Administration of Justice — Untraceable / Unverified Claimants — Protection of Underlying Entitlements - While administrative verification exercises cannot remain open indefinitely, the closure of verification exercises does not extinguish substantive underlying claims - Untraced employees or their legal heirs granted 12 months' liberty to submit documentation before designated...
Administration of Justice — Untraceable / Unverified Claimants — Protection of Underlying Entitlements - While administrative verification exercises cannot remain open indefinitely, the closure of verification exercises does not extinguish substantive underlying claims - Untraced employees or their legal heirs granted 12 months' liberty to submit documentation before designated Nodal Officers for verification and disbursal - States directed to publish verified/pending lists transparently on public websites. [Relied on Arcot Textile Mills Ltd. v. Regl. Provident Fund Commissioner & Ors., (2013) 16 SCC 1; Central Bank of India v. Ravindra & Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 367; Referred to Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar, (2003) 6 SCC 1; Paras 34-59] Bihar State Ardh Sarkari Arajpati Karamchari Maha Sangh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 995 : 2026 INSC 1061
Administrative Law — Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate — Consistency of conduct - A bidder who has acquiesced in being declared technically non-responsive on an identical experience clause by other statutory authorities under the same parent board cannot approbate and reprobate by advancing a contradictory interpretation to claim eligibility before another authority. [Paras 31-33] Micky Traders v. L.R.Y. Labour Contractor, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 971 : 2026 INSC 1025
Administrative Law — Precedents & Internal Departmental Notings — Legal Efficacy - Internal Departmental File Notings — Held - Departmental file notings do not carry the sanction of law to become an executable order - A noting recorded by an officer (such as the Executive Director / LAD of SEBI) represents mere internal viewpoints/opinions expressed for internal deliberations and does not constitute a final binding adjudication or confer legal rights/immunities upon an assessee/noticee. [Relied On: M/s Sethi Auto Service Station & Anr. v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 180; Paras 26–28] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Vedanta Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 919 : 2026 INSC 978
Administrative Law & Judicial Discipline – Subsistence of Interim Judicial Direction vs. Subsequent Executive Action - An executive authority cannot, during the subsistence of an operative interim direction issued by a constitutional court granting provisional permission, render that direction ineffective or redundant by passing an administrative order inconsistent with it - If the authorities find compliance impracticable or contrary to rules, the appropriate course is to approach the court for modification, clarification, or stay. [Paras 25, 26] Indian Kayaking and Canoeing Association v. Union Territory of J&K, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 922 : 2026 INSC 981
Administrative Law & Revenue Jurisprudence — Revisional Power to be Exercised within Reasonable Time — Doctrine of Stale Claims - Even where an enactment does not explicitly prescribe a period of limitation for the exercise of suo motu revisional power, such power must be exercised within a "reasonable time" - Factors such as the nature of the statute, accrued rights/liabilities, prejudice caused, and the creation of third-party interests must be weighed - Public interest demands that authorities do not reopen settled, stale matters - Where the statute affirmatively specifies a 3-year outer limit, initiating an inquiry after 35–40 years and after third-party apartment owners have acquired rights is without statutory mooring and void at its very inception. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, (1969) 2 SCC 187; Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan and Others, (2023) 2 SCC 643; Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak and Others, (1984) 1 SCC 125; Government of India v. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras, and Others, (1989) 3 SCC 483; State of Orissa and Others v. Brundaban Sharma and Another, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 249; State of Punjab and Others v. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd., (2007) 11 SCC 363; Paras 14-16] M.R.R. Setty (Dead), by LRs Versus Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 889 : 2026 INSC 944
Administrative Law & Service Law – Deputation / NOC for National Sports Assignments – Exercise of Administrative Discretion – Article 14 of the Constitution – Duty of Timely Consideration - Although a government employee or a borrowing sports federation does not possess an absolute or vested right to claim deputation, relieving, or foreign travel permission, the absence of an absolute right cannot be equated with the absence of a right to a fair, reasonable, non-arbitrary, and timely consideration of a request - Administrative discretion must be exercised on relevant considerations, excluding extraneous ones, and within a reasonable timeframe - Where an assignment involves representing or coaching the Indian National Team at time-sensitive international events (such as the Asian Games or World Cups), delay itself defeats the object of the power exercised - A belated rejection order passed after an international event has already concluded cannot retrospectively cure prolonged executive inaction. [Paras 21–32] Indian Kayaking and Canoeing Association v. Union Territory of J&K, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 922 : 2026 INSC 981
Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017 — Section 5(1)(b) read with Section 5(2) — Sister-Ship Arrest — Twin Jurisdictional Requirements - For a valid sister-ship arrest in rem under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(b), the claimant must establish that - (i) the demise charterer of the vessel at the time the maritime claim arose is liable for the claim; and (ii) such person continues to be the demise charterer (or owner) of the arrested vessel at the time the arrest is effected - If the bareboat charterparty stood validly terminated prior to the date of arrest, the entity ceases to be the demise charterer, displacing the statutory foundation for an arrest in rem under Section 5(1)(b). [Paras 30 - 44] Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. Nereus Progress v. Om Freight Forwarders Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 991 : 2026 INSC 1055
Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017 — Bareboat Charterparty (BIMCO BARECON 2017) — Clauses 31 & 32 — Termination vs. Repossession — Status as Gratuitous Bailee - A validly issued notice of contractual termination (under Clause 31 for non-payment of hire following anti-technicality grace periods) operates of its own force to bring the demise charter to an end - Physical repossession is not a condition precedent to termination; it is merely the consequential practical mechanism by which the owner recovers physical control - Under Clause 32 of BIMCO BARECON 2017, pending physical repossession, the charterer holds the vessel strictly as a "gratuitous bailee only to the Owners" - An entity cannot simultaneously be a 'demise charterer' (exercising full commercial dominion and control) and a 'gratuitous bailee' (holding property without user rights) - Because the demise charter had terminated and the charterer was holding the vessel merely as a gratuitous bailee prior to the date of the arrest order, the vessel was not liable to arrest under Section 5(1)(b). [Paras 20 - 45] Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. Nereus Progress v. Om Freight Forwarders Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 991 : 2026 INSC 1055
Arbitration — Interpretation of Negative Interest Clause — Clause 54 of NEEPCO GCC — State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra distinguished - Clause 54 of the GCC provided: "No claims for interest or damages will be entertained by the Corporation with respect to any money or balance which may be lying with the Corporation owing to any dispute, OR with respect to any delay on the part of the Engineer-in-Charge making periodical or final payments or in any other respect whatsoever - The clause construed in State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra and Co., (1999) 1 SCC 63, operated only where money was withheld owing to a dispute in making payments, and did not bar interest where money was simply delayed without any dispute - Clause 54 creates two distinct, disjunctive categories joined by "or" - (i) money withheld due to a dispute, and (ii) any delay in making payments standing independently on its own - Because delay in payment is expressly made an independent ground, Clause 54 operates as a complete contractual prohibition against the grant of pre-reference interest, aligning squarely with Sayeed Ahmed & Co. v. State of U.P. and THDC-II - The arbitral award granting pre-reference interest was contrary to Section 31(7)(a) and exceeded jurisdiction - the High Court's order restoring pre-reference interest set aside. [Relied on Sayeed Ahmed & Co. v. State of U.P., (2009) 12 SCC 26; Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. v. Tehri Hydro Development Corpn. (India) Ltd. (THDC-II), (2019) 17 SCC 786; Pam Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, (2024) 10 SCC 715; Distinguished from State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra and Co., (1999) 1 SCC 63; Paras 16 - 23] North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd. (NEEPCO) v. Astra Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 980 : 2026 INSC 1036
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Asymmetry in Handling Court Deposits & Reference to Law Commission - Highlighting severe disparities and lack of uniform rules across various High Courts regarding court deposits, registry investments, and the time value of money, the Supreme Court requested the Law Commission of India to study global frameworks (such as the US Court Registry Investment System [CRIS] and the Canadian Consolidated Revenue Fund model), consult the RBI, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Law & Justice, and propose comprehensive legislation. [Relied on Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 457; Delhi Development Authority v. Bhai Sardar Singh & Sons, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1450; Nepa Ltd. v. Manoj Kumar Agrawal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1736; DLF Limited & Anr. v. Koncar Generators & Motors Limited, (2025) 1 SCC 343; Paras 27–46] National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. National Agro Seed Corporation (India), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 958 : 2026 INSC 1017
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Conditional Withdrawal Does Not Halt Interest: Where the award-debtor resists the release of deposited funds, or where the court permits withdrawal only upon furnishing security (such as title deeds), the deposit does not constitute satisfaction of the award under Order XXI Rule 1 - liability to pay interest continues to run until the date the awarded funds are unconditionally made available to the award-holder – i. Distillation of Principles Govering Interest on Court Deposits - The Supreme Court synthesized nine binding principles governing interest liability during deposit in court - (i) The 1996 Act incorporates CPC principles for enforcement under Section 36; (ii) Court must have regard to CPC provisions on money decree stays when staying an award [Section 36(3)]; (iii) Deposit merely places money beyond reach of the parties; (iv) Deposit must be unconditional and freely withdrawable; (v) Withdrawal permitted only against security is not payment in satisfaction of the decree; (vi) If deposit is non-compliant with Order XXI Rule 1, interest continues to run; (vii) Failure by the decree-holder to seek withdrawal when funds are freely available amounts to deemed refusal, stopping interest; (viii) If deposited sums are placed in a fixed deposit at the decree-holder's instance, only FD interest accrues; (ix) Partial unconditional deposit arrests interest only pro tanto on the deposited component. [Paras 21-28] National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. National Agro Seed Corporation (India), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 958 : 2026 INSC 1017
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11(6) read with Section 42 — Reference by High Court does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the District or Commercial Court where the High Court is physically situated - The High Court exercises territorial jurisdiction over the entire State - Merely because an arbitrator is appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6) whose principal seat is at Cuttack, it does not confer exclusive supervisory jurisdiction under Section 42 on the District Court or Commercial Court at Cuttack to entertain a petition under Section 34 - In the absence of a designated seat or an established Commercial Court (where the cause of action substantially arose and the contract was executed), the Section 34 petition was maintainable before the District Judge under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. [Relied on Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (BALCO), (2012) 9 SCC 552; Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678; BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234; Paras 22-32] Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd v. GSCO (Gurmeet Singh and Company) Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 978 : 2026 INSC 1038
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 2(1)(h) read with Section 7 — Definition of "Parties" — Binding Non-Signatories - The requirement of a written arbitration agreement under Section 7 does not preclude binding a non-signatory party - The subjective intention and mutual consent of parties to be bound by an arbitration clause can be gathered from surrounding circumstances, negotiation, execution of composite documents, and conduct. Modern commercial arbitration mechanisms must remain elastic enough to accommodate multi-party and multi-contract arrangements without compromising party autonomy. [Relied on ASF Buildtech Private Limited v. Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Private Limited, (2025) 9 SCC 76; Ajay Madhusudan Patel and Others v. Jyotrindra S. Patel and Others, (2025) 2 SCC 147; Cox and Kings Limited v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 1; Inox Wind Limited v. Thermocables Limited, (2018) 2 SCC 519; Paras 20-28] National Skill Development Corporation v. Surya Wires, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 930 : 2026 INSC 977
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 31(7)(a) — Pre-reference and Pendente Lite Interest — Contractual Bar — Regime shift from the 1940 Act to the 1996 Act - Under Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act, the power of an arbitral tribunal to award interest for the pre-reference and pendente lite period is expressly subject to party autonomy ("Unless otherwise agreed by the parties") - Unlike the strict-construction approach under the 1940 Act, under the 1996 Act, an express contractual bar in the agreement excludes the jurisdiction of the tribunal to award pre-reference and pendente lite interest, even if the clause is not specifically directed against the arbitrator - While pendente lite interest is procedural, pre-reference interest is substantive and cannot be awarded when explicitly prohibited by the contract. [Paras 13-23] North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd. (NEEPCO) v. Astra Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 980 : 2026 INSC 1036
