Administration of Justice – Guidelines on Procedural Timelines for High Courts – i. General Timeline - High Courts must endeavour to pronounce reasoned judgements promptly, within a maximum of 3 months from the date of reserving; ii. Personal Liberty & Bail - Extra promptitude must be shown in matters of personal liberty - Bail orders should preferably be pronounced and uploaded...
Administration of Justice – Guidelines on Procedural Timelines for High Courts – i. General Timeline - High Courts must endeavour to pronounce reasoned judgements promptly, within a maximum of 3 months from the date of reserving; ii. Personal Liberty & Bail - Extra promptitude must be shown in matters of personal liberty - Bail orders should preferably be pronounced and uploaded on the same day or the next day if reserved - Orders granting bail, suspension of sentence, or acquittal must be immediately communicated to jail authorities and Trial Courts for release on the same or next day; iii. Clarifications: If a judgement is reserved, clarifications from advocates must be sought within 7 days in criminal appeals/death references (where the appellant is in custody) and within 1 month in all other matters; iv. Operative Part & Reasoned Judgement - Where urgent orders are required to prevent irreparable loss, the operative part may be pronounced, but the reasoned judgement must be uploaded within 7 to 15 days - judgements pronounced in open court must be uploaded within 24 hours; v. Accountability & Monitoring - Automated monthly emails of pending reserved judgements must be sent to the Chief Justice of the High Court and the concerned Bench - If a judgement is delayed beyond 3 months, the Registrar General shall place it before the Chief Justice, who shall direct the Bench to pronounce it within 2 weeks, failing which the Chief Justice should re-assign the case to another Bench for a fresh hearing; vi. Remedies for Litigants - Parties can file an application for early judgement if it is not pronounced within 3 months of reserving - If the judgement remains unpronounced for 3.5 months, the party can apply to the Chief Justice for withdrawal and re-assignment of the case to another Bench for a fresh hearing - Similar remedies apply if a reasoned judgement is not uploaded within 15 days or 1 month respectively, after the pronouncement of the operative part. [Relied on Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318; Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985; Paras 12-24] Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : 2026 INSC 604
Administrative Law — Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation - Policy decisions of the State coupled with formal undertakings before the High Court gave rise to a legitimate expectation in the minds of left-out workers that their cases would be considered fairly - Although legitimate expectation does not create an absolute vested right, it is firmly rooted in the principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness under Article 14 - Policy statements cannot be applied selectively or disregarded unfairly. [Paras 68 – 70] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523
Administrative Law – Doctrine of Proportionality – Legitimate Purpose and Least Restrictive Measure – ECI's order directing a Special Intensive Revision after a gap of over two decades (since 2003) satisfies the four-pronged proportionality test - The restoration of the accuracy and purity of electoral rolls is a legitimate purpose embedded in Articles 325 and 326 - House-to-house verification and documentary scrutiny bear a rational nexus to this goal - A state-wide systemic issue cannot be remedied by piecemeal constituency-specific revisions, making the comprehensive SIR necessary. [Relied on Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India, (2023) 3 SCC 1; Paras 69 - 82] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564
Administrative Law — Separation of Powers — Executive Authority - Regularization is an executive function falling within the domain of policy and administration - Courts do not grant prior approval to executive actions - The action of the State in seeking prior permission from the High Court to implement its own validly passed 2005 Cabinet decision amounted to an unwarranted surrender of its executive authority. [Paras 31, 71, 72, 88-95] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523
Administrative Law — State Liability and Complete Justice — When the primary administrative action taken by an official is found to be lawful, technicalities cannot impede the Supreme Court from doing complete justice to protect the public exchequer - Even if the State fails to file an independent appeal against an adverse cost order, the Court can exercise its powers to set aside the cost imposed on the State, keeping in view its role as the custodian of public funds - The Supreme Court observed that a government servant cannot be expected to take a stand against the Government - Since the appellant merely followed the rule of law existing at that point in time, no adverse personal liability could be fastened onto him - exercising its power to do complete justice, the Supreme Court extended the benefit to the State of Tamil Nadu and set aside its share of the ₹25,00,000/- cost as well, noting that the State failed to actively defend its own officer despite the officer having acted strictly in accordance with the law. [Paras 8 – 10] C. Poorna Chandran v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 508
Advocates - Members of the judiciary at all levels must show patience, compassion, and a spirit of encouragement towards lawyers, particularly young members of the Bar. The Court emphasized that the responsibility to nurture discipline, professional ethics, integrity, and a sense of duty among lawyers — viewing them as officers of the Court — lies not only with senior members of the Bar but equally with the Bench. Bar Council of India v. High Court of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 500
Advocates Act, 1961 - Section 35 and Section 38 - Professional Misconduct - Deletion of Adverse Observations/Warning – Appeal filed by advocate against the Bar Council of India's (BCI) order issuing a warning despite affirming the dismissal of the complaint against him - The respondent-complainant (brother-in-law of the appellant) filed a frivolous complaint alleging threats due to matrimonial discord - The State Bar Council dismissed the complaint as false and motivated, imposing Rs.25,000/- cost. On appeal, the BCI affirmed that there was no cogent evidence of professional misconduct but waived the cost and issued a warning to the appellant to not intimidate the complainant - Held: The Supreme Court observed that both the State Bar Council and the BCI concurrently found no merit in the complaint, concluding it was filed for oblique motives and to wreak vengeance - Despite this, the BCI proceeded to issue a warning without any justification and set aside the cost without assigning any justifiable reasons - Since the complaint was concurrently found to be frivolous and motivated, the BCI's adverse observations and warning against the advocate cannot be sustained - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed/struck off the warning recorded against the appellant-advocate. [Paras 12 - 14] Prem Pal Singh v. Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 482
All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 – Rule 16(2A) – Voluntary Retirement from Service (VRS) – Final Authority of the Central Government - The Supreme Court held that the voluntary severance of an employer-employee relationship pursuant to a VRS notice by an All India Service officer mandatorily requires the acceptance of the Central Government - The Central Government is the ultimate repository of authority over career-terminating decisions for such officers and possesses the final word in deciding a request for VRS - It is not bound by the recommendation or opinion formed by the State Government - The act of "acceptance" under the first proviso to Rule 16(2A) is not a mere automatic, routine, or ministerial function; rather, it requires a genuine, independent assessment and a well-considered exercise of discretion based on the entire material available on record - while not bound by the State Government's views, the Central Government's independent decision must still actively engage with and consider the views expressed by the State Government, as it possesses direct supervisory knowledge of the officer. [Relied on Ashok Kumar Sahu v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 704; Paras 10 - 22] Abdur Rahman v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2026 INSC 550
All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 – Rule 16(2A) read with DoPT Guidelines dated 16.10.1980 [Guideline 3(ii)] – Service Law – Vigilance Clearance – Distinction Between "Pending" and "Contemplated" Disciplinary Proceedings - The Supreme Court clarified the conditions precedent under Guideline 3(ii) for rejecting a VRS request on vigilance grounds – i. Pending Proceedings: A disciplinary proceeding is legally considered "pending" only when a formal charge-sheet/charge-memorandum has been issued and served upon the employee - The mere existence or pendency of a preliminary investigation or complaint prior to the issuance of a charge-sheet does not amount to "pending" disciplinary proceedings; ii. Contemplated Proceedings: "Contemplation" in the context of disciplinary action connotes a deliberate, concrete intention to act on a complaint - It requires the existence of a genuine possibility or contingency that formal departmental proceedings will follow a given complaint, rather than the mere passive existence of an unexamined pending complaint. [Relied on Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109; State of Haryana v. Dinesh Singh, (2024) 13 SCC 357; State of U.P. v. Jai Singh Dixit, 1974 SCC OnLine All 240; Paras 23-34] Abdur Rahman v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2026 INSC 550
Anticipatory Bail - Successive Applications — Filing multiple anticipatory bail petitions in quick succession (e.g., three petitions within three months) after earlier dismissals, without any material change in circumstances, constitutes a clear abuse of process and reduces the extraordinary remedy of anticipatory bail to a mere gamble. Vasantha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 520 : 2026 INSC 513
Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 47 Proviso – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order XXIII Rule 3 – Enforcement of Private Award in Pending Suit – Absolute Necessity of Post-Award Consent - The proviso to Section 47 acts as a limited saving mechanism for an award 'otherwise obtained' (i.e., outside the regular provisions of the 1940 Act or during the pendency of a suit without court intervention) - Such an award cannot proprio vigore (of its own force) be enforced, set up as a valid defense, or used to non-suit a plaintiff - It can only be taken into consideration by the court as a compromise or adjustment of the suit under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC if allinterested parties explicitly give their mutual consent after the award has been made - This post-award consent is a strict sine qua non - In the absence of an express or implied post-award consent by a party to treat the award as a compromise, the court has no jurisdiction to enforce it or non-suit the parties on its basis, and must instead proceed to decide the suit on its independent merits. [Relied on Naraindas v. Vallabhdas & Ors., (1971) 3 SCC 642; Paras 49-69] Ashok v. Padam Chand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 570 : 2026 INSC 591
Arbitration Act, 1940 – Sections 20, 21, and Chapter IV – Mutually Exclusive Modes of Arbitration – Mandatory Nature of Court Reference in Pending Suits - The statutory scheme of the 1940 Act envisions three distinct and mutually exclusive modes of arbitration through Chapters II, III, and IV - Once a civil suit is instituted and pending between the parties regarding a subject matter, any reference of the dispute to arbitration can only fall within the ambit of Chapter IV - Section 21 mandates an express, written application by all interested parties to the court where the suit is pending to seek a formal order of reference - Subjective 'knowledge' of the pendency of the suit by the parties is not a condition precedent or a determinative factor; the mere factual 'institution' or 'pendency' of the suit triggers the mandatory operation of Chapter IV - Any arbitral reference made or continued out of court after the institution of a suit, without obtaining a formal order of reference from the trial court under Section 21, bypasses the legislative intent and renders the subsequent arbitral award legally ineffective as a bar or defense against the pending suit. [Relied on M.P. Rajya Tilhan Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Maryadit v. Modi Transport Service, (2022) 14 SCC 345; Paras 34-64] Ashok v. Padam Chand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 570 : 2026 INSC 591
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 - Principles of Natural Justice - Allegation of denial of procedural fairness – The appellant consistently engaged in dilatory tactics, failed to file point-wise replies, remained absent during scheduled meetings, and declined to attend a final hearing while merely expressing inability without seeking an adjournment - Held: The arbitrator was fully justified in treating the matter as heard and passing the award - A party cannot invoke the principles of natural justice to impugn an award when the delay and lack of presentation were substantially a result of its own conduct. [Paras 23–25] Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Saryu Plastics, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2026 INSC 552
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 14 & Mandate of Arbitrator – Estoppel / Acquiescence - Contractual time limits for arbitral awards – The appellant board actively participated in the arbitration proceedings and failed to raise objections regarding the expiration of the arbitrator's mandate despite multiple unilateral extensions and subsequent hearing fixtures - Held that the grievance regarding the expiry of the mandate is governed by the contract and not by statute - Having participated and acquiesced in the continuation of the proceedings, the appellant is estopped from challenging the validity of the award on the ground of expired mandate after the award has been passed. [Para 18-21] Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Saryu Plastics, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2026 INSC 552
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 33(1)(a) – Power to Modify Award – Scope of Review: Substitution of Interest – The Commercial Court, purporting to act under Section 33(1)(a), modified the arbitral award by substituting "simple interest" with "compound interest" for the pendente lite period, exponentially increasing the appellant's liability – Held that Section 33(1)(a) is strictly confined to the correction of computational, clerical, or typographical errors and does not contemplate a substantive review or material modification of the findings on merits - The choice between simple or compound interest represents a conscious, substantive assessment of equities by the arbitrator, not a clerical oversight. The Commercial Court manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction. [Relied on Gyan Prakash Arya v. Titan Industries Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 153; Paras 30–32] Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Saryu Plastics, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2026 INSC 552
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34(2A) – Patent Illegality – Setting aside of Arbitral Award – An award that completely ignores the statutory directives of Section 26(1)(b) of the 2013 LA Act and its Explanations by adopting a single, completely dissimilar sale exemplar is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the record - The cloak of protection under the proviso to Section 34(2A) (which restricts interference on mere erroneous application of law or reappreciation of evidence) cannot be extended to such an award. [Relied on National Highways Authority of India vs. P. Nagaraju alias Cheluvaiah and another, (2022) 15 SCC 1; Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation vs. Vincent Daniel and others, (2025) 7 SCC 798; Para 12] Project Director, National Highways Authority of India v. Alfa Remidis Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 494 : 2026 INSC 480
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 7(5) — Arbitration Agreement by Incorporation — Incorporation vs. Mere Reference — Distinction Explained — The High Court rejected Section 11 applications on the ground that a generic reference to a Development Agreement (containing an arbitration clause) in the subsequent Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreements (PAAAs) executed with individual society members was insufficient to bind them to arbitration – Held that there is a distinct legal difference between a mere reference to another document and the incorporation of another document by reference - Where a subsequent contract explicitly provides that all terms, conditions, and clauses of an earlier document shall form part of it and be binding on the parties, the earlier document gets incorporated in its entirety (body and soul) into the later agreement - In the present case, Clause 14 of the PAAAs unequivocally stated that all terms, conditions, and clauses of the Development Agreement shall form a part of and be binding on the parties - This went beyond a mere general reference and clearly demonstrated the intention of the parties to import the Development Agreement in its entirety, including its dispute resolution mechanism (Clause 36) - a valid arbitration agreement existed between the parties by incorporation under Section 7(5) of the Act. [Relied on M.R. Engineers and Contractors Private Limited vs. Som Datt Builders Limited, (2009) 7 SCC 696; NBCC (India) Limited. vs. Zillion Infraprojects Private Limited, (2024) 7 SCC 174; Paras 9-13] Hirani Developers v. Nehru Nagar Samruddhi CHS Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 499 : 2026 INSC 484
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 – Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Objection regarding stamping of agreement – Whether such objection can be entertained by Writ Court at a pre-arbitral stage – Held, non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect and does not render an agreement void – Any objection in relation to the stamping of the agreement falls within the ambit of the Arbitral Tribunal – The Writ Court ought not to embark upon an interpretation of the contract to decide the nature of the document while the arbitral proceedings are pending - Held, where a writ petition is filed invoking jurisdiction under both Articles 226 and 227, the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal depends upon the pleadings, the nature of the order, and the directions issued by the Single Judge – If the order is passed in a composite manner, the Division Bench has the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. [Relied on Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 and The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2023 INSC 1066); Paras 18-26] Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. Sunflag Iron and Steel Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 561 : 2026 INSC 566
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16, 34, 37 – Constitution of India, Articles 226/227 – Challenge to order passed by Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Held, the scheme of the Act envisages minimal judicial interference in arbitral proceedings – Except in cases where the order is so perverse that a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction stares one in the face, the High Court should not entertain a challenge to a Section 16 order under Article 226/227 – The party must wait for the passing of the final award and avail the remedy under Section 34. Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. Sunflag Iron and Steel Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 561 : 2026 INSC 566
Bail - An undertrial prisoner who has remained in custody for 9 years is entitled to bail as continued detention amounts to a gross violation of his fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Vickki Yadav @ Vikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 545
Bail - Grant and Cancellation of – Successive Bail Application – Conduct of Accused and Parity - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 437/439 (corresponding to Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Grant of bail by High Court in a successive application after cancellation by the Supreme Court – Sustainability - An order granting bail that fails to engage with the prior bail-cancellation order of the Supreme Court, overlooks the contumacious conduct of the accused in absconding post-cancellation, ignores prima facie incriminating material (such as CCTV footage and recovery of weapons), and blindly applies the principle of parity despite distinct criminal roles, suffers from manifest error of law and perversity. [Paras 22-34] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526
Bail – The Supreme Court, invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed the release of a murder convict on bail who had already undergone more than 22 years of actual imprisonment. The High Court's order dismissing a jail appeal filed by a life convict on the ground of delay of 3157 days, without considering the merits, was described by the Supreme Court as “very disturbing”. When an appeal is filed through jail by a convict serving life sentence, the High Court should adopt a practical and sympathetic approach and, at the very least, condone the delay to afford an opportunity of hearing on merits. The High Court failed to consider that the appellant had already undergone over 12 years of sentence at the time of filing the appeal and that it was a jail appeal. The Court took note of the convict's satisfactory jail conduct for 22 years and the fact that he was never released on parole or furlough even once. The District Legal Services Authority was directed to assist the petitioner in filing an appropriate representation for remission of sentence under the applicable remission policy. The Supreme Court held that remanding the matter to the High Court at this stage (after 22 years) would be a futile exercise. The petitioner was ordered to be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of ₹10,000/-. Arjun Jani @ Tuntun v. State of Orissa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 473
Bail conditions - the Supreme Court strongly deprecated and set aside bail conditions requiring accused persons belonging to Dalit and Adivasi communities to clean police station premises for two months. In Re Condition Being Imposed While Granting Bail, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 472
Bail Jurisdiction - While exercising jurisdiction under Section 483 BNSS, a High Court cannot issue general directions to trial courts regarding service of summons and execution of coercive processes, as such directions fall outside the limited scope of bail proceedings. Rambalak v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 527 : 2026 INSC 511
Banking Law - The Supreme Court strongly deprecated the discriminatory and uneven approach adopted by banks in lending practices. The Court observed that banks are generally casual and negligent while granting huge loans to big companies/entities without proper due diligence of repayment capacity, but become excessively demanding, impose stringent conditions, and subject ordinary citizens seeking small personal loans to a tedious and harassing process. Bhaskar International v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 524
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 194 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 174 – Scope and Purpose of Inquest Proceedings – Bail Parameters - The Supreme Court held that the scope of an inquiry under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. (now corresponding to Section 194 of the BNSS, 2023) is a preliminary enquiry of a limited and specific character, strictly confined to ascertaining the apparent cause of death - It is neither intended nor required to record a detailed account of the incident or register the names of the accused persons who might have caused the death - The High Court was not justified in drawing an adverse inference to grant bail to the accused merely because the informant and another panch witness had not made specific allegations against the accused during the inquest proceedings - Non-mention of the author of the crime in the inquest report cannot, by itself, be a valid reason to doubt the involvement of an accused who is subsequently named. [Relied on Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P., (1975) 4 SCC 153; Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 518; Paras 12-14] Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2026 INSC 527
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 173(1), Section 173(4), and Section 175(3) [erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 154(1), Section 154(3), and Section 156(3)] — Sequential Mechanism for Criminal Prosecution — Held - The BNSS provides a structured, sequential mechanism for initiating criminal prosecution - If an officer-in-charge of a police station refuses to register an FIR under Section 173(1) BNSS, the informant's recourse lies first in approaching the jurisdictional Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) BNSS, and subsequently, the competent Magistrate under Section 175(3) BNSS - Rushing directly to the High Court under Article 226 without exhausting these structured statutory steps renders the writ petition premature and unfit to be entertained. [Relied on Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. (2021) 6 SCC 771; Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes AIR 1964 SC 1419; Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage (2016) 6 SCC 277; Paras 5-11] Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : 2026 INSC 442
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 2(1)(k) and Section 531(2)(a) — Definition of "Inquiry" — Saving of pending proceedings — Purely ministerial or administrative acts prior to taking cognizance – Held A mere ministerial act, such as a Special Court directing a prosecution complaint to be registered/numbered and fixing a future date for a hearing on cognizance, does not constitute an "inquiry" under Section 2(1)(k) of the BNSS - An inquiry is a judicial act requiring a positive, conscious application of the judicial mind, which commences only when the Court takes judicial notice of an offence - Where a PMLA complaint was filed prior to the commencement of the BNSS but the Special Court took cognizance after the said date without hearing the accused, the saving clause under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS cannot be invoked to apply the old CrPC - Because no "inquiry" or "trial" was pending immediately before the commencement of the BNSS, the substantive right of being heard under the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS must prospectively ensure to the benefit of the accused. [Relied on Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221; Yash Tuteja & Ors. v. Union of India, (2024) 8 SCC 46; Tarsem Lal v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 7 SCC 61; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; Paras 27-36] Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2026 INSC 519
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 223(1) first proviso — Applicability to Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) proceedings — Right of the accused to be heard prior to taking cognizance — Nature of provision – Held that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, which prohibits a Court from taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard, is substantive and mandatory in nature - It confers a vital right upon the accused that forms an integral part of the right to a fair trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - The procedural framework governing complaint cases under the erstwhile CrPC (Sections 200 to 205) and the corresponding provisions of the BNSS (Sections 223 to 228) apply to prosecution complaints filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA, as they are not inconsistent with the special statute - Non-compliance with the mandate of the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS is not a mere procedural irregularity but an illegality that renders the order taking cognizance void ab initio. Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2026 INSC 519
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 528 [Inherent Powers / Quashing of Criminal Proceedings] – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) – Sections 3 & 4 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Sections 65, 74, 115, 351, 352 – Vexatious and Frivolous Matrimonial Litigation - Appeal against the High Court's refusal to quash criminal proceedings involving grave allegations of rape and sexual assault under the POCSO Act and BNS filed by the wife/complainant against her estranged husband, brother-in-law, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law - The Supreme Court observed that the parties were heavily embroiled in multiple civil and criminal matrimonial disputes, with more than ten cases pending between them - Supreme Court noted that the allegations of rape against the father (appellant No. 1) and uncle (appellant No. 4) were completely generic, blanket statements lacking specific factual details or chronological backing - a close inspection of the statements of the complainant and the minor daughter revealed that they were virtually identical and reproduced verbatim, indicating a strong probability of tutoring and concoction due to pre-existing bad blood - highlighted the total absence of any medical examination or report, which was fatal to the prosecution's case given the gravity of the alleged physical injuries (such as the insertion of a hammer handle) - Held, allowing the continuation of such a trial on the basis of vague, omnibus, and improbable allegations would tantamount to an abuse of the process of law - The impugned order of the High Court was set aside, and the entire criminal proceedings arising out of the complaint case were quashed. [Paras 7 – 11] Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 566 : 2026 INSC 587
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 528 [Inherent Powers / Quashing of Criminal Proceedings] – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) – Sections 3 & 4 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Sections 65, 74, 115, 351, 352 – Vexatious and Frivolous Matrimonial Litigation - Key Legal Observations & Guidelines by Supreme Court – i. Rising Trend in Vexatious Litigation & 'Matrimonial Bouquets' - Supreme Court expressed serious concern over the growing trend of litigants using the legal machinery as an 'arm-twisting' tactic to settle personal scores in matrimonial disputes - It noted the emergence of a 'matrimonial bouquet' where sweeping, vague, and omnibus criminal allegations are thrown widely to implicate entire families - Courts must exercise utmost caution, scrutinize complaints thoroughly, and "separate the wheat from the chaff" to protect the rights of innocent citizens and prevent docket explosion; ii. Abuse of POCSO Act in Family Disputes - Supreme Court painfully took judicial notice of instances where complaints under the POCSO Act are weaponized by an estranged spouse against the other, using impressionable children as tools to extract higher monetary settlements or escape civil/commercial liabilities - Such heinous accusations, when prima facie vague and lacking material backing, must be nipped in the bud; iii. Duty of the Bar - Legal practitioners have a profound social responsibility to restrain clients from initiating false or exaggerated criminal proceedings arising out of domestic discords rather than encouraging multiple cases. [Relied on State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335; Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Bihar, (2025) 3 SCC 735; Geddam Jhansi vs. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263; Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana, (2025) 3 SCC 756; Paras 9-10] Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 566 : 2026 INSC 587
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) - Section 63(4) - Supreme Court upholds constitutional validity of Section 63(4) BSA mandating certificate with hash value and expert certification for admissibility of secondary electronic evidence. Pune Bar Association v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 551
Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 – Regulation 10 – Common Proceedings – Interpretation of the word "May" – Held - The word "may" employed in Regulation 10 of the 1976 Regulations is directory and not mandatory - Construing "may" as mandatory would strip away the employer's necessary discretion in dynamic administrative situations - The roles of different charge-sheeted employees under a common category are often distinct, and their respective disciplinary authorities may vary depending on their cadres - Regulation 10 is a facilitative, enabling provision meant to empower the Bank to hold joint proceedings where necessary, but it does not vest a corresponding legal right in a delinquent employee to demand or insist upon a joint enquiry - the failure to conduct a joint enquiry does not vitiate independent disciplinary proceedings initiated against an individual officer. [Paras 15 – 17] Canara Bank v. Prem Latha Uppal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : 2026 INSC 478
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — Sections 2(31), 2(52), 7, 9, And 15 — Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 — Rule 31a, Rule 31b, And Rule 31c — Constitution of India — Article 246a Read With Entry 34 of List II — Online Gaming, Fantasy Sports, And Casinos — Taxability Of Stakes As Betting And Gambling - Key Issues Decided – i. Characterization of Games of Skill played with Stakes - Whether placing monetary stakes on games predominantly involving skill (such as Rummy or Fantasy Sports) alters the nature of the transaction to fall within the ambit of "Betting and Gambling" under the GST/Constitutional framework; ii. Relevance of Skill vs. Chance in Taxing Framework - Whether the distinction between games of skill and games of chance pales into insignificance once the element of betting or staking money on an uncertain outcome enters the activity - Held by the Supreme Court – a. Staking Transforms Activity into Betting and Gambling - Once money or money's worth is risked or staked upon an uncertain outcome, the activity inherently acquires the character of betting and gambling - This holds true irrespective of whether the underlying game is categorized as a game of skill, a game of chance, or a combination of both, as the intrinsic nature of the underlying game loses significance for regulatory and fiscal purposes once a staking arrangement is introduced; b. Betting and Gambling as Interchangeable Cognate Expressions - The expressions "betting" and "gambling" are interchangeable and cognate terms that cannot be artificially split or rewritten as "betting on gambling" - Both terms fundamentally encompass the act of staking money on an unknown and uncertain future victory or outcome; c. Online Rummy and Fantasy Sports with Stakes constitute Betting - While the underlying formats of games like online Rummy or Fantasy Sports may involve elements of expertise or skill, playing or organizing them with real money stakes open to the general public constitutes a betting enterprise - The participants are effectively forecasting an unknown future event (victory) to win a pool directly linked to the staked amounts; d. Definition of Gaming Includes Skill and Chance for Money - Relying on established jurisprudence, "gaming" is judicially defined as playing any game, whether of skill or chance, for money or money's worth - The act does not cease to be gaming merely because the underlying game requires a substantial degree of skill. [Relied on M.J. Sivani and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others (1995) 6 SCC 289; Clarified State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (RMDC-I) 1957 SCR 870; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India (RMDC-II) 1957 SCR 930; Distinguished from K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 2 SCC 226; Paras 66-86] Directorate General of Goods and Services Tax Intelligence Hqs v. Gameskraft Technologies, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 572 : 2026 INSC 595
