible rule and cannot be mechanically applied by courts when the roles attributed to the accused persons are materially different and distinct. [Relied on Ajwar v. Waseem & Anr., (2024) 10 SCC 768; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508; Sudha Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2021) 4 SCC 781; Para 29-32] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526
Penal Code, 1860; Section 320 (Seventhly & Eighthly) and Section 325 - Grievous Hurt - Fracture or dislocation of a bone constitutes grievous hurt within the meaning of Clause Seventhly of Section 320 IPC - Any hurt which endangers life or causes the sufferer to be in severe bodily pain or undergo prolonged treatment attracts Clause Eighthly of Section 320 IPC - Where the medical evidence unequivocally establishes that the victim suffered fractures in both parietal bones near the midline accompanied by neurological complications and prolonged hospitalization, the ingredients necessary to attract Section 325 IPC stand fully satisfied. [Paras 36-38] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524
Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 364, 396, 201 read with Section 120B — Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 9, 27, 106, 114 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 100(4) — Circumstantial Evidence — Last seen together theory — Recovery of dead body and articles — Reversal of conviction by High Court upheld - The case of the prosecution entirely rested on circumstantial evidence - The High Court reversed the Trial Court's conviction and acquitted the accused persons on finding the chain of circumstances incomplete – Noted the following key points - i. Recovery of Dead Body - The alleged recovery of the dead body at the instance of the accused was rightly doubted. At the time of arrest, the police had only received a missing report, yet the arrest memo pre-recorded offences under Sections 302, 394, and 201 IPC - independent witnesses were withheld, creating a serious dent in the prosecution's story - Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of legal evidence. ii. Recovery from Accessible Places - The discovery of the vehicle (Bolero Jeep) allegedly at the instance of the accused was from an open road accessible to all and not from the exclusive possession of the accused, making it unreliable; iii. Last Seen Together - Evidence of 'last seen together' is a weak type of evidence. Conviction solely based on 'last seen' without other corroborative evidence is unsustainable - Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not shift the primary burden of proof, which always remains on the prosecution; iv. Test Identification Parade (TIP) of Articles: Recovered articles like a tape recorder and wrist watch were never subjected to a TIP under the applicable police rules. Identification of recovered articles directly in Court without a prior TIP is meaningless in the eyes of law and makes the recovery insignificant; v. Common Household Objects - Recovery of a towel without any connecting material (such as bloodstains) is wholly immaterial as it is a common household object – Held that to convict an accused on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove each incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, forming an unbroken chain that excludes every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. [Relied on Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. (2021) 13 SCC 716; Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 1466) and Kanhaiya Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (2014) 4 SCC 715; Thammaraya & Anr. v. The State Of Karnataka (2025) 3 SCC 590; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) 2 SCC 71; Paras 29 – 32, 33-43] Pawan Kumar Sharma v. Manoj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 543 : 2026 INSC 539
Penal Code, 1872; Section 302 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 134 - Quality vs Quantity of Evidence - Conviction on Solitary Witness – Held - It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that it is the quality and not the quantity of evidence which is determinative - The Indian legal system does not insist on a plurality of witnesses. Neither the Legislature under Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872, nor the judiciary mandates that there must be a particular number of witnesses to record an order of conviction against an accused - The emphasis of Courts is always on the value, weight, and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity, or plurality of witnesses. Even the testimony of a solitary witness, if found to be wholly reliable, free from blemish or suspicion, and of a sterling quality, is sufficient to form the sole basis of a conviction without the necessity of corroboration - a court may acquit the accused in spite of the testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied with the quality of evidence - the mere fact that a large number of witnesses, including panch witnesses and some of the alleged eyewitnesses, have turned hostile will not entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt if the remaining material witnesses completely establish the case of the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. [Relied on Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150; Bhimappa Chandappa v. State of Karnataka, (2006) 11 SCC 32; Paras 8-16] Mitesh @ T.V. Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : 2026 INSC 469