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 34 read with Sections 2(1)(e) and 42 — Territorial Jurisdiction — Distinction between "Seat" and "Venue" — Sittings of the tribunal held at Cuttack merely for convenience — High Court seat physically located at Cuttack does not make Cuttack the juridical seat of arbitration - There is an established distinction between the "Seat" and the "Venue" of arbitration - While the "seat" determines the court exercising supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings, the "venue" merely denotes the physical location where sittings are held for administrative convenience - Where the order under Section 11(6) did not designate Cuttack as the seat, and there was no agreement between the parties conferring exclusive supervisory jurisdiction on the courts at Cuttack, the mere conduct of arbitral proceedings at Cuttack for the convenience of the arbitrator does not constitute Cuttack as the juridical seat. [Paras 26-29] Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd v. GSCO (Gurmeet Singh and Company) Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 978 : 2026 INSC 1038
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 34(3) — Limitation - Where the arbitral award was passed on 25.10.2021 and the objection petition under Section 34 was presented before the court on 08.12.2021, the petition was filed well within the statutory period of three months prescribed under Section 34(3) - the finding of the High Court that it was time-barred was factually and legally erroneous. [Paras 17-21] Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd v. GSCO (Gurmeet Singh and Company) Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 978 : 2026 INSC 1038
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 36 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XXI Rules 1 & 4, Order XLI Rules 5 & 6 — Enforcement of Arbitral Award — Conditional Court Deposit vs. Satisfaction of Decree — Cessation of Post-Award Interest - Deposit in Court Not Synonymous with Payment - A deposit is not payment; placing money beyond the debtor's reach neither extinguishes liability nor places it at the creditor's disposal - Under Section 36(1) of the Arbitration Act, an award is enforced as a decree under the CPC - For a deposit in court to arrest the accrual of interest under Order XXI Rule 1, it must be made unconditionally, accompanied by notice under Rule 1(2), and be freely and immediately available for withdrawal by the award-holder. [Paras 21-25] National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. National Agro Seed Corporation (India), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 958 : 2026 INSC 1017
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 7(5) — Arbitration agreement — Incorporation by reference — Composite transaction — Interconnected agreements — Personal Guarantee forming an integral part of Loan Agreement - Where parties structure a single commercial transaction through several interconnected instruments and the ancillary agreement (Personal Guarantee) is contractually defined as a "Facility Agreement" forming an integral and inseparable part of the principal agreement, the arbitration clause in the principal agreement stands incorporated by reference under Section 7(5) into the ancillary agreement - The Supreme Court held that the phrase "shall be deemed to be part of this Agreement as if the provisions thereof were set out herein in extension" operates as an internal deeming fiction that binds every facility agreement including the Personal Guarantee within the same legal and arbitral framework as the principal Loan Agreement - A personal guarantee exacted as a mandatory pre-disbursement condition precedent to secure public funds cannot be severed for the purpose of dispute resolution alone while remaining tethered to the main contract for every other purpose, including liability - the guarantor, despite signing the Loan Agreement only in an official capacity and executing the Personal Guarantee in a personal capacity, is bound to submit to arbitration. [Paras 24-29] National Skill Development Corporation v. Surya Wires, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 930 : 2026 INSC 977
Armed Forces Pension — Disability Pension — Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982 vs. Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 2008 — Burden of Proof and Presumption of Attributability/Aggravation — Judicial Review of Release Medical Board (RMB) Opinions - Substantive Continuity Between 1982 and 2008 Regimes - The Entitlement Rules 2008 substantially reproduce the 1982 scheme concerning causal connection, onus of proof, and attributability/aggravation - Although Rule 5 of the 2008 Rules withdraws the initial presumption that any deterioration in health is deemed service-related by clarifying that mere manifestation of a disease in service does not per se establish attributability or aggravation, it does not dismantle the protective framework for service personnel - Under Rule 7 of the 2008 Rules, read with Rule 10(b)(iii), Rule 11, and Regulation 423 of the Regulations for the Medical Services of the Armed Forces (RMSAF), 2010, the primary burden of disproving entitlement still rests on the employer establishment - If the cause of a disease remains unknown and the presumption of entitlement in favour of the claimant is not rebutted, attributability must be conceded. [Paras 29 - 34] Union of India v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 935 : 2026 INSC 993
Armed Forces Pension — Legality and Uncertainty Surrounding Promulgation of Entitlement Rules 2008 - The Union failed to establish the precise source, timeline, and valid promulgation through which the 2008 Rules officially superseded the 1982 Rules, rendering them a mere collation of executive instructions - Under the Allocation of Business Rules, 1961, the Department of Pension and Pensioners' Welfare (DoPPW) not the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW) holds jurisdiction over policy formulation on retirement benefits - Compelling necessity highlighted for the competent authority to authoritatively notify transparent, clear, and uniform rules/regulations - Batch of 271 appeals dismissed on grounds of severe limitation/delay as well as lack of merit - The Union's failure to implement the 2015 Raksha Mantri Expert Committee recommendation regarding the withdrawal of pending appeals against disabled soldiers deprecated. [Relied on Dharamvir Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 316; Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1064; Union of India v. Rajbir Singh, (2015) 12 SCC 264; Paras 20–28, 36-39] Union of India v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 935 : 2026 INSC 993
Armed Forces Pension — Limited Qualification under Rule 7 Proviso — Belated Claims Beyond 15 Years - The sole significant departure in the Entitlement Rules 2008 from Rule 9 of the 1982 Rules is the proviso introduced to Rule 7 - Where a claim for disability pension is preferred after 15 years of discharge, retirement, invalidment, or release by which time service documents are typically weeded out the onus of proving entitlement reverses and shifts entirely onto the claimant - Tribunals and Courts cannot mechanically apply the Dharamvir Singh presumptions to allow routine applications filed after 15 years without a detailed scrutiny of the claimant's evidence. [Paras 30–39] Union of India v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 935 : 2026 INSC 993
Armed Forces Pension — Weight Accorded to Release Medical Board Opinion - The Medical Board is an expert body, and its scientific opinion on medical causation is entitled to due deference and weight - Courts and the Armed Forces Tribunal ought not to substitute their own views merely because an alternative medical conclusion is plausible - Judicial interference is warranted only where there is an absence of reasons, omission of germane facts, or a patent defect in the decision-making process - Where an unreasoned Medical Board opinion is set aside, the appropriate course is ordinarily to direct a review/reconstitution of the Medical Board rather than judicial substitution of medical findings. [Paras 31- 39] Union of India v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 935 : 2026 INSC 993
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 – Section 21 & Section 35A – Trading and Assignment of Non-Performing Assets – Regulatory Validity – Held that assignment of debt is a permissible banking activity under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and RBI guidelines issued under circulars have statutory force - Banks are permitted to engage in trading in NPAs to resolve bad debts and clean their balance sheets. Interpreting the SARFAESI Act restrictively to deny an assignee bank the remedy of enforcing security interest under the Act upon default would defeat the object of the financial system and the enactment. [Paras 27 - 29] Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Trupti Sanjay Mehta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 886 : 2026 INSC 943
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Section 35-A — Indian Contract Act, 1872 — Constitution of India — Articles 14, 21, and 226 — Hypothecation - Where possession of a commercial vehicle was forcibly taken at 1:00 a.m. by breaking the steering lock without mandatory 7-day prior notice and without a signed inventory/possession memorandum, the action constitutes unlawful and arbitrary seizure bearing the mark of "goonda-ism" expressly condemned by the Supreme Court - Depriving a small transporter of his sole means of livelihood in such an arbitrary manner violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India - Dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court solely on the ground of delay without examining the illegalities and subsequent traffic challans issued against the borrower was erroneous - The Supreme Court directed the financer to close both loan accounts, refund the vehicle's sale proceeds of Rs. 4,50,000/- with 6% interest per annum, and awarded compensation of Rs. 10,00,000/- to the borrower for loss of livelihood and mental agony, along with Rs. 50,000/- costs - RBI directed to take effective steps to secure genuine compliance with Fair Practices Code guidelines. [Relied on ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Prakash Kaur and Ors., (2007) 2 SCC 711; Orix Auto Finance (India) Ltd. v. Jagmander Singh and Anr., (2006) 2 SCC 598; Sundaram Finance Limited and Anr. v. T. Thankam, (2015) 14 SCC 444; Paras 15-19, 21–32] Hari Dutta Sharma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 942 : 2026 INSC 998
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Section 35-A — RBI Master Circulars / Guidelines on Fair Practices Code — Unilateral Repossession of Hypothecated Vehicles by NBFCs / Financers — Validity of Unconscionable Contractual Repossession Clauses — Use of Force and 'Goondaism' - Financiers and NBFCs cannot take forcible possession of hypothecated vehicles through brute force, deceit, or recovery agents in the dead of night in complete disregard of statutory RBI guidelines and contractual procedural safeguards - Held, directions and guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India under Section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 possess statutory force and are binding on banking institutions and NBFCs - Self-help repossession clauses under hypothecation agreements are intended to facilitate credit expansion but operate under the implicit condition that they conform strictly to the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the procedural safeguards established by the RBI (mandatory pre-seizure notice, fair procedure, final opportunity to cure before sale, and transparent auction) - Contractual provisions such as Article 11 of the subject agreement stipulating that the borrower's rights determine ipso facto without notice, empowering recovery agents to enter any place without process, and conferring unfettered discretion on the lender to waive pre- and post-repossession notice, are unconscionable, opposed to public policy, and violate the RBI Fair Practices Code. Hari Dutta Sharma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 942 : 2026 INSC 998
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Section 36AAA(1) & (7) – Extension of Supersession beyond the Elected Statutory Term of the Board of Directors – Held, Permissible - Once an order of supersession is passed, the Board ceases to exist and its powers vest in the Administrator - Under Section 36AAA(7) of the BR Act, the Administrator is required to convene a general meeting to elect new directors only "on and before expiration of the period of supersession" specified by the RBI - The statutory tenure of the erstwhile Board of Directors has no bearing upon the exercise or continuation of the RBI's power of supersession, provided the total period of supersession does not exceed the aggregate limit of five years - Where supersession was initiated during the Board's term, it can validly be extended even after the expiry of the original term. [Paras 36, 37, 38] Sandeep S. Ghandat v. Reserve Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 895 : 2026 INSC 955
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Section 36AAA(1), First Proviso – Requirement of Consultation with State Government – Scope – Multi-State Co-operative Bank – Held, Inapplicable - The requirement of prior consultation with the State Government under the proviso to Section 36AAA(1) applies exclusively to a co-operative bank registered with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies of a State (uni-State co-operative bank) and does not extend to multi-State co-operative banks. [Relied on Pandurang Ganapati Chaugule v. Vishwasrao Patil Murgud Sahakari Bank Ltd., (2020) 9 SCC 215; Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah and Anr., (2022) 19 SCC 520; DMRC v. Tarun Pal Singh, (2018) 14 SCC 161; Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors. v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver & Ors., 1967 SCC OnLine SC 31; Para 30-39] Sandeep S. Ghandat v. Reserve Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 895 : 2026 INSC 955
Civil Law – Dedication vs. Adverse Possession – Mutually Destructive / Inconsistent Pleas - A party asserting title cannot simultaneously claim ownership on the contradictory doctrines of completed dedication and adverse possession - If property has already vested by dedication, adverse possession cannot arise, as adverse possession necessarily proceeds on the premise that title originally vested in another and was subsequently extinguished by hostile possession for the statutory limitation period - Long and continuous possession, by itself, cannot be equated with adverse possession in the absence of pleading and proving the specific time when possession became hostile (animus possidendi) to the knowledge of the true owner. [Paras 26–31] Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 923 : 2026 INSC 983
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXIII Rule 3A — Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended by Act 39 of 2005) — Section 6 — Partition suit — Daughter entitled to undivided 1/4th share omitted from suit and subsequent appeal — Validity of compromise decree recorded behind back of omitted coparcener's heirs — Recall application maintainable - By virtue of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended in 2005), a daughter is a coparcener and entitled to an undivided share in ancestral coparcenary properties, making her and her legal heirs necessary parties to a suit for partition - A compromise decree entered into among other coparceners/brothers in appeal, deliberately omitting the sister/daughter or her legal heirs, is a complete nullity in the eyes of law - Such legal heirs cannot be treated as strangers to the lis - The bar contained under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC does not disentitle them from filing an interlocutory application before the very court that recorded the compromise to seek recall of the decree obtained behind their back – Held that the High Court's view that their only remedy was to institute a separate suit or seek leave to appeal was erroneous and set aside; applications remitted for fresh determination on merits. [Paras 10–15] Geeta Bai v. K. Arjun Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1004
