Advocates Act, 1961 - The Supreme Court directed the Bar Council of India to reconsider its rule which bars office bearers of Bar Associations from contesting elections to State Bar Councils. With this direction, the Court disposed of a writ petition challenging Chapter III of the Bar Council of India Uniform Rules (and Mandatory Guidelines) for the Elections of Bar Councils,...
Advocates Act, 1961 - The Supreme Court directed the Bar Council of India to reconsider its rule which bars office bearers of Bar Associations from contesting elections to State Bar Councils. With this direction, the Court disposed of a writ petition challenging Chapter III of the Bar Council of India Uniform Rules (and Mandatory Guidelines) for the Elections of Bar Councils, 2016. Dhanya Kumar Jain v. Bar Council of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 216
Advocates Act, 1961 - The Supreme Court disposed of a plea seeking reservation for advocates belonging to Other Backward Classes in appointments of government pleaders in Madhya Pradesh. While declining to issue binding directions in the absence of a statutory mandate, the Court through its order urged the Advocate General to ensure representation of lawyers from marginalised communities and women. OBC Advocates Welfare Association v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 217
Amicus Curiae - Procedure for Appointing Amicus Curiae for Absentee Appellants – Guidelines – To prevent technical pleas of unfairness, the Supreme Court directed that when appointing an Amicus Curiae due to the absence of a convict's counsel, the Registry should issue notice to the convict's address via the jurisdictional police station - If the convict remains dormant despite service (including service by pasting on the premises), the Supreme Court may proceed to decide the appeal - This process ensures the Court knows if the appeal survives or has abated after long periods. Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257
Anticipatory Bail — Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 18 — Cancellation of Anticipatory Bail - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the respondents, observing that a prima facie case under the SC/ST Act was established - noted that while the High Court relied on the absence of casteist slurs in the initial FIR (lodged by a police official based on a social media video), it failed to exercise sufficient caution in examining other records - an affidavit filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and statements of various persons clearly alleged the use of casteist slurs and violence by the upper-caste respondents against marginalized community members over a drainage dispute – noted that the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, which precludes the grant of anticipatory bail, is applicable when the ingredients of the offence are prima facie disclosed - In this case, investigation reports indicated offences under the SC/ST Act, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the Arms Act - noted that mere attempts at reconciliation by the police cannot prevent the taking of cognizance for criminal acts - Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in concluding there was no prima facie culpability, as subsequent investigation reports and affidavits by high-ranking police officials corroborated allegations of caste-based abuse and firearm discharge – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249; Paras 8-15] Kuldeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 239
Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 2(a) and Section 39 – Absence of Arbitration Agreement – Jurisdiction of State Government – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision setting aside an arbitral award, holding that there was neither a valid arbitration agreement nor informed consent by the Municipal Council to resolve disputes through arbitration - Noted that Clause 22 of the contract, which provided for dispute referral to the Collector with subsequent appeals to the Divisional Commissioner and the State Government, constituted a departmental dispute-resolution mechanism and not an "arbitration agreement". Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 31(7)(a) and 31(7)(b) — General Conditions of Contract (GCC); Clause 16(3) and 64(5) — Pre-award/Pendente lite Interest — Post-award Interest — The Arbitral Tribunal cannot award pre-award or pendente lite interest, even in the form of "compensation," if the contract expressly prohibits interest on amounts payable to the contractor - a contractual bar on pre-award interest does not automatically extend to post-award interest - Post-award interest is a statutory mandate under Section 31(7)(b) and is not subject to "contracting out" by parties unless the exclusion is explicit and unambiguous - The Court retains the power to modify the rate of post-award interest if it is deemed excessive or lacks justification - Key Findings and Relied-on Decisions: i. Contractual Supremacy in Pre-award Interest: Under Section 31(7)(a), the arbitrator's power to award pre-award interest is subordinate to the terms of the agreement. If a contract (like Clause 16(3) of the GCC) bars interest on "amounts payable to the contractor," the arbitrator lacks jurisdiction to grant it. Ii. Rejection of Ejusdem Generis: The phrase "amounts payable to the contractor under the contract" in Clause 16(3) is independent and distinct from "earnest money" or "security deposits." It cannot be read down to only include deposits; iii. Statutory Mandate of Post-award Interest: Section 31(7)(b) is not subject to party autonomy. The expression "unless the award otherwise directs" refers to the rate of interest, not the entitlement to it; iv. Power to Modify Interest Rate: Courts can modify post-award interest rates to avoid excessive financial burdens and ensure "just compensation" based on contemporary economic scenarios – Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises (2022) 2 SCC 331; RP Garg v. Chief General Manager, Telecom Department 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2928; Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2025) 7 SCC 1; Union of India v. Bright Power Projects (India) (P) Limited (2015) 9 SCC 695; Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises (2022) 2 SCC 331; Paras 30-60] Union of India v. Larsen & Tubro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 214 : 2026 INSC 203
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 16, Section 4, and Section 34 – Appointment of Presiding Arbitrator – Improper Constitution of Tribunal – Waiver and Conduct – The Appellant challenged the arbitral award on the ground that the Presiding Arbitrator was appointed by the two nominee arbitrators beyond the 30-day period prescribed in Clause 8.3(b) of the Agreement - The Appellant contended that after 30 days, the power of the nominee arbitrators was extinguished, and only the Secretary General of ICSID could make the appointment - Held: Clause 8.3(b) is an enabling provision, not a restrictive one - It provides a "fail-safe" by permitting parties to approach ICSID if the nominee arbitrators reach an impasse, but it does not denude the nominee arbitrators of their power to appoint after the 30-day period unless a request is actually made to ICSID - Since neither party approached ICSID, the appointment by the nominee arbitrators was valid. [Paras 30-34] Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. R.V. Anderson Associates, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2026 INSC 228
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 4 and Section 16(2) – Timelines for Objection vs. Past Conduct – Held that while an objection under Section 16(2) raised before the statement of defence is technically "timely" to prevent statutory waiver under Section 4, the prior conduct and acquiescence of the party remain relevant in adjudicating the merits of the jurisdictional challenge - A party cannot participate in the process, allow multiple appointments of presiding arbitrators without protest, and then "keep a jurisdictional ace up their sleeve" to challenge the final constitution - Supreme Court must respect arbitral autonomy and ensure minimum judicial interference - If the arbitrator's interpretation of a contractual clause is a plausible view, the Court cannot substitute it with another view merely because it is possible – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578; Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v. Software Technology Parks of India (2025 INSC 574); Paras 36, 40-45, 51-54, 61, 66, 67] Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. R.V. Anderson Associates, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2026 INSC 228
Arbitration – Jurisdiction – Excepted Matters – Rule of Law – Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – The Supreme Court held that one party to a contract cannot be the sole arbiter to decide whether the other party committed a breach when liability is disputed. Such an interpretation violates the fundamental principle that no party shall be a judge in its own cause - Supreme Court clarified that while certain matters may be "excepted" from arbitration, they cannot be "excluded" from judicial remedy entirely, as a vacuum in legal remedies is opposed to the Rule of Law. ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2026 INSC 274
Bail – Cancellation of Bail – Dowry Death – Sections 103(1) and 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Appeal by the mother of the deceased challenging the High Court's order granting bail to the husband of the deceased – The deceased died within 1.5 years of marriage in suspicious circumstances with multiple external and internal injuries – Allegations of dowry harassment and threats by the accused prior to the death – High Court granted bail primarily noting the absence of criminal antecedents and the period of custody – Held: The High Court adopted a "mechanical approach" and failed to consider the gravity of the offence and the nature of the accusations – While criminal antecedents are a factor, they cannot outweigh the seriousness of a crime like dowry death where circumstantial evidence strongly points toward the accused – The Supreme Court emphasized that an appellate court can interfere with a bail order if relevant materials were ignored or the gravity of the offence was not considered. [Relied on P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211; Paras 14-27] Lal Muni Devi v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 298
Bail – Foreign Nationals – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Financial Constraints in furnishing Surety –The Respondent, a 32-year-old Ugandan national, was granted bail by the High Court on 15.09.2025 in a case involving the NDPS Act - Despite the Trial Court reducing the surety amount progressively from ₹1,00,000 to ₹25,000, the accused remained in Tihar Jail for months due to her inability to furnish a solvent surety - Held: Article 21 of the Constitution, which protects the right to life and personal liberty, applies equally to foreign nationals prosecuted in India - Once an accused has established a case for bail, financial difficulties or the inability to provide a solvent surety should not act as a barrier to their release - In cases where a foreign national cannot meet surety requirements due to financial constraints, they may be released on a personal bond and subsequently housed in a detention center to ensure they do not leave the country - Supreme Court explicitly grounded its reasoning in the constitutional mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, emphasizing its universal application to any person within the territory of India, regardless of nationality. [Paras 4-13] Customs v. Faridah Nakanwagi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 278
Bail - The Supreme Court granted regular bail to an accused in the alleged multi-crore Andhra Pradesh liquor scam, invoking its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. Muppidi Avinash Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 274
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 173(3) – Registration of FIR – Preliminary Inquiry – Safeguard against mechanical registration – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR registered against a media executive, holding that the allegations were "absolutely vague," "speculative," and "inherently improbable" – Noted that Section 173(3) BNSS provides an additional safeguard for offences punishable between three and seven years - Unlike Section 154 CrPC, where a preliminary inquiry is limited to ascertaining if a cognizable offence is disclosed, Section 173(3) BNSS empowers police to conduct an inquiry to determine if a prima facie case exists even if the information ostensibly discloses a cognizable offence - The legislative intent is to prevent the registration of frivolous cases. In the instant case, the police acted with "unusual expediency" and registered the FIR in a mechanical manner without exercising the option of a preliminary inquiry despite the indeterminate nature of the allegations. [Paras 23-25] Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 258 : 2026 INSC 244
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 528 (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC) – Quashing of FIR – Abuse of Process – Supreme Court observed that the FIR was a "glaring example" of an influential media house managing to register a case against its own executive following a fallout - The complaint lacked specific victim names, dates, or instances of the alleged extortion and cheating - If the allegations, even taken at face value, do not constitute an offence or are so absurd that no prudent person could reach a conclusion of sufficient grounds for proceeding, the FIR must be quashed to prevent the abuse of the process of law – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1; Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, (2026) 1 SCC 721; Paras 19-28] Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 258 : 2026 INSC 244
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 528 — Quashing of Proceedings — Informant's Right to Hearing — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that quashed an FIR and consequential criminal proceedings without issuing notice to the informant - The High Court had quashed the case based on a general observation in a previous election-related writ petition suggesting parties withdraw all proceedings - The Supreme Court held that since the FIR disclosed a cognizable offence and a charge-sheet had already been submitted following investigation, the proceedings could not be quashed "straight-away" without giving the informant an opportunity to be heard - Matter restored for fresh consideration. [Relied on District Bar Association and Another vs. Bar Council of India Writ (C) No. 5973 of 2025; Paras 11-13] Suman Kumar Raghav v. Ravindra Kumar Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 279
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 11A(1) Proviso – Extended Period of Limitation – Suppression of Facts – Revenue Neutrality – The Revenue invoked the extended period of five years alleging suppression of actual use of Naphtha - held that "suppression" requires a deliberate act to escape payment of duty - Where the assessee is a Public Sector Undertaking receiving subsidies from the Central Government, any excise duty paid would be reimbursed as a subsidy, making the entire exercise "revenue neutral" - In cases of revenue neutrality where no benefit is derived by the assessee from evading duty, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked. [Relied on Steel Authority of India v. Collector of Central Excise (1996) 5 SCC 484; State of Haryana v. Dalmia Dadri Cement Limited 1987 Supp SCC 679; Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company v. Collector of Central Excise (1995) Supp 3 SCC 462; Nirlon Limited v. Chief Commissioner of Excise (2015) 14 SCC 798; Paras 38-45, 52-54, 56-58] Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 295 : 2026 INSC 285
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 5A – Exemption Notifications (No. 75/84-CE and No. 4/97-CE) – Naphtha used in the manufacture of Fertilizer – Interpretation of "Intended Use" – The Supreme Court held that when an exemption notification is conditioned on the "intended use" of a product, the benefit is attracted if the goods are used for the purpose and with the intention of manufacturing the specified product (fertilizer/ammonia) – Noted that the mere fact that a fraction of the procured Naphtha was used for generating electricity (steam), a portion of which was used in a chemical plant or supplied to the electricity board, does not disentitle the assessee from the exemption - Once eligibility for exemption is established, the notification must be construed liberally. Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 295 : 2026 INSC 285
Certified Copy - The Supreme Court has reiterated that a statutory appeal cannot be entertained without a certified copy of the impugned judgment. Central Bank of India v. Bijendra Kumar Jha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 273
Cinema Law - The Supreme Court dismissed a writ petition seeking a stay on release of the film “Yadav Ji ki Love Story”, holding that the title of the movie does not portray the Yadav community in a negative manner. A bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan noted that the title did not contain any adjective or word that attached any negative meaning to the community. Awdesh Kumar Yadav v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 215
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XLI Rule 27 — Exercise of Judicial Discretion — Noted that power to allow additional evidence is discretionary and must be used sparingly to remove a lacuna in the evidence, not to allow a party to fill gaps in their case at their "leisure or sweet will." - If the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory and reasoned judgment based on the existing record, the provision has no application. [Para 11] Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XLI Rule 27 — Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court — Scope and Conditions Precedent — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence as a matter of right - The provision is couched in negative terms and applies only in three specific contingencies: (a) refusal by the trial court to admit evidence that ought to have been admitted; (aa) the party establishing that despite due diligence, such evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced at the trial stage; or (b) the Appellate Court itself requiring the evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 97-101 – Execution of Decree – Obstruction by Third Party – Abuse of Process – Re-litigation – Res Judicata – Appellants obtained a decree for specific performance and initiated execution - Respondents 1-3 (third parties) filed objections under Order XXI Rules 99-101 claiming independent title - During the pendency of the specific performance suit, the appellants had also filed separate suits against the same respondents for injunction/possession but allowed those suits to be dismissed for default and failed to restore them - Held: The appellants, having abandoned their earlier independent suits against the respondents for the same subject matter without seeking liberty to file afresh, are precluded from contesting the respondents' rights in execution proceedings - To permit the appellants to reap the benefits of the decree against these respondents through execution, after having failed to pursue direct legal remedies against them, would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and "re-litigation" - The principle of nemo debet bis vexari (no one should be twice troubled for the same cause) applies. [Paras 32-54] Sharada Sanghi v. Asha Agarwal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2026 INSC 292
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Possession of Auction Purchaser – Supreme Court observed that while Order 21 Rule 95 CPC provides a procedure for an auction purchaser to take possession, if the purchaser actually gains possession and maintains it on the date of the suit's institution, they cannot be denied an injunction against a party with no title who seeks to interfere - Even if a specific issue on possession was not formally framed by the Trial Court, since the parties went to trial fully aware that the issue was central and led evidence accordingly, they cannot later claim prejudice - Held – The High Court erred by not considering the extensive documentary evidence (e.g., revenue records, factory registrations, tax payments) relied upon by the First Appellate Court to establish the appellant's possession - The matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration within the scope of Section 100 CPC. [Relied on Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B. Shama Rao & Ors., (1956) 1 SCC 698; B. Arvind Kumar v. Govt. of India & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 745; Paras 19-25] P. Elaiyappan v. Natarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 219
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact – Possession and Injunction – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had dismissed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction despite concurrent findings of possession in favor of the appellant by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court – Noted that the High Court failed to frame a specific substantial question of law regarding the correctness or validity of the findings on possession returned by the lower courts - The Supreme Court held that interference with concurrent findings of fact under Section 100 CPC is permissible only on limited grounds, such as perversity, misreading of evidence, or consideration of inadmissible evidence. P. Elaiyappan v. Natarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 219
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 215, 228, 464, and 465 — Framing of Charge — Procedural Irregularity vs. Fundamental Illegality — De Novo Trial — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order directing a fresh trial due to an unsigned formal charge-sheet - held that the purpose of framing a charge is to provide the accused with precise notice of accusations to enable an effective defense, rather than being a "mere ritualistic formality" - Where the record indicates that charges were read over and explained to the accused in the presence of counsel, and the accused subsequently participated in the trial for over fourteen years by extensively cross-examining witnesses, there is substantial compliance with Section 228 Cr.P.C. - A procedural lapse, such as the omission of a signature on a formal charge document, constitutes a curable irregularity under Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C. unless it is demonstrated that the accused was misled or that a "failure of justice" was occasioned. Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : 2026 INSC 301
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Proceedings - Suicide Note – Held that criminal proceedings quashed where the suicide note lacked material particulars regarding the nature, time, and place of alleged threats – Noted that where a suicide note indicts multiple creditors (nine in this case) without specifying individual roles or showing they acted as a group, a trial based on such a note would be a "futile exercise" and an "abuse of the process of the Court" – Held that Mere evidence of frequency of calls (40 calls in six months) without audio recordings or records of the content of those calls to indicate threats is insufficient to sustain a prosecution under Section 306 IPC – Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-15] Dhirubhai Nanjibhai Patel Lotwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 270
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Exceptional Nature of De Novo Trials — A direction for a de novo trial is an exceptional measure and should not be resorted to for mere procedural lapses, especially when a trial has substantially progressed and key prosecution witnesses have since expired - Ordering a fresh trial in the absence of demonstrated prejudice irretrievably prejudices the prosecution and defeats the interests of timely justice. [Relied on Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1956 SC 116); Main Pal v. State of Haryana (2010) 10 SCC 130; Ajay Kumar Ghoshal v. State of Bihar (2017) 12 SCC 699; Paras 14-17] Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : 2026 INSC 301
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 157 – Procedural Lapses – Alleged non-compliance with the requirement of sending the FIR to the Magistrate under Section 157 CrPC is not, by itself, fatal to the prosecution case - Such procedural lapses are insufficient to overturn a conviction when the overall evidence establishes the guilt of the accused - The movement of multiple accused persons, arriving together armed with firearms and chasing the deceased into a private residence to execute the killing, is sufficient to draw an inference of a common object - The recovery of 40 pellets from the body and multiple entry/exit wounds corroborated the involvement of multiple shooters. [Paras 13, 17 - 20] Dablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 238 : 2026 INSC 224
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 313 - Examination of Accused – Duty of Court and Prosecutor – Impact of Inadequate Questioning - Held: It is the solemn duty of both the Trial Court and the Prosecutor to ensure all incriminating circumstances (motive, dying declarations, medical evidence) are put to the accused during their Section 313 examination - A casual or "scanty" examination that omits material circumstances falls short of the legal standard and can lead to the failure of the entire prosecution. Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 230 : 2026 INSC 223
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 313 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 21 – Opportunity to Lead Defense Evidence – The appellant contended he was not afforded an opportunity to examine himself as a defense witness - Supreme Court rejected this, noting that the trial record showed the appellant's statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded and he had the opportunity to avail himself of Section 21 of the P.C. Act but failed to do so during the trial. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 319 – Scope of Judicial Scrutiny – Mini-Trial prohibited – The Supreme Court observed that while Section 319 is an extraordinary power to be exercised sparingly, the Trial Court must not conduct a "mini-trial" or a threadbare credibility assessment of minor contradictions at this stage - In the instant case, the Trial Court erred by overemphasizing minor inconsistencies in witness accounts, the absence of jail records, and the physical plausibility of the complainant escaping injury. Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Standards of Evidence – Three-Tier Threshold – Supreme Court noted three distinct levels of evidence assessment: (i) Prima facie standard(lowest) for framing formal charges; (ii) Strong and cogent evidence (middle) for summoning additional accused under Section 319 CrPC, where evidence must be reliable and reasonably persuasive but not beyond reasonable doubt; and (iii) Proof beyond reasonable doubt (highest) required for conviction. Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Civil Dispute vs. Criminal Offence – Commercial Risk in Movie Production – Supreme Court observed that movie making is a high-risk business where fulfilment of a promise (sharing profits) is not entirely in the control of the promisor - If a transaction involves inherent risk and the conduct of the parties does not reflect dishonest intention from the beginning, the High Court should exercise its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings and relegate the parties to civil remedies - In the present case, since the movie was actually completed and released, the promise to make the movie was not false, and the dispute regarding profit-sharing remains a civil cause of action. V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Forgery and Fraud – High Court quashed FIR at the threshold while investigation was ongoing and vital forensic evidence was awaited - Supreme Court held that when allegations of forgery are made and documents have been sent to a handwriting expert, quashing the FIR without awaiting the report is unjustified - Once the Court is apprised that the genuineness of signatures is under SFSL analysis, there is no reason to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to stifle the probe - Supreme Court's Observations – i. The High Court prematurely terminated the proceedings despite clear allegations establishing fraud, falsification of documents, and criminal breach of trust; ii. Subsequent SFSL reports confirmed that the signatures on bank nomination documents and sale deeds were forged/facsimile stamps and did not match the admitted signatures of the deceased; iii. The High Court's reliance on Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI (2009) 15 SCC 643 was misplaced and irrelevant to the facts of the present case, as the proof of forgery was dependent on the then-pending handwriting expert's report - Held: The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside - The Investigating Officer was directed to conclude the investigation and file the result before the concerned Court – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643; Paras 16-23] Sharla Bazliel v. Baldev Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2026 INSC 252
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) – Section 482 - Quashing of Proceedings – Summoning of Accused – Copyright Infringement – Appeal against High Court order refusing to quash criminal proceedings for alleged copyright infringement of a film script - The Supreme Court observed that summoning an accused is a serious matter and should not be done as a matter of course - The Magistrate's order must reflect an application of mind to the facts and law, involving a careful scrutiny of the evidence to determine if an offence is prima facie made out - In the present case, the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) failed to record satisfaction regarding any specific similarities between the appellant's film 'Kahaani-2' and the complainant's script 'Sabak' - The summoning order was passed in a mechanical manner. Sujoy Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 271 : 2026 INSC 267
Code of Criminal Procedure – Quashing of Proceedings – Section 482 of CrPC / Section 528 of BNSS – Offences under Sections 341, 323, 498A, and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act – General and Omnibus Allegations – Parity in Relief – The High Court quashed proceedings against the sister-in-law but refused to extend the same relief to the father-in-law and mother-in-law (appellants) despite identical allegations. Held: The Supreme Court found that the allegations against the appellants were general and omnibus, lacking specific dates, places, or overt acts – Held that Relatives of the husband cannot be prosecuted based on vague and general allegations without any specific overt act attributed to them - Supreme Court observed that since the allegations against the appellants and the sister-in-law were identical in substance, the High Court erred in applying different standards. Quashing the proceedings against the appellants - noted that criminal proceedings should not be used as a tool for harassment through improved and supplemental versions of events – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., (2010) 7 SCC 667; Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 741; Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2022) 6 SCC 599; Paras 7 - 11] Dr. Sushil Kumar Purbey v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : 2026 INSC 212
Companies Act, 2013 – Section 418A & 419 – Composition of NCLAT Benches – Validity of Technical Member Majority - Supreme Court rejected the challenge to a three-member NCLAT Bench comprising two Technical Members and one Judicial Member - held that while a Bench must have at least one Judicial Member, the current law does not mandate a majority of Judicial Members in larger Benches - Technical and administrative members are not to be treated with "disdain" or labeled lower in status, as their expertise aids in holistic adjudication - A notice is "tricky" if it is artfully framed to mislead or conceal material facts from shareholders - the disclosure of the exit price and the availability of valuation reports at the registered office satisfied the requirements of Section 102. [Relied on: Kaye v. Croydon Tramways & Co. Ltd.; Baillie v. Oriental Telephone and Electric Co. Ltd.; In Re: Cadbury India Limited; Mihir H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. 2014 SCC Online Bom 4934; Paras 18-22, 23-37, 48, 50] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213
Companies Act, 2013 – Section 66 – Reduction of Share Capital – Validity of Selective Reduction and Forced Exit of Minority Shareholders - The Supreme Court upheld the reduction of share capital under Section 66, even if selective and resulting in an involuntary exit of minority shareholders – Held that reduction of share capital is a domestic concern of the company decided by the majority - As long as the procedure is followed and the transaction is not unfair, inequitable, or against public interest, the majority has the right to decide how to carry out the reduction, including extinguishing certain shares while retaining others. [Relied on: Re: Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd.; British and American Trustee and Finance Corporation v. Couper 2005 SCC Online Del 674; Paras 42-47] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213
Companies Act, 2013 – Section 66 – Requirement of Valuation Report – Statutory Interpretation – Held that unlike Sections 62, 230, and 232, Section 66 does not statutorily mandate a valuation report from a registered valuer for the reduction of share capital - The primary safeguards are a special resolution and confirmation by the Tribunal - The absence of a valuation report being sent with the notice does not constitute a "tricky notice" if the fair value and methodology are disclosed or made available for inspection. [Paras 24-37] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213
Companies Act, 2013 – Valuation – Discount for Lack of Marketability (DLOM) – Applicability in Unlisted Companies - held that the application of a Discount for Lack of Marketability (DLOM) is a valid accounting principle for valuing shares of unlisted or delisted companies - While DLOM may be declined in court-ordered buyouts involving "oppression," it is applicable in a standard Section 66 reduction where no oppression is proved and the shares lack liquidity - noted that "Fair Value" under Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS 113) is a market-based measurement that accounts for restrictions on sale. [Relied on: Liew Kit Fah v. Koh Keng Chew [2020] 1 SLR 275; Paras 39-45] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 142 — Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage — Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees — Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had dismissed a divorce petition in India on the grounds of a pre-existing US divorce decree - held that the foreign decree was not binding as it was granted on a ground (irretrievable breakdown) not recognized under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the husband had not effectively submitted to the foreign jurisdiction - Exercising its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court granted a decree of divorce to bring a quietus to the 18-year-long separation - Key Legal Points – i. Non-Binding Nature of Foreign Decrees: A foreign decree of divorce is not conclusive or binding if it is granted on grounds not available under the matrimonial law governing the parties (in this case, the Hindu Marriage Act) and where the opposite party did not voluntarily or effectively submit to the foreign court's jurisdiction; ii. Effective Participation: Mere service of summons or filing a jurisdictional objection by post does not constitute "effective participation" or "voluntary submission" to a foreign forum - Principles of natural justice require a meaningful opportunity to contest the proceedings; iii. Article 142 Power: Where a marriage has irretrievably broken down and parties have been separated for a prolonged period (nearly 18 years), the Supreme Court can exercise its plenary power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage directly to ensure justice. [Relied on Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi (1991) 3 SCC 451; Paras 8-11] Kishorekumar Mohan Kale v. Kashmira Kale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 259
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 528 — Quashing of FIR — Duty of High Court to Decide on Merits - The Supreme Court held that when a petitioner seeks the quashing of an FIR, the High Court must consider the merits of the challenge based on available material and applicable law, rather than disposing of the petition with general directions to follow arrest guidelines or concluding it without addressing the underlying grievance - Once jurisdiction for quashing is invoked, the High Court should decide the matter "one way or the other" on its merits. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948; Paras 5-8] Md. Mashood v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2026 INSC 259
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 142 – Gender Equality in Armed Forces – Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Women Officers (SSCWOs) – Assessment of Merit – Casual Grading of ACRs – The Supreme Court held that the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of women officers commissioned between 2010 and 2012 were authored under the systemic assumption that they were ineligible for career progression beyond 14 years - This institutional mindset resulted in "middling" or "average" grades being assigned to women while "outstanding" grades were reserved for male counterparts whose future depended on them - Supreme Court observed that such a structural disadvantage, embedded in years of service assessments, cannot be neutralized by mere procedural safeguards like anonymization of data at the final evaluation stage. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281
Constitution of India – Article 12 – Definition of 'State' – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) - The Supreme Court held that the Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) constitutes 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, writ petitions filed by its employees under Article 226 of the Constitution are maintainable - Key Determinants for Article 12 Status – Supreme Court observed that while no single test is exhaustive, the cumulative effect of the following factors established AFGIS as an instrumentality of the State - i. Deep and Pervasive Control - The Society was established with the sanction of the President of India, who also approved its deputation rules; ii. Administrative Dominance - The Board of Trustees and Managing Committee consist entirely of serving senior officers of the Indian Air Force (IAF); iii. Compulsory Nature - Membership and premium deductions are mandatory for all IAF personnel as an integral part of their service conditions, leaving no choice to the individual; iv. Public Function - The Society performs a public duty by providing insurance and welfare to armed forces personnel, which is a core government function linked to national sovereignty and security; v. Self-Representation - The Society had previously represented itself as 'Government' to seek exemptions from service tax under the Finance Act, 1994 – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111; Paras 15-19] Ravi Khokhar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2026 INSC 233
Constitution of India – Article 139A(1) – Withdrawal of cases from High Court – Substantial questions of general importance – Stagnation of Trial – Failure to pronounce judgment after reserving it – The Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary power under Article 139A(1) to withdraw three criminal revision petitions pending before the Allahabad High Court to itself – Noted that the revisions had been heard and judgment reserved on 05.02.2020, but no judgment had been pronounced for several years - The continuing stay on trial proceedings arising from a 1994 incident resulted in a "standstill" of the criminal process for decades, infringing upon the right to speedy justice. Jaideep Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 211
Constitution of India – Article 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 – Unconstitutionality – Held: The impugned Act, which provides for the complete takeover of the management and assets of a private trust-run institution (Sinha Library) without a principled framework for compensation or a demonstration of mismanagement, is "manifestly arbitrary" - The State cannot use its legislative power to single out a specific institution for takeover without an intelligible basis or fair process - The Act fails the test of reasonableness and non-confiscatory nature required under Article 300A. Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2026 INSC 219
Constitution of India – Article 21 – Right to Die with Dignity – Passive Euthanasia – Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment – Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) – Supreme Court allowed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, specifically CANH administered through a PEG tube, for a patient in an irreversible Permanent Vegetative State (PVS) for over 12 years - Held: The right to live with dignity under Article 21 includes the right to die with dignity - In cases where medical treatment is futile and serves no therapeutic purpose other than artificially prolonging a mindless biological existence, its withdrawal is constitutionally permissible. [Paras 29, 52, 72, 91] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222
Constitution of India – Article 21 – Right to Life and Health – COVID-19 Vaccination – Adverse Events Following Immunization (AEFI) – Compensation Policy – The Supreme Court directed the Union of India to formulate a "no-fault" compensation framework for serious adverse events or deaths resulting from COVID-19 vaccinations - held that while the state-led vaccination program was a vital public health intervention, the State bears a positive obligation under Article 21 to ensure that families suffering grave harm are not left without an accessible mechanism for redress. Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218
Constitution of India – Article 233(2) – Eligibility of Judicial Officers for District Judge Recruitment – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion – Practice Requirement - Held: In-service judicial officers are eligible for appointment as District Judges through direct recruitment - Their past service as a judicial officer must be counted toward the minimum practice requirement of seven years as stipulated under Article 233(2) - Categories of Relief held – i. Category A (Appointed but Reverted): Officers whose appointments were reversed due to an erroneous interpretation of law are deemed to have continued in service without a break - They are entitled to seniority and notional pay fixation but no arrears of pay; ii. Category B (Selected but not Formally Appointed): Selected candidates whose appointments were stalled by judicial intervention must be immediately offered appointments, subject to vacancy availability. Seniority will be determined by a committee of three senior High Court judges; iii. Category C & D (Ongoing or Future Selection): Officers currently in the selection process or seeking to participate must be treated as eligible; iv. Age Relaxation: Candidates who crossed the age limit while erroneously considered ineligible are granted a one-time relaxation to participate in the next selection process; v. Cadre Management: All officers benefiting from these directions shall be treated as District Judges appointed through direct recruitment. [Overruled Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, (2020) 7 SCC 401; Paras 5-22] Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 306
Constitution of India – Article 311(2)(b) – Dismissal from service without departmental inquiry – Scope of "Reasonably Practicable" – Requirement of Objective Satisfaction – The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal of a Delhi Police Constable, holding that the power to dispense with a regular departmental inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) cannot be exercised based on mere "assumptions and conjectures" - Supreme Court noted that the disciplinary authority must record satisfaction based on independent material showing that holding an inquiry is not "reasonably practicable" - Key Observations held – i. Judicial Review and Satisfaction - The finality given to the disciplinary authority's decision under Article 311(3) is not binding on the Courts - The scope of judicial review is open to strike down orders dispensing with an inquiry if the reasons are irrelevant, arbitrary, or lack a factual basis – Held that court must consider whether a "reasonable man acting in a reasonable way" would have reached the same conclusion in the prevailing situation; ii. Absence of Material Evidence: In the present case, the Preliminary Inquiry (PE) report failed to record any specific instances of the appellant who was in custody at the time—threatening or intimidating witnesses - The Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) relied on the ACP's "presumption" of potential witness tampering without any supporting material, which the Court deemed a failure of application of mind; iii. Custody as a Factor: It was incumbent upon the authority to demonstrate how the appellant, while in jail, posed a threat that made an inquiry "not reasonably practicable"; iv. Adherence to Circulars: noted that the Delhi Police's own circulars (dated 31.12.1998 and 11.09.2007) mandate that Article 311(2)(b) should not be used as a "short cut" and requires "cogent and legally tenable reasons". [Relied on Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398; Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 36; Paras 23-40] Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2026 INSC 234
Constitution of India – Article 32 and Article 14 – Declaration of Public Holidays – Judicial Review of Policy Decisions – Writ petition seeking directions to the Union and State governments to frame uniform guidelines for declaring public/gazetted holidays and to declare Guru Gobind Singh's 'Prakash Parv' as a nationwide gazetted holiday - Held: Dismissing the petition, the Court observed that the declaration of public holidays is a policy decision involving administrative efficiency, economic implications, and the balancing of diverse socio-cultural practices – Noted that i. Executive Domain: Matters of policy determination regarding governance and administrative exigencies lie within the exclusive domain of the executive. Any judicial mandate to increase non-working days involves a line-drawing exercise that is inherently policy-driven and not amenable to judicial determination; ii. Article 14 (Equality): The absence of a uniform policy does not amount to discrimination under Article 14. Absolute uniformity is not mandated where differentiation is founded on rational considerations, such as regional socio-cultural needs in a federal structure; iii. Article 25 (Religious Freedom): Freedom of religion does not extend to a right to seek State recognition of a religious occasion in the form of a compulsory nationwide public holiday; iv. Administrative Impact: Expanding the list of gazetted holidays would adversely impact governance and public productivity - In a developing nation, the focus must remain on the dignity of labor and continuity of work; v. Floodgates Argument: Granting such relief would open the floodgates to similar claims from diverse sections of society, leading to an impractical expansion of holidays; vi. Legacy of Guru Gobind Singh Ji: Supreme Court recorded deep reverence for the Tenth Guru, noting that his teachings of 'Kirat Karo' (honest living) and 'Vand Chakko' (sharing) emphasize active engagement with responsibilities - His legacy is best honored through the dedicated performance of duties rather than a symbolic show of respect by demanding a holiday. [Paras 11-18] All India Shiromani Singh Sabha v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : 2026 INSC 289
Constitution of India – Article 32 and Article 21 – Right to Legal Representation and Personal Liberty – Transfer of Criminal Case – The Supreme Court deprecated the acts of hooliganism and violence by the District Bar Association, Barabanki, where members passed a resolution to not represent the accused and physically assaulted the office of an advocate who filed a bail application - held that the denial of bail for over two months in a case arising from a trivial scuffle at a toll plaza was unjustified and violative of Article 21 – Noted that denial of bail to the petitioners and the curtailment of their liberty for a period exceeding two months is absolutely unjustified and violative of the Fundamental Right of Liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India warranting exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article 32 of the Constitution of India - To ensure a fair trial and proper legal representation - the Supreme Court directed the immediate release of the petitioners on bail and transferred the proceedings from Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh, to Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi. Vishvjeet v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2026 INSC 254
Constitution of India – Article 32 – Writ Jurisdiction vs. High Court Administration – While the Supreme Court does not ordinarily function as a supervisory forum over the day-to-day administration or rosters of High Courts, it may intervene in "rare and exceptional situations" where continuing inaction results in a demonstrable infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 – Supreme Court noted that pending revisions must be decided by giving full effect to the legal and constitutional observations of the Supreme Court - The failure to implement specific directions regarding the re-evaluation of withdrawal of prosecution (Section 321 CrPC) implicated the credibility of the criminal process. [Paras 3-9] Jaideep Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 211
Constitution of India – Article 32 – Writ Petition – Delay and Laches – Right to Property – Writ petition filed by Mizo Chief Council seeking compensation for lands allegedly acquired without due process in 1954-55 - Respondents raised preliminary objection regarding inordinate delay of nearly six decades - The Supreme Court reiterated that while Article 32 is a fundamental right, it is not immune from general principles of law and reasonable procedure - Petitions agitating stale claims ought not to be entertained to prevent disturbing settled positions and causing prejudice to third parties - Supreme Court clarified that the operative test is not "unreasonable delay" but "unexplained delay. Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236
Constitution of India – Article 32 – Writ Petition seeking directions regarding alleged violations of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) – Import of animals by private facilities – Legality of CITES permits – Held: The subject matter was previously examined by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) in W.P. (C) No. 783 of 2025, which found no violation of domestic or international law - The CITES Secretarial Document relied upon by the petitioner explicitly records that no evidence was found regarding imports without requisite documentation or for commercial purposes - Once an import is effected under valid permission, it cannot be subsequently treated as prohibited merely because objections are raised later - Disturbing the settled environment, custody, and care of living animals (including rescued animals) after lawful import may itself result in cruelty. [Relied on East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Vs. The Collector of Customs, 1962 AIR 1893; Paras 2-5] Karanartham Viramah Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 266
Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 21 – Judicial Review of Executive Policy – Separation of Powers – While acknowledging the executive's competence in drafting health policies, Supreme Court maintained that the separation of powers cannot prevent judicial intervention when fundamental rights are violated due to the absence of a structured relief framework in exceptional circumstances. Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218
Constitution of India – Doctrine of Manifest Arbitrariness – Evolution and Application – Held: Manifest arbitrariness is a well-settled ground for striking down plenary legislation under Article 14. A law is manifestly arbitrary when it is "capricious, irrational, or not guided by any principle" or is "excessive and disproportionate" - A legislative enactment that targets a specific entity for total deprivation of management and property rights without following due process, providing adequate compensation, or establishing a clear public necessity (beyond mere "better management") is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248; Paras 35-50] Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2026 INSC 219
Constitution of India – Mitigating Factors for Delay - Supreme Court observed that delay is not a rigid rule of law but a flexible rule of practice guided by judicial discretion - In the present case, Supreme Court declined to dismiss the petition at the threshold despite a 60-year delay due to: i. The unique historical trajectory and political insurgency in Mizoram; ii. Continuous agitation of claims by the Chiefs before various forums; iii. Official assurances and conduct of the State Government that engendered a legitimate expectation of an amicable resolution, thereby dissuading immediate litigation. Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236
Constitution of India – No-Fault Liability – Principle and International Precedent – Supreme Court emphasized that requiring proof of negligence through civil courts or consumer fora imposes an "onerous burden" on families in complex scientific matters - Relying on the principle of no-fault liability (similar to Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), Supreme Court noted that global jurisdictions, including Australia, the UK, and Japan, have implemented dedicated COVID-19 vaccine injury compensation schemes - Supreme Court declined to appoint an independent medical board, finding the existing National and State AEFI Committees adequate for scientific assessment - it reaffirmed the state's duty to maintain transparent surveillance and ensure AEFI data is accessible in the public domain. [Relied on Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India (2022 SCC OnLine SC 533); In re: Distribution of Essential Supplies and Services During Pandemic (2021 SCC OnLine SC 372); Gaurav Kumar Bansal v. Union of India (W.P.(C) No. 539/2021); Paras 27-37] Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218
Constitution of India – Right to Property and Burden of Proof – i. Burden of Proof - In cases alleging fundamental rights violations, the initial burden lies on the petitioner to establish the existence and invasion of such rights; ii. Title over Land - held that the petitioner failed to prove that Mizo Chiefs were absolute owners of the land under the British regime - Documents (boundary papers) suggested they functioned as administrative heads rather than proprietary owners; iii. Privy Purses - rejected the plea of discrimination comparing Mizo Chiefs to rulers of Princely States, noting that privy purses were outcomes of specific pre-constitutional contractual arrangements and not a legally enforceable fundamental right - the petitioner failed to establish a clear title to the lands or a specific breach of fundamental rights under the erstwhile Articles 19(1)(f) and 31, the petition was dismissed. [Relied on Tilokchand and Motichand & Ors v. H.B. Munshi & Anr (1969) 1 SCC 110; Rabindranath Bose & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (1970) 1 SCC 84; Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors vs Union of India & Ors (2015) 3 SCC 1; G.P. Doval & Ors v. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. (1984) 4 SCC 329; Paras 27-64] Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236
Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d) and 2(1)(g) — Maintainability of Complaint — Commercial Purpose vs. Banking Service — Summary Proceedings — Fraud and Forgery - Commercial Purpose and Bank Deposits - The Supreme Court held that the mere earning of interest on a Fixed Deposit Receipt (FDR) does not automatically categorize the banking service as being for a "commercial purpose." - Parking surplus funds for safe custody or statutory compliance is not reflective of a commercial intent - if a deposit is made specifically to leverage credit facilities for business augmentation, it would have a direct nexus with profit-generating activity and thus fall under "commercial purpose." Sant Rohidas Leather Industries v. Vijaya Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 267 : 2026 INSC 264
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Summary Jurisdiction and Complex Facts – Noted that proceedings before Consumer Fora are summary in nature and not intended to adjudicate complex factual disputes involving criminal or tortious acts like fraud, cheating, or forgery - Where a Bank sets up a subsequent contract of pledge against an FDR which the complainant alleges is fraudulent or based on forged documents such a dispute must be addressed in a regular civil or criminal proceeding rather than under the 1986 Act - The burden to prove that services were availed for a "commercial purpose" lies on the respondent (Bank), whereas the burden to prove "deficiency in service" lies on the complainant. [Relied on Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti Developers and Others (2020) 2 SCC 265; Chairman and Managing Director, City Union Bank Limited and Another v. R. Chandramohan (2023) 7 SCC 775; Paras 21-31] Sant Rohidas Leather Industries v. Vijaya Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 267 : 2026 INSC 264
Consumer Protection – Insurance Claim – Fraud and Arson – Repudiation of Claim – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC order that had partially allowed an insurance claim despite evidence of fraud - held that once a claim is established to be founded on fraud, the entire claim collapses, and no relief partial or equitable can be granted - Key Findings: i. Deliberate Arson: Forensic analysis (Truth Labs) identified hydrocarbon residues (kerosene) at the seat of the fire, while electrical examinations ruled out a short circuit; ii. Fabricated Evidence: The respondent relied on invoices from non-existent or unrelated suppliers and manipulated VAT returns to inflate the claim; iii. Suspicious Proximity: The enhancement of insurance coverage and procurement of an additional policy occurred in close proximity to the fire incident, raising serious doubts about the bona fides of the claim; iv. Legal Principle: Fraud vitiates all solemn acts - An insurance contract cannot be used as an instrument for unjust enrichment - directed the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, to form a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate the orchestrated fraud. [Relied on S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1; A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2007) 4 SCC 221; Paras 15-26] United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sayona Colors Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 303 : 2026 INSC 287
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Civil Contempt – Intentional Delays and Administrative Hurdles – The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of government departments seeking "guidance" or citing "administrative hurdles" and "internal correspondence" as excuses for the non-compliance of clear court orders - Supreme Court noted that such actions are often a "calculated strategy" to delay or defeat the implementation of judicial directions. Israr Ahmed Khan v. Amarnath Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 209 : 2026 INSC 209
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Liability of Non-Parties – Reiterated that even a third party or an officer not originally impleaded in the main proceedings can be held liable for contempt if they have knowledge of the court's order and act in a manner that willfully prevents its compliance or aids and abets its violation - Supreme Court emphasized that in contempt proceedings, the court cannot traverse beyond the original order or supplement its directions - The focus remains strictly on whether the specific directions issued in the judgment have been willfully disobeyed. [Relied on Sita Ram v. Balbir, (2014) 13 SCC 489; J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar, (1996) 6 SCC 291; Snehasis Giri v. Subhasis Mitra, (2023) 18 SCC 529; Paras 9-29] Israr Ahmed Khan v. Amarnath Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 209 : 2026 INSC 209
Contract Act, 1872; Section 133 - Discharge of surety by variance in terms of contract - The Supreme Court held that any variance made in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor without the surety's consent discharges the surety only as to transactions subsequent to the variance - The discharge of the surety is not absolute; they remain liable for the original amount for which they stood as guarantee before the unauthorized variance occurred. Bhagyalaxmi Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Babaldas Amtharam Patel, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 210 : 2026 INSC 205
Contract Act, 1872 - Error by Bank and Third-Party Decree – Held that the Bank committed a clear breach of duty by unilaterally remitting the amount to the vessel owner despite receiving specific instructions (Form A-2) to remit it to the Plaintiff - The Bank, not being a party to the underlying Charter Party Agreement, could not rely on its terms to ignore the customer's mandate - Under the third-party procedure (Order VIII-A CPC / Order V-A Madras High Court Original Side Rules), the Bank was held liable to indemnify the customer (Defendant No. 1) for this erroneous transfer. [Relied on Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Damodar Prasad and others (1969) 1 SCR 620; Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Electrosteel Castings Ltd. (2026) 264 Comp Cas 11; Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. (2010) 7 SCC 417; Paras 35, 36] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247
Contract Act, 1872 - Liability of Guarantors - Bifurcation of Liability - Supreme Court set aside the High Court's finding that guarantors are either liable for the entire amount or not at all. It held that liability can be bifurcated; sureties are liable to the extent of their original engagement (plus applicable interest) but are not liable for excess amounts permitted to be withdrawn by the creditor in connivance with the principal debtor without the sureties' intimation or consent - The cardinal rule is that a guarantor must not be liable beyond the terms of his engagement – noted that unless there is bad faith, misrepresentation, or a material variation to the prejudice of the surety, the creditor's actions within the contract terms do not automatically discharge the surety – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Maharashtra vs. Dr. MN Kaul (D) by his LRs, AIR 1967 SC 1634; Syndicate Bank vs. Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors., (2006) 11 SCC 506; Paras 4-7] Bhagyalaxmi Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Babaldas Amtharam Patel, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 210 : 2026 INSC 205
Contract Act, 1872 - Necessary Parties and Dominus Litis - Supreme Court rejected the contention that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the vessel owner (principal debtor) - It reaffirmed that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom they seek no relief, unless that person is an indispensable "necessary party" without whom no effective decree can be passed. [Paras 27-32] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247
Contract Act, 1872 - Sections 126, 127, 128, and 140 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII-A – Key Issues – i. Whether a "Corporate Guarantee" issued by a charterer (Defendant No. 1) to a ship repairer (Plaintiff) to pay outstanding dues from freight amounts constitutes a valid, independent guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act; ii. Whether a bank is liable to indemnify its customer under third-party procedure when it erroneously remits funds to the wrong party contrary to express customer instructions – Held that the "Corporate Guarantee" (Exhibit P11) and related communications (Exhibit P10) constituted a valid, independent contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act - It was not merely a freight-sharing arrangement as contended by the Appellant – Noted that a guarantee is a voluntary act of taking up the burden of a third party who failed to make payment - Under Section 128, the liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor - The creditor is entitled to proceed against the surety without first exhausting remedies against the principal debtor. [Paras 21-25] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247
Contract Law - Interpretation of Contracts – Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence – Sections 92 and 94 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Supreme Court emphasized that when the language of a contract is plain and applies accurately to existing facts, evidence cannot be given to show it was not meant to apply to such facts - under Section 92, factual context and correspondences between parties can be used to make ambiguous terms certain. [Paras 21-22] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202
Contract Law - Shortfall in Tapering Linkage – Indemnity Clauses – Supreme Court set aside the compensation awarded for the period prior to the coal block cancellation (pre-25.08.2014) - It held that Article 2.5 of the PPA/PSA acted as an indemnity clause, stipulating that if coal was procured from alternative sources (e-auction/import) to meet shortfalls in tapering linkage before the captive source became operational, such coal would be deemed to be from the captive source with no separate cost escalation allowed. [Paras 19-23, 25-26] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202
Contractual Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Clauses 3.20 and 3.22 – Supreme Court noted that a widely worded arbitration clause (Clause 3.22) must be read in conjunction with restrictive default clauses (Clause 3.20) - Clause 3.20, which accorded finality to the Administration's decision and barred legal proceedings, was interpreted to apply only where liability is admitted and only the quantification is at issue - Where liability is disputed, the matter falls within the ambit of the arbitration clause. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills Thirthahalli, (1987) 2 SCC 160; J.G. Engineers Private Limited v. Union of India, (2011) 5 SCC 758; Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru Pattabhirami Reddi, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 243; Paras 25-38] ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2026 INSC 274
Cooperative Societies — Interplay between Reorganisation Act and 2002 Act — Legislative Continuity — Section 87 of the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000, embodies the doctrine of legislative continuity, allowing for the adaptation of laws for two years following bifurcation - Actions taken during this transitional period to reorganize societies to fit single-state boundaries are valid and cannot be retrospectively invalidated by Section 103 of the 2002 Act. Registrar Cane Cooperative Societies v. Gurdeep Singh Narval, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2026 INSC 216
Cooperative Societies — Non-obstante Clause — Section 93 of the Reorganisation Act provides that its provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any other law - The deeming fiction of Section 103 of the 2002 Act cannot override the express statutory scheme of the Reorganisation Act where reorganisation actions were already completed – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary and Others v. Milkiyat Singh and Others; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2802; Paras 13-24] Registrar Cane Cooperative Societies v. Gurdeep Singh Narval, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2026 INSC 216
Cooperative Societies — Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 — Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 — Section 103 — Status of Sugarcane Cooperative Societies upon State Bifurcation — The Supreme Court held that the Sugarcane Growers Cooperative Societies of Bajpur and Gadarpur are not Multi-State Cooperative Societies – Held that the deeming fiction under Section 103 of the 2002 Act is neither automatic nor universal; it requires a factual determination of whether a society's objects (distinguished from its area of operation) extend to more than one State. Registrar Cane Cooperative Societies v. Gurdeep Singh Narval, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2026 INSC 216
Criminal Administration of Justice – Fair Trial vs. Expeditious Disposal – Appointment of Amicus Curiae – The Supreme Court emphasized that while fast-tracking criminal appeals is necessary, it must not occur at the expense of basic fairness - Noted that in cases where an appeal is listed after a significant delay (two decades in this instance) and the appellant's counsel is absent, it is a "desirable precaution" for the High Court to issue notice to the appellant regarding the appointment of an Amicus Curiae - While the High Court's intention to render legal assistance is genuine, justice is better served if the convict is informed so they may provide instructions for a "real and meaningful" defence rather than a "token gesture". Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257
Criminal Jurisprudence – Bail – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial accused – Appeal against Delhi High Court order denying bail – Appellant in custody since June 4, 2019, with a combined incarceration of 8 ½ years in NIA and ED cases – Trial proceeding at a "snail's pace" with only 34 out of 248 witnesses examined so far – Held, prolonged detention where a trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time results in undue curtailment of personal liberty under Article 21 – Stringent bail provisions in special statutes (UAPA/PMLA) cannot be used to incarcerate an accused indefinitely without trial – The rigours of such statutory provisions melt down when there is no likelihood of the trial completing in a reasonable time and the accused has undergone a substantial part of the sentence – Considering the appellant's advanced age (74 years), medical ailments, and bleak chances of early trial disposal, Supreme Court enlarged the appellant on bail subject to stringent conditions – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 18-20] Shabir Ahmed Shah v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 305
Criminal Law – Convicts on Bail – Duty of Appellant – Supreme Court noted that convicts often neglect to cooperate with the court once their sentence is suspended - Appellants enlarged on bail have a responsibility to keep track of their appeals; they cannot blame the court or an Amicus Curiae for not raising specific grounds if they failed to engage with the proceedings for decades. [Relied on Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019) 20 SCC 196; Paras 17 - 23] Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257
Criminal Law – Grant of Bail – Delay in Trial – Incarceration without trial amounts to punishment – The Supreme Court granted bail to the appellant who had been in custody since April 13, 2024, for offenses under Sections 386, 307, 506, 120-B, 482, and 411 of the IPC, and Sections 25(6) and 27 of the Arms Act - Supreme Court observed that despite the prosecution proposing to examine 23 witnesses, none had been examined after almost two years of incarceration - Noted that when a trial is unlikely to conclude in the near future and the accused has undergone significant pre-trial detention, further detention is unnecessary as incarceration without trial amounts to punishment. [Paras 5-11] Pardeep Kumar @ Banu v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 302
Criminal Law — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376(2)(g) and Section 506 — Rape — Conviction Set Aside — Appreciation of Evidence — Delayed FIR and Solitary Testimony of Prosecutrix — The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellants, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt - Supreme Court observed that the FIR was lodged after a significant delay of over three months without a cogent explanation - noted that the prosecutrix's version failing to disclose the incident even to her husband but allegedly disclosing it later to a stranger who was never produced as a witness was contrary to natural human conduct. Rajendra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2026 INSC 238
Criminal Law — Sexual Offences — Appreciation of Child Witness Testimony — Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 — SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Appeal against acquittal — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment of acquittal, restoring the conviction of the respondent - held that the High Court erred by prioritizing minor inconsistencies and "mathematical precision" regarding travel time over the credible, unshakeable testimony of the nine-year-old victim - Reiterated that there is no hard and fast rule for testing the competency of a child witness; it depends on the trial judge's satisfaction regarding the child's capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood - Corroboration is a rule of practical wisdom, not a legal necessity, and conviction can be based solely on a child's testimony if it inspires confidence and withstands cross-examination. [Para 7, 8, 10] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukum Chand @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : 2026 INSC 290
Criminal Law — Solitary Testimony of Prosecutrix — Reliability — While conviction can rest on the solitary version of a prosecutrix, it must inspire the confidence of the Court - Supreme Court found material inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecutrix regarding the location of the incident (room vs. plot) and the distance from her house, which weakened the prosecution's case - held that the defense of prior enmity (water dispute) between the parties was not properly considered by the lower courts, which had given undue weightage to the prosecutrix's emotional outbursts - In the absence of immediate reporting, supporting evidence such as a medical report becomes crucial - there was a total lack of medical or corroborative evidence to prove the act – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vijayan vs. State of Kerala (2008) 14 SCC 763; Paras 13-18] Rajendra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2026 INSC 238
Criminal Trial – Appreciation of Evidence – Fragmented vs. Cumulative Approach – Held, the Trial Court misdirected itself by treating inconsistencies in isolation rather than assessing the cumulative weight of testimonies and circumstances - Testimony on oath by three witnesses, including the complainant, is sufficient to meet the "strong and cogent" standard for summoning additional accused, even if minor inconsistencies exist which are matters for trial. [Relied on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92; Neeraj Kumar v. State of UP 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2639; Paras 7-12] Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251
Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel — Statutory Power — The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to manifest an outcome that precludes the State from exercising its statutory power to withdraw an exemption in the public interest - While the State can withdraw a concession, the principles of fairness and legitimate expectation require that such withdrawal should not cause "undue hardship" to those who structured their financial planning based on the earlier concession. State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296
Election - The Supreme Court urged the Election Commission of India to consider the suggestions put forth by a petitioner regarding measures to curb excessive election expenditures observing that the suggestions given by the petitioner are "worth consideration". Prabhakar Deshpande v. Chief Election Commissioner of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 218
Election - Where only two candidates contested an election, setting aside the winning candidate's election does not warrant a fresh poll; instead, the runner-up should be declared elected. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision to direct a fresh election, after the winning candidate's election as Panchayat Samiti Chairperson was declared null and void. Ramadebi Rautray v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2026 INSC 243
Electricity Act, 2003 – Regulation as an "Enterprise" – Duty of Regulators – While SERCs possess plenary power, they must not act in silos - Supreme Court adopted the model of "Regulation as an Enterprise," where regulators act as "Governments in Miniature" to balance efficiency with distributive and environmental goals - Regulatory power must be exercised as a collaborative project with other stakeholders to subserve the purpose of the Act, including energy security and the transition to renewable energy. Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294
Electricity Act, 2003 – Sections 61, 62, 64, and 86 – Tariff Determination – Generation Based Incentive (GBI) – Power and Jurisdiction of State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) – Whether an SERC, while exercising its exclusive power to determine tariff, can "consider and factor in" the GBI granted by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) to renewable energy generating companies (GENCOs) - Held, there is no unallocated regulatory residue left outside the SERC's jurisdiction; tariff determination is its exclusive province - The power of the Commission to determine tariff includes the authority to consider the impact of incentives or subsidies, such as GBI, that affect the economic position of a GENCO - This authority flows directly from the Electricity Act and relevant Regulations (e.g., Regulation 20 of APERC Regulations, 2015) and is not denuded by the mere existence of a Union grant under Article 282 of the Constitution. Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294
Electricity Act, 2003 – Treatment of GBI – Mandatory Deduction vs. Contextual Application – Held, the requirement to "take into consideration" an incentive under Regulation 20 does not mechanically translate into a mandatory deduction from the tariff - If an incentive (like GBI) is designed as a "generator-focused incentive" to encourage investment in renewable energy and not as a "consumer subsidy," the Commission must respect its underlying objective - Factoring GBI into the tariff in a manner that effectively redirects the benefit from the generator to the consumer nullifies the policy intent of the grant. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh v. JSW Hydro Energy Ltd., 2025 INSC 857; Paras 15-46] Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294
Electricity Duty Act, 1958 (Bombay); Section 5A — Exemption from Electricity Duty — Withdrawal of Exemption — Power of State Government — The State Government, having the statutory power to grant exemptions in the public interest under Section 5A, also possesses the inherent power to withdraw or modify such exemptions - The power to grant an exemption is a policy decision in the realm of fiscal administration, and the State must retain flexibility to recalibrate such policies based on changing economic circumstances and public finance management. State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296
Electricity – Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) – Change in Law – Cancellation of Coal Blocks – The Supreme Court upheld the grant of compensation to the power generator (APNRL) for additional costs incurred due to "Change in Law" events resulting from the cancellation of the Ganeshpur captive coal block – Noted that the judgment in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secy. & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 516 and the subsequent enactment of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015 constituted a "Change in Law" under Article 10 of the PPA - These events altered the legal regime for coal allocation, thereby entitling the generator to be restored to the same economic position as if the Change in Law had not occurred. [Para 24] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202
Electricity - Reasonable Notice Period — Fiscal Implications — Where captive power generators have made significant investments based on duty exemptions, a sudden withdrawal can be disruptive - In the interest of justice, a "reasonable notice period" must be granted to allow affected industries to adjust their financial planning - A period of one year from the date of the notifications is considered a reasonable notice period. [Relied on Shri Bakul Oil Industries & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (1987) 1 SCC 31; Kasinka Trading and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., (1995) 1 SCC 274; State of Rajasthan & Another v. J K Udaipur Udyog Ltd. & Another, (2004) 7 SCC 673; Paras 15-24] State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296
Equity – Fixation of Reasonable Penal Rent – While upholding the right to deduct penal rent, the Supreme Court noted that full enforcement of the management's penal policy might entirely extinguish the gratuity of retired skilled/semi-skilled workers - In an equitable exercise of jurisdiction, the Court fixed a reasonable sum of Rs. 1,000 per month as penal rent for the period beyond the grace period, balancing the interests of both parties. [Relied on Secretary, ONGC Ltd. v. V. U. Warrier (2005) 5 SCC 245; Paras 16 - 21] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263
Estoppel and Participation – Jurisdictional Nullity – Participation in arbitral proceedings does not confer jurisdiction where an arbitration agreement is inherently absent. Since the arbitrator lacked inherent jurisdiction, the proceedings were a nullity (coram non judice) and the award was non-est - The Municipal Council was not estopped from challenging the award as it was "forced" into arbitration without consent while functioning under a State-appointed Administrator - Supreme Court rejected the application of these precedents, affirming the High Court's finding that there is no acquiescence or estoppel where a party is compelled to participate in proceedings that are a jurisdictional nullity. [Relied on N. Chellappan v. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. (1975) 1 SCC 289; Inder Sain Mittal v. Housing Board, Haryana and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 175; Paras 19-26] Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288
Evidence Act, 1872 – Ocular Evidence vs. Unnatural Conduct – held that the testimony of related witnesses (brother, son, and nephews of the deceased) could not be discarded merely because they failed to intervene or take the victim to the hospital after the shooting - Such "unnatural behavior" does not invalidate their evidence when consistent with other facts, such as the established political rivalry and the forensic evidence of multiple gunshot wounds. [Paras 11 - 15] Dablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 238 : 2026 INSC 224
Evidence Act, 1872 – Production of Material Objects – Tainted Currency Notes – The appellant argued that the failure to produce tainted currency notes before the Court was fatal to the prosecution - Supreme Court dismissed this contention as it was raised for the first time during oral arguments at the Supreme Court and was never pleaded in the Trial Court, High Court, or the Special Leave Petition. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 [Proviso to Section 23 of BSA, 2023] – Recovery of currency notes and blood-stained shirt – Reliability - Currency Notes: A discrepancy in the amount recovered (Rs. 46,000/- vs Rs. 46,145/- counted in Court) casts a "grave cloud of doubt" on the factum of recovery - Mere recovery of money, without a clear nexus to the crime, is not an incriminating circumstance – Noted that it "highly improbable and unnatural" that an accused, who was at liberty for days, would meticulously conceal a blood-stained shirt in an iron box rather than destroying it or washing it. Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 65-B [Section 63 of BSA, 2023] – Admissibility of Electronic Evidence (Call Detail Records) – Held that the certificate required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of electronic records. Oral evidence cannot substitute this mandatory requirement - Since the prosecution failed to prove the Section 65-B certificate, the CDRs indicating frequent contact between the accused were rendered inadmissible. [Relied on Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1; Paras 49-52] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217
Evidence Act - Section 32 - Dying Declaration – Conviction on the sole basis of dying declaration – Requirements and Caution - Held: While a dying declaration is a crucial piece of evidence that can form the sole basis for conviction without corroboration, it must inspire full confidence in the Court – Supreme Court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind, and the statement was not the result of tutoring, prompting, or imagination - If the declaration is suspicious or the deceased's physical/mental capacity is in doubt, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence - In the present case, multiple inconsistencies, the presence of interested relatives during recording, and the lack of medical certification regarding the victim's fit state of mind rendered the declarations unreliable. Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 230 : 2026 INSC 223
Evidence Law – Circumstantial Evidence – Recovery of Articles – Call Detail Records (CDR) – Section 65-B of Evidence Act – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302/34 and 201 [Sections 103(1)/3(5) and 238 of BNS, 2023] – Conviction based on circumstantial evidence – Requirements for conviction – Held that the "Panchsheel" principles governing circumstantial evidence - To sustain a conviction, the circumstances must be fully established and form a complete chain that excludes every possible hypothesis except the guilt of the accused - The mental distance between "may be guilty" and "must be guilty" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. [Relied on harad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 27-28] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217
Evidence Law – Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) Report – Chain of Custody – Sanctity of Samples. For an FSL report to be reliable, the prosecution must prove an unbroken chain of custody from seizure to laboratory - In this case, contradictions between the Malkhana In-charge and Carrier Constable regarding the dates the samples were sent and returned from the FSL (due to unspecified "defects") breached the chain of custody – Noted that even if blood groups match, this circumstance in isolation cannot link the accused to the crime without other cogent evidence. [Relied on Karandeep Sharma alias Razia alias Raju v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 SCC OnLine SC 773; Paras 41-44] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217
Evidence Law – Witness Testimony – Hostile Witnesses – The testimony of "hostile" independent witnesses cannot be discarded in toto - Supreme Court must consider parts of the testimony that are creditworthy and corroborated by other evidence, such as the Trap Laying Officer's account and the recovery of marked currency. [Relied on Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Administration), (1979) 3 SCC 90; State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 500; Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om Prakash, (1972) 1 SCC 249; Paras 15-30] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Baljeet Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 228 : 2026 INSC 221
Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Ecological Balance vs. Invasive Species – Held that the mere presence of dense vegetation does not automatically signify a natural forest ecosystem, especially if the growth consists primarily of invasive alien species like Prosopis juliflora (Vilayati Kikar), which can disrupt native biodiversity - Environmental management should prioritize the restoration of native/indigenous species over the protection of harmful invasive monocultures - reiterated that tribunals and courts should not interfere with the implementation of a long-approved Master Plan under the guise of environmental principles once that plan has attained statutory finality - Harmonizing the right to a clean environment under Article 21 with the right to development, the Court noted that integrated transport projects (like the Bijwasan Railway Station redevelopment) serve public interest by decongesting urban zones and optimizing land use. [Relied on The Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody and Others (2025) 4 SCC 150; Paras 42-65] Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2026 INSC 270
Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Section 2 – Deemed Forest – Interplay between Statutory Master Plan and Subsequent Vegetation Growth – The Supreme Court held that land earmarked for a project under an approved Master Plan, which was not recorded as forest or deemed forest at the time the Plan came into force, cannot be subsequently declared a "deemed forest" due to the natural proliferation of vegetation or invasive species over time - Noted that the statutory binding force and sanctity of a Master Plan must prevail to ensure certainty and stability in urban planning - The relevant date for determining whether a parcel of land qualifies as a "deemed forest" is the date of the coming into force of the Master Plan, not the date when project work actually commences on the ground. Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2026 INSC 270
Frivolous and Vexatious Proceedings – Duty of Court – Held that when quashing is sought on grounds that proceedings are frivolous or malicious, the Court must examine the matter with "greater care" - The Court is not restricted to the averments in the complaint alone but must look into attending circumstances and "read in between the lines" - Noted that the appellant had registered the synopsis and scripts for the film between 2012 and 2013, well before the complainant allegedly met the appellant in June 2015 or registered his script in July 2015 - Since the appellant's work preceded the complainant's script, the question of infringement does not arise - the Screen Writers Association (SWA) Dispute Settlement Committee had already found no similarity between the works, a fact suppressed by the complainant - The proceedings were found to be manifestly frivolous and vexatious - The summoning order and the High Court's judgment are quashed and set aside - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mohd. Wajid & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2023) 20 SCC 219; Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749; Paras 13-20] Sujoy Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 271 : 2026 INSC 267
Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Joint Meeting Requirement – Under Section 5(3) of the Rules, the approval of the Gang Chart must occur after a joint meeting between the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police – Held that no indication of such a meeting in the records, which constitutes a violation of the prescribed rules - Relying on the principle that when a statute prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all - Noted that since the Act permits the mere naming of a person as a "gangster" with "perilous consequences" to individual liberty, the prescribed procedure must be followed scrupulously – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vinod Bihari Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2025 SCC Online SC 1216; Paras 8-12] Gabbar Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2026 INSC 271
Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Section 3(1) – Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021 – Rules 5 and 16 – Quashing of FIR – Procedural Irregularity in Gang Chart – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR registered under the Act of 1986 on the grounds that the accompanying Gang Chart was not prepared in accordance with the statutory mandate – Held that a valid Gang Chart requires the recommendation of the Nodal Officer (SHO) and the Additional Superintendent of Police, followed by approval from the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate - These recommendations must be in written form and approvals must be evidenced by signatures - In the present case, a certified copy of the Gang Chart obtained from the Court lacked these necessary signatures and recommendations. Gabbar Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2026 INSC 271
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 — Moratorium — Appropriation of Security Deposit against pre-CIRP dues — Held: The appropriation of a cash security deposit available with a creditor after the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) towards dues that arose prior to the CIRP is impermissible and contrary to the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the IBC - Such a deposit remains the property of the Corporate Debtor until a valid adjustment is made - While payments for maintaining the supply of goods and services during the moratorium period (post-CIRP) to keep the Corporate Debtor as a going concern are permissible under Section 14(2A), the recovery of pre-CIRP dues must strictly follow the claim procedure envisaged in the IBC. Central Transmission Utility of India v. Sumit Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : 2026 INSC 284
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 31(1) — Arbitral Proceedings — Counterclaim vs. Set-off — 'Clean Slate' Principle — Whether a respondent can raise a plea of set-off in arbitration proceedings after the approval of a Resolution Plan, even if its counterclaim was not part of the plan and stands extinguished - Held, that once a Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the IBC, all claims not included in the plan stand extinguished - a respondent cannot seek any affirmative relief through a counterclaim that was not part of the approved plan - if the specific terms of the Resolution Plan only bar payments or settlements and do not expressly or impliedly exclude the plea of set-off as a defense, such a plea can be raised to defend against the appellant's claim - The plea of set-off is permitted only as a defensive tool to prevent the appellant from succeeding entirely or in part - If the amount due to the respondent exceeds the amount awarded to the appellant, the surplus is not recoverable. If the appellant's proceedings are withdrawn, the counterclaim/set-off defense fails. [Relied on Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2021) 9 SCC 657; Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Aircel Ltd. & Dishnet Wireless Ltd. (Resolution Professional) (2024) 4 SCC 668; Paras 21-27] Ujaas Energy Ltd. v. West Bengal Power Development Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 272 : 2026 INSC 268
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 12A – Recall of Order – Maintainability – Commercial Wisdom of CoC - The Supreme Court dismissed a Miscellaneous Application (MA) seeking to recall a prior order dated 25.02.2025 that had dismissed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) - The applicant sought recall based on subsequent events, specifically a settlement reached under Section 12A of the IBC and the withdrawal of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Supreme Court reiterated that the decision to accept a settlement or a commercial course of action under Section 12A falls within the "collective commercial wisdom" of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) - held that a higher offer by an applicant does not, by itself, provide a ground to unsettle steps taken within the insolvency framework or to reopen the dismissal of an SLP. Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2026 INSC 275
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Set-off in CIRP — Pari Passu Principle — Held - The principle of insolvency set-off as permitted in liquidation regulations cannot be applied to CIRP - Set-off of dues payable by the Corporate Debtor for a period prior to the commencement of the CIRP cannot be made from dues (or assets) payable to or belonging to the Corporate Debtor post the commencement of the CIRP - Allowing such a set-off would mitigate against the pari passu principle essential to the scheme of the IBC. [Relied on Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Aircel Ltd. & Dishnet Wireless Ltd. (Resolution Professional), (2024) 4 SCC 668; Paras 15-25] Central Transmission Utility of India v. Sumit Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : 2026 INSC 284
Intervenors/Non-Parties — Right to Seek Review — Even a non-party to the proceedings can seek a review of an order if they perceive themselves to be an "aggrieved person" and satisfy the court of such a standing - Judgments in service matters often affect a class of employees beyond the immediate parties. Such judgments are not strictly in personam and can adversely affect the rights of others who were not joined in the original litigation. [Relied on Union of India v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad (2019) 18 SCC 586; Ajit Babu v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 473; K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 473; Paras 13-20] Dr. Jiji K.S. v. Shibu K., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 212 : 2026 INSC 207
Investigation - Lapses in Investigation – Failure to Secure Crime Scene and Independent Witnesses - Held: Overzealous or lethargic investigations are equally fatal to the prosecution - The failure of the Investigating Officer (I.O.) to draw a scene mahazar, conduct forensic examinations to rule out accidental fire (e.g., cylinder burst), or examine independent witnesses despite their presence at the scene constitutes a serious lacuna – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2010) 9 SCC 1; Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710; Paras 10-31] Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 230 : 2026 INSC 223
Judicial Discipline and Binding Precedents – Noted that Subordinate authorities must follow the orders of higher appellate authorities unreservedly - Disregarding the law laid down in previous decisions or overreaching superior court orders subverts the Rule of Law and undermines constitutional authority. [Relied on Baradakanta Misra v. Bhimsen Dixit, (1973) 1 SCC 446; Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corpn. Ltd., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 443; C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, (1995) 5 SCC 457; Paras 11- 15] Rajesh Goyal v. Laxmi Constructions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2026 INSC 299
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A - Delay and Redetermination – Noted that the fact that landowners received compensation based on an earlier Section 28-A application is irrelevant to their right to seek further parity with enhanced awards passed by higher courts for similarly placed landowners - The purpose of Section 28-A is to remove inequality between affluent landowners who can afford litigation and poor landowners who cannot - Acquisition – When an appeal is preferred against an award of the Reference Court, the High Court's decision becomes the operative award - The principle of merger ensures that the finality of the compensation is determined by the highest court that has adjudicated the matter. [Relied on Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736; Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 92; Paras 15-27] Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2026 INSC 293
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A - Re-determination of Compensation - Maintainability of second application - Doctrine of Merger – The Supreme Court held that landowners are entitled to seek re-determination of compensation based on a subsequent High Court award even if they had previously filed an application based on a Reference Court award – Noted that once a Reference Court's award is challenged and decided by the High Court, the lower award merges into the High Court's judgment - there is no legal bar for appellants to seek re-determination based on the High Court's award, as the earlier Reference Court award no longer exists independently. Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2026 INSC 293
Legal Profession – Professional Misconduct – Supreme Court expressed concern over the "sorry state of affairs" where legal professionals turned into perpetrators of violence - noted that while fraternity among lawyers is understandable, it cannot justify lawlessness or the burning of a colleague's property for defending an accused - The Bar Council of India was directed to take appropriate action against the erring members. [Paras 12-17] Vishvjeet v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2026 INSC 254
Maternity Benefit – Adoptive Mothers – Constitutional Validity of Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 (pari materia with Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961) – Age Limit for Adoption – The Supreme Court struck down the three-month age limit prescribed for an adopted child to entitle the adoptive mother to maternity benefits - held that the distinction between women adopting a child below three months and those adopting an older child lacks a rational nexus with the object of the legislation, which is to dignify motherhood and ensure child welfare - Key Findings noted – i. Motherhood vs. Childbirth: Supreme Court emphasized that maternity benefit is associated with the process of motherhood rather than the biological process of childbirth - Motherhood is a gradual process that takes shape in the heart, and the bond formed outside the womb is as crucial as that formed inside; ii. Article 14 (Equality): The three-month cap was found to be discriminatory and under-inclusive - Adoptive mothers are similarly situated regardless of the child's age, as the need for emotional bonding, nurturing, and family integration remains constant; iii. Article 21 (Reproductive Autonomy): Adoption is an expression of reproductive and decisional autonomy - Denying benefits based on an arbitrary age threshold violates the mother's right to a dignified life and the child's right to holistic care; iv. Practical Unworkability: noted that the legal procedure to declare a child "legally free for adoption" under the Juvenile Justice Act and CARA Regulations typically exceeds two to three months - Thus, the age limit rendered the statutory benefit illusory and otiose in practice; v. Best Interest of the Child: The principle of "best interest" is a continuing obligation that persists throughout the integration period; vi. Judicial Redrafting of Section 60(4): directed that the provision must now be meaningfully read as: "A woman who legally adopts a child or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over"; vii. Paternity Leave: Supreme Court urged the Union of India to recognize paternity leave as a social security benefit, noting that shared parenting is essential for a child's development and for dismantling gendered roles. [Relied on Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), (2000) 3 SCC 224; Deepika Singh v. PGIMER, Chandigarh, (2023) 13 SCC 681; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656; Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 244; State of Kerala v. Unni, (2007) 2 SCC 365; Paras 66-69, 75-82, 131-136, 146-152, 155-158, 166] Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 250 : 2026 INSC 246
Medical Ethics – Best Interest Principle – Substituted Judgment Standard – For incompetent patients, the decision to withdraw treatment must be grounded in the "best interest of the patient" - Held: The inquiry is not whether it is in the patient's best interest to die, but whether it is in their best interest to prolong life artificially through futile treatment - The "Substituted Judgment" standard—ascertaining what the patient would have wanted if competent is a critical component of determining their best interest from a dignity-centric lens. [Paras 131, 228, 229] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222
Medical Ethics – Procedural Guidelines – Minimal Judicial Intervention – Supreme Court emphasized that judicial intervention under Article 226 is only a fallback mechanism when medical boards disagree or hospitals fail to act. In the ordinary course, hospitals must constitute Primary and Secondary Medical Boards as per the Common Cause framework - Implementation of the boards' decision must follow a mandatory "Reconsideration Period" of 30 days to allow aggrieved parties to seek legal recourse. [Relied on Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1; Paras 23, 109, 274, 322] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222
Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Testimony — Victim Anonymity — Section 228-A IPC — Held that medical evidence is corroborative and an expert opinion - While it may be ignored if it contradicts credible ocular evidence, in this case, the medical findings of lacerated wounds and a torn hymen squarely supported the victim's version - Supreme Court deprecated the practice of freely using the victim's name in court records, despite the 1983 amendment and subsequent mandates intended to prevent social stigma - Directed all Registrars General of High Courts to ensure strict compliance with the proscription of disclosing a victim's identity. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Chatra (2025) 8 SCC 613; State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh (2025) 8 SCC 545; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh (2019) 16 SCC 759; State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2801; State of U.P. v. M. K. Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505; Para 12- 15] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukum Chand @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : 2026 INSC 290
Medical Law – Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) – Definition of "Medical Treatment" – Supreme Court clarified that CANH (enteral or parenteral nutrition via tubes) is a technologically mediated medical intervention, not mere basic care or sustenance - Held: Since CANH involves specialized medical protocols, risks of complications, and clinical assessment, it constitutes "medical treatment" amenable to withdrawal or withholding under the Common Cause guidelines. [Paras 118, 125, 128, 130] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222
Motor accident compensation — Procedural Lapses — Non-joinder of driver — Held: The provision for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to enhance social justice, the rigours of procedure, such as not adding a driver as a party, cannot be allowed to defeat the purpose of the Act, especially as the trial is summary in nature. [Relied on Helen C. Rebello & Ors. Vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (1999) 1 SCC 90; Sebastiani Lakra vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2019) 17 SCC 465; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Patricia Jean Mahajan & Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 281; Paras 12-17] Managing Director, KSRTC v. P. Chandramouli, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 245 : 2026 INSC 241
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Assessment of Disability and Loss of Earning Capacity – Functional Disability vs. Physical Disability – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision to reduce the functional disability of the appellant-claimant from 63% to 30% - held that the High Court failed to provide cogent reasons for disregarding the Medical Board's certificate and the neuropsychological report which evidenced severe cognitive impairment, partial blindness, and intellectual disability resulting from a head injury - Noted that for a professional like a Manager, whose role depends on memory and analytical skills, such neurological deficits lead to a profound erosion of faculties essential for employment - the Supreme Court enhanced the functional disability to 100% for the purpose of computing compensation - Supreme Court increased the compensation from ₹35.61 lakh (as fixed by the Madras High Court) to ₹97.73 lakh, restoring and expanding the approach adopted by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT). [Paras 21 - 30] R. Halle v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2026 INSC 260
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Duties of Appellate Courts – When an appellate court interferes with the findings of fact recorded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), especially regarding disability assessment, it must undertake a thorough reappreciation of evidence and assign clear, convincing reasons - Mechanical reductions of compensation without independent analysis of medical records are not sustainable in law – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343; Paras 22 - 35] R. Halle v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2026 INSC 260
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Compensation — Deduction of Group Insurance Scheme (GIS) benefits — Held: Amounts received by the dependents of a deceased under an employer-provided group insurance scheme or other contractual/social security benefits cannot be deducted from the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act - These benefits arise from an independent contractual relationship and lack the requisite nexus with the statutory compensation payable for death in a motor vehicle accident - The principle of balancing loss and gain cannot be invoked to diminish the statutory entitlement to "just compensation." [Paras 14 - 16] Managing Director, KSRTC v. P. Chandramouli, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 245 : 2026 INSC 241
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 2(30) and 147 – Requisition of Vehicle for Election Duty – Determination of Liability – Whether the registered owner/insurer or the requisitioning authority (State) is liable for compensation in case of an accident involving a vehicle requisitioned under statutory orders - Held: When a public authority requisitions a privately owned vehicle for public purposes (such as Gram Panchayat Elections), the nature of possession and control changes entirely - The registered owner is divested of custody and decision-making power, and the vehicle is placed at the disposal of the State for governmental functions – Held that the requisitioning authority assumes the role of the "owner" for the period of requisition. District Magistrate v. National Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : 2026 INSC 279
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Shifting of Liability from Insurer to State – The insurance policy obtained by the owner covers "regular and lawful use" in the ordinary course - Compelled deployment under statutory command cannot be characterized as "regular use" within the usual contemplation of the insurance contract - To fasten liability on the insurer for risks generated exclusively by governmental action would be to extend the contract beyond the agreed risk - responsibility for accidents occurring during the requisition period rests with the requisitioning authority (State) and not the insurer – Although Section 160 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1950, does not expressly authorize requisitioning manpower, if the authority utilizes the services of the driver provided with the vehicle, it implicitly recognizes the driver's competence to operate the vehicle under its control - The liability remains with the State even if the driver is an employee of the original owner, as the driver operates under official directions during the requisition period. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepa Devi (2008) 1 SCC 414; Purnya Kala Devi v. State of Assam (2014) 14 SCC 142; Paras 8-12] District Magistrate v. National Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : 2026 INSC 279
Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 (Maharashtra) – Section 143-A(3) – The State Government lacks the authority under Section 143-A(3) to unilaterally "foist" arbitration on parties governed by a concluded contract - The power of the State to issue directions under this section is limited to regulating the manner and procedure of octroi collection and does not extend to appointing an arbitrator for the Municipal Council and its agent. Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 50 – Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted – Non-compliance with mandatory requirements – Provision of "Third Option" for search – Noted that the High Court's acquittal of the accused was upheld where the Investigating Officer, while apprising the accused of his rights, provided a "third option" to be searched by the Police Officer instead of only a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer - Such an option is contrary to the statutory mandate of Section 50, which only allows for search before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate – Held that although the contraband (11 kg 50 grams of Charas) was recovered from a bag carried by the accused, Section 50 was attracted because a personal search was also conducted alongside the search of the bag – noted that the prosecution's case was further weakened by the testimony of PW-8 (shopkeeper), who denied providing an electronic weighing scale as claimed by the police, stating he only possessed traditional scales - This discrepancy rendered the prosecution's version of events doubtful and untrustworthy. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand and Another (2014) 5 SCC 345; Suresh and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013) 1 SCC 550; Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat (2011) 1 SCC 609; Paras 17-18] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Surat Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 246 : 2026 INSC 240
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 14, 2(m) and Schedule I - Jurisdiction of NGT - Removal of Encroachment - The Supreme Court set aside an NGT order directing the removal of a temple and associated structures allegedly built on land earmarked for a park/open space - held that for the NGT to exercise jurisdiction under Section 14, there must be a "substantial question relating to environment" involving the implementation of specific enactments listed in Schedule I of the Act - Since the dispute involved alleged violations of Municipal Laws and Town Planning Acts which are not included in Schedule I, the NGT lacked the jurisdiction to order the removal of the encroachment. Narender Bhardwaj v. 108 Super Complex R.W.A., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 249
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(m) - Substantial Question Relating to Environment - Definition includes instances of direct violation of specific environmental statutory obligations affecting the community at large, substantial damage to environment/property, or measurable damage to public health. Jurisdiction is strictly limited to the seven central environmental laws specified in Schedule I. [Paras 7-10] Narender Bhardwaj v. 108 Super Complex R.W.A., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 249
National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3-J — Entitlement to Solatium and Interest — Nature of Application of Tarsem Singh-I — The Supreme Court clarified the temporal application of its decision in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304 - While the declaration of Section 3-J as unconstitutional operates from the inception of the provision, Supreme Court issued specific directions to prevent the reopening of long-settled cases and to manage the financial implications on the public exchequer – Key Points – i. Settled Cases: Landowners whose claims were concluded prior to the date of the Tarsem Singh-I judgment (September 19, 2019) without any pending litigation (Appeals, Writ Petitions, or SLPs) are not entitled to reopen their cases to claim solatium or interest; ii. Pending Litigation: In cases where litigation was pending as of September 19, 2019, landowners are entitled to 'solatium' and 'interest' as per the 1894 Act standards; iii. Interest on Solatium: Landowners are entitled to 'interest on solatium' only from the date such specific claims were raised; iv. No Recovery: The Supreme Court clarified that these directions do not authorize the NHAI or the Union of India to seek refunds or recovery of solatium or interest already paid to landowners. [Relied on Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304; Paras 13-17] National Highways Authority of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2026 INSC 291
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Dishonour of Post-dated Cheques – Presumption of Cheating – Dishonour of a post-dated cheque by itself is not sufficient to presume the existence of a dishonest intention at the time of issuance - Post-dated cheques are often issued to discharge existing or future liabilities and do not carry a representation of sufficient funds at the time of issuance - While dishonour may trigger proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, it does not ipso facto amount to cheating under Section 420 IPC unless dishonest intention is proved from the start. [Relied on Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. (2011) 1 SCC 74; Vesa Holdings Private Limited and Another v. State of Kerala and others (2015) 8 SCC 293; Paras 12-20] V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265
Other Backward Classes (OBC) – Reservation – Creamy Layer Exclusion – Validity of Clarificatory Letter dated 14.10.2004 vs. Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 – Equality Doctrine - Key Principles Held – i. Primacy of the 1993 Office Memorandum (OM): A mere executive letter of clarification (dated 14.10.2004) cannot override or alter the substantive framework of a parent policy like the 1993 OM - If a clarification introduces new conditions that alter rights, it ceases to be clarificatory and becomes an impermissible amendment; ii. Exclusion of Salary and Agricultural Income: Under the 1993 OM, income from salaries and agricultural land must be excluded from the "Income/Wealth Test" (Category VI) - Supreme Court affirmed that income from salaries alone cannot be the sole criterion for Creamy Layer status; parental status and category of post are essential factors; iii. Hostile Discrimination: Denying OBC-Non-Creamy Layer (NCL) status to children of PSU/private employees based on salary while granting it to similarly placed Government servants (Group C and D) who reach similar income levels is "hostile discrimination." - It treats equals as unequals; iv. Constitutional Imperative: The exclusion of the creamy layer is a constitutional necessity to ensure benefits reach the truly backward - this exercise must be rational and non-arbitrary - directed the Union of India/DoPT to consider the claims of respondent candidates and intervenors based on these principles and to create supernumerary posts as required to accommodate those who satisfy the NCL criteria. [Relied on Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310; Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1; Paras 24 33, 37-43] Union of India v. Rohith Nathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : 2026 INSC 230
Other Backward Classes (OBC) – Reservation – Creamy Layer Exclusion – Validity of Clarificatory Letter dated 14.10.2004 vs. Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 – Equality Doctrine - The Supreme Court dismissed a batch of appeals filed by the Union of India against various High Court judgments which had ruled in favor of candidates from the OBC category - The central controversy was whether the salary of parents employed in Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) or private sectors could be the sole basis for "Creamy Layer" exclusion in the absence of established "equivalence" with government posts - held that treating PSU/private employees differently from Government servants (where salary is excluded from the income test) constitutes hostile discrimination and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Union of India v. Rohith Nathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : 2026 INSC 230
Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 and Section 498A - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32 - Dying Declaration - Reliability of Dying Declaration in cases of high percentage of burns - Conviction Upheld – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's reversal of an acquittal, affirming the conviction of the appellant for murdering his wife by pouring kerosene and setting her on fire - held that even with 80-90% burn injuries, a dying declaration is reliable if the attending doctors certify the patient was in a fit and conscious state to make a statement - The evidence of the victim's daughter (PW-3), who was an eyewitness to the appellant fetching kerosene and setting the deceased on fire, was found to be "clinchingly" credible - Supreme Court dismissed the defense's argument regarding inconsistencies in witness testimonies (PW-7 and PW-16), noting that the professional medical opinion of the treating doctors (PW-10 and PW-11) carries more weight regarding the deceased's mental capacity than the contradictory statements of other witnesses - noted that a mere discrepancy in the investigation officer's statements would not discredit the dying declaration when the doctor has approved the deceased's fit state of mind to give statements. [Paras 11-23] Subramani v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2026 INSC 249
Penal Code, 1860; Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide - Debt Recovery – Held a creditor making repeated phone calls or persistent demands for the return of money lent does not, by itself, constitute the offence of abetment of suicide - Such a demand is a lawful act - Supreme Court observed that in the absence of evidence showing the deceased was beaten or physically assaulted, mere demands for dues cannot be inferred as abetment - noted that the deceased might have committed suicide due to depression from being unable to clear the debt rather than due to the actions of the creditors. Dhirubhai Nanjibhai Patel Lotwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 270
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 149 – Unlawful Assembly and Vicarious Liability – Murder – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of four appellants sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of a Watershed Committee Chairman - Noted that to attract Section 149 IPC, two essential elements must be established: an "unlawful assembly" and a "common object" - Even in the absence of a specific overt act attributed to each member, the mere presence of the accused as part of an armed unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction - noted that all accused alighting together from a bus while armed with firearms clearly established their common motive and participation in the unlawful assembly. [Paras 12, 13] Dablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 238 : 2026 INSC 224
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 420 – Cheating – Ingredients – Essential requirement of dishonest intention from the inception – The Supreme Court held that to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive must exist at the time the inducement was made - Mere failure to keep a promise subsequently cannot be the sole basis to presume dishonest intention existed from the beginning - Every breach of contract does not give rise to an offence of cheating unless deception was played at the very inception. V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265
Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 323, 341, 506, and 34 — Quashing of Proceedings — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 — Where allegations of assault and criminal intimidation rest solely on the statement of the complainant without independent corroboration and are contradicted by other witness statements, the basic foundation for the offences is missing - Held, that continuing such proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. [Relied on Punjabrao vs. D.P. Meshram 1964 SCC OnLine 76; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp 1 SCC 335; K.P. Manu vs. Scrutiny Committee forVerification of Community Certificate 2015 4 SCC 1; Paras 40-60] Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283
Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 125 & 266 – Pension Regulations for the Army, 2008 – Regulation 44, 173 & 175 – Defence Security Corps (DSC) – Second Service Pension – Condonation of Deficiency in Service – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Union of India, holding that personnel of the Defence Security Corps (DSC) are entitled to seek condonation of shortfall in their qualifying service (up to one year) for the purpose of a second service pension - Key Findings – i. DSC as Part of Armed Forces: DSC constitutes a "Corps" of the Indian Army under the Army Act, 1950, and its personnel are recognized as "Armed Forces personnel"; ii. Applicability of General Rules: Paragraph 266 (1961 Regulations) and Paragraph 173 (2008 Regulations) stipulate that pensionary awards for DSC shall be governed by the same rules applicable to the Regular Army, unless specifically inconsistent; iii. No Inconsistency: There is no "inconsistency" or express prohibition in the DSC - specific chapters against the condonation of shortfall provided in Regulation 125 (1961) or Regulation 44 (2008); iv. Calculation of Service: Before applying condonation, the length of service must be determined by treating a fraction of a year between 3 to 6 months as a completed half-year, as per Note 5 of the MoD letter dated 30th October 1987; v. Executive Letters vs. Regulations: The Government cannot override or amend statutory Pension Regulations through administrative letters (such as those dated 20th June 2017 and 22nd March 2022) to bar condonation benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Surender Singh Parmar, (2015) 3 SCC 404; Paras 31-48] Union of India v. Balakrishnan Mullikote, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2026 INSC 286
Practice and Procedure – Miscellaneous Application for Recall – An application for recall of an order dismissing an SLP cannot be used as a "second innings" to litigate issues that were not part of the original proceedings - noted that the original SLP arose from a suit for specific performance, whereas the MA attempted to introduce new grievances related to separate insolvency proceedings - While fraud can vitiate proceedings, such a claim must be proven and cannot be invoked on mere assertion. [Paras 10-15] Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2026 INSC 275
Precedent – Nature of Orders – Article 141 – that the High Court relied on Ram Naresh Singh v. Bokaro Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017) as a binding precedent to direct the release of gratuity with only nominal rent deductions - Held: The order in Ram Naresh Singh was passed on grounds of equity in specific facts and did not purport to lay down a binding precedent - An order passed on facts cannot be elevated to the status of a precedent by operation of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. [Para 17] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 7 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 120B – Criminal Conspiracy – Demand and Acceptance of Bribe – Individual Liability vs. Collective Culpability – The Supreme Court held that even if a charge of criminal conspiracy (Section 120B IPC) fails due to lack of evidence regarding a prior meeting of minds or demand by one of the accused, the other accused can still be independently convicted for demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the PC Act if the evidence specifically establishes their individual role - The conduct of an accused person—such as turning pale, remaining "mum," or attempting to escape/dispose of the bribe money when challenged by the Trap Laying Officer—is admissible as relevant conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Baljeet Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 228 : 2026 INSC 221
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7 and 13(2) – Illegal Gratification – Trap Proceedings – Evidentiary Value of Shadow Witness – Credibility of Independent Witnesses – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an Excise Constable caught in a trap for demanding and accepting a bribe of ₹500 - held that the testimony of a shadow witness (PW-2) cannot be branded as "interested" merely because they are acquainted with the complainant - To disqualify a witness as interested, the defense must provide specific material demonstrating actual hostility. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239
Property Law — Declaration of Title — Adverse Possession — A claim for perfection of title by adverse possession cannot be sustained against the State/Union regardless of the duration of possession if the claimant fails to prove the specific point of time and basis upon which their predecessors entered possession - a decree obtained in an earlier suit where the true owner (Union of India) was not impleaded is non-est and not binding upon the Union – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148; State of Karnataka v. K.C. Subramanya, (2014) 13 SCC 468; Paras 7- 11] Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211
Railway - Passengers purchasing railway tickets over the counter cannot be denied the benefit of travel insurance when the same facility is available to those booking tickets online. Union of India v. Radha Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 231
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 – Auction Sale – Finality of Sale vs. Adequacy of Valuation – Limited Remand – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to remit the matter to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) for the limited purpose of reconsidering the valuation of properties, even after the auction sale was confirmed - While the rights of a bona fide auction purchaser deserve protection, this protection is not absolute - If credible issues regarding the adequacy of valuation or the fairness of the reserve price fixation arise, the court may invoke its supervisory jurisdiction to ensure the recovery process realized the maximum possible value for the secured asset. Om Sakthi Sekar v. V. Sukumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : 2026 INSC 237
Recovery Proceedings – Objective of Auction – The primary goal of an auction is to obtain the most remunerative price for a property through competitive bidding, ensuring transparency and fairness - A process that compromises competitive bidding increases the risk of underbidding or inadequate pricing - The principle of finality in judicial sales does not shield the process from examination regarding valuation or reserve price fixation - Recovery processes must be fair, transparent, and based on proper value assessments to balance the interests of both creditors and borrowers – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Rajiv Kumar Jindal v. BCI Staff Welfare Association (2023) 238 Comp Cas 227: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 507; Paras 15-19] Om Sakthi Sekar v. V. Sukumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : 2026 INSC 237
Recruitment and Selection — Migration from Reserved to General Category — Teachers Recruitment — The principal issue is whether candidates belonging to reserved categories, who have availed relaxation in a qualifying examination (TET) to become eligible for the main selection process (TAIT), are entitled to migrate to the open/unreserved category on the basis of merit secured in the main examination - Held - The requirement of obtaining 60% marks in the Teachers Eligibility Test (TET) is not an essential eligibility condition, as the NCTE guidelines permit the appropriate Government to grant relaxation to reserved category candidates - Relaxation in qualifying marks for an eligibility test merely creates a "level playing field" and does not amount to a concession in the actual selection process - If a reserved category candidate secures higher marks in the final merit list (TAIT) than the last selected candidate in the general category, they are entitled to be adjusted against the general category - The High Court's view that such candidates are ineligible for the open category is erroneous. [Relied on Jitendra Kumar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 119; Vikas Sankhala & Ors. v. Vikas Kumar Agarwal & Ors. (2017) 1 SCC 350; Paras 22-32] Chaya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 281 : 2026 INSC 277
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Appointment to Public Posts – Suitability of Posts for Mental Illness and Specific Learning Disabilities (SLD) – Change in Rule Position during Pendency of Litigation – The Supreme Court directed the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) to accommodate candidates suffering from 'mental illness' and 'Specific Learning Disability' (SLD) in Group 'C' posts - Although the posts of 'Auditor' were initially identified as unsuitable for these specific benchmark disabilities in 2018, a subsequent Gazette Notification dated 04.01.2021 by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment expressly identified Group 'C' posts as suitable for such categories – Supreme Court directed the Staff Selection Commission (SSC) to forward the dossiers of the candidates within two weeks - It further ordered that if the posts advertised in 2018 are already filled, the respondents must create supernumerary posts to accommodate the candidates. [Paras 17-21] Sudhanshu Kardam v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 237 : 2026 INSC 232
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Sections 2(r) and 33 – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Arbitrary Ceiling on Disability – Validity of fixing a 60% maximum disability limit for the post of Assistant District Attorney (ADA) - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment that upheld the denial of appointment to a candidate with 90% locomotor disability – Held that the RPwD Act, 2016 establishes a "floor" (minimum 40%) for benchmark disability but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary "ceiling" that excludes those with higher degrees of disability, provided they can perform the functional requirements through reasonable accommodation - Key Principles – i. Arbitrariness of Disability Caps: Prescribing an upper limit of 60% disability for a legal professional role (ADA) has no rational nexus with the nature of duties, which primarily require mental alacrity and legal acumen; ii. Reasonable Accommodation: The State has a positive obligation to make necessary modifications to ensure persons with disabilities enjoy rights on an equal basis - A candidate's capability must be assessed on actual functional competence rather than an abstract medical percentage; iii. Statutory Misinterpretation: By fixing a maximum limit, the respondents essentially "rewrote" the statutory definition of "benchmark disability" to the detriment of the protected class – Directed Respondent No. 1 directed to issue an appointment letter to the appellant within two weeks and the State of Himachal Pradesh is directed to pay Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant for unjust denial of appointment and prolonged litigation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vikash Kumar v. U.P.S.C. (2021 5 SCC 370); Paras 22-40] Prabhu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2026 INSC 253
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3 — Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 — Clause 3 — Effect of conversion to Christianity on Scheduled Caste status —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to quash criminal proceedings under the SC/ST Act initiated by a person who had converted to Christianity and was practicing as a Pastor - Held, that as per Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu, Sikh, or Buddhist religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste - Since the appellant indubitably professed Christianity by performing pastoral duties for over a decade, his caste status as a member of the Madiga community stood "eclipsed in the eyes of law" upon conversion - once the foundational requirement of caste status is extinguished, the statutory protection under the SC/ST Act is no longer available. Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Statutory vs. Non-Statutory Benefits — Reliance on State Government Orders (G.O.Ms. No. 341) extending benefits to converts is misplaced regarding central statutory enactments - Held, that such executive orders only apply to "non-statutory concessions" like economic support schemes and cannot override the Presidential Order or apply to statutory benefits/protections under Central Acts like the SC/ST Act. Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283
Securities Law – SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP) – Regulations 3 and 4 – Fraudulent Diversion of Funds – Ratification by Shareholders – Legality of Post-Facto Approval - Core Issue: Whether a company that raises funds through preferential allotment for specific disclosed objects can, after immediately diverting those funds for unauthorized purposes, legitimize the illegality through a subsequent shareholders' resolution – Supreme Court noted the following – i. PFUTP and Fraud: The definition of "fraud" under PFUTP Regulations is expansive and does not require a strict "deceit" element as per common law - Diversion of funds raised for a specific object to an undisclosed purpose constitutes a breach of Regulation 3 and Regulations 4(2)(f), (k), and (r); ii. Irregularity vs. Illegality: Supreme Court distinguished between an "irregularity," which can be regularized, and an "illegality," which cannot - An act that is "ultra vires" or violates statutory regulations impacting public interest and multiple stakeholders cannot be ratified even if all shareholders agree; iii. Public Interest Dimensions: SEBI Regulations have public law dimensions designed to protect the integrity of the market - A private resolution by shareholders cannot wipe off a crystallized liability or waive rights involving public policy; iv. Parallel Proceedings: Held, that the Whole Time Member (WTM) and the Adjudicating Officer (AO) operate in separate fields the former for protective measures/disgorgement and the latter for imposing penalties and both proceedings are maintainable on the same set of facts. [Relied on SEBI v. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel (2017) 15 SCC 1; Shri Lachoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam (1971) 1 SCC 619; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Brahmanandam (2008) 5 SCC 241; SEBI v. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368; Paras 41-66] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Terrascope Ventures, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 248 : 2026 INSC 245
Sentencing – Mitigating Circumstances – Delay and Age – While sustaining the conviction, the Court modified the sentence due to the passage of time and the appellant's advanced age - The appellant was approximately 40 years old at the time of the offense (1990) and 75 years old at the time of the final judgment – Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the statutory minimums: 6 months for Section 7 and 1 year for Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. [Paras 15-25] Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239
Service Law – Accelerated Promotion – Counter-Extremism/Naxal Activities – Parity in Treatment – Judicial Review of Committee Decisions – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to grant accelerated promotion to a police constable (Respondent) who resisted a Naxalite attack on a police station - The State had denied the promotion claiming the Respondent's role was "nominal" compared to a colleague (G. Venkat Reddy) who received the benefit – Supreme Court found the Committee's assessment "perverse" as it was admitted that the Respondent, while on roof-top guard sentry duty, fired more rounds at the Naxalites than the promoted colleague and was instrumental in repelling the attack - Held, when collective efforts repel an attack, it is unfair to belittle the role of individual personnel to deny them benefits intended to boost the morale of the force - While the Court's intervention in decisions taken by specialized Committees for out-of-turn promotion is minimal, such decisions are not immune to interference if they are found to be unfair or based on perverse findings – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. vs. Sanjay Shukla (Civil Appeal No. 2040 of 2023, decided on March 27, 2023; Paras 9, 10] State of Telangana v. P. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 263 : 2026 INSC 258
Service Law – Character and Suitability for Disciplined Force – Held that a candidate for the police force must possess impeccable character, rectitude, and integrity - The employer, through a screening committee, has a wide realm of discretion to assess the suitability of a candidate based on their criminal antecedents, even if an acquittal has been recorded - An acquittal based on technical grounds or "benefit of doubt" does not automatically entitle a candidate to appointment. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225
Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Continuance after Superannuation – Permissibility of Punishment – Punjab and Sind Bank Officers' Service Regulations, 1982; Regulation 20(3)(iii) – Punjab and Sind Bank Employees' Pension Regulations, 1995; Regulation 48 - The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a writ petition filed by a retired bank officer challenging a punishment of "reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay" imposed after his superannuation - Key Findings by Supreme Court – i. Continuance of Proceedings: If service rules permit, disciplinary proceedings initiated before superannuation can be continued and brought to a logical conclusion even after the employee attains the age of superannuation; ii. Legal Fiction of Service - Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulations creates a legal fiction where the officer is deemed to be in service until the proceedings are concluded; iii. Implementability of Punishment - The Court rejected the argument that only penalties under Pension Regulations could be imposed post-retirement - held that a punishment of reduction in pay scale relates back to the date of superannuation and is implementable because pension is computed based on the salary last drawn/payable; iv. Misconduct by Bank Officers: A bank officer holds a position of trust - Failure to ensure the end-use of a loan constitutes a financial irregularity that exposes the bank to risk and amounts to misconduct, regardless of whether an actual loss was suffered. [Relied on Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs. Rabindranath Choubey (2020) 18 SCC 71; Ramesh Chandra Sharma vs. Punjab National Bank and Another (2007) 9 SCC 15; State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar (2011) 10 SCC 249; Paras 25-37] Virinder Pal Singh v. Punjab and Sind Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 268 : 2026 INSC 266
Service Law – Distinction between "Honourable Acquittal" and "Acquittal on Benefit of Doubt" – An honourable acquittal occurs when the court definitively concludes that the accused did not commit the offence - In contrast, an acquittal based on a "benefit of doubt" due to a weak prosecution case or lack of credible evidence is a technical consideration and does not constitute a "clean chit". [Para 5] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225
Service Law – Equitable Relief – Creation of Supernumerary Post – To balance the equities between a candidate already in service (Appellant) and a deserving candidate deprived of selection due to a contested answer (Respondent No. 3), Supreme Court directed the creation of a supernumerary post – Appellant to retain seniority over the new appointee. [Relied on Vikas Pratap Singh and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others (2013) 14 SCC 494; Paras 7 - 11] Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248
Service Law – Indian Navy – Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) – Selection Process Fairness – Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) – Appeal against Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) order directing fresh Selection Boards for SSCOs who were denied PC in 2020 and 2022 – Appellants contended that ACRs were "casually graded" during periods when they were ineligible for PC, leading to an inherently skewed merit assessment - Held, the appraisal process was inevitably affected from its inception because Reporting Officers were conscious that these officers had no avenue for career progression – High gradings in a bell-curve system were reserved for those with future prospects, while ineligible officers received average marks serving no institutional purpose – The conversion of "Not Recommended for PC" endorsements (recorded when officers were ineligible as a matter of policy) into substantive disqualifications once they became eligible is arbitrary – This circularity, where past ineligibility was transformed into "deemed unsuitability," resulted in an uneven playing field. [Para 16-17] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282
Service Law – Interpretation of "Ratio" vs "Quota" – The Supreme Court clarified that the 11% allocation was intended to upgrade the cadre by ensuring experienced graduates are appointed to Supervisor posts, previously filled from the open category direct recruitment - This earmarking did not reduce the chances of SSLC-only holders, as their 29% ratio remained intact and was not reduced by the amendment. Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242
Service Law – Inter-se Seniority – Direct Recruits vs. Internally Selected Candidates – Reckoning of Seniority from Date of Appointment/Training vs. Date of Commencement of Probation - Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (Service Regulations), 1967 – Regulations 10(9), 87(1), and 97 – Determination of Seniority: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's judgment which had ruled that seniority for direct recruits should only commence from the date their probation started (after completion of training) - held that according to the plain language of the Regulations, a person is considered to be "on duty" and "appointed to a class of service" from the moment they perform duties or commence prescribed training/instruction. [Relied on Govt. of A.P. v. P. Bhaskar (2008) 11 SCC 687; 2008 INSC 267; Paras 19-24] M. Thanigivelu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2026 INSC 229
Service Law – Key Directions issued – i. Deemed Service for Pension: SSCWOs released from service during the pendency of litigation (excluding JAG and AEC cadres) are deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service and are entitled to pension and consequential benefits; ii. Grant of PC: SSCWOs currently in service who secured the 60% cut-off in the 2020/2021 Selection Boards shall be granted Permanent Commission, subject to medical and disciplinary clearance; iii. Policy Review: The Army is directed to review the method of evaluation of ACRs and cut-offs for future batches to address the disproportionate impact on women officers. [Para 66, 67] Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281
Service Law – Limited Scope of Judicial Review – Held that courts should not override the wisdom of the employer or substitute their own view regarding a candidate's suitability unless the decision is demonstrably mala fide, arbitrary, or whimsical - The Division Bench erred by intruding into the functional realm of the screening committee – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685; Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. Vs. Pradeep Kumar & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 797; State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591; Para 7-9] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225
Service Law – Merit-Based Selection – No Edge for Graduates – The selection process, involving an OMR and main written test focusing on pediatric health, provided a level playing field - The fact that non-graduates significantly outnumbered graduates in the final selection (235 out of 317) dispelled any apprehension that graduation conferred an unfair advantage or "edge" in the examination – Noted that The High Court's interpretation that the quotas were mutually exclusive was termed a "judicial fiat" that interfered with the executive's rule-making authority. "What the executive did not think fit to do by prescription in the Rules, could not have been done by a judicial fiat" – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sanjay Kumar v. Narinder Verma (2006) 6 SCC 467; Paras 13-23] Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242
Service Law – Payment of Gratuity – Retention of Staff Quarters – Adjustment of Penal Rent from Gratuity – Reciprocal Obligations – The management of Steel Authority of India (SAIL) challenged the High Court's direction to release the full gratuity with interest to retired employees who had failed to vacate official accommodation – Held that the obligation of an ex-employee to vacate staff quarters and the obligation of the management to release gratuity are mutual and reciprocal - Neither can be enforced in isolation - Under Rule 3.2.1(c) of the SAIL Gratuity Rules, 1978, the management is expressly empowered to withhold gratuity for non-vacation of company accommodation - no interest is payable on the gratuity amount withheld during the period of unauthorized occupation. [Paras 19 & 20] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263
Service Law – Recruitment – Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) – Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Services – Selection to the post of Supervisor – Eligibility of Graduate Anganwadi Workers to compete in the 29% quota reserved for SSLC holders - Special Rules for the Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Services, 2010 – Amendment effective from 01.01.2014 – Distribution of Vacancies – Held that the 11% ratio carved out specifically for Anganwadi Workers with a graduate degree does not exclude such graduates from applying under the 29% quota earmarked for Anganwadi Workers with SSLC and 10 years' experience - held that graduates naturally possess the lower SSLC qualification; therefore, unless the rules expressly prohibit higher qualifications or exclude graduates from the general pool, they are eligible to compete in both categories. Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242
Service Law – Recruitment – Judicial Review of Answer Keys – Ambiguity in Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs) – Selection for the post of Law Officer – Dispute over the correct answer to a question regarding the immunity of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution from judicial review – Recruiting body considered "Ninth Schedule" (Option B) as correct, while the respondent claimed "None of the above" (Option D) was correct based on the 'Basic Structure' doctrine – Held: When High Court Judges themselves hold divergent views on the interpretation of Constitutional provisions and Supreme Court precedents spanning decades, law graduates appearing for a recruitment exam cannot be expected to reach a singular "correct" conclusion by such complex interpretation – Both candidates found to be deserving of accommodation as both answers could be considered correct from different perspectives. Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248
Service Law – Recruitment – Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 – Additional/Waiting List – Key Principle – Absence of Waiting List – Under the 1997 Rules, there is no provision for the preparation or operation of an additional or waiting list - A vacancy arising from a selected candidate's failure to report for duty or complete pre-appointment formalities must be treated as a fresh vacancy for subsequent recruitment – Noted that once a select list is exhausted or finalized as per the statutory rules, its operation cannot be enlarged to fill vacancies caused by non-joining – Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-21] State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 282 : 2026 INSC 276
Service Law – Recruitment – Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 – Additional/Waiting List – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that directed the State to consider a candidate for a post left vacant due to the non-joining of a selected candidate - held that when recruitment rules specifically define the contours of a select list and do not provide for a reserve or additional list, a post left unfilled cannot be claimed as a right by the next candidate in line. State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 282 : 2026 INSC 276
Service Law – Recruitment to Police Force – Criminal Antecedents and "Honourable Acquittal" – Scope of Judicial Review – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's order which had directed the State to treat a candidate's acquittal as "honourable" and reconsider him for the post of constable (driver) - The respondent was previously charged with serious offences involving moral turpitude, including kidnapping and rape (Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(c) IPC), but was acquitted by the trial court by being given the "benefit of doubt". State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225
Service Law – Relief – One-time Measure to Prevent Protracted Litigation – Supreme Court noted this was the third round of litigation and a fourth round (fresh Selection Board) would not yield equitable results due to inherently skewed ACRs – Supreme Court modified AFT directions to grant PC directly to specific categories: (a) SSCWOs inducted prior to January 2009; (b) SSCWOs inducted after January 2009 in branches other than Law, Education, and Naval Architecture; and (c) Male SSCOs barred by initial terms, subject to medical and disciplinary clearance – Released officers within these categories deemed to have completed 20 years of service for pensionary benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Annie Nagaraja (2020) 13 SCC 1; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125; Amit Kumar Sharma v. Union of India (2023) 20 SCC 486; Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47; Para 54-56] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282
Service Law – Selection Criteria – Criteria Appointments and Career-Enhancing Courses – Supreme Court found that SSCWOs were systematically denied criteria appointments and access to important courses (e.g., Junior Command Course) due to their perceived lack of a "future" in the Army - While these may not have a high numerical weightage in computerized evaluation, they significantly influence the "Value Judgement" component (5 marks), which often becomes determinative when officers miss the cut-off by narrow margins. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281
Service Law – Seniority from Initial Joining - Administrative Instructions vs. Statutory Regulations - Supreme Court clarified that the period of training is an integral part of service and must be counted for seniority - Regulation 97 specifies that seniority is determined by the rank in the list of approved candidates, and the date of joining duty marks the commencement of the relationship with the service, regardless of whether the candidate is on a consolidated pay during training or a regular scale during probation - rejected the application of the "cyclic order" (Proviso to Regulation 97) because the direct recruits were selected/appointed in 2000 and 2001, while the internal candidates were promoted in May 2002 - Since they were not recruited in the same calendar year, the direct recruits appointed earlier maintain their seniority over those appointed later - noted that any Board Proceedings (BPs) or terms in appointment letters that run contrary to the statutory Regulations (10(9) and 87) cannot override the legal position that seniority counts from the first date of joining for training. M. Thanigivelu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2026 INSC 229
Service Law – Vacancy Cap – Sanctity of 250-Vacancy Ceiling – Supreme Court rejected the Union's contention that the annual cap of 250 vacancies for PC is sacrosanct - Historical data revealed the cap was frequently breached for exigencies like the Kargil War or policy transitions - held that the vacancy cap cannot act as a shield against remedial action where the method of assessment is found to be unfair and discriminatory - Male officers cannot claim a legitimate expectation to compete only against other males for PC vacancies - Following the Delhi High Court's 2010 judgment in Babita Puniya, all parties were aware that women were entitled to PC consideration - Any expectation that runs contrary to the constitutional mandate of gender equality is inherently illegitimate. [Relied on Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125; Paras 32-64] Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281
Service Law – Vacancy Computation – Dynamic Vacancy Model – Validity of the methodology used in the December 2020 Selection Board – Held, the "Dynamic Vacancy Model" was a rational one-time mechanism to distribute vacancies across 24 batches while maintaining the Navy's pyramidal structure and operational agility – The use of '15' as a divisor is anchored in service realities, representing the approximate years of service accompanying a grant of PC – The methodology does not suffer from arbitrariness or discrimination - Held, unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy's failure to disclose the evaluation framework and vacancy computation methodology prior to the 2020 and 2022 Boards violated basic norms of fairness and transparency. [Para 25, 38-48] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282
Short Service Commission — Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) — Indian Air Force — Retrospective evaluation based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) — Validity of Minimum Performance Criteria — Pregnancy and Medical Category - Key Findings - i. Structural Distortion in Evaluation: ACRs authored in an environment where SSCOs had no future in the service are "structurally distorted" and cannot be deployed to their disadvantage when they are suddenly placed in a competitive fray for PC; ii. Arbitrary Implementation of Policy: The hurried implementation of Human Resource Policy (HRP) 01/2019, which introduced new criteria like "Categorisation" and "Mandatory In-Service Courses" (MISCs) without providing a reasonable gestation period, deprived officers of a meaningful opportunity to meet eligibility requirements; iii. Pregnancy and Gender Equality: The failure to accommodate officers who lost a round of consideration due to a temporary lowering of medical category on account of pregnancy amounts to arbitrariness - The choice to become a parent cannot be equated with an unwillingness to pursue professional advancement. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India and Ors (Civil Appeal No. 14681/2024); AU Tayyaba v. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 688; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (2021) 15 SCC 125; Paras 14-17, 26-32, 35-39] Wg Cdr Sucheta EDN v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2026 INSC 280
Short Service Commission — Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) — Indian Air Force — Retrospective evaluation based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) — Validity of Minimum Performance Criteria — Pregnancy and Medical Category - The Supreme Court has held that evaluating Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) for Permanent Commission based on ACRs authored during a period when they were ineligible for PC is inherently unfair and arbitrary - Supreme Court held that the evaluative lens applied by assessing officers is conditioned by the available career trajectory; thus, reports intended only to assess suitability for short-term extension cannot be retrospectively treated as reliable indicators for long-term retention or advanced leadership potential - While declining reinstatement for released officers due to operational effectiveness, Supreme Court directed that SSCOs considered in the 2019–2021 Boards be deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service for pensionary benefits as a one-time measure - For future Boards, the Air Force must disclose vacancies and detailed evaluation criteria prior to the selection process. Wg Cdr Sucheta EDN v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2026 INSC 280
Special Courts Act, 2009 (Bihar) — Confiscation of Property — Death of Public Servant during pendency of Appeal — Effect on Confiscation Proceedings against spouse/relative - The Supreme Court held that confiscation proceedings initiated under the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 (BSCA) do not automatically abate or get set aside upon the death of the public servant if the property is held by a relative or spouse who was also put to notice – Noted that "abatement" in criminal proceedings discontinuation due to the death of the accused is distinct from "acquittal" and does not constitute a comment on the merits of the case - Under Section 19 of the BSCA, confiscated property can only be returned in two specific scenarios: (a) modification or annulment of the order by the High Court, or (b) acquittal by the Special Court - Since the Act does not account for the death of a public servant as a ground for returning property, and because non-public servants can be proceeded against for holding illegally acquired assets, the High Court is required to decide such appeals on their merits rather than dropping them due to the death of the primary accused. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2016) 3 SCC 183; Gurmail Singh v. State of U.P. (2022) 10 SCC 684; P. Nallammal v. State (1999) 6 SCC 559; Para 8-12] State of Bihar v. Sudha Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : 2026 INSC 272
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Sham and Nominal Documents – Loan Transaction vs. Sale Agreement – Probative Value of Contemporaneous Documents – Held that where a registered sale agreement and a separate MoU are executed on the same day, purchased from the same stamp vendor, and witnessed by the same individuals, such facts strongly probablize the defense that the sale agreement was merely security for a loan transaction rather than a genuine sale. [Paras 10-12] Muddam Raju Yadav v. B. Raja Shanker, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2026 INSC 214
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Discretionary Relief – Bona Fides of Plaintiff – Suppression of Material Facts – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss a suit for specific performance where the plaintiff suppressed the existence of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) executed on the same day as the sale agreement - held that specific performance is an equitable and discretionary relief that must be denied if there is even a slight doubt regarding the plaintiff's bona fides or if material facts have been withheld from the Court - A plaintiff approaching the Court with "unclean hands" by failing to mention a contemporaneous document that characterizes the sale agreement as a sham/nominal document for a loan transaction is not entitled to relief. Muddam Raju Yadav v. B. Raja Shanker, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2026 INSC 214
Urban Premises Rent Control Act, 2021 (UP); Section 38(2) - Jurisdiction of Rent Authority - Judicial Discipline - The Supreme Court censured the Rent Authority for entertaining a restoration application and staying eviction after the Supreme Court had already dismissed the tenant's Special Leave Petition and Review Petition with a direction to vacate - Supreme Court emphasized that under Section 38(2), the Rent Authority's jurisdiction is limited to tenancy agreements and does not extend to questions of title or ownership. An order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. Rajesh Goyal v. Laxmi Constructions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2026 INSC 299