Preventive Detention — Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981 — Section 3 — Bootlegger — Maintenance of Public Order vs. Law and Order — Non-application of Mind — Failure to invoke ordinary laws of the land - Held: The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the activities of the appellant were prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order" had no real basis - A bald and stereotypical averment that the appellant's activities are prejudicial to public order is legally insufficient - To invoke the stringent powers of preventive detention, there must be cogent material on record to demonstrate that the alleged activities disrupted public order, rather than just affecting 'law and order' - In the present case, despite five registered cases under the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949, the Investigating Agency made no effort to arrest the appellant under ordinary criminal law, even though the offences are cognizable - Where a person can be effectively dealt with under the ordinary laws of the land, the invocation of preventive detention laws is unwarranted in the absence of cogent material showing a distinct breach of public order - the preventive detention order cannot be sustained and is quashed. [Relied on Arjun v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3718; T. Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu (1990) 2 SCC 456; Paras 12 - 14] Vidyawant v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 510
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Section 27 and Section 45 – Civil Confiscation vs. Criminal Prosecution – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Double Jeopardy – Adjudication and confiscation under Chapter IV of the Benami Act are civil actions directed against the property itself to remedy a statutory violation, whereas personal criminal prosecution is governed by Chapter VII - Confiscation is a civil consequence tested on the principle of preponderance of probabilities and does not amount to prosecution or criminal punishment - Simultaneous or successive initiation of both civil confiscation and criminal prosecution does not attract the bar of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution - Once a competent judicial determination declaring a transaction to be benami attains finality in a civil suit, the property is liable to absolute confiscation by the Central Government, and it is unnecessary to relegate the matter to the statutory Adjudicating Authority under the Act. Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Sections 2(9), 3, 4, 5, and 27 – Benami Transaction – Retrospective Operation of 2016 Amendment – Fiduciary Capacity Exemption – Employer-Employee Relationship– The amendments introduced by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016, being declaratory, procedural, curative, and machinery-oriented, operate retrospectively and can be invoked in respect of past benami transactions - To determine whether a transaction is benami, the substance must prevail over form, and the Court must look at the real nature of the transaction beneath any camouflage - The expression "fiduciary capacity" under Section 2(9)(A)(ii) must receive a restricted construction and covers explicitly enumerated classes (trustee, executor, partner, director, etc.) or categories notified by the Central Government - An ordinary employer-employee relationship or a commercial arrangement supported by reciprocal financial consideration does not constitute a fiduciary relationship - Where a plaintiff provides the consideration to purchase agricultural lands in the name of an employee/name-lender to circumvent statutory restrictions under the land reforms law, the arrangement squarely falls within the mischief of a prohibited benami transaction. [Paras 18 – 29] Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465
Right to Speedy Trial – Bail – Seriousness of Offence - Where an undertrial accused is incarcerated for a prolonged period and there is no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is infringed. In such cases, bail must be considered and ordinarily granted, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Sahil Manoj Machare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 456
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) — Ingredient of "in any place within public view" — Essentiality of public gaze — Sine qua non for constituting offences under the Act - To make out an offence under Section 3(1)(r) and/or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the occurrence of the incident and the act of hurling caste-based abuses must take place at "a place within public view" or within the public gaze - Even if the incident happens at a private place, the public must have access to notice what is happening to satisfy this requirement - A residential house cannot be considered "a place within public view" when the incident occurs within its four walls and no independent member of the public is present to witness it. [Paras 5 – 9] Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 484 : 2026 INSC 468
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Section 43-D(5) — Constitution of India — Article 21 — Bail — Prolonged Incarceration — Judicial Discipline — Binding Nature of Precedents — Grant of bail to an undertrial prisoner facing charges under the UAPA and the NDPS Act on the ground of prolonged incarceration and gross delay in the trial - The appellant was in custody for over 5 years and 11 months with more than 350 prosecution witnesses remaining to be examined - Restrictive statutory provisions under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA do not oust the jurisdiction of constitutional courts to grant bail where an undertrial's fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 has been infringed - The rigors of statutory bail restrictions "melt down" when there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone is substantial - The legislative intent cannot invert the core constitutional relationship between personal liberty and detention - Even under stringent special statutes like the UAPA, "bail is the rule and jail is the exception". Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2026 INSC 503
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 10(a)(i), 10(a)(iv) and 38(1) – Criminal Conspiracy – Mistaken Identity – Appreciation of Evidence – Material Improvements – Test Identification Parade (TIP) – Conduct of Accused - Glaring contradictions, material improvements, and lack of Test Identification Parade (TIP) render the prosecution's identification of the accused wholly doubtful – Consequent conviction based on flawed identification cannot be sustained - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of a Sri Lankan national convicted for offences under the UAP Act, 1967, the IPC, the Poisons Act, 1919, the Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Passport Act, 1967 - The prosecution alleged that the appellant was the absconding accused named "Sri" (A-5) who had conspired to rejuvenate the banned LTTE organization by supplying cyanide capsules and equipment - The appellant maintained a consistent defense of mistaken identity, asserting his true identity as "Ranjan." - Key Principles Established by the Supreme Court – i. Material Improvements in Testimony Deconstruct Credibility - The star prosecution witnesses (PW-8 and PW-9) introduced the appellant's name ("Ranjan") as an alias for the absconding accused ("Sri") for the very first time during the current trial - Their complete silence on this aspect during the investigation and previous split-up trials of co-accused constitutes a substantive and material improvement that severely dents their credibility - Such deep-rooted improvements cannot be brushed aside as inconsequential lapses of memory; ii. Inapplicability of the Abuthagir Principle to Improvements - The principle that a mere belated disclosure of a fact by a witness cannot solely discard their testimony applies strictly to a delay in the examination of witnesses during investigation. It cannot be extended to cover cases featuring substantive material improvements over distinct prior judicial depositions; iii. Absence of Corroborative Material and TIP - Where the identity of an accused is heavily disputed and the accused is tied to an alias post-arrest, the absence of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) combined with a complete lack of contemporaneous official or police records linking the two identities prior to the arrest invalidates the identification process; iv. Inconsistency of Innocent Conduct with Absconding Status - The open residence of the appellant at a registered refugee address for years and his active engagement with a foreign embassy to secure a visa and local police clearance are wholly inconsistent with the behaviour of an absconding accused fleeing a serious UAPA charge. [Relied on Vishwanatha v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 482; Para 47 – 61] Sri v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 521 : 2026 INSC 516
Vexatious Litigation & 'Matrimonial Bouquets' - Key Legal Observations & Guidelines by Supreme Court – i. Rising Trend in Vexatious Litigation & 'Matrimonial Bouquets' - Supreme Court expressed serious concern over the growing trend of litigants using the legal machinery as an 'arm-twisting' tactic to settle personal scores in matrimonial disputes - It noted the emergence of a 'matrimonial bouquet' where sweeping, vague, and omnibus criminal allegations are thrown widely to implicate entire families - Courts must exercise utmost caution, scrutinize complaints thoroughly, and "separate the wheat from the chaff" to protect the rights of innocent citizens and prevent docket explosion; ii. Abuse of POCSO Act in Family Disputes - Supreme Court painfully took judicial notice of instances where complaints under the POCSO Act are weaponized by an estranged spouse against the other, using impressionable children as tools to extract higher monetary settlements or escape civil/commercial liabilities - Such heinous accusations, when prima facie vague and lacking material backing, must be nipped in the bud; iii. Duty of the Bar - Legal practitioners have a profound social responsibility to restrain clients from initiating false or exaggerated criminal proceedings arising out of domestic discords rather than encouraging multiple cases. [Relied on State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335; Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Bihar, (2025) 3 SCC 735; Geddam Jhansi vs. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263; Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana, (2025) 3 SCC 756; Paras 9-10] Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 566 : 2026 INSC 587