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 — Anti-suit Injunction — Parameters for grant — Principle of Judicial Comity and Restraint - An anti-suit injunction is an equitable and extraordinary remedy by which an Indian court restrains a party amenable to its personal jurisdiction from instituting or prosecuting proceedings in a foreign court - Because such an injunction indirectly interjects into the sovereign jurisdiction of a foreign court, it must be granted sparingly, with extreme caution, and not as a matter of routine - The court can grant an anti-suit injunction only if - (i) the defendant is amenable to its personal jurisdiction; (ii) declining injunction would perpetuate injustice; and (iii) the foreign proceedings are shown to be oppressive, vexatious, or before a forum non conveniens. [Para 5] Mihir Prakash Bajoria v. Vidushi Jain Bajoria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 979 : 2026 INSC 1034
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court are not immune from interference under Section 100 CPC where such findings are vitiated by an erroneous application of settled legal principles, ignore material legal requirements, or equate long possession with adverse possession without establishing hostile animus – Held that a plaintiff in a suit for declaration must succeed on the strength of their own title and not merely on the weakness of the defendant's title – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186; Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 815; Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 961; Dharampal v. Punjab Wakf Board, (2018) 11 SCC 449; A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 969; Paras 37–41] Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 923 : 2026 INSC 983
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 11 — Res Judicata in Continuous Service Claims - Prior rounds of litigation concerning claims for regularization do not operate as res judicata against subsequent claims claiming pensionary consequences and retiral benefits flowing from regularizations voluntarily effected thereafter - The causes of action and reliefs are distinct, and hyper technical bars cannot foreclose consideration of statutory retiral rights arising out of a continuing service relationship. [Relied on Harbans Lal v. State of Punjab & Ors., 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 8181 (affirmed in SLP (C) No. 23578 of 2012); Paras 20-32] Punjab School Education Board v. Satnam Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2026 INSC 965
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 13 — Granting anti-suit injunction on premature apprehension of foreign decree's non-enforceability impermissible - An anti-suit injunction cannot be issued at an inchoate stage merely on the speculative assumption that the foreign court might grant a divorce decree on the ground of "irretrievable breakdown of marriage" which may ultimately be unenforceable under Section 13 CPC in India - The question of conclusiveness and enforceability of a foreign judgment arises under Section 13 CPC only after a final decree is passed, and not while the foreign proceedings are pending and all jurisdictional issues remain at large - Vacation of the anti-suit injunction by the High Court upheld. [Relied on Modi Entertainment Network & Anr. v. W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd., (2003) 4 SCC 341; Dinesh Singh Thakur v. Sonal Thakur, (2018) 17 SCC 12; Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE, (2025) 9 SCC 750; Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1098; Paras 5-10] Mihir Prakash Bajoria v. Vidushi Jain Bajoria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 979 : 2026 INSC 1034
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Framing All Issues Does Not Exhaust Rule 2(2), but Embarking upon General Trial Does - The statutory words 'may try that issue first' are distinct from the optional power that the Court 'may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues' - The four procedural operating settings are – i. Court frames only the qualifying issue of law and postpones settlement of other issues; ii. Court frames all issues and contemporaneously directs that the qualifying issue be tried first; iii. Court frames all issues and fixes a date for evidence, but before the court actually embarks upon the trial and evidentiary recording generally, an application under Rule 2(2) is made (mere fixation of a date does not bar exercise of discretion); iv. Court has already embarked upon the trial of the issues generally (e.g., plaintiff has closed evidence and defendants have entered upon evidence) - Once the trial on the issues generally has commenced, the statutory occasion to direct that an issue be 'tried first' has irrevocably passed - The word 'first' is relational and authorizes only a prospective ordering of the trial, not a retrospective reordering or severance of an ongoing composite trial. Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to bypass this temporal bar. [Paras 21-47] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Framing All Issues Does Not Exhaust Rule 2(2), but Embarking upon General Trial Does - The statutory words 'may try that issue first' are distinct from the optional power that the Court 'may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues' - The four procedural operating settings are – i. Court frames only the qualifying issue of law and postpones settlement of other issues; ii. Court frames all issues and contemporaneously directs that the qualifying issue be tried first; iii. Court frames all issues and fixes a date for evidence, but before the court actually embarks upon the trial and evidentiary recording generally, an application under Rule 2(2) is made (mere fixation of a date does not bar exercise of discretion); iv. Court has already embarked upon the trial of the issues generally (e.g., plaintiff has closed evidence and defendants have entered upon evidence) - Once the trial on the issues generally has commenced, the statutory occasion to direct that an issue be 'tried first' has irrevocably passed - The word 'first' is relational and authorizes only a prospective ordering of the trial, not a retrospective reordering or severance of an ongoing composite trial. Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to bypass this temporal bar. [Paras 21-47] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Harmonious Reading with Order XX Rule 5 - Limitation Involving Mixed Questions of Law and Fact - Order XX Rule 5 obligates the Court to render findings on each separate issue unless a finding on one or more issues is sufficient for disposal of the suit - This exception applies where a preliminary issue was validly isolated and tried first - where issues have entered a composite general trial, findings must be rendered on all issues to avoid unnecessary remands and piecemeal adjudications - Where limitation depends on determining whether a registered alienation was void ab initio for want of authority under a General Power of Attorney (attracting Article 65 of the Limitation Act) or voidable requiring cancellation (attracting Article 59), it involves mixed questions of fact and law requiring adduction of evidence and cannot be severed for summary dismissal under Order XIV Rule 2(2) or rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d). [Relied on Sathyanath v. Sarojamani, (2022) 7 SCC 644; Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557; Sukhbiri Devi v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1322; Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 INSC 465; Paras 19 – 26, 41-46] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Harmonious Reading with Order XX Rule 5 - Limitation Involving Mixed Questions of Law and Fact - Order XX Rule 5 obligates the Court to render findings on each separate issue unless a finding on one or more issues is sufficient for disposal of the suit - This exception applies where a preliminary issue was validly isolated and tried first - where issues have entered a composite general trial, findings must be rendered on all issues to avoid unnecessary remands and piecemeal adjudications - Where limitation depends on determining whether a registered alienation was void ab initio for want of authority under a General Power of Attorney (attracting Article 65 of the Limitation Act) or voidable requiring cancellation (attracting Article 59), it involves mixed questions of fact and law requiring adduction of evidence and cannot be severed for summary dismissal under Order XIV Rule 2(2) or rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d). [Relied on Sathyanath v. Sarojamani, (2022) 7 SCC 644; Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557; Sukhbiri Devi v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1322; Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 INSC 465; Paras 19 – 26, 41-46] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XIV Rule 2, Order XX Rule 5, Order VII Rule 11(d), and Section 151 — Framing of Issues vs. Trying an Issue — Trial of Preliminary Issue — Stage at which Power to Try an Issue First under Order XIV Rule 2(2) Ceases — Ongoing Composite Trial Cannot Be Severed Retrospectively - Scheme and Cumulative Requirements of Order XIV Rule 2(2) - Under the post-1976 amended scheme of Order XIV Rule 2, the general rule under sub-rule (1) is that the Court shall pronounce judgment on all issues - The exception carved out under sub-rule (2) is discretionary and strictly conditional upon three cumulative criteria - (i) it must be an issue of law only; (ii) it must relate either to the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force; (iii) the Court must form an opinion that the suit or any part thereof may be disposed of on that issue alone - A mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. [Paras 16-19] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XIV Rule 2, Order XX Rule 5, Order VII Rule 11(d), and Section 151 — Framing of Issues vs. Trying an Issue — Trial of Preliminary Issue — Stage at which Power to Try an Issue First under Order XIV Rule 2(2) Ceases — Ongoing Composite Trial Cannot Be Severed Retrospectively - Scheme and Cumulative Requirements of Order XIV Rule 2(2) - Under the post-1976 amended scheme of Order XIV Rule 2, the general rule under sub-rule (1) is that the Court shall pronounce judgment on all issues - The exception carved out under sub-rule (2) is discretionary and strictly conditional upon three cumulative criteria - (i) it must be an issue of law only; (ii) it must relate either to the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force; (iii) the Court must form an opinion that the suit or any part thereof may be disposed of on that issue alone - A mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. [Paras 16-19] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 92 — Urgent Interim Relief — Dispensation of Notice Prior to Grant of Leave — Ex Parte Leave - Where compelling circumstances and extreme urgency exist to prevent waste or damage to trust property, the Court is empowered to dispense with prior notice to the defendants and grant leave to sue ex parte, recording reasons in writing - Once leave is granted, the suit stands instituted, and the court acquires full jurisdiction to pass interim orders (including temporary injunctions or receiver appointments) - The defendants retain the right to apply for revocation/recall of leave on merits. [Relied on Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, (2026) 1 SCC 569; Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R, (2008) 4 SCC 115; Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese, (2004) 6 SCC 378; Paras 57–60] S. Panchalingu v. People's Education Trust (R), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 955 : 2026 INSC 1010
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 92, Section 94, Section 141, Section 151, and Order XL Rule 1 — Public Charities — Application for Leave to Institute Suit — Power of Civil Court to Grant Protective/Preservatory Interim Orders (Receiver) Pending Leave Application — Jurisdiction Excluded - Obtaining leave of the court under Section 92(1) CPC is a mandatory condition precedent and a "threshold gateway" to the institution of a suit against public charities - In the absence of leave, there is no validly instituted suit or substantive lis pending before the court - A Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain applications for interim, preservatory, or protective relief including the appointment of a receiver under Order XL Rule 1 prior to the grant of leave - Supplemental powers under Section 94 presuppose an underlying, validly instituted proceeding and cannot be invoked at the pre-leave stage - Section 141 applies purely to procedural matters and cannot dilute substantive statutory safeguards, nor can inherent powers under Section 151 override express statutory bars (generalia specialibus non derogant). [Paras 28–31, 35, 38–41, 44– 60] S. Panchalingu v. People's Education Trust (R), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 955 : 2026 INSC 1010
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 91, Section 227 — Accused seeking production of unrelied documents at the stage of framing of charges — Permissibility, limits, and procedure for inspection - While an accused is entitled to documents available with the prosecuting agency to shape their defence, the entitlement to demand production of unrelied documents at the pre-charge stage under Section 91 CrPC is not absolute - Internal records of the investigating agency (such as Daily Diary Registers, Dispatch Registers, and Source Information Reports) and case diaries are confidential/privileged and cannot be directed to be divulged or produced - Where the seized but unrelied documents are voluminous, the appropriate procedure is to allow the accused or their authorized representative to inspect the seized documents with the permission of the Court - Upon inspection, the accused may specify in writing the particular document(s) required, signed by both parties, which the prosecution shall keep ready and produce before the Trial Court at the appropriate stage of trial (when relevant prosecution or defence witnesses are examined) - Documents not in the possession or custody of the investigating agency cannot be directed to be produced - the accused remains at liberty to procure them independently (via RTI or defence evidence) to establish their defence. [Relied on State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568; Sarla Gupta and Anr. v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 7 SCC 626; Paras 6–14] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Anil Dixit, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1001 : 2026 INSC 1064
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 222, 386(b), & 464 – Conversion of POCSO Conviction to Section 376 IPC in Absence of Formal Charge – Cognate Offences & Absence of Failure of Justice - The omission to frame a specific or alternative charge under Section 376 IPC does not bar the Appellate Court from convicting the accused under Section 376 IPC where the charge under Section 4 POCSO Act fails due to lack of proof of the victim's age, provided the actus reus of rape is conclusively proved - Section 375 IPC and Section 3 of the POCSO Act share identical ingredients and actus reus, with the victim's minority being the sole distinguishing feature - Where the accused was put to notice and given full opportunity to defend against penetrative sexual assault, no prejudice or failure of justice is occasioned under Section 464 CrPC - Under Section 222 and Section 386(b) CrPC, the Appellate Court is fully empowered to alter the finding and convict the accused for the cognate/minor offence under Section 376(1) IPC and modify the sentence accordingly. [Distinguished from Luis Caetano Viegas v. Estrelina Mariana R.M.A Da'Costa, (2002) 9 SCC 144; Relied on P. Yuvaprakash v. State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846; Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263; Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 474; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Swaroop @ Barkat, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 442; Sachin v. State of Maharashtra, (2025) 9 SCC 507; Paras 41–47, 50-58] Pynchemalangaki Bareh v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 924 : 2026 INSC 984