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Inapplicability of the Public Trust Doctrine to Fiscal Claims and Tax Situs - The Public Trust Doctrine is rooted in environmental jurisprudence (Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g)) to ensure normative standards of resource management by the State as a trustee - It cannot be extended beyond its avowed purpose to serve as an instrument to override the constitutional scheme of legislative competence or to artificially create a local taxing jurisdiction for a State in clear breach of constitutional limitations under Articles 269 and 286. [Relied on Tata Iron and Steel Co. Limited v. S.R. Sarkar & Ors., 1960 SCC OnLine SC 106; State of Andhra Pradesh v. National Thermal Power Corporation, (2002) 5 SCC 203; Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. v. The Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur, (1976) 4 SCC 124; Sedco Forex International Drill. Inc. and Ors. v. CIT, Dehradun & Anr., (2005) 12 SCC 717; Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit & Ors. v. Dr. Manu & Anr., (2023) 19 SCC 30; Para 88] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Nature and Scope of Explanation 3 to Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Explanation 3 to Section 3 of the CST Act (introduced vide Act 28 of 2016) is purely clarificatory and curative in nature, inserted ex abundanti cautela to formalize the pre-existing situation - It did not alter the existing understanding or create a new regime but explicitly codified the pre-existing legal position that the movement of gas through a common carrier pipeline from one State to another, despite co-mingling, is deemed an inter-State movement - Being clarificatory, the argument that it applies only prospectively is misplaced and rejected. [Paras 61 - 66] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Priority of Section 3 over Section 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Section 4 of the CST Act is expressly made subject to Section 3 of the Act. Even if a sale is fictionally deemed to have taken place "inside" a particular State under the situs tests of Section 4(2) (based on the place of appropriation of unascertained or future goods), if that sale simultaneously occasions the movement of goods across State borders, Section 3 takes precedence and overrides Section 4 - The State cannot tax it as a purely local (intra-State) sale under its general sales tax laws once the transaction fulfills the conditions of an inter-State trade under Section 3. [Para 71-83] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Relevance of Co-mingling and Fungibility in Common Carrier Transportation - The physical co-mingling of natural gas with the gas of other parties in a common transport or distribution pipeline does not affect or alter the inter-State character of the transaction - The subsequent physical blending and re-metering at the destination are mere incidents of transportation attendant upon a sale already fully concluded at the delivery point in the originating State where the title and risk had passed. [Paras 81, 85] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Sections 3 & 4 – Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008 – Section 7 – Inter-State Sale vs. Intra-State Sale – Common Carrier Pipeline – Co-mingling of Gas – Natural gas was extracted off-shore in Andhra Pradesh, metered and delivered to buyers' designated transporters at Gadimoga (A.P.) under Gas Sales and Purchase Agreements (GSPA) – Title and risk passed to buyers at the delivery point in Andhra Pradesh – The gas was thereafter transported through common carrier pipelines across States to buyers' factories in Uttar Pradesh – The State of Uttar Pradesh levied local VAT treating the transaction as an intra-State sale, on the grounds that the gas moved in a co-mingled, fungible form through a common carrier pipeline and was ascertained only upon re-metering at the consumers' premises in U.P. – Dismissing the State's appeals, the Supreme Court held that once a sale occasions the movement of goods from one State to another pursuant to a pre-existing contract of sale, it constitutes an inter-State sale under Section 3(a) of the CST Act. [Paras 81-83] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491
Civil Suit for Declaration of Title and Possession — Burden of Proof — Management vs. Ownership — Shifts of Burden — In a suit for declaration of title and restoration of possession, the burden of proof lies squarely upon the plaintiff to establish a clear and cogent title to the suit property on the strength of their own case, and not on the weakness of the defense - The mere fact that a society exercises certain supervisory or managerial functions over a temple, participates in the appointment of pujaris (priests/caretakers), or maintains periodic control over temple articles does not ipso facto confer proprietary title or ownership of immovable property upon it - The distinction between the management of a religious institution and the ownership of its properties is well-recognized in law, and the two cannot be conflated - Even if the defendant fails to conclusively establish their claim of independent title or hereditary succession, such an infirmity does not enure to the benefit of the plaintiff - The plaintiff must independently discharge the burden under Sections 101, 102, and 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 by producing legally admissible documents of title, deeds of dedication, or endowments evidencing ownership - Courts below cannot misdirect themselves in law by shifting the focus from the requirement of proof of title onto the weaknesses of the defense. [Relied on Union of India v. Vasavi Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269; Paras 12 - 19] Kishan Chand v. Gautam Gaur Hitkarak Sabha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 463 : 2026 INSC 448
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Compliance with Appellate Judgment Requisites – Order XLI Rule 31 – Effect of framing general points for determination – Strict technical interpretation of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC should not compromise substantial justice - Total or partial non-compliance with the requirement to frame specific points for determination does not automatically vitiate an appellate judgment or render it void - If a perusal of the judgment demonstrates that the First Appellate Court made an honest endeavor to appraise the rival contentions, thoroughly scrutinized the entire evidence on record, and provided well-supported reasons for its conclusions, there is substantial compliance with the law. [Paras 36, 37] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VI Rules 1 & 2 – Pleadings vs. Proof – Scope of Summary Facts - Distinction between facta probanda (material facts to be proved) and facta probantia (facts/evidence by which they are proved) – Pleadings must contain only facta probandaand not facta probantia – In an eviction suit, the plaintiff is required to plead and prove the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and the statutory grounds for eviction – Specific documents like share certificates, internal family understandings, or detailed requirements of the family constitute evidence (facta probantia) to establish the material facts and are not required to be set out verbatim in the plaint itself – Both tests of pleading and proof stand satisfied if the essential elements of the cause of action are present in the plaint and substantiated through evidence. [Paras 28, 31-34, 36, 40] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Duty of Court at the threshold – Clever Drafting and Fictional Cause of Action – Admission of a plaint is not an automatic or mechanical process - The trial Court has a bounden duty to scrutinize the averments of the plaint in conjunction with the relied-upon documents to determine whether it discloses a real cause of action or if it is barred by law - Litigants cannot circumvent statutory prohibitions by clever drafting or artful pleadings that create a surreal or illusory cause of action - When clever drafting veils an implied bar under law, the Court must lift the veil, expose the bar, and nip the sham litigation in the bud at the earliest stage, without necessarily waiting for the defendant to enter appearance or seek rejection. [Paras 8, 9, 26 - 29] Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11 — Scope of Inquiry — Excessive Relief — Plaint Averments — For the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11, only the averments in the plaint are to be taken as correct, and external defense materials or written statements cannot be considered - A plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold merely because the plaintiffs have claimed a larger or excessive relief (such as partitioning the entire estate rather than just the father's share) than what they may ultimately be entitled to after a trial. [Relied on Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941; Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100; Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1; Paras 31-58] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11(d) read with Section 11 — Rejection of Plaint — Interlocutory Res Judicata — Multiple Applications under Order VII Rule 11 — The legal representatives of a defendant filed a second application seeking rejection of the plaint, asserting a 'change in law' - The Supreme Court held that the second application was barred by the principle of res judicata since the identical issue had been directly and substantially raised, heard, and decided on merits against the defendants by the High Court in an earlier round of proceedings, which had attained finality - A party cannot circumvent the finality of an adverse order by re-framing the same challenge under a different sub-clause or procedural provision. [Paras 35-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – Admissions made outside pleadings, including in criminal proceedings, can form basis for decree - Held, a judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be passed on the basis of an admission made by a party even outside the pleadings, provided the admission is clear, unequivocal and in writing or oral. There is no bar under the Code restricting such admissions to only those made in the pleadings. Sheikh Abedin v. Iqbal Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 483
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – The appellant-defendant had admitted in a complaint leading to registration of an FIR that he was merely a caretaker of the suit property owned by the respondent-plaintiff. Relying upon this admission, the Trial Court decreed the suit for mandatory injunction directing the defendant to vacate the premises. The First Appellate Court and the High Court upheld the decree. The defendant contended before the Supreme Court that an admission made in criminal proceedings could not be relied upon for passing judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Held: Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court clarified that admissions, wherever made, if clear and unequivocal, can be the foundation for a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The Court reiterated that the object of the provision is to enable a party to obtain speedy justice on the basis of admissions made by the opposite party. [Relied on : Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120] Sheikh Abedin v. Iqbal Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 483
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XLI Rule 31 – Requirement of framing points for determination by the First Appellate Court – Nature of compliance – Held, compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 is mandatory, and the appellate court must formulate points for determination and record findings thereon supported by reasons - the requirement is one of substantial compliance and not one of mere technical formality - The substance of the judgment and the manner in which the appellate court has dealt with the controversy are of greater significance than the form in which points are framed - Where the First Appellate Court has undertaken a detailed reappreciation of oral and documentary evidence and recorded independent findings while reversing the trial court decree, the judgment is not liable to be set aside solely on the ground of non-compliance with the form of Order XLI Rule 31. [Paras 40, 41, 42] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XV Rule 5 — First Date of Hearing — Determination of — Held, the expression 'first date of hearing' is not a mere formal date or any earlier date fixed for procedural purposes - It has to be understood as the date when the Court proposes to apply its mind to determine the points in controversy between the parties and to frame issues, if necessary - In the absence of a clear determination of such a date, the very foundation for invoking Order XV Rule 5 CPC becomes uncertain - Held, rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it - Construction of a rule of procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred - Procedural law is the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. [Relied on Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal, (1981) 3 SCC 486; Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash, (1980) 3 SCC 610; Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor, (1993) 4 SCC 406; Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344; Paras 16-28] Dharmendra Kalra v. Kulvinder Singh Bhatia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 509 : 2026 INSC 492
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XV Rule 5 — Striking off defence for non-deposit of rent — Discretionary vs. Mandatory nature — Held, the power to strike off the defence under Order XV Rule 5 CPC, though couched in mandatory terms, is not to be exercised mechanically - It is in the nature of a penalty and carries a serious responsibility - Supreme Court must consider whether there has been substantial compliance and whether the default is wilful, deliberate, or contumacious, rather than resorting to it as a routine visitation of a punitive extreme. [Paras 16, 17] Dharmendra Kalra v. Kulvinder Singh Bhatia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 509 : 2026 INSC 492
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Practice and Procedure – Deficiency in Pleadings raised in Appeal - Pleadings – Deficiency raised for the first time in appeal – Where the pleadings in substance contain the necessary averments, and the parties went to trial fully conscious of the case and the issues, leading evidence thereon, it is not open to a party to raise the question of deficiency or absence of specific pleadings in appeal. [Para 41] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Practice and Procedure – Taking Cognizance of Subsequent Events - Subsequent developments – Power of the Court to take note of subsequent events – While relief is ordinarily judged based on the date of institution of the suit, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of subsequent events and developments to ensure the remedy matches current realities, provided rules of fairness are scrupulously observed. [Para 47] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 11, Explanation VI — Joint Defense — Same Title — Where multiple defendants collectively resist a partition suit, share a common interest, defend the same partition deed, and assert an identical plea against the plaintiffs, they litigate under the same title - An earlier final order passed against some of the defendants binds the remaining co-defendants or their legal representatives - They cannot escape the bar of res judicata merely because their specific predecessor was not the applicant in the first round. [Paras 37-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 114 & Order XLVII Rule 1 — Scope of Review — A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an "appeal in disguise" - An error on the face of the record must be self-evident and strike the court immediately, without requiring a long-drawn process of reasoning where two opinions are conceivable - Perceived career insecurity or difficulties faced by teachers do not constitute a palpable error on the face of the record warranting a review of the final judgment. [Relied on Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. State (UT of Delhi), (1980) 2 SCC 167; Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. A.S. Raghavendra, (2024) 6 SCC 418; Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1912; State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO, (2005) 3 SCC 752; Paras 15-34] State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 2(2), Order XX Rule 18 – Partition Suit – Executability of Decree – Execution of Preliminary Decree without drawing a formal Final Decree – Distinction between Preliminary and Final Decree - The Supreme Court observed that the fundamental error in the High Court's appreciation was that it proceeded solely on the nomenclature assigned to the Decree - A decree can be both preliminary and final, or partly preliminary and partly final - Where a decree determines the entitlement or right to possession, fixes mesne profits, and provides a specific alternate mechanism (such as sale/auction) if physical division by metes and bounds is reported to be impossible, the direction to file a fresh application for a separate final decree is completely unwarranted - Supreme Court emphasized that once a preliminary decree is passed, the trial court should proceed for drawing up the final decree suo motu and there is no need to file a separate final decree proceeding - where the Advocate Commissioner reported that the small flat was unavailable for division by metes and bounds, the executing court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed with the bidding process and auction of the subject matter - High Court's order setting aside the execution proceedings on the rigid technicality that a final decree was a sine qua non for execution was set aside. [Relied on Shankar Balwant Lokhande v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande, (1995) 3 SCC 413; Bimal Kumar v. Shakuntala Debi, (2012) 3 SCC 548 (Paragraph 13); Kattukandi Edathil Krishnan v. Kattukandi Edathil Valsan, (2022) 16 SCC 7; Paras 14 - 17] Jennifer Messias v. Leonard G Lobo, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 513 : 2026 INSC 502
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 — Section 227 and Section 482 — Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 471, 477-A, and 120-B — Orissa Forest Act, 1972 — Section 27 — Discharge — Vague and General Allegations — Principle of Parity - Held, that the presence of general allegations without any overt act or specific imputations against the accused is insufficient to proceed to trial - While a detailed appreciation of evidence is not warranted at the stage of framing charges, Supreme Court must be satisfied that there exists a sufficient ground or grave suspicion against the accused - Broad and joint accusations cast in a wide net, without defining individual roles or culpability, are impermissible under law - Held, that when similarly situated co-accused persons prominently placed in the administrative chain have already been discharged under similar allegations, the principle of parity requires that the Appellant be treated alike - Continuing proceedings against one accused while discharging others on indistinguishable facts would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - Continuation of such vague criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law - The High Court's order dismissing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is set aside, and the Appellant is discharged. [Relied on Neelu Chopra and another Vs. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Yogesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394; Paras 15-24] Susanta Kumar Dalei v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2026 INSC 510
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 156(3) and 200 - The parameters and fields of operation of Section 156(3) CrPC (direction for registration of FIR) and Section 200 CrPC (private complaint) are distinct and different. Once an application under Section 156(3) CrPC has been dismissed and the High Court, while dealing with a subsequent challenge, grants liberty to the complainant to file a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC, the complainant cannot file a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC by taking advantage of such liberty. Filing a second Section 156(3) application in such circumstances amounts to an impermissible attempt to review or override the earlier order of the High Court and is not maintainable in law. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Magistrate directing registration of an FIR on a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC. The Court held that after the High Court had expressly granted liberty to file a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC against the police closure report, the Magistrate could not have entertained a fresh application under Section 156(3). The Court directed the Magistrate to treat the said second application filed under Section 156(3) CrPC as a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC and proceed in accordance with law. Mohan Karthik v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 458
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 173(8) - In the absence of express permission from the concerned Magistrate, the police cannot proceed with further investigation after filing a closure report/final report. The requirement of obtaining leave of the Court/Magistrate, though not expressly provided in the statute, has been read into Section 173(8) CrPC as a necessary safeguard through consistent judicial pronouncements. [Relied on: Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2013) 5 SCC 762, Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad, (2013) 5 SCC 762, Peethambaran v. State of Kerala, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 402, Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511] Paliniswamy Veeraraja v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 557 : 2026 INSC 561
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 195 read with Section 340 – Prosecution for Perjury in Matrimonial Disputes – Scope of – Application filed by husband seeking prosecution of wife for making allegedly false statements on oath during interim maintenance proceedings - Held: The allegations do not disclose the necessary ingredients of the offence of perjury - The husband's grievances stem from a hyper-technical dissection of the material on record and appear to be instigated by personal vendetta, anger, and pent-up frustration arising out of escalated matrimonial acrimony - Recourse to criminal prosecution under Section 340 CrPC cannot be permitted to satisfy a spiteful approach. Special Leave Petition filed by the husband dismissed. [Paras 36, 37] Ann Saurabh Dutt v. Lieutenant Colonel Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur Dutt, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 489 : 2026 INSC 475
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 294, 296 - Scope and Distinction – Admissibility of documents without formal proof vs. Evidence of formal character on affidavit – The High Court dismissed the application under Section 294 Cr.P.C. by erroneously relying on a precedent concerning Section 296 Cr.P.C. – Held: Section 294 Cr.P.C. deals with documentary evidence where the court calls upon parties to admit or deny the genuineness of documents to dispense with formal proof - In contrast, Section 296 Cr.P.C. relates to evidence of a formal character given by affidavit - The ratio of a judgment concerning Section 296 cannot be applied to reject an application under Section 294 - It is the duty of the Court to uphold the spirit of Section 294 by ascertaining the genuineness of documents through admission or denial. [Relied on State of Punjab Vs. Naib Din (2001) 8 SCC 578; Para 6-9] R. Ganesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 471
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 432 (now Section 473 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Premature Release / Remission – Automation of Process – Automatic Triggering of Eligibility - It is the bounden obligation of the appropriate Government to consider the cases of all convicts for the grant of premature release as and when they become eligible for consideration in terms of the state policy - It is not necessary for the convict or their relatives to file a specific application for permanent remission; instead, the process must be automatically triggered and initiated a few months prior to their date of eligibility – Held that endorsing the implementation of the National Legal Services Authority's (NALSA) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of 2022, the Supreme Court directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to roll out the 'E-Prisons Early Release Processing Module' (developed by the NIC) as a pilot project in Central Jail, Agra, and District Jail, Lucknow to automate premature release processing, eradicate administrative delays, and eliminate the physical movement of files. [Relied on: In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 349; Paras 14 - 22] Surendra @ Sunda v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : 2026 INSC 414
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 - Maintainability of second quash petition – Dismissal of earlier petition as withdrawn without merits – Held - There is no inviolable rule that a second quash petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable - Where the earlier petition was withdrawn without any discussion on the merits, the second petition cannot be thrown out purely on the ground of maintainability, especially when the facts reveal that the alleged offence is not made out. [Paras 15 - 22] Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 459
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 — Quashing of FIR and Chargesheet — Absence of necessary ingredients - An FIR is liable to be quashed if its bare reading does not disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offences - When the basic constituents of the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act (i.e., occurrence in a place within public view) and Section 506 IPC (i.e., intent to cause alarm) are conspicuously missing from the contents of the FIR and the chargesheet, the framing of charges is unsustainable in the eyes of law. [Relied on Swaran Singh and Others vs. State through Standing Counsel and Another (2008) 8 SCC 435; Karuppudayar vs. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy and Others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 215; State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Amar Nath Jha vs. Nand Kishore Singh and Others (2018) 9 SCC 137; Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2023) 17 SCC 615; Paras 9 - 11] Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 484 : 2026 INSC 468
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 154 & Section 173 – Registration of Multiple FIRs for the Same Transaction / Occurrence – Permissibility of Parallel Investigations – Clubbing and Transfer of FIRs – The petitioners sought the clubbing and transfer of multiple FIRs registered against them across Delhi and Haryana, arising out of the same real estate project ("Brahma City/Krrish World") on identical allegations of cheating, non-delivery of plots/flats, and siphoning of homebuyer funds – Held - There cannot be multiple FIRs and parallel investigations in different jurisdictions concerning the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to cognizable offences - The scheme of the CrPC mandates a single, comprehensive investigation - Permitting parallel and overlapping investigations on identical facts leads to an avoidable multiplicity of proceedings, potential for conflicting findings, and manifest prejudice to the accused - the subsequent FIR registered in Gurugram, Haryana, was ordered to be clubbed and transferred to be investigated alongside the primary FIR in Delhi - A blanket protective order restraining coercive steps for potential future FIRs was declined. [Relied on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181; Paras 21 - 28] Amit Katyal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 516 : 2026 INSC 509
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 319 – Subsequent Summoning of Quashed Accused – Doctrine of Double Jeopardy (Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India & Section 300 CrPC) – Held - Quashing of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC at the threshold does not amount to an acquittal on merits and does not trigger the bar of 'double jeopardy' - Supreme Court clarified that if strong and cogent evidence emerges during the trial of the husband implicating the present appellants, the trial court remains fully competent to exercise its powers under Section 319 CrPC to summon them to face trial. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1; Paras 22-57] Arti Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2026 INSC 533
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 304-A – Medical Negligence – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Exoneration on Merits in Civil/Consumer Proceedings – Effect on Parallel Criminal Prosecution – The appellant, a senior anaesthetist, challenged the criminal prosecution initiated against her under Section 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC for alleged gross negligence leading to the death of a patient post-surgery - The prosecution alleged that the appellant orally instructed an inexperienced staff nurse to administer a specialized analgesic injection ('sensorcaine') instead of doing it personally, which allegedly did not enter the epidural space, failing to alleviate pain and triggering a fatal cardiac event - Held, allowing the appeal and quashing the criminal proceedings, that for a criminal charge under Section 304-A of the IPC to survive, the negligence or recklessness must be of such a high degree as to be "gross" - An anaesthetist whose duty hours have concluded cannot be held criminally liable for a subsequent procedural error committed by a staff nurse in the mechanical execution of a standard post-operative pain management instruction - the family of the deceased pursued a parallel civil claim before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, which categorically exonerated the appellant on merits, finding that she had not given instructions to the nurse to administer the injection - This exoneration remained unchallenged and attained finality. Once an accused is exonerated on merits in civil proceedings, allowing a criminal prosecution to continue on identical allegations and facts constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law, as the standard of proof required in criminal cases is higher than that in civil cases. [Paras 18, 21-29] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Inherent Powers of High Court – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Banking and Commercial Disputes – Approved Compromise Settlement – Impact on Prosecution - A criminal prosecution initiated under Sections 420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) cannot be allowed to continue after a full and final settlement of the loan account by way of an approved compromise that has received the imprimatur of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) - Banking transactions arising out of loan facilities are commercial transactions having an overwhelmingly and predominantly civil flavour - Where the dispute has been amicably resolved, the settlement amount has been fully deposited, a "No Dues Certificate" has been issued, and recovery proceedings before the DRT have been consequently withdrawn, the possibility of a conviction becomes remote and bleak - In such circumstances, allowing the belated criminal prosecution to continue would cause grave prejudice, oppression, and injustice to the accused, and would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Vijay Kumar Kela v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2026 INSC 588
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Inherent Powers of High Court – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Banking and Commercial Disputes – Approved Compromise Settlement – Impact on Prosecution - Sanctity of Settlements before Judicial/Quasi-Judicial Fora – Economic Implications - Allowing a bank to initiate criminal prosecution long after entering into a voluntary and approved compromise settlement before a judicial/quasi-judicial forum like the DRT severely undermines the sanctity of such settlements - Overlooking such conduct would make commercial entities hesitant to seek resolutions for banking disputes, causing a debilitating effect on the overall economy, especially when the institutional focus remains on the swift settlement of commercial disputes. [Relied on K. Bharthi Devi Vs. State of Telangana, (2024) 10 SCC 384; Paras 17-28] Vijay Kumar Kela v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2026 INSC 588
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Quashing of FIR and Criminal Proceedings – Matrimonial Disputes – Omnibus and Generalised Allegations against In-laws – Criminal proceedings under Section 498A/34 IPC, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) quashed against the sister-in-law, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law of the complainant – Held - While criminal law protects women from domestic abuse, it cannot be weaponised against every relative of the husband based on sweeping, vague, and omnibus allegations lacking specific factual foundation - A close reading of the FIR and the complainant's own divorce petition revealed that the core allegations of physical assault, verbal abuse, and surveillance were exclusively directed against the husband at his place of posting (Sheopur), while the appellants resided separately at Shivpuri - Mere familial association or failure to intervene in a marital discord does not automatically attract criminal culpability without active, specific involvement in the alleged offences. Arti Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2026 INSC 533
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 167(2) read with Section 43-D(2) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Extension of time for investigation — Right to Default Bail — Mandatory requirement of production and notice to the accused - The Supreme Court set aside the orders extending the time for completing the investigation and granted default bail to the accused - held that the initial order extending the time to file the chargesheet was passed without procuring the presence of the accused (either physically or virtually) and without giving him an opportunity of being heard or raising objections - This constitutes a gross illegality that violates the fundamental rights of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Supreme Court reiterated that the extension of time for completing an investigation is not an empty formality - Any direction to extend the period for filing a chargesheet encroaches upon personal liberty and must be preceded by due application of mind by recording justifiable, cogent, and valid reasons - Extension orders passed in an absolutely mechanical or perfunctory manner merely noting that "investigation is still pending" are legally unsustainable - Since the first extension order was declared illegal and arbitrary, the subsequent chargesheet filed after the expiry of the statutory period of 90 days could not defeat the right of the accused - The appellant's right to claim default bail stood crystallized upon the filing of his application under Section 167(2) CrPC before the chargesheet was submitted. [Relied on Jigar v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484; Paras 24 - 36] Md. Ariz Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : 2026 INSC 456
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 235(2) and Section 386(a) — Procedure on reversing an acquittal — Appellate Court's power and obligation to sentence — When an Appellate Court reverses a judgment of acquittal and convicts an accused for the first time, it has a bounden duty to hear the convict on the question of sentence and impose an appropriate sentence itself - The Appellate Court cannot abdicate its judicial function or relegate the matter to the Trial Court solely for the purpose of pronouncing and imposing a sentence - Such a course of remanding the matter for sentencing is alien to the scheme of Section 386(a) of the Cr.P.C - The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's direction to the Trial Judge to impose the sentence - The matter was remitted back to the High Court with a direction to fix a date, hear the convict on the issue of sentence, and pass an appropriate sentence in accordance with law. [Relied on Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513; Dagdu and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 3 SCC 68; Allauddin Mian and Others Sharif Mian and Another v. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5; Kamalakar Nandram Bhavsar and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 10 SCC 192; Paras 14 - 20] Mukesh Kumar Yadav v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 546 : 2026 INSC 559
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 82 – Delay in Surrendering after Bail Cancellation – Effect of Pending Review Petition - The filing of a Review Petition before the Supreme Court does not operate as an automatic stay of a surrender direction - Evading arrest for 42 days, necessitating the issuance of a Non-Bailable Warrant (NBW) and initiation of proclamation proceedings under Section 82 CrPC, constitutes contumacious conduct that heavily weighs against the fresh grant of bail. [Para 26-27] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526
Companies Act, 1956 — Sections 2(27), 41(2), 397, 398 and 399 — Maintainability of Oppression and Mismanagement Petition — Absence of Formal Entry in Register of Members — Deemed Membership by Conduct — Jurisdictional Fact — The Supreme Court held that the absence of a formal entry of a person's name in the register of members does not automatically debar them from maintaining a petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 - The expression "member" for the purpose of invoking remedies against oppression and mismanagement must be construed in light of the wider definitional framework of Section 2(27) rather than being rigidly controlled by the procedural requirements of Section 41(2) - Where a person's substantial investment is accepted and utilized by the company, and cumulative factual circumstances (such as being inducted as Managing Director, rebranding the business, and being recognized as a "co-owner" in communications) demonstrate long-standing recognition of their proprietary stake, considerations of equity and justice must prevail to treat them as a member for the purpose of maintaining the petition. [Relied on M/s World Wide Agencies Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Margarat T. Desor and Ors. (1990) 1 SCC 536; Paragraphs 17 - 29] Dr. Bais Surgical and Medical Institute Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhananjay Pande, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 461 : 2026 INSC 447
Competition Act, 2002; Sections 5, 6(2), 20(1), 31(1), 43A, 44, 45 — Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011; Regulations 9(4), 9(5) — Merger Control Regime — Power to keep Approval Order in Abeyance or Compel Fresh Form II Filing Post-Approval – Supreme Court held that – i. No Power to Keep Approval in Abeyance - The Competition Commission of India (CCI) does not possess any inherent or statutory power to place a concluded approval order under Section 31(1) in abeyance, suspend it, or compel a fresh Form II notice for an already approved and consummated transaction - A statutory authority cannot expand its jurisdiction or create post-approval suspension powers via descriptive recitals within an approval order; ii. Distinction Between Non-Notification and Defective Disclosure - Section 43A is a strict penal provision confined only to the transactional gateway default of a complete "failure to give notice" under Section 6(2) - A processed notification cannot be converted into a case of non-notification merely because the regulator subsequently disagrees with the descriptive characterization or nomenclature used by the notifying party for disclosed agreements - Misdescriptions or material omissions fall strictly within the domain of Sections 44 and 45, not Section 43A; iii. Evidentiary Value of Internal Pre-Execution Communications - Pre-execution internal communications and exploratory strategies cannot substitute the statutory inquiry into the executed transaction agreements, the formal notice, and responses filed during the review - Penal consequences under Sections 44 and 45 cannot rest on broad inferences of "lack of candour" without distinct, reasoned findings meeting the strict ingredients of material falsity, requirement of disclosure, and the relevant mental element; iv. Limitation Bar on Reopening Merger Scrutiny - The proviso to Section 20(1) imposes a rigid jurisdictional limitation of one year from the date a combination takes effect to initiate a competition merits inquiry - The CCI cannot indirectly circumvent this limitation bar after the expiry of one year under the guise of an information-gathering procedure or penalty proceeding by keeping a valid approval in abeyance and ordering a fresh merits review; v. Principles of Natural Justice in Punitive Proceedings - Show cause notices are the foundation of adjudicatory authority - Shifting the final reasoning to a materially sharpened case based on internal documents or introducing severe civil consequences like keeping a prior clearance order in abeyance without specific supplemental notice and a focused opportunity to be heard, fundamentally violates the principles of natural justice. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719; Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd. v. CCT, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 21; Competition Commission of India v. Thomas Cook (India) Limited & Anr., (2018) 6 SCC 549; SCM Solifert Limited & Anr. v. Competition Commission of India, (2018) 6 SCC 631; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496.; Gorkha Security Services v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), (2014) 9 SCC 105; Siemens Engineering & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981; Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India, (2017) 8 SCC 47; Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613; Paras 146- 301] Amazon v. Competition Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 553 : 2026 INSC 576
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Administration of Justice – Undue delay in pronouncing reserved judgements by High Courts – Frame of Uniform Guidelines – The Supreme Court observed that the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution extends to every stage of a proceeding and is violated by delayed delivery of reserved judgements, particularly impacting those in custody - Exercising powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court issued comprehensive and binding guidelines for all High Courts to ensure timely pronouncement and uploading of judgements. Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : 2026 INSC 604
Constitution of India – Article 20(3) – Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 25 & 26 – Crime Scene Re-enactment – Right Against Self-Incrimination - The Supreme Court corrected the High Court's finding that compelling an accused to re-enact a crime scene per se violates the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution or constitutes an inadmissible confession under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act - The core test is whether the exercise compels the disclosure of incriminating information from the personal knowledge of the accused, or merely requires him to mimic a visual sequence or perform physical movements - A directed re-enactment staged by the Investigating Officer to analyze physical attributes does not amount to a personal testimony - While a re-enactment is merely "created evidence" and not substantive proof of the actual crime, expert assessments derived from it—such as gait analysis—are admissible as corroborative evidence of identity. [Paras 86-90] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Constitution of India – Article 21 [Right to Life and Personal Liberty] – Administrative Delay in Releasing Prisoner on Parole Post-Judicial Order – Inherent Power / Public Law Remedy – Grant of Monetary Compensation for Illegal Detention - Appeal seeking monetary compensation for 24 days of illegal detention resulting from administrative delay by State authorities in executing a judicial release order on permanent parole - The High Court had directed the release of the appellant-convict on parole, and despite compliance with the conditions and verification of sureties, the State delayed his actual release on the ground that it was considering filing an appeal against the parole order - The Supreme Court observed that the deprivation of liberty by the State without lawful authority or in violation of constitutional provisions constitutes illegal detention - Supreme Court forcefully negated the State's justification, holding that a judicial order remains in operation unless stayed, modified, or set aside by a superior forum - The principle of "obey first, appeal later" must guide executive actions, and the State cannot subordinate an individual's fundamental right to personal liberty to its slow bureaucratic processes or administrative decisions regarding whether to prefer an appeal - Just because a person is a convict does not mean their constitutional rights weigh any less on the scales of justice - Held, the non-release of the prisoner after the satisfaction of judicial conditions amounts to illegal detention, for which monetary compensation is an established public law remedy to penalize the public wrong and make amends - The State was directed to pay a compensation of Rs. 11,00,000/- directly to the appellant. [Paras 9 - 12] Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 567 : 2026 INSC 599
Constitution of India – Article 300A – Right to Property – Fair Compensation - The right to receive fair statutory compensation upon the compulsory deprivation of property is an intrinsic sub-right encapsulated within the sacrosanct constitutional and human right under Article 300A - Statutes that are expropriatory must be strictly construed, and the State cannot abdicate its responsibility or deprive a person of property without strict compliance with the prescribed statutory compensation mechanism. [Paras 41 - 62] Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation v. Vijay Nagar Apartments, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 523 : 2026 INSC 517
Constitution of India – Article 324 & Article 327 – Interplay between Constitutional Powers and Parliamentary Legislation – The legislative competence of Parliament under Article 327 and the ECI's mandate under Article 324 are complementary, not competing - Parliamentary legislation cannot extinguish or paralyse the core constitutional functions of the Commission - The Commission retains plenary authority to issue regulatory directions and fill vacuums where the law is silent, though it must act consistently with express statutory prohibitions. [Relied on: Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405; Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of India, (1972) 4 SCC 664; All Party Hill Leaders' Conference v. Captain W.A. Sangma, (1977) 4 SCC 161; Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi, (1985) 4 SCC 628; In Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, (2002) 8 SCC 237; Para 175-186] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564
Constitution of India — Articles 14, 16, 226, 142 and 309 — Mandamus for Regularisation contrary to Statutory Rules — High Court dismissed writ petitions filed by contractual para-teachers seeking regularisation — Held that Courts exercising powers under Articles 226 or 142 cannot issue a mandamus to regularise services contrary to the statutory scheme or rules made under Article 309 - Adherence to statutory rules must be insisted upon to protect the rights of open-market candidates and preserve the constitutional guarantees of equal opportunity in public employment. [Paras 11 - 21] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462
Constitution of India - Eighth Schedule Technicality vs. Constitutional Imperative - The State cannot justify its continued inaction or lackadaisical approach on the technical premise that a regional language (such as Rajasthani) is not formally recognized in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution - The absence of an administrative policy is an executive shortcoming warranting prompt rectification, not a valid ground to defend institutional inertia. [Para 46] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Equal Pay for Equal Work / Regularization — Parity in Service benefits - The State Government framed a policy in 2005 to regularize Work Charged and Muster Roll workers engaged prior to 01.04.1993, under which approximately 30,000 workers were regularized - The appellants, who were similarly situated, engaged prior to the cut-off date, and had rendered continuous service for decades, were excluded due to clerical errors and administrative lapses on the part of the State - Held, the State cannot extend a benefit to one large group and deny it to a smaller group within the same identifiable class without demonstrating a valid distinction - Equality does not allow selective or partial implementation of a policy - Exclusion of the appellants is manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Article 14. [Relied on Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; State of Karnataka & Others v. M.L. Kesari & Others, (2010) 9 SCC 247; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66; Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand and Others, 2026 INSC 99; Paras 60 - 78] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 142 – Modification of Penalty – Although the appellant committed a lapse through a brazen mis-declaration regarding his faculty appearances in the same academic year, the incident dated back to 2016 - Considering that a decade had passed, the appellant was now 76 years old, and the operation of the penalty had remained stayed throughout the litigation, the Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to do complete justice - Supreme Court directed the National Medical Commission (NMC) to reduce the punishment from a three-month removal of the appellant's name from the Indian Medical Register to the issuance of a censure/warning. [Paras 13-16] Dr. Nigam Prakash Narain v. National Medical Commission, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 467 : 2026 INSC 453
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 142 — Power to do complete justice — Taking a pragmatic approach to avoid the sudden displacement of a substantial number of in-service teachers and consequent disruption to school-going children, the timeline to qualify the TET is modified - The timeline originally granted in Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra is extended from 2 (two) years to 3 (three) years - In-service teachers must acquire the TET qualification by August 31, 2028, instead of August 31, 2027 - States are directed to conduct the TET periodically, preferably twice a year. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 145(4) – Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Order XII Rules 1 and 3 – Practice and Procedure – Status of Order Dictated in Open Court vs. Signed Order – Variance – Modification before Signing – Miscellaneous application filed seeking a clarification that a draft order dictated in open court is final and binding, and that the subsequent signed order uploaded later lacks the force of law due to the omission of an ancillary direction for status quo and the modification of a direction disposing of a Writ Petition – Held - Displaced the applicants' contention. A distinction must be drawn between the dictation of a draft order to a Court-master and the formal pronouncement of a judgment - The dictation of an order in open court serves as a skeletal framework to put facts on record, which remains subject to correction, refinement, and enhancement in chambers prior to signing - The digitally signed and uploaded order is the sole final expository of the Court's unalterable opinion - Judges retain a locus poenitentiae to change their mind or correct an error in law (such as the erroneous grant of an ancillary status quo order) before the judgment crystallizes through signing - Unless a material change is made to the core outcome behind the back of the parties without a re-hearing, refinements made in chambers do not invalidate the signed order. [Paras 15, 19 - 23, 25 - 28] Fakir Mamad Suleman Sameja v. Adani Ports and Special Economic Zones, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 490 : 2026 INSC 483
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression – Right to Education in Mother Tongue/Language of Choice - The guarantee of freedom of speech and expression necessarily encompasses the right to receive information in a form that is both meaningful and comprehensible - The true value of this freedom lies in the ability to understand, internalize, and process information - Education, as a primary vehicle for transmitting knowledge, must be imparted in a language that the child understands best - A child, or a parent/guardian on their behalf, has a fundamental right to freedom of choice regarding the medium of instruction at the primary school stage, and the State cannot artificially restrict this choice. [Paras 42, 43] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Life — Right to Trauma Care and Road Safety — The right to trauma care of citizens is an integral part of the right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - A robust, uniform, and swift mechanism for emergency trauma care is critical to recognizing and responding to road accident situations to save human lives - Bystanders often hesitate to act due to fear of legal proceedings or police harassment - Systemic interventions, uniform frameworks, and proper Good Samaritan laws are required to eliminate these barriers. Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 556
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Life — Right to Trauma Care and Road Safety —Interim Directions for Uniform Trauma Care System — The Supreme Court issued comprehensive time-bound interim directions to the Union and all States/UTs i. Full technical and operational integration of all emergency helplines (100, 101, 108, etc.) into the universal helpline 112 within three months; ii. Establishment of functional physical and digital Good Samaritan Grievance Redressal Systems within three months; iii. Notification of a medical rescue protocol by the Union within three months, to be operationalized by States/UTs within three months thereafter; iv. Mandatory Automotive Industry Standard 125 (AIS-125) compliance and GPS/Vehicle Location Tracking Device (VLTD) fitment in all public and private ambulances, integrated with helpline 112 within three months; v. Adoption of the National Commission for Allied and Healthcare Professionals (NCAHP) notified Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) curriculum within three months; vi. Establishment of State Trauma Registries within four months; vii. Grading and designation of all medical facilities across National/State Highways and urban areas within three months; viii. Full operationalization of the PM RAHAT cashless treatment scheme for road accident victims within three months, failing which it would amount to a violation of the Motor Vehicles Act; ix. Execution of multi-lingual mass-media campaigns within one month. [Relied on Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 194; Paras 5-12] Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 556
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Suppression of Facts — Relief Moulding vs. State Inaction — Suppression of a fact by a litigant must be of a material fact that has the potential to significantly influence the decision-making process or alter its trajectory on merits to disentitle them from relief - Even in cases of non-disclosure of connected litigation, the Court cannot permit the State to deny the appellants the benefit of a judicial order passed in their favour which has attained finality and was never challenged - Allowing the State to escape its obligation on the ground of delay in seeking implementation would tantamount to permitting it to take advantage of its own wrong (Ex injuria sua nemo habere debet) - The State, being a model employer under Article 12, is estopped from espousing such a contention, especially when the failure to make monthly payments gives rise to a fresh cause of action every month - The Supreme Court emphasized that it is the duty of the litigants and their counsel to place all connected facts on record, and it is for the Court to decide what constitutes a "material fact." - Pick-and-choose disclosures are impermissible - reiterated that the principle of suppression is a safeguard against the abuse of judicial process and not a weapon of technicality, noting that the withheld fact must be of such critical import that its absence renders a decision unjust. [Relied on SJS Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 7 SCC 166; Government of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370; Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2007) 11 SCC 447; Machhindranath v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Dhamne, (2025) 7 SCC 450; Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, (2024) 18 SCC 643; Paras 6 – 8] B. Yerraji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 505 : 2026 INSC 495
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Writ Jurisdiction — Exhaustion of Alternative Statutory Remedies — Registration of FIR — Held - The extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and subject to self-imposed restrictions - It ought not to be invoked for the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) or proper investigation when alternative, equally efficacious sequential statutory remedies are available under the criminal procedure framework, unless justified by exceptional urgency or imminent danger to life or liberty - Entertaining such a writ petition in the first instance effectively results in the High Court acting as a forum of first instance, thereby completely bypassing the structured statutory scheme, which is impermissible. Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : 2026 INSC 442
Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 14 and 16 — Public Employment — Arbitrary Contractual Appointment against Regular Vacancy — Validity of Selection Process — Even by the most liberal approach to the primacy of selection committees in educational institutions, denying a regular appointment to a fully qualified candidate while appointing others on a regular basis through the same selection process is patently illegal and unconstitutional, especially when the selection record discloses no reasons for such differential treatment - If a candidate is deemed unsuitable for a regular appointment, they cannot be recommended even on a contractual basis. (Paras 12 - 14) Lokendra Kumar Tiwari v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2026 INSC 487
Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 21 & 23 — Human Trafficking for Commercial Sexual Exploitation (CSE)— Right to Rehabilitation — Held, a combined reading of Articles 21 and 23 establishes that victims of trafficking for CSE possess a fundamental right to rehabilitation - The constitutional obligations owed to victims of exploitative structures extend beyond a prevention, rescue, and punishment paradigm to comprehensive rehabilitation - State's failure to provide a robust "Victim Protection Plan" and adequate rehabilitation infrastructures violates Articles 21 and 23 - Detailed guidelines issued under Articles 32 and 142 to govern pre-rescue, rescue, post-rescue, rehabilitation, and repatriation of victims until the enactment of comprehensive central legislation. [Paras 56, 277-281, 290 - 303] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Constitutional Law – Article 226 vs Section 528 BNSS (Section 482 CrPC) – Quashing of FIR – Distinguishing the scope of jurisdiction, the Court observed that so long as cognizance of an offence is not taken, a writ to quash an FIR/charge-sheet can be issued under Article 226 - once a judicial order of taking cognizance intervenes, the power under Article 226 is not available, though the inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (erstwhile Section 482 CrPC) can be invoked to quash the proceedings. Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Section 13(7) (corresponding to Section 38(12) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019) — Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 2 & 4 — Indian Succession Act, 1925 — Section 306 — Medical Negligence — Death of the Doctor/Opposite Party pending proceedings — Survivability of claims against Legal Heirs — The Supreme Court held that upon the death of an alleged medically negligent doctor during the pendency of a consumer dispute (including at the appellate/revisional stage), their legal heirs can be impleaded and brought on record - the continuation of the "right to sue" under Order XXII of the CPC is fundamentally governed by the substantive law enshrined in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 - When adjudicating claims under the first exception to Section 306 of the 1925 Act, purely personal injury claims (such as damages for pain, suffering, or loss of reputation) lapse and abate with the death of the doctor - Conversely, distinct claims for pecuniary loss or economic damages that affect or are maintainable against the estate of the deceased doctor survive - The Consumer Commissions are duty-bound to first adjudicate the negligence aspect of the deceased doctor before recovering surviving estate-linked claims. [Relied on M. Veerappa Vs. Evelyn Sequeira, (1988) 1 SCC 556; Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan Vs. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair, (1986) 1 SCC 118; Vinayak Purshottam Dube Vs. Jayashree Padamkar Bhat, (2024) 9 SCC 398; Paras 55-71] Kumud Lall v. Suresh Chandra Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 454 : 2026 INSC 443
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Section 2(c)(i) — Criminal Contempt — Scandalizing the Court — Reckless allegations by Bar President against the High Court Administration and Registry - The Appellant (President of the High Court Advocates' Association and Senior Advocate) was convicted of criminal contempt by the Gujarat High Court for branding the institution a "gambling den" and alleging corruption, nepotism, and preferential treatment towards rich litigants in matter listings during a live press conference - The Supreme Court held that the reasons assigned by the High Court for conviction warranted no interference on merits - Terming a Court a "gambling den" cannot be a permissible method to criticize its functioning, and severe emotional distress under pandemic pressures does not excuse conduct that disrupts public faith in the justice delivery system - emphasizing judicial magnanimity and balancing accountability with reform, the Supreme Court exercised its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to suspend the conviction and sentence indefinitely, subject to an express undertaking of "impeccable conduct" and a mechanism for periodic review by the High Court - Key Points Elaborated in the Judgment – i. Distinct Nature of Contempt and Recall of Senior Designation - Criminal contempt proceedings under the 1971 Act and the recalling of a senior advocate's designation under Rule 26 of the relevant High Court Rules are entirely distinct parallel proceedings - Divesting an advocate of their senior gown cannot be treated as a sufficient punishment to automatically discharge or bypass statutory and constitutional contempt actions; ii. Automatic Disqualification under the Advocates Act - Upon the conviction of an advocate for criminal contempt, they face an automatic disqualification from practicing for a minimum period of two years under Section 24-A of the Advocates Act, 1961, even without separate regulatory action by the Bar Council -By suspending the conviction under Article 142, the Supreme Court protected the Appellant from this consequential disadvantage, contingent on future conduct; iii. Forgiveness with Vigil - The apex court introduced a mechanism of "measured forgiveness with vigil," directing the Full Court of the High Court to keep a watch and periodically review the Appellant's conduct every two years - If any further contumacious acts occur, the High Court is granted liberty to move the Supreme Court to revive and enforce the conviction immediately. [Relied on Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P., (2016) 8 SCC 335; Paras 44 – 65] Yatin Narendra Oza v. Suo Motu, High Court of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 485 : 2026 INSC 470
Contractual Liability vs. Unjust Enrichment – Students who initially consciously contracted to take admission in a private medical institution under a higher fee structure cannot be permitted to exclusively avail the benefit of highly subsidized Government-rate fees throughout the course duration under the garb of interim orders - Permitting students to undertake a full MBBS course at a pittance of what they would have originally paid amounts to unjust enrichment - Neither the students can be given an undue advantage or bonanza, nor can the defaulting institution be permitted to take benefit of its own follies. [Paras 33 - 50] Soumya Ranjan Panda v. Subhalaxmi Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 498 : 2026 INSC 488
Criminal Administration – Special Investigation Team (SIT) – Land Scams – In view of organized criminal activities involving the forgery of documents and unauthorized sale of a spiritual society's freehold lands across multiple states, Supreme Court directed the constitution of an SIT supervised by the Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh - The SIT, including the Registrar of Societies, is mandated to conduct a fact-finding inquiry into the alienation of society lands and submit a report to the police for further action. [Relied on Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra (2025) SCC Online 1948; Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401; Pratibha Manchanda & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. (2023) 8 SCC 181; Paras 14 -19] Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482
Criminal Evidence – Testimony of Hostile Witness – Evidentiary Value for Acquittal – The Supreme Court ruled that just as the dependable part of a hostile witness's testimony can be used to convict an accused if corroborated by reliable evidence, the reverse is also true - The testimony or statement in the deposition of a hostile witness can be properly employed to discredit the prosecution's case and support a conclusion of acquittal, especially when it inspires credibility and aligns with other evidence on record to cast serious doubt on the occurrence of the incident - Held: The evidence of a hostile witness does not get completely washed off the record - If such evidence discredits the very fulcrum and genesis of the prosecution's story (such as the holding of a village panchayat or the presence of eyewitnesses), and is supported by unexplained medical discrepancies and a failure to examine independent public witnesses at a busy crime scene, the benefit of the doubt must go to the accused - The concurrent convictions by the Trial Court and High Court were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. [Relied on Ghulam Hassan Beigh vs. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey and Others, (2022) 12 SCC 657; Bhaskarrao and Others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 591; Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai vs. State of Gujarat, (1999) 8 SCC 624; Himanshu alias Chintu vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2 SCC 36; Paras 6-10] Talari Naresh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 496 : 2026 INSC 486
Criminal Jurisprudence — Circumstantial Evidence — Recovery of bloodstained articles — Chain of custody — Failure to conduct Test Identification Parade (TIP) — Suppression of material witnesses - Key Rulings – i. Circumstantial Evidence - In a case resting solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution carries the onerous burden of establishing each incriminating circumstance independently beyond reasonable doubt - The cumulative effect of the proved circumstances must form a complete and unbroken chain pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused alone, while excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; ii. Recovery of Bloodstained Articles - The sole circumstance of recovering a bloodstained article matching the blood group of the deceased, in isolation, cannot be considered sufficient to link the accused with the crime - Blood group 'O' is a common blood group, and its mere presence on recovered articles cannot be treated as a determinative incriminating circumstance without establishing an uncompromised connection to the crime; iii. Chain of Custody - The failure of the prosecution to lead cogent and reliable evidence establishing an unbroken chain of custody of seized forensic articles from the stage of recovery till their examination at the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) diminishes the scientific value of such reports, as the possibility of tampering or contamination cannot be reasonably ruled out; iv. Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Where the accused persons are complete strangers to the material witnesses, a Test Identification Parade assumes considerable significance to provide assurance to the dock identification - The rank failure of the investigating agency to hold a TIP, combined with showing the accused to witnesses while in police custody, substantially diminishes the evidentiary value of subsequent dock identification; v. Suppression of Material Witness - The non-examination of a natural, material witness closely related to the deceased whose statement was recorded during the investigation, without any plausible explanation, amounts to the suppression of the best available evidence and casts a serious cloud of doubt on the fairness of the investigation. [Relied on Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 16 SCC 357; Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, (2024) 9 SCC 546; Paras 40-86] Mehtab v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 560 : 2026 INSC 578
Criminal Jurisprudence - Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Summarized principles governing interference by the Supreme Court in a criminal appeal by special leave against concurrent findings of the courts below - Supreme Court would not normally interfere with a concurrent finding of fact based on pure appreciation of evidence or enter into a re-appraisement unless the assessment of the High Court is vitiated by an error of law or procedure, misreading of evidence, or is manifestly perverse and based on no evidence. [Relied on Dalbir Kaur & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 158; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554; Bipin Bihari v. State of M.P. (2006) 8 SCC 799; Para 30-40] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524
Criminal Law – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 503 & Section 506 Part II – Criminal Intimidation to Impute Unchastity – Appeal against conviction for threatening to upload a video of the prosecutrix bathing on Facebook if she insisted on continuing their relationship – Non-recovery of mobile phone/videography – Held: Law does not mandate that the recovery of an article of crime is sine qua non for conviction if there is other credible evidence to prove its existence - What is relevant is that the threat was issued, and the victim truly believed and felt threatened that such a threat could be carried out - The genuine perception of the prosecutrix that such a video exists and that the appellant threatened to upload it on social media constitutes key ingredients to invoke Section 503 IPC - Non-recovery of the device is not fatal to the prosecution's case. [Relied on Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; Paras 46, 53, 54 - 87] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Criminal Law – Proximate Cause (Causa Causans) – To fasten criminal liability under Section 304-A IPC, there must be a direct and proximate nexus between the alleged negligent act and the death - Where the post-mortem report conclusively establishes that the immediate cause of death was acute coronary insufficiency resulting from an underlying, undisclosed 80% blockage in the coronary artery, the actions of an off-duty anaesthetist are far too remote to attract criminal culpability. [Relied on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1; Radheyshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581; Videocon Industries Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2016) 12 SCC 315; Prem Raj v. Poonamma Menon, (2024) 6 SCC 143; Para 20-28] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537
Criminal Procedure – Grant of Bail – Judicial Discretion and Duty to Consider Material Evidence - The Supreme Court observed that while the judicial discretion to grant bail is wide, it must be exercised in a judicious, reasoned manner by adverting to the settled parameters, especially where accusations are grave - The High Court erred in isolating the omission in the inquest proceedings while completely ignoring vital material collected during the investigation - A specific overt act attributed to the accused in the FIR, the corroborative post-mortem report showing firearm injuries, the recovery of the weapon at the instance of the accused, and the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS, 2023 constitute material circumstances that cannot be brushed aside - Assigning reasons not in consonance with settled bail principles in serious offences renders the order unsustainable. [Paras 14-16] Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2026 INSC 527
Criminal Procedure – Inherent Powers – Quashing of Proceedings – Right to Speedy Trial as a Fundamental Right under Article 21 - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the appellant for 35 years arising out of a dispute over food in a police mess involving minor offences under Sections 147, 323, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 120 of the Railways Act - Supreme Court emphasized that a quick trial is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Keeping a public servant in suspended animation for 35 years without any fault on his part runs completely contrary to the spirit of the "procedure established by law" - Right to speedy trial is not an abstract or illusory safeguard; it is a fundamental right and a human right that no civilized society can deny to an accused - If the continuation of proceedings amounts to a violation of Article 21, the High Court should not hesitate to exercise its inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) or its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. [Paras 30 - 42] Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : 2026 INSC 473
Criminal Procedure – Remission / Premature Release – Rejection of Remission Proposal by Central Government – Investigation by CBI – Requirement of Concurrence – Speaking Order – Application of Mind – Parity – Reformative Theory of Punishment – Writ Petition challenging the letter dated 09.07.2025 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Union of India, which disallowed the recommendation of the State of Uttarakhand for the premature release of the petitioner who had been incarcerated for over 22 years in a murder case investigated by the CBI – Held that i. Cryptic and Non-Speaking Orders Invalidation: The impugned letter issued by the MHA rejecting the remission recommendation was ex-facie non-speaking, cryptic, and failed to disclose any reasons for its disagreement with the State Government's proposal - Recording of reasons is an essential safeguard against arbitrariness, ensures transparency, and reflects due application of mind - Absence of reasons violates the principles of natural justice and frustrates the convict's right to seek effective judicial review; ii. Heinousness of Offence Not the Sole Ground for Denial: Denial of remission cannot rest solely on the gravity or heinous nature of the original crime - The heinousness of the offence stands exhausted at the stage of sentencing and judicial determination of punishment - Remission is a distinct executive function concerned with the present and the future specifically the prisoner's conduct, evidence of reformation, and prospects of reintegration into society - Permanent incarceration under the shadow of a past worst act is impermissible in a liberal constitutional order; iii. Principle of Parity: Where a co-accused in the very same offence and incident has already been granted premature release after a lesser period of actual incarceration (17 years), denying similar consideration to the petitioner without any cogent, rational, and discernible distinguishing circumstances violates the constitutional requirements of fairness and non-arbitrariness under Article 14; iv. Futility of Remand: While a non-speaking order is ordinarily remanded for fresh consideration, a mechanical remand is unnecessary where the authority has already fully articulated its firm stand on merits before the Court - Relegating a convict who has served over 22 years to another round of administrative proceedings would prolong incarceration unnecessarily and fail the interests of justice - The impugned letter is quashed - The Writ Petition is allowed, and the petitioner (already on interim bail) is directed to be treated as prematurely released without requiring him to surrender. [Relied on Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B., (2000) 7 SCC 626; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121; Satish v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580; Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 481; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath, AIR 1961 SC 334; Paras 5 - 10] Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 501 : 2026 INSC 490
Criminal Procedure – Section 162 Proviso CrPC r/w Section 145 of Evidence Act – Impeaching Credibility vs. Omissions in FIR – Defense merely cross-examined the prosecutrix by suggesting that the details of the videography threat were not mentioned in her initial complaint/FIR – Held: The FIR is primarily meant to set the criminal investigation into motion and is not an encyclopedia of all relevant facts - An omission in the FIR is not fatal unless it goes to the root of the case - To properly contradict and discredit a witness under the proviso to Section 162 CrPC, the defense must draw the witness's attention to significant omissions or contradictions in their previous statements recorded by the police under Section 161 CrPC during investigation - Suggestions of oral denial and reference only to the FIR do not invoke the statutory mechanism required to shake the veracity of the deposition. [Relied on Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 and Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365; Paras 74, 76, & 77, 90-100] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Criminal Procedure – Stay of Investigation/Charge-sheet – Interim Orders in Writ Jurisdiction – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court's interim direction that restrained the police from filing a charge-sheet while allowing the investigation to continue - Supreme Court held that while a High Court can exercise discretion to grant protection from coercive steps during the pendency of a petition under Article 226, a blanket stay on filing the report under Section 193(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is "wholly unjust" when the facts involve repeated fraudulent sale of society lands. Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482
Criminal Trial – Appreciation of Approver's Evidence – Object of Granting Pardon - The Supreme Court observed that the testimony of an approver must be evaluated with caution and requires due corroboration on material particulars - the High Court adopted an infirm approach by rejecting the approver's testimony on the sole ground that it contradicted his previous statement given to the police when he was an accused - The very object of granting pardon under the law is to elicit a "true and full disclosure" in aid of the prosecution, which inherently acknowledges that the individual had concealed the truth prior to the pardon - Rejection of post-pardon testimonies based mechanically on pre-pardon contradictions would effectively frustrate the statutory purpose of pardon in criminal trials. [Relied On: Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637; Paras 39, 64-67] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Customary Law & Succession – Princely States – Rule of Lineal Male Primogeniture vs. Personal Law – Merger Covenant and Private Properties – Dispute over the character and devolution of the properties belonging to the erstwhile royal family of Kapurthala - The appellants contended that the properties declared as "private properties" by the former ruler under the merger agreement are subject to Hindu Mitakshara Law and liable for partition, while the contesting respondent claimed absolute ownership under the rule of primogeniture - Held, upon signing the merger covenant on May 5, 1948, the Maharaja ceased to be an absolute sovereign and assumed the status of an ordinary citizen - The recognition of the Maharaja as a "Ruler" under Article 366(22) of the Constitution of India was a political/executive act for ceremonial purposes and was not an indicium of property ownership – While Article XIV of the covenant guaranteed succession according to law and custom to the Gaddi (throne), it did not extend that protection or the rule of primogeniture to the private personal properties earmarked under Article XII. [Paras 47, 48] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571
Customs and Central Excise Tariffs – Classification of "n-Hexane" or "Exxsol Hexane" – Competing Entries between Chapter 27 (Petroleum Oils/Motor Spirit) and Chapter 29 (Separate Chemically Defined Organic Compounds/Pure Hydrocarbons) – Held - The imported product "n-Hexane" or "Exxsol Hexane", which is a Saturated Acyclic Hydrocarbon with the chemical formula , is correctly classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH) 2901.10 and Central Excise Tariff Heading (CETH) 2901.90 as a separate chemically defined organic compound in its pure commercial form, and not under Chapter 27 as a Petroleum Oil or Motor Spirit - The initial burden of proof rests entirely on the Revenue to show that an item is taxable in the manner claimed by them - The Revenue failed to discharge this burden by merely demonstrating that the product's flash point was below and its distillation range was between to - To classify a product as "Motor Spirit" under Chapter 27, all three conditions stipulated in the Supplementary Notes must be satisfied: (i) it must be a hydrocarbon oil, (ii) it must have a flash point below , and (iii) it must be shown to be suitable for use as fuel in spark-ignition engines - The Revenue led no evidence to establish the third condition, whereas the Assessee demonstrated its use as an industrial solvent. [Relied on CCE v. GAIL (India), 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2130; Paras 50 – 58] Commissioner of Customs v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 544 : 2026 INSC 536
Customs and Central Excise Tariffs – Interpretation via HSN Explanatory Notes & Impurities - Harmonized System Nomenclature (HSN) Notes serve as a safe guide for resolving tariff classification disputes when the expressions used are pari materia with the Tariff Acts - Under Chapter Note 1 to Chapter 29, a "Separate Chemically Defined Compound" is defined by a constant ratio of elements and a definitive structural diagram - While n-Hexane shares its molecular formula (C6H14) with its four other isomers, it possesses a distinct, linear acyclic structural formation that differentiates its physical and chemical properties - the presence of minor, non-deliberate impurities resulting solely from the fractional distillation process (such as unconverted starting materials) does not alter its character or convert the compound into an excluded acyclic isomer mixture under Chapter 27 – Held that as per Paragraph 2.3 of the Foreign Trade Policy, any doubt regarding the classification of an item in the Indian Trade Classification (Harmonized System) [ITC (HS)] must be referred to the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), whose decision is final and binding - The DGFT vide Policy Circular No. 40(RE-2003)/2002-2007 dated 14.07.2004 explicitly clarified that the import of Hexane falls within Chapter 29, which binds the customs authorities. [Relied on CCE v. M/s Wood Craft Products Limited, (1995) 3 SCC 454; Atul Commodities Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs, (2009) 5 SCC 46; Paras 23-51, 65-71] Commissioner of Customs v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 544 : 2026 INSC 536
Delay and Laches – Continuing Cause of Action – Land Acquisition Compensation -The Appellant-Corporation resisted the 2019 claim for additional amenity TDR on the ground of an unexplained delay of 17 years since the surrender of land in 2002 – Held that neither the doctrine of delay and laches nor the principle of abandonment or waiver applies when a relief in the nature of statutory compensation (FSI/TDR) is sought - The right to fair compensation under Section 126(1)(b) of the MRTP Act crystallizes upon the surrender of the land, and a duty is cast on the State to pay it proactively, even in the absence of a representation - noted that between 1996 and 2009, the law regarding the scaling down of additional amenity TDR remained in "suspended animation" due to executive circulars, which was clarified only by the Supreme Court in 2009 - A clear distinction must be drawn between a delayed challenge to the acquisition process itself and a delay in seeking fair statutory compensation; the latter constitutes a continuing cause of action. [Relied on Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 24; Kukreja Construction Company and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2024) 14 SCC 594; Municipal Corpn., Greater Bombay v. Yeshwant Jagannath Vaity, (2011) 11 SCC 88; Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn., Greater Mumbai, (2023) 15 SCC 110; Sukh Dutt Ratra & Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., (2022) 7 SCC 508; olkata Municipal Corpn. v. Bimal Kumar Shah, (2024) 10 SCC 533; Paras 58 – 70] Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation v. Vijay Nagar Apartments, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 523 : 2026 INSC 517
Delay and Laches – Public Law Jurisdiction – Seniority Dispute – A court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage the agitation of stale claims, particularly in matters of seniority and promotion, where the rights of third parties have crystallized in the interregnum - "Fence-sitters" cannot be permitted to raise a dispute relating to seniority and consequential promotion or challenge the validity of an order after the matter has concluded. [Relied on Shiba Shankar Mohapatra and others v. State of Orissa and others, (2010) 12 SCC 471; Para 25] T. Gnanavel v. R. Sasipriya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : 2026 INSC 446
Departmental Inquiry - Police Service - Fraud and Dual Employment - Judicial Review - Appeal against the High Court Division Bench judgment which set aside the dismissal of a Constable - The respondent was alleged to have secured simultaneous appointments in the Jharkhand Police (as Ranjan Kumar) and the Bihar Police (as Santosh Kumar) using forged documents and assumed identities - The Supreme Court reiterated that in departmental proceedings, the standard of proof is the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt - Strict rules of the Evidence Act do not apply to domestic enquiries; any material with logical probative value is admissible - Held, the High Court under Article 226/227 cannot act as an appellate authority to reappreciate evidence or interfere with findings of fact unless they are perverse or based on no evidence - The Division Bench erred in substituting its own view over the concurrent findings of the disciplinary, appellate, and revisional authorities - A member of the police force must maintain the highest degree of integrity - Fraud at the threshold of entry strikes at the root of public employment. Forensic evidence, including fingerprint and photographic comparisons, confirmed that the respondent used dual identities to deceive two sovereign employers - To do complete justice, Supreme Court exercised its power under Article 142 to quash the respondent's second appointment in the Bihar Police and directed the initiation of criminal proceedings for cheating and forgery. [Relied on Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610; State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491; Union of India v. Subrata Nath, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617; Paras 8-26] State of Jharkhand v. Ranjan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2026 INSC 466
Education - Pedantic Contradiction in Academic Recognition - Where a language is already being taught as an academic subject at the university level across the State, the argument that it lacks institutional or pedagogical acceptance for school education is highly pedantic and untenable - The State is obligated to translate constitutional assurances into concrete action by introducing such regional languages as a subject in schools in a phased and progressive manner. [Relied on State of Karnataka & Anr. v. Associated Management of English Medium Primary & Secondary Schools & Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 485; English Medium Students Parents Assn. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1994) 1 SCC 550; Devesh Sharma v. Union of India & Ors., (2023) 18 SCC 339; State of U.P. & Anr. v. Anand Kumar Yadav & Ors., (2018) 13 SCC 560; Para 50, 51] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476
Education Law – Relocation of Medical Students – Capitation and Fee Structure – Apportionment of Financial Liability - Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 142 – Recovery of Outstanding Fees of Relocated Medical Students – Sudden closing/denial of recognition to a medical college due to deficiencies creates an extraordinary situation putting the academic future of students in jeopardy - When students are relocated to other private medical colleges under judicial intervention via a State-supervised counselling mechanism, the resultant financial burden must be equitably apportioned. [Paras 4 – 6] Soumya Ranjan Panda v. Subhalaxmi Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 498 : 2026 INSC 488
Election Law – Presumption of Regularity of Existing Entries – Scope of Re-verification – Enrolment in an electoral roll carries a rebuttable evidentiary presumption of validity under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, but it does not impose a blanket embargo on the ECI's power to conduct a systemic, inquisitorial re-verification exercise - A prior entry cannot be used as a shield to obstruct the Commission's constitutional mandate of systemic oversight. [Distinguished: Labu Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer, (1995) 3 SCC 100 Paras 111-125] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564
Electricity - Declared Capacity - Distinction from 'Gaming - The Court clarified that “gaming” involves intentional manipulation of declarations to make illegal profit and requires detailed inquiry and adherence to principles of natural justice. Simple failure to demonstrate capacity, however, does not fall under gaming and entails strict liability. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515
Electricity - Declared Capacity - Generating stations receive fixed charges based on their Declared Capacity. The declaration must be made faithfully and must be capable of being met on a real-time basis. Demonstration of DC is a regulatory safeguard to ensure the veracity of the declared capability, particularly when incentives are also linked to generation exceeding 80% of DC. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515
Electricity - Declared Capacity - Talwandi Sabo Power Limited, operating three 660 MW units, repeatedly declared higher capacities than it could actually supply in January 2017. Despite multiple demonstration notices, the company failed to meet the declared capacity within the prescribed time blocks. The Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) imposed a penalty of approximately ₹162.74 Crore. The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) set aside the penalty, accepting the company's plea of absence of deliberate gaming. The Supreme Court reversed APTEL's order and restored the SERC's penalty. Demonstration of DC is a measure of ensuring that the (State Generating Stations) has the ability to generate the capacity declared on a real time basis and that the declaration is made faithfully, especially when fixed charges are paid on the declared capability. The Court emphasised that a generating station must carefully assess its coal stock, machinery condition, and other operational factors before declaring capacity. If unprepared, it should seek revision rather than make an unrealistic declaration. Appeal allowed. SERC's penalty order restored. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515
Electricity - Declared Capacity - Upon being called upon by the State Load Despatch Centre to demonstrate capacity, the generating station must achieve the declared level within four time blocks (approximately one hour). Failure to do so automatically invites penal consequences under the regulations. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515
Electricity - Strict Liability for Non-Demonstration of Declared Capacity (DC) - Failure of a generating station to demonstrate its declared electricity generation capacity within the stipulated time under the Punjab State Grid Code, 2013 attracts strict liability. Proof of mens rea, deliberate wrongdoing, or “gaming” is not required. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515
Electricity Act, 2003 – Harmonious Construction of Tariff Regulations - Regulation 6.32 of the DERC Regulations, 2011, which prescribes the calculation of depreciation over the useful life of an asset, cannot be read in isolation - It must be construed harmoniously with Regulation 4.1, which confines tariff entitlement strictly to the operational period approved or adopted by the Commission in the PPA - Regulation 6.32 does not confer an absolute or unconditional right upon a generating utility to recover depreciation from retail consumers when the asset is no longer utilized for supplying electricity to them - True-up proceedings are intended to give effect to the established tariff framework and cannot be weaponized to reopen, reconfigure, or circumvent regulatory approval conditions that have already attained finality between the parties. [Relied on BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1637; Paras 19 - 25] Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission v. Tata Power Delhi Distribution Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2026 INSC 461
Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 2(5) – Definition of "Appropriate Government" - Applying the functional test, while the Indian Railways operates under the pervasive administrative, nominal, and fiscal control of the Central Government and thus falls within the wide scope of the "Appropriate Government" under Section 2(5)(a) of the Electricity Act, 2003, this nominal status cannot automatically extend the benefit of being treated as a DDL - The status demands the substantive fulfillment of legislative obligations, namely supplying electricity to consumers within an area of supply against consideration, which the Railways does not perform. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers & Ors. (2001) 7 SCC 1; Paras 40 - 50] Indian Railways v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2026 INSC 464
Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 42(2) & 42(4) – Liability of DDL/Consumer to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge - The Indian Railways is a "consumer" under Section 2(15) of the Electricity Act, 2003, as it procures and utilizes electricity exclusively for captive self-consumption - Even in arguendo, if the Railways were treated as a DDL, its procurement of electricity through open access solely for its own consumption attracts the functionality test, rendering it a consumer for that limited purpose - the Indian Railways cannot selectively claim privileges to evade statutory socio-economic and structural charges and remains strictly liable to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) and Additional Surcharge (AS) to the respective distribution licensees of the area of supply for availing non-discriminatory open access. [Relied on Sesa Sterlite Limited v. Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors. (2014) 8 SCC 444; Paras 57-71] Indian Railways v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2026 INSC 464
Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 61(d), 62, and 125 – DERC (Terms and Conditions for Determination of Generation Tariff) Regulations, 2011 – Regulations 4.1 and 6.32 – Recovery of Capital Cost through Depreciation – Useful Life vs. Regulatory Operational Framework - The Supreme Court held that tariff determination under Section 61(d) of the Electricity Act, 2003 requires balancing a utility's reasonable cost recovery against the paramount obligation to safeguard consumer interests - Consumers cannot be compelled to pay for services they do not receive - Where a power plant ceases to supply electricity to consumers after the expiration of its approved Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) period, the utility cannot pass through the remaining capital cost or depreciation to the retail consumers for the period beyond its actual operation, even if the technical useful life of the asset is longer. [Para 20] Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission v. Tata Power Delhi Distribution Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2026 INSC 461
Electricity Act, 2003 – Statutory Interpretation – Relevance of Proposed / Draft Legislation to Determine Legislative Intent - Although a draft bill has no force of law, a legislative proposal (such as the Draft Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2025) that seeks to specifically introduce provisions to phase out or eliminate surcharges for a particular entity confirms that such exemptions or privileges do not exist under the prevailing statute - A legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by the judicial interpretative process to read an absent exemption into the current framework - Furthermore, being a Central Government entity, the Appellant cannot advance contentions contrary to the position adopted under the proposed statutory amendments under the principles of estoppel. [Relied on Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India & Anr. (2012) 6 SCC 757; Paras 65-70] Indian Railways v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2026 INSC 464
Electricity Act, 2003 & Railways Act, 1989 – Deemed Distribution Licensee Status and Definition of Distribution System - The Indian Railways does not qualify as a Deemed Distribution Licensee (DDL) within the ambit of the third proviso to Section 14 of the Electricity Act, 2003 - The activities under Section 11(g) and (h) of the Railways Act, 1989, which authorize the erection and operation of "distribution installations," do not equate to a "distribution system" under Section 2(19) of the Electricity Act - A distribution system requires a multi-pronged mechanism that connects the delivery points of transmission lines to the point of connection of a "consumer" for last-mile connectivity and commercial supply - The internal conveyance of electricity by the Railways through its closed network for its own operational facilities (locomotives, signals, and stations) does not constitute commercial distribution or sale to consumers. [Paras 16-31] Indian Railways v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2026 INSC 464
Environment Protection Act, 1986 — Section 5 & Section 23 — Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026 — Implementation and Delegation of Powers — Supreme Court directed the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) to issue a notification delegating powers under Section 5 to District Collectors across India for one year - This delegation is exclusively for supervising, administering, and implementing the Solid Waste Management (SWM) Rules, 2026 - Key Directives for Waste Management Enforcement – i. Establishment of Special Cells: District Collectors directed to constitute a 'Special Cell', including Regional Officers of respective Pollution Control Boards, to oversee implementation - The cell is authorized to issue directions to stop electricity/water supply to bulk solid waste generators who disobey or disregard the rules; ii. Field and Spot Inspections: Regional Officers of Pollution Control Boards must conduct field inspections of authorized and unauthorized dump yards and forward photographic evidence to District Collectors and local bodies for action - Collectors must conduct virtual spot inspections and submit monthly progress summaries to the State; iii. Leveraging CSR Funds: Union Ministries directed to explore incorporating Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) contributions by industries for establishing Compressed Biogas plants or waste-to-energy technologies, prioritising improvement of local bodies where contributing industries are located; iv. Administrative & Human Resource Reforms: Directed integration of a 3-level paperless approval method for SWM projects under the Swachh Bharat Mission-Urban - States/UTs directed to review human resources, fill vacancies in local bodies in a time-bound manner, and ensure at least a full-time Panchayat Secretary in every Gram Panchayat; v. Source Segregation and Upgradation: Local Self Governments (LSGs) mandated to focus on source segregation for Bulk Waste Generators (BWGs), deploy door-to-door mapping via Safai Supervisors, upgrade to completely closed vehicles for secondary transportation, and establish neighbourhood Reduce-Reuse-Recycle (RRR) centres. [Paras 4 - 21] Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 465
Environmental Law & Constitution of India – Protection of Ecological Hotspots, Wildlife Sanctuaries, and Tiger Reserves – Removal of Forest Encroachments vs. Humanitarian Grounds for Rehabilitation – Constitutional Imperatives - The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) flagged massive, multi-decade encroachments across the Agasthyamalai Ecological Landscape, specifically within the Srivilliputhur-Megamalai Tiger Reserve (SMTR), Kalakad- Mundanthurai Tiger Reserve (KMTR), and Kanyakumari Wildlife Sanctuary (KWS) - The report highlighted slow eviction progress by State authorities, the active extension of public utilities/welfare amenities to illegal occupants, and the presence of 118 serving or retired government employees among the encroachers - The State of Tamil Nadu sought a phased, humanitarian approach to eviction owing to the long duration of settlements and complex socio-economic ties – Held that environmental preservation cannot stand indefinitely deferred under the guise of procedural or humanitarian challenges - While the Court is fully alive to the necessity of structured human rehabilitation, complex resettlement issues cannot operate as a perpetual justification for postponing legally mandated eviction and ecological restoration - Protection of forests and fragile ecosystems is a non-negotiable constitutional imperative under Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g) of the Constitution of India - The approach to conservation must be strictly eco-centric rather than anthropocentric, recognizing the intrinsic value of non-human species – Supreme Court issued exhaustive, time-bound mandamus directions, including a division-wise encroachment eviction plan, a blanket moratorium on welfare schemes/infrastructure in encroached pockets, stringent disciplinary action and environmental restitution charges against government employee encroachers, and the total removal of commercial/governmental structures from protected tiger habitats. [Relied on T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2025) 2 SCC 641; 46-65] A. John Kennedy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 573 : 2026 INSC 605
Equal Pay for Equal Work — Principle Explained — Claim for pay parity by contractual para-teachers with regular Assistant Teachers—Held: Equal pay for equal work is not an automatic entitlement. The claimant must demonstrate that their duties, responsibilities, qualifications, accountability, and conditions of service are qualitatively and substantially identical to those of regular employees. Contractual para-teachers, though performing similar classroom functions, are not assigned the full range of responsibilities attached to regular Assistant Teachers. [Para 20-25] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462
Equity and Limitation – Delay and Laches – Unexplained delay of nearly ten years in instituting the suit challenging sale deeds executed under GPAs – Held, leaving GPAs uncancelled, allowing mutation entries to continue in the names of purchasers, and permitting subsequent sales to take place for almost a decade without objection is inconsistent with the conduct normally expected from a person alleging fraudulent and unauthorized alienation of immovable property - Prolonged silence and inaction for almost ten years are critical factors in assessing the credibility of the plaintiff's case. [Relied on H. Siddiqui (dead) by LRs v. A. Ramalingam, 2011 (4) SCC 240; Subhra Mukerjee v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 312; Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao, (1999) 3 SCC 573; Para 54] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529
Evidence Act - Elastic Time of Death - Extra-Judicial Confession - Exculpatory Statements - Where the postmortem report indicates an elastic timeframe for the time of death (e.g., '24 hours not passed during examination') and the time gap between when the deceased was last seen with the accused and the recovery of the body is large, death cannot be termed as proximate. Consequently, no conviction can be sustained solely based on the last seen together theory - An exculpatory statement made by an accused absolving himself and accusing the co-accused is, by its very nature, unreliable. It cannot be used against co-accused persons as they have no opportunity to cross-examine the maker, nor does it incriminate the maker since it lacks an element of confession. Furthermore, a statement made while being detained by a mob under pressure, undue duress, or threat of violence lacks credibility and is a weak piece of evidence. [Paras 9-11] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528
Evidence Act - Section 27 - Criminal Evidence — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together Theory — Extra-judicial Confession — Recovery under — Absence of Motive — Conviction set aside - Last Seen Together Theory — Time Gap & Proximity - What assumes significance in placing reliance on the 'last seen together' theory is the gap between the time the accused and the deceased were seen together and the occurrence of death - The proximity of the death having occurred within a short time after they were last seen together is most relevant for that fact to be taken as an incriminating circumstance - When the time gap is large, intervening circumstances can snap the link and prevent an adverse inference against the accused, even if the accused fails to explain when they parted company. [Relied on State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Another, (2007) 3 SCC 755; Para 7-10] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528
Evidence Act - Section 27 - Recoveries under — Essential Ingredients - Concealment and its knowledge, revealed from the statement of the accused, are the crucial ingredients of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act - In the absence of a recorded statement showing that the concealment was effected by the accused, a mere recital in the seizure list that objects were recovered "on being shown and certified" by the accused does not qualify as a valid recovery under Section 27 - Assault: Where weapon recoveries lack clarity, are made from open spaces with free access, are not produced or confronted before the witnesses in Court, and are not shown to the medical officer to elicit an opinion on whether they could cause the injuries found on the deceased, such recoveries do not form a clinching incriminating circumstance – Motive - While the absence of motive is not imperative when the chain of circumstances is so complete as to establish only a hypothesis of guilt, its absence raises a reasonable doubt when the individual links in the chain of circumstances are weak, unproven, or not incriminating. [Paras 12 - 19] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528
Evidence Act, 1872 — Appreciation of Evidence — Canon of Common Sense — The dictum of common sense and common wisdom serves as a vital canon for evaluating evidence and judging human conduct in criminal trials - Applying the yardstick of common sense to day-to-day affairs and natural human activities helps the court look past technical assumptions and arrive closer to the truth. [Para 7-9] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 101 & 102 – Burden of Proof – Allegation of fraud and misuse of fiduciary position – Power of Attorney – Held, the burden of establishing that transactions executed under registered General Powers of Attorney (GPAs) were not genuine sale transactions, but merely security arrangements for loans, rests upon the plaintiff/appellant - Mere allegations of fraud or misuse of fiduciary position are not sufficient unless supported by reliable and cogent evidence - Before the burden can shift onto the beneficiaries/respondents to establish their bona fides, the plaintiff is required to first establish foundational facts constituting fraud or fiduciary misuse - In the absence of documentary material substantiating the alleged loan transactions or repayment/discharge, the initial burden continues to remain upon the plaintiff. [Paras 45, 46] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge — Matrimonial Home Death — Circumstantial Evidence — Appeal against the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court convicting the appellant-husband under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for the murder of his wife - The deceased died an unnatural death inside her matrimonial home - The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence - The medical reports and autopsy indicated the cause of death as "asphyxia due to strangulation" based on a fractured hyoid bone and trachea, a fresh bruise mark on the cheek, and multiple ligature marks - A critical circumstance relied upon was that the deceased's left earring, right leg anklet, and toe rings were missing—articles unlikely to be displaced in a case of suicide by hanging - The appellant set up a defense of suicide based on a recovered chit (suicide note) - handwriting experts and evidence established that the chit was forcibly written by the accused prior to the strangulation - The appellant also failed to explain why, after being told by the first doctor that the victim was dead, he rushed her to another private clinic instead of a civil hospital – Held that the death occurred under suspicious circumstances inside the matrimonial home where the appellant-husband resided with the deceased - This fact was within the special knowledge of the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act - The appellant utterly failed to provide any justifiable or plausible explanation to discharge this statutory burden - When a case rests on circumstantial evidence, the failure of the accused to offer a reasonable explanation under Section 106 provides an additional link to the chain of circumstances established by the prosecution - The prosecution successfully established a complete, unbroken chain of circumstances pointing unerringly to the guilt of the appellant - No interference is warranted under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against concurrent findings of fact. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725; Mulakh Raj and Others v. Satish Kumar and Others, (1992) 3 SCC 43; Paras 16, 19 - 26] Chetan Dashrath Gade v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 526 : 2026 INSC 522
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 106 & Section 114 – Burden of Proof & Special Knowledge in Interpersonal Relationships – Applicability of Section 106 to private moments within a romantic relationship – Held: The "especial knowledge" contemplated under Section 106 is not confined strictly to physical spaces (like a domestic house) - It extends to intimate interpersonal relationships where only the accused and the victim are privy to conversations and transactions - Once the foundational fact of a long-term physical relationship is established by the prosecution, the court can draw reasonable inferences under Section 114 regarding human conduct - The burden then shifts to the accused to provide an explanation or an alternate version of facts within his special knowledge - A generalized, studied silence or a stock reply of "false evidence" during Section 313 CrPC examination fails to discharge this burden or create reasonable doubt against an otherwise unimpeached, credible testimony of the prosecutrix. [Relied on Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 15 SCC 48 and Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 626; Paras 62, 63, 66, 68, & 81] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 114(g) – Adverse Inference – Non-examination of a party – Held, where serious allegations of fraud, forgery of receipts, misuse of signed blank papers, and collusive transfers are levelled, and the party possessing special knowledge of facts fails to enter the witness box, an adverse inference may legitimately be drawn against such party. [Paras 48, 49] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 25, 26, 27 & 161 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 161 & 162 – Approver/Accomplice Evidence – Use of Previous Statement for Contradiction - The Supreme Court held that a non-confessional statement of an accused recorded by an Investigating Officer during investigation qualifies as a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C - If the accused subsequently turns into an approver and steps into the witness box as a prosecution witness, such a statement can be put to him for the purpose of contradiction under Section 162 Cr.P.C - A confessional statement made while in police custody remains strictly barred by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be used for any purpose other than what is permissible under Section 27. State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 65-B – Call Detail Records (CDRs) – Mode of Proof and Chain of Custody - The Supreme Court upheld the rejection of Call Detail Records (CDRs) filed by a Cyber Unit Police Officer who took printouts of data sent via email by telecom service providers and certified them under Section 65-B - Because the officer was merely a recipient and not the person having lawful control over the computer systems that generated the original records, he was incompetent to prove their contents - The prosecution's failure to examine the concerned Nodal Officers of the telecom companies or to produce the routing emails created a fatal gap in the chain of custody of the electronic data. [Paras 80, 81] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 3 – Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Order XIX– Evidentiary Value of Affidavits – Whether an affidavit constitutes 'evidence' – An affidavit does not fall within the definition of "evidence" under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - It can only be treated as evidence if the Court passes a specific order for sufficient reasons under Order XIX of the CPC - In the absence of an opportunity for cross-examination, or where the circumstances surrounding the filing of such affidavits appear suspicious or self-created prior to the submission of pleadings, they cannot be relied upon to determine factual situations or invalidate a proved document - It is a settled proposition of law that mutation entries in revenue records do not confer, create, or extinguish title over immovable property. Such entries are effected purely for fiscal purposes to enable the State to realize land revenue from the person recorded therein. [Relied on Meena Pradhan and Others v. Kamla Pradhan and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1198; H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 31; Balwant Singh and Another v. Daulat Singh (Dead) By LRs. and Others, (1997) 7 SCC 137; Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and Another v. Panchanan Banerjee (Dead) by LRs and Others, (1995) 4 SCC 459; Ram Piari v. Bhagwant and Ors., (1990) 3 SCC 364; Para 31-38] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32(1) - Oral Dying Declaration - Reliability and Evidentiary Value – Held - The legal position with regard to dying declarations is well settled by a catena of decisions - A truthful and voluntary dying declaration, if found to be reliable, can by itself form the sole basis of conviction without the necessity of corroboration - Simply because the deceased subsequently became unconscious by the time he reached the hospital or the doctor, it cannot be presumed that he was unconscious even when the witness initially reached the spot and asked him about the incident immediately after the occurrence - the non-mentioning of the name of the assailant in the medical history papers pales into insignificance, as medical history is recorded by doctors primarily to understand how the incident occurred and what type of weapon was involved, rather than investigating who caused the injury. [Relied on P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 44; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Others, (1985) 1 SCC 552; Paras 13-15] Mitesh @ T.V. Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : 2026 INSC 469
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 – Succession Act, 1925; Section 63 – Validity and Proof of Execution –Requirements for proving a Will – The court must evaluate whether the Will was executed by the testator and represents their final testamentary disposition - Proof does not necessitate mathematical accuracy, but must satisfy the conscience of a prudent mind - Compliance with statutory formalities under Section 63 of the Succession Act is mandatory, requiring attestation by at least two witnesses who signed in the presence of the testator - Examination of at least one alive and capable attesting witness satisfies the evidentiary requirement to prove due execution - If suspicious circumstances shroud the execution, the propounder bears a heavier initial onus to dispel them by offering cogent explanations to satisfy the judicial conscience. [Paras 27 – 29] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521
Evidence Law - Expert Evidence – Forensic Science – Gait Analysis – Admissibility and Reliability Standards - The Supreme Court noted that while gait analysis is an evolving scientific technique useful for corroborating a suspect's identity and physical attributes, its validity relies entirely on a comparison between two independently admissible and reliable pieces of visual evidence - Where the original hard disk and DVR of a CCTV system were mishandled, delayed in extraction, and ultimately corrupted or destroyed by the investigating agency, a gait analysis report prepared by a private laboratory using an unverified backup copy cannot be safely relied upon. [Paras 91-93, 95-102] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Family Arrangement – Oral Settlements - Oral Family Settlement – Validity and enforcement – A family arrangement or settlement can be entered into even by way of an unregistered oral agreement and is enforceable under special principles of equity – Technical considerations must give way to peace and harmony in enforcing family arrangements – Co-landlord is fully entitled to rely upon an oral family arrangement earmarking the suit premises for her exclusive use as a subsequent development. [Relied on Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh & Ors., (2007) 3 SCC 617; Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) By LRs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 555; Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal & Anr., (2008) 17 SCC 491; Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770; Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors., (1976) 3 SCC 11; Paras 49-50] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496
Forest Act, 1326 (Hyderabad) - Fasli (1916 AD) & 1355 Fasli (1945 AD) – Revenue Entries – Evidentiary value on title – Scope of Writ Jurisdiction – Writ of Certiorari – Revenue records or Jamabandi entries serve only a fiscal purpose to enable the person whose name is mutated to pay land revenue - A revenue record is not a document of title and does not create or extinguish ownership, nor does it possess presumptive value regarding title - Stray or solitary entries for a single year cannot be relied upon against long, consistent revenue entries - Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not the appropriate forum for resolving serious disputes concerning complex questions of fact and property title - The proper function of investigating these claims lies with a civil court in a regularly constituted suit, rather than a court exercising writ jurisdiction - A Writ of Certiorari lies only on limited grounds, namely: (i) want of jurisdiction, (ii) excess of jurisdiction, (iii) violation of principles of natural justice, and (iv) an error of law apparent on the face of the record. [Relied on Sohan Lal v. Union of India, (1957) 1 SCC 439; Paras 16 - 19] Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 469 : 2026 INSC 450
Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 (Uttar Pradesh) – Section 13(4) – Uttar Pradesh Education Service Selection Commission Act, 2023 – Section 31 – Waitlisted Candidates – Change of Posting – Effect of Repeal - The Supreme Court held that Section 13(4) of the Old Act does not permit a waitlisted candidate, who has already been recommended for appointment to a specific college, to seek a change of posting to another college on personal grounds - A candidate's voluntary decision not to assume charge at the initially recommended institution does not fall within the ambit of a vacancy arising out of death, resignation, or "otherwise" - Supreme Court further clarified that upon the enforcement of the New Act of 2023, which repealed the Old Act, the select list/panel prepared under the old statutory scheme automatically lapses - Authorities cannot revive the expired list to issue fresh recommendation or placement orders - Any such fresh appointment after the commencement of the New Act must strictly adhere to the procedure contemplated under Sections 10 and 11 of the New Act. [Relied on Kamlesh Kumar Sharma v. Yogesh Kumar Gupta and others, (1998) 3 SCC 45; Paras 20 - 24] Dr. Manoj Kumar Rawat v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 517 : 2026 INSC 508
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 25 – Disqualification of Murderer – Applicability to Testamentary Succession – Standard of Proof in Civil Proceedings – Section 25 provides that a person who commits murder or abets murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered - This disqualification is based on public policy, justice, equity, and good conscience, encapsulating the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (no man can take advantage of his own wrong) - The bar under Section 25 applies uniformly to both intestate and testamentary succession (disposition through a Will) - Criminal conviction is not a condition precedent for the operation of this statutory bar; the civil consequence of disqualification can be examined independently on the standard of preponderance of probabilities - A person who claims title through a Will but suppresses the material fact that they are facing investigation/prosecution for the murder of the testator is disentitled from asserting any rights in a court of equity. [Relied on T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 467; Mithilesh Kumari and Another v. Prem Behari Khare, (1989) 2 SCC 95; R. Rajagopal Reddy (Dead) by LRs and Others v. Padmini Chandrasekharan (Dead) by LRs, (1995) 2 SCC 630; Union of India and Others v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav, (1996) 4 SCC 127; Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties and Others, (2020) 6 SCC 557] Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — Section 6(5) (As amended by Act 39 of 2005) — Nature of Saving Clause vs. Jurisdictional Bar — Section 6(5) protects valid, completed partitions executed before 20.12.2004 from the retroactive reach of the amended coparcenary rights of daughters - It operates as a strict and narrow saving clause providing a defense on the merits, rather than a jurisdictional bar to the institution of a suit - A disputed question regarding whether a registered partition deed executed secretly behind the daughters' backs without assigning them a share is valid and binding cannot be foreclosed at the threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11. [Paras 53-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — Section 8 read with Proviso to erstwhile Section 6 — Independent Succession Rights of Class I Heirs — Devolution on Intestacy — Where a Hindu male died intestate in 1985 leaving behind daughters, his undivided coparcenary interest devolved by intestate succession under Section 8 upon all Class I heirs simultaneously - This right accrued under the unamended Act and remains wholly independent of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 - The saving clause under Section 6(5) only limits the retroactive reach of the substituted Section 6; it does not override, abrogate, or extinguish the independent devolution that took place under Section 8 - A partition suit is maintainable, at minimum, to the extent of the daughters' share in the father's property. [Paras 62-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499
Illegal Detention - Key Legal Observations & Guidelines by Supreme Court - Definition of Illegal Detention - i. The deprivation of liberty by the State without lawful authority or in violation of provisions of the Constitution is illegal detention - It includes instances where the detention lacks a valid legal basis or where a lawful power is exercised arbitrarily, in bad faith, or through a procedure that fails to observe essential safeguards; ii. Binding Nature of Judicial Orders ("Obey First, Appeal Later") - Once a competent court issues a direction, it must be obeyed and implemented without reservation - The mere filing or anticipation of an appeal does not automatically keep a judicial order in abeyance or operate as a stay - Flouting or ignoring such directions on a specious plea that the order is erroneous undermines the rule of law and invites chaos; iii. [Relied on Rudul Sah vs. State of Bihar & Anr., (1983) 4 SCC 141; Poonam Lata vs. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 347; Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705; Kanu Sanyal vs. Distt. Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674; Kanu Sanyal vs. Distt. Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674; Paras 7-9] Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 567 : 2026 INSC 599
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Existence of Legislative Gaps & Poor State Implementation - Supreme Court noted that despite commitments made by the Union of India in 2015 to enact a comprehensive law and establish an Organised Crime Investigation Agency (OCIA), no such dedicated legislation materialized - Reviewing data across various States/UTs, Supreme Court identified severe gaps in current setups, including non-functional One-Stop Centres (OSCs), gross deficiency of referral staff, a lack of mental healthcare and vocational training inside Shakti Sadan homes, an absence of mandatory rule-formulation by several States under Section 23 of the ITPA, and an entire omission of Half-way Homes – Supreme Court concluded that the State has failed to take "reasonable measures" to progressively realize the right to rehabilitation. [Paras 298-302] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Interim Directions on the Victim Protection Plan - Invoking its powers under Articles 32 and 142, the Supreme Court laid down extensive guidelines encompassing the pre-rescue, rescue, post-rescue, rehabilitation, and repatriation stages - These include – i. Mandatory notification of Anti-Human Trafficking Units (AHTUs) as specialized police stations with multi-disciplinary composition; ii. Curbing degrading and unscientific "mass raids" as a default option; iii. Mandating the immediate production of child victims before Child Welfare Committees (CWCs) in terms of the Juvenile Justice Act, overriding ITPA court procedures; iv. Ensuring strict protection of identity, free professional legal aid, psychological de-addiction programs, and individual care plans; v. These guidelines shall operate as the binding law of the land until the Parliament steps in to fill the vacuum. [Paras 223 - 362] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Restructuring Section 17 ITPA: Agency & Primacy of Consent – Supreme Court heavily criticized the "one-size-fits-all" approach under Section 17 of the ITPA, which indiscriminately processes involuntary trafficked victims alongside adult voluntary sex workers – Held that the i. Threshold Inquiry - Magistrates are directed to conduct a preliminary inquiry to identify voluntary adult sex workers and exempt them from intrusive custody or family restoration processes, keeping in line with the principle of non-interference; ii. Primacy of Consent - For victims of trafficking, long-term institutionalization or family restoration cannot be forcibly imposed against their volition. Forcible rehabilitation violates the intrinsic dignity of a person - A victim's informed consent must govern the final orders passed by Magistrates, with judicial exceptions restricted strictly to cases of documented coercion, tutoring, or imminent physical threat to the victim's safety. [Paras 329 – 352] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Rights-Based Re-framing of Trafficking - The Supreme Court observed that human trafficking cannot be viewed solely through the prism of a criminal justice or crime-control response - Secure convictions do not address the multi-layered material, physical, and psychological trauma suffered by victims - Under a human rights framework grounded in Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution, victims must be recognized as rights-holders at the centre of the state's response - Rehabilitation is a constitutional guarantee, equal to or more important than rescue, since returning a victim to a site of vulnerability without material or psychological protection risks immediate re-trafficking. [Paras 254-256, 278-281] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Section 17 — Heterogeneity of Victims — Threshold Inquiry & Consent — Held, the mechanism under Section 17 uniformly processes all individuals produced after a raid without differentiation - Magistrates must conduct an initial threshold inquiry under Section 17 to identify adult voluntary sex workers who do not wish to be subjected to long-term safe custody, respecting the principle of non-interference - a victim's informed consent must be the driving and primary factor in passing final orders for detention in a protective home or family restoration - Forcible imposition of rehabilitation is alien to human dignity - Exceptions are permissible only when the victim's safety is at imminent risk or consent is extracted via coercion, threat, or tutoring. [Relied on People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161; Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of M.P., (1984) 3 SCC 243; Public Union for Civil Liberties v. State of T.N., (2004) 12 SCC 381; Dr. Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 585; Budhadev Karmaskar v. State of W.B., (2022) 20 SCC 220; Paras 324, 329, 335, 336, 343, 348-352, 400-450] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Sections 15, 16, 17, 19, 21 & 23 — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — Sections 111, 143 & 144 — Conflation between Sex Trafficking and Prostitution — Duality of thresholds under ITPA and BNS — Held, the ITPA treats all third-party involvement in prostitution as inherently exploitative without requiring a "means" element, whereas Section 143 BNS strictly requires the fulfillment of all three elements (action, means, purpose) for adults - For the purpose of the protective protocol, "victims of trafficking for CSE" collectively includes individuals identified under both the ITPA and BNS frameworks. [Paras 162, 209, 217-219] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Income Tax Act, 1961; Interpretation of Contracts – Revenue vs. Profit – Overriding Title – The interpretation of a contractual clause which is the foundation of the rights of parties is a question of law - Under Clause 7 of the AOP Agreement, the appellant was entitled to 35% of gross sale proceeds upfront, while all project expenses were to be met from the remaining 65% share of the collaborator - Since the appellant's share remained insulated from the expenses of the AOP, the receipt lacked the essential characteristics of "profit" (which is surplus after expenses) and was in substance a "share of revenue" - Such an arrangement creates an "overriding title" that diverts the income before it reaches the AOP, making it taxable in the hands of the member (assessee) as a business receipt and not exempt as a share of AOP profit under Section 86. [Relied on CIT v. Sitaldas Tirathdas, (1961) 41 ITR 367; Paras 82, 83, 94, 97-105, 119-126] Commissioner of Income Tax III v. Sanand Properties, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 488 : 2026 INSC 472
Income Tax Act, 1961; Sections 147 and 148 – Reassessment – Reason to Believe – Tangible Material – Change of Opinion – Reopening of assessment is valid if the Assessing Officer possesses "tangible material" providing a "reason to believe" that income has escaped assessment - Mere production of account books or documents during original assessment does not necessarily amount to "full and true disclosure" if the assessee fails to bring the Assessing Officer's attention to specific relevant items or if subsequent fresh information exposes the falsity of earlier statements - In the present case, while the assessee disclosed the existence of the Association of Persons (AOP) and the income derived from it, the primary fact that the income was a 35% share of gross revenue (and not tax-exempt profit) came to light only through documents impounded during a subsequent survey and a director's statement recorded under Section 131 - Since the Assessing Officer had not formed a conscious opinion on the fundamental nature of this income during the original scrutiny assessment, the reopening did not constitute a mere "change of opinion" but was a valid exercise of jurisdiction based on fresh tangible material. [Paras 64, 70-71, 75-76, 82-83, 106-113, 116, 117] Commissioner of Income Tax III v. Sanand Properties, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 488 : 2026 INSC 472
Industrial Policy, 2019 (Himachal Pradesh) - Nature and Effect of the 2022 Amendment Notification - The amendment notification dated 29.04.2022, which substituted the word "eligible" with "new" in Clause 16(a) and Rule 16(i)(a), was merely clarificatory in nature to remove an inadvertent drafting error - It did not create or extinguish any substantive rights but merely reinforced the original intent of the Policy. Being clarificatory, it operates retrospectively and relates back to the inception of the original policy - the amendment introducing a three-year limitation on the duration of benefits under Clause 16(b) was introduced for the first time, making it substantive and prospective in operation. [Paras 50-51, 60-64] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kundlas Loh Udyog, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2026 INSC 534
Industrial Policy, 2019 (Himachal Pradesh) - Vested Rights and Promissory Estoppel - The mere issuance of a Commencement of Commercial Production (COP) Certificate does not automatically create a vested or crystallised right to specific tariff concessions under Clause 16(a) - Per Rule 27 of the 2019 Rules, incentives must be formally sanctioned and disbursed by the Director of Industries, which was never done for the respondent under Clause 16(a) - the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the State to grant a benefit that was never intended for the recipient's class of industry - Since the respondent had already legitimately availed itself of the expansion rebate under Clause 16(b), no case of inequity or enforceable equity survives. Promissory estoppel cannot be stretched to defeat public interest, fiscal discipline, or the true scope of a state policy. [Relied on IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 28; Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 3 SCC 193; State of Rajasthan v. J.K. Udaipur Udyog Ltd., (2004) 7 SCC 673; Arvind Industries v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 6 SCC 53; Paras 60-64] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kundlas Loh Udyog, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2026 INSC 534
Industrial Policy, 2019 (Himachal Pradesh); Clause 16(a) and Clause 16(b) — Rules regarding grant of incentives, concessions, facilities for investment promotion in Himachal Pradesh, 2019; Rule 16(i)(a) and Rule 16(i)(b) — Applicability of Concessional Electricity Rates to Existing Industries undergoing Substantial Expansion — Clarificatory Amendment Notification dated 29.04.2022 — Retrospective Operation — Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel - The Supreme Court was inter-alia considering whether existing industrial enterprises undergoing substantial expansion are entitled to a 15% discount on approved energy charges under Clause 16(a) of the Industrial Policy of 2019 (meant for new enterprises) in addition to the 15% rebate on incremental power consumption under Clause 16(b) – Held that Clause 16(a) of the Industrial Policy of 2019 and Rule 16(i)(a) of the 2019 Rules were always intended to apply exclusively to "new industrial enterprises" and not to "existing industrial enterprises undergoing substantial expansion" - The overall scheme of the Policy and the contemporaneous tariff orders indicate a clear classification: new enterprises receive general concessional tariffs under Clause 16(a) to attract fresh investment, while existing units undergoing expansion are incentivized via consumption-linked rebates on additional power consumption under Clause 16(b) - Allowing expanding units to claim benefits under both clauses would result in an unintended overlapping or dual benefit, imposing an unjustified fiscal burden on the State. [Paras 44-48, 50-64] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kundlas Loh Udyog, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2026 INSC 534
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Project-Specific CIRP and Corporate Veil in Real Estate — Restoration of Resolution Plans — Appeals filed against the NCLAT judgment which had set aside NCLT orders approving project-specific resolution plans for Earth Infrastructures Limited (Corporate Debtor/Holding Company) - NCLAT had held that the project lands belonged to the subsidiary companies (lessees from GNIDA) and could not be treated as assets of the holding company under the Code - Supreme Court held: This was an eminently fit case for lifting the corporate veil as the holding company (EIL) was the main driving force in the development of the projects and payment of dues, while the subsidiaries were merely a front - The Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (GNIDA) contributed greatly to the imbroglio through persistent inaction, ineptitude, and failure to monitor the projects despite being fully aware of the facts and the CIRP proceedings - GNIDA is disentitled from levying penal interest, penal charges, or time-extension penalties - To secure the completion of stalled real estate projects and protect innocent homebuyers, the project-specific resolution plans stand restored. GNIDA is directed to recalculate its dues strictly on principal amounts and communicate them to the resolution applicants, who shall clear the dues on their own over 24 months without burdening the homebuyers. [Paras 56 – 68] Alpha Corp Development v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 460 : 2026 INSC 449
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 25A(3A) — Representation of Class of Financial Creditors — Minority dissentient homebuyers challenging the resolution plan - Held, once an authorized representative casts a vote on behalf of a class of financial creditors (like homebuyers) based on a vote of more than 50% of the voting share of those who voted, it is not open to individual minority homebuyers to raise a separate voice of dissent against the majority vote. They must sail with the majority - Appeals filed with a delay of 34 days - Held, Section 62(2) empowers the Supreme Court to condone delay in filing an appeal up to 15 days but not more - The appeals are clearly barred by time and cannot be entertained. [Relied on Indiabulls Asset Reconstruction Company Limited vs. Ram Kishore Arora and others, AIR 2023 SC 2273; Mansi Brar Fernandes vs. Shubha Sharma and another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1972; Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Ltd. and others, (1986) 1 SCC 264; ArcelorMittal India Private Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta and others, (2019) 2 SCC 1; RPS Infrastructure Limited vs. Mukul Kumar and another, (2023) 10 SCC 718; Noida Entrepreneurs Association vs. Noida and others, (2011) 6 SCC 508; Paras 30, 31, 55-60, 65-76] Alpha Corp Development v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 460 : 2026 INSC 449
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 33(2) & Section 62 – Withdrawal or Modification of Resolution Plan – Approving and Reprobating Conditions in Letter of Intent (LoI) – Forfeiture of Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) – Commercial Wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) – Supreme Court held the following – i. No Scope for Reneging After CoC Approval - Once a Resolution Plan is approved by the CoC, the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) is precluded from raising grievances regarding conditions in the Letter of Intent (LoI) that were already within their knowledge and expressly agreed upon during CoC meetings. A submitted resolution plan is binding and irrevocable between the CoC and the SRA; ii. Artifices to Delay/Modify Plan Prohibited - SRAs cannot employ clever ploys or indirect attempts (subterfuges) to back out of a CoC-approved plan by characterizing standard legal contingencies in an LoI as "conditionalities" - Such actions threaten to crumble the statutory architecture of the IBC; iii. Legality of EMD Forfeiture - Forfeiture of the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) is fully justified under the Request For Resolution Plan (RFRP) if the SRA fails to submit the required performance bank guarantee within the stipulated time or non-complies with the resolution process; iv. Paramountcy of CoC's Decision to Liquidate - The decision of the CoC to liquidate the Corporate Debtor prior to the confirmation of the resolution plan especially when the SRA defaults or vacillates is a business decision taken in its commercial wisdom and is not amenable to judicial review. [Relied on Ebix Singapore Private Limited vs. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited and Another (2022) 2 SCC 401; Chairman, State Bank of India and Another v. M.J. James (2022) 2 SCC 301; Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B. Shama Rao and Others (1956) 1 SCC 698; Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation and Another v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limited and Another (2013) 5 SCC 470; Manish Kumar v. Union of India (2021) 5 SCC 1; Paras 26-42] Sanjay Dave v. Andhra Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : 2026 INSC 580
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Section 61(2) Proviso – Appeal before NCLAT – Limitation and Mandatory Requirement of Certified Copy – Appeal filed/refiled without a certified copy of the impugned order or an accompanying application for exemption from filing the same is a "wholly incompetent appeal" and not a mere defective appeal - Filing an application for a certified copy is an essential indicator of the litigant's diligence under the strict timelines of the Code. [Paras 6 - 10] Angelwoods Apartment Allottees Association v. M. Lalitha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 491 : 2026 INSC 479
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Recovery Mechanism - Abuse of Process - The Code operates as a collective insolvency resolution mechanism and not as a forum for the adjudication of individual contractual claims - Where the object behind the invocation of the Code is to compel payment rather than to address genuine financial distress, such invocation amounts to an abuse of process - The Code must not be used as a tool for coercion and debt recovery by individual creditors. Dhanlaxmi Bank v. Mohammed Javed Sultan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 480 : 2026 INSC 460
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 - Financial Debt and Default - Intertwined Contractual Obligations - In a case where a loan was disbursed directly to a Builder under a quadripartite agreement, the Bank's disbursement is intrinsically linked to the performance of the Builder's obligations - When the dispute is predominantly contractual in character involving competing claims relating to the transfer of property and is already being adjudicated before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), it does not constitute a straightforward financial debt-default scenario warranting initiation of CIRP - Permitting invocation of the Code in such instances would amount to converting insolvency proceedings into a coercive mechanism for recovery, which is impermissible. [Relied on Innovative Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 407; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 8 SCC 416; Glas Trust Company LLC v. BYJU Raveendran & Ors. (2025) 3 SCC 625; Anjani Technoplast Ltd v. Shubh Gautam 2026 INSC 410 Paras 8-12] Dhanlaxmi Bank v. Mohammed Javed Sultan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 480 : 2026 INSC 460
Interim Relief – Grant of Interim Bail Pending Reference - Recognizing that the determination of the legal issues by a larger Bench may consume further time, the Supreme Court noted that the appellants cannot be made to suffer continued incarceration merely because an important question of law has arisen for authoritative settlement - Without expressing any opinion on the merits, the Supreme Court granted interim bail to the appellants for a period of six (6) months subject to stringent safeguards. [Paras 27 - 30] Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 533
Interpretation of Rules and Advertisements — Principles of Eligibility — When the language of a recruitment advertisement admits of only one clear and unambiguous interpretation requiring the "possession" of a degree, considerations of enlarging the candidate pool or promoting competition cannot be invoked to adopt an alternative interpretation - Accepting a contention that qualifications can be acquired at any stage prior to the interview introduces uncertainty into the selection process and imposes an unwarranted administrative burden on the selecting authority. Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Lavanshu Sankhla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2026 INSC 444
Judicial Discipline & Hierarchy of Benches — Benches of smaller strength are strictly bound by the decisions rendered by larger Benches - Smaller Benches cannot dilute, circumvent, or progressively hollow out the constitutional force of a larger Bench decision without expressly referring the matter to a larger Bench - Confessional statements or explanation memos made before the police are prima facie self-incriminating and strictly hit by the exclusionary rule of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - In the absence of any conscious possession or recovery of contraband/cash from the person or premises of the appellant, continuing indefinite detention solely based on the seriousness of the allegations is unconscionable, particularly when juxtaposed with abysmal conviction rates under the UAPA - High Court's order denying bail set aside; Appellant directed to be released on bail. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 21-53] Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2026 INSC 503
Judicial Monitoring – Systematic Pendency Data – Directives to High Court - To make the right to a speedy trial meaningful and real rather than illusory, the Supreme Court directed the Registrar General of the Allahabad High Court to submit a comprehensive affidavit on oath detailing the statistics of pending cases before Judicial Magistrates and Sessions Courts, the functional and vacant strength of the judicial cadre, and categorized data regarding the period of custody undergone by undertrial prisoners awaiting bail. [Relied on Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., (1992) 1 SCC 225; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2012) 2 SCC 688; State of Kerala v. Rasheed, (2019) 13 SCC 297; Paras 42 - 44] Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : 2026 INSC 473
Judicial Review – Disciplinary Proceedings – Scope of Interference – Natural Justice – Held: The Division Bench's interference with the disciplinary penalty was justified where the findings of the Enquiry Officer were vitiated due to a violation of natural justice and a complete absence of evidence - The Enquiry Officer improperly relied upon preliminary statements of co-accused officers who were never examined as witnesses during the domestic enquiry, thereby depriving the delinquent employee of an opportunity to cross-examine or rebut the material used against her. [Relied on State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR (1961) SC 751; T. Baba Prasad v. Andhra Bank, Hyderabad and others, (2011) SCC OnLine AP 276; Paras 9 – 14] Canara Bank v. Prem Latha Uppal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : 2026 INSC 478
Judicial Review - Separation of Powers - Constitutional Courts cannot step into the shoes of administrative/executive authorities or assume the role of framing and implementing specific infrastructural solutions. Neither a High Court under Article 226 nor the Supreme Court under Article 136 should devise remedial measures for civic problems such as waterlogging and inadequate drainage. While Courts can monitor and direct authorities to perform their duties, they cannot themselves prescribe detailed engineering or administrative solutions (such as directing the laying of a specific sewer line across AIIMS premises). All India Institute of Medical Sciences v. Shailendra Bhatnagar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 511
Judiciary and Case Management – Non-accountability of Trial Courts – Ineffectiveness of Guidelines - The Supreme Court lamented that multiple guidelines issued by it over the last two decades for the expeditious conduct of criminal trials often remain merely on paper - Trial courts frequently fail to implement these guidelines because there is an absolute lack of accountability and no one is made answerable or held accountable for the resulting systemic delays. [Para 39] Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : 2026 INSC 473
Labour Law - Unauthorised Absence - Burden of Proof - Duty to Update Address - An employer is entitled to send communications to the address furnished by the employee. If an employee changes his residence but fails to intimate the new address to the employer, he cannot later complain of non-receipt of a show-cause notice sent to the recorded address and claim any benefit on that ground. Satya Narayan Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 558 : 2026 INSC 583
Legal Maxim — Aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum — What cannot be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly - This principle embodies the rule that what is expressly prohibited by law cannot be circumvented through indirect means - Since the statutory proviso relaxing eligibility for final year candidates was explicitly deleted by a state notification, candidates who have not acquired the requisite qualification as on the last date of application cannot circumvent this prohibition to participate in the selection process. [Paras 18-24] Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Lavanshu Sankhla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2026 INSC 444
Legal Maxim – Commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet – No one should derive a benefit from their own wrong - Since the closure was occasioned due to the serious fundamental deficiencies of the defaulting institution in relation to infrastructure and teaching faculty, the primary brunt of liability must be fastened upon the defaulting management/trust - Amount secured by way of bank guarantees furnished by the defaulting Trust with the MCI/NMC along with the amount deposited before the Supreme Court Registry ordered to be released and distributed among the transferee private medical colleges in equal proportions - For the remaining shortfall, transferee colleges are permitted to represent to the National Medical Commission (NMC) to recover the deficit amount from the passed-out students based on the original fee structure of the defaulting college, while adjusting the amounts initially paid by them - Students complying with the determined fee liability shall be entitled to receive their academic and course-completion documents forthwith. [Relied on Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 7 SCC 433; Paras 27, 38 – 42, 44 - 54] Soumya Ranjan Panda v. Subhalaxmi Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 498 : 2026 INSC 488
Market Manipulation – Sale of Shares below Last Traded Price (LTP) in Cash Segment – Placing large sell orders in the cash segment during the closing minutes of a settlement day at a price discounted below the Last Traded Price (LTP) does not conclusively prove a fraudulent intent to depress prices - In an online live trading system driven by market forces, a seller may legitimately discount its asking price to ensure trade fulfillment during a brief phase of high price volatility - it is commercially improbable for a promoter retaining a massive majority stake (70%) to intentionally depress equity values, as the marginal gains reaped in the futures segment would be severely offset by the systemic depreciation of its residual corporate valuation. [Paras 202 - 225] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585
Matrimonial Jurisprudence – Dissolution of Marriage – Cruelty and Desertion – Gender Stereotypes and Women's Autonomy – Facts - Wife, a qualified dentist, established a private dental clinic at Ahmedabad to secure her professional future and provide a safe medical environment for her minor daughter who suffered from seizure episodes - Family Court and High Court granted and affirmed divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion, viewing her actions as a disregard for family emotions and a violation of her bounden duty to reside wherever her husband chooses - Pursuit of professional career by a qualified woman and her choices made for the welfare of her child cannot be branded as "cruelty" or "desertion" – A well-educated and professionally qualified woman cannot be expected to be confined within the rigid boundaries of matrimonial obligations alone - Marriage does not eclipse her individuality or subjugate her identity - Regressive assumptions that a wife's professional identity is subject to an implied spousal veto, or that she must automatically sacrifice her career to conform to the geographical postings of her husband, are ultra-conservative, patriarchal, and legally unsustainable - Held: The approach of the Courts below is pedantic, regressive, and reflective of a male chauvinistic mindset - If there was a role reversal, a husband would never be expected to sacrifice his professional career, and his failure to do so would not be branded as cruelty - Not utilizing an earned professional degree constitutes a sinful wastage of talent and resources - Since the respondent-husband had already remarried and the appellant-wife did not seek to contest the divorce itself but prayed to clear her name, the decree of divorce is upheld but modified - All findings and observations pertaining to "cruelty" and "desertion" attributed to the wife are expressly expunged and set aside - The decree shall be deemed to have been passed solely on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. [Paras 21 - 27, 30 - 32] Ann Saurabh Dutt v. Lieutenant Colonel Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur Dutt, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 489 : 2026 INSC 475
Medical Negligence – Expert Panel Guidelines – Absence of Peer Specialist – The investigative guidelines require an independent medical opinion from a doctor qualified in the specific branch of medicine involved before initiating criminal prosecution against a medical professional - The constitution of a four-member expert medical panel without an anaesthetist to review a case involving technical nuances of epidural anaesthesia constitutes a significant legal and procedural flaw, rendering its conclusion incompetent. [Paras 26, 27] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 & 173 — Motor Accident Claim — Enhancement of Compensation — 100% Permanent Disability of a 14-year-old Minor Pillion Rider - Notional Income Evaluation - The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in fixing the minor claimant's notional annual income at a low rate of ₹30,000/- The notional income must be determined based on the prevailing minimum wages admissible for a skilled workman in the state at the time of the accident - Since the minimum wages for a skilled workman in Rajasthan in 2016 were ₹5,746/- per month, Supreme Court rounded it off to ₹5,800/- per month (amounting to ₹69,600/- annually) - After adding 40% for future prospects and applying a multiplier of 18, the loss of income was enhanced to ₹17,53,920/- Supreme Court modified the meager attendant charges of ₹1,21,800/- awarded by the High Court - Pointing out that the minor appellant suffered 100% permanent disability and requires the continuous assistance of two attendants round the clock for the rest of his life, computed the charges using the minimum wages of a semi-skilled workman (₹5,000/- per month per attendant) - Applying a multiplier of 18, the Court enhanced the attendant charges to ₹21,60,000/- To secure the minor's future, the Court directed that 25% of this amount be released immediately, while the remaining 75% be kept in a fixed deposit, with ₹1,50,000/- released annually to earn continuous interest - Supreme Court significantly enhanced compensation under alternative heads to meet the ends of justice: ₹10,000,00/- for mental pain, suffering, and loss of amenities; ₹3,00,000/- for future medical expenses; ₹3,00,000/- for loss of marriage prospects; and ₹1,00,000/- for special diet and transportation, bringing the total modified compensation to ₹56,83,663/- with 6% interest per annum. [Relied on Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Others, 2020 INSC 135; Paras 8-11] Hansraj v. Mukesh Nath, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 468 : 2026 INSC 454
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 166 and 168 — Deductibility of Mediclaim/Medical Insurance from Motor Accident Compensation — The question of law arose whether the amount of money received by a claimant as Mediclaim, in terms of a medical insurance policy, is deductible from the compensation awarded by a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) for medical expenses incurred due to an accident - The Supreme Court held that the amount received as part of a Mediclaim/medical insurance policy is strictly not deductible from the compensation calculated by the concerned Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act (MVA), even if compensation under the head of medical expenses is specifically claimed - Key Principles Articulated by the Supreme Court – i. Statutory Entitlement vs. Contractual Benefit - A statutory benefit under the MVA flows from the authority of law and serves a broader public welfare purpose, whereas a contractual benefit like a Mediclaim policy flows from a private agreement supported by independent premium considerations - These two entitlements operate in separate domains and stand on completely different footings; ii. No "Double Benefit" or Unjust Enrichment - Receiving both payments does not amount to an impermissible "double benefit" or unjust enrichment - The contractual insurance reimbursement is merely the fruit of hard-earned money voluntarily parted with by the claimant in the past in the form of premiums to guard against life's uncertainties; iii. No Windfall for Tortfeasors/Insurers - Allowing a deduction of Mediclaim benefits would result in an unjust and undue advantage to the insurer of the offending vehicle or the tortfeasor, effectively letting them escape liability under the head of medical expenses solely because the claimant had the prudence to secure independent insurance coverage; iv. Different Yardsticks - A Mediclaim policy is strictly capped by a monetary limit defined by the contract, whereas the guiding yardstick under the MVA is the beneficial principle of just and fair compensation, which carries no strict monetary limits. [Relied on Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC (1999) 1 SCC 9; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan (2002) 6 SCC 281; Paras 9-15] New India Assurance Company v. Dolly Satish Gandhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 504 : 2026 INSC 498
Moulding of Relief — Elimination of Ad-hocism & Timely Recruitment — Though blanket regularisation was denied, the State of Jharkhand had earmarked a 50% horizontal quota for para-teachers in its 2012 and 2022 Recruitment Rules —Held: The State cannot resist the prayer for regularisation while simultaneously failing to give effect to its own statutory mechanism for absorbing para-teachers. To ensure security of employment and eliminate perpetual ad-hocism, the Court molded the relief by issuing a strict time-bound calendar (Immediate and Annual Recurring Schedules) directing the State to notify and fill the 50% earmarked vacancies exclusively from eligible para-teachers every academic year. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1; State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh, (2017) 1 SCC 148; Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, (2024) 9 SCC 327; Union of India v. Ilmo Devi, (2021) 20 SCC 290; Paras 23, 24] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Bail — Prolonged incarceration and inordinate delay in trial — Grant of regular bail in commercial quantity case - The Supreme Court granted regular bail to an accused charged under Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(c) and 29(1) of the NDPS Act for allegedly possessing nearly 22 kg of ganja (commercial quantity), primarily on the ground of delay in trial and the accused having already undergone more than one year of incarceration. Rajadurai v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 462
National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 – Rule 22(2) – Mandate of Certified Copy – Compliance with Rule 22(2) cannot be rendered nugatory - While NCLAT has the power to exempt compliance under Rules 14 and 15, it does not confer an automatic right on the applicant to dispense with the certified copy - If an appeal is instituted without applying for a certified copy within the limitation period, it practically means there is no filing of an appeal in the eyes of law. [Relied on V. Nagarajan vs. SKS Ispat and Power Limited and others, (2022) 2 SCC 244; Ebix Singapore Private Limited vs. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited and another, (2022) 2 SCC 401; Paras 7 - 10] Angelwoods Apartment Allottees Association v. M. Lalitha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 491 : 2026 INSC 479
National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 - Section 12A — Power of Council to determine minimum standards — The second proviso to Section 12A reinforces the legislative mandate that the minimum qualifications of a teacher must be acquired within the period specified under the RTE Act - Subordinate notifications cannot override the clear and unambiguous command of the parent statute. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597
National Education Policy (NEP), 2020 – Executive Policies vs. Ground Implementation - The NEP, 2020 underscores the primacy of the home, local, or regional language as a medium of instruction, recognizing that young children grasp complex concepts better in their mother tongue - there appears to be a substantial deficit in the actual implementation of these commitments by the State at the ground level - While frameworks and policies continue to be announced, their absence in the lived experience of the child renders the entire exercise hollow - A right that exists only on paper without corresponding administrative will or implementation is no right at all. [Paras 29-35, 40 - 45] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Sections 138 and 141 – Offences by Companies/Societies – Vicarious Liability of Office Bearers – Scope of Quashing under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. – Mere designation as an office bearer of a society/company is insufficient to attract vicarious liability under Section 141 of the NI Act in the absence of specific averments disclosing an active role in the conduct of its business affairs - a hyper-technical approach should not be adopted while construing a complaint. If the complaint, read as a whole alongside the documentary material on record, discloses a sufficient factual foundation and prima facie participation of the office bearers in the underlying financial transactions (such as being signatories to the MoU, cheques, or promissory notes), the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed at the threshold - in the absence of any specific factual foundation connecting an office bearer to the transaction beyond a general assertion of their official status, prosecution against such person cannot be sustained – Held that the High Court erred in quashing the proceedings against respondents 1, 2, and 4 (Vice-President, Treasurer, and Manager) whose active involvement was prima facie established through their signatures on the financial documents/cheques related to the transaction - the quashing of proceedings against respondent No. 3 (Executive Member) was justified as no specific role or signing of documents was attributed to him beyond a general assertion of his designation - Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Another (2005) 8 SCC 89; National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Harmeet Singh Paintal and Another (2010) 3 SCC 330; Ashok Shewakramani and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another (2023) 8 SCC 473; S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan (2023) 10 SCC 685; Paras 28 - 42] Mansi Finance v. M. Lalitha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 559
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 & Section 141 — Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Part III (Sections 96, 101, 124, 128) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 357) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Section 395) — Interplay between Individual Moratorium and Cheque Bounce Proceedings - Core Principles Enunciated by Supreme Court - i. Predominantly Criminal Character of Section 138 - Although arising out of an inherently civil dispute or transaction, the "deeming fiction" under Section 138 of the NI Act attaches strict criminal liability as a measure of public policy and deterrence to maintain commercial integrity. It cannot be treated on par with a mere civil recovery mechanism; ii. Tiered/Bifurcated Approach to Section 138 - Proceedings under Section 138 must be bifurcated into two tiers - Tier-I (Criminal Aspect) which is mandatory and results in personal criminal liability (imprisonment or fine); and Tier-II (Compensatory Aspect) which is a discretionary exercise of power under Section 357 CrPC / Section 395 BNSS aimed at victim reparation; iii. Inapplicability of Moratorium on Criminal Aspect (Tier-I) - The interim moratorium under Section 96 and statutory moratorium under Section 101 of the IBC (Part III) do not stay the criminal aspect of Section 138 proceedings - Liability to pay a fine is an "excluded debt" under Section 79(15)(a) of the IBC, and the moratorium cannot be used to evade personal criminal accountability; iv. Applicability of Moratorium on Compensatory Aspect (Tier-II) - The moratorium provisions under Part III of the IBC apply strictly to the compensatory aspect of Section 138 - If a criminal court adjudicates that compensation is payable, the recovery and enforcement of such compensation against the debtor or his property must be temporarily halted during the moratorium period to prevent the depletion of the asset pool and allow breathing space; v. Vicarious Liability of Directors Undergoing Personal Insolvency - Where a corporate entity cannot be proceeded against due to a legal snag, the personal criminal liability of its Directors under Section 141 survives - if such a Director is undergoing personal insolvency or bankruptcy under Part III of the IBC, the expression "any debt" under Sections 96 and 101 is broad enough to include the statutory compensatory liability shifted onto him - while the criminal trial against the Director continues, the recovery of any ordered compensation from him or his properties remains stayed under Sections 96, 101, 124, and 128 of the IBC - Finding a deep-seated systemic conflict between the literal procedural mechanisms and the overarching social objective of penal deterrence under the NI Act, the Division Bench referred the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of a three-judge Bench to conclusively determine the precise penal orientation of Section 138 and the exact extent of moratorium protections applicable over it. [Relied on P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258; Rakesh Bhanot v. Gurdas Agro Private Limited, (2025) 6 SCC 781; Ajay Kumar Radheshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 545; Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, (2025) 4 SCC 629; Paras 141-185, 186 - 211] Dineshchand Surana v. UCO Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2026 INSC 579
Penal Code, 1800; Section 307 vs Section 325 - Attempt to Murder vs Voluntarily Causing Grievous Hurt - Essential Ingredients - Intention or Knowledge - The essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to murder is the intention or knowledge to cause death, which must be established independently of the act itself - The gravity of the injury by itself cannot be determinative of an offence under Section 307 IPC unless the prosecution establishes the requisite mens rea - The intention to commit murder cannot be presumed merely because the injuries were ultimately opined to be dangerous to life - In the absence of evidence showing prior motive, premeditation, repeated deliberate blows with deadly weapons, or any conduct indicative of a determined effort to cause death, a conviction under Section 307 IPC cannot be sustained - Since the incident occurred suddenly when the injured intervened in an altercation, and the weapons used were ordinary lathis without showing brutal persistence, the conviction was altered from Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC to Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC. [Paras 26, 31-38] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 279 & Section 304A — Rash and Negligent Driving — Liability of a Bus Driver — A passenger bus driver cannot be attributed with culpable negligence or rashness if he moves or restarts the vehicle strictly in accordance with the indicative instructions or whistling signals of the bus conductor - The driver is duty-bound to concentrate on driving for safety stakes and naturally relies on the conductor who is the person in charge of regulating passenger movement to monitor when to stop or move the bus - The driver is not expected to turn his head back to personally verify if the passengers have safely alighted - Acting bona fide on the conductor's signals negates the element of criminal negligence or recklessness. [Paras 5, 6] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 and Section 498A — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Murder in the privacy of a house — Custodial death of wife — Burden of proof on inmates — Homicidal vs. Suicidal Hanging — Medical Evidence — Sustained dowry harassment and torture established against the husband – Held - Where an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house, though the initial burden to establish the case rests on the prosecution, Section 106 of the Evidence Act casts a corresponding burden on the inmates to give a cogent explanation as to how the victim succumbed. If the husband does not offer any explanation regarding how his wife received fatal injuries in their shared dwelling home, or offers an explanation found to be false, it serves as a strong circumstance indicating his responsibility for the crime. Inmates cannot escape liability by simply keeping quiet on the premise that the burden lies entirely on the prosecution. [Relied on Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681; Paras 20 - 31] Gour Acharjee v. State of Tripura, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 538 : 2026 INSC 535
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 304A — Culpable Rashness and Negligence — To attract punishment under Section 304A, the rashness or negligence must be attributable to a state of mind involving a "deliberation in mind" risking the crime and the life of a person, rather than a mere error of judgment or acting bona fide under regulatory operational instructions - Highlighting the concept of "culpable rashness", negligence cannot be presumed merely from an accident but must be inferred from the distinct attendant circumstances. [Relied On Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284; State of Karnataka v. Satish, (1998) 8 SCC 493; Para 7-10] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 376(2)(n), 377, and 506 – Rape on false promise of marriage – Consent given under misconception of fact versus breach of promise – Prolonged physical relationship with full knowledge of marital status – Held: If a physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the relationship was purely because of the alleged promise of marriage - Unless it is shown that the physical relationship had a direct nexus with the promise of marriage, without being influenced by any other consideration, there can be no vitiation of consent under a misconception of fact - In the present case, both parties were fully aware that they were married to different spouses - The complainant uploaded her profile on a matrimonial site and established a physical relationship even before her divorce was finalized - The parties happily cohabited and travelled together for over 4 years without any complaint of force - This is a case of a relationship turning sour, rather than a promise of marriage resulting in deception - Criminal proceedings quashed. [Relied on Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2024) 11 SCC 398; Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385; M.C. Ravi Kumar v. D.S. Velmurugan & Ors., [2025] SCC Online SC 1498; Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal v. Mohan Singh and Others, (1975) 3 SCC 706; Paras 18 - 21] Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 459
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 506 Part II – Evolving Understanding of "Chastity" and "Unchastity" – Meaning of threatening to "impute unchastity to a woman" in the digital age – Held: Chastity is not to be considered purely from a traditional moral perspective focused on virtue alone; it must be viewed through the prism of an individual woman's dignity, privacy, and sexual autonomy under Article 21 of the Constitution - "Unchastity" encompasses any action or unwarranted interference that disrupts a woman's control over her own sexual choices and dissemination of personal information - The act of secretly video-recording a victim in a naked state in a bathroom, and threatening to publish it online, directly assaults her sexual autonomy, undermines her dignity, and violates her privacy - Such a threat squarely constitutes an act to "impute unchastity" within the meaning of Part II of Section 506 IPC, irrespective of whether the parties were in a long-term consensual physical relationship. [Relied on Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39; Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 Paras 31 - 41] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 506 read with Section 34 — Criminal Intimidation — Sine qua non of "intent to cause alarm" — Absence of common intention - The pivotal aspect to establish an offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC is the "intent to cause alarm" to the complainant. Where allegations do not demonstrate that the threats exerted by the accused were intended to cause such alarm, and there is no evidence of a common intention to commit a criminal act under Section 34 IPC, prosecuting the accused would amount to an abuse of the process of law. [Para 10] Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 484 : 2026 INSC 468
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 53 & Section 302 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 433-A — Modification of Life Sentence to Fixed Term — Constitutional courts (the High Courts and the Supreme Court) possess the power to modify a sentence of life imprisonment to a fixed-term sentence or to the period already undergone, provided that the period imposed is not less than 14 years of imprisonment - Such modification of a life sentence to a specific term of incarceration does not amount to an enhancement of the sentence - Held: When a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed, Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC conveys the meaning that it is for the rest of the natural life of the prisoner, subject to the right of claiming remission - Modifying a sentence of life imprisonment and imposing a fixed sentence is fully permissible as long as the period imposed exceeds fourteen years of imprisonment - Considering that the appellant was 21 years old at the time of the incident in 1998 and has already undergone 23 years, 6 months, and 3 days of imprisonment without remission, the Supreme Court modified the life sentence to the period already undergone and directed his immediate release. [Relied on Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Shiva Kumar alias Shiva alias Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817; Paras 10-18] Munna Moyuddin Shaikh v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 548 : 2026 INSC 558
Penal Code, 1860; Section 307 (corresponding to Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) – Attempt to Murder – Absence of Firearm Injury - The mere absence of firearm injuries does not negate a charge under Section 307 IPC - The essential ingredient is the act being done with the requisite intent or knowledge that it could cause death; if the victims escape by chance, the offence is complete - The principle of parity is not an inflexible rule and cannot be mechanically applied by courts when the roles attributed to the accused persons are materially different and distinct. [Relied on Ajwar v. Waseem & Anr., (2024) 10 SCC 768; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508; Sudha Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2021) 4 SCC 781; Para 29-32] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526
Penal Code, 1860; Section 320 (Seventhly & Eighthly) and Section 325 - Grievous Hurt - Fracture or dislocation of a bone constitutes grievous hurt within the meaning of Clause Seventhly of Section 320 IPC - Any hurt which endangers life or causes the sufferer to be in severe bodily pain or undergo prolonged treatment attracts Clause Eighthly of Section 320 IPC - Where the medical evidence unequivocally establishes that the victim suffered fractures in both parietal bones near the midline accompanied by neurological complications and prolonged hospitalization, the ingredients necessary to attract Section 325 IPC stand fully satisfied. [Paras 36-38] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524
Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 364, 396, 201 read with Section 120B — Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 9, 27, 106, 114 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 100(4) — Circumstantial Evidence — Last seen together theory — Recovery of dead body and articles — Reversal of conviction by High Court upheld - The case of the prosecution entirely rested on circumstantial evidence - The High Court reversed the Trial Court's conviction and acquitted the accused persons on finding the chain of circumstances incomplete – Noted the following key points - i. Recovery of Dead Body - The alleged recovery of the dead body at the instance of the accused was rightly doubted. At the time of arrest, the police had only received a missing report, yet the arrest memo pre-recorded offences under Sections 302, 394, and 201 IPC - independent witnesses were withheld, creating a serious dent in the prosecution's story - Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of legal evidence. ii. Recovery from Accessible Places - The discovery of the vehicle (Bolero Jeep) allegedly at the instance of the accused was from an open road accessible to all and not from the exclusive possession of the accused, making it unreliable; iii. Last Seen Together - Evidence of 'last seen together' is a weak type of evidence. Conviction solely based on 'last seen' without other corroborative evidence is unsustainable - Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not shift the primary burden of proof, which always remains on the prosecution; iv. Test Identification Parade (TIP) of Articles: Recovered articles like a tape recorder and wrist watch were never subjected to a TIP under the applicable police rules. Identification of recovered articles directly in Court without a prior TIP is meaningless in the eyes of law and makes the recovery insignificant; v. Common Household Objects - Recovery of a towel without any connecting material (such as bloodstains) is wholly immaterial as it is a common household object – Held that to convict an accused on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove each incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, forming an unbroken chain that excludes every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. [Relied on Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. (2021) 13 SCC 716; Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 1466) and Kanhaiya Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (2014) 4 SCC 715; Thammaraya & Anr. v. The State Of Karnataka (2025) 3 SCC 590; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) 2 SCC 71; Paras 29 – 32, 33-43] Pawan Kumar Sharma v. Manoj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 543 : 2026 INSC 539
Penal Code, 1872; Section 302 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 134 - Quality vs Quantity of Evidence - Conviction on Solitary Witness – Held - It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that it is the quality and not the quantity of evidence which is determinative - The Indian legal system does not insist on a plurality of witnesses. Neither the Legislature under Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872, nor the judiciary mandates that there must be a particular number of witnesses to record an order of conviction against an accused - The emphasis of Courts is always on the value, weight, and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity, or plurality of witnesses. Even the testimony of a solitary witness, if found to be wholly reliable, free from blemish or suspicion, and of a sterling quality, is sufficient to form the sole basis of a conviction without the necessity of corroboration - a court may acquit the accused in spite of the testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied with the quality of evidence - the mere fact that a large number of witnesses, including panch witnesses and some of the alleged eyewitnesses, have turned hostile will not entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt if the remaining material witnesses completely establish the case of the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. [Relied on Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150; Bhimappa Chandappa v. State of Karnataka, (2006) 11 SCC 32; Paras 8-16] Mitesh @ T.V. Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : 2026 INSC 469
Practice and Procedure – Abuse of Process – Maintainability of Miscellaneous Applications in Disposed-of Matters – Absolute Bar on Review in the Garb of Clarification – Applicants sought to rewrite the final order under the guise of an application for clarification – Held - A post-disposal miscellaneous application is not maintainable to challenge the validity of a signed order or to seek a material modification - It lies strictly for rectifying clerical or arithmetical errors, or in exceptional circumstances where the main order is executory and has become impossible to implement due to subsequent developments - Applicants failed to file the mandatory affidavit on solemn affirmation under Circular F.No.01/Judl./2025 verifying such executory impossibility - The application being a gross abuse of the process of law to browbeat the Court's authority, it was dismissed with exemplary costs. [Relied on Surendra Singh v. State of U.P., (1953) 2 SCC 468; Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 9 SCC 124; Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985; Paras 16 - 18, 19 - 31] Fakir Mamad Suleman Sameja v. Adani Ports and Special Economic Zones, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 490 : 2026 INSC 483
Precedent & Judicial Discipline – Conflict between Coordinate Benches – Reference to Larger Bench: The Supreme Court was faced with a perceived divergence of views between coordinate Benches regarding the manner in which the three-Judge Bench decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) is to be applied in UAPA cases - In Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2026), a two-judge Bench held that the inquiry into delay must be contextual and cannot be a mechanical override based on time alone - Conversely, a later coordinate Bench in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency (2026) expressed serious reservations, observing that Gulfisha Fatima adopted a narrower reading that hollowed out the constitutional force of K.A. Najeeb - Held: A coordinate Bench cannot, by strong observations, effectively unsettle the ratio of an earlier coordinate Bench while continuing to sit in equal strength - When a doubt goes to the root of the legal principle applied, the matter cannot be left at the stage of criticism, as it introduces uncertainty in the administration of justice -To protect the authority of the Court and establish clarity across pending trials under special statutes, the proper course is reference - The Registry was directed to place the papers before the Chief Justice of India for the constitution of an appropriate Bench. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2026 INSC 2); Paras 10-25] Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 533
Preventive Detention — Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981 — Section 3 — Bootlegger — Maintenance of Public Order vs. Law and Order — Non-application of Mind — Failure to invoke ordinary laws of the land - Held: The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the activities of the appellant were prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order" had no real basis - A bald and stereotypical averment that the appellant's activities are prejudicial to public order is legally insufficient - To invoke the stringent powers of preventive detention, there must be cogent material on record to demonstrate that the alleged activities disrupted public order, rather than just affecting 'law and order' - In the present case, despite five registered cases under the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949, the Investigating Agency made no effort to arrest the appellant under ordinary criminal law, even though the offences are cognizable - Where a person can be effectively dealt with under the ordinary laws of the land, the invocation of preventive detention laws is unwarranted in the absence of cogent material showing a distinct breach of public order - the preventive detention order cannot be sustained and is quashed. [Relied on Arjun v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3718; T. Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu (1990) 2 SCC 456; Paras 12 - 14] Vidyawant v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 510
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Section 27 and Section 45 – Civil Confiscation vs. Criminal Prosecution – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Double Jeopardy – Adjudication and confiscation under Chapter IV of the Benami Act are civil actions directed against the property itself to remedy a statutory violation, whereas personal criminal prosecution is governed by Chapter VII - Confiscation is a civil consequence tested on the principle of preponderance of probabilities and does not amount to prosecution or criminal punishment - Simultaneous or successive initiation of both civil confiscation and criminal prosecution does not attract the bar of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution - Once a competent judicial determination declaring a transaction to be benami attains finality in a civil suit, the property is liable to absolute confiscation by the Central Government, and it is unnecessary to relegate the matter to the statutory Adjudicating Authority under the Act. Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Sections 2(9), 3, 4, 5, and 27 – Benami Transaction – Retrospective Operation of 2016 Amendment – Fiduciary Capacity Exemption – Employer-Employee Relationship– The amendments introduced by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016, being declaratory, procedural, curative, and machinery-oriented, operate retrospectively and can be invoked in respect of past benami transactions - To determine whether a transaction is benami, the substance must prevail over form, and the Court must look at the real nature of the transaction beneath any camouflage - The expression "fiduciary capacity" under Section 2(9)(A)(ii) must receive a restricted construction and covers explicitly enumerated classes (trustee, executor, partner, director, etc.) or categories notified by the Central Government - An ordinary employer-employee relationship or a commercial arrangement supported by reciprocal financial consideration does not constitute a fiduciary relationship - Where a plaintiff provides the consideration to purchase agricultural lands in the name of an employee/name-lender to circumvent statutory restrictions under the land reforms law, the arrangement squarely falls within the mischief of a prohibited benami transaction. [Paras 18 – 29] Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465
Property Law – Co-ownership and Definition of Landlord - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Sections 3 & 8 – Share certificates of land – Interest in land includes things attached to the earth, such as walls or buildings – Holders of share certificates of the land are co-owners of the building built thereon – Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 – Section 5(3) – Definition of 'Landlord' – A co-owner of the building who is entitled to receive rent or receives rent on behalf of another falls squarely within the statutory definition of a 'landlord' and possesses the locus to maintain an eviction petition. [Paras 42-46] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496
Property Law / Land Revenue Records – Evidentiary value of mutation entries regarding possession – Held, while mutation entries alone do not create or transfer ownership rights, when such revenue records continue for many years, are supported by registered sale transactions, and remain unchallenged for a long period (a decade in the present case), they become relevant factors while considering possession and the conduct of the parties. [Paras 45 - 53] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529
Prosecution Subordinate Service Rules, 1978 (Rajasthan) — Rule 12 — Academic Qualification — Deletion of Proviso Allowing Final Year Students — Relevant Date for Eligibility — The Supreme Court held that the relevant date for determining the eligibility, including the minimum essential educational qualification, is the date of submission of the application pursuant to the recruitment advertisement, and not any subsequent stage prior to the examination or interview. Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Lavanshu Sankhla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2026 INSC 444
Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (Maharashtra) – Sections 2(c), 2(d) and 3 – Scope and Definition of "Deposit" and "Financial Establishment" – Transaction termed as a "loan" falling within the ambit of MPID Act – Distinction between IPC offences and MPID Act remedies - Held: The nomenclature given to a transaction is irrelevant. Even if a transaction of advancing money is treated or termed as a "loan", it satisfies the necessary attributes and ingredients to constitute a "deposit" within the wide amplitude of Section 2(c) of the MPID Act if it involves the receipt of money returnable after a specified period with or without interest - looking at the expansive definition under Section 2(d) of the Act, private individuals or entities accepting such money assume the character of a "Financial Establishment" - The machinery under the MPID Act and the criminal proceedings under the IPC operate in entirely distinct statutory fields - Merely because the appellants were unsuccessful in establishing offences under Sections 420, 409, and 405 of the IPC, it would not imply a legal embargo or bar against invoking the specific independent recourse provided under Section 3 of the MPID Act. [Relied on State of Maharashtra v. 63 Moons Technologies Ltd., (2022) 9 SCC 457; Paras 5-7] Alka Agrawal v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 507 : 2026 INSC 489
Public Employment — Doctrine of Estoppel/Acquiescence — Unemployed Candidate accepting Contractual Appointment under Economic Compulsion — The choices for the unemployed are few - Joining a post on a contractual basis and working for a considerable period does not estop the employee from challenging the patent illegality or arbitrariness in the selection procedure, nor does it wipe out the violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (Paras 6, 10 - 14) Lokendra Kumar Tiwari v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2026 INSC 487
Public Employment — Regularisation of Para-Teachers / Contractual Employees — Scheme-based appointments vs. Cadre posts — Para-teachers engaged on a contractual basis under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan ("SSA") sought blanket regularisation as permanent Assistant Teachers/Sahayak Acharyas bypassing the statutory recruitment rules — Held that a prayer for regularisation from a scheme post to a State cadre post changes the character of the appointment - A scheme post under the SSA is jointly funded and continues until the scheme ceases, whereas a cadre post is governed by Article 309 of the Constitution of India creating public employment via constitutionally aligned recruitment processes - A direct leap from one to the other, bypassing statutory rules, creates an unsanctioned mode of recruitment which is prohibited - Para-teachers have a right to participation and consideration under the statutory rules, but do not possess an absolute right to blanket regularisation. [Paras 19 - 21] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462
Public Tender — Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) — Permissibility of Fixed Deposit (FD) vs Demand Draft (DD) for out-of-state bidders — Interpretation of tender terms — Mandatory vs Directory - The High Court disqualified the appellant (an out-of-state bidder) on the ground that it submitted its EMD in the form of a Fixed Deposit (FD) instead of a Demand Draft (DD) - The High Court interpreted the relevant tender terms as rendering a DD strictly mandatory for out-of-state bidders - Reversing the High Court's view, the Supreme Court analyzed Clause 2.13 and Clause 2.15 of the Notice Inviting Tender - noted that Clause 2.13(a)(iv) permitted EMD submission via "Approved Interest Bearing Security", a character that a Fixed Deposit (FD) definitely possesses - Clause 2.13(b) and Clause 2.15 employed the permissive phrase "may submit" and "may" concerning the submission of a bank draft by out-of-state bidders – Held that the terms of the tender document clearly indicate that the requirement of providing a DD for out-of-state bidders was merely an option and not a mandatory condition - A Fixed Deposit issued by a scheduled bank in favor of the tendering authority satisfies the technical requirements of the EMD under the category of an "Approved Interest Bearing Security" - The High Court erred in invalidating the appellant's technical qualification. [Paras 7- 10] RR Constructions and Infrastructure v. Gayatri Ventures, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 530 : 2026 INSC 514
Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 – Rule 21A – Procedure for Deletion/Removal of Names – The safeguards of notice and hearing under Rule 21A are not violated by the SIR guidelines - While non-submission of the enumeration form results in provisional non-inclusion in the draft roll, final deletions are only made after the claims and objections stage, where the ERO conducts an enquiry, issues show-cause notices for doubtful cases, and passes speaking orders subject to a two-tier statutory appeal. Substance of due process is preserved. [Paras 136-142] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564
Rent Control and Eviction – Bona Fide Requirement and Comparative Hardship - Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 – Sections 13(1)(g), 13(1)(l), and 13(2) – Eviction suit filed by co-landlord – Landlord-tenant relationship – Acquisition of alternate accommodation by tenants – Temporary co-occupation of another portion of the building by the co-landlord during the pendency of the suit due to the death of a parent does not negate her bona fide need – Tenant cannot dictate to the landlord the suitability of the tenanted premises or insist on utilizing some other property – In assessing comparative hardship, the acquisition of alternative accommodation by the tenants shifts the balance in favor of the landlord – Selling alternative accommodation during the pendency of a suit to avoid eviction reflects a conduct that tilts relative hardship against the tenant. [Paras 51-53, 56 - 60] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496
Representation of the People Act, 1950 – Section 21(3) – Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 – Rule 21A – Constitution of India – Articles 324, 325, 326 & 327 – Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of Electoral Rolls – Power of the Election Commission of India (ECI) to conduct state-wide Special Intensive Revision – The expression "for any constituency or part of a constituency" in Section 21(3) of the RP Act includes "many" or "all" constituencies if state-wide reasons like rapid urbanization, migration, and duplication pollute the rolls - The non-obstante clause in Section 21(3) frees the Commission from the ordinary procedural limitations of Section 21(2), allowing it to shape the course of revision as it thinks fit, provided it records cogent reasons. [Paras 35 – 50] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564
Representation of the People Act, 1950 – Sections 16, 19 & 23(4) – Citizenship Act, 1955 – Section 9(2) – Scrutiny of Citizenship for Electoral Eligibility – The ECI is empowered to undertake a limited, prima facie enquiry into the citizenship status of an individual to satisfy itself of the baseline eligibility condition under Section 16 of the RP Act - There is a distinction between an administrative satisfaction for electoral purposes and a formal adjudication of status under the Citizenship Act - ECI's decision does not amount to a final declaration of non-citizenship - In cases of doubt, the ECI must refer the individuals to the Competent Authority under the Citizenship Act, 1955 for final adjudication within a reasonable timeframe - Aadhaar Card can be treated as a 12th identity document for registration under Section 23(4) of the RP Act but does not constitute proof of citizenship. [Paras 157-178] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 - Section 23(2) Provisos & Right to Quality Education — Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) is a mandatory eligibility requirement and a constitutional necessity flowing from Article 21-A of the Constitution of India - The statutory framework of Section 23 does not operate retrospectively to invalidate past appointments; instead, it provides a prospective, time-bound mechanism for in-service teachers to secure the minimum qualifications necessary to maintain elementary education standards - The services of teachers cannot be protected at the cost of the educational future of children. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 - Section 29(2)(f) – Curriculum and Evaluation Procedure – Medium of Instruction in Mother Tongue: Section 29(2)(f) is a key provision aimed at securing the delivery of quality education in a real and substantive sense - It proceeds on the well-established pedagogical premise that instruction imparted in the child's mother tongue or regional language significantly enhances comprehension and learning outcomes - Imparting education in an unfamiliar language impedes understanding, risks impairing foundational development, and engenders a sense of alienation or apprehension, thereby defeating the purpose of elementary education. [Paras 17 - 39] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 - Section 26(1) & Explanations 1 to 4 – Determination of Market Value – Applicability to National Highways Act, 1956 – The provisions of the 2013 LA Act relating to the determination of compensation are fully applicable to land acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 - The Arbitrator cannot determine the market value of an industrial land by placing reliance on a single sale deed relating to a small residential plot in an adjoining village - Under Section 26(1)(b) read with Explanations 1 and 2, the lands must be of a "similar type", and the methodology requires working out an "average sale price" from multiple deeds rather than relying on a singular transaction. [Paras 8 - 11] Project Director, National Highways Authority of India v. Alfa Remidis Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 494 : 2026 INSC 480
Right to Speedy Trial – Bail – Seriousness of Offence - Where an undertrial accused is incarcerated for a prolonged period and there is no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is infringed. In such cases, bail must be considered and ordinarily granted, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Sahil Manoj Machare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 456
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Implementation and Monitoring Framework - Noting persistent gaps and minimal compliance by various States and Union Territories nearly eight years after the enactment of the 2016 Act, the Supreme Court directed a structured assessment of its implementation - Following the appointment of Nodal Officers across almost all States/UTs, the Supreme Court entrusted the National Law Universities (NLUs) under "Project Ability Empowerment" to undertake a substantive, detailed evaluation of compliance with statutory mandates, institutional mechanisms, and accessibility measures - National Law University, Delhi was specifically directed to map the extent of compliance achieved by the Union of India, with a mandate for a Joint Secretary-rank officer from the Department of Social Justice and Empowerment to coordinate. [Paras 12 - 16] Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 464 : 2026 INSC 441
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Policy of "Own Merit" and Upward Movement of PwBD Candidates - The Supreme Court endorsed the policy framework of the Union of India (DoPT) regarding the adjustment and upward movement of Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD). A PwBD candidate selected on the basis of their own merit, without availing relaxed standards, must be adjusted against unreserved (UR) vacancies and not against the reserved quota - those who avail relaxed standards are to be adjusted against reserved vacancies - This principle applies to both direct recruitment and promotions (including seniority-cum-fitness and selection-based promotions) - Facilitative measures like the provision of a scribe or compensatory time do not constitute relaxed standards, whereas relaxations in cut-off marks, age, or number of attempts do - Disability itself shall not be treated as a relaxed standard in medical fitness tests for determining "own merit". [Paras 9, 10] Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 464 : 2026 INSC 441
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) — Ingredient of "in any place within public view" — Essentiality of public gaze — Sine qua non for constituting offences under the Act - To make out an offence under Section 3(1)(r) and/or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the occurrence of the incident and the act of hurling caste-based abuses must take place at "a place within public view" or within the public gaze - Even if the incident happens at a private place, the public must have access to notice what is happening to satisfy this requirement - A residential house cannot be considered "a place within public view" when the incident occurs within its four walls and no independent member of the public is present to witness it. [Paras 5 – 9] Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 484 : 2026 INSC 468
SEBI Circular dated 02.11.2001 – Client/Customer Level Position Limits – Mode of Calculation – Position limits under the 2001 SEBI Circular are applicable on the combined open positions across all derivative contracts on an underlying stock at an exchange - It is erroneous to calculate client-specific position limits or market concentration merely on the basis of a singular, specific one-month series (e.g., November futures series) instead of aggregating holdings across all series (including near-month, mid-month, and far-month futures along with options) of that underlying stock on the exchange. [Paragraphs 151 - 154] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585
SEBI Circular dated 02.11.2001 – Principle of "What cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly" – Principal-Agent Relationship and Position Limits – A client cannot circumvent the prescribed individual client-level position limits by splitting trades and appointing multiple independent entities/agents to open separate accounts for its sole benefit - Since the 2001 SEBI Circular creates an implicit duty to disclose trades that cross mandated thresholds, executing such aggregate transactions through a non-disclosed principal-agent arrangement violates the circular's disclosure requirements. [Relied on Firm of Pratapchand Nopaji v. Firm of Kotrike Venkatta Shetty, (1975) 2 SCC 208 and Jagir Singh v. Rambir Singh, AIR 1979 SC 381; Paras 139 - 140] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 – Regulation 2(1)(c), 3 and 4 – Definition and Proof of 'Fraud' and 'Market Manipulation' – Inducing another person to deal in securities remains a strict requirement for establishing fraud under Regulation 2(1)(c) - Where the respondent authority is unable to show or prove direct inducement or injury to third parties, a higher burden of proof is cast upon it to cogently and sufficiently establish the factum of price manipulation. In such cases, the standard of proof required is a higher degree of the preponderance of probabilities - Motives and suspicions alone cannot form the sole basis for holding that there was fraudulent intent. [Relied on SEBI v. Kanhaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel (2017) 15 SCC 1; SEBI v. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368; SEBI v. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd. (2018) 13 SCC 753; Paragraphs 175 - 207] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 – Regulations 3 and 4 – Hedging vs. Market Manipulation – Concentration of Open Interest – Concentration of positions or "cornering the market" by itself cannot be considered per se manipulation or a fraudulent device under the PFUTP Regulations if it is validly justified by the commercial consideration of hedging - Hedging includes anticipatory hedging to mitigate risk against potential price corrections - There is no legal mandate or policy requiring a perfect 1:1 ratio of hedges to stock quantity, nor was there any legal requirement in 2007 for a specific board resolution or a pre-existing written policy to execute equity derivatives hedges. [Relied on Pankaj Oil Mills v. CIT, 1976 SCC OnLine Guj 33; Paras 187 - 193] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585
Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 – Section 18A – Validity of Derivative Contracts Exceeding Position Limits – Section 18A of the SCRA nowhere mandates that a transgression of the client-level position limits specified by an Exchange or SEBI Circular will automatically have the effect of voiding or nullifying the underlying derivative contracts - Where the regulatory text prescribes explicit penalties (such as fines, suspension, or expulsion) but does not expressly mandate nullification as a consequence of a violation, courts cannot read a "void transaction" theory into the text by implication. [Paras 145 - 146] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585
Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Effect of Abnormal and Unexplained Delay - The Supreme Court reiterated that an unexplained and abnormal delay in the initiation and conclusion of disciplinary proceedings defeats justice and causes inherent prejudice to the delinquent employee - A government servant has a fundamental right to have disciplinary proceedings against them concluded expeditiously - Subjecting an employee to protracted proceedings without any fault on their part inflicts unnecessary mental agony and monetary loss - Supreme Court must balance the need for clean and honest administration against the seriousness of the disciplinary authority in pursuing the charges when determining if delayed proceedings should be terminated. [Relied on State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154; Para 30, 31] Abdur Rahman v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2026 INSC 550
Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Medical Ethics – Shift of Charges and Principles of Natural Justice – The appellant, a retired medical professor, faced a show-cause notice from the Medical Council of India (MCI) alleging that he had falsely appeared as faculty for inspection in two different medical colleges during the same academic year - The appellant successfully defended this charge by demonstrating that he was abroad during the second inspection - the Ethics Committee, acting on the directions of the Executive Committee, subsequently found the appellant guilty of a separate charge failing to disclose his previous appearance at another medical college within his declaration form - This alternative charge was never part of the original show-cause notice, and no opportunity for an explanation was given to the appellant regarding this omission - Held: The procedure adopted by the Executive Committee suffers from a serious flaw and amounts to a clear breach of the principles of natural justice - A disciplinary authority cannot punish a delinquent employee on a completely different or alternative charge that was not originally framed, without giving a fresh show-cause notice or providing a fair and reasonable opportunity to respond - Such an action constitutes a denial of a fair hearing. [Relied on Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 SCC Online SC 2192; Paras 12] Dr. Nigam Prakash Narain v. National Medical Commission, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 467 : 2026 INSC 453
Service Law — Imposition of Cost on Government Servant — Scope of Liability — A government servant cannot be penalized or made personally liable for heavy costs for adhering to a validly operating Government Order (G.O.) at the relevant point of time - An official following executive instructions limiting recruitment to sanctioned posts acts in accordance with the law, and subsequent retrospective changes or quashing of such instructions by a court cannot fasten adverse liability on them. [Para 6] C. Poorna Chandran v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 508
Service Law — Model Employer — Principle of Approbate and Reprobate - The State repeatedly gave solemn undertakings before the High Court to frame a policy to regularize the left-out eligible workers, but subsequently resiled by citing Umadevi as a legal embargo and issuing a restrictive Office Memorandum in 2012 - Held, the State, as a model employer, bears a heightened constitutional obligation to act with probity, fairness, candor, and consistency - It cannot constantly give undertakings before a constitutional court and then resile from them on narrow technical grounds - The State cannot invoke the principle of approbate and reprobate to avoid its obligations. [Paras 37, 66 – 72] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523
Service Law — Moulding of Relief — Regularisation with Retrospective Seniority but without Backwages —Supreme Court directed the Institute to issue a regular appointment letter to the appellant within four weeks, placing him as the last candidate in the seniority list of Assistant Professors appointed through the same selection process, granting continuity of service but without any financial or monetary benefits for the past period. (Para 14) Lokendra Kumar Tiwari v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2026 INSC 487
Service Law – Promotion vs. Selection Post – Restructuring of Cadre and Framing of Rules under Article 309 – Vested Right to Promotion – Supercession of Executive Instructions: The respondents, serving as Assistant Section Officers, sought directions for the curation of a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) to consider their promotion to the post of Assistant Regional Transport Officer (ARTO) based on Executive Instructions dated 17.11.1981 - the State restructured the cadre, making the Government the appointing authority, and subsequently framed the Odisha Transport Service (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution - The 2021 Rules mandated filling the ARTO posts through a competitive examination conducted by the OPSC - The High Court directed the State to convene the DPC under the old Executive Instructions, holding that the vacancies arose prior to the new rules and that the pending recommendation for a DPC was saved from supersession - Allowing the appeals of the State, the Supreme Court held – i. An employee does not possess a vested right or a legitimate expectation to be promoted - The limited right available is only for the consideration of candidacy in accordance with the "rule in force" as on the date the consideration takes place; ii. There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must necessarily be filled on the basis of the law/rules that existed on the date when they arose - The Government is fully entitled to take a conscious policy decision not to fill up existing vacancies prior to the amendment or framing of new rules, especially when a restructuring of the cadre is intended for efficient administration; iii. Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India strictly supersede any prior departmental executive instructions, circulars, or memoranda; iv. The savings clause in the 2021 Rules exempting "things done or omitted to be done" cannot save a mere inter-departmental letter or recommendation to convene a DPC, as it does not constitute a completed or concluded act under the old instructions; v. Furthermore, the post of ARTO was a selection post and not a promotional post - Ranking or position in a gradation list does not confer an automatic right to promotion to a selection post where merit and policy-driven selection methods govern - The method of selection is a matter of policy vesting entirely with the Government. [Relied on State of H.P. v. Raj Kumar, (2023) 3 SCC 773; Union of India v. Somasundaram Viswanath, (1989) 1 SCC 175; Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910; Paras 13-28] State of Odisha v. Sreepati Ranjan Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 514 : 2026 INSC 505
Service Law — Regularization — Scope of Umadevi Judgment - The State contended that post the decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, no regularization can be effected for employees not initially appointed against duly sanctioned posts - Held, Umadevi cannot be invoked as a blanket barrier or a mechanical shield to justify prolonged, exploitative engagements of a temporary/ad-hoc nature where employees have continuously performed perennial, essential, and recurring functions of the State for decades -Distinction between "illegal" and "irregular" appointments must be maintained. Long and continuous service is a highly relevant consideration. [Paras 73 – 76] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523
Service Law – Selection Process – Appointment – Indefeasible Right – Preservation of Records – Adverse Inference - No Indefeasible Right to Appointment - The State or its instrumentalities, while filling vacancies, are obligated to adhere to the principle of comparative merit based on performance - It is well-settled law that even if a candidate's name appears in a select list, they do not acquire an indefeasible right to appointment in the absence of a specific rule entitling them to such appointment - Where neither the recruitment rules nor the advertisement prescribed a duration for preserving selection records, the non-production or destruction of records after the finalization of appointments cannot be deemed mala fide - Mere non-production of examination records does not justify drawing an inference that the candidates had cleared the written test, especially when there is no material on record to indicate they had passed - A direction for appointment cannot be granted when the qualifications for the advertised post have subsequently been revised by the employer. [Relied on Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Dilbagh Singh & Ors., (1993) 1 SCC 15; Mohd. Rashid v. Director, Local Bodies, New Secretariat & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 582 [Para 13]; State of Manipur & Anr. v. Takhelmayum Khelendro Meitei & Ors., (2019) 3 SCC 331; Para 13-18] Durgapur Steel Plant v. Bidhan Chandra Chowdhury, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 481 : 2026 INSC 459
Service Law – Seniority and Promotion – Merger of Cadres – Interference by Court after long efflux of time –Dispute regarding inter se seniority between employees of the Engineering Department and the merged Town Planning Department of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation. G.O. (Ms.) No. 237 dated 26.09.1996 prescribed that Assistant Engineers transferred from the Town Planning Department were to be placed below the existing Assistant Engineers of the Engineering and Water Supply Department - The Government issued G.O. (D) No. 19 dated 18.01.2005 granting notional promotion to the Appellant (from the Engineering Department) with effect from 14.04.1997 and placing him above the redesignated Town Planning Inspectors - Challenged by Respondent No. 1 after a lapse of nearly two decades - The Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside G.O. (D) No. 19 long after the retirement of Respondent No. 1 and without noticing that a Three-Member Committee had previously scrutinized the promotions and found no illegality - both parties had already been promoted to higher posts subsequently, leaving no surviving contest - Interventions by third parties at the Supreme Court stage rejected as they were "fence-sitters" agitating stale claims. Impugned judgment set aside and G.O. (D) No. 19 restored. [Paras 16 - 26] T. Gnanavel v. R. Sasipriya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : 2026 INSC 446
Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 28 — Execution of Decree for Specific Performance — Conditional Decree — Deemed Dismissal upon Default - Whether a decree of specific performance becomes inexecutable if the plaintiff-decree holder fails to deposit the balance sale consideration within the time stipulated by the Court - Held: Yes, A decree passed in a suit for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree, and the Court retains control over it until the sale deed is executed or the decree is rendered inexecutable - If a conditional decree directs the execution of a sale deed subject to the deposit of the balance sale consideration within a specified period, the obligation is reciprocal - Non-compliance with the condition to deposit the amount within the stipulated time without applying for an extension within that period leads to the automatic dismissal of the suit - Supreme Court rejected the contention that subsequent permission by the Executing Court to deposit the money after the expiry of the period amounts to a "deemed extension" or condonation of delay - Once the time limit expires without compliance or an extension application, the decree ceases to exist in the eyes of the law and becomes completely inexecutable. Habban Shah v. Sheruddin, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 466 : 2026 INSC 451
Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 28 — Necessity of Formal Application for Rescission of Contract - Is it mandatory for the judgment-debtor to file a formal application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act to rescind the contract before objecting to the executability of a defaulted decree? - Held: No, moving an application under Section 28 of the Act for rescinding the contract due to non-compliance is optional and immaterial - The failure of the judgment-debtor to seek formal rescission does not revive a decree that has already become inexecutable due to a default in payment - Supreme Court in given circumstances is not powerless to treat the contract as rescinded for non-compliance with the condition. [Relied on P.R. Yelumalai v. N.M. Ravi (2015) 9 SCC 52; Prem Jeevan v. K.S. Venkata Raman and Another (2017) 11 SCC 57; Balbir Singh and Another v. Baldev Singh (Dead) Through LRs and Others (2025) 3 SCC 543; N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and Others (1995) 5 SCC 115; Paras 22-50] Habban Shah v. Sheruddin, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 466 : 2026 INSC 451
Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 28 — Exercise of Discretion — While considering applications for rescission or extension of time, the Court must adopt a justice-oriented approach and balance equities - The test is whether the decree-holder's conduct amounts to a "positive refusal" or "willful negligence" to perform their part - Delay in deposit need not be explained with the same rigor as an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act – Supreme Court may compensate the judgment-debtor for the delay by imposing additional terms or costs on the decree-holder - The doctrine of merger applies only when a higher forum passes an order on merits - An order dismissing an appeal for non-prosecution (default) is specifically excluded from the definition of a "decree" under Section 2(2) of the CPC and does not result in the merger of the Trial Court's decree with the Appellate Court's order - An application under Section 28 should be treated as an application in the original suit and numbered as an interlocutory application, even if filed before the Execution Court (provided it is the court of first instance). [Relied on Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara, (1994) 2 SCC 642; Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 584; Sardar Mohar Singh v. Mangilal, (1997) 9 SCC 217; Paras 25-38] Anand Narayan Shukla v Jagat Dhari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 477 : 2026 INSC 463
Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 28 — Extension of Time and Rescission of Contract — A decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree - Supreme Court does not become functus officio after passing the decree and retains jurisdiction until the sale deed is executed - Under Section 28, the Court has discretionary power to either rescind the contract or extend the time for deposit of purchase money - There is no automatic rescission of the decree for non-payment within the stipulated period unless the decree specifically provides that the suit shall stand dismissed upon such failure. Anand Narayan Shukla v Jagat Dhari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 477 : 2026 INSC 463
Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Adherence to SOPs & Extension to Public Spaces - Strict compliance with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued by the Animal Welfare Board of India (AWBI) on 27th November, 2025 is mandatory - Competent authorities must make informed decisions on extending these safety protocols to other high-footfall areas like religious sites, public parks, and tourist locations - Universal availability of anti-rabies vaccines and immunoglobulin must be ensured across all Government medical and healthcare facilities - The National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) cannot divest itself of road safety obligations by citing dependence on local state machinery - NHAI must proactively deploy specialized transport vehicles and create holding facilities to safely handle and relocate stray cattle/animals from National Highways and Expressways - In areas where canine populations are highly aggressive and pose an active, continuing hazard to public safety, authorities are legally permitted to carry out euthanasia for rabid, incurably ill, or demonstrably dangerous dogs, strictly in accordance with the protocols of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and the ABC Rules, 2023. [Paras 83 - 108] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 - Rule 7(2) & Rule 11(19) — Classification of Street Dogs and Mandate of Re-release — Inapplicability to Institutional and Restricted-Access Premises - Held, a harmonious and purposive construction of the ABC Rules, 2023, read with the parent Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, does not support the proposition that stray dogs possess an absolute right to occupy or remain within all categories of spaces - Rule 7(2), which includes a "gated campus" within the classification of street dogs, is merely descriptive for the purpose of canine population regulation - It cannot be expansively construed to legitimize or perpetuate the presence of stray dogs in sensitive, high-risk, and controlled-access environments such as schools, colleges, hospitals, sports complexes, airports, and railway stations - Such premises are functionally required to maintain a sterile, secure, and hygienic environment to safeguard vulnerable populations like children, patients, and the elderly - Therefore, stray dogs captured from these institutional areas are ineligible for re-release into the same locations under Rule 11(19) - The directions issued in the order dated 7th November, 2025, banning their re-release into such institutional precincts, are valid and consistent with the statutory framework. [Paras 41–43, 48–49, 75] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Constitution of India - Article 142 — Plenary Power to Do Complete Justice — Scope and Limits: Reaffirmed, the jurisdiction under Article 142 is expansive but tempered by self-imposed restraints founded on fundamental public policy - It cannot be invoked to "supplant" substantive law or disregard express statutory provisions rooted in fundamental public policy considerations - it retains wide discretion to mould relief, bridge gaps, and address situations in nebulous areas where the law is silent or inadequate, provided it does not contravene a core, non-derogable principle of a statute - issuing directions to protect sensitive institutional areas from stray dogs does not override or contravene the statutory scheme, but supplements, clarifies, and operationalizes it. [Relied on: Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409; and Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Paras 50–54, 62 - 75] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 — Right to Life and Personal Safety —Held, the fundamental right to live with dignity under Article 21 encompasses the right of every citizen to move freely and access public spaces without living under constant apprehension of physical harm, attack, or exposure to life-threatening events like dog bites - While animal welfare and protection of sentient beings are of high constitutional and moral significance, they cannot eclipse or subordinate the paramount obligation of the State to safeguard human life, bodily integrity, and public safety - When human lives are weighed against the interests of sentient beings, the constitutional balance must unequivocally tilt in favor of the preservation and protection of human life. (Paras 31, 99, 101) In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Engagement of NGOs — Due Diligence and Financial Accountability - While observing that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can play a constructive role in executing the Capture-Sterilize-Vaccinate-Release (CSVR) model to ease the burden on local bodies, judicial notice was taken of instances where fraudulent or repetitive bills were submitted for monetary gain - Held, municipal authorities must undertake rigorous background checks, verify credentials, and evaluate technical capability and financial integrity before awarding contracts to NGOs - Public funds must be protected through continuous supervision, periodic field inspections, and independent financial/performance audits. [Paras 65–67] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Judicial Oversight & Continuing Mandamus - Decentralization of Monitoring to High Courts - Recognizing that day-to-day compliance monitoring on a pan-India scale is administratively burdensome and that local issues require grassroots supervision, the Supreme Court decentralized the oversight mechanism - All High Courts directed to register a suo moto writ petition titled “In Re: Compliance with the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No(s). 5 of 2025” as a continuing mandamus - High Courts are fully empowered to monitor field compliance, tailor directions to suit regional exigencies without diluting their intent, and initiate contempt or disciplinary proceedings against erring municipal or state officials for deliberate non-compliance - Updated compliance affidavits by Chief Secretaries and relevant authorities are to be filed before the respective High Courts on or before 7th August, 2026 - States/UTs must systematically expand sterilization and vaccination capacities and establish at least one fully functional, well-equipped Animal Birth Control Centre in each district, scaling up based on local population densities. [Paras 110–111] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 - Section 2(i) — Definition of "Street" — Interpretation of "Same Place or Locality" for Re-release - Held, the definition of "street" under Section 2(i) of the parent Act expressly limits the expression to public spaces such as ways, roads, lanes, or open spaces to which the public has access - This definition must guide and inform the interpretation of subordinate rules - the expression "same place or locality" used for the re-release of dogs cannot be interpreted in an unbound manner to include private premises, controlled-access spaces, or sensitive institutional campuses. [Paras 44 - 48] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Protection of Officials Acting in Good Faith - Held, all officers and officials of municipal authorities, local bodies, Panchayati Raj institutions, and autonomous bodies/schools/hospitals tasked with executing the Court's directions shall be entitled to due protection for acts performed in good faith - No FIR, criminal complaint, or coercive proceeding shall ordinarily be initiated against them unless a prima facie case of mala fides or gross abuse of authority is established. [Para 108] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Tortious Liability & Administrative Accountability - Stray Dog Management — Assumption of Responsibility by Animal Welfare Groups and Institutional Heads - Held, the assertion of rights or interests in favor of protecting and feeding stray dogs cannot operate in isolation from the corresponding responsibility to safeguard human safety - It is mandatory for animal welfare groups, associations, or student-led bodies operating within educational or institutional campuses to file an affidavit undertaking express tortious liability for any incident of dog bites or attacks occurring within the premises - If no such undertaking is filed, no activity of maintaining or feeding stray dogs shall be permitted within the campus - Failure to enforce this will entail suitable action against the Head of the Institution concerned. [Paras 71–74] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Succession – Applicability of Personal Law of Succession – Held, properties declared as personal private properties by an erstwhile ruler lose their sovereign character upon merger and are treated as the ordinary property of a private citizen – Succession to such private ancestral properties must be governed by the personal law applicable to the ruler (Hindu Mitakshara Law/Hindu Succession Act, 1956) and not by custom or the rule of primogeniture. [Paras 62 – 65] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571
Succession - Exclusion of Natural Heirs – Whether the exclusion of natural heirs amounts to a suspicious circumstance – The primary objective of executing a Will is to alter the natural line of succession - Mere deprivation or exclusion of natural heirs, by itself, is legally insufficient to construe a circumstance as suspicious or to invalidate a Will outright - Prudence requires an indication of the testator's mind regarding the disposition; however, where the terms of the Will explicitly state that sufficient provisions or properties have already been provided to the spouse and children during the testator's lifetime, such exclusion cannot vitiate the validity of the Will. [Paras 32 - 34] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521
Succession – Exemption under Section 5(ii) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Scope – The exemption from the Act under Section 5(ii) applies only to estates which descend to a single heir by the terms of a covenant – Where succession opened in 1949 (prior to the enforcement of the Act) upon the demise of the ruler, the properties had already vested under the ordinary law in force – Since the merger covenant guaranteed the custom of single-heir descent only for the Gaddi and not for private property, Section 5(ii) cannot be invoked to shield private properties from ordinary personal law. [Paras 70-79] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571
Succession – Precedential Value and Judicial Discipline – Conflicting benches – The Division Bench decision in Trijugi Narain v. Sankoo (2019), which held that private properties continue to devolve by the rule of primogeniture, incorrectly restricted the Three-Judge Bench decision in Talat Fatima Hasan (2020) to Muslim Personal Law – The core ratio of Talat Fatima Hasan is that the rule of primogeniture is excluded for private properties upon the cessation of sovereignty, regardless of whether the personal law is Hindu or Muslim – As a matter of judicial discipline, a Division Bench decision cannot override the explicit ratios laid down by the Three-Judge Benches in the Travancore case (1993), Rampur case (2020), and Faridkot case (2022). [Relied on Revathinnal Balagopala Varma v. His Highness Padmanabha Dasa Bala Rama Varma (Travancore Case), 1993 Supp (1) SCC 233; Talat Fatima Hasan v. Syed Murtaza Ali Khan (Rampur Case), (2020) 15 SCC 655; Kunwar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India (Dholpur Case), (1969) 3 SCC 150; Maharani Deepinder Kaur v. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur (Faridkot Case), (2022) 9 SCC 658; Paras 73-94] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571
Succession Act, 1925 - Inherent and Plenary Powers of Constitutional Court — Testamentary Jurisdiction — Protection of Estate in medio — held that a High Court, while sitting in its testamentary jurisdiction, does not cease to be a Constitutional Court of Record or a Court of Equity - When an estate is brought under the protective umbrella of the Court through the appointment of an Administrator pendente lite under Section 247 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, it is in custodia legis – If the Supreme Court discovers glaring irregularities, deceit, suppression of bank accounts, or siphoning of funds by a self-styled executor using shell or dormant trusts, it cannot remain a silent spectator - It is entirely within the inherent and plenary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India to direct a police investigation to unearth the fraud, safeguard the property, and protect the process of the Court from abuse - Key Takeaways & Statutory Interpretations – i. Indian Succession Act, 1925 — Sections 211, 247 & 307 — Authority of Executor vs. Administrator pendente lite - While an executor derives authority from the Will, such authority is not a license to plunder cash assets when rival Wills are propounded and the matter is fiercely contested - The appointment of an Administrator pendente lite under Section 247 suspends the powers of the executor, making the Administrator the "hand of the court" to preserve and maintain the estate; ii. The Succession Act is Not a Bar to Criminal Investigation - The Indian Succession Act governs the administration of estates but does not grant immunity to individuals committing criminal breach of trust, forgery, or conspiracy; iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 340 - Directing a criminal investigation into a larger conspiracy of siphoning funds through fraudulent banking transactions does not strictly fall under Section 340 of the CrPC (which deals with offences affecting the administration of justice) - broader inherent powers can be exercised without being strictly shackled by the procedural bars or appellate restrictions under Section 341 of the CrPC – iv. No Prejudice Caused by Investigation - Mere initiation of an investigation to uncover the truth and assist the Testamentary Court in tracing siphoned assets does not infringe upon personal liberty or cause actual or substantive prejudice. [Relied on Paras M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd., 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433; Anthony C. Leo v. Nandlal Bal Krishnan, (1996) 11 SCC 376; Pandurang Shamrao Laud v. Dwarkadas Kalliandas, 1932 SCC OnLine Bom 154; Paras 28-43] Bai Avabai Hormusji Tata Trust v. Shernaz Faroukh Lawyer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 542 : 2026 INSC 540
Town Planning - Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 – Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 – Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 – Property Tax vs. Service Charges – Exemption from Municipal Taxation - Territorial Jurisdiction of Municipal Corporation over Industrial Areas - the Trans Thane Creek (TTC) Industrial Area developed by the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) falls within the notified municipal limits of the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation (NMMC) - The revenue jurisdiction of the villages remains unaffected by their vesting with the MIDC for development - The power to impose and collect property tax (which includes water tax, sewerage tax, general tax, etc.) vests exclusively with the Municipal Corporation under Sections 127 and 128A of the MMC Act - the MIDC is only empowered under Section 17 of the MID Act to levy fees or service charges to cover its maintenance expenses - A fee/service charge linked to a specific amenity involves the element of quid pro quo and cannot be equated to a tax - the NMMC has the authority to levy property tax even if plot holders pay service charges to the MIDC. [Paras 58 – 69, 73-89] Arjun Dass v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 569 : 2026 INSC 592
Town Planning - Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 – Section 126(1)(b) – Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991 – Regulation 34 & Appendix VII-A – Acquisition of Reserved Land – Grant of Additional Transferable Development Rights (TDR) / Floor Space Index (FSI) for Development of Amenity - The Landowner surrendered land reserved for a 'garden' and developed the amenity at its own cost as per Municipal specifications - The Appellant-Corporation released TDR for the bare land but rejected the claim for additional amenity TDR, citing an Letter of Intent (LOI), a registered Undertaking, and a Maintenance Agreement wherein the Landowner had agreed not to claim amenity TDR in exchange for maintaining the garden on an "adoption basis" for 20 years – Held that Statutory compensation under Section 126(1)(b) is two-fold - (i) FSI/TDR equal to the area of land surrendered, and (ii) additional FSI/TDR against the development/construction of the amenity - Once statutory compensation is ordained, the executive cannot impose extra-statutory conditions or contract out of the statute via negotiations to derogate from the landowner's rights - There is an inherent imbalance of bargaining power between the acquiring authority and the landowner - The condition in the LOI, Undertaking, and Maintenance Agreement forcing the landowner to abjure a part of statutory compensation is invalid - Granting maintenance rights on an adoption basis is independent of the statutory right to acquisition compensation and cannot substitute it. [Paras 43 - 49, 51 - 56] Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation v. Vijay Nagar Apartments, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 523 : 2026 INSC 517
Town Planning - Scope of Exemption Under Clause 7(1) of the First Schedule, MRTP Act - The statutory exemption from property tax provided under Clause 7(1) of the First Schedule of the MRTP Act applies not only to the MIDC itself but extends to all individual unit/plot holders occupying lands vesting in the MIDC - Restricting this exemption solely to the authority would render the provision otiose and absurd - This tax exemption is conditional and remains operational only so long as the industrial authority continues to provide the municipal amenities - Once the maintenance and infrastructure responsibilities are transferred to the Municipal Corporation (as done via the MoU/Agreement dated 01.12.2005 between MIDC and NMMC), the exemption ceases to exist - the NMMC is fully empowered to collect property tax from the plot holders from the date of such transfer. [Relied on Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, (1954) 1 SCC 412; Corporation of Calcutta and Anr. v. Liberty Cinema, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 65; Sreenivasa General Traders and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., (1983) 4 SCC 353; Government of Kerala and Another v. Mother Superior Adoration Convent, (2021) 5 SCC 602; Paras 97 – 105] Arjun Dass v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 569 : 2026 INSC 592
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Section 43-D(5) — Constitution of India — Article 21 — Bail — Prolonged Incarceration — Judicial Discipline — Binding Nature of Precedents — Grant of bail to an undertrial prisoner facing charges under the UAPA and the NDPS Act on the ground of prolonged incarceration and gross delay in the trial - The appellant was in custody for over 5 years and 11 months with more than 350 prosecution witnesses remaining to be examined - Restrictive statutory provisions under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA do not oust the jurisdiction of constitutional courts to grant bail where an undertrial's fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 has been infringed - The rigors of statutory bail restrictions "melt down" when there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone is substantial - The legislative intent cannot invert the core constitutional relationship between personal liberty and detention - Even under stringent special statutes like the UAPA, "bail is the rule and jail is the exception". Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2026 INSC 503
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 10(a)(i), 10(a)(iv) and 38(1) – Criminal Conspiracy – Mistaken Identity – Appreciation of Evidence – Material Improvements – Test Identification Parade (TIP) – Conduct of Accused - Glaring contradictions, material improvements, and lack of Test Identification Parade (TIP) render the prosecution's identification of the accused wholly doubtful – Consequent conviction based on flawed identification cannot be sustained - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of a Sri Lankan national convicted for offences under the UAP Act, 1967, the IPC, the Poisons Act, 1919, the Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Passport Act, 1967 - The prosecution alleged that the appellant was the absconding accused named "Sri" (A-5) who had conspired to rejuvenate the banned LTTE organization by supplying cyanide capsules and equipment - The appellant maintained a consistent defense of mistaken identity, asserting his true identity as "Ranjan." - Key Principles Established by the Supreme Court – i. Material Improvements in Testimony Deconstruct Credibility - The star prosecution witnesses (PW-8 and PW-9) introduced the appellant's name ("Ranjan") as an alias for the absconding accused ("Sri") for the very first time during the current trial - Their complete silence on this aspect during the investigation and previous split-up trials of co-accused constitutes a substantive and material improvement that severely dents their credibility - Such deep-rooted improvements cannot be brushed aside as inconsequential lapses of memory; ii. Inapplicability of the Abuthagir Principle to Improvements - The principle that a mere belated disclosure of a fact by a witness cannot solely discard their testimony applies strictly to a delay in the examination of witnesses during investigation. It cannot be extended to cover cases featuring substantive material improvements over distinct prior judicial depositions; iii. Absence of Corroborative Material and TIP - Where the identity of an accused is heavily disputed and the accused is tied to an alias post-arrest, the absence of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) combined with a complete lack of contemporaneous official or police records linking the two identities prior to the arrest invalidates the identification process; iv. Inconsistency of Innocent Conduct with Absconding Status - The open residence of the appellant at a registered refugee address for years and his active engagement with a foreign embassy to secure a visa and local police clearance are wholly inconsistent with the behaviour of an absconding accused fleeing a serious UAPA charge. [Relied on Vishwanatha v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 482; Para 47 – 61] Sri v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 521 : 2026 INSC 516