Abuse of Process of Court — Imposition of Exemplary Costs- The machinery of justice cannot be deployed as a facility to settle personal scores or salvage reputations imperiled by the parties' own actions. Where both litigants engaged in suppression, embellishment, and afterthought, and consumed institutional time of disciplinary bodies and constitutional courts for eleven years, costs...
Abuse of Process of Court — Imposition of Exemplary Costs- The machinery of justice cannot be deployed as a facility to settle personal scores or salvage reputations imperiled by the parties' own actions. Where both litigants engaged in suppression, embellishment, and afterthought, and consumed institutional time of disciplinary bodies and constitutional courts for eleven years, costs of ₹5,00,000/- each imposed on both the complainant and the advocate to be deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. [Paras 21 - 23]. Rehana Khan v. Rizwan Siddhiquee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846 : 2026 INSC 907
Advocates Act, 1961 — Appellate Jurisdiction / Disciplinary Proceedings — Enhancement of Punishment — Clean Hands Doctrine - A complainant seeking enhancement of punishment awarded to an advocate must approach the court with clean hands. Where the complainant suppressed material facts, engaged in dubious conduct during the subsistence of the professional relationship (such as strategizing to trap the opposing party rather than seeking pure legal advice), voluntarily appeared before the electronic media to ventilate the dispute, and allowed the discharge order of the main accused to achieve finality, no relief for enhancement of punishment can be entertained. [Para 15-20] Rehana Khan v. Rizwan Siddhiquee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846 : 2026 INSC 907
Advocates Act, 1961 — Section 35 — Principles of Natural Justice — Ex-Parte Allegation - Where an advocate entered appearance, filed a written statement, was represented by counsel, participated in the recording of evidence, and was aware of the ongoing disciplinary proceedings throughout its pendency, a subsequent plea alleging denial of a reasonable opportunity of hearing on the ground of non-service of notice of the final hearing at an updated address cannot be sustained. A party present throughout cannot be heard to allege absence, particularly when the litigant is himself an advocate. [Para 14]. Rehana Khan v. Rizwan Siddhiquee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846 : 2026 INSC 907
Advocates Act, 1961 — Section 35 — Professional Misconduct — Fiduciary Duty and Privileged Communications — Advocate going to the media against a former client — Scope of professional duty - An advocate cannot use information received in confidence against a client, and the circumstance that the client has subsequently turned into an adversary makes no difference. An advocate's professional duty is not conditional upon the client's continued good behavior towards the advocate. Even where an advocate is named in a First Information Report (FIR) by the client or subjected to media pursuit, the remedies lie in presenting their version before the investigating agency or initiating proceedings for defamation. An advocate is strictly prohibited from taking grievances to television channels, disclosing privileged communications, broadcasting recorded conversations with a former client, or publicly disparaging the client's case. [Paras 17-20]. Rehana Khan v. Rizwan Siddhiquee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846 : 2026 INSC 907
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 11 & Non-Signatory Parties — "Veritable Party" Doctrine — Non-signatory to the primary agreement can be bound by the arbitration agreement contained therein if their conduct, participation, and performance of obligations under interlinked agreements demonstrate a mutual intent to be bound — Principles laid down in Cox and Kings applied - Veritable Parties & Non-Signatories - The Supreme Court held that a non-signatory to a primary settlement agreement (Memorandum of Settlement) can qualify as a "veritable party" to the arbitration clause contained therein if the performance of their individual agreement (Share Purchase Agreement) is fundamental and interwoven with the completion of the main agreement - Equal Treatment of Identically Situated Parties - Where multiple non-signatories execute individual Share Purchase Agreements containing similar or identical exclusion/decoupling clauses, the Court cannot differentiate between them to exclude one from arbitration while referring others - The Court observed that drawing a distinction between identically situated persons without a factual basis is unsustainable - Composite Transactions - Participation of a non-signatory in the performance of the underlying contract is the most critical factor indicating an intention to be bound by the arbitration clause - The composite nature of the transaction and commonality of the subject matter suggest that claims against such non-signatory are inextricably interlinked with the issues under arbitration. [Relied on Cox and Kings Limited v. SAP India Private Limited and Another, (2024) 4 SCC 1; Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Discovery Enterprises Private Limited and Another, (2022) 8 SCC 42; Paras 13-22] KKH Finvest Pvt. Ltd. v. Ashiesh Shukla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 769 : 2026 INSC 803
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 9, Section 9(1)(ii)(e), Section 34 and Section 36 – Maintainability of Section 9 Petition at Post-Award Stage by an Unsuccessful Party / Award Debtor – Threshold and Guiding Principles for Grant of Interim Relief – Securing Amount in Dispute / Deposit of Monies – Rare and Compelling Cases - A petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 at the post-award stage by an unsuccessful party (award debtor) is maintainable in law - the threshold for granting interim relief to an unsuccessful party is significantly higher - The Supreme Court may grant interim measures in rare and compelling cases to balance equities, prevent irreparable prejudice, and preserve the efficacy of the challenge proceedings under Section 34 - The exercise of power under the "just and convenient" residuary clause under Section 9(1)(ii)(e) must be guided by settled principles namely, existence of a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury, and reasonable expedition and must promote the efficacy of arbitration without being rigidly bound by the strict procedural technicalities of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 or Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - In the present case, bank guarantees furnished against mobilisation advance were encashed by the appellant prior to the pronouncement of the arbitral award - The Arbitrator dismissed the respondent's claims in toto without the appellant having filed any counter-claim or the Arbitrator recording any finding regarding non-utilisation of the mobilisation advance - Sustaining the High Court's direction directing the appellant to deposit Rs. 3.5 crores in the Registry to be placed in an interest-bearing Fixed Deposit pending adjudication of the Section 34 petition, the Supreme Court held that permitting the appellant to retain the encashed funds in the absence of an executable award or counter-claim in its favour would result in unjust enrichment and defeat earlier interim undertakings - The case presented rare and compelling circumstances warranting interim deposit to prevent irreparable prejudice and preserve the subject matter of the dispute. [Relied on Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 670; Essar House Private Limited v. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited, (2022) 20 SCC 178; Paras 18–27]. National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. v. Ishvakoo (India) Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 791 : 2026 INSC 828
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Sections 16, 18, 31(8), 37(2) – Pre-deposit condition in arbitration clause – Validity and constitutionality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Correctness of 3-Judge Bench decision in S.K. Jain v. State of Haryana – Reference to Larger Bench - Doubting the correctness of the three-Judge Bench decision in S.K. Jain v. State of Haryana, (2009) 4 SCC 357 (which upheld a pre-deposit condition requiring a contractor alone to deposit security prior to arbitration as a valid mechanism to prevent frivolous claims), a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has referred the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of a larger Bench – The Supreme Court observed that an arbitration clause cannot impose pre-deposit conditions so onerous as to render the right to sue, at the threshold, illusory or nugatory - A requirement mandating the deposit of a substantial percentage of the claim amount prior to arbitration inevitably suppresses claims, deters recourse to alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and defeats the objective of declogging the court system - Although a two-Judge Bench in ICOMM Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply, (2019) 4 SCC 401 struck down a 10% pre-deposit condition as arbitrary under Article 14, and subsequent decisions in Lombardi Engineering Ltd. v. Uttarakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 341 and the Constitution Bench in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (CORE) v. M/s ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), (2025) 4 SCC 641 reiterated that party autonomy cannot violate fundamental rights or principles of non-arbitrariness, Lombardi Engineering had held there was no conflict between S.K. Jain and ICOMM Tele as the clauses were materially distinct - Mindful of judicial discipline, the Court held that being a two-Judge Bench, it could neither declare the 3-Judge Bench ruling in S.K. Jain to be sub silentio or bad in law, nor override it directly - Following the principles laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673 and Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal, (2025) 6 SCC 1, the Bench framed questions on whether one-sided pre-deposit conditions violate Section 18 of the Arbitration Act, Section 28 of the Contract Act, and Article 14 of the Constitution, and referred the issue to the CJI to consider listing before a larger Bench. [Relied on ICOMM Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Anr., (2019) 4 SCC 401; Lombardi Engineering Ltd. v. Uttarakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 341; Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (CORE) v. M/s ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), (2025) 4 SCC 641; Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors., (2025) 6 SCC 1; Paras 20-32] Santosh Associate v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 818 : 2026 INSC 872
Banking Accounting Practice for NPAs & Suspense Account - Capitalisation of Interest & Directives - As per applicable accounting guidelines, once a loan account is classified as an NPA, the bank applies interest only up to the NPA date in the main loan statement and thereafter maintains a separate suspense account for interest due on the outstanding loan amount - A balance certificate reflecting only the outstanding amount in the primary loan account cannot be misconstrued to wipe out the accrued interest maintained in the separate suspense account - Reaffirming the law settled by the Constitution Bench, banks are entitled to charge interest on periodical rests and capitalise unpaid interest in accordance with RBI directives and voluntary contracts - The borrower cannot present self-serving, inconsistent account statements by selectively ignoring the interest component/suspense account – Held - The High Court committed an oversimplification of calculations by relying solely on a balance certificate while completely ignoring the interest component kept in the suspense account post-NPA classification - The High Court's orders directing full and final settlement on a reduced amount set aside, and the order of the DRAT Kolkata determining the liability at ₹54,90,413/- with pendente lite and future simple interest @ 9% p.a. restored. [Relied on Central Bank of India v. Ravindra and others, (2002) 1 SCC 367; Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India and others, (2020) 3 SCC 525; Paras 10 -15] Punjab National Bank v. Shree Jyoti Education and Management Trust World, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 796 : 2026 INSC 836
CBI Investigation - Transfer of Investigation to CBI - Enhancement / Award of Interim Compensation in Public Law - Where state police and jail authorities exhibited blatant indifference, suppressed material facts (such as post-mortem reports before the High Court), and attempted to mislead inquiry via contradictory preliminary jail medical records, the ends of justice require entrusting the investigation to an independent agency - The Supreme Court directed the Director, CBI, to forthwith register a regular criminal case and investigate the custodial death as well as the conduct of state officials who failed to take follow-up action on the Section 176 CrPC inquiry report - High Court had awarded a "pittance" of Rs. 1,00,000/- as compensation under Article 226 for the custodial death of the 34-year-old sole breadwinner - Held: The compensation awarded was completely inadequate and not commensurate with the gravity of the loss - Supreme Court directed the State of Chhattisgarh to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs) as an interim measure to the widow/dependents within four weeks, subject to final determination of total compensation. [Paras 16–22] Lahra Bai Tamre v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 794 : 2026 INSC 840
Central Excise Act, 1944 — Section 2(f) — Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 — First Schedule, Section XVI, Note 6 — Manufacture — Kitting and Assembly of Imported Modules – Held - Grouping and kitting imported photostatic parts, modules, and accessories in sets according to customer specifications, followed by minimal pinning, plugging, or packing in a warehouse for dispatch, does not constitute "manufacture" under Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - The Revenue failed to prove physical assembly or transformation resulting in a new, commercially distinct article. Additionally, Note 6 to Section XVI of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 is not attracted when goods are imported, classified, and assessed as complete machines in complete/semi knocked-down (CKD/SKD) condition and cleared from the warehouse in their original packaging without undergoing any process of conversion from an incomplete to a complete machine - Key Rulings & Observations – i. Definition and Tests of "Manufacture" - Manufacture under Section 2(f) requires a transformation where a new and distinct article emerges with a separate commercial identity, name, character, or end-use - Mere processing, kitting, or simple assembly that leaves the commodity commercially the same article does not amount to manufacture, regardless of the labor, skill, or value added – ii. Applicability of Note 6 to Section XVI - Note 6 operates specifically on incomplete or unfinished articles - Where the Revenue assesses and levies customs duty/CVD on imported items as complete machines under Tariff Heading 8471, it cannot simultaneously treat the same items as incomplete/unfinished articles to invoke Note 6 for levying excise duty – iii. Burden of Proof on Revenue - The Revenue cannot rely on generic inferences or unsubstantiated assumptions without proper physical inspection or best evidence showing actual manufacturing operations taking place inside the warehouse. [Relied on Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., (1962) SCC OnLine SC 148; Servo-Med Industries Private Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai, (2015) 14 SCC 47; Distinguished from M/s Narne Tulaman Manufacturers Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad v. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad, (1989) 1 SCC 172; Quippo Energy Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad-II, (2025) 152 GST R 264 (SC); Paras 13-19]. Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad-IV v. Xerox India Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 767 : 2026 INSC 805
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — Section 69, Section 132 read with Central Goods and Service Tax Rules, 2017, Rule 8 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 438 / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Section 482 — Power to Arrest — Requirement of prior communication of arrest order to the accused before arrest — Mandatory Nature - An order passed by the Commissioner under Section 69(1) of the CGST Act recording "reasons to believe" is a sine qua non for an accused to entertain an apprehension of arrest and maintain an application for anticipatory bail - Principles of natural justice, fairness in administrative action, and Article 21 require that communication of the arrest order under Section 69 to the person sought to be arrested is mandatory prior to arrest - The order may be communicated electronically (via email/mobile provided under Rule 8 of the CGST Rules), under BNSS provisions, or via other permissible modes - Without such communication, the question of arrest does not arise, so as to enable the accused to exercise their right to seek pre-arrest bail or judicial review of the reasons. [Paras 14–22] Union of India v. Sunil Biyani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2026 INSC 849
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — Section 70 — Summons — Status of a Summoned Person - Mere issuance of summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act does not per se make the person summoned an accused - The prohibitive sweep of Article 20(3) of the Constitution does not go back to the stage of interrogation, and in the absence of an order under Section 69, there can be no apprehension of arrest to maintain an application for anticipatory bail. [Relied on Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, (2025) 6 SCC 545; Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440; Poolpandi v. CCE, (1992) 3 SCC 259; Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria, (1998) 1 SCC 52; Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1; Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Paras 15-22] Union of India v. Sunil Biyani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2026 INSC 849
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) – Requirement of Foundational Facts in Show Cause Notice - Audit Objections and 'Call Book' Procedure - The extended limitation period of five years under Section 74 cannot be availed of by merely reciting statutory words mechanically - It requires more than mere lip service to the statutory provisions - The foundational facts leading to the inference of fraud, willful misstatement, or suppression of facts must be expressly set out in the Show Cause Notice itself - A bland allegation that input tax credit was availed “without documentary evidence and suppress the facts”, bereft of foundational facts evidencing a deliberate device employed to evade tax, does not demonstrate an application of mind and invalidates the invocation of Section 74 - The fact that the Department contested audit objections before the Public Accounts Committee and placed the Show Cause Notice into the 'call book' (kept in abeyance) clearly indicates an absence of satisfaction on the part of the Assessing Officer regarding the alleged tax shortfall, mismatch, or suppression - issuing a subsequent notice to revive proceedings by proposing a 'protective demand' solely because statutory limitation is nearing expiry is impermissible, as the concept of protective demand/assessment is alien to the GST regime. [Relied on IN RE: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation [Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020; Paras 10 - 15] M/s Tata Steel Limited v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2026 INSC 920
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) – Section 73 and Section 74 – Limitation Period – Invocation of Extended Period of Limitation – Requirements of Fraud, Willful Misstatement, or Suppression of Facts – Protective Demand - Subjective Satisfaction of Proper Officer - Proceedings under Section 73 or Section 74 can be initiated only upon the independent satisfaction of the Assessing Office - Even when audit objections or observations are raised (such as by the CAG), the Assessing Officer must enter his own satisfaction before issuing a notice - Under Section 74, the Officer must be satisfied not merely that a mismatch of ITC or short payment of tax occurred, but specifically that such mismatch or short payment was caused by reason of fraud, willful misstatement, or suppression of facts - Under Section 73(10), the limitation period of three years is prescribed for the issuance of the adjudication order under Section 73(9), and not for issuing the Show Cause Notice - Under Section 73(2), the notice must be issued at least three months prior to the expiry of the time limit specified under Section 73(10). M/s Tata Steel Limited v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2026 INSC 920
Central Implementation Committee & Force of Law - The Central Implementation Committee constituted by the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) pursuant to Rule 18 read with Rule 38(3) of the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026, is the duty bearer for monitoring and implementing the SWM Rules. Its functioning, orders, and decisions carry the full force of law - Determining environmental compensation under Rule 17 must follow a structured, objective regime based on clarity, certainty, and deterrence rather than unguided discretion - Synthesizing historical and recent legal precedents, the Supreme Court formulated eight essential governing principles – Held that - i. Restitutionary Nature: Environmental compensation is restitutionary in nature to restore ecological damage and is levied in addition to (not as a replacement for) statutory penalties or fines – ii. Temporal Extent: The duty of a polluter to pay compensation continues until the environmental damage caused is fully reversed; iii. Duty of Authorities: State authorities are obligated to undertake valuation of environmental damage and recover compensation required for complete restoration; iv. Tangible & Intangible Harm: Valuation must encompass both direct/tangible costs and indirect/intangible ecological damages; v. Potential Harm Liability: Compensation liability attaches even where actual damage is imminent or where activities pose a potential threat of environmental harm; vi. Financial Capacity & Remediation Cost: Factors such as the financial capacity/prosperity of the enterprise, costs incurred in assessing damage, loss suffered by individuals, and overall restoration costs must guide valuation; vii. Proportionality & Rational Nexus: Compensation levied must strictly be proportional to the damage caused and bear a rational nexus to the specific pollution - All Courts, Tribunals, and Adjudicating Authorities must record explicit reasons detailing the factors considered, standard of valuation used, and formula applied to quantify compensation. [Paras 15-24] Amravati Municipal Corporation v. Ganesh Dadarao Anasane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 760 : 2026 INSC 796
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956; Section 8(2) – Inter-State Sales Reassessment - Retrospective amendments under State law do not dispense with the statutory rate and conditions mandated under the Central Sales Tax Act - Reassessment of tax on inter-State sales must be strictly recomputed in terms of the applicable provisions of the CST Act, including Section 8(2), after providing a hearing to the assessees. [Paras 85–87, 88(ix), 91(d)] Asia Sugar & Chemical Co., Devangere v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 778 : 2026 INSC 693
Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Andhra Pradesh, Act 19 of 1972) – Sections 1(3), 2(a), 3 – Constitution of India – Fifth Schedule, Article 14, Article 244(1) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 9 – Scheduled Districts Act, 1874 – Andhra Pradesh Agency Rules, 1924 – Jurisdiction of Civil Courts in Scheduled Areas – Civil disputes exclusively between Non-Tribal parties - The Supreme Court held that the ordinary Civil Courts have the requisite jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to entertain and adjudicate civil disputes (such as partition and succession) concerning properties located in Scheduled Areas, provided that the dispute is exclusively between non-tribal parties and involves no tribal interest or fetters - The salutary purpose and constitutional objective of establishing Scheduled Areas under the Fifth Schedule and continuing Agency Courts under the Andhra Pradesh Agency Rules, 1924 is to safeguard indigenous tribal communities, protect their lands from exploitation, and preserve their age-old customs and autonomy - Subjecting non-tribal persons to special agency procedures for disputes solely amongst themselves bears no rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved, which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution - Merely because a parcel of land falls within a geographically notified 'Scheduled Area', it cannot attract the blanket exclusion of Civil Courts if all parties involved are non-tribals - If even one party to the dispute is a tribal residing in the Scheduled Area, the Agency Courts alone will retain jurisdiction - The restoration of Civil Court jurisdiction for disputes involving exclusively non-tribal parties applies to pending cases and those arising in the future. [Paras 10-15] Mukkera Venkata Ratnam v. Vantasala China Venkateswarlu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2026 INSC 810
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XLI Rule 22 — Challenge to Adverse Findings without Cross-Objections - A respondent who supports the ultimate decree passed by the trial court is entitled to impugn an adverse finding recorded against him by the trial court without filing cross-objections or a separate appeal under Order XLI Rule 22 CPC, provided he does not seek any additional relief beyond sustaining the decree. [Paras 31-35] V.N.A.S. Chandran v. S. Venilla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2026 INSC 776
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XVIII Rule 17 & Section 151 — Scope, Object, and Parameters for Recalling Witness / Reopening Evidence - Nature of Power - Power under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is a discretionary, facilitator power-cum-discretion exclusively vested in the Court to enable it to clarify any doubt that may have arisen during the examination of a witness - Cannot be used to Fill Gaps or Lacunae: The power under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC cannot be invoked by a party or by the Court to fill up gaps, omissions, or lacunae in evidence already led and closed, nor to allow a party to embellish, refine, or improve its case at a later stage - Exclusivity of Examination - Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC enables the Court to put questions to a recalled witness - it does not empower the Court to recall a witness for the purpose of further examination-in-chief or cross-examination by either party - "No Prejudice" Is Not a Valid Ground - Reopening evidence or recalling a witness cannot be permitted merely on the specious ground that doing so would not cause prejudice to the opposing side - Absence of prejudice is not a valid yardstick - an independent justification must exist before invoking Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC - Frequent resort to Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC, especially at the fag end of a suit when final arguments are underway, leads to an abuse of the court process, delays litigation, and cannot be allowed routinely or for the mere asking - Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court and Trial Court erred in law - Noted that Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is exclusively a discretionary tool for the Court to clarify doubts and cannot be invoked to permit a party to cure lacunae or fill gaps in evidence at the argument stage - held that the "lack of prejudice to the other side" is not a legal ground to grant such recall, and ordering cross-examination of a recalled witness under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is completely beyond the scope of the provision. [Relied on Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar (Dead) through LRs v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate, (2009) 4 SCC 410; Paras 5-8] K. Bharathamma v. Bandaru Sakku Bai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 764 : 2026 INSC 795
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Disapproval of Mini-Trials at Interlocutory Stage: The Supreme Court strongly deprecated the recurring practice of writing lengthy, merits-laden orders at the interlocutory stage or in appeal by conducting "mini-trials" upon affidavits - The courts must strictly confine their enquiry to the three cardinal tests (prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury) without embarking upon an examination of the final merits or the probable outcome of issues properly triable upon evidence. [Relied on Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi & Ors., (2024) 11 SCC 351; Seema Arshad Zaheer & Ors. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai & Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 282; Shyam Sel and Power Limited v. Shyam Steel Industries Limited, (2023) 1 SCC 634; Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Coca Cola Co. & Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 545; Wander Ltd. & Anr. v. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727; Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719; Paras 37-40] Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2026 INSC 843
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Evidence Act, 1872, Section 60 – Admissibility and Redaction of Evidence Affidavit in Lieu of Examination-in-Chief – Oral Evidence qua Inadmissible/Irrelevant Internal Documents – Permissibility – Principles on Res Judicata at Interlocutory Stages - Where internal documents, internal emails, and inter-se correspondence unilaterally prepared by a party have been consistently held irrelevant and inadmissible by the court, and such orders have attained finality, a party cannot be permitted to adduce oral evidence as to the contents of those very documents or what transpired in internal meetings by an indirect method - The earlier orders operate as res judicata and are binding during the trial - An interlocutory order ruling on the relevance and non-production of such documents cannot be circumvented by invoking Section 60 of the Evidence Act under the guise of oral testimony of a witness who was party to internal discussions – Held that the High Court was fully justified in meticulously scrutinizing and redacting the yellow-marked portions of the evidence affidavits of the defendant's witness (DW-1) that sought to introduce the contents of excluded internal communications and meetings, while retaining portions that pertained strictly to the witness's personal perception/state of mind or inter-party correspondence. [Paras 13–20] Reliance Industries v. NTPC Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 806 : 2026 INSC 862
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Framing of Issues & Appellate Power — Adequacy of Existing Issues - Where existing issues framed by the Trial Court are sufficiently broad and comprehensive to cover the core disputes between the parties (e.g., validity/binding nature of a registered sale deed and legal necessity), and the parties went to trial knowing the controversy and leading evidence accordingly, an appellate court cannot routinely remand the matter merely on the premise that specific distinct issues (such as limitation, possession, or whether the deed is sham/nominal) were not explicitly framed - The First Appellate Court possesses full jurisdiction to evaluate the available evidence and return findings on questions of fact and law. [Relied on Ashwini Kumar K. Patel v. Upendra J. Patel & Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 161; P. Purushottam Reddy & Anr. v. Pratap Steels Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 686; Zarif Ahmad (Dead) Through LRs. & Anr. v. Mohd. Farooq, (2015) 13 SCC 673; Paras 14-17] Shivappa v. Shantavva, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 812 : 2026 INSC 857
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Object of Interlocutory Injunction — Principle of Minimisation of Irremediable Prejudice - An interlocutory injunction decides nothing on final merits; it is purely a holding operation designed to preserve the status quo of the subject-matter so that the trial is not rendered a barren or meaningless exercise - The fundamental principle guiding the court is to adopt the course that carries the lower risk of injustice and causes the least irremediable injury. [Paras 20 - 23] Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2026 INSC 843
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order I Rule 8 — Inapplicability of Representative Suit / Class Action Principles to Inter Se Title and Apportionment Disputes Before Lok Adalat - Order I Rule 8 of the CPC presupposes a "community of interest" among the persons represented, wherein the interest of all is common and adequately protected by the representatives - It cannot be applied to proceedings where the very subject matter is an adverse, conflicting claim between the claimants themselves - The High Court erred in characterizing Lok Adalat awards as akin to a settlement in a class action suit under Order I Rule 8 - Treating rival claimants as a single class elides the very title dispute referred under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as rival claimants do not share a common adversary or a representative common interest. [Paras 47-50] Singapogu Babu Rao v. Special Deputy Collector, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 831 : 2026 INSC 888
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order VIII Rules 6A to 6G, Order XX Rules 6A & 19, Order XLI Rule 1, Section 96 & Section 11 – Suit and Counterclaim decided by a single common judgment – Maintainability of a Single/Composite Appeal – Requirement of filing two separate appeals – Held - A suit and a counterclaim, when adjudicated and disposed of by a single common judgment, can be challenged by way of a single composite appeal - The requirement to file two separate appeals or the necessity of whether one or two decrees are drawn up pales into insignificance, particularly in view of the post-2002 amendment to Order XLI Rule 1 CPC, which permits an appeal to be accompanied by a copy of the judgment - Conditions for Composite Appeal - The appellant preferring a composite appeal must - Show and formulate the grounds of challenge raised against the decree in the suit and the decree in the counterclaim separately, irrespective of whether one composite decree or two separate decrees have been drawn up; and Value the composite appeal as two separate appeals and pay the requisite court fees on the valuation of both the suit and the counterclaim - Bar of Res Judicata & Estoppel Inapplicable - A single composite appeal satisfying these conditions cannot be dismissed on the grounds of waiver, estoppel, or res judicata under Section 11 of the CPC merely because two separate appeals were not preferred - Rules of procedure are intended to subserve the cause of justice and avoid procedural rigmarole and multiplicity of litigation. [Relied on Rajni Rani & Anr. v. Khairati Lal, (2015) 2 SCC 682; Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. 'Vali Pero' v. Fernandeo Lopez & Ors., (1989) 4 SCC 671; Abdul Nazer v. Lakshmana Das, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 41103; Paras 25-30] Basudev v. Sanjay Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 792 : 2026 INSC 831
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order XLI Rule 27 – Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court – Duty of Appellate Court to consider pending application along with main appeal – Jurisdictional error in failing to adjudicate application - An Appellate Court has a statutory duty to deal with an application for additional evidence on its merits, and such an application cannot be ignored while the Court proceeds to pronounce the final judgment - The application filed under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC must be considered simultaneously with the hearing of the main appeal on its merits to determine whether the Court "requires" the documents to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause - The Appellate Court is obligated to pass a specific order either allowing or rejecting the application, recording reasons if admitted - Before evaluating additional evidence, the Court must first examine the party's pleadings to ensure that the foundational case supports the introduction of the proposed evidence - Dismissing an appeal without deciding a pending application for additional evidence constitutes a jurisdictional error and results in a severe miscarriage of justice. [Relied on Jatinder Singh and another v. Mehar Singh and others, (2009) 17 SCC 465; North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das (Dead) By LRs., (2008) 8 SCC 511; Iqbal Ahmed (Dead) by LRs. and another v. Abdul Shukoor, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1787; G. Shashikala (dead) Thr. LRs v. G. Kalawati Bai (dead) Thr. LRs and others, (2019) 15 SCC 201; Paras 11- 13] Chowdappa v. Hanumantharayappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 785 : 2026 INSC 816
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XLI Rule 27(1)(b) read with Sections 168 & 169 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court — Beneficial Legislation - Under Order XLI Rule 27(1)(b) CPC, the Appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence if it requires the documents to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause - The MV Act is a beneficial, welfare-oriented legislation requiring summary procedure to determine "just compensation" - Where a newly married claimant (widowed within three months of marriage) could not immediately gather bank inquiry records and commercial IT invoices due to shock, trauma, and systemic banking delays, the High Court erred in rejecting the additional evidence application (I.A. No. 1 of 2024) solely on grounds of delay. Rejection overlooks substantial cause and prolongs 21 years of pending litigation - Additional evidence received on record. [Paras 23, 24, 25] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, Order XLIII Rule 1(r), Section 94(c), and Section 151 — Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Sections 36 & 37(1) — Temporary Injunction — Interlocutory Jurisdiction — Nature and Scope of Relief — Trinity Test — Appellate Interference and Standard of Review — Mini-Trial at Interlocutory Stage deprecated - Scope of Appellate Interference under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) - An order passed on an application for a temporary injunction is purely discretionary - The appellate court does not ordinarily substitute its own discretion or view for that of the court of first instance merely because it might have arrived at a different conclusion on the same material - Interference is warranted only where the court of first instance has exercised its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, mala fide, upon irrelevant or extraneous considerations, or contrary to settled legal principles - The Division Bench erred in substituting its own appreciation of the Will, parties' conduct, and statutory provisions for that of the Single Judge, which was squarely impermissible under the settled legal principles. [Paras 17- 39] Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2026 INSC 843
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Prima Facie Case — Standard & Meaning - Balance of Convenience & Irreparable Injury - A prima facie case does not require full-proof title or a case proved to the hilt - It only requires the demonstration of a substantial question raised bona fide which is not frivolous or vexatious and needs investigation and decision on merits at trial - The court must weigh the injury apprehended by the plaintiff against the prejudice likely to be caused to the defendant - The loss of controlling shareholding in family companies or the creation of third-party rights over properties traceable to disputed transfers cannot be compensated in money or damages and constitutes irreparable injury in equity. [Paras 24 – 35] Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2026 INSC 843
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 100 – Scope of Second Appellate Jurisdiction – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Section 100 confers a restricted jurisdiction upon the High Court, and a second appeal can be entertained only where it involves a substantial question of law - Concurrent findings of fact ordinarily cannot be disturbed unless they are demonstrated to be perverse or vitiated by an error of law - The existence of power to interfere where findings are demonstrably perverse cannot become a license to reappreciate evidence merely because another view of it is possible, or because the High Court considers a different inference preferable - Interference is warranted solely when there is a demonstrable error in the approach to the evidence, reliance on inadmissible material, omission of vital evidence, or a conclusion that no reasonable judicial mind could arrive at on the record - The High Court erred in overturning concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-execution of a relinquishment document and the date of knowledge by reappreciating evidence and mischaracterizing a non-attesting witness. [Relied on Bholaram v. Ameerchand, (1981) 2 SCC 414; Kulwant Kaur and Others v. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) by LRs. and Others, (2001) 4 SCC 262; P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar, (2024) 13 SCC 553; Paras 16-30] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 107, Order XLI Rule 23, Order XLI Rule 24 & Order XLI Rule 27 — Scope and exercise of power of remand by the First Appellate Court — Remand is not a matter of routine course - An order of remand should not be adopted as a matter of ordinary course - The First Appellate Court is required not only to determine the legality and tenability of the Trial Court's judgment, but it also exercises all the jurisdiction that the Trial Court had to decide the issues - When the necessary pleadings and evidence (both oral and documentary) are already available on record, the First Appellate Court ought to decide the appeal itself on merits rather than remitting the matter to the Trial Court to re-frame issues and record further evidence, which only serves to cause unnecessary delay, uncertainty, and avoidable prolonged litigation - The discretion to remand is to be exercised only when imminently warranted by the specific circumstances of a given case (such as where a suit was disposed of strictly on a preliminary issue without evidence on other issues). [Paras 14 - 16] Shivappa v. Shantavva, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 812 : 2026 INSC 857
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11 — Res Judicata qua Common Judgment in Consolidated Suits - Where two suits filed by the same plaintiff are consolidated, tried together on common evidence, and disposed of by a single common judgment, a composite appeal challenging the common judgment and both decrees is not barred by the principle of res judicata - Res judicata applies qua a judgment and not a decree; where there is one trial, one finding, and one decision, two decrees drawn are in substance one. [Relied on Charan Singh v. Ram Saroop, Civil Appeal Nos. 1585–1586 of 2025; Narhari and others v. Shankar and others, 1950 INSC 24; P.A. Oommen v. Moran Mar Baselius Marthoma, 1992 INSC 175; Paras 14-18] Bassanna v. Bhimanna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 800 : 2026 INSC 838
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 115 — Routine Grant of Stay of Trial disapproved - The Supreme Court deprecated the routine practice adopted by High Courts of granting stay of trial while issuing notice in revision petitions challenging interlocutory orders - Stay of trial ought to be eschewed unless the High Court, upon an examination deeper than prima facie, arrives at a finding that continuation of the trial would seriously and irreparably prejudice the outcome of the revision or adversely affect the parties. [Relied on Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, (2003) 6 SCC 65; High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 6 SCC 267; Paras 20–24]. Madhav Vidarbha Estate Pvt Ltd v Praharsh Corporation Pvt Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2026 INSC 925
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 115 & Order VII Rule 11 — Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction against Interlocutory Orders — Rejection of Plaint - Jurisdiction and Limitations under Section 115 CPC — Revisional Court cannot sit as an Original Court or examine extrinsic evidence - Section 115 CPC provides for revision against an order of a subordinate court against which no appeal lies and is essentially supervisory in nature to control the functioning of subordinate courts - Revisional jurisdiction is not a substantive right and is confined to: (a) exercise of jurisdiction not vested by law; (b) failure to exercise jurisdiction so vested; or (c) exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity - High Courts cannot treat a revision on par with an appeal or review evidence - While examining an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, only the averments made in the plaint and documents annexed thereto must be looked into - Held, the High Court committed a jurisdictional illegality by donning the hat of the Trial Court, failing to point out any jurisdictional error committed by the Trial Court, and exceeding the permissible scope of inquiry under Order VII Rule 11 by rejecting the plaint on the basis of facts and documents not forming part of the plaint. [Paras 11–21] Madhav Vidarbha Estate Pvt Ltd v Praharsh Corporation Pvt Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2026 INSC 925
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 60(1)(ccc) [as applicable to Delhi, Punjab, and Haryana via Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934] – Exemption of main residential house from attachment and sale – Exemption is personal to the Judgment-Debtor and not available to Legal Representatives - The protection under Section 60(1)(ccc) of the CPC exempting one main residential house belonging to and occupied by a judgment-debtor (other than an agriculturist) is personal to the judgment-debtor - A legal representative is a distinct juridical concept, and the liability devolving upon them is limited to the estate in their hands - A legal representative cannot, merely by virtue of residing in a house that belonged to the deceased judgment-debtor, claim the personal exemption provided to the judgment-debtor alone. [Relied on Yogesh Sharma & Ors. v. Devi Dayal & Ors., AIR 1977 Delhi 270; K.L. Bawa v. Basant Textiles, AIR 1982 P&H 275; Pargat Singh & Anr. v. Gurmail Kaur & Ors., 2014 SCC OnLine P&H 23436; Paras 41–44] Sheela Gehlot v. Mohini Hardayal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 808 : 2026 INSC 863
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 96, Section 11, Section 151, Order XLI Rule 1 — Maintainability of Composite First Appeal against Common Judgment dismissing two consolidated suits filed by the same plaintiff — Procedural defect vs. Substantive right — Defect of Form - A single/composite appeal filed under Section 96 CPC challenging a common judgment of the trial court dismissing two consolidated suits instituted by the same plaintiff is maintainable, provided certified copies of both decrees are filed, requisite court fees payable for both appeals are paid, and a specific prayer challenging the dismissal of both suits is made - The absence of a separate memorandum of appeal for each suit is merely a defect of form and not of substance, which is curable in nature and not fatal - The right of appeal is a substantive right, and rules of procedure under the CPC, being the handmaid of justice, cannot be utilized as a sword to deprive a party of an adjudication on merits. [Paras 12-20] Bassanna v. Bhimanna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 800 : 2026 INSC 838
Code of Criminal Procedure — Anticipatory Bail / Pre-arrest Bail — Grant of interim protection while dismissing non-maintainable application — Impermissibility - An interim relief can only be granted in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief - While dismissing an application seeking pre-arrest bail on the ground that it is not maintainable (whatever be the ground therefor), neither the High Court nor the Sessions Court can extend or grant protection against arrest in the nature of interim relief that could otherwise be granted during the pendency of the application. [Relied On State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, 1951 SCC 1024; Hema Mishra v. State of U.P., (2014) 4 SCC 453; Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, Purandhar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 297; Paras 8 - 11] Union of India v. Sunil Biyani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2026 INSC 849
Code of Criminal Procedure — Bail to Foreign Nationals — Absence/Abscondence on Fake Sureties — Cancellation of Bail - Where a foreign national accused jumped bail and absconded, and upon subsequent verification, the sureties, PAN card, Aadhaar details, employer declaration, and bank account provided were found to be completely fabricated and non-existent, the appeal against the grant of bail metamorphoses into a proceeding for cancellation of bail due to breach of bail conditions - Impugned bail order set aside and bail cancelled. [Paras 17 - 20.1] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Invocation of Section 319 CrPC to Cure Fatal Defect Permissibility - Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be invoked to arraign a company as an accused at a later stage of the trial to cure a fundamentally defective complaint - Where a complaint suffers from a defect so basic that no valid cognizance could have been taken on it at the threshold, there is no valid institution of proceedings - The trial court/High Court cannot resort to Section 319 CrPC as a device to bypass the period of limitation prescribed under Section 142 of the NI Act or to revive a dead complaint - The High Court erred in directing the Trial Court to suo motu issue notice to the company under Section 319 CrPC - In case of a fatal defect in the initial complaint, the proper course is the filing of a fresh complaint after removing the defect within the prescribed limitation period - If the limitation period under Section 142(1)(b) has expired, the magistrate may only take cognizance under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) if the complainant satisfies the court regarding sufficient cause for the delay. [Relied on Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661; N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas, (2018) 13 SCC 663; Paras 12–16] Manjula Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 763 : 2026 INSC 789
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 397 (now Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) — Revisional Jurisdiction of High Court — Scope & Contours - In the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not act as a court of appeal and cannot embark upon an in-depth, roving re-examination or re-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence to substitute its own conclusions over concurrent findings of conviction passed by the lower courts - Revisional interference is impermissible unless the finding of the lower courts is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable, untenable in law, or passed by ignoring material evidence. [Relied on Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd., (2001) 6 SCC 463; Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745; Para 7] Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 765 : 2026 INSC 790
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) — Section 227 — Discharge - When the entire prosecution material taken at face value fails to disclose the essential statutory ingredients of abetment under Section 306 IPC or offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC, the refusal to grant discharge is unsustainable - High Court's dismissal of the revision application and Trial Court's rejection of the discharge application set aside; accused discharged. [Relied on Abhinav Mohan Delkar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2026) 6 SCC 233; Prakash & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2026) 6 SCC 251; Ude Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2019) 17 SCC 301; Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780; Paras 26 - 28] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 125 — Interim Maintenance to Minor Children — Shared Obligation of Parents — Non-Monetary Contribution of Custodial Mother — Purely Arithmetical Division Impermissible - The mere fact that the mother is gainfully employed and earning an independent income is not, by itself, a sufficient ground to mechanically halve or dilute the father's liability to maintain their minor children - While the legal obligation to maintain children is shared by both parents, it cannot be apportioned on the basis of simple arithmetic alone - The custodial parent (mother) who attends to the day-to-day upbringing, personal care, and emotional needs of minor children while juggling professional employment makes a substantial and real contribution that cannot be quantified solely in monetary terms, often constituting the greater contribution. [Para 10-12] Sujata Kumari v. Rahul Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2026 INSC 896
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 125 — Interim Maintenance to Minor Daughters — Quantum Assessment — Scope of Revisional Interference - Where the Family Court, after duly considering the income affidavits, lifestyle, socio-economic status of the parties, and the actual educational requirements of two school-going daughters (aged about 9 and 8 years), assessed interim maintenance at Rs. 30,000/- per month for each child (totaling Rs. 60,000/- per month), the High Court committed a manifest error in revisional jurisdiction by halving the award to Rs. 15,000/- per child merely on the footing that the mother is also a practising gynaecologist - Given that the respondent-father is a qualified consultant paediatrician earning at least Rs. 2,00,000/- per month, an interim maintenance sum of Rs. 60,000/- per month for both children cannot be termed excessive or unjust - The High Court's revisional interference was unwarranted, particularly when the main petition under Section 125 CrPC remains pending determination on merits - High Court order set aside; Family Court order restored. [Paras 9-14] Sujata Kumari v. Rahul Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2026 INSC 896
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Delay in Lodging FIR — When Not Fatal - Mere delay in lodging the FIR is not fatal to the prosecution if reasonably and satisfactorily explained in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances - Where a 15–16 year old girl (PW-3) witnessed the gruesome assault and death of her mother late in the evening and lodged the report the following morning upon the arrival of her maternal uncle due to shock, despair, and lack of immediate support, the delay of a few hours stood sufficiently explained. [Relied on Ramdas and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 170; Paras 29-35] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Unexplained Delay in Lodging FIR - An inordinate and unexplained delay of five days in lodging the FIR, even after the surviving witness was rescued and had allegedly disclosed the identity of the accused to the investigating officer while bodies were already recovered, casts serious doubt on the prosecution case - Such unjustified delay in setting the criminal law into motion undermines the credibility of the investigation and opens the door to embellishments. [Paras 32-37] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 156(3) & Section 154 — Rejection of Section 156(3) Application does not bar subsequent registration of FIR — Doctrine of Res Judicata inapplicable to threshold rejection under Section 156(3) — Statutory duty under Section 154 - The rejection of an application filed under Section 156(3) CrPC by a Magistrate does not operate as res judicata or act as a bar to the subsequent registration of an FIR under Section 154 CrPC on the same or substantially similar allegations - An order passed under Section 156(3) CrPC is merely a judicial direction to the police to exercise plenary powers of investigation under Chapter XII - it does not entail an adjudication on the merits of the allegations nor determine the rights/liabilities of the proposed accused - such threshold rejection does not possess the finality required to attract the doctrine of res judicata in criminal proceedings - the statutory duty of the police under Section 154 CrPC to register an FIR when information disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence is furnished is independent and cannot be extinguished or curtailed by the prior rejection of an application under Section 156(3) CrPC. [Paras 27-43] Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 829 : 2026 INSC 887
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 31(1) & Section 31(2) — Sentencing — Multiple Offences at One Trial — Consecutive vs Concurrent Running of Sentences — Sentence of Life Imprisonment along with Fixed-Term Sentences or Multiple Life Sentences — Imprisonment for life implies imprisonment till the end of the normal life of the convict - a sentence of life imprisonment cannot be directed to run consecutively, either with another life sentence or with a fixed-term sentence - Where an accused is awarded multiple sentences for multiple offences at one trial and one of the sentences awarded is life imprisonment, the sentences must only run concurrently and not consecutively - Directions issued by the Trial Court and High Court ordering consecutive execution of multiple life sentences and fixed-term sentences modified to run concurrently. [Relied on Muthuramalingam and Ors. v. State, Rep. by Inspector of Police, (2016) 8 SCC 313; O.M. Cherian alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala and Ors., (2015) 2 SCC 501; Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 783; Paras 20 - 23] Gopi @ Sahaya Puruna v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2026 INSC 880
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 354(5) [Corresponding to Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)] — Mode of Execution of Death Sentence by Hanging — Constitutional Validity — Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India — Challenge to Hanging as the Sole Method of Execution - Writ petition under Article 32 seeking declaration of Section 354(5) CrPC / Section 393(5) BNSS as ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 on the ground that execution by hanging is barbaric, cruel, and inhumane, and seeking declaration that the right to die by a dignified procedure is a fundamental right - Dismissing the petition, held - The constitutional validity of Section 354(5) CrPC was conclusively settled by a three-Judge Bench in Deena v. Union of India and subsequently approved by a Constitution Bench in Shashi Nayar (Smt) v. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 96 - The doctrine of stare decisis mandates that a smaller bench should not depart from the ratio of a larger bench that has stood for over four decades unless it is shown to have lost efficacy due to significant constitutional developments, legislative amendments, or cogent scientific/empirical evidence - The petitioners failed to demonstrate, by any unimpeachable evidence, even a single instance of a botched execution in India under the existing framework - The 187th Report of the Law Commission (2003) is merely recommendatory, and Parliament consciously retained hanging under Section 393(5) of the BNSS, 2023 - No compelling case made out to refer the matter to a larger Bench. [Paras 48–51, 60–63] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378 — Appeal against Acquittal — Double Presumption of Innocence — Interference by Appellate Court - An appellate court entertaining an appeal against an acquittal is bound to bear in mind that a double presumption of innocence operates in favor of the accused - first, the foundational presumption available under criminal jurisprudence that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty; and second, the reinforcement and strengthening of that presumption upon securing an acquittal from the trial court - The appellate court can interfere with an acquittal only if the trial court's view was one that no reasonable court could have taken on the material before it, and not merely because an alternative plausible view exists - If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. [Relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Para 22, 23] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 386(b), Section 397 & Section 401 — Powers of Appellate Court / Revisional Jurisdiction — Enhancement of Sentence — Scope and limits — Absence of Appeal or Revision for Enhancement — In an appeal against conviction preferred by the accused, the appellate court cannot, while maintaining the conviction, enhance the sentence awarded by the trial court so as to leave the convict in a position worse off than prior to the filing of the appeal - The right to appeal is both a statutory and constitutional right - Where no appeal or revision for enhancement has been filed either by the State, the victim, or the complainant, the High Court cannot invoke or exercise its suo motu revisional jurisdiction to enhance the convict's sentence (herein, life imprisonment enhanced to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life) - Such an order of enhancement is impermissible and illegal. [Relied on Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 INSC 802; Paras 17-23]. Gopi @ Sahaya Puruna v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2026 INSC 880
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 437/439 — Bail Application — Evidentiary Value of Admissions - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 8 — Subsequent Conduct of Accused — Abnormal Conduct not Inculpatory Evidence - Presumptions and alleged admissions raised in bail applications cannot form the basis of sustaining a conviction for murder in a case based on circumstantial evidence - Fleeing from the scene in panic upon witnessing a friend accidentally drown, omitting to call for rescue, lying initially to family members, and subsequently going to watch a movie or returning empty soda bottles though morally reprehensible, foolish, or strange cannot be elevated to an incriminating circumstance establishing premeditated murder - The human mind is fickle, manipulative, and unpredictable in the face of sudden adversity - Where the hypothesis of accidental drowning is far more probable and plausible, the chain of circumstances cannot be held to be complete to exclude the hypothesis of innocence - Dock identification of unknown accused persons by witnesses for the first time in court without a prior Test Identification Parade (TIP) carries no evidentiary value, especially when the allegations are levelled months after the occurrence. [Paras 17 - 23] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 439 — Distinction Between Main Assailants Present at Spot and Conspirator Not Present — Circumstantial Evidence — Grant of Bail Affirmed - Where the co-accused (father of the prime accused) was admittedly not present at the spot when the fatal attack occurred and was implicated solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence of conspiracy and providing petrol under Section 109 IPC, his case stands on a materially different footing - Order of the High Court granting him regular bail affirmed. [Relied on Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 598; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar & Anr., (2020) 2 SCC 118; Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana & Anr., (2021) 6 SCC 230; Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 172; Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129; Paras 26-40] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 439 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 307, 323, 109, 504, 506 read with Section 34 — Grant and Cancellation of Regular Bail — Serious and Heinous Offences — Exercise of Discretionary Jurisdiction — Parameters and Duty to Assign Reasons - Discretion to grant bail in serious and non-bailable offences such as murder must be exercised judiciously and not as a matter of course - An order granting bail in grave crimes must reflect proper application of mind to the facts and material on record and must record justifiable, cogent reasons - An unreasoned, superficial, or perverse order of bail warrants interference and reversal by the appellate court - Where a bail order is devoid of reasons or assigns flimsy and untenable grounds, ignoring material circumstances regarding the gravity of the offence, premeditation, concerted action, and the specific role of the accused, the superior court is fully empowered to cancel the bail. [Paras 32–37] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 439 — Premeditated Murder by Setting Victim Ablaze — Common Intention — Bail Erroneously Granted on Flimsy Grounds — Cancellation of Bail - In a case where four accused persons launched a sustained offensive at night upon the complainant's house demanding an apology from his son, arrived together in a four-wheeler carrying a can of petrol, restrained and assaulted the victim, and set him on fire by pouring petrol and throwing a lit matchstick, the High Court and Trial Court erred in granting regular bail to Accused No. 4 (who recorded the incident) and Accused No. 3 (on grounds of parity) - The facts prima facie demonstrated prior preparation, concerted action, and premeditated common intention under Section 34 IPC to inflict grave harm - The reasoning of the High Court that Accused No. 4 merely recorded the incident and had no antecedents was flimsy and untenable in law - regular bail granted to Accused Nos. 3 and 4 cancelled; rejection of bail to Accused No. 2 (who drove the vehicle and acted as lookout) upheld. [Paras 29- 40] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 406, 120B – Quashing based on settlement with the sole victim where dispute has civil flavour – Absence of consent of informant - The complainant/informant alleged that the accused forged a Power of Attorney of the landowner (Respondent No. 2), formed a partnership firm, and unlawfully got the land mutated in the firm's name, thereby depriving the informant of 7.50 acres of eucalyptus plantation allegedly given orally to him by Respondent No. 2 - the actual owner/victim (Respondent No. 2) entered into an amicable settlement with the accused, filed an affidavit admitting the validity of the partnership and mutation, and stated he had no grievances - The High Court declined to quash proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that the informant was not a party to the compromise and offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC could not be compounded with a witness - Reversing the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court held: i. The High Court erred in conflating Section 320 compounding with Section 482 quashing; ii. Respondent No. 2 was the real victim of the alleged forgery and breach of trust. As the star witness had settled the dispute and affirmed the transactions, chances of conviction were bleak, and keeping the prosecution alive would be an exercise in futility and an abuse of judicial process; iii. The dispute predominantly bore a private and civil/commercial flavour with no wider repercussions on society; iv. The informant produced no documentary proof of title/interest in the land, nor showed that the accused had knowledge of any oral assignment - The informant could not block the quashing of proceedings when the real victim had settled all grievances. [Relied on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303; Jagjeet Singh and Others v. Ashish Mishra alias Monu and Another, (2022) 9 SCC 321; Naushey Ali and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., (2025) 4 SCC 78; Paras 39–49] Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 874 : 2026 INSC 928
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Defence Material / Plea of Alibi Based on Unimpeachable Official Records — Distinction from Disputed Questions of Fact - While ordinarily a plea of alibi is a matter of defence to be established by leading evidence at trial and cannot be decided under Section 482 CrPC on the strength of private affidavits, there is no inflexible rule barring the High Court from considering documentary material touching upon the presence or absence of the accused at the threshold where such material consists of official records maintained in the ordinary course of duty by a wing of the Armed Forces of the Union (BSF) whose authenticity is undisputed - Refusing to examine unimpeachable, contemporaneous official records produced from the earliest stage of investigation amounts to elevating procedural formalism over substantial justice and compelling an undeniably absent accused to undergo the ordeal of a full-fledged trial. [Paras 30, 31] Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 786 : 2026 INSC 825
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing on the Basis of Defence Material — 4-Step Test - Reiterating the four-step test laid down in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, when the defence material is of sterling and impeccable quality, completely rules out the assertions in the charges, is not and cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution, and proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC must be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of the court and save judicial time. [Paras 19 - 35] Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 786 : 2026 INSC 825
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 & Section 154 — Scope of Interference at the Threshold — Quashing of FIR - At the stage of considering a plea for quashing an FIR under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is strictly concerned with whether the allegations contained in the FIR, taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence - The Court cannot embark upon a mini-trial or evaluate the veracity, evidentiary value, or defence version regarding the financial transactions, which fall entirely within the domain of investigation and trial. [Relied on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2014) 2 SCC 1; S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 791; SAS Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana and Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4046; Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2008) 2 SCC 409; Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another (2019) 17 SCC 1; Paras 40–48] Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 829 : 2026 INSC 887
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 r/w Section 320 [Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 528 r/w Section 359] – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings on Compromise/Settlement vs. Compounding of Offences – Locus of Informant vs. Victim to Authorize Settlement - Quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the basis of a compromise between an offender and the victim is conceptually distinct from compounding of offences under Section 320 CrPC - Compounding is strictly circumscribed by statutory provisions where power is guided solely by Section 320 CrPC, whereas the High Court's inherent power to quash proceedings is guided by whether the ends of justice warrant such exercise and whether continuing proceedings would amount to an abuse of the legal process - "Victim" [Section 2(wa) CrPC / Section 2(y) BNSS] and "complainant/informant" are two distinct legal connotations - A complainant/informant need not necessarily be the victim, as even a stranger can set criminal law into motion - To seek quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of an amicable settlement, it is only the real victim (i.e., the person who has suffered loss or injury due to the alleged offence) who can authorize a settlement, and not an informant who has suffered no injury - Disastrous consequences would follow if informants who are not victims are permitted to compromise disputes while the actual victim is left in limbo. [Paras 28–36]. Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 874 : 2026 INSC 928
Commercial Suits – Delay and Obstruction of Trial – Imposition of Exemplary Costs - Criticism of the tendency of well-resourced litigants to obstruct and prolong commercial litigation by repeatedly generating rounds of interlocutory applications, appeals, and special leave petitions - Permitting a party to prolong a 2006 commercial suit for two decades without crossing the evidence stage is a sad reflection on the conduct of judicial proceedings - Reiteration of directions for expeditious disposal of the trial and dismissal of the appeal with costs of ₹10,000,000 (Rupees Ten Lakhs) payable to the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association. [Relied on NTPC Limited v. Reliance Industries Limited (SLP (C) Nos. 11741–11742 of 2018, Paras 21–23] Reliance Industries v. NTPC Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 806 : 2026 INSC 862
Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953 (Punjab Village) / Peppl Act, 1954 – Statutory Vesting – Requirement of Notice to Proprietors - Upon the enactment of the 1953 and 1954 Acts, all rights, title, and interest of proprietors (malkan deh) in lands classified as shamilat deh were statutorily extinguished and vested automatically in the Gram Panchayat - a mutation entry executed in favour of the Gram Panchayat pursuant to statutory vesting cannot be invalidated on the ground of lack of notice or hearing to individual proprietors, as the statutory fiat was absolute and permitted no exemption. [Para 96] Suraj Bhan v. Ashvarya Estate, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 755 : 2026 INSC 786
Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (Haryana) - Section 2(g)(1) read with Section 2(g)(iii), Section 2(g)(viii), and Section 4 – Vesting of Shamilat Deh in Gram Panchayat vs. Exclusion Claims – Requirement of Partition and Individual Cultivating Possession Prior to 26.01.1950 – Significance of Revenue Entries 'Hasab Rasad Biswat' and 'Makbuja Malkan' - Land described as shamilat deh in the revenue records automatically vests in the Gram Panchayat under Section 2(g)(1) read with Section 4 of the Haryana Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 - Merely because the revenue entry reads "shamilat deh hasab rasad biswat" followed by the names of distinct pattis, the character of the land as shamilat deh does not change to shamilat patti, nor does it prove private title or exclude it from vesting - The expression "hasab rasad biswat" merely reflects the shareholding of the proprietary body (malkan deh) for the purpose of potential partition - the revenue entry "makbuja malkan" in the cultivator's column denotes joint possession of the proprietary body in common, not individual or separate cultivating possession - To claim exclusion under Section 2(g)(iii) or Section 2(g)(viii) of the 1961 Act, a claimant must produce proof that the shamilat deh land was partitioned among co-sharers and brought under individual cultivating possession prior to January 26, 1950 - In the absence of evidence showing a formal partition before the cutoff date, the land continues to be shamilat deh and vests in the Panchayat (or its successor Municipal Corporation) regardless of whether it was used for common purposes under Section 2(g)(3) or 2(g)(v). [Relied on Patram v. Gram Panchayat Katwar and others, (2020) 15 SCC 56; Paras 54-64, 106-111] Suraj Bhan v. Ashvarya Estate, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 755 : 2026 INSC 786
Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (Haryana) - Section 2(g)(1) vs. Section 2(g)(3) & Section 2(g)(v) – User for Common Purposes – When Inquiry is Necessary - The statutory requirement to establish that land has been used for common purposes of the village or for the benefit of the village community applies specifically when the land in the revenue records is described as shamilat taraf, shamilat patti, shamilat panna, or shamilat thola under Section 2(g)(3) or Section 2(g)(v) - Where the land is directly recorded as shamilat deh in the revenue records and Sharat-wajib-ul-arz, it falls squarely under Section 2(g)(1), and it is not necessary to separately prove that the land was used for common purposes or for the benefit of the village community for it to vest in the Gram Panchayat. [Paras 52- 64, 107- 111] Suraj Bhan v. Ashvarya Estate, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 755 : 2026 INSC 786
Constitution of India — Article 136 — Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Powers under Article 136 are wide and plenary, but the Supreme Court does not reappraise evidence or interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by courts below unless the findings are manifestly perverse, unsupportable from record, vitiated by error of law/procedure, or where the decision shocks the conscience of the Court. [Relied on Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 12 SCC 558; Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219; Paras 15-25] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852
Constitution of India — Article 14 — Differential Modes of Execution Under Ordinary Criminal Law vs. Military Law — Army Act, 1950, Air Force Act, 1950, and Navy Act, 1957 - The argument that permitting execution by shooting as an alternative mode under special military enactments amounts to hostile discrimination under Article 14 against civilian convicts executed solely by hanging under CrPC/BNSS was rejected - Military statutes operate in a distinct field governing a separate class of persons subject to military discipline and necessity, and cannot serve as a benchmark to assess the constitutional validity of procedures governing civilian convictions. [Paras 55, 56] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873
Constitution of India — Article 141 — Retrospective operation of Supreme Court judgments — Declaration of Law — Subvention Scheme — Stoppage of subvention post-unconstitutionality of the Unni Krishnan scheme – Held - Unless a decision of the Supreme Court explicitly declares its application to be prospective, the law declared by the Court carries a retrospective effect - The subvention scheme formulated via interim orders during the pendency of the TMA Pai Foundation case ceased to exist on October 31, 2002, when the 11-Judge Bench declared the Unni Krishnan scheme unconstitutional - The subvention scheme obligated the Central Government to pay the subvention amount on an annual basis rather than as a lump sum for the entire course; hence, there existed no vested right for educational institutions to claim subvention amounts for the entire 5-year duration of a course for students admitted during or prior to the 2002–03 academic year once the scheme itself was declared unconstitutional. [Paras 10 - 12] Government of India v. Sri Devraj URS Medical College, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : 2026 INSC 799
Constitution of India — Article 142 read with Article 21 — Guidelines & Comprehensive Directions for Grant of Bail to Foreign Nationals in NDPS Commercial Quantity Cases — Surety Verification and Regulatory Mechanism - To plug the systemic loophole and eliminate the rampant menace of fake/professional sureties used by foreign nationals to abscond, the Supreme Court exercised its plenary jurisdiction under Article 142 to issue binding mandatory directions and introduce standard Form-47A – i. Passport & Travel Restrictions - The passport of the foreign national accused must be mandatorily deposited with the jurisdictional Court - An application for release of passport for travel must be decided expeditiously, preferably within four weeks - Travel outside the country is restricted without prior permission – ii. FRRO Registration - The accused must register with the FRRO within one week of release and submit proof thereof in writing to the Court and IO - The FRRO/MHA shall create a dedicated portal for this purpose – iii. Two Solvent Sureties - The accused must furnish two solvent sureties of like amount; relaxable only upon recorded reasons by the Court – iv. Strict Verification Timelines - Verification of sureties and physical re-verification of the accused's Indian residential address must be completed within 3 working days prior to release on bail – v. Disclosure of Finances & Embassies - Accused must disclose income sources and bank details via affidavit within one week of release - The IO must formally communicate the accused's involvement to the relevant Embassy/Consulate – vi. Charge/Lien on Surety Property - A lien/charge equivalent to the surety bond amount shall be created on the surety's movable/immovable property, realizable in the event of forfeiture – vii. Centralised Database & Portal - Ministry of Law and Justice along with NIC to maintain a centralised database of accused persons and sureties - High Courts via their IT Committees directed to implement digital portals for authentication of financial and property credentials – viii. Accountability of Erring Officials - Departmental inquiries must be initiated against police, revenue, or court officials responsible for approving fake/fabricated sureties due to negligence or collusion – ix. Form-47A - Insertion and adoption of the specialised mandatory undertaking and surety verification format (Form-47A) under BNSS, 2023. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 671; Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, (2022) 18 SCC 374; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409; Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665; Paras 28, 29] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870
Constitution of India – Article 20(1) – General Clauses Act, 1897 – Definition of "Offence" – Ex Post Facto Law and Legality - Reiterating the maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (no crime or punishment without a penal law), the Court observed that Article 20(1) bars conviction unless there is a violation of a "law in force" at the time of commission of the act - Under criminal jurisprudence, an "offence" means an act or omission made punishable by law - In the absence of an offence created within the four corners of the U.P. Act itself, an individual cannot be subjected to trial or enhanced penal exposure merely based on an administrative Gang Chart. [Paras 36 – 52]. Shiv Pratap Singh @ Chinu v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2026 INSC 894
Constitution of India — Article 21 — Death Penalty — Alternative Modes of Execution — Lethal Injection vs. Hanging – noted that contention that intravenous lethal injection is a demonstrably superior, scientific, and painless alternative to hanging was rejected - Referring to Deena v. Union of India, the Supreme Court reiterated that comparative analysis of alternatives (electrocution, lethal gas, shooting, and lethal injection) showed no distinct or demonstrable advantage over hanging - material placed on record revealed that lethal injection in jurisdictions like the United States has been plagued with systemic issues and numerous botched executions - In the absence of unimpeachable empirical evidence establishing that lethal injection or another method is more humane, the statutory prescription cannot be invalidated. [Paras 53 - 62] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873
Constitution of India — Article 226 — Alternative Statutory Remedy — Exhaustion of Remedies vs. Maintainability & Entertainability — Flagrant Violation of Natural Justice and Lack of Jurisdiction - The High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition challenging the ex parte externment order on the ground of availability of an alternative statutory appellate remedy under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam – Held that the self-imposed restriction of exhausting an alternative statutory remedy does not bar the exercise of writ jurisdiction where the impugned order has been passed in flagrant breach of the principles of natural justice or without jurisdiction - Relegating the appellant to an appeal under Section 9 in the face of an egregious violation of mandatory statutory safeguards and total lack of review jurisdiction demonstrated an abject failure on the part of the High Court to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. [Paras 16-27] Vijay Kumar Rajpoot @ Vijju v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2026 INSC 926
Constitution of India – Article 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition vs Alternative Remedy - The existence of an alternative remedy (such as raising a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) does not operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly where the challenge is directly to the legality and validity of the order of termination itself. [Relied on Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471; Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P. and Others, 2024 INSC 131; Umesh Chandra Yadav v. Inspector General and Chief Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force, Northern Railway, New Delhi and Others, (2022) 14 SCC 244; Paras 18-25]. Shatrughn Yadav v. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (F.A.C.T.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2026 INSC 829
Constitution of India — Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction — Pleadings and Proof — Distinction between Civil Procedure Code and Writ Petitions — Abstract questions of law requiring factual substantiation - Held: When an issue such as shortfalls in revenue vs. expenditure or claims of financial hardship ostensibly presents a point of law that must be substantiated by facts, the party asserting it in a writ petition must plead and prove such facts through evidence annexed directly to the writ petition or counter-affidavit - Unlike pleadings under the Code of Civil Procedure where only material facts are required to be pleaded, a writ petition or counter-affidavit must contain both facts and the evidence in proof thereof - In the absence of specific pleadings or proof showing that revenue generated fell short of expenses incurred, the Court will not entertain such claims. [Relied on P.V. George v. State of Kerala, (2007) 3 SCC 557; Bharat Singh and Others v. State of Haryana and Others, (1988) 4 SCC 534; Paras 6-13] Government of India v. Sri Devraj URS Medical College, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : 2026 INSC 799
Constitution of India – Knowledge as a Pre-requisite for Suppressio Veri / Suggestio Falsi: Knowledge of a fact is a necessary pre-requisite for its non-disclosure - The concept of suppression presupposes awareness of that which is suppressed; a person cannot be said to have withheld or concealed something of which they had no knowledge in the first place - Where the very existence of a criminal antecedent is not shown to have been within the candidate's knowledge at the relevant time (substantiated by cogent material such as character certificates, lack of summons/arrest, and subsequent deletion of name after investigation), the candidate cannot be held guilty of suppression or supplying false information - the onus lies upon the candidate to substantiate the claim of bona fide ignorance with reliable material, and a bare plea of ignorance will not suffice - Termination is not an automatic consequence of the mere existence/disclosure of criminal antecedents. An employer must not act mechanically and must evaluate the candidate's suitability rather than passing an order of termination without applying its mind to the nature of the post, the gravity of the offence, and the final outcome of the case. [Paras 20–34] Shatrughn Yadav v. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (F.A.C.T.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2026 INSC 829
Constitution of India — Social Justice & Constitutional Morality — Witch-Hunting — Practice Derogatory to Dignity of Women - Witch-hunting is a deeply rooted social malady driven by superstition, prejudice, and irrational fear, where vulnerable women are targeted as scapegoats and subjected to extreme brutality and ostracization - Such derogatory practices strike at the root of constitutional morality, human dignity, equality, and scientific temperament envisioned by the Constitution of India; reason must prevail as a bulwark against collective irrationality. [Paras 31-38] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 136 — Scope of Interference with High Court Order of Acquittal - Scope of Appellate Restraint - The Supreme Court will not interfere under Article 136 with a High Court judgment of acquittal unless it is shown to be perverse, manifestly illegal, or productive of a gross miscarriage of justice. If the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the accused is a reasonable and possible view based on material on record, it cannot be substituted merely because another view of the evidence might be possible - While defects in investigation alone do not warrant acquittal if substantive evidence is credible, where substantive ocular testimony is itself infirm and compromised by unsealed/tampered case property and unexplained FIR discrepancies, the benefit of such investigative lapses enures to the accused. [Relied on Himmat Sukhadeo Wahurwagh and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 712; Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another, 2026 INSC 735; Eknath Ganpat Aher and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2010) 6 SCC 519; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; Paras 23 – 46] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136 – Special Leave Appeal – Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact: The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the High Court unless the findings are shown to suffer from patent perversity or absurdity. [Relied on Balak Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1975) 3 SCC 219; Paras 24 - 51] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21, Article 32, and Article 226 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 176 and Section 154 — Custodial Death — Failure to register FIR and investigate — Award of interim compensation — Transfer of investigation to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) - Custodial Violence and Statutory Inaction - Deceased was arrested for an excise offence carrying a maximum sentence of 3 years and subsequently died in judicial/police custody - Judicial Magistrate First Class conducted an inquiry under Section 176 CrPC and reported that the death resulted from complications arising from a blunt-force head injury, with post-mortem showing multiple antemortem injuries - Despite the inquiry report and the High Court holding that the deceased died due to custodial violence, the State authorities (including DGP and Jail Authorities) failed to register an FIR or initiate an investigation, taking the stance that the judicial inquiry report had not been formally received by police officials - Held: that the stance of "blissful ignorance" and inaction taken by the senior State authorities is reprehensible, sacrilegious, and amounts to an attempt to cover up custodial violence. [Paras 5–7, 14–17] Lahra Bai Tamre v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 794 : 2026 INSC 840
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Mixed Questions of Law and Fact cannot be raised for the first time in a Writ Petition - While a pure question of law can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact requiring factual inquiry and investigation cannot be permitted to be agitated for the first time in a writ petition without laying a proper factual foundation in the pleadings before the subordinate authorities/tribunals - The High Court erred in remitting the matter to the DRT for a factual inquiry into the claim of exemption under Section 60(1)(ccc) CPC when no such plea or evidence was placed before the Recovery Officer or the DRT. [Relied on Greater Mohali Area Development Authority & Ors. v. Manju Jain & Ors., (2010) 9 SCC 157; Paras 30 - 46] Sheela Gehlot v. Mohini Hardayal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 808 : 2026 INSC 863
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Writ Jurisdiction — Maintainability in Electrocution Claims — Disputed Questions of Fact - Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not an appropriate remedy to claim compensation for death or injury caused by electrocution where disputed questions of fact are involved - The High Court erred in entertaining writ petitions and awarding compensation by treating the occurrence as a matter of absolute liability and ignoring factual disputes relating to negligence, contributory negligence, compliance with statutory safety distances, and third-party liability - Where material facts are in dispute, parties must be relegated to civil courts or appropriate alternate forums. [Relied on Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das, (1999) 7 SCC 298; Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P., (2021) 6 SCC 771; T.N. Cements Corpn. Ltd. v. Unicon Engineers, (2025) 4 SCC 1; Paras 8-16] Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation v. Rekha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 799 : 2026 INSC 847
Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 14, 16, and 32 — Service Law — Pay Fixation & Parity — Central Government Industrial Tribunals-cum-Labour Courts (CGIT-cum-LCs) — Re-employed Judicial Officers — Claim for 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) Pay Scales at par with other Central Tribunals vs. Pay Scales applicable to District Judiciary based on Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee / Shetty Commission Recommendations — Permissibility of reasonable classification — Scope of Judicial Review - Petitioners, retired judicial officers appointed on a re-employment basis as Presiding Officers of Central Government Industrial Tribunals-cum-Labour Courts (CGIT-cum-LCs), challenged the denial of 6th CPC pay scales and their equation with the District Judiciary for pay fixation – Held - Classification of re-employed pensioners as a distinct class for pay fixation is valid and does not violate Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution - Upon re-employment after superannuation, such officers cease to be homogeneous vis-à-vis regular government employees and are governed by a special scheme under the Central Civil Services (Fixation of Pay of Re-employed Pensioners) Orders, 1986 - The determination of pay structures and equation of posts is an executive function based on expert body recommendations (such as the Shetty Commission and Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee) - The Industrial Tribunals/Labour Courts in which petitioners are appointed are established within the State; thus, equating their pay scale with that of the District Judiciary carries a rational and intelligible differentia and is free from arbitrariness - Judicial review in pay fixation is limited and courts must refrain from interfering with the executive domain unless patent arbitrariness, malafides, or apparent anomalies are demonstrated. [Relied on State of U.P. and Others v. J.P. Chaurasia and Others, (1989) 1 SCC 121; Union of India v. Dineshan K.K., (2008) 1 SCC 586; Union of India v. Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers Association and Another, (2023) 19 SCC 482; Union of India v. T.V.L.N. Mallikarjuna Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 653; Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, 1950 SCC 833; Paras 5 - 6] R.K. Yadav v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2026 INSC 848
Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 226 & 227 — Scope of Certiorari Jurisdiction — Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact — Error of Law Apparent on Face of Record — When Justified - A finding of fact recorded by a lower court, arbitrator, or tribunal without any supporting evidence or by ignoring material documentary evidence is perverse and amounts to an error of law apparent on the face of the record, making it amenable to judicial review and vulnerable to correction under a writ of certiorari - Certiorari jurisdiction is supervisory and not appellate in nature; the writ court will not re-appreciate evidence or correct a mere error of fact - if findings of fact are based on “no evidence”, or purely on surmises and conjectures, or where the overwhelming weight of evidence does not support the finding, such perversity constitutes an error of law entitling the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari and set aside concurrent orders. [Paras 12 - 15] Shri Prakash Narain Sharma v. Burmah Shell Co-Operative Housing Society, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 873 : 2026 INSC 927
Constitution of India, 1950 — Subordinate Judiciary — Judicial Service Rules — Recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) — Eligibility Criteria — Requirement of 3 years' practice at the Bar — Modification/Review of Judgment dated 20.05.2025 — Transitional Scheme vs. Post-Transitional Scheme - The Supreme Court had, vide its Judgment dated 20.05.2025 in All India Judges Association v. Union of India(Judgment under Review), restored the mandatory requirement of a minimum 3 years' practice at the Bar to be eligible to appear for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination - On review and clarification petitions, the Court examined the disproportionate impact and hardship caused to law graduates, women, and marginalized candidates due to the abrupt restoration of the 3-year practice rule - Held (per Surya Kant, CJI. and Augustine George Masih, J) - While the institutional necessity for prior exposure to court functioning before assuming judicial office is neither unreasonable nor displaced, the 3-year practice requirement cannot be applied in a manner that abruptly excludes candidates who arranged their careers under the pre-existing regime - The judgment under review stands modified to balance practical readiness with intellectual merit by prescribing a phased transitional model and a restructured post-transitional framework. Bhumika Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2026 INSC 904
Constitution of India, 1950 — Subordinate Judiciary — Judicial Service Rules — Recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) — Eligibility Criteria — Requirement of 3 years' practice at the Bar — Modification/Review of Judgment dated 20.05.2025 — Transitional Scheme vs. Post-Transitional Scheme - Dissenting Opinion (Per K. Vinod Chandran, J.) - No Ground for Review - There is no error apparent on the face of the record to warrant reviewing the well-considered judgment restoring the 3-year practice requirement - Impracticability of the Two-Year Training Model - Requiring candidates to undergo two years of post-selection training/clerkship on half-pay prejudices recruits, creates unviable financial and administrative burdens on the exchequer, and leaves courts undermanned - making confirmation contingent on the subjective satisfaction of a High Court Judge creates arbitrary hurdles and results in disparate classes of recruits - Distinction from Civil Services - Judicial service cannot be equated with executive services like IAS/IPS; judicial officers exercise unhindered adjudicatory discretion from day one without hierarchical supervisory control over their judicial decisions - Courtroom practice is irreplaceable by pre-service training. [Paras 4-10] Bhumika Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2026 INSC 904
Constitution of India, 1950 — Subordinate Judiciary — Judicial Service Rules — Recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) — Eligibility Criteria — Requirement of 3 years' practice at the Bar — Modification/Review of Judgment dated 20.05.2025 — Transitional Scheme vs. Post-Transitional Scheme - Key Holdings & Scheme Framed By Majority – i. Transitional Period (For advertisements/notifications issued after 20.05.2025 up to 31.03.2027) - Deemed Practice Exemption - All law graduates are eligible to apply without having to satisfy the 3-year actual bar practice requirement. Candidates are deemed to have completed one year of active practice, and no separate Certificate of Practice is required for this deemed period - Two-Year Training & Clerkship Model - Selected candidates shall be designated as "Trainee Judicial Officers"and must complete - Compulsory 1 year of intensive training at the State Judicial Academy (treated as equivalent to 1 year of practice at the Bar) with fixed emoluments equal to half the salary of a Judicial Magistrate First Class - Compulsory 1 year of structured Law Clerkship (6 months under a Principal District/District and Sessions Judge or Higher Judicial Service Member, and 6 months under a sitting High Court Judge), also treated as equivalent to 1 year of practice at the Bar - Confirmation: Trainee Judicial Officers shall be appointed to regular cadres carrying full pay scales only upon a satisfactory, reasoned evaluation report submitted by the supervising High Court Judge - ii. Post-Transitional Period (For advertisements/notifications issued on or after 01.04.2027) - 1-Year Actual Practice Mandatory: Candidates must possess at least 1 year of actual practice in the District Courts, verified through a Certificate of Practice showing recorded presence and participation in effective judicial proceedings - Subsequent Training: Selected candidates must undergo 1 year of institutional training at the State Judicial Academy, followed by 6 months of Law Clerkship in District Courts and 6 months of Law Clerkship under a sitting High Court Judge - iii. Higher Legal Education Not Countable as Practice - The duration spent pursuing higher legal education (LL.M., etc.) cannot be counted towards the mandatory practice requirement, as it does not foster the requisite familiarity with courtroom processes and practical court functioning - iv. Operation & Review of the Scheme - The scheme shall operate for five years, following which empirical data regarding its efficacy, recruitment quality, and officer performance shall be placed before the Supreme Court for reconsideration. [Relied on Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 481; All India Judges Association v. Union of India (Judgment under Review / 6th AIJA Case), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1184; Paras 58–80] Bhumika Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2026 INSC 904
Consumer Protection Act, 2019 — Section 58(3) — Reference on Difference of Opinion — Scope of Jurisdiction of Third Member / Referee Bench — High Court's Supervisory Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution - Scope of Referee Member's Jurisdiction under Section 58(3) - the course to be adopted by a referee Bench/Member is to return the reference with answers to the points referred to the referring Bench to enable it to dispose of the matter based on the majority opinion - where the referring Bench did not delineate the specific point(s) of difference but formulated broad questions requiring examination of the entire evidence on merits, the referee member taking a common-sense approach to answer the reference and decide the appeal along the lines of the concurring companion member is not a jurisdictional illegality warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution - The objection as to the strict scope of reference in such circumstances is merely technical - When questions referred go to the very root of the complaint and are inseparable from the evidence on record, requiring a survey of the entire gamut of material and rival contentions, the referee member deciding the appeal on merits based on the majority opinion reflects a permissible common-sense approach. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok, (2013) 5 SCC 1; Paras 14-23]. Askari Hussain v. Dinesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 871 : 2026 INSC 929
Contract Act, 1872 — Section 196 — Ratification — Prospectivity of Endorsement - Ratification must be a conscious adoption of the very unauthorized act in question - Where an additional endorsement enhancing the sum insured is expressly made effective from a prospective date, it negates any intention to ratify, with retrospective effect, an agent's prior assurance that risk cover continued after exhaustion of the original sum insured - ratification cannot be employed to defeat a mandatory statutory requirement governing the assumption of risk. [Relied on Deokar Exports (P) Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2008) 14 SCC 598; Harshad J. Shah v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1997) 5 SCC 64; State of Orissa v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 512; State of W.B. v. Gitashree Dutta, (2022) 19 SCC 388; Paras 12, 13] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2026 INSC 876
Contract Act, 1872 – Section 56 – Doctrine of Frustration vs. Effluxion of Time – Self-Induced Frustration – Distinction - Frustration occurs when an unforeseen supervening extraneous event makes performance impossible or unlawful, whereas effluxion of time is the natural closure/expiry of a contract - Self-Induced Frustration Inapplicable - The doctrine of frustration under Section 56 does not apply where the stalling or suspension of the contract is the result of the default, act, or election of one of the contracting parties (self-induced frustration) - Where a contract is suspended due to non-payment and neither party invokes the termination clause, the contract continues to subsist. [Relied on Boothalinga Agencies v. V.T.C. Poriaswami Nadar, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 135; Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd., (2018) 1 SCC 353; Next Education India (P) Ltd. v. K12 Techno Services, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1117; B. Prashanth Hegde v. SBI, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 197; Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries (P) Ltd., (2020) 15 SCC 1; Paras 40–46, 89–91, 98-100]. Srinivasa Reddy Velagala v. Sravanthi Infratech Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 793 : 2026 INSC 835
Contract Act, 1872 — Sections 182, 186, 187, 188, 226, 227 & 237 — Law of Agency — Principal and Agent — Actual vs. Ostensible/Apparent Authority — Competence of an Agent/Officer to Bind Principal Insurer Beyond Authority and Statutory Mandate — Separability of Authorised and Unauthorised Acts - The usual or implied authority of an employee or managerial agent of an insurer (such as a Divisional Manager) to administer, correspond, or explain an existing policy does not equate to the authority to rewrite it, enlarge the risk, create an independent source of unlimited cover, or dispense with statutory preconditions governing the attachment of risk under Section 64VB - Apparent or ostensible authority under Section 237 of the Contract Act proceeds from the manifestations, conduct, or holding out of the principal towards third parties, and cannot be established by the mere self-serving assertion or communication of the agent - An agent cannot, by invoking apparent authority, confer upon the principal a capacity or liability which the governing statute itself withholds from the principal - Under Section 227 of the Contract Act, where the authorised part of the agent's act can be separated from the unauthorised part, the insurer is bound only to the extent of the valid administration/clarification within the lawfully insured limits, and not by unauthorised representations assuring cover beyond the insured limit. [Paras 12, 13] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2026 INSC 876
Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 (Delhi) — Sections 61 & 76 — Claim for Membership and Allotment of Plot — Presumption vs. Cogent Evidence — Equitable Considerations - Where material documentary evidence established that the original claimant had resigned from the membership of the Society in 1951, his shares had been transferred, and his subsequent application for membership in 1952 was specifically rejected, the Arbitrator and the Co-operative Tribunal erred in ignoring such core documents and drawing an unwarranted presumption that the claimant continued to remain a member throughout his lifetime merely because his name appeared on certain lists or in a suspense account - The Delhi High Court, therefore, did not exceed its supervisory writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 in quashing the concurrent cryptic awards/orders passed by the Arbitrator and the Tribunal, which were bereft of reasoning and suffered from patent perversity - equitable considerations warranted non-interference with the High Court's decision, as senior/prior eligible claimants could not be bypassed in favour of a person who was not a valid member. [Relied on General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and others v. Sri Giridhari Sahu and others, (2019) INSC 1020; Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others, 1954 INSC 122; Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and another v. Bikartan Das and others, 2023 INSC 733; Distinguished from Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, 2010 INSC 422; Paras 8 - 17] Shri Prakash Narain Sharma v. Burmah Shell Co-Operative Housing Society, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 873 : 2026 INSC 927
Criminal Jurisprudence — Defective Investigation, Unexplained Injuries on Accused & Non-Examination of Independent Witnesses - Unexplained Injuries on the Accused - Non-explanation of injuries sustained by the accused creates serious doubt as to whether the prosecution has presented the true genesis and origin of the incident, particularly when all prosecution witnesses are related/interested - Failure to examine independent witnesses from a residential locality where dozens of neighbours gathered, relying exclusively on related witnesses, warrants an adverse inference against the prosecution. [Paras 36 - 41] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787
Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Panchsheel Principles — Incomplete Chain of Events — Benefit of Doubt - In a case solely dependent on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all incriminating circumstances by reliable and clinching evidence, which taken together must form a complete chain of events pointing exclusively to the guilt of the accused and leaving no reasonable ground for any hypothesis consistent with innocence - Suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute for legal proof - An adverse inference or mere suspicion drawn from an accused's explanation regarding his absence or absconding cannot substitute for cogent evidence completing the chain of circumstances - The presence of missing links in the chain of circumstances entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt and acquittal. [Relied on Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2024) 10 SCC 813; Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172; Anil Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67; Reddy Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P., (2005) 7 SCC 603; State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Bodhraj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45; Paras 27- 30] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899
Criminal Law — Evidence — Injured Witness vs. Stereotyped/Identical Testimony — Group Assault & Constructive Liability under Section 149 IPC - Reliability of Injured Witness versus Detailed Attribution in Unlawful Assembly - The presence of an injured witness at the crime scene carries an inherent guarantee of presence and reliability regarding the assault upon himself; however, it does not automatically render their testimony a reliable inventory of the specific, minute roles and weapons attributed to each of the multiple members of a large assembly - Parrot-like / Tutored Narration - Where multiple witnesses (both injured and eye-witnesses) present a verbatim, identical, and stereotyped account—assigning distinct overt acts, weapons, and body parts assaulted across 23 accused persons without individual variation—it raises serious doubts of tutoring rather than truthful recollection - In cases involving group rivalries and constructive liability under Section 149 IPC, safe identification is foundational, and convictions cannot safely rest solely on interested and stereotyped testimony. [Paras 27- 35] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787
Criminal Trial — Appreciation of Evidence — Related Witness vs. Interested Witness - A witness can be regarded as an “interested witness” only when it is demonstrated that the witness has a direct motive, personal animosity, or reasons to falsely implicate the accused - A close relative who is a natural witness cannot be equated with an interested witness merely on account of the relationship - Relationship far from being a foundation to discard testimony is often a sure guarantee of truth, as a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit to falsely implicate an innocent person. [Relied on Shio Shankar Dubey and Others v. State of Bihar, (2019) 6 SCC 501; Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 614; Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 158; Paras 24-35] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852
Customs Act, 1962 – Sections 13, 45(1), 45(2), and 45(3) read with Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 – Sections 42 and 43 – Liability to pay customs duty on pilfered goods – Notification approving Port Trust as custodian – Validity – Overriding effect of Section 45(3) - The saving clause under Section 45(1) of the Customs Act ("save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force") does not bar the Commissioner of Customs from notifying and approving a Major Port Trust as a "custodian" of imported goods unloaded in a customs area - The liability of a Port Trust under Section 43 of the Major Port Trusts Act is fundamentally distinct from the liability created under Section 45(3) of the Customs Act - The former regulates the civil, compensatory liability of the Board as a bailee towards the owner of the goods under Sections 151, 152, and 161 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and is conditional upon the issuance of a receipt under Section 42(2) - In contrast, Section 45(3) imposes an independent and absolute statutory liability on the approved custodian to pay customs duty to the Revenue in respect of goods pilfered while in its custody, safeguarding the Revenue since Section 13 absolves the importer from such liability - The non obstante clause in Section 45(3) ("notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force") overrides the provisions of the Major Port Trusts Act as well as the saving clause in Section 45(1) - the Notification dated 11.10.2000 issued by the Commissioner of Customs (Import) approving Mumbai Port Trust as the custodian under Section 45(1) is valid and intra vires - liability under Section 45(3) cannot be fastened retrospectively for pilferage that occurred prior to the date of approval/notification under Section 45(1). [Paras 3 – 7] Union of India v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 863 : 2026 INSC 919
Election Law - Seizure of Cash & Assets by Flying Squads (FS) / Static Surveillance Teams (SST) - Seizure of cash or valuables requires a recorded suspicion of crime/inducement - To protect ordinary citizens from unwarranted harassment while maintaining transparency, the seizing authority must mandatorily record written reasons disclosing a prima facie nexus between the seized asset and the suspected electoral offence - Where SST detects cash exceeding ₹10,00,000, information must immediately be transmitted to the Income Tax Department - To prevent the "under-investigation" tag from lingering endlessly and to allow voters to make informed choices before the next election cycle, the Investigating Officer (IO) must make all endeavors to complete the probe within one year - Reasons for delay must be reported to the ECI, and quarterly status reports approved by the SSP/DCP must be furnished to the ECI - High Courts are directed to designate Special Courts for prompt hearings and expeditious disposal of cases involving candidates/sitting MPs/MLAs. [Paras 17 - 18] State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868
Election Law - Summary of Directives Issued – 1. Reporting of Seizure within 24 Hours - Written reasons establishing the prima facie nexus to the electoral offence must be submitted to the DM/ADM/Competent Court within 24 hours of seizure; 2. Investigation Timeline - IOs must endeavor to finish the investigation within 1 year; failures must be explained in writing to the ECI; 3. Quarterly Reporting - Quarterly progress reports must be routed to the ECI via the Nodal Officer after approval by the district SSP/DCP; 4. Income Tax Reference - Seizures exceeding ₹10,00,000 must be notified to Income Tax authorities; 5. Special Courts: High Courts are to designate special fast-track courts for cases involving candidates/sitting MPs/MLAs; 6. Mandatory High Court Approval for Withdrawal - No electoral prosecution against candidates may be withdrawn under Section 321 CrPC without High Court sanction; 7. Compliance - Compliance report to be filed by the ECI and State Governments by November 18, 2026. State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868
Election Law - Withdrawal of Cases against Candidates / Politicians (Section 321 CrPC / BNSS) - Unilateral withdrawal of electoral offences by State Governments upon political changes is antithetical to an unbiased criminal justice system - Candidates contesting elections stand on the same pedestal as sitting MPs/MLAs regarding prosecution; hence, withdrawal of prosecution against election candidates cannot be done without the prior approval and leave of the concerned High Court. [Relied on: State of Kerala v. K. Ajith, (2021) 17 SCC 318; Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, (2021) 20 SCC 599; Paras 14 - 18] State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868
Election Law & Criminal Jurisprudence — Electoral Offences, Seizure of Black Money, and Withdrawal of Prosecutions — Comprehensive Directions issued to curb money power, streamline investigations, and regulate withdrawal of criminal cases filed during elections - Constitutional Role of Election Commission & Free/Fair Elections - Article 324 of the Constitution vests wide superintendence, direction, and control of elections in the Election Commission of India (ECI), which acts as a reservoir of residuary powers in unoccupied fields to ensure purity and transparency in the electoral process - Purity in elections and the rule of law are indispensable basic features of democracy. [Relied on: Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1; Rameshwar Prasad (6) v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1; Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405; A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai, (1984) 2 SCC 656; Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 161; Kanwar Lal Gupta v. Amar Nath Chawla, (1975) 3 SCC 646; Ashok Shankarrao Chavan v. Madhavrao Kinhalkar, (2014) 7 SCC 99; Paras 8 - 12] State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868
Electricity Act, 2003 — Section 57 — Compensation in Electrocution Claims — Inapplicability of Motor Vehicles Act Multiplier Formula - The calculation paradigm and multiplier method provided under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to determine compensation in electrocution cases - In the absence of a prescribed calculation method under the Electricity Act, 2003, compensation must be determined on the overarching principle of awarding just, fair, and reasonable compensation based on proven income and relevant facts before the competent forum. [Relied on Raman v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., (2014) 15 SCC 1; Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha, (2014) 1 SCC 384; Para 15-16] Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation v. Rekha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 799 : 2026 INSC 847
Environmental Law — Civil Procedure / Environmental Adjudication — Interim Orders — Nature and binding effect — Erroneous treatment of interim findings as final - Held, interim orders are by their very nature provisional and not based on a comprehensive appreciation of evidence - When an interim order is passed "without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties," a court or tribunal is legally bound to re-test its preliminary findings after affording parties full opportunity to lead counter-material and rebut allegations - The NGT committed a grave procedural error by treating its prima facie interim order (which imposed Rs. 5 crores environmental compensation) as conclusive and binding on the sole ground that the appellant complied with it and did not prefer an appeal against it - Compliance undertaken two days prior to an event under compelling circumstances cannot operate as an estoppel or confer finality upon an unreasoned interim order - Treating interim findings as final without independent enquiry vitiated the entire subsequent proceedings. [Paras 33–36] Vyakti Vikas Kendra India v. Manoj Misra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2026 INSC 910
Environmental Law — Evidence and Expert Reports — Evidentiary value of solitary satellite imagery vs. contemporaneous material - Held, expert committee reports and visual inspections cannot be accepted uncritically when they suffer from patent contradictions and somersaults - A solitary satellite image obtained from Google Earth cannot override independent, contemporaneous evidence and previous official inspection reports demonstrating that the river floodplains were already in a dilapidated and degraded state with accumulated construction debris prior to allotment - Judicial bodies must critically evaluate expert reports against surrounding contemporaneous record rather than according them mechanical acceptance. [Paras 30–50] Vyakti Vikas Kendra India v. Manoj Misra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2026 INSC 910
Environmental Law — National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 — Section 15 and Section 17 — "Restoration" vs. "Rehabilitation" — Scope of Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 15 — Distinction between ecological restoration and ecological rehabilitation - Held, the National Green Tribunal fell into error by equating the distinct legal and ecological concepts of "restoration" and "rehabilitation" - Restoration refers to a process whereby an affected area is simply brought back to its original pre-existing state, irrespective of how optimum that original state was - In contrast, rehabilitation refers to complete reparation of the affected area to make it fully functional and capable of rendering optimum ecological services - While rehabilitation is an ideal end goal, its execution falls squarely upon the State under the Public Trust Doctrine and the principle of intergenerational equity - The statutory mandate under Section 15 of the NGT Act is confined to relief, compensation, and restitution/restoration of the environment to its original state - Where the expert committee itself admitted that the pre-event ecological status of the site could not be ascertained and original baseline conditions were unknown, ordering full-scale ecological "rehabilitation" and directing the project proponent to bear the cost of constructing a public biodiversity park amounted to burdening the appellant with developing something it never destroyed, thereby exceeding the Tribunal's statutory jurisdiction under Section 15. [Paras 44–48] Vyakti Vikas Kendra India v. Manoj Misra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2026 INSC 910
Environmental Law — National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 — Section 17(3) — "No-Fault Liability" and "Polluter Pays Principle" — Essential preconditions for invocation — Causation and establishment of a causal link - Held, the NGT erroneously applied the principle of "no-fault liability" under Section 17(3) of the NGT Act - Section 17(3) applies strictly to accidents involving environmental hazards (such as gas leaks or chemical spills) - While the "Polluter Pays Principle" is a permanent facet of Indian environmental jurisprudence and finds legislative manifestation in Section 17, its application is fundamentally contingent upon: (i) proof of actual, real damage, and (ii) the establishment of a direct causal link between the actions of the project proponent and the resultant environmental degradation - A person must first be proven to be a "polluter" before absolute liability can be fastened - In the absence of evidence demonstrating that the appellant caused damage beyond the pre-existing dilapidated condition of the site, the reversal of the burden of proof and holding the appellant liable on a no-fault basis was wholly unsustainable. [Paras 51–53] Vyakti Vikas Kendra India v. Manoj Misra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2026 INSC 910
Environmental Law — Role of Public Authorities — Precautionary Principle & Public Trust Doctrine — River Yamuna Floodplains - The Supreme Court deprecated the conduct of the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) in granting permissions to hold large-scale events on the active floodplains of River Yamuna - Held, DDA acted in breach of the Precautionary Principle and the Doctrine of Public Trust reposed in it as the custodian responsible for the conservation and ecological maintenance of the river floodplains - since the event had concluded and general directions for floodplain rejuvenation were already operating under prior judgments, DDA was directed to carry out rehabilitation from its own funds and refund the ₹5 crores compensation to the appellant. [Relied on Manoj Misra v. Union of India & Ors. (NGT Original Application No. 06 of 2012; Paras 40–56] Vyakti Vikas Kendra India v. Manoj Misra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2026 INSC 910
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 114(e) & Section 114 Illustration (g) – Presumption of Regularity of Official Acts – Non-examination of Material Witness - The statutory presumption of regularity under Section 114(e) extends solely to the regularity of official procedure and does not extend to conclusively proving the bona fides or legality of the underlying private transaction on which the official order is based - an adverse inference under Section 114 Illustration (g) does not follow automatically from the non-examination of an available party/witness (such as the widow) where the acquisition of knowledge of hostile action is independently established through contemporary documentary evidence. [Para 28-30] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 118 — Child Witness — Evaluation and Corroboration — Rule of Prudence — Tutoring - While there is no inflexible statutory bar preventing conviction based on the testimony of a competent child witness, seeking independent corroboration is a well-established rule of prudence - A child witness of tender age, lacking maturity of understanding, is an easy prey to tutoring; thus, the evidence must be evaluated with great care and circumspection - Where the child witness (aged 4.5 years at the time of the incident and examined 4 years later) was residing with a police constable and expressly admitted in his cross-examination to having been tutored by the Station House Officer prior to deposing, his testimony cannot form the sole basis of conviction - where the child's account of being strangulated with a rope and burnt with acid is falsified by medical evidence and humanly unnatural conduct is attributed, insisting on corroboration is imperative and the trial court's rejection of such evidence cannot be considered unreasonable. [Relied on Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2003) 3 SCC 21; Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177; Paras 24, 25, 26] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 134 — Quality vs. Quantity of Evidence — Sole Eyewitness - The legal system lays emphasis on the value, weight, and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity, or plurality of witnesses - The time-honoured principle is that “evidence has to be weighed and not counted” - There exists no legal impediment to convicting an accused solely on the testimony of a single witness, provided such testimony is wholly reliable and inspires confidence. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13; Prithipal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 1 SCC 10; Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367; Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150; Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91; Paras 20-35] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Recovery Evidence — Hostile Panch Witnesses and Inordinate Delay - Recovery of incriminating articles (clothes and an empty acid bottle) made six months after the incident from an open/accessible dump site at the instance of the accused loses its evidentiary value when independent seizure witnesses turn hostile and testify that they merely signed blank papers without knowing the contents - The evidentiary integrity of the recovery is further compromised when articles allegedly buried 6 feet deep under rocks for months show no traces of mud, earth, or water residue, raising a serious possibility of planting and creating a fatal breach in the prosecution case. [Paras 30, 31, 32] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899
Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 68 & 69 — Invocation of Section 69 — Proof where no attesting witness can be found — Conditions Precedent — Evidentiary Burden - Section 69 is not an alternative which the propounder may freely choose, but an exceptional mode of proof available only when proof through an attesting witness has become impossible - The opening condition "if no such attesting witness can be found" requires strict proof that the witnesses are dead, beyond the jurisdiction, untraceable despite diligent search, or incapable of giving evidence - A bare, unparticularised statement by an interested propounder regarding the death of a witness, unsupported by credible oral or documentary evidence or enquiry, is insufficient to invoke Section 69 - The mere absence of a contrary suggestion in cross-examination cannot reverse the statutory burden or establish the foundational fact required to bypass Section 68 - Even if Section 69 is applicable, proving the handwriting of one attestor and the mark of the testatrix only satisfies the formal limb and does not create a presumption of capacity, free will, or elimination of suspicious circumstances. [Relied on Babu Singh v. Ram Sahai alias Ram Singh, (2008) 14 SCC 754; Paras 72–76, 78–85, 96–98] Pazhanathal v. Alamathal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2026 INSC 860
Evidence Law - Appreciation of Evidence – Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus not applicable – Sifting Chaff from Grain - The doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no strict application in Indian criminal jurisprudence - When evidence is separable, the court must sift the chaff from the grain and act on acceptable evidence - Discrepancies on collateral particulars that do not shake the core of the prosecution case or touch the documentary/forensic chain of custody do not warrant acquittal. [Relied on Arvind Kumar alias Nemichand v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) SCC OnLine SC 1099; Ramabora alias Ramaboraiah v. State of Karnataka, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 996; Paras 43–46] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854
Gangsters Act vs. Preventive Detention Laws (U.P.) – Lack of procedural safeguards – Comparison with MCOCA and GUJCTOC - Unlike the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) and Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act, 2015 (GUJCTOC) which specifically define and penalise substantive offences such as "organised crime"— the U.P. Gangsters Act creates no offence - While operating in effect like a preventive detention mechanism by prolonging pre-trial custody up to a year, the U.P. Gangsters Act lacks the constitutional and statutory safeguards inherent to preventive detention (such as Advisory Board review, time-bound representations, and strictly monitored executive satisfaction) - The trial before the Special Court becomes a foregone conclusion based mechanically on the Gang Chart. [Relied on Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.R. Kishore, (2023) 15 SCC 339; Union of India & Anr. v. Ganpati Dealcom Private Limited, (2023) 3 SCC 315; Mahipal Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., (2014) 11 SCC 282; S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India & Anr., (1954) 1 SCC 586; Paras 38-57] Shiv Pratap Singh @ Chinu v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2026 INSC 894
Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Sections 2(b), 2(c), 3, 7, 23 – Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021 – Constitution of India, Article 20(1) – General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 3(38) – Absence of substantive offence – Principle of Nulla Poena Sine Lege – Punishment for mere status – Subordinate legislation cannot create an offence - The Supreme Court held that the U.P. Gangsters Act, 1986 is "stillborn" as it completely fails to create a substantive crime or penalise any specific act or omission - The enactment merely provides definitions of 'gang' and 'gangster' under Section 2 and directly prescribes punishment under Section 3 without defining an actionable offence - Indulgence in activities under Section 2(b)(i) to (xxv) is already penalised under independent penal statutes, and the Act impermissibly punishes a person for their executive-determined "status" rather than an actus reus created by the statute - The subordinate Rules of 2021, by prescribing a Gang Chart procedure to determine such status, exceed the rule-making powers under Section 23 of the Act - Creation of an offence is an essential legislative function that cannot be delegated to executive ipse dixit. [Paras 21- 59]. Shiv Pratap Singh @ Chinu v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2026 INSC 894
Government Contracts and Public Tenders – Challenge to Eligibility Conditions – Delay and Laches – Cause of Action – Stage of Intervention – Judicial Review under Article 226/136 - A facial challenge to a tender condition or eligibility criterion—as distinguished from a challenge to bid evaluation or disqualification accrues on the very day the tender condition is published, as nothing further remains to be discovered - An entity finding itself ineligible or excluded by an allegedly arbitrary clause must approach the Court at the earliest - Delay in public procurement tenders is measured not merely by calendar days or the statutory limitation period, but against the progression of the procurement process itself - Where tenderers consciously delay approaching the court until the tender process has advanced substantially, third-party rights have intervened, or public interest would be prejudiced, relief is liable to be refused on the sole ground of delay and laches. Non-judicial representations and legal notices do not arrest delay or cure a lack of diligence. [Paras 19 - 26] Utkarsh Enterprises v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 825 : 2026 INSC 881
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — Section 15(2)(b) — Devolution of property inherited by female Hindu dying intestate and issueless - Where the Will propounded by one branch fails for lack of legal proof and failure to remove suspicious circumstances, the testatrix is deemed to have died intestate - property inherited by an issueless female Hindu from her husband does not devolve under general rules of Section 15(1), but reverts to the heirs of the husband under Section 15(2)(b) - The heirs representing the branches of the predeceased wives are entitled to their proportionate partition shares accordingly. [Paras 136–139] Pazhanathal v. Alamathal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2026 INSC 860
Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 & Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (IR Code) — Legal Impact on Section 2(j) of the ID Act — Status of Bangalore Water Supply as an interpretive guide for future enactments - The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act 46 of 1982) was never notified by the Central Government and thus remained inchoate without acquiring operative legal force - The IR Code, 2020, which came into force on 21.11.2025 repealing the ID Act, constitutes an independent legislative scheme - The provisions and definitions under the IR Code must be interpreted on their own terms, text, and statutory context - Bangalore Water Supply shall not be regarded as the sheet anchor for interpreting the definition of "industry" under the IR Code. [Paras 81, 279–284, 287]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Per B.V. Nagarathna, J. (Dissenting / Separate Concurring in Result) - Reconsideration of Bangalore Water Supply was wholly unnecessary and the reference itself was unjustified - The Five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh misinterpreted an apparent factual distinction between Jagannath Kondhare and Pratamsingh Parmar as a legal conflict - With the ID Act having been repealed w.e.f. 21.11.2025 and replaced by the IR Code, embarking upon an interpretive re-engineering of Section 2(j) is an entirely academic exercise - In an era of post-1991 Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation (LPG), an expansive definition of "industry" as articulated by Krishna Iyer, J. and concurred with by Beg, C.J. and Chandrachud, C.J. (constituting a clear 5:2 majority) remains vital to safeguard vulnerable workmen against imbalances in bargaining power - The ratio and Triple Test in Bangalore Water Supply require no modification or dilution whatsoever. [Paras 1.1–1.4, 3, 4, 12.1–12.6, 17.1–17.8, 18.3–18.11, 19.1–19.8]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Per Dipankar Datta, J., on behalf of himself and Ujjal Bhuyan, J. - Constitution of India — Article 145(5) — Jurisprudential Precedent and Bench References — Maintainability and Effect of Repeal - A Bench of lesser quorum cannot question the substantive soundness of a decision delivered by a larger Bench (Bangalore Water Supply, 7-Judges) merely because of divergent subsequent opinions - Doubting the correctness of an expansive interpretation that has settled industrial relations across the nation disrupts the bedrock principle of certainty - With the enforcement of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 on 21.11.2025 and the repeal of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, settled rights of workmen in pending legacy proceedings cannot be destabilized by rewriting or reading down Bangalore Water Supply under the guise of calibrating the Triple Test. [Relied on Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213; State (NCT of Delhi) v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370; Trimurthi Fragrances Pvt. Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2024) 20 SCC 709]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J. - Practice and Procedure — Maintainability of Reference to Larger Bench — Stare Decisis and Res Judicata — Doctrine of Judicial Discipline - A preliminary objection to maintainability raised on the ground of res judicata (citing Coir Board (II) which earlier declined a reference) and stare decisis is untenable - Res judicata applies to determinations in personam arising from a specific cause of action, not to pure questions of law or reference of legal precedents - A Five-Judge Bench, being superior in strength to a Three-Judge Bench, was fully competent to refer doubts to the Chief Justice of India for placing before a larger Bench - Institutional prudence and the necessity of bringing finality to decades of conflicting jurisprudence override procedural technicalities. [Relied on Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673; Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293; Trimurthi Fragrances Private Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2024) 20 SCC 709; State (NCT of Delhi) v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370; Paras 90–96, 110–116, 118–127, 131–138]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 2(j) — Constitution of India, Articles 14, 38, 39, and 43 — Per Joymalya Bagchi, J. - Sovereign Functions Exception — Government Welfare Schemes and Bottom-rung Employees - A blanket exclusion of government welfare departments and schemes from Section 2(j) is unconstitutional and offensive to the equality code under Article 14. A gardener, driver, clerk, or maintenance employee does not perform a different species of physical or operational labour simply because their payslip bears the seal of the State - The sovereign functions exemption must strictly remain confined to the inalienable, non-justiciable core of Statehood (such as defense, foreign affairs, coinage, administration of justice, and legislative enactment) - Extending "sovereign immunity" to developmental or socio-economic welfare schemes strikes hardest at vulnerable daily-rated and precarious workers who most require industrial protection - The Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply embodies the constitutional vision of social justice and correctly brings such employment within the statutory shield. [Relied On: Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213; Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675; Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 2(j) — Definition of "Industry" — Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 — Scope, calibration, and prospective effect of reformulation — Commercial character restored as an essential element - The Seven-Judge Bench decision in Bangalore Water Supply erred to the extent of completely discarding the rule of noscitur a sociis, leading to an overly expansive construction that decoupled the definition of "industry" from its traditional economic and commercial underpinnings - The inquiry had erroneously shifted almost entirely toward the presence of an employer-employee relationship, relegating the functional nature and character of the activity to the background - Held (per Majority — Surya Kant, C.J.I., Satish Chandra Sharma, Alok Aradhe, and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ.) - (i) While the core framework of the Triple Test has largely stood the test of time, it required calibration and refinement - The test ought to be reformulated to require: (a) systematic activity; (b) organized through cooperation between employer and employee; and (c) the production, distribution, or provision of goods or services possessing a discernible commercial character that is analogous to trade or business to satisfy material human wants and wishes - (ii) The absence of a profit motive remains irrelevant; an enterprise may have a commercial character without an intention to maximize profits - (iii) However, to avoid prejudice and instability, this refined formulation operates purely prospectively and remains our considered opinion/hypothesis for future guidance - All matters currently pending before Labour Courts, Tribunals, High Courts, and the Supreme Court under the ID Act shall continue to be governed and decided strictly in accordance with the Triple Test as laid down in Bangalore Water Supply. [Paras 216–220, 230–236, 246–250, 274–278, 287]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 2(j) — Sovereign Functions Exception and State Welfare Activities — Applicability to Government Departments - Welfare schemes and socio-economic activities undertaken by the State or its instrumentalities in furtherance of Directive Principles under Part IV and Fundamental Rights under Part III cannot be presumed to automatically constitute an "industry" simply because they involve organized employment - Governmental undertakings must be evaluated on their true substance and functional character rather than mere form - Where functions are governed by separate constitutional/statutory frameworks (e.g., Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution) or lack an analogy to trade or commerce, they stand outside Section 2(j) - public utility services and substantially severable units carrying on commercial-type operations within government departments remain amenable to Section 2(j). [Paras 261–287]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 5(21) – Operational Debt vs. Damages - Scope of Operational Debt in Works Contracts - Amounts payable as consideration for completed stages/milestones in a works/EPC contract fall within the definition of "operational debt" under Section 5(21) of the IBC - Unadjudicated Damages Cannot Constitute Operational Debt - Claims for suspension charges, idling costs, or demobilization expenses arising from an alleged breach of contract are in the nature of damages (liquidated or unliquidated) - They cannot be treated as an operational debt unless and until they are formally assessed, adjudicated, and crystallized by a court or arbitral tribunal of competent jurisdiction. [Paras 48–54, 90-93] Srinivasa Reddy Velagala v. Sravanthi Infratech Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 793 : 2026 INSC 835
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 3(12), 9, & 238A r/w Limitation Act, 1963, Article 137 & Section 18 – Starting Point of Limitation – Continuing Cause of Action – Unilateral Legal Notices - Non-payment of Debt as a Singular Default - A default arising out of non-payment of a due and payable amount provides a cause of action on the date when the default occurs and does not constitute a "continuing cause of action" - While an unpaid debt may cause continuing damage, it does not cause continuing legal injury - The mere subsistence of an EPC contract does not extend the statutory limitation period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act - Each Invoice Generates Its Own Default - Where a claim is founded on multiple invoices or milestone payments, each invoice/milestone generates its own date of default - Limitation cannot be treated in the aggregate from the date of the first or last invoice, and only defaults occurring within the three years preceding the filing of the Section 9 application can be entertained - Unilateral Notices Do Not Reset Limitation - Mere service of statutory/legal demand notices by the creditor without any written acknowledgment of liability by the debtor under Section 18 of the Limitation Act cannot extend or reset the limitation period - The IBC is not intended to revive or give a new lease of life to time-barred claims. [Paras 69–73, 75, 76, 81–85, 97–100] Srinivasa Reddy Velagala v. Sravanthi Infratech Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 793 : 2026 INSC 835
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 8 & 9 – Pre-Existing Dispute – Corporate Debtor's Silence - Standard for Dispute: To bar an application under Section 9, a dispute must truly exist, be substantive, and not be spurious, hypothetical, or illusory - It is not strictly necessary for a civil suit or arbitration to be pending prior to the Section 8 notice - Silence as Evidence of No Dispute - While silence cannot as a general rule be treated as an indicator of "no dispute", consistent and total silence on the part of the corporate debtor across multiple notices over several years, without raising any contestation until filing a reply to the Section 9 application, shows that the defence is an afterthought, establishing the absence of a pre-existing dispute. [Paras 56–64, 94–96] Srinivasa Reddy Velagala v. Sravanthi Infratech Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 793 : 2026 INSC 835
Insurance Act, 1938 — Section 64VB — Marine Cargo Annual Turnover Policy — Advance Payment of Premium — Mandatory Statutory Embargo on Assumption of Risk — Surpassing Insured Turnover Prior to Occurrence of Loss — Retrospective Regularisation impermissible — Estoppel cannot operate against statute - Under Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, 1938, there is an absolute statutory embargo prohibiting an insurer from assuming risk unless and until the premium is received in advance or guaranteed in the prescribed manner - Where an insured entity under a Marine Cargo Annual Turnover Policy surpasses the total agreed sum insured/turnover limit prior to the date of the loss incident, the insurance coverage ceases to attach in the absence of advance payment of additional premium - The subsequent payment of additional premium and issuance of an endorsement accepting the same cannot retrospectively regularise the policy or resurrect lapsed coverage for an incident that occurred when the policy limit stood exhausted - The insurer cannot be held bound by estoppel or waiver by conduct, as the rule of estoppel cannot be applied against or in contravention of a mandatory statutory command. [Paras 10 - 13] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2026 INSC 876
Interpretation of Statutes – Non Obstante Clause vs. Saving Clause - A non obstante clause operates to set aside as no longer valid anything contained in relevant existing laws that is inconsistent with the new enactment - It cannot cut down clear terms of an enactment, and must be understood to operate according to its plain grammatical construction or as clarifying the whole position incorporated ex abundanti cautela - The words "any law for the time being in force" include provisions within the very enactment in which those words appear. [Relied on Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369; Dominion of India v. Shrinbai A. Irani, AIR 1954 SC 596; Paras 6, 7] Union of India v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 863 : 2026 INSC 919
Judicial Review & Separation of Powers — Legislative and Executive Domain — Future Scrutiny - The choice and substitution of penal methods of execution fall squarely within legislative and executive policy - Dismissal of the writ petition does not foreclose future constitutional scrutiny if compelling scientific, medical, or empirical evidence emerges to displace the foundational premise of Deena v. Union of India - The Union Government is not precluded from undertaking a comprehensive review through an expert body (comprising specialists in law, forensic medicine, neuroscience, penology, and allied disciplines) to assess if any alternative method better balances pain minimization with human dignity. [Relied on Deena v. Union of India, (1983) 4 SCC 645; Shashi Nayar (Smt) v. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 96; Paras 45 - 65] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000; Section 7A, Section 15(1)(g), Section 19, and Section 20 read with Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Section 25 — Claim of Juvenility at Appellate Stage — Effect on Conviction and Sentence - A plea of juvenility can be raised at any stage before any court, even after the final disposal of the case - The subsequent declaration of juvenility does not, by itself, erase or annul a finding of guilt recorded on evidence by a regular court - It primarily affects the forum and nature of the permissible disposition and renders the adult sentence legally ineffective - Where a person below eighteen years of age on the date of commission of an offence was tried and sentenced as an adult, the conviction on merits is to be maintained, but the substantive adult sentence, fine, and default stipulations are deemed to have no effect and must be set aside - When the juvenile has already undergone detention well beyond the maximum permissible period of three years under Section 15(1)(g), remanding the matter back to the Juvenile Justice Board is an empty formality; the accused is not required to surrender and is entitled to statutory protection against disqualifications arising from conviction under Section 19. [Paras 12, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2026 INSC 842
Land Acquisition — Determination of Entitlement — "Enjoyment Survey" Has No Legal Sanction — Mere Physical Possession Cannot Substitute Legal Title - An "enjoyment survey" conducted to record the state of physical occupation on the acquired land has no statutory basis under the law for determining entitlement to compensation - Such a survey merely captures physical occupation at the time it is conducted and is incapable of examining legal title, lawful right, or the nature of possession (e.g., assignee, permissive possessor, encroacher, or trespasser) - Public funds disbursed towards land acquisition cannot be released merely to a person found in physical possession or who is the most vocal or visible before authorities; it must be paid to the person legally entitled in accordance with law - Apportionment based solely on an enjoyment survey is unsustainable in law. [Relied On Gudala Pentamma v. State of Telangana, 2026 SCC OnLine TS 6654; Kottamula Mallaiah v. State of Telangana, W.P. No. 2118/2023; Paras 40-44] Singapogu Babu Rao v. Special Deputy Collector, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 831 : 2026 INSC 888
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Sections 29, 30, and 31 — Apportionment of Compensation — Reference to Civil Court — Modes of Resolving Apportionment Dispute - There are only two modes under the statutory scheme to resolve disputes regarding the apportionment of compensation - (i) under Section 29, where persons interested arrive at an agreement among themselves; and (ii) under Section 30, where in the absence of an agreement, the Collector refers the dispute to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction for adjudication - An agreement under Section 29 strictly requires the concurrence of all persons interested - A partial or truncated consensus involving only some claimants cannot take effect as an agreement under Section 29, as those excluded remain in dispute -Making a reference under Section 30 is an explicit acknowledgment by the Collector of a prima facie dispute as to title and apportionment, which the Collector is not empowered to adjudicate - Once compensation is deposited in Court, the Collector/acquiring body exits the arena, and the dispute survives solely between the rival claimants. [Relied On Dr. G.H. Grant v. State of Bihar, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 51; Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, (2003) 3 SCC 128; Paras 28-46] Singapogu Babu Rao v. Special Deputy Collector, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 831 : 2026 INSC 888
Land Law - Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 — Section 3 & Section 4 — Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905 — Section 2, Section 3 & Section 6 — Companies Act, 1956 — Winding up and Liquidation — Summary proceedings for eviction / resumption of land — Bona fide dispute of title — Long, settled, and uninterrupted possession - Summary Eviction Cannot Be Resorted to Where Bona Fide Dispute as to Title Exists - When there is a serious, genuine, and bona fide dispute regarding title and ownership over land tracing back several decades on the basis of registered title deeds, mutation entries, and long, uninterrupted possession (including conversion to industrial use and operation of a functional factory), the State Government cannot unilaterally determine title in its own favour or resort to summary eviction/resumption proceedings under Section 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977. Circar Paper Mills Ltd. v. District Collector, Nellore Distt., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 868 : 2026 INSC 924
Land Law - Appropriate Remedy is a Properly Constituted Civil Suit - Custody of Company Court & Official Liquidator - Questions of complicated or disputed title over immovable property cannot be adjudicated summarily under summary eviction statutes, in writ proceedings under Article 226, or before the Company Court conducting an auction sale of properties in the custody of the Official Liquidator - The proper recourse for the State to establish title in such cases is by way of a properly instituted civil suit - Where the Official Liquidator takes possession of properties under the orders of the Company Court, the property comes into the custody of the Court - The State cannot sit back in slumber and later stall auction proceedings or claim summary resumption without establishing its title in a competent forum - The Division Bench of the High Court erred in summarily setting aside the confirmation of the auction-sale - Allowing the appeals, the Supreme Court held that the title and uninterrupted possession were traceable back to 1920 under registered deeds, mutations, and industrial sanctions - Following Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao, where a bona fide and genuine dispute regarding title exists, the Government cannot unilaterally assert title and invoke summary eviction - The order of the Division Bench was set aside, the Single Judge's confirmation order revived, and the connected writ petitions restored for fresh consideration in accordance with the law. [Relied on Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao and Another, (1982) 2 SCC 134; Paras 12–20] Circar Paper Mills Ltd. v. District Collector, Nellore Distt., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 868 : 2026 INSC 924
Land Revenue Code, 1959 (Madhya Pradesh) – Section 117 – Revenue Entries / Mutation – Effect on Title - Settled law dictates that an entry in the revenue record neither creates nor extinguishes title; it exists essentially for fiscal purposes - An order of mutation passed by a Naib Tehsildar cannot operate as a conveyance or relinquishment of proprietary rights merely by substituting names in the revenue register - The civil court remains fully competent to determine underlying title, which a revenue entry merely follows rather than creates - The statutory presumption of correctness attaching to a revenue entry under Section 117 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 is a rebuttable evidentiary presumption and not a presumption of title, which can be displaced by evidence showing the absence of lawful divestment or relinquishment. [Relied on Sawarni v. Inder Kaur and Others, (1996) 6 SCC 223; Paras 21, 22] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900
Law of Torts — Electrocution Cases — Principle of Liability Applicable — Strict Liability vs. Absolute Liability — Exceptions to Strict Liability - In cases of electrocution involving electricity transmission and distribution entities, the standard of liability applicable is Strict Liability (under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher), and not Absolute Liability - Although transmission of electricity is inherently dangerous and enterprises engaging in it are strictly liable irrespective of absence of negligence/fault, such liability remains subject to recognized legal exceptions (e.g., act of God, act of a stranger, default/negligence of the plaintiff, consent, statutory authority) - The standard of absolute liability (evolved in M.C. Mehta without exceptions) does not apply indiscriminately to all electrocution cases so as to preclude statutory and factual defences. [Relied on Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527; M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, (2002) 2 SCC 162; Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2001) 2 SCC 9; Distinguished from M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram - Oleum Gas), (1987) 1 SCC 395; Paras 10-14] Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation v. Rekha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 799 : 2026 INSC 847
Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 — Section 19(5) read with Regulation 17(2) of National Legal Services Authority (Lok Adalat) Regulations, 2009 — Validity and Enforceability of Lok Adalat Award — Mandatory Requirement of Signatures and Consent of All Disputing Parties - A Lok Adalat award is binding only on the parties who entered into a settlement accepted by both sides - Under Regulation 17(2) of the NALSA (Lok Adalat) Regulations, 2009, an award must bear the signatures of the parties to the settlement - Where a dispute regarding title and apportionment under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is referred, individual awards passed by the Lok Adalat without recording terms of compromise among the rival claimants, and without the presence or signatures of all disputed title holders, are invalid, non-binding, and void against non-signatory claimants - Lok Adalat awards drawn as if the dispute were merely between the Land Acquisition Officer/acquiring body and an individual interest-holder cannot extinguish or resolve the inter se title disputes of rival claimants. [Relied On Vasant Nanaji Patre v. Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5305/2025; Paras 37-52;] Singapogu Babu Rao v. Special Deputy Collector, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 831 : 2026 INSC 888
Limitation Act, 1963 – Articles 58 & 100 – Suit for Declaration of Co-ownership by Succession – Starting Point of Limitation – Co-owners and Plea of Ouster - The starting point of limitation cannot be fixed merely by identifying the date on which a revenue mutation entry was recorded - In law, the possession of one co-owner is ordinarily treated as possession on behalf of all, and a co-owner in possession does not acquire adverse title merely by continuing in possession - Ouster between co-heirs requires an open assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the other co-heir; mere exclusive possession is insufficient - Where a suit is substantially for declaration of co-ownership by succession, partition, and separate possession, and not directly founded upon a challenge to a revenue order as the source of title, the limitation runs from the date when the right to sue actually accrued upon knowledge of adverse claims/threat to title (such as a public notice to sell), rather than the date of an unnoticed mutation order. [Relied on P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, (1956) 2 SCC 759; Paras 24-26] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900
Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 14 – Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction – Winding up proceedings vs. Suit for recovery of money – Initiation of winding up / insolvency proceedings does not suspend or extend the limitation period for filing an independent civil suit for recovery of money - The remedy of winding up and the remedy of a civil suit for recovery are separate and independent - A Company Court has no competence or jurisdiction to extend the statutory period of limitation for instituting a recovery suit. [Relied on Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari, 1950 SCC 766; Jignesh Shah and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., (2019) 10 SCC 750; Distinguished from Kalpraj Dharamshi and Anr. v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited and Anr., (2021) 10 SCC 401; J. Kumaradasan Nair v. Iric Sohan, (2009) 12 SCC 175; Paras 13 - 16] Mageba Bridge Products v. Trade Centre, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 795 : 2026 INSC 839
Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 18 & Section 19 – Acknowledgment of debt and effect of part payment – Invoices vs. Running Account – A suit instituted strictly on the strength of individual unpaid invoices/bills, and not on a mutual, open, and current running account, cannot claim extension of limitation merely because the debtor made payments against specific admitted invoices while disputing all other claims - Payment restricted to distinct admitted invoices does not constitute a part-payment of the entire disputed liability nor does it amount to an acknowledgment of debt under Section 18/19 of the Limitation Act – Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 – 18] Mageba Bridge Products v. Trade Centre, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 795 : 2026 INSC 839
Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Evidence — Direct Conflict & Improbability - Mismatch Between Number of Blows/Assailants and Post-Mortem Findings - When the ocular version attributes continuous blows with iron pipes to the victim's head by four separate assailants over 2 to 3 minutes, but the post-mortem report reveals only a single laceration with a frontal bone fracture, and the medical expert testifies that repeated blows by four persons would have crushed the skull, the ocular account is medically improbable - Exaggeration vs. Inconsistency - Exaggeration explains overstatement of ferocity, but it cannot explain how an assault deposed to have been delivered by four assailants with separate weapons registered as a single point of impact - Such a fundamental mismatch creates reasonable doubt that goes to the root of the prosecution case. [Paras 30-33] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 146, 147, 149, 196, 207 & Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999 — Section 14 — Non-compliance of Section 146 MVA — Uninsured Vehicles — Technology Integration & Structural Framework Directions - Noting that nearly 56% of vehicles plying on Indian roads remain uninsured, creating severe impediments to motor accident victims receiving timely compensation, the Supreme Court issued wide-ranging directions under public interest: i. ANPR Integration for e-Challans - Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras on highways and roads must be integrated with data from the Insurance Information Bureau (IIB) and VAHAN portal to issue automatic e-challans to uninsured vehicles; ii. Handheld Devices for Traffic Police - State Police forces are to be equipped with handheld digital devices or apps linked to IIB and VAHAN portals for real-time verification of insurance status on the ground; iii. Four-Layer Structure for Private Vehicle Policies - IRDA to implement a standardized four-tier insurance policy structure for private vehicles (1. Mandatory Third-Party Only; 2. Optional Occupant/Pillion Cover; 3. Personal Accident Cover for Owner/Driver/Occupants; 4. Own Damage Cover) accompanied by a mandatory 'Customer Option Form' and 'Customer Information Sheet'; iv. Enhancement of Mandatory Multi-Year Cover Duration - Extending its earlier mandate in S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, the Court enhanced the mandatory third-party insurance period at the time of purchase/registration of new vehicles from 3 years to 4 years for new cars and from 5 years to 6 years for new two-wheelers; v. Pilot Projects — Fuel Denial & Toll Automation - IRDA and MoRTH to evolve a pilot project linking fuel supply at petrol pumps to valid insurance status (denying fuel to uninsured vehicles via ANPR cameras) - MoRTH to also implement toll plaza automation through automatic detection to eliminate congestion. [Paras 23-30] National Insurance v. Thungala Dhana Laxmi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 759 : 2026 INSC 793
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 159 (formerly Section 158(6)) & Section 166 — Motor Accident Claims Procedure — Pending Pre-2022 Cases - To resolve long-pending Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) cases relating to accidents occurring prior to 31.03.2022, the Supreme Court directed the State Police to promptly file Detailed Accident Reports (DAR) along with relevant documents (FIR, MLC, post-mortem report, insurance policy, permit) before the concerned MACT, and assist in prompt service/production of witnesses for speedy disposal - Courts must not adopt a hyper-technical approach in motor accident compensation claims - Pursuant to the IRDA Circular dated 16.11.2009, insurance companies under a comprehensive/package policy are liable to compensate for any occupant/passenger travelling in the vehicle - Held, High Court rightly awarded compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased owner/occupant travelling as a passenger under a comprehensive insurance policy. [Relied on S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 447; General Insurance Council v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2007) 12 SCC 354; Shishu Pal @ Shish Ram & Ors v. Surjeet & Ors, 2026 INSC 63; In Re: Phalodi Accident v. National Highways Authority of India and Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 646; Abhijeet Kumar Pandey v. State of Bihar, 2023 SCC OnLine Pat 279; Paras 31-34] National Insurance v. Thungala Dhana Laxmi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 759 : 2026 INSC 793
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Contributory Negligence — Topographical Scene Sketch / Site Map - A rough sketch or site map prepared post-accident cannot be read in isolation or used as the exclusive foundation to apportion contributory negligence against the driver of a smaller vehicle in the absence of corroborative ocular testimony - The resting position of a lighter vehicle on a site map post-collision cannot automatically lead to an inference that it was being driven on the wrong side or caused the impact, as a collision with a heavy, speeding vehicle naturally pushes or drags the smaller vehicle forward - The contact point between vehicles is determinative, not the ultimate drag marks - The High Court's attribution of 50% contributory negligence to the deceased car driver solely based on the car's resting spot on the sketch was set aside and 100% sole negligence of the KSRTC bus driver restored. [Relied on Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., (2018) 5 SCC 656; Sunita & Ors. v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., (2020) 13 SCC 486; Paras 20 - 22.1] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 168 — Assessment of Notional Income — Skilled IT Entrepreneur — Just Compensation - Fixation of notional income at Rs. 20,000/- per month for a qualified Mechanical Engineer who obtained specialised software certifications in Oracle and Visual Basic and successfully transitioned into an IT entrepreneur running a proprietorship executing corporate software contracts in Bangalore was excessively low - Relying on corporate purchase orders, bank inquiry records, and business invoices from 2003 to 2005, the deceased's base monthly income at the time of death in October 2005 assessed realistically at Rs. 70,000/- per month - After standard statutory tax deductions, addition of 40% towards future prospects, 1/3rd deduction towards personal expenses, and applying multiplier of 17, total compensation enhanced from Rs. 7,17,634/- to Rs. 50,81,876/- along with 6% interest per annum payable solely by the State Road Transport Corporation. [Paras 26-30] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 168 — Child Victim Suffering Permanent Disability — Method of Determination of Just Compensation — Assessment Parameters - Child Victims vs. Adults - Child victims suffering permanent or near-total disability constitute a distinct and special category - Compensation cannot be evaluated through the same lens applied to adults. Loss suffered by a child is lifelong, continuing, and irreversible, depriving them not merely of physical capacity, but of their entire future life and human dignity - Functional Disability vs. Physical Disability - A conceptual distinction exists between medically certified physical impairment and functional disability felt in daily life - Where a 6-month-old infant suffered 90% permanent locomotor disability (post-traumatic myelopathy with paraplegia) rendering her completely dependent on others for life, her functional disability must be treated as 100% because her future earning capacity stands completely extinguished - For a minor child (up to 15 years) suffering catastrophic permanent disability, the multiplier to be applied is 18 - The High Court erred in applying a multiplier of 15 - Minor children who suffer death or permanent disability cannot be placed in the category of non-earning individuals or unskilled labourers - The loss of income must necessarily be calculated based on the matrix of minimum wages payable to a skilled worker in the respective State at the relevant time plus 40% towards future prospects - Compensation towards attendant charges for a severely disabled child requiring lifelong 24-hour assistance must be determined using the multiplier method (taking full-time skilled assistance rates and applying a multiplier of 18) rather than awarding a lump-sum nominal amount - Compensation enhanced from ₹45,40,800/- to ₹83,38,360/- along with 9% per annum interest. [Relied on Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4 SCC 413; Master Ayush v. Reliance General Insurance Company Limited, (2022) 7 SCC 738; Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmed Simon, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3692; Hitesh Nagjibhai Patel v. Bababhai Nagjibhai Rabari, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 3446; Shankar Dutt v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1193; Paras 31-76] Gayatree Pattnaik for Shreejita Pattnaik v. Arundhati Sahoo, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 756 : 2026 INSC 785
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 166 and 168 — Proof of Negligence — Evidentiary Value of Criminal Investigation Records vs. Criminal Court Acquittal - Police investigation records, including the First Information Report (FIR) and the final charge-sheet, constitute valid, admissible, and reliable prima facie evidence to establish rash and negligent driving in Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) proceedings - The subsequent acquittal of the offending driver in a criminal case particularly an acquittal based on the benefit of doubt does not eclipse or displace tortious liability under the MV Act - Criminal trials and civil motor accident claim adjudications operate in distinct realms - the standard of culpable rashness under Section 304A IPC is significantly higher than that of actionable negligence under the law of torts, which is governed strictly by the touchstone of preponderance of probability rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt - The High Court committed an error apparent in reversing the Tribunal's finding of sole negligence against the bus driver by predominantly relying on his criminal court acquittal and the non-examination of the claimant in the criminal trial. [Relied on ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajani Sahoo & Ors., (2025) 2 SCC 599; Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi & Anr., (2023) 13 SCC 510; Geeta Dubey & Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3779; Paras 20-22] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 166(1)(c) – Claim Petition by Legal Representatives – Dependency vs Devolution of Estate - Liability to pay compensation under the Act does not cease merely because of the absence of dependency of the legal representative - The right to file a claim petition extends to all legal representatives upon whom the estate devolves or who represent the estate of the deceased. [Relied on National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Magma General Insurance Company Limited v. Nanu Ram and Others, (2018) 18 SCC 130; National Insurance Company Limited v. Birender and Others, (2020) 11 SCC 356; Puttamma and Others v. K.L. Narayana Reddy and Another, (2013) 15 SCC 45; Paras 5-7] Sameem Begum v. K. Venkat Swamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : 2026 INSC 864
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Sections 166, 168 – Motor Accident Compensation – Conventional Heads – Loss of Consortium – Spousal and Parental Consortium – Enhancement of 10% every three years - The head of 'consortium' is an indispensable and vital component of just compensation in motor accident claim cases - The term 'consortium' is a compendious concept encompassing spousal consortium (loss of company, society, and conjugal affection to the surviving spouse), parental consortium (loss of guidance, care, protection, and affection to surviving children), and filial consortium (loss suffered by parents on the death of a child) - All legal representatives, including major children, who suffer on account of the vehicular death are entitled to claim and receive compensation under the head of consortium - In accordance with the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance, each surviving dependent/legal representative (spouse and children) is entitled to compensation of ₹40,000/- under the head of spousal or parental consortium, subject to a mandatory 10% enhancement every three years - the Supreme Court awarded ₹48,400/- each to the surviving wife (spousal consortium) and each of the three children (parental consortium), along with ₹15,000/- each towards funeral expenses and loss of estate. [Paras 5 - 9] Sameem Begum v. K. Venkat Swamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : 2026 INSC 864
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 31A read with Section 37(2) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 436A [Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Section 479] — Maximum Detention Period for Undertrials — Inapplicability where Capital Punishment is Specified - Where the accused was previously convicted under the NDPS Act and subsequently implicated as a mastermind in trafficking commercial quantities (approx. 5 kg heroin), the enhanced penalty provisions under Section 31A of the NDPS Act (which prescribe death penalty as an alternative punishment) stand attracted - The statutory protection under Section 436A CrPC (or Section 479 BNSS) for release upon undergoing one-half of the maximum sentence is expressly inapplicable to offences for which the punishment of death is specified. [Paras 15, 16] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 37 — Commercial Quantity — Grant of Bail to Foreign Nationals — Mandatory Twin Conditions — Article 21 & Incarceration - Right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is not exercised in isolation from statutory rigours; in cases involving commercial quantities under special enactments such as the NDPS Act, the Article 21 right must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the ground of delay to override the twin statutory conditions - The High Court erred in granting bail to a foreign national solely on grounds of prolonged incarceration (2.5 years) and reliance on Tofan Singh without recording mandatory satisfaction under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) that there were reasonable grounds to believe he was not guilty and unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. [Paras 11-14] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 42 – Search and Seizure – Secret Information received on the move – Substantial Compliance - Total non-compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) is impermissible - where information is received while an empowered officer is on patrol duty/on the move and emergent action is required to intercept a vehicle in transit, immediate recording in writing is not feasible - Where the Investigating Officer scribed a contemporaneously recording the substance of the information before interception and summoned a superior Gazetted Officer who supervised the search, there is substantial compliance with Section 42 - The registration and dispatch of an FIR under the CrPC cannot by itself assume compliance with Section 42, but it is a relevant circumstance that can be weighed alongside other contemporaneous material to determine if the statutory purpose has been served. [Relied on Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 8 SCC 539; Bahadur Singh v. State of Haryana, (2010) 4 SCC 445; Paras 27–35] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 50 – Scope of Personal Search vs Search of Conveyance - The safeguard enacted under Section 50 applies exclusively to the search of the person of an individual to prevent unwitnessed personal searches, and does not extend to the search of a bag, container, or conveyance - The search of a vehicle and the incidental personal search of an occupant are two separate and independent steps - Where contraband is recovered solely from the vehicle (beneath a tarpaulin) and nothing is recovered during personal search, Section 50 is not attracted and the entire search is not vitiated - The substantive rank/current duty charge status of the Gazetted Officer overseeing the search is inconsequential when Section 50 is not attracted. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar, (2005) 4 SCC 350; Paras 35–37] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 52A & Standing Order 1/88 – Delay in dispatching samples to Chemical Examiner – Procedural Irregularity - The requirement for prompt dispatch (e.g., within 72 hours) is aimed at foreclosing tampering or substitution while samples are outside judicial custody - Where the case property was produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours (who verified seals and drew representative samples) and the Chemical Examiner confirmed seals intact and matching the specimen impressions, the possibility of tampering is independently foreclosed - An interval between seizure and chemical examination constitutes a mere procedural irregularity that does not vitiate the trial in the absence of evidence of tampering. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; Paras 38–40] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 54 & Section 15 – Presumption from Possession of Illicit Articles – Ownership vs Possession - For an offence under Section 15, what is material is conscious possession and not title or registration of the conveyance - The fact that a vehicle is registered in the name of a third party does not absolve the occupants when commercial quantity contraband is recovered from the vehicle - Once conscious possession is established, the statutory presumption under Section 54 is attracted, casting a reverse onus on the accused to provide a satisfactory account - Bare assertions of false implication unsupported by complaints to higher authorities do not rebut this presumption. [Paras 40-48] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854
National Coal Wage Agreement - VI (NCWA) – Clause 9.3.4 – Compassionate Appointment – Age Eligibility – Relevant Date for Determining Upper Age Limit – Administrative Delay by Employer – Welfare Nature of Scheme - The Supreme Court held that the age eligibility of a candidate seeking compassionate appointment under Clause 9.3.4 of the National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA) cannot be reckoned with reference to the date of consideration of the application where the delay is attributable to the employer - An otherwise eligible dependent who was within the prescribed upper age limit (35 years) on the date of death of the employee and when the compassionate appointment process commenced (marked by the employer directing police verification) cannot be rendered ineligible merely because administrative formalities or processing took time - Employers cannot be permitted to defeat the claim of an eligible dependent by taking advantage of their own administrative delay. [Paras 15 - 26] Raspelli Bhagya Kishaiya v. General Manager Western Coalfields, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 811 : 2026 INSC 841
National Coal Wage Agreement - VI (NCWA) – Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) / Circular Reference No. 1416/2020-21 – Commencement of Process - Directive issued by the employer requiring the applicant to undergo police verification is an intrinsic part of the compassionate appointment process under the SOP and cannot take place unless a claim has already been initiated - Rejection of the claim on the ground that the formal application was received on a later date when the candidate had crossed 35 years is legally unsustainable when the process was initiated prior to the applicant crossing the age limit - Allowing the appeal against the judgment of the Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court directed the respondent-authorities to reconsider the claim of Appellant No. 2 for compassionate appointment by treating him as eligible in age and to verify only the remaining eligibility conditions within 8 weeks, with appointment to be offered within 4 weeks thereafter if found eligible. [Relied on Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa & Ors., (2024) 15 SCC 766; Paras 17-23] Raspelli Bhagya Kishaiya v. General Manager Western Coalfields, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 811 : 2026 INSC 841
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138 read with Section 141 — Dishonour of Cheque — Non-Impleadment of Company as Accused — Maintainability of Complaint against Director/Authorised Signatory — Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Arraignment of Company is Mandatory - For maintaining a prosecution under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, arraigning the company as an accused is an express condition precedent - Where a cheque is drawn on an account maintained by a company, commission of the offence by the company is a prerequisite to attract vicarious liability against its directors or authorised signatories - A complaint filed solely against a director/authorised signatory without impleadment of the company suffers from a fatal, fundamental defect and is non est in law. [Paras 11 - 14] Manjula Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 763 : 2026 INSC 789
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138, Section 118(a), Section 139 — Presumption in favour of holder & Rebuttal — Financial capacity of complainant & Ex post facto defense - Once the drawer admits their signature on the cheque, mandatory statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arise in favour of the holder - The onus then shifts to the accused to displace the presumption by leading cogent direct or indirect evidence - A bare denial, plausible theories, or ex post facto creation of evidence (such as sending a legal notice demanding return of cheques after the commencement of prosecution evidence) does not rebut the statutory presumption - where the accused fails to reply to the statutory demand notice under Section 138 to specifically plead lack of financial capacity of the complainant, the complainant cannot be expected to adduce evidence establishing his financial capacity at the initial stage - The financial capacity of the complainant is sufficiently demonstrated where evidence shows mobilization of funds through relatives/friends and investments in chit funds. [Paras 5-7] Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 765 : 2026 INSC 790
Partnership Act, 1932 – Section 69(2) – Effect of non-registration – Proof of registration of firm – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XLI Rule 27 – Additional Evidence – A memorandum issued by the Registrar of Firms acknowledging the filing/registration of documents and allotting a specific Registration Number conclusively proves the registration of the partnership firm - Production of a certified copy of Form-VIII under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is permissible to further the cause of justice and corroborate the registration status. Mageba Bridge Products v. Trade Centre, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 795 : 2026 INSC 839
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Circumstantial Evidence — Delayed FIR & Motive as an Afterthought - Gross, unexplained delay of about four months in lodging the First Information Statement (FIS)/FIR alleging motive for murder renders the story of motive a deliberated afterthought - Conduct of the deceased's family members in allowing the deceased to travel with the accused on friendly terms dispels the alleged pre-existing enmity. [Paras 13 - 21] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300 (Exceptions), Section 302 vs. Section 304 Part I/Part II — Determination of Intention to Cause Death - The distinction between murder (Section 302) and culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304) depends on the intention of the accused, to be gathered from totality of circumstances including the nature of the weapon, target area, force employed, premeditation, and whether blows were struck on vital body parts - The infliction of extensive ante-mortem injuries and grievous blows on vital parts (head, neck, chest) reflects clear murderous intention - In the absence of evidence attracting any Exception under Section 300, plea for conversion of conviction to Section 304 Part I/Part II rejected. [Relied on Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444; Paras 26-32] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 302 r/w Section 34 — Murder — Witch-Hunting — Conviction based on Sole Eyewitness Testimony — Upheld - Direct ocular evidence, if found natural, cogent, and trustworthy, constitutes the best form of evidence and ordinarily prevails over all other forms - The testimony of a single reliable eyewitness (PW-3, daughter of the deceased) who witnessed the brutal lathi assault on her mother after being dragged from her house on the accusation of practicing witchcraft, was consistent, unshaken, and duly corroborated by medical evidence. [Paras 17 - 22] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 306 — Abetment of Suicide in Workplace Setting — Official Reprimands, Administrative Supervision, and Stern Behavior by Superior Officer - Ordinary administrative directions, disciplinary supervision, official reprimands, show cause notices issued in the course of discharge of duty, or stern conduct of a superior officer even if perceived as harsh or unpleasant by a subordinate cannot be elevated to the status of abetment under Section 306 IPC in the absence of material demonstrating a conscious intention (mens rea) to drive the subordinate to suicide - Where the incidents alleged (such as work assignments, encroachment removal, or past departmental interactions) occurred months prior to the incident, there was a complete absence of any proximate act of instigation immediately preceding the suicide - criminal proceedings against the senior officer amounted to an abuse of the process of law, and the appellant was entitled to discharge. [Paras 22 - 26] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 306 read with Section 107 — Abetment of Suicide — Essential Ingredients — Requirement of Proximate Act, Instigation, and Mens Rea - To attract the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC read with Section 107 IPC, three essential ingredients must be satisfied - (i) direct or indirect instigation/incitement, (ii) in close proximity to the commission of suicide, along with (iii) a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide - Mere allegations of continuous harassment or stern behavior by a superior officer over a period of time do not automatically constitute abetment unless there is a proximate prior act that goaded, incited, or created circumstances leaving the victim with no other option but to take their own life - Mens rea cannot be gleaned merely from what goes on in the mind of the victim or the tragic outcome alone; there must be a conscious, deliberate intention on the part of the accused to drive the deceased to commit suicide. [Paras 14-25] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 376 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378 — Appeal against acquittal — Scope of interference by the High Court — Medical Evidence and Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) Report conflicting with ocular testimony — Rape of a 4.5-year-old child alleged - The High Court overturned the trial Court's acquittal without considering the medical report and the FSL report - The informant (PW-2) and the child victim (PW-3) consistently claimed that the victim sustained injuries and that her clothes had bloodstains - the medical examination conducted within 12 hours of the incident revealed no injuries, inflammation, redness, or bruising on the body or private parts of the victim, with the hymen found intact - the State Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report confirmed that even after performing the Benzidine test (a reliable screening test capable of detecting blood up to multiple washings) as well as the Acid Phosphatase test, neither blood nor semen was detected on the clothes of the victim or the seized mat/bedding from the alleged place of occurrence - There were also irreconcilable contradictions regarding the place of occurrence (cot vs. kitchen where no cot existed) - Held, the entire prosecution evidence must be considered in totality - Where oral testimonies alleging bleeding/injury are directly belied by prompt medical examination and negative forensic reports, a grave doubt is cast on the prosecution's case - The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned acquittal by ignoring the medical and FSL reports. Conviction set aside; trial court's acquittal restored. [Paras 9–16]. Ram Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 788 : 2026 INSC 830
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 498A — Applicability to Live-In Relationships — "Relationship in the Nature of Marriage" — Purposive Interpretation — Fundamental Rights — Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India – i. Applicability of Section 498A IPC to Live-In Relationships - Held, Section 498A IPC applies to "live-in relationships" that qualify as "relationships in the nature of marriage," provided that the intent to marry is established as an intrinsic element - Giving a restrictive or purely literal interpretation to the word "husband" to exclude live-in partners would defeat the social, reformative, and protective legislative objective of the provision – ii. Constitutional Imperative (Article 14) - Creating a distinction between a legally wedded wife and a female partner in a relationship in the nature of marriage for protection against domestic cruelty lacks any rational nexus with the legislative objective of curbing domestic abuse - Differentiating solely on the basis of formal ceremonial marriage violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India – iii. Individual Choice and Autonomy (Article 21) - The right to choose a life partner is an intrinsic facet of individual autonomy and dignity under Article 21, encompassing spatial and associational privacy - The protection of criminal law against household cruelty cannot depend on whether a woman has formally solemnized her union – iv. Distinction between Civil Protection (DV Act) and Criminal Remedy (Section 498A IPC) - Civil protection under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) is insufficient by itself, as civil/monetary consequences cannot substitute for the deterrent effect of criminal law. [Paras 12-23] Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 753 : 2026 INSC 784
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 120B, 201 read with Section 34 — Circumstantial Evidence — Accidental Death vs. Homicidal Death — Chain of Circumstances - Conviction of the appellants-accused by the Trial Court and the High Court under Sections 302, 120B, and 201 read with Section 34 IPC set aside - The Supreme Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the foundational fact of a homicidal death - Medical evidence established the cause of death as 'Cardio-Respiratory arrest due to Asphyxia due to drowning' - Non-grievous injuries found on the body could have been sustained due to friction with hard or sharp objects in the river flow, corroborating the defence version of accidental drowning rather than a premeditated attack - Alleged use of a broken soda bottle as a weapon was unsupported due to non-confrontation of the object to the medical expert, absence of seizure, and lack of forensic matching. [Paras 10 - 21] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 498-A, 304-B — Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Sections 3, 4 — Quashing of Proceedings Qua Husband — Effect of Acquittal of Co-Accused Parents on Identical Evidence: Where co-accused parents have already been acquitted after a full-fledged trial on the self-same allegations and evidence, and the solitary additional allegation against the husband regarding telephonic dowry demands is unsubstantiated by any Call Detail Records (CDR) and stands neutralised by unimpeached official proof of his deployment on BSF duty outside the State, continuing criminal proceedings against the husband alone constitutes an abuse of the judicial process whose substratum has collapsed. Continuation of proceedings falls within categories (1), (3), and (6) of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and warrants quashing. [Relied on Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330; Mahmood Ali and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2023) 15 SCC 488; Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293; Paras 32–37]. Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 786 : 2026 INSC 825
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 504 and 506 — Intentional Insult and Criminal Intimidation — Official Capacity - Allegations arising out of acts performed in an official capacity as a superior officer such as reprimands regarding official work or threats of suspension which the officer had no independent competence to execute do not constitute an intentional insult likely to provoke a breach of the peace under Section 504 IPC, nor do they amount to criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC. [Para 27] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867
Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302/34 and 392/34 — Circumstantial Evidence — Last-Seen Theory & Unexplained Possession of Stolen Property — Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 and Section 106 - Conviction based on circumstantial evidence upheld where foundational circumstances were firmly established in an unbroken chain - (i) deceased was last seen leaving with the accused persons in his taxi; (ii) deceased went missing and his decomposed body was subsequently found along the route; (iii) accused persons were intercepted within five days in joint, unexplained possession of the deceased's taxi and its original papers while attempting to dispose of it; and (iv) personal belongings (driving licence and tiffin carrier) of the deceased were recovered from a sugarcane field pursuant to disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act - Held, failure of the accused to offer any plausible explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. regarding recent possession of the taxi supplied an additional link under Section 106 of the Evidence Act - Inability of medical evidence to ascertain the precise cause of death due to advanced decomposition does not override an otherwise complete and consistent chain of circumstantial evidence. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344; Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 193; Paras 14–23] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2026 INSC 842
Precedent – Ratio Decidendi vs. Obiter / Judicial Deference – Inversion Test - The earlier decision in Nagarjuna Gramin Bank v. Medi Narayana did not lay down a binding proposition of law - An order passed out of judicial deference to an executive/legislative policy decision (such as the report of a High-Powered Committee of the State) without undertaking an independent legal interpretation of statutory provisions and their constitutional intent does not create a binding legal precedent - Applying the Wambaugh Inversion Test, the ratio decidendi consists strictly of the statements of the principles of law necessary for deciding the legal problem disclosed by the facts, rather than mere factual conclusions or judicial deference to executive domain. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51; Career Institute Educational Society v. Om Shree Thakurji Educational Society, (2023) 16 SCC 458; State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, (2025) 1 SCC 1; T.N. Medical Officers Assn. v. Union of India, (2021) 6 SCC 568; Paras 9 - 15] Mukkera Venkata Ratnam v. Vantasala China Venkateswarlu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2026 INSC 810
Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Criminal Procedure – Overlapping Offences under PCPNDT Act and Substantive Penal Law (IPC/BNS) – Dual-Track Procedure - The statutory bar against police investigation under the PCPNDT Act applies solely to offences proscribed under the special statute and does not circumscribe or impede the independent statutory power and duty of the police to register an FIR and investigate distinct cognizable offences disclosed under general penal laws (IPC/BNS), even if they arise from the same or a connected transaction. [Paras 10 - 11, per Sanjay Karol, J.] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901
Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Sections 17, 17(4), 17A, 27, 28, 30; Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996 – Rule 18A(3)(iv); Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 4(2), 5, 154, 173, 190(1); Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Sections 4, 5, 175, 225 – Interplay between Section 27 and Section 28 of PCPNDT Act – Investigation and Cognizance - Registration of an FIR and independent police investigation into offences exclusively punishable under the PCPNDT Act is legally impermissible - The mere classification of offences as cognizable, non-bailable, and non-compoundable under Section 27 does not authorize the police to investigate them or displace the specialized enforcement machinery established under the Act - The Appropriate Authority (AA) appointed under Section 17 is the sole competent authority statutorily empowered under Section 17(4) and Section 17A to investigate violations and institute criminal complaints - Rule 18A(3)(iv) of the PCPNDT Rules, 1996, which mandates that the police shall not be involved in investigating cases under the Act “as far as possible,” possesses statutory force and vests discretion in the AA to seek police involvement strictly in an ancillary, supplemental, or aiding capacity under its supervision - The police have no independent investigative authority qua PCPNDT Act offences - A competent Magistrate cannot take cognizance of an offence under the PCPNDT Act on the basis of a police report/charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC - Section 28 contains an absolute, mandatory, and prohibitory jurisdictional bar which restricts taking of cognizance exclusively to a written complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority (or its authorized officer) or by a person/social organization after giving the statutory 15 days' notice. [Paras 10 – 11, per Sanjay Karol, J.] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901
Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Sections 17(4), 17A, 27, 28, 30; Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques Rules, 1996 – Rule 18A(3)(iv); Indian Penal Code, 1860 / Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – Interface between Appropriate Authority and Police in Connected Transactions – Guidelines: (Per Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J, Concurring / Supplementary Opinion) - When offences under both the PCPNDT Act and the IPC/BNS emanate from the same connected transaction, the existence of a common factual transaction does not merge the distinct statutory routes – i. Information Disclosing Only PCPNDT Offence - Where information received at a police station discloses solely an offence under the PCPNDT Act or Rules, police cannot commence an independent investigation; they must make an appropriate station diary entry and transmit the information and material without delay to the notified Appropriate Authority – ii. Mixed Offences (PCPNDT + IPC/BNS) - Where the allegations disclose ingredients of both a PCPNDT violation and an independent cognizable offence under IPC/BNS, the police may register an FIR and investigate the IPC/BNS offence only - The PCPNDT component must simultaneously be communicated to the Appropriate Authority - Overlap of facts, premises, or records does not authorize the police to investigate the PCPNDT offence itself; iii. Discovery During Ongoing Investigation - If police unearth PCPNDT violations while lawfully investigating an IPC/BNS offence, they must promptly notify and place the relevant material before the Appropriate Authority - Police cannot use the general penal offence as a gateway to investigate the PCPNDT component - if the Appropriate Authority uncovers an independent IPC/BNS offence during its inquiry, it must promptly transfer that material to the jurisdictional police without stalling its own PCPNDT proceedings; iv. Supplemental Nature of Police Assistance - Police assistance under Section 30(1) (such as protection, tracing accused, digital or forensic support) can only be rendered upon a specific request by the Appropriate Authority - Such assistance is purely supplemental, must be recorded in the file/diary, and can neither result in an independent police investigation nor culminate in a police charge-sheet for offences under the Act; v. Pith and Substance Test - Neither agency shall assume jurisdiction merely because two offences arise out of the same factual matrix - The controlling question is whether the essential ingredients of the offence fall within the agency's lawful field. [Paras 1–13 of Supplementary Opinion per Kotiswar Singh, J.]. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901
Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Statutory Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Special Law Overriding General Law - The PCPNDT Act is a special and socially beneficial statute that overrides general procedural provisions of the CrPC/BNSS - The rule laid down in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. mandating registration of an FIR upon receipt of information disclosing a cognizable offence does not confer boundless jurisdiction on the police where a special regulatory statute excludes their role - The preliminary inquiry/hurdle permits ascertaining whether the police possess jurisdiction at the threshold - Where two provisions in the same statute appear discordant such as Section 27 (cognizable nature) and Section 28 (cognizance only upon complaint) they must be harmoniously construed - The classification in Section 27 merely reflects the gravity of the offences and denies police the power to grant bail; it cannot be interpreted to supersede the leading, prohibitory, and jurisdictional command of Section 28 or reduce the specialized complaint machinery to a futility. [Relied on Jeewan Kumar Raut & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 7 SCC 526; Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674; Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Para 10, 11] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Appellate Jurisdiction / Criminal Trial — Standard of Proof — Material Contradictions - Variance between the complainant's statements in the corruption trial and earlier depositions in collateral proceedings regarding the demanded amount, coupled with disobedience of the trap-laying instructions given by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, creates serious doubt regarding the foundational fact of demand - the conviction cannot be sustained. [Paras 10–19] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 19(1)(c) — Validity of Sanction — Authority Competent to Remove - Cognizance under Sections 7 and 13 cannot be validly taken without previous sanction from the authority competent to remove the public servant from office - For a substantively appointed Talati-cum-Mantri under the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961, the competent authority to remove is the District Development Officer (DDO) - Sanction granted by the Deputy District Development Officer (Dy. DDO) is defective and invalid, notwithstanding that the initial ad-hoc appointment was made by the Dy. DDO. [Para 17] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) — Timing of Payment — Work Already Executed - Payment made after the delivery/issuance of the requested document casts serious doubt on the allegation of bribe demand - Where an income certificate was already prepared and handed over to the complainant before any money was allegedly passed to the peon, it cannot be assumed ipso facto that such payment was made pursuant to an illegal demand - The defence that the amount was handed over on the eve of a festival (Eid) was held to be probable. [Relied On State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere v. C.B. Nagaraj, 2025 INSC 736; Paras 16 - 18] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d), and 20 — Proof of Demand and Acceptance — Statutory Presumption - The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act comes into play only after the prosecution proves the foundational fact of demand beyond reasonable doubt - Mere recovery of tainted money from an accused, in the absence of proof of demand, cannot sustain a conviction - Where the initial demand by Accused No. 1 (Talati-cum-Mantri) was doubtful due to material contradictions, Accused No. 2 (Peon) made no demand, and both stood acquitted of the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC, mere recovery of ₹20/- from Accused No. 2 cannot resurrect the prosecution's case or attract the presumption under Section 20. [Relied On N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 3 SCC 687; Paras 10 – 18] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction – Effect on Public Employment – Termination/Dismissal based on conviction – Scope of non-obstante clause - Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 does not obliterate or wash away a criminal conviction, nor does it preclude the employer from taking disciplinary action or removing a public servant based on the conduct leading to conviction - Release of a convict on probation is primarily intended for reformation and rehabilitation, but does not confer a right to continue in service - The words "shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law" in Section 12 refer to statutory disqualifications under other general or special enactments and do not override constitutional provisions, including the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution - an employee cannot claim reinstatement merely because the criminal court released them on probation or directed that the conviction would not affect their service career. [Paras 17-21] Spo/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2026 INSC 798
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 22 – Quashing of Proceedings – Settlement Agreement and Mutual Consent Divorce – Relinquishment/Waiver of Monetary and Maintenance Claims – Subsequent DV Proceedings Constitute Abuse of Process – Absence of Fresh Cause of Action - Where a wife has voluntarily entered into a Settlement Agreement relinquishing all monetary claims, including maintenance allowance, followed by an affidavit reiterated before the Family Court obtaining a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869, the initiation or continuation of subsequent proceedings under the DV Act based on alleged acts predating the settlement constitutes an abuse of the process of law - Once monetary claims stand extinguished under a valid compromise, their revival through subsequent proceedings cannot be permitted, especially when no fresh cause of action has arisen post-divorce and no formal legal proceedings have been instituted to declare the settlement void or set aside the divorce decree on grounds of alleged duress or coercion - Mere bald averments of coercion or lack of maintenance consideration cannot invalidate a settlement executed voluntarily by educated parties cognizant of their rights. [Paras 8 – 15]. Reji Baby v. Subi Mary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2026 INSC 918
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Settlement Agreement – Non-Signatory Major Child – Right of Major Daughter to Claim Monetary Reliefs Independent of Parents' Settlement - A settlement agreement executed solely between husband and wife does not bind a major child who is not a party to the agreement - While quashing the DV proceedings initiated against the husband on the basis of the wife's waiver, the Supreme Court clarified that the daughter (who attained majority prior to the settlement and was not a signatory) cannot be held to have waived her rights to monetary claims and remains at liberty to institute fresh proceedings seeking monetary reliefs against her father in accordance with law. [Relied on Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 587; Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, (2022) 11 SCC 705; Paras 14, 15] Reji Baby v. Subi Mary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2026 INSC 918
Public Procurement – Nature of Tender Timelines – Equitable Considerations and Third-Party Rights - Tender schedules operate within compressed, purpose-bound timelines where even a period of four months marks a significant progression from invitation to evaluation and final selection - Bidders who comply with all tender conditions and successfully clear rigorous technical evaluations acquire legitimate rights and interests as their price bids reach final evaluation - Permitting fence-sitters, non-participants, and belated challengers to derail an ongoing public procurement process at an advanced stage is inequitable and unjust - Courts must exercise extreme circumspection to prevent disruption of tenders affecting large-scale public interest—such as the supply of sports and gymnasium equipment to over 16 lakh school children. [Paras 19 - 27] Utkarsh Enterprises v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 825 : 2026 INSC 881
Public Tender - Accrual of Cause of Action for Challenging Tender Conditions - A challenge to a tender condition or eligibility criterion distinct from a challenge to bid evaluation or rejection of a bid accrues on the very day the condition is published - Nothing further is required to be discovered - A party finding itself ineligible must approach the court with utmost expedition - Approaching the Court four months after publication when bids have substantially advanced to technical/financial stages or contracts have been awarded disentitles the petitioner from discretionary relief under Article 226 - Merely making representations or issuing legal notices does not explain the lack of diligence. [Paras 22–25] Keshvendra Singh v. Shankar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 815 : 2026 INSC 866
Public Tender - Third-Party Rights & Public Interest - Distinction of Precedent on Local Experience Restrictions - Entities that participated, complied with all criteria, and progressed through evaluation acquire legitimate interests - Stalling procurement intended for public welfare (such as sports infrastructure for school children) at the behest of non-participating "fence-sitters" who approach the Court belatedly is impermissible - Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., held that restricting past performance strictly to past supplies made within a single State creates an arbitrary, exclusionary barrier - Such principle does not apply automatically to a operational clause requiring a fully functional local office/warehouse to ensure prompt delivery, servicing, and safety for government school equipment - The Supreme Court affirmed the Delhi High Court's refusal to interfere with the ongoing tenders due to unexplained delay and non-participation, leaving the larger question regarding the validity of Clause 2.17 open to be examined in an appropriate proceeding - Appeals dismissed. [Distinguished from Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., 2025 INSC 1182; Paras 19 - 37] Keshvendra Singh v. Shankar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 815 : 2026 INSC 866
Public Tender / Procurement — Challenge to Eligibility Conditions — Delay and Laches — Accrual of Cause of Action — Judicial Review — Scope of Interference — High Court declining to interfere with tender conditions for procurement of sports goods and gymnasium equipment for government schools on the ground of delay, laches, and non-participation — Held - Assessment of Delay in Tender Matters - Delay in public procurement is not merely measured against the calendar for the purposes of limitation, but against the progression of the tender process -Tender schedules operate within compressed and purpose-bound timelines; delay must be assessed with reference to what has transpired, whose rights/interests have arisen, and the public consequences of unsettling the ongoing process. [Paras 19, 20] Keshvendra Singh v. Shankar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 815 : 2026 INSC 866
Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 — Application of Principles in Avtar Singh - The case of a candidate who deliberately suppresses pending criminal cases despite having knowledge falls squarely under paragraph 38.7 of Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 471, empowering the employer to cancel candidature or terminate service - Subsequent acquittal in the criminal proceedings does not wipe out or condone the initial act of deliberate suppression (suppressio veri or suggestio falsi) committed at the time of submitting the verification form - Candidates who suppressed pending criminal proceedings cannot claim parity with candidates who were acquitted prior to filling up the verification form, nor with those reinstated pursuant to specific High Court directions or after an objective case-by-case evaluation of triviality - Distinction drawn from cases where acquittal occurred prior to filling up the attestation form (Pawan Kumar v. Union of India), or cases involving long service and civil suits for damages (SPO/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab). [Relied on Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (2016) 8 SCC 471; distinguished from Pawan Kumar v. Union of India & Anr., (2023) 12 SCC 317; Paras 19–29] Bappa Barai v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 826 : 2026 INSC 882
Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 — Rules 52 and 67 — Suppression of Criminal Antecedents — Deliberate Concealment in Attestation Form — Termination / Discharge from Service — Parity Claim - Non-disclosure and deliberate suppression of pending criminal cases at the recruitment stage warrants discharge from service - Where candidates for the post of Constable in RPF/RPSF deliberately answered "NO" in the verification/attestation form despite pending criminal cases against them, such deliberate suppression by itself assumes significance - The candidate has no unfettered right to continuity in service when the statutory mandate under Rules 52 and 67 of the RPF Rules, 1987, the Employment Notice, and the Attestation Form clearly provide for discharge/termination on grounds of false declaration or suppression of material information. [Paras 13 – 21] Bappa Barai v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 826 : 2026 INSC 882
Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (Chhattisgarh) — Section 5(a) & 5(b) — Inapplicability of Grounds — Subjective Satisfaction Must Rest on Objective Material – Held that invocations of Section 5(b) require reasonable grounds to believe that the person is engaged or about to engage in offences involving force or violence, or specified offences under Chapters XII, XVI, or XVII of the IPC (or Sections 506/509 IPC) - Allegations of circulating offensive social media videos affecting religion (corresponding to Chapter XV IPC) do not satisfy the statutory threshold of Section 5(b) - Even under Section 5(a), an order of externment seriously infringes upon fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution and cannot be passed routinely, on mere ipse dixit, or solely because criminal cases are registered - The competent authority must arrive at a bona fide subjective satisfaction based on objective materials disclosing a discernible nexus to the apprehending mischief - An order lacking demonstrable reasons or objective material cannot pass muster. [Relied on Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 2 SCC 121; Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95; Deepak v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 14 SCC 707; Paras 29 - 34] Vijay Kumar Rajpoot @ Vijju v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2026 INSC 926
Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (Chhattisgarh) — Section 5(a), Section 5(b), and Section 8 — Scope and Procedure for Externment — Mandatory Requirement of Prior Notice and Hearing — Absence of Review Jurisdiction — Quashing of Externment Order Passed Ex Parte Upon Reopening Closed Proceedings - The District Magistrate had initially closed externment proceedings initiated against the appellant with a warning, taking note of his acquittal in previous cases - upon registration of fresh FIRs (one under the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and another under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 / SC/ST Act) and a report by the Superintendent of Police, the District Magistrate recalled/reopened the closed proceedings and passed an ex parte order of externment banishing the appellant for one year without issuing a fresh notice or affording an opportunity of hearing while the appellant was in judicial custody – Held under Section 8(1) of the Adhiniyam, informing the proposed externee in writing of the general nature of the material allegations against him and granting a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation are indispensable conditions precedent for the exercise of power under Sections 3 to 6 - An order passed in derogation of these mandatory requirements stands vitiated and is void ab initio - Under Section 8(4) read with Section 8(5), an ex parte order can lawfully be passed only when the person fails to execute a security bond for attendance or fails to appear before the District Magistrate during the inquiry - Save and except these express statutory contingencies, the statute does not authorize the District Magistrate to dispense with notice or hearing and proceed ex parte - An administrative authority has no inherent power to review, recall, or reopen its earlier order unless specifically empowered by statute - The District Magistrate possessed no jurisdiction to recall the closure order; any alleged breach of a prior warning or receipt of a fresh police report could not clothe the authority with review jurisdiction, but instead statutorily mandated following the procedure prescribed under Section 8 afresh. [Paras 18 - 25] Vijay Kumar Rajpoot @ Vijju v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2026 INSC 926
Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 – Sections 2(g) & 19(20) – Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Section 21A – Recovery of Dues – Calculation of Dues Post-NPA Classification – Interest Maintained in Suspense Account – High Court's Simplification of Dues Setting Aside DRAT Order Unsustainable - Definition of Debt & Inclusion of Interest - Under Section 2(g) of the Act of 1993, 'debt' includes any liability inclusive of interest claimed as due by a bank - Section 19(20) empowers the DRT to pass orders for payment of interest up to the date of realisation, and Section 21A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 bars courts from reopening transactions on the ground of excessive interest. [Para 12] Punjab National Bank v. Shree Jyoti Education and Management Trust World, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 796 : 2026 INSC 836
Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 – Sections 22, 29, and 31 read with Income Tax Act, 1961 – Second Schedule, Rules 2 and 61 – Transfer of execution proceedings from Civil Court to DRT – Applicability of Order XXI Rule 22 CPC vs. Rule 2 of Second Schedule to 1961 Act – Non-service of notice under Rule 2 – Validity of Auction Sale - Upon the transfer of execution proceedings from a Civil Court to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under Section 31 of the 1993 Act, the Recovery Officer is empowered to recover dues in accordance with the procedure under Section 29 of the 1993 Act read with the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961, superseding the CPC execution procedure - The execution before the Recovery Officer is governed by Rule 2 of the Second Schedule and not Order XXI Rule 22 CPC. Consequently, non-compliance with Order XXI Rule 22 CPC has no impact on the validity of the auction sale - where the legal representatives had full knowledge of the execution and auction proceedings and filed objections/applications for recall, non-service of formal notice under Rule 2 causes no substantial injury - Absence of notice under Rule 2 does not render the execution or auction sale void per se, particularly when the remedy under Rule 61 (to set aside the sale on grounds of non-service/irregularity upon establishing substantial injury and making requisite deposit) was not availed. [Paras 35–44] Sheela Gehlot v. Mohini Hardayal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 808 : 2026 INSC 863
Registration Act, 1908 — Section 17(1A) — Unregistered Agreement to Sell — Inapplicability of Section 53A of TP Act - Post the 2001 amendment inserting Section 17(1A) into the Registration Act, any contract to transfer immovable property for consideration executed on or after 24.09.2001 must be registered to claim the protection of part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act - An unregistered agreement to sell executed after the amendment cannot be relied upon to shield possession under Section 53A, and subsequent impounding for deficient stamp duty cannot cure the defect of non-registration. [Relied on Shah Mathuradas Maganlal & Co. v. Nagappa Shankarappa Malage and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 660; Vayyaeti Srinivasarao v. Gaineedi Jagajyothi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 84; Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (2) Through Director v. State of Haryana and Another, (2012) 1 SCC 656; Ameer Minhaj v. Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar and Others, (2018) 7 SCC 639; Distinguished from R. Kanthimathi and Another v. Beatrice Xavier (Mrs.), (2000) 9 SCC 339; Arjunlal Bhatt Mall Gothani and Others v. Girish Chandra Dutta and Another, (1973) 2 SCC 197; Paras 20 - 27] Nazim Shaikh Hasan v. Nasir Mushtaq Shaikh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 803 : 2026 INSC 853
Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Absence of Notarization/Attestation Endorsement in Form-25 Copy Supplied to Respondent - The absence of the endorsement of attestation/notarization on the copy of the Form-25 affidavit served on the returned candidate is not fatal to the maintainability of the election petition under Section 81(3) read with Section 86 - The word 'copy' under Section 81(3) does not mean an absolutely exact replica, but one so true that nobody can misunderstand it - The test is whether the variation from the original is calculated to mislead an ordinary person - Where the original affidavit filed before the Court has been duly affirmed before a Commissioner of Affidavits/Notary, the omission of such endorsement in the copy served does not mislead the returned candidate - It merely calls for verification by the High Court from the original record. [Paras 21–25] Hafiz Rashid Ahmed Choudhury v. Kripanath Mallah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 857 : 2026 INSC 915
Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Scope of Section 86 vs Section 83 - Section 86 mandates peremptory dismissal of an election petition only for non-compliance with Sections 81, 82, or 117 - A defect relating to the affidavit of corrupt practices under the proviso to Section 83(1) does not attract summary dismissal under Section 86 - Even if Form-25 read with Rule 94A is found to be defective upon verification of the original record, it only warrants striking off the allegations of corrupt practices; the High Court must proceed to try and decide any other independent grounds on merits. [Relied on Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore and Others, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 129; F.A. Sapa v. Singora, (1991) 3 SCC 375; Paras 21 – 26] Hafiz Rashid Ahmed Choudhury v. Kripanath Mallah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 857 : 2026 INSC 915
Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Sections 81(3), 83(1)(c) proviso, and 86 — Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, Rule 94A & Form-25 — Election Petition — Attestation of Copies — Defect in Form-25 Affidavit Copy supplied to Returned Candidate — Dismissal in Limine — Maintainability - Attestation under Section 81(3) - Section 81(3) requires every copy of the election petition to be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy - No particular form of attestation is prescribed; what is required is that the election petitioner signs at the foot of each page, taking responsibility that the copy served is a true copy - The use of different rubber stamps—such as 'attested to be true copy' on some pages and 'certified to be true copy' on others—conveys the same meaning and does not invalidate the election petition. [Paras 20-24] Hafiz Rashid Ahmed Choudhury v. Kripanath Mallah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 857 : 2026 INSC 915
Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka) - Limits on Enforcement of Retrospective Levy – Penalty and Interest - Retrospectivity cannot be enforced in a penal or oppressive manner against dealers who acted strictly under the earlier exemption regime, whose original assessments were completed as exempt by the department, and who did not collect indirect tax from purchasers - While the State is entitled to determine and recover the principal tax liability upon lawful reassessment, no penalty can be imposed for past periods since penalty presupposes contumacious conduct, culpable failure, or deliberate breach of an existing obligation - interest cannot be levied retrospectively from the date of the original transactions or assessment periods, as doing so would operate punitively; interest shall run only from the date of a fresh lawful demand raised pursuant to reassessment. [Paras 72–84, 88- 91] Asia Sugar & Chemical Co., Devangere v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 778 : 2026 INSC 693
Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka) - Validity of Retrospective Amendment (Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001): The insertion of the words “produced or manufactured in India” with retrospective effect via a deeming clause is substantively a withdrawal/restriction of an exemption and not merely clarificatory - The State Legislature possesses plenary competence under Entry 54 of List II to enact retrospective fiscal legislation, grant exemptions, and subsequently withdraw or restrict them in public interest - Retrospective withdrawal of a fiscal exemption is not unconstitutional per se. [Relied on Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1667; Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy v. State of Orissa, AIR 1964 SC 1581; M/s. Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 216; Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283; P. Kannadasan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 5 SCC 670; Kasinka Trading v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 274; Shrijee Sales Corporation v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 398; Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 314; R.C. Tobacco (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 725; CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1; Paras 64–71, 80-88] Asia Sugar & Chemical Co., Devangere v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 778 : 2026 INSC 693
Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka); Section 8, Fifth Schedule (Entry 31-B / Entry 51) – Exemption on Sugar – Scope of pre-2001 entry – Retrospective withdrawal of exemption via Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001 – Reassessment, Penalty and Interest - Scope of Pre-2001 Exemption Entry: Prior to Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001, imported sugar fell within the exemption entry relating to “sugar” under the Fifth Schedule to the KST Act - The reference in the entry to the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 was incorporated solely for identifying and describing the commodity and did not introduce an origin-based or territorial limitation excluding imported goods - Strict construction requires interpreting the entry according to its text without reading in words of limitation such as “produced or manufactured in India” before they were expressly enacted. [Relied on State of Kerala v. State Trading Corporation of India Ltd., (1999) 9 SCC 102; Govind Saran Ganga Saran v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, 1985 Supp SCC 205; Mathuram Agrawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) 8 SCC 667; Paras 16–18, 40-44, 53, 56–88] Asia Sugar & Chemical Co., Devangere v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 778 : 2026 INSC 693
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3(1)(r) and Section 3(1)(s) — Expression "in any place within public view" — Essential ingredients — Offence occurring inside an enclosed room without public presence - To constitute an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the alleged intentional insult, intimidation, or caste-based abuse must occur at a place "within public view" - The requirement of "public view" depends upon whether the alleged utterance was made in circumstances where members of the public could witness or hear it - If the occurrence takes place within the four corners of a wall where members of the public are not present, it cannot be deemed to have occurred at a place within public view - The mere fact that an incident occurred inside a school premises does not automatically satisfy the statutory requirement of "within public view" when the site plan and material on record demonstrate that the occurrence was confined to an enclosed room having no window or public access, and where witness statements merely establish their presence in the school building but do not place them inside the room or indicate that they heard or witnessed any caste-based utterances - general and vague allegations of caste-based abuse without specific attribution of caste-based slurs or words to the accused do not prima facie make out offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) - Proceedings quashed to the extent of offences under the SC/ST Act. [Relied on Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Others, 2025 INSC 132; Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710; Paras 9 - 19] Ramkrishna Chauhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 837 : 2026 INSC 895
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 – Regulation 4(1) Note – Rebuttable Presumption – Motive & Application of Proceeds Irrelevant - When a person trades in securities while in possession of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI), the trades are presumed to be motivated by the knowledge and awareness of such UPSI - The reasons for trading or the specific purposes to which the proceeds are applied (such as funding or bailing out the company) are completely irrelevant under the 2015 PIT Regulations to determine whether insider trading has occurred - Once possession of UPSI and the execution of trades are established, the insider can only avoid liability by proving innocence within the statutory exceptions/defences provided under the proviso to Regulation 4(1) or circumstances of a similar nature. [Paras 9-19] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Rajeev Vasant Sheth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 787 : 2026 INSC 826
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 – Regulation 4(1) Proviso – Scope of Defences – Rule of Construction - The defences listed in the proviso to Regulation 4(1) are preceded by the word “including”, indicating that the six enumerated defences are illustrative and not exhaustive - any non-enumerated defence sought to be pleaded must be of the same and similar nature as those explicitly provided under the regulation. [Para 13] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Rajeev Vasant Sheth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 787 : 2026 INSC 826
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 vs. Regulations, 2015 – Distinction Explained - The ruling in SEBI v. Abhijit Rajan (2024) was rendered in the context of the erstwhile 1992 PIT Regulations, where no Note barred consideration of the underlying intent or the application of sale proceeds - Post the notification of the 2015 PIT Regulations, the statutory Note to Regulation 4(1) precludes courts and tribunals from entertaining defences based on motive or "legitimate corporate purpose" (such as rerouting funds to avoid corporate bankruptcy/NPA downgrading) to escape insider trading liability. [Relied on Vikram Singh v. Union of India, (2015) 9 SCC 502; Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 458; P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258; Paras 14-19]. Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Rajeev Vasant Sheth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 787 : 2026 INSC 826
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 – Section 11B & Section 15G – Insider Trading – Disgorgement & Avoidance of Loss - Disgorgement under Section 11B includes the power to direct any person who averted loss by engaging in transactions in contravention of the Act/Regulations to disgorge an amount equivalent to the wrongful gain made or loss averted - The fact that there was little or no profit made is of no consequence when significant losses were avoided by trading prior to the UPSI becoming public. [Paras 11-16] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Rajeev Vasant Sheth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 787 : 2026 INSC 826
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) – Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 – Rules 8(6), 9(3), and 9(4) – Possession-cum-sale notice – Shortfall in Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) – Whether deposit of EMD is an essential condition of eligibility rendering the auction sale void in case of a shortfall – Held, requirements in a tender/auction notice fall into two categories - (i) essential conditions of eligibility requiring strict adherence, and (ii) ancillary or subsidiary conditions intended to achieve the main objective, from which deviation is permissible if it causes no substantial prejudice - The clause requiring bidders to submit EMD is non-statutory and incorporated merely to filter out non-serious bidders - Where the auction purchasers made an initial minor shortfall in the EMD amount but deposited the mandatory 25% of the total bid price on the very date of the auction in full compliance with Rule 9(3), any anterior shortfall in the EMD pales into insignificance - Such non-conformity caused no prejudice or injustice to the borrower or other bidders, and the bid cannot be invalidated - held, where the delay in depositing the remaining 75% balance sale consideration under Rule 9(4) occurred due to pending litigation initiated by the borrower and the Bank had deferred the date in writing, the deposit made immediately upon dismissal of the borrower's proceedings is valid - The Bank was directed to refund the surplus sale proceeds along with 7% per annum interest to the borrower for failing to keep the surplus amount in an interest-bearing account. [Relied on Om Prakash Sharma v. Ramesh Chand Prashar & Ors., (2016) 12 SCC 632; Bakshi Security & Personnel Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Devkishan Computed Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2016) 8 SCC 446; Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation & Ors. v. Anoj Kumar Agarwala & Ors., (2020) 17 SCC 577; National High Speed Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Monte Carlo Ltd. & Anr., (2022) 6 SCC 401; National High Speed Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Monte Carlo Ltd. & Anr., (2022) 6 SCC 401; B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. & Ors., (2006) 11 SCC 548; Paras 19–24]. Lakshmi Mohan v. Airtech Projects Engineers Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 851 : 2026 INSC 909
Service Law – Appointment by Transfer vs. Direct Recruitment Quota – Illegality of Absorption against Direct Recruitment Posts - Where statutory rules prescribe recruitment solely through two regular modes (50% direct recruitment and 50% promotion), appointment by transfer under Rule 10 is an exceptional mode permissible only in "special circumstances" with Commission approval - Because Rule 2(9) expressly excludes appointment by transfer from the definition of direct appointment, an officer cannot be absorbed/appointed by transfer against a vacancy earmarked for direct recruitment - Facilitating absorption of officers who failed or bypassed regular competitive selection amounts to achieving indirectly what could not be achieved directly, constituting an impermissible backdoor entry. [Paras 46 – 93] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878
Service Law – Chhattisgarh State Universities Service Rules, 1983 – Rule 10 – Finality of Commission's Decision on Eligibility – Scope of Reassessment/Verification by Appointing Authority - Under Rule 10 of the Service Rules, 1983, the decision of the Public Service Commission regarding the eligibility of a candidate is final and binding - The Appointing Authority cannot usurp or supplant the constitutional and statutory domain of the Commission by undertaking an exhaustive, subjective, or de novo inquiry through an independently constituted expert committee to redetermine eligibility on materials already scrutinised by the Commission - The power of the Appointing Authority to verify documents before issuing an appointment order is strictly confined to – i. Checking the genuineness and authenticity of certificates/documents (e.g., detecting fraud, forgery, or impersonation); ii. Detecting fundamental, patent, and demonstrable deficiencies in eligibility without an exhaustive inquiry; iii. Evaluating new materials brought to its notice that clearly establish ineligibility - If the Appointing Authority entertains any doubt or reservation concerning a candidate's eligibility, it cannot unilaterally declare the candidate ineligible; it is duty-bound to refer the matter back to the Commission with reasons for its view - An administrative stipulation in a recommendation letter requiring "verification and satisfaction regarding eligibility" cannot dilute or override the statutory finality attached under Rule 10 - Held, the inquiry report dated 28.06.2023 constituted by the State was unsustainable in law and liable to be ignored. [Relied On Ram Ashray Yadav (Dr), Chairman, Bihar Public Service Commission, In Re, (2000) 4 SCC 309; Ram Kumar Kashyap v. Union of India, (2009) 9 SCC 378; Paras 51-68] Shailendra Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2026 INSC 902
Service Law – Deputation, Absorption, and Appointment by Transfer – Punjab Service of Engineers, Class II, P.W.D. (Buildings and Roads Branch) Rules, 1965, Rules 2(9), 6, 10, 11, 12 – Backdoor Entry – Political Machination – Meaning of "Special Circumstances" – Revocation/Revival of Lien - Deputation and Consensual Tripartite Nature - Deputation means service outside the cadre or parent department on a temporary basis to meet exigencies of public service - It is essentially consensual and requires consensus among the lending authority, the borrowing authority, and the employee concerned - A deputationist per se has no vested right to claim permanent absorption unless supported by statutory rules - The initiation of deputation directly by probationary officers through personal overtures or through political recommendations of outside ministers bypassing service discipline is completely alien to the concept of deputation and constitutes manifest illegality. [Paras 49–53, 70–78] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878
Service Law – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion – Distinct Eligibility Criteria - Eligibility criteria for appointment by direct recruitment and appointment by promotion are distinct and governed by separate requirements under the rules - A candidate's eligibility for direct recruitment cannot be determined or evaluated with reference to the statutory criteria prescribed for promotion. [Para 66] Shailendra Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2026 INSC 902
Service Law – Extinguishment and Revival of Lien - No government servant can simultaneously hold two liens across different cadres - While permanent substantive absorption in a borrowing department extinguishes past lien, such lien automatically revives in the parent department once the deputation and absorption are quashed as illegal, null, and void - The officers must be repatriated to their parent cadre with seniority fixed immediately above those who were junior to them at the time of leaving. [Relied on Kunal Nanda v. Union of India, (2000) 5 SCC 362; CBI v. Ramesh Chander Diwan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 871; Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 115 - 117] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878
Service Law – Judicial Sympathy cannot Perpetuate or Regularize Illegality - When an appointment or absorption is fundamentally void ab initio and in infraction of statutory rules, it is an incurable illegality distinct from an irregularity - The High Court erred under Article 226 in taking a "sympathetic view" to protect and sustain illegal absorptions on grounds of prolonged service of over 18 years - An illegality cannot be sanctified or regularized by mere passage of time or misplaced judicial sympathy. [Paras 114, 115] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878
Service Law – National Institute of Technology First Statutes, 2009 – Statute 30 – Effectiveness of Resignation – Communication & Notice Period - Effective Date of Resignation: Under the proviso to Statute 30 of the NIT First Statutes, 2009, a resignation takes legal effect immediately on the date of its acceptance by the appointing authority - Its legal efficacy is neither conditional upon formal communication nor held in abeyance during the serving of the notice period - While Paragraph 3 of Office Memorandum dated 11.02.1988 permits withdrawal of an accepted resignation prior to actual relieving, the competent authority retains the discretion to reject such withdrawal request by recording rational and communicated reasons. [Relied on High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 239; National Institute of Technology & Anr. v. Pannalal Choudhury & Anr., (2015) 11 SCC 669; Municipal Commissioner, Jamnagar Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. R.M. Doshi, (2024) 20 SCC 742; Air India Express Ltd. & Ors. v. Captain Gurdarshan Kaur Sandhu, (2019) 17 SCC 129; Paras 27-30] Delhi Technological University v. B.S. Rawat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 761 : 2026 INSC 797
Service Law – Promotion – Educational Qualification – Degree Obtained Through Open University / Distance Education Mode – Prospective Operation of Executive Orders Modifying Equivalence – Saving of Existing Rights - Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016 – Sections 25 (Explanation 1(b)) & 54 – Pre-foundation and Foundation Courses offered by Open Universities – Equivalence to SSLC and Higher Secondary (+2) Courses – Validity of Degrees Obtained Under Prior Prevailing Norms – Noted that Degrees obtained through open university/distance education mode following the two-year foundation course under G.O. Ms No. 528 dated 18.05.1985 (which held the field for over 24 years) cannot be invalidated retrospectively for the purpose of promotion - The cutoff date for declaring pre-foundation and foundation courses as not equivalent to SSLC and +2 is 20.11.2017, being the date of notification of G.O. Ms No. 144 - Persons who acquired such qualifications prior to 20.11.2017 are fully protected, and the invalidity applies only prospectively. [Paras 46–50] R.J. Gajendra Kumar v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 853 : 2026 INSC 911
Service Law – Recruitment / Verification of Antecedents – Suppression of Criminal Cases – Two-Pronged Enquiry Test – Knowledge as Pre-requisite for Suppression - Service Jurisprudence – Suppression of Criminal Antecedents / Non-Disclosure: The enquiry to be undertaken by the employer prior to terminating the services of an employee on the ground of suppression of information regarding criminal antecedents is essentially two-pronged – i. Factual Enquiry: Whether there has, in truth, been any deliberate suppression or furnishing of false information by the candidate, having regard to the extent of his knowledge at the relevant time and the circumstances in which the declaration came to be made – ii. Application of Mind / Gravity Assessment: The employer/authorities must apply their mind to the specific facts and circumstances of the case, including the type/nature of suppression, the nature of allegations, role and gravity of the offence, the nature of the post and duties attached to it, and the eventual outcome of the criminal proceedings (if concluded), to arrive at a considered conclusion as to whether continuation in service is feasible or if termination is the only available option. [Paras 24-30] Shatrughn Yadav v. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (F.A.C.T.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2026 INSC 829
Service Law – Relief & Directions – Non-issuance of Appointment Order – Consequential Benefits - Where a candidate was duly recommended by the PSC, reaffirmed as eligible by the Commission, and unlawfully denied regular posting due to an invalid de novo departmental inquiry, the candidate was entitled to be appointed to the post of Registrar against an available vacancy - The Supreme Court directed the State to issue an appointment order within three weeks, according the appellant parity of service benefits and seniority from the date co-selectees were appointed, though arrears of pay prior to the date of provisional appointment (10.04.2023) were disallowed. [Paras 67 - 70] Shailendra Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2026 INSC 902
Service Law – Resignation – Withdrawal of Resignation – Unauthorised Acceptance and Subsequent Ratification – Relation-back Doctrine – Principle against Approbation and Reprobation - Effect of Ratification by Competent Authority - An acceptance of resignation originally made by an officer lacking competence or holding merely additional charge stands validated upon subsequent ratification by the competent authority - Under the maxim omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur, a valid ratification operates retrospectively, relating back to the date of the original unauthorized acceptance and curing the defect of lack of prior authority - Once an unauthorized acceptance is ratified by the competent authority, the acceptance relates back to the original date of relieving - there remains no resignation in existence in the eyes of the law that an employee can subsequently withdraw - An employee who requests a waiver of notice period, accepts full settlement (no-dues certificate, last pay certificate, experience certificate), and utilizes the same to secure employment elsewhere is precluded from challenging the resignation's acceptance on technical grounds or alleging lack of authority under the principle against approbation and reprobation. [Para 17 - 25] Delhi Technological University v. B.S. Rawat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 761 : 2026 INSC 797
Service Law – Scope of "Special Circumstances" under Rule 10 - Routine accrual of vacancies, departmental shortage of staff, or an undertaking given to court deferring fresh recruitments do not constitute "special circumstances" - Rule 10 contemplates out-of-the-ordinary exigencies, such as specialized projects requiring specific talent or qualifications that cannot await regular recruitment - Merely holding a higher degree (M.Tech) or the prospect of becoming junior-most upon repatriation cannot justify bypassing statutory recruitment rules under the guise of "special circumstances". [Paras 92, 107–109, 112] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878
Service Law – Selection vs. Appointment – Public Service Commission – Right of Recommended Candidates - Mere inclusion of a candidate's name in a select list or a recommendation by the Public Service Commission does not confer an indefeasible or vested right to appointment - Selection only confers a right to fair, non-arbitrary, and equitable consideration for appointment - While appointment pursuant to the Commission's selection is the norm, the Appointing Authority retains ultimate discretion to decide whether or not to appoint - this executive discretion is not absolute or untrammelled; it must be informed by valid, germane, and non-arbitrary reasons supported by the record and the governing statutory rules - When a challenge is mounted against the denial of appointment to a selected candidate, the burden rests on the State/Appointing Authority to justify its decision with cogent reasons. [Relied On Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47; State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220; Commissioner of Police v. Umesh Kumar, (2020) 10 SCC 448; Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, (2025) 2 SCC 1; H. Mukherjee (Dr) v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 250; Asha Kaul (Mrs.) & Anr. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir & Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 573; Paras 43 – 68] Shailendra Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2026 INSC 902
Service Law – Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016 – Saving Clause under Section 54 of 2016 Act - Challenging Feeder Cadre Eligibility at Subsequent Promotion Stage Not Permissible - Section 25 (Explanation 1(b)) of the 2016 Act which prescribes a degree obtained after SSLC and Higher Secondary (10 + 2 + 3 pattern) came into effect on 14.09.2016 and cannot adversely affect degrees obtained prior thereto in view of the savings contained in Section 54 - Explanation 1(b) nowhere mandates that the degree must be acquired through a regular physical course rather than distance education - Where an employee has been promoted to and regularized in a feeder cadre post (Tourist Officer) and has served uninterruptedly for nearly 15 years without any challenge to the said appointment, the employer cannot rake up the validity of his initial entry/feeder cadre eligibility at the time of considering his case for promotion to the next higher post (Assistant Director of Tourism) - Appeals allowed - The judgment and order of the Division Bench dated 06.06.2023 and the Review Bench order dated 18.11.2024 are set aside - The judgment of the Single Judge dated 16.08.2021 is restored, holding the appellant eligible for promotion to the post of Assistant Director of Tourism. [Relied on P. Thavam v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 6177; Chandrakala Trivedi v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 3 SCC 129; Annamalai University v. Secretary to Government, Information and Tourism Department, (2009) 4 SCC 590; Paras 23-55]. R.J. Gajendra Kumar v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 853 : 2026 INSC 911
Service Law – Termination/Discharge based solely on Pendency of Criminal Case – Illegality and Violation of Natural Justice – Subsequent conviction does not cure initial invalidity - Discharge or termination of an employee serving the police force for over a decade solely on the ground of the pendency of a criminal case, without affording an opportunity of hearing or conducting an enquiry, is arbitrary, unlawful, and unsustainable in law - A subsequent conviction recorded against the employee at a later date cannot cure or validate the fundamental illegality that vitiated the discharge order at the time it was passed. [Paras 24-26] Spo/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2026 INSC 798
Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026 — Rule 16, Rule 17, Rule 18, Rule 38(3) — Environmental Governance — Institutionalisation of Regulatory Bodies — Determination and Imposition of Environmental Compensation — Essential Principles - Institutionalisation of Environmental Regulatory Bodies - Constitutional Courts and the National Green Tribunal have a legal duty to ensure that statutory mandates and rules are translated into effective enforcement systems - The Supreme Court emphasized that establishing regulatory bodies requires ensuring their formal notification, appointment of members, provision of infrastructure and human resources, and clear definition of powers accompanied by accountability - Constitutional Courts must provide necessary hand-holding to enable regulatory bodies to function with discipline, efficiency, integrity, and fairness, thereby moving away from micromanaging environmental governance while earning public trust. Amravati Municipal Corporation v. Ganesh Dadarao Anasane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 760 : 2026 INSC 796
Specific Performance — Locus Standi & Non-Examination of Vendee - Suppressio Veri & Unclean Hands - Where the power-of-attorney holder (husband of the vendee) lodges a criminal complaint seeking refund/recovery of advance money alleging fraud by the vendor, and the named vendee (wife) neither steps into the witness box to clarify her stance nor disowns the criminal complaint, the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to "blow hot and cold" by simultaneously seeking refund in criminal proceedings and specific performance in civil proceedings - A plaintiff who approaches the court with unclean hands by adopting inconsistent positions (such as alleging an assignment of rights to a third party in one proceeding while denying it in the main suit) and by withholding material documents/MoUs from the plaint is disentitled from claiming the equitable relief of specific performance - A long lapse of time (over two decades) during which the dynamics between the parties have materially altered, coupled with the advanced age of the defendant/vendor, constitutes a significant hardship factor under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, militating against the grant of specific performance. [Paras 28-51] V.N.A.S. Chandran v. S. Venilla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2026 INSC 776
Specific Performance — Termination of Agreement — Maintainability of Suit without Declaratory Relief - Where an agreement to sell does not confer any explicit contractual right on the vendor to unilaterally terminate the agreement, a unilateral cancellation constitutes a breach by repudiation - The aggrieved vendee can treat the contract as subsisting and maintain a suit for specific performance without seeking a formal declaratory relief that the unilateral termination is bad in law, provided the issue of maintainability/validity of termination is adjudicated by the trial court. [Relied on Muddam Raju Yadav v. B. Raja Shanker (D) Through LRs & Ors., 2026 INSC 214; Janardan Das and Others v. Durga Prasad Agarwalla and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine 2937; Major Gen. Darshan Singh (D) By LRs & Anr. v. Brij Bhushan Chaudhary (D) By LRs, 2024 INSC 157; Paras 36, 37] V.N.A.S. Chandran v. S. Venilla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2026 INSC 776
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 14 – Civil Suit for Reinstatement – Constitution of India – Article 142 – Compensation in lieu of Reinstatement - A civil court, bound by the procedural rigours of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, cannot grant a decree for reinstatement in service in view of the bar contained in Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; the remedy lies only in claiming damages - where a public servant was subjected to an illegal discharge solely due to pending criminal proceedings and denied procedural justice, the Supreme Court exercised its plenary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice by directing the State to pay lump-sum compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh) in lieu of reinstatement. [Relied on Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Punjab National Bank, (2010) 8 SCC 573; Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan, (2007) 9 SCC 86; DIG of Police v. P.R.K. Mohan, (1997) 11 SCC 571; Paras 24-27] Spo/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2026 INSC 798
Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 16(c) & Section 20 — Specific Performance — Continuous Readiness and Willingness — Inconsistent Conduct & Clean Hands — Discretionary Relief - Continuous Readiness & Willingness - The remedy for specific performance is an equitable and discretionary relief under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Under Section 16(c), the plaintiff must plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract from the date of the execution of the agreement till the date of the decree - A mere production of funds/demand draft at the appellate stage is insufficient to establish continuous readiness when the plaintiff lacked funds at the time of institution of the suit and had instances of dishonoured cheques during the transaction. [Paras 38 - 41] V.N.A.S. Chandran v. S. Venilla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2026 INSC 776
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 34 Proviso – Maintainability of Suit – Non-seeking of Cancellation of Revenue Mutation Entry - The proviso to Section 34 requires a plaintiff seeking a declaration of legal character or right to seek further relief where available, aiming to preclude bare declarations when consequential relief is available and necessary - A suit seeking a declaration of co-ownership along with partition, separate possession, and a permanent injunction does not attract the bar under the proviso to Section 34 - The relief of cancellation of a revenue mutation entry is not equivalent to a declaration of title - Once a civil court determines that an inherited title has not been extinguished, the mutation entry itself cannot impede the declared title, and the absence of a specific prayer for cancellation of the mutation order is not fatal to the maintainability of the suit. [Para 27] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900
Succession Act, 1925 — Section 63(c) — Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 68 — Proof of execution and attestation of Will — Dual statutory requirement — Distinction between Scribe and Attesting Witness — Animus Attestandi - Sections 63 of the Indian Succession Act and 68 of the Evidence Act perform related but distinct functions - Section 63 prescribes what must have occurred when the Will was executed, whereas Section 68 prescribes the ordinary manner in which the occurrence of those acts must be proved - Proof of the testatrix's signature or thumb impression alone does not establish due execution unless the statutory attestation by at least two witnesses is proved - The concession in Section 68 permitting examination of only one attesting witness does not dilute the requirement that the witness examined must be capable of proving the complete statutory execution of the Will, including attestation by both witnesses - A scribe who signs the document merely to authenticate authorship and not animo attestandi cannot be treated as an attesting witness, nor can his testimony cure the lack of proof of attestation under Section 68. [Relied on N. Kamalam v. Ayyasamy, (2001) 7 SCC 503; Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam, (2003) 2 SCC 91; Paras 50–59, 60–68, 70–71] Pazhanathal v. Alamathal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2026 INSC 860
Succession Act, 1925 — Sections 59 & 61 — Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 68 — Testamentary Capacity, Sound Disposing Mind, and Cumulative Suspicious Circumstances - Proof of physical execution or thumb impression of an illiterate testatrix does not dispense with the necessity of proving testamentary capacity, sound disposing mind, and conscious approval of the dispositions - Where a registered Will exhibits multiple suspicious circumstances incorrect recital describing ancestral property inherited from the husband as "self-acquired", describing a step-daughter as own daughter without disclosure of true relation, unexplained exclusion of other legal heir branches, attestation by a close relative of a beneficiary, witnesses brought from another village, beneficiary branch in proximate control/possession, unexplained custody, and non-examination of the key surviving person (the step-daughter) best placed to explain the family arrangement—the court must evaluate the cumulative effect - Registration and subsequent survival of the testatrix for years do not by themselves remove legitimate suspicions where independent evidence of informed, free agency is lacking. [Relied on Bharpur Singh v. Shamsher Singh, (2009) 3 SCC 687; Paras 99–104, 110–121, 122–134] Pazhanathal v. Alamathal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2026 INSC 860
Tender Conditions – Territorial/Operational Nexus vs. Discriminatory Past Local Supply Conditions – Distinction from State-Confined Supply Criteria - Distinguishing Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., which invalidated a past performance condition restricting eligibility solely to bidders with past supply experience inside that particular State as arbitrary and discriminatory - A tender stipulation requiring a functional office in Delhi and a warehouse in Delhi/NCR for the last three years (Clause 2.17) serves an operational rather than a geographical purpose, designed to ensure prompt delivery, inspection, servicing, maintenance, and replacement of bulk sports equipment at short notice for government school children. The ruling in Vinishma Technologies does not have a decisive bearing on an operational infrastructure clause; however, due to the belated nature of the challenge and lack of bona fides, the substantive validity of Clause 2.17 was left open for adjudication in an appropriate proceeding. [Distinguished from Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. (2025 INSC 1182); Paras 28 - 35] Utkarsh Enterprises v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 825 : 2026 INSC 881
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 111(e), Section 111(f) & Section 53A — Agreement to Sell with Existing Tenant — Determination of Tenancy — Part Performance - Mere execution of an agreement to sell between a landlord and tenant upon payment of part consideration does not ipso facto determine the subsisting tenancy or alter the jural relationship to that of vendor and vendee - It is only when the express terms of the agreement or the unequivocal conduct of the parties disclose an express or implied surrender of the lease under Section 111(e) or Section 111(f) of the Transfer of Property Act that the tenancy stands determined - Continuous possession of a tenant even after executing an agreement to sell does not amount to part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act unless such possession is directly relatable to, and flowing from, the agreement to sell rather than the pre-existing lease - An agreement to sell, not being a registered conveyance deed, does not by itself confer any title or proprietary interest in immovable property under Section 54 of the Act. [Paras 14-24] Nazim Shaikh Hasan v. Nasir Mushtaq Shaikh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 803 : 2026 INSC 853
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 54 — Validity of Sale Deed — Non-payment or failure to pay balance sale consideration — Remedy of Vendor — Actual payment of the entire sale consideration at the time of execution and registration of a sale deed is not a sine qua non for the completion of a sale. Even if part consideration alone has been paid and the balance is promised to be paid or retained to satisfy debts/dues of the transferor, title passes to the transferee upon execution and registration of the sale deed. The transaction of sale does not become void, invalid, or inoperative merely due to non-payment or failure to pay the remaining/balance sale price. In such circumstances, the remedy of the vendor/transferor is to institute a suit for recovery of the unpaid balance consideration (with interest), and not to seek cancellation of the sale deed or a declaration that the sale deed is null and void. [Relied on Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr., (1999) 3 SCC 573; Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead through Legal Representatives & Ors., (2020) 7 SCC 366; Paras 10-17]. Raziya Begum & Ors. Versus Nafisa Begum Abdul Hamid, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2026 INSC 814