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 227 & 228 — Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 468 & 471 — Framing of charge of forgery — Non-recovery or non-production of original forged document along with chargesheet does not entitle accused to discharge - The absence of the original document alleged to have been forged is not fatal to the prosecution at the threshold stage of framing charge and does not sound the death knell of the criminal proceedings - The prosecution is entitled to lead secondary or circumstantial evidence at trial to establish the commission of forgery beyond reasonable doubt - At the stage of framing charges under Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC, the Court cannot embark upon a roving inquiry or sift evidence as if conducting a mini-trial - it is sufficient if the material on record creates a grave suspicion against the accused. [Paras 6 - 20] Antonetto J D'souza v. Aldila Braganza, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2026 INSC 1032
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Distinction from Default Bail under Section 167(2) CrPC - Public Law Remedy of Compensation - Default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC (Section 187(2) BNSS) operates on a distinct footing - In default bail cases, re-arrest is permissible upon filing of the chargesheet on cogent grounds, whereas breaches under Article 22(1) and 22(2) occur at the threshold of the arrest itself and violate fundamental rights, requiring strict judicial safeguards before custody can be sought again - For illegal detention in violation of Article 22(2), the constitutional court may direct payment of compensation under public law remedies as exemplary damages / palliative relief for infringement of civil liberties, without relegating the citizen solely to private law remedies, though reserving liberty to claim damages under private civil law. [Relied on Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500; Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254; Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799; Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240; Paras 28-36] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378 & Section 386 — Appeal against Acquittal — Scope of Appellate Interference — Principles governing reversal of trial court's acquittal - An appellate court considering an appeal against acquittal must bear in mind the cardinal principles - (1) presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is not weakened but reinforced by an acquittal; (2) if two reasonable views are possible on the evidence, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted; (3) the appellate court must give proper weight and consideration to the trial court's assessment regarding credibility and demeanour of witnesses, as the trial judge had the distinct advantage of seeing and hearing them; and (4) the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt - To reverse an acquittal, it is imperative for the appellate court to record a clear finding that the trial court's view is perverse, misread the evidence, or is an impossible conclusion unsupported by the material on record. [Relied on Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227(2); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Samman Dass, 1972 INSC 11; Paras 7 - 13] Sanjay Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2026 INSC 948
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Maintainability of Corporate Prosecution without Arraigning or Identifying Natural Persons / Alter Ego - Criminal proceedings against a corporate entity cannot be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC on the sole ground that no natural person/alter ego has been identified or arraigned alongside it in the chargesheet - The role and mental element of a company can be prima facie disclosed through its own conduct, decisions, and surrounding circumstances without naming specific individuals at the threshold stage - Establishing attribution conclusively is a matter of evidence to be determined during trial - While non-arraignment under provisions like Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is fatal to prosecuting individuals because liability is vicarious and derivative, no such condition precedent applies in reverse to corporations prosecuted for direct offences under the IPC or Prevention of Corruption Act. [Relied on Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission, [1995] 2 A.C. 500; Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530; Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661; Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74; Paras 175–187, 188–197] Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2026 INSC 957
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 & Section 362 – Inherent Powers of the High Court – Bar under Section 362 – Scope of Recall vs. Substantive Review – Claim of Juvenility – Recall of earlier order dismissing appeal – Permissibility where order suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction or mistake by Court resulting in grave injustice - The High Court has inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to recall its previous order or judgment where an accused/convict was a juvenile on the date of occurrence and was deprived of statutory benefits due to a mistake committed by the Court - The bar enacted under Section 362 CrPC against altering or reviewing a judgment does not extinguish or curtail the inherent powers of the High Court to correct palpable mistakes, procedural irregularities, or orders passed under a misconception of law that result in a failure of justice - The principle actus curiae neminem gravabit (no person should suffer on account of a mistake of the Court) applies squarely - A petition seeking recall of an order on the ground of an inherent lack of jurisdiction (such as lack of trial jurisdiction over a juvenile) is in the nature of a procedural review, which is not barred by Section 362 CrPC. [Relied on A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., (1988) 2 SCC 602; Ganesh Patel v. Umakant Rajoria, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2050; Asit Kumar Kar v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 703; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578; Paras 27–33] Mahavir @ Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 892 : 2026 INSC 942
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 161, 162 & 164 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 145 – Omissions in previous statements – Maxim 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' – Held - Statements recorded under Section 161 and Section 164 CrPC are not substantive evidence; their legitimate use is strictly confined to contradicting the witness under Section 145 Evidence Act - An omission matures into a contradiction only if the omitted fact is irreconcilable with the court testimony or is one which the witness would ordinarily have been expected to state - Omission of background and contextual facts (such as antecedent ill-treatment or threats) by an illiterate witness does not destroy the credibility of her core account of sexual assault and strangulation - The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus does not apply in India - courts must separate the grain from the chaff and act on the reliable core. [Relied On Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 17; State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505; Selvamani v. State of T.N., (2024) 19 SCC 112; Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 INSC 525; Paras 32, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 235(2) & 354(3) – Constitution of India; Articles 14 & 21 – Sentencing Principles – Same-Day Sentencing – Aggravating vs. Mitigating Circumstances – Intermediate Sentence of Natural Life Imprisonment without Remission – Held - (i) Imposing the death sentence on the same day as conviction violates Section 235(2) CrPC as expounded in Allaudin Mian - the sentencing court must provide an effective opportunity to place individualised mitigating circumstances on record; (ii) The High Court's formulation evaluating the "crime test at 100% and criminal test at 0%" is legally flawed - the criminal test can almost never be zero, and sentencing courts cannot ignore the circumstances of the offender; (iii) Although "instrumental silencing" (murdering a child victim to destroy evidence and suppress the rape) is an aggravating circumstance of the highest order, it relates to the crime and does not automatically establish that the criminal is beyond reformation - The State failed to discharge its burden of proving that the accused was incorrigible - The convict had no prior criminal antecedents, suffered severe childhood deprivation, maintained unblemished prison conduct over eight years, and showed no psychiatric disorder; (iv) Applying the Sriharan doctrine, life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission serves as an adequate and severe intermediate punishment to meet the ends of justice while keeping the possibility of reform intact - Death penalty commuted to life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission. [Relied On Allaudin Mian v. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5; Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2019) 16 SCC 584; Manoj v. State of M.P., (2023) 2 SCC 353; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470; Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546; Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 12 SCC 460; Lochan Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 15 SCC 401; Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 801; Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1043; Paras 148, 149, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 167, 182, 184, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 195, 198, 201, 202, 203] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 391 & 367 – Constitution of India; Article 21 – Legal aid counsel appointed on the very date when the star witness was examined and cross-examined in a capital case – Held - Appointing a legal aid counsel and recording the complete deposition of the key prosecution witness on the self-same day without providing adequate opportunity to prepare violates the standard of effective legal assistance and meaningful cross-examination guaranteed under Article 21 - this infirmity stood adequately cured when the Supreme Court invoked Section 391 read with Section 367 CrPC to direct a curative further cross-examination of the witness through counsel of the accused's choice with the complete record furnished in advance - Her testimony must be appreciated by reading together her original deposition and the further cross-examination. [Paras 4, 14, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050
Commercial Contracts — Interpretation and Business Efficacy - Commercial documents must be interpreted to give full effect to the intention of the parties and commercial efficacy to contractual terms as understood and intended - If a demise charter were deemed to survive despite contractual termination until physical repossession is completed, an owner's termination right would be held hostage to the defaulting charterer's evasive conduct or technical delays outside the owner's control. [Relied on M/s Tomorrowland Limited v. Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited & Anr., 2025 INSC 207; Paras 19, 32-39] Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. Nereus Progress v. Om Freight Forwarders Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 991 : 2026 INSC 1055
Constitution of India — Article 142 — Inherent Powers — Direction for Independent Inquiry into Genuineness of Academic Degree - Even when declining to disturb the appointment of a candidate on a writ of quo warranto because he held the mandatory UGC-NET qualification, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to prima facie evidence demonstrating that an additional Ph.D. degree used to secure selection was forged or fabricated - In exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court directed the employing University to conduct a full-fledged departmental inquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, ensuring presence of original records and officials of the degree-awarding university - If the degree is found to be forged, the appointment will not be protected, and the authorities shall be at liberty to initiate criminal prosecution. [Relied on A.N. Shastri v. State of Punjab, (1998) Supp SCC 127; R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 119; B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees Association, (2006) 11 SCC 731; Paras 18–20] Annu Kumar v. Maharshi Dayanand University Rohtak, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 913 : 2026 INSC 968
Constitution of India — Article 145(3) read with Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Order XXXVIII Rule 1 — Split Verdict on Reference to Constitution Bench - In a batch of writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 6, 7, and 8(2) of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 for excluding the Chief Justice of India and institutionalizing executive dominance in the Selection Committee, the two-Judge Bench delivered a split opinion on whether the challenge must be referred to a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3) – Per Dipankar Datta, J. (Rejecting the plea for reference) - Merely raising a constitutional question or challenging a novel enactment does not attract Article 145(3), if the foundational constitutional principles have already been authoritatively settled by Supreme Court - The Constitution Bench in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 161, definitively held that the Election Commission of India must be insulated from exclusive executive control and that free and fair elections form part of the basic structure - What remains is only the application of these settled standards to the newly enacted 2023 Act - Applying settled law does not amount to interpreting the Constitution under Article 145(3) - The interim committee in Anoop Baranwal was a transient pro tem measure under Article 142 until legislative intervention, and examining whether the 2023 Act passes the muster of Article 14 and Article 324 is within the domain of the regular Bench. [Paras 49-88]. Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 976 : 2026 INSC 1040
Constitution of India — Article 20(3), Article 22(5) — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Section 23 — Preventive detention based on extra-judicial confession made to police — Inadmissibility and invalidity - A confessional statement made before a police officer cannot, by itself and in the absence of independent material lending support thereto, constitute the basis for forming the subjective satisfaction necessary to sustain an order of preventive detention - Under Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (analogous to Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872), confessions made before police officers are inherently suspect and excluded from evidence - If such a confession is too tainted to be received in evidence for proving guilt, it cannot legitimately constitute a valid ground for preventive detention, particularly when procured under alleged threat or torture in violation of Article 20(3) - Under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, the inclusion of an irrelevant or legally impermissible ground strikes at the root of the detenu's right to make an effective representation and vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. [Relied on Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569; Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipur, (2010) 9 SCC 618; Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424; Distinguished from Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N., (2006) 5 SCC 676; E. Subbulakshmi v. State of T.N., (2017) 1 SCC 757; Paras 15, 30–36, 38–39] Mulla Afroz v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2026 INSC 1067
Constitution of India — Article 21 — Safety in Public Spaces & Institutional Accountability - The right to live with dignity, free from fear of violence, is an intrinsic facet of the fundamental guarantee of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution - Recurring sexual offences in public parks, roads, and transit facilities across Delhi-NCR expose a systemic failure of law enforcement and civic administrative bodies - Public spaces cannot be allowed to turn into high-risk zones due to poor lighting, lax patrolling, and deficient surveillance - Mere expressions of concern and solidarity by authorities, devoid of accountability, do not solve institutional security lapses - measurable responsibility must be fixed upon authorities entrusted with crime prevention and public order. [Paras 5-15] In Re: Recent Rape Incidents in Delhi NCR, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 996
Constitution of India — Article 21 and Article 47 — Right to Health as part of Right to Life — State's affirmative duty to protect public health — Front-of-Package Labelling ("FoPL") on packaged food - The right to life guaranteed under Article 21 encompasses the right to health, casting a positive duty upon the State under Article 47 to take affirmative steps to safeguard public health and protect consumers especially growing children from the scientifically substantiated perils of foods High in Fat, Sugar, or Salt (HFSS) and Ultra-Processed Foods (UPF) - Prompt, clear, and consumer-friendly Front-of-Package Labelling (FoPL) is vital to enable informed consumer choice and encourage product reformulation. [Paras 28-38] 3S and Our Health Society v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 926 : 2026 INSC 988
Constitution of India — Article 22(1), Article 22(2), and Article 21 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 50, Section 57, and Section 167 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 47 and Section 58 — Arrest and Re-arrest — Violation of Fundamental Safeguards against Arrest — Procedure and Judicial Imprimatur Required for Re-arrest — Public Law Remedy – i. Mandatory Nature of Written Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) - The requirement to communicate grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 50 CrPC (Section 47 BNSS) is a mandatory, binding constitutional safeguard and not a mere procedural formality - The grounds must be communicated in writing in a language understood by the arrestee - Any infringement vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand, entitling the arrestee to immediate release - Procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest do not fall under a prejudice-oriented test; when there is a constitutional violation, the question of demonstrable prejudice does not arise - When released for violation of Article 22(1), the accused is not enlarged on bail, but released from illegal and unconstitutional detention; ii. Mandatory Production within 24 Hours under Article 22(2) - The constitutional mandate under Article 22(2) and Section 57 CrPC (Section 58 BNSS) requiring production of an arrestee before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours (excluding journey time) must be strictly and scrupulously observed - Detention beyond 24 hours without magisterial authorization is unconstitutional and unlawful, rendering the arrest otiose and vitiated, which infringes both Article 22(2) and Article 21. [Paras 20-33] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022
Constitution of India — Article 22(1), Article 22(2), and Article 21 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 50, Section 57, and Section 167 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 47 and Section 58 — Arrest and Re-arrest — Violation of Fundamental Safeguards against Arrest — Procedure and Judicial Imprimatur Required for Re-arrest — Public Law Remedy – i. Mandatory Nature of Written Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) - The requirement to communicate grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 50 CrPC (Section 47 BNSS) is a mandatory, binding constitutional safeguard and not a mere procedural formality - The grounds must be communicated in writing in a language understood by the arrestee - Any infringement vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand, entitling the arrestee to immediate release - Procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest do not fall under a prejudice-oriented test; when there is a constitutional violation, the question of demonstrable prejudice does not arise - When released for violation of Article 22(1), the accused is not enlarged on bail, but released from illegal and unconstitutional detention; ii. Mandatory Production within 24 Hours under Article 22(2) - The constitutional mandate under Article 22(2) and Section 57 CrPC (Section 58 BNSS) requiring production of an arrestee before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours (excluding journey time) must be strictly and scrupulously observed - Detention beyond 24 hours without magisterial authorization is unconstitutional and unlawful, rendering the arrest otiose and vitiated, which infringes both Article 22(2) and Article 21. [Paras 20-33] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022
Constitution of India — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition challenging Show Cause Notice — Exceptions - A writ petition directed merely against a show cause notice is ordinarily not maintainable where statutory alternative remedies exist - two narrow exceptions exist through which a writ court may entertain a challenge at the threshold - (i) want of jurisdiction (where the authority has no power in law to embark upon an inquiry, rendering the notice non est); and (ii) abuse of jurisdiction (i.e., mala fide exercise of jurisdiction) - Where the authority is competent under the statute and no mala fides are established, the notice cannot be quashed at inception merely on disputed questions of valuation. [Paras 10–12] Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. District Revenue Officer (Stamps), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 907 : 2026 INSC 963
Constitution of India — Article 226 — Writ of Quo Warranto — Essential Requirements and Locus Standi — Scope of Inquiry - To seek and succeed in a proceeding for a writ of quo warranto, the petitioner (even if a stranger) must establish that an appointee lacks the mandatory statutory eligibility/qualifications for occupying a public office or suffers from a statutory disability/disqualification, and has consequently usurped the public office - The initial burden of proof lies heavily on the petitioner to produce unimpeachable evidence, following which the onus shifts to the appointer and appointee - A writ of quo warranto cannot be employed as a vehicle for the vindication of personal grievances by unsuccessful candidates who participated in the selection process and failed to qualify on merit - Where the appointee holds the minimum mandatory qualification (here, UGC-NET) and a Ph.D. degree was merely a desirable/alternative qualification under the applicable recruitment rules and UGC Regulations 2010, the appointee cannot be declared to have usurped the public office. [Paras 8, 9, 11–17] Annu Kumar v. Maharshi Dayanand University Rohtak, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 913 : 2026 INSC 968
Constitution of India — Article 299 — Transactions executed in the name of the President of India — Effect on Stamp Duty Inquiries - The mere fact that the constitutional nomenclature of the President of India figures in an instrument of transfer as the transferor does not preclude an inquiry under Section 47-A into whether the consideration or market value has been truly set forth in the instrument - Instruments entered into in the exercise of the executive power of the Union are expressed in the name of the President and executed by authorised officers, but this does not render the question of true market value or fraudulent intention incapable of arising as a matter of law. [Relied on Ramesh Chand Bansal v. District Magistrate/Collector, (1999) 5 SCC 62; Shanti Bhushan v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 489; Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, (2004) 3 SCC 440; Union of India v. VICCO Laboratories, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 489; Para 12 - 23] Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. District Revenue Officer (Stamps), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 907 : 2026 INSC 963
Constitution of India — Article 311(1) — Dismissal or Removal by Subordinate Authority — Identifying the "Appointing Authority" — Call Letter for Training vs. Regular Order of Appointment - The respondent was selected as a recruit and issued a Call Letter dated 03.05.1979 by the Commandant to report for training, which explicitly stipulated that appointment as a regular Rakshak was contingent upon successful completion of initial training - Following completion of training, the Assistant Commandant issued Battalion Order dated 04.12.1979 appointing the respondent as a Rakshak and posting him to the 7th Battalion - the respondent was removed from service by the Adjutant (an officer equivalent in rank to Assistant Commandant) for unauthorized absence of 72 days - The First Appellate Court and the High Court erroneously set aside the removal on the ground that the Commandant was the appointing authority and the Adjutant was subordinate to him, violating Article 311(1) - Reversing the High Court, the Supreme Court held that the Call Letter was merely an offer and a direction to undergo mandatory training - The substantive appointment was made only via the Battalion Order dated 04.12.1979 issued by the Assistant Commandant - Since the Adjutant who passed the removal order was equal in rank to the Assistant Commandant and not subordinate, the bar under Article 311(1) of the Constitution was not attracted. [Relied on Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, Central Railway, (1979) 4 SCC 289; Union of India & Anr. v. Chandra Pal Pandey, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 176; P. Karuppaiah (Dead) through LRs v. General Manager, Thiruvaluvar Transport Corporation Ltd., (2018) 12 SCC 663; Paras 6–12, 15, 24–26] Union of India v. Ramdhani Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2026 INSC 1047
Constitution of India — Article 32 / Article 226 — Delayed Payment of Salary and Non-EPF Arrears — Grant of Simple Interest at 6% per annum — Concept of Interest - Salary, retiral benefits, and earned emoluments are rightful monetary entitlements - Interest is compensation/recompense for unjust deprivation of the use of money lawfully due to an individual - Although corporations possess separate juristic personalities, successor welfare States cannot shelter behind the corporate veil to leave employees remediless after decades of deprivation - Balancing the financial burden of the exchequer with restitution for prolonged withholding, simple interest @ 6% per annum awarded on salary/wages arrears from the due date till actual realization. [Paras 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59] Bihar State Ardh Sarkari Arajpati Karamchari Maha Sangh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 995 : 2026 INSC 1061
Constitution of India — Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 19(6) — Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972 — Rules 18A and 18B (inserted vide 2011 Amendment) — Subordinate Legislation — Methanol Regulation — Mandatory Addition of Denaturants (Bitterant & Colourant) — Restricting Purchase to Form A Licensees & Confiscation — Manifest Arbitrariness & Proportionality Test - Rules 18A and 18B of the Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972, mandating the compulsory mixing of a colourant (methylene carmine) and a bitterant (denatonium saccharide) in methanol prior to sale to non-drug manufacturers, restricting purchases solely to Form A licensees, and prescribing confiscation for possession without a Form A licence, are manifestly arbitrary, disproportionate, and unconstitutional - Sub-rule (1) of Rule 18A errs in conflating sellers with consumers, excluding legitimate industrial consumers holding Form B permits from procuring essential raw material - Sub-rule (2) imposes severe, destructive burdens on downstream industries (rendering methanol unusable in paints, resins, laminates, and life-saving drug catalysts) while serving merely a speculative chance of visual/taste identification without remedying illicit diversion, pilferage, or masking of hooch in unregulated channels - The rules fail all four prongs of the proportionality doctrine (K.S. Puttaswamy) and violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). [Paras 23–25, 29–37, 40–51, 53–68] Balaji Formalin Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 954 : 2026 INSC 1009
Constitution of India – Articles 21, 226, 227 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 173(8), Section 482 – Rape and Murder of minor – Botched and tainted investigation resulting in full acquittal – Inherent & Constitutional Power to order Reinvestigation / De Novo Investigation - Held, although normally only 'further investigation' can be directed under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. upon submission of a final report under Section 173(2), Constitutional Courts possess the dynamic and uncurtailable power under Article 226/227 and Section 482 Cr.P.C. to order a fresh or de novo investigation by an independent agency or Special Investigation Team (SIT) where the investigation was tainted, biased, sham, or conducted to shield real culprits - A fair investigation is as fundamental a facet of Article 21 as a fair trial - Where a trial culminates in the acquittal of a wrongly accused person due to lack of evidence, it underscores that the real perpetrators remain unapprehended - The refusal of the High Court to direct reinvestigation on the premise that evidence lost during the "golden hour" cannot be collected was erroneous, especially when key physical evidence (intact clothes bearing foreign male hair samples for DNA comparison) and material witnesses remain readily available. [Paras 25, 26, 46 - 61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030
Constitution of India – Articles 21, 226, 227 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 173(8), Section 482 – Rape and Murder of minor – Botched and tainted investigation resulting in full acquittal – Inherent & Constitutional Power to order Reinvestigation / De Novo Investigation - Held, although normally only 'further investigation' can be directed under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. upon submission of a final report under Section 173(2), Constitutional Courts possess the dynamic and uncurtailable power under Article 226/227 and Section 482 Cr.P.C. to order a fresh or de novo investigation by an independent agency or Special Investigation Team (SIT) where the investigation was tainted, biased, sham, or conducted to shield real culprits - A fair investigation is as fundamental a facet of Article 21 as a fair trial - Where a trial culminates in the acquittal of a wrongly accused person due to lack of evidence, it underscores that the real perpetrators remain unapprehended - The refusal of the High Court to direct reinvestigation on the premise that evidence lost during the "golden hour" cannot be collected was erroneous, especially when key physical evidence (intact clothes bearing foreign male hair samples for DNA comparison) and material witnesses remain readily available. [Paras 25, 26, 46 - 61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030
Constitution of India — Distinction from Default Bail under Section 167(2) CrPC - Public Law Remedy of Compensation - Default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC (Section 187(2) BNSS) operates on a distinct footing - In default bail cases, re-arrest is permissible upon filing of the chargesheet on cogent grounds, whereas breaches under Article 22(1) and 22(2) occur at the threshold of the arrest itself and violate fundamental rights, requiring strict judicial safeguards before custody can be sought again - For illegal detention in violation of Article 22(2), the constitutional court may direct payment of compensation under public law remedies as exemplary damages / palliative relief for infringement of civil liberties, without relegating the citizen solely to private law remedies, though reserving liberty to claim damages under private civil law. [Relied on Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500; Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254; Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799; Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240; Paras 28-36] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022
Constitution of India — Per Satish Chandra Sharma, J. (Allowing the plea for reference) - The 2023 Act was enacted by Parliament pursuant to Anoop Baranwal - There is no prior authoritative decision of the Supreme Court testing the constitutional validity of the 2023 Act - Whether Parliament was constitutionally justified under Article 324(2) in excluding an independent or neutral selector (such as the CJI) from the Selection Committee and retaining an executive majority raises a seminal and substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution which has never been decided before - Under Article 145(3) read with Order XXXVIII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, such a pristine question of constitutional interpretation must be decided by a Bench of not less than five Judges. [Relied on Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 161; People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399; Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Karnataka Legislative Assembly, (2020) 2 SCC 595; Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (NJAC Case), (2016) 5 SCC 1; Paras 5-20]. Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 976 : 2026 INSC 1040
Constitution of India — Procedure for Re-arrest / Fresh Custody Following Release for Breach of Article 22(1) and Article 22(2) - An accused who has suffered a breach of Article 22(1) or Article 22(2) does not enjoy a blanket permanent immunity from re-arrest - the investigating agency cannot automatically re-arrest the accused by executive fiat - Re-arrest requires prior judicial sanction/imprimatur; i. The investigating agency must file a formal application for custody before the concerned Magistrate setting forth the reasons and necessity for re-arrest and custodial interrogation, accompanied by an explanation for the initial default; ii. Such application can be moved only after furnishing the written grounds of arrest to the accused; iii. To eliminate foul play or collusion, the application must bear the prior endorsement of the immediate superior authority; iv. On the administrative side, the superior authority must transfer the investigation to another officer and initiate departmental/disciplinary proceedings against the erring officer(s); v. The Magistrate shall decide the application expeditiously, preferably within one week, adhering to principles of natural justice, and may grant custody only upon being satisfied with the bona fides of the explanation and the genuine necessity for re-arrest; vi. The same procedure applies mutatis mutandis to breaches under Article 22(2). [Paras 24 - 38] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022
Constitution of India — Procedure for Re-arrest / Fresh Custody Following Release for Breach of Article 22(1) and Article 22(2) - An accused who has suffered a breach of Article 22(1) or Article 22(2) does not enjoy a blanket permanent immunity from re-arrest - the investigating agency cannot automatically re-arrest the accused by executive fiat - Re-arrest requires prior judicial sanction/imprimatur; i. The investigating agency must file a formal application for custody before the concerned Magistrate setting forth the reasons and necessity for re-arrest and custodial interrogation, accompanied by an explanation for the initial default; ii. Such application can be moved only after furnishing the written grounds of arrest to the accused; iii. To eliminate foul play or collusion, the application must bear the prior endorsement of the immediate superior authority; iv. On the administrative side, the superior authority must transfer the investigation to another officer and initiate departmental/disciplinary proceedings against the erring officer(s); v. The Magistrate shall decide the application expeditiously, preferably within one week, adhering to principles of natural justice, and may grant custody only upon being satisfied with the bona fides of the explanation and the genuine necessity for re-arrest; vi. The same procedure applies mutatis mutandis to breaches under Article 22(2). [Paras 24 - 38] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022
Constitution of India — Public Health & Regulatory Governance — Hooch Tragedies — Preventive Guidelines for States & Union Territories - Striking down excessive subordinate legislation does not diminish the State's duty to control toxic substances - The Supreme Court laid down 15 comprehensive guidelines for States/UTs to check spurious liquor tragedies, including multi-departmental coordination, tracking industrial solvents, dedicating exclusive tankers with tamper-evident seals, mandatory stock reconciliation, and establishing specialized medical disaster management cells and de-addiction facilities. [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9 J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1; Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2009) 16 SCC 569; Vasu Dev Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 12 SCC 753; Paras 65–67] Balaji Formalin Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 954 : 2026 INSC 1009
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 142 — Invalidation of Scheduled Tribe Certificate — Protection of Pensionary and Retiral Dues — Scope of equitable relief - The appellant was appointed as Junior Engineer (Civil) in 1994 on the basis of a caste certificate certifying him as belonging to the "Tokre Koli" Scheduled Tribe and retired on superannuation on 30.06.2025 after more than three decades of service - The Scrutiny Committee invalidated and confiscated his caste certificate, and the High Court dismissed his writ petition relying on pre-constitutional family records showing the caste of his paternal ancestors as "Koli" - Affirming the findings of the Scrutiny Committee and the High Court on the invalidity of the caste claim, the Supreme Court considered the question of protecting his retiral benefits – The Supreme Court observed that while ordinarily an appointment obtained on the basis of an invalid caste certificate would not survive, in exceptional circumstances where equities of the case so warrant, the Supreme Court may exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to render complete justice - Taking note that the appellant had rendered more than 30 years of unblemished service until superannuation, and filed an affidavit stating that he has no children and no member of his family had derived any benefit from the invalidated certificate, the Court directed that the service rendered by the appellant from 21.10.1994 to 30.06.2025 shall stand protected for the limited purpose of computation and release of his retiral and pensionary benefits - It was explicitly clarified that such protection shall neither amount to validation/recognition of the caste claim nor entitle the appellant or his family to claim future benefits. [Relied on Chairman and Managing Director, Food Corporation of India & Ors. v. Jagdish Balaram Bahira & Ors., (2017) 8 SCC 670; R. Sundaram v. Tamil Nadu State Level Scrutiny Committee, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 287; Surekha Baljorsingh Thakur v. Caste Scrutiny Committee & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 4586 of 2024; Paras 11–16] Shirish Pandharinath Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 898 : 2026 INSC 949
Constitution of India, 1950 – Part IXB – Article 243ZL and Article 243ZT – Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Section 36AAA(1), (2), (7) & Section 56 – Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 – Supersession of Board of Directors of Multi-State Co-operative Bank – Six-month limitation under Article 243ZL(1) – Whether RBI's power of supersession under Section 36AAA of the BR Act is circumscribed by the six-month ceiling under Article 243ZL(1) – Held, No, the third proviso to Article 243ZL(1) explicitly states that in the case of a co-operative society carrying on the business of banking, the provisions of the BR Act "shall also apply" - The expression "shall also apply" is used in an additive and non-restrictive sense, incorporating the provisions of the BR Act into Part IXB of the Constitution by reference insofar as it relates to multi-State co-operative banks - The third proviso acts as an independent substantive legislative provision rather than a qualifying or restrictive clause - the fourth proviso to Article 243ZL(1), which extends supersession from six months to one year for banking co-operative societies, explicitly excludes a multi-State co-operative society carrying on the business of banking - An exclusion presupposes prior inclusion - the six-month ceiling on supersession under Article 243ZL(1) does not apply to multi-State co-operative banks, and the RBI retains statutory power under Section 36AAA(1) of the BR Act to supersede the Board of Directors for a period not exceeding five years in aggregate. [Paras 20-34] Sandeep S. Ghandat v. Reserve Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 895 : 2026 INSC 955
Constitution of India, 1950 — Seventh Schedule, List I Entry 57 and List II Entry 21 — Division of Legislative and Executive Powers — EEZ and Territorial Waters - The regulatory domains governing maritime fishing are distinctly bifurcated. While Entry 57 of List I grants the Parliament legislative competence (and the Union executive power) to regulate fishing and fisheries beyond territorial waters (in the EEZ), Entry 21 of List II vests the State Legislature and State Executive with authority to regulate fisheries within territorial waters - These powers are co-equal and autonomous in their respective spheres, with no direct conflict between the Union's Sustainable Harnessing of Fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone Rules, 2025 and the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Rules, 2020. [Para 14] Fisherman Care v. Government of India Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 888 : 2026 INSC 937
Constitutional Law — Cooperative Federalism and Article 19(1)(g) — Delay in Processing Applications as Unwritten Ban - Both the Union and the State are constitutional duty-bearers obligated by principles of cooperative federalism to enforce regulations harmoniously and ensure that citizens can pursue their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) subject only to reasonable restrictions - Where the State Verifying Authority kept 226 out of 257 Access Pass applications pending without timely verification, such administrative lethargy virtually amounted to an impermissible "unwritten ban" - The State was directed to process and clear verification applications in an effective and time-bound manner, and notify transit channels under Rules 15(5) and 15(6) of the 2020 Rules for vessels transiting to the EEZ. [Relied on Union of India and Anr. v. Mohit Minerals Private Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 700; State of Kerala v. Joseph Antony, (1994) 1 SCC 301; Kerala Swathanthra Malaya Thozhilali Federation and Others v. Kerala Trawlnet Boat Operators' Association and Others, (1994) 5 SCC 28; Paras 15-17] Fisherman Care v. Government of India Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 888 : 2026 INSC 937
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Fire Insurance – Presumption of accidental fire – Limits – Where reasonable suspicion exists of instigation by insured - Held, the legal principle that the precise origin or cause of a fire is immaterial so long as the claimant is not the instigator does not apply where there is reasonable cause to suspect arson, deliberate staging, or gross lack of bonafide fire-minimization efforts by the insured - Where physical verification contradicts the very occurrence of massive structural fire damage, material has been pre-demolished, and the insured willfully engages in delaying tactics in informing authorities, the claim cannot be allowed merely by presuming the fire to be accidental. [Relied on New India Assurance Company Limited v. Pradeep Kumar, (2009) 7 SCC 787; Khatema Fibres Limited v. New India Assurance Company Limited and another, (2023) 15 SCC 327; Sri Venkateswara Syndicate v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another, (2009) 8 SCC 507; Paras 26-30] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hemkund Duplex and Board Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2026 INSC 1023
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Insurance Act, 1938 – Section 64UM(1-A), Section 64UM(2) Proviso – Surveyors and Loss Assessors – Evidentiary value of surveyor reports – Requirement of recording reasons for appointing a second surveyor / investigative agency - Held, although the assessment of loss by an approved surveyor under Section 64UM(2) is a prerequisite for settling a claim exceeding the statutory threshold, the surveyor's report is neither sacrosanct nor conclusive and is not the last word binding either the insurer or the insured - While an insurer cannot appoint a second surveyor as a matter of course without recording cogent reasons, appointment of subsequent surveyors/investigators is fully permissible where the preliminary surveyor expressly observes serious abnormalities requiring meticulous investigation to rule out arson and hypothetical loss - consumer fora cannot ignore joint/final surveyor reports containing detailed empirical data; doing so causes a serious miscarriage of justice. [Paras 18-25] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hemkund Duplex and Board Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2026 INSC 1023
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 2(1)(g) – Insurance Act, 1938 – Section 64UM – Fire Insurance – Repudiation of claim on grounds of false declaration, manipulated accounts, and suspected arson – Scope and effect of policy forfeiture clauses - Held, when an insured willfully makes false declarations or relies on manipulated books of account and inflated inventory to buttress an insurance claim in violation of policy conditions (specifically Policy Conditions No. 6 and 8), the insurer is lawfully entitled to reject and repudiate such claim in its entirety without further ado - The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) erred in casually brushing aside findings recorded in multiple detailed surveyor reports and the report of an investigative agency which demonstrated that unusable dead scrap was lying in the affected shed rather than usable raw material, the books showed an imaginary yield and arbitrary consumption to create non-existent book stock, and the fire-fighting and loss-minimization efforts were non-genuine - the order of the NCDRC awarding compensation was set aside and the repudiation was sustained. [Paras 31-35] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hemkund Duplex and Board Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2026 INSC 1023
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 2(1)(g) – Insurance Act, 1938 – Section 64UM – Fire Insurance – Repudiation of claim on grounds of false declaration, manipulated accounts, and suspected arson – Scope and effect of policy forfeiture clauses - Held, when an insured willfully makes false declarations or relies on manipulated books of account and inflated inventory to buttress an insurance claim in violation of policy conditions (specifically Policy Conditions No. 6 and 8), the insurer is lawfully entitled to reject and repudiate such claim in its entirety without further ado - The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) erred in casually brushing aside findings recorded in multiple detailed surveyor reports and the report of an investigative agency which demonstrated that unusable dead scrap was lying in the affected shed rather than usable raw material, the books showed an imaginary yield and arbitrary consumption to create non-existent book stock, and the fire-fighting and loss-minimization efforts were non-genuine - the order of the NCDRC awarding compensation was set aside and the repudiation was sustained. [Paras 31-35] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hemkund Duplex and Board Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2026 INSC 1023
Corporate Criminal Liability — Possession of Mens Rea and the Three-Stage Sequential Framework of Attribution - The Supreme Court held that corporations can possess mens rea and be held criminally liable for offences requiring intent - Attributing the act and state of mind of an individual to a corporation fixes direct liability on the company, distinct from vicarious liability – The Supreme Court laid down a three-stage sequential/hierarchical framework to answer - "If X, a natural person, does an act while acting for a corporation, in what circumstances is X's act, and the state of mind accompanying it, to be treated as the corporation's own?" – I. Primary Stage: Examines whether the constitutional documents (Memorandum / Articles of Association) or rules implied by company law vest the person with the power to do the act; II. General Stage: Inquires whether the power to do the act was delegated (expressly or impliedly) to the person with sufficient discretion and independence in doing the act; III. Special Stage: Involves statutory construction to determine whether the purpose of the statute requires fashioning a special rule of attribution - Where the statutory purpose is narrow, it is tested in the abstract; where broad, it is examined in the specific facts and circumstances of the case. [Paras 23, 24, 137, 142–151, 171] Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2026 INSC 957
Criminal Jurisprudence — Defective Investigation — Shifting of Dead Body to Police Station vs. Hospital — Medical Impossibility of Instantaneous Death - Unexplained conduct and shoddy investigation creating reasonable doubt — Held: Medical expert evidence established that the gunshot wound sustained by the deceased could not cause instantaneous death and that a person of his physique would have survived for 3 to 6 hours - Conduct of relatives carrying the injured victim directly to the police station instead of taking him to a medical facility/hospital is highly unnatural and suspicious - the Investigating Officer's complete failure to prepare a site map of the scene of occurrence, non-recovery of firearms/empty cartridges from the spot, failure to seize blood-stained clothes, and failure to produce the gun license in court, fundamentally impair the prosecution version. [Paras 9-18] Ashok Upadhyay v. State of of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2026 INSC 971
Criminal Jurisprudence — Principle of Issue Estoppel — Relitigation of settled issues barred - Section 173(5) & 173(8) — Production of additional documents - Where a Division Bench of the High Court had previously declined to quash an FIR and chargesheet under Section 482 CrPC on the specific ground that the original plan was missing, a subsequent petition under Section 482 before a Single Judge raising the identical challenge against the order framing charges is barred by the doctrine of issue estoppel - A party cannot relitigate a proposition of fact or law distinctly raised and settled in earlier proceedings between the same parties - The requirement under Section 173(5) to submit all documents with the chargesheet is directory and not mandatory - The prosecution is not precluded from placing additional documents gathered during further investigation on record after the filing of the chargesheet. [Relied on Rama Shanker Lal & Ors. v. State of U.P., (1971) 3 SCC 905; Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 82; Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 INSC 522; Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 82; Paras 11 - 21] Antonetto J D'souza v. Aldila Braganza, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2026 INSC 1032
Criminal Jurisprudence – Victimology – Protection Against Double Jeopardy – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 300 – Scope of fresh SIT investigation post-acquittal - Held, criminal jurisprudence places paramount emphasis on victimology, recognizing that an offence is one against society at large, casting an onerous duty on the State to bring real culprits to book - While injustice to a falsely prosecuted person can be compensated, injustice to a brutally raped and murdered victim can never be compensated if the real perpetrators escape justice due to institutional failure - where the originally prosecuted accused has undergone full trial and stands acquitted on merits, he is fully cloaked with the constitutional protection of Article 20(2) and Section 300 Cr.P.C. and cannot be subjected to further investigation or prosecution - An SIT composed of fresh independent officers must carry out the de novo probe untainted by earlier investigations. [Relied on Kashmeri Devi v. Delhi Admn., 1988 Supp SCC 482; Bharati Tamang v. Union of India, (2013) 15 SCC 578; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158; Pooja Pal v. Union of India, (2016) 3 SCC 135; Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 160; Paras 56-61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030
Criminal Jurisprudence – Victimology – Protection Against Double Jeopardy – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 300 – Scope of fresh SIT investigation post-acquittal - Held, criminal jurisprudence places paramount emphasis on victimology, recognizing that an offence is one against society at large, casting an onerous duty on the State to bring real culprits to book - While injustice to a falsely prosecuted person can be compensated, injustice to a brutally raped and murdered victim can never be compensated if the real perpetrators escape justice due to institutional failure - where the originally prosecuted accused has undergone full trial and stands acquitted on merits, he is fully cloaked with the constitutional protection of Article 20(2) and Section 300 Cr.P.C. and cannot be subjected to further investigation or prosecution - An SIT composed of fresh independent officers must carry out the de novo probe untainted by earlier investigations. [Relied on Kashmeri Devi v. Delhi Admn., 1988 Supp SCC 482; Bharati Tamang v. Union of India, (2013) 15 SCC 578; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158; Pooja Pal v. Union of India, (2016) 3 SCC 135; Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 160; Paras 56-61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030
Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — "Last Seen Together" Theory — Inferences from Cross-Examination Suggestions — Impermissibility - The theory of "last seen together" cannot be established when the witness testimonies lack consistency, contain material improvements over police statements, and fail to establish that the deceased accompanied the accused in close proximity to the time of death - The High Court committed a manifest error by holding that even if prosecution witnesses failed to depose in their examination-in-chief that the child accompanied the accused, a mere suggestion put by the defence counsel during cross-examination could be treated as an admission/inference establishing the "last seen together" theory to clinch the guilt of the accused - Circumstantial links cannot be substituted with erroneous inferences drawn from defence cross-examination suggestions. [Paras 23-42] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945
Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Extra-Judicial Confession — Evidentiary Value — Duty of Court - An extra-judicial confession is inherently a weak piece of evidence and, per se, cannot form the sole basis of conviction without independent and cogent corroboration - Wherever the court intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession upon due appreciation of the entire evidence, it must ensure that the confession inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence - If it suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities, the court is fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration - the prosecution alleged an extra-judicial confession was made to the village Sarpanch (PW-9) on 14.03.2007, whereas shopkeepers (PW-7 and PW-8) testified that the accused was already in police custody and brought to the shop on 12.03.2007 - This material contradiction, combined with the lack of intimate connection between the accused and the Sarpanch, completely belied the prosecution story. [Relied On Sahadevan v. State of T.N., (2012) 6 SCC 403; Paras 31 – 43] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945
Criminal Law — Failure to Collect Corroborative Physical Clues / Telltale Evidence - Failure to recover any spent cartridges despite allegations of indiscriminate firing, non-recovery of the offending weapons, failure to seize the blood-stained clothes of the deceased or of the witnesses who allegedly carried him, omission to subject seized blood-stained earth to chemical examination, non-examination of independent eye-witnesses, and absence of injuries on accompanying witnesses despite indiscriminate firing, render the entire prosecution case doubtful and justify acquittal – Appeals allowed. [Paras 5-11] Dhrub Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2026 INSC 935
Criminal Law — Forensic Evidence — Burden of Proof — Section 106, Evidence Act — Absence of DNA Profiling - Where human semen is detected on the underwear of the accused as well as on the rectal swab of the deceased, the prosecution is duty-bound to establish a positive link through DNA profiling or scientific matching - In the absence of a DNA match connecting the two samples, the mere presence of semen on the clothing of an unmarried accused cannot lead to a presumption of guilt - The burden cannot be shifted to the accused to prove that the semen did not belong to him or did not match the victim; the initial burden of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt remains squarely on the prosecution. [Paras 26 – 45] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945
Criminal Law — Hypothesis of Innocence — Benefit of Doubt - Applicability of the Principle of Hypothesis of Innocence — Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence — Held: Even where the prosecution case relies on purported direct eyewitness evidence, if the oral accounts suffer from irreconcilable contradictions and surrounding objective circumstances give rise to a plausible and reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the court is precluded from entering a conviction - The appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. Conviction and sentence set aside. [Paras 18–21] Ashok Upadhyay v. State of of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2026 INSC 971
Criminal Law — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 read with Section 34 — Arms Act, 1959 — Section 27 — Appreciation of Eyewitness Evidence — Related and Interested Witnesses - Reliability of Interested and Related Eyewitnesses — Significant contradictions, improvements, and lack of independent corroboration — Held: While related witnesses cannot be branded as interested witnesses solely by reason of relationship, where circumstances disclose a ring of falsity, closer scrutiny of their testimonies is warranted - Where the First Information Statement (FIS) omits material witnesses, substantial contradictions emerge with Section 161 CrPC statements, injury claims of alleged injured eyewitnesses are contradicted by medical evidence, and no independent local villagers are examined, unreserved reliance cannot be placed on such related witnesses to sustain a conviction. [Paras 12-20] Ashok Upadhyay v. State of of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2026 INSC 971
Criminal Law — Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 307 read with Section 149, Section 148, Section 147 — Arms Act, 1959 — Section 27 — Defective/Collusive Investigation — Presumption of Guilt — Medical Evidence Contradicting Eye-witness Account — Inquest Prepared Prior to Registration of FIR/FIS - Investigation / Benefit of Defective Investigation - While a faulty investigation cannot ordinarily inure to the benefit of the accused, the Court cannot presume the guilt of the accused where there is a complete absence of reliable evidence simply because the Investigating Officer (I.O.) was recalcitrant or because allegations/complaints of collusive investigation were raised against the investigator - The High Court egregiously erred in relying upon a complaint against the I.O. that was not even brought on record during the trial to plug glaring evidentiary gaps and hold the prosecution case clinching. [Para 9 – 11] Dhrub Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2026 INSC 935
Criminal Law — Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Testimony - Inquest Prior to First Information Statement (FIS) - Where ocular witnesses claimed that the party was walking in a single file led by the deceased and that the accused ambushed and shot the deceased in the back during indiscriminate firing from behind, but the expert medical evidence (ballistic/post-mortem) demonstrated that the deceased suffered an oval bullet entry wound with tattooing/blackening indicating a shot fired from close range (3–4 feet) while the victim was in a sitting position, the medical evidence directly discredited the eye-witness version - The High Court erred in brushing aside such expert medical evidence on mere conjectures of a "shaking hand" or moving target - The admission by the I.O. that the inquest was carried out before the First Information Statement was recorded renders the narration of events suspicious and premeditated. [Paras 7-11] Dhrub Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2026 INSC 935
Criminal Trial — Evidence — Appreciation of Testimony — "Sterling Witness" — Non-Corroboration by Forensic and Medical Findings - Where the prosecution relies heavily on a prime witness whose account is riddled with contradictions, material improvements over Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements, and is directly refuted by expert medical and FSL examinations (showing an intact hymen, no vulval injury, and total absence of semen or male DNA), such a witness cannot be characterised as a "sterling witness" - When ocular testimony is entirely inconsistent with the scientific and medical evidence, and a plausible defence of false implication stemming from local disputes (water-sharing) is established, the accused is entitled to acquittal. [Relied on Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21; Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 573; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417; Naresh Kumar alias Nitu v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 15 SCC 684; Gangadhar alias Gangaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2020) 9 SCC 202; Paras 5-10] Deepak in JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 952 : 2026 INSC 1008
Custody of Minors — Financial Capacity of Parents — Consideration of Paternal Grandparents' Pension - Meeting the financial and educational needs of minor children is the primary obligation of the parents. Where the father earned a modest salary of Rs. 17,000/- per month and channelled his energies into litigation rather than enhancing his earning potential, while the mother earned Rs. 3 Lakhs per month as a university lecturer in the UK, the combined pension received by the paternal grandparents cannot be treated as supplementing or filling the gap of the father's statutory and moral obligations. [Paras 45-49] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043
Delay in uploading judgments - Delay in uploading judgment after 2 years 5 months of pronouncing of judgment, is a matter of grave concern and a practice to be deprecated - However, there was no infirmity in the appreciation of evidence by the lower courts and concluded that the delay, by itself, was not sufficient to set aside the judgment - Delay in judgment uploading alone cannot nullify a conviction if the judgment is otherwise sound - Practice of High Courts deprives the aggrieved party of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal more particularly in criminal matters wherein the appeal is dismissed affirming the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court - Such delays should not recur and reiterated the guidelines from the case Anil Rai v. State of Bihar to address delays in pronouncing and uploading judgements - Judgments should be made available to the parties within 3 months from the date of reserving - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Anil Rai v. State of Bihar (2001) 7 SCC 318; Ravindra Pratap Shahi v. State of U.P. & Ors. 2025 INSC 1039; Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. 2024 INSC 801; Paras 41-47] Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority v. Matrix Pharmacorp Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 879 : 2026 INSC 932
Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 — Section 7-Q — Mandatory Statutory Interest on Delayed EPF Dues - Provident fund is a statutory social security benefit accrued during employment and cannot be treated as an ordinary monetary claim - The liability to pay simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum under Section 7-Q of the Act is an automatic, mandatory consequence of law that does not rest on administrative discretion or contractual stipulations - Such statutory interest must be computed from the date the EPF amounts fell due until the date of actual payment, irrespective of the corporate entity becoming non-functional or the principal amount being disbursed belatedly. [Paras 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 59] Bihar State Ardh Sarkari Arajpati Karamchari Maha Sangh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 995 : 2026 INSC 1061
Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 — Section 14B & Section 7Q — Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) — Liability of Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) — Mandatory vs. Discretionary Nature of Damages under Section 14B — Reference to Larger Bench - Liability of SRA to Clear EPF Dues - Provident fund and gratuity dues fall outside the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(b)(iii) of the IBC and cannot be subjected to the waterfall mechanism under Section 53(1) - In terms of Section 11(2) of the EPF & MP Act, statutory first charge is created in respect of workmen dues (including Section 7Q interest and Section 14B damages), which overrides non-obstante priority clauses in subsequent legislation - the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) is liable to pay provident fund and gratuity dues in full to save the resolution plan from being hit by Section 30(2)(e) of the IBC. Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation v. Central Board of Trustees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 933 : 2026 INSC 990
Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 — Rehabilitation Mechanism and Power of Central Board under Second Proviso to Section 14B - The Second Proviso to Section 14B empowers the Central Board to reduce or waive damages for an establishment undergoing rehabilitation under the now-repealed SICA - Since the IBC superseded SICA for corporate turnaround, a resolution plan under IBC is functionally akin to a scheme of rehabilitation sanctioned by BIFR - The Central Board is competent to consider an application for reduction or waiver of damages preferred by an SRA under the Second Proviso. [Paras 6-18] Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation v. Central Board of Trustees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 933 : 2026 INSC 990
Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 — Discretion of Authorized Officer to Impose Damages under Section 14B — Doubt Cast on Horticulture Experiment Station: A doubt was expressed regarding the ratio in Horticulture Experiment Station Gonikoppal v. Regional Provident Fund Organization, (2022) 4 SCC 516, which held that imposition of damages under Section 14B is strictly automatic and mandatory upon civil default without requiring discretion - The phrase 'may recover from the employer by way of penalty such damages' in the post-1988 amended Section 14B indicates that the Authorized Officer retains quasi-judicial discretion to decide whether or not to levy penalty/damages at all under extenuating circumstances - If the officer decides to impose damages, only the quantum is rigidly regulated by the scheme under Paragraph 32A - Statutory interest under Section 7Q is purely compensatory and distinct from the punitive damages under Section 14B - Question referred to a Larger Bench - Appellants directed to deposit outstanding EPF dues and Section 7Q interest in four quarterly installments, subject to final determination of waiver/damages by the competent forum. [Relied on Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank Limited v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, (2009) 10 SCC 123; Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2513; State Bank of India v. Murari Lal Jalan & Florian Fritsch (Consortium), (2025) 4 SCC 354; Jet Aircraft Maintenance Engineers Welfare Assn. v. Ashish Chhawchharia, 2022 SCC OnLine NCLAT 418; Paras 7– 20] Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation v. Central Board of Trustees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 933 : 2026 INSC 990
Environmental Law — EIA Notification, 2006 & RG, 2016 — Status of Land Allotment at Various Regulatory Stages – I. Form 1 Stage (Clause 6, EIA 2006) - Procurement or allotment of land is not a condition precedent for submitting Form 1; identification of a prospective site is sufficient; II. Appraisal Stage: In terms of MoEF&CC O.M. dated 07.10.2014, the project proponent must furnish a credible document evidencing the status of land acquisition (e.g., allotment letter or provisional allotment) before final appraisal; III. Consent to Establish (CTE): Land allotment is not a condition precedent to apply for or obtain a CTE under the Water and Air Acts, provided that if the land is under one acre, relaxation under Clause 7(b) of the RG, 2016 must precede the grant. [Paras 65–93, 110(iv)-(viii)] Punahchakran Pvt. Ltd. v. Indotech Waste Solution, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2026 INSC 956
Environmental Law — Revised Guidelines for CBWTF, 2016 — Clause 7(b) — Relaxation of Land Area Requirement - The requirement under Clause 7(a) to set up a CBWTF on a plot size of not less than one acre is a mandatory rule - under Clause 7(b), the land area may be relaxed down to 0.5 acres by the SPCB/PCC in consultation with CPCB subject to: (i) location within municipal limits with a population over 25 lakhs, OR within a rural area; and (ii) mandatory prescription of additional environmental control measures - Held: Where an industrial area was declared via official notification in a village (rural area) outside municipal/Nagar Panchayat limits, the pre-condition for relaxation was satisfied - The NGT erred in quashing the EC and CTE on the ground of an impermissible relaxation. [Paras 55–63, 110(iii)] Punahchakran Pvt. Ltd. v. Indotech Waste Solution, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2026 INSC 956
Environmental Law — Revised Guidelines for CBWTF, 2016 (RG, 2016) — Mandatory Nature and Publication Mode - The Revised Guidelines for Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment and Disposal Facilities, 2016 (RG, 2016) framed by the CPCB under the Bio-Medical Waste Management Rules, 2016 (BMWM Rules) and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 are mandatory and enforceable - Non-publication in the Official Gazette does not vitiate their binding nature - Where neither the parent Act nor the subordinate rules prescribe a mandatory mode of publication, publication through any other reasonable mode is sufficient - The uploading of technical guidelines on the official website of the CPCB constitutes sufficient and reasonable publication. [Relied on B.K. Srinivasan and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others, (1987) 1 SCC 658; Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Yeshaswinee Merchant and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 277; Bengaluru Development Authority v. Sudhakar Hegde and Others, (2020) 15 SCC 63; Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India, (2019) 15 SCC 401; Distinguished from, Gulf Goans Hotels Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (2014) 10 SCC 673; Paras 34–54, 110(i)-(ii)] Punahchakran Pvt. Ltd. v. Indotech Waste Solution, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2026 INSC 956
Environmental Law — Terms of Reference (ToR) — Invalidation of Prior EC Does Not Automatically Void ToR - Setting aside an Environmental Clearance (EC) does not mechanically render the Terms of Reference (ToR) void - If the flaw that invalidated the EC lay solely at the appraisal stage and there was no material concealment affecting scoping/Form 1, the ToR remains operative for its prescribed validity period of four (3+1) years under MoEF&CC Office Memorandums. [Paras 94–109, 110(ix)] Punahchakran Pvt. Ltd. v. Indotech Waste Solution, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2026 INSC 956
Evidence Act – Solitary Witness / Related Witness / Child Sexual Abuse - Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 134 & 106 – Appreciation of Evidence in Intra-Household Sexual Offence – Solitary Witness – Testimony of Mother against Husband – Held: Section 134 establishes that evidence is to be weighed and not counted; conviction can be founded on a single reliable witness - A related witness is distinct from an interested witness - The mother of a victim child testifying against her own husband renounces her home and security, making it inherently improbable that she would shield the real killer of her daughter to falsely frame her husband - offences committed within the secrecy of a household seldom occur before multiple witnesses; demanding independent corroboration of a standard impossible to attain would confer immunity upon perpetrators - As an inmate of the house possessing special knowledge under Section 106, the burden rested on the appellant to offer a plausible explanation of how the child suffered sexual violation and homicidal death. [Relied On Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, (1957) 1 SCC 700; Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, (1953) 2 SCC 36; State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752; Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681; Paras 28, 29, 30, 31, 38, 39] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 114A — Presumption as to Absence of Consent — Scope and Applicability - The statutory presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act does not apply mechanically merely because the prosecutrix denied consent - The denial of consent must be assessed in the overall matrix and context of her entire testimony - When surrounding facts, conduct, and lack of resistance demonstrate voluntary accompaniment and stay over multiple days, absence of consent cannot be accepted - mere presence of spermatozoa in vaginal swabs does not conclusively establish rape in the absence of internal or external injury and in the face of consensual conduct - A charge of rape must be proved beyond reasonable doubt on hard, credible evidence and not on surmises, conjectures, or personal value judgments of the trial judge - Even if the conduct of the accused is considered immoral or unethical, immorality sans credible evidence cannot justify a conviction under criminal law. [Paras 18-27] Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2026 INSC 1054
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 133 read with Section 114, Illustration (b) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 306 — Approver/Accomplice Testimony — Rule of Prudence — Requirement of independent material corroboration connecting the accused with the crime - An accomplice who secures pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. possesses a powerful incentive to minimize his own culpability and shift blame onto others - Although an accomplice is a competent witness under Section 133 of the Evidence Act, the rule of prudence under Section 114, Illustration (b) mandates independent corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the commission of the offence, and not merely connecting the transaction with the offence - Testimony of one participant in a bribe transaction (the bribe-giver) corroborating another participant (the approver intermediary) does not satisfy the requirement of independent corroboration in the sense required by law. [Relied on Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637; Paras 52–55, 70-82] Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 945 : 2026 INSC 999
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 165 (BSA, 2023, Section 168) r/w CrPC — Section 311 (BNSS, 2023, Section 348) — Role and Duty of Trial Court - A criminal trial is not an adversarial game where the Presiding Officer acts as a mere recording machine - Under Section 165 of the Evidence Act and Section 311 of the CrPC, the Court possesses wide powers and is required to take an active, participatory role to elicit truth and ensure material evidence necessary for just adjudication is brought on record - When the accused was present in the courtroom from judicial custody, the failure of the Public Prosecutor and the Trial Judge to have the victim identify the accused from the dock was a gross omission. [Paras 45–48, 54] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 [Now Proviso to Section 23(2), Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023] — Disclosure Statement & Information Leading to Discovery — Inadmissibility when no new fact is discovered - A confession made to a police officer is inadmissible except to the extent permitted under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, where a fact is discovered in consequence of information received from the accused - Where no new fact is discovered and the disclosure statement merely relates to the demarcation or identification of places/spots already within the prior knowledge of the police and recorded in the site plan, Section 27 cannot be invoked, and the disclosure statement cannot be taken into consideration - The High Court fundamentally erred in holding that the disclosure statement dated 14.03.2007 led to the recovery of the deceased's body from the well, when the body had already been recovered by the police two days earlier on 12.03.2007. [Paras 38–44] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945
Evidence Act, 1872 — Test Identification Parade (TIP) vs. Dock Identification — Evidentiary Value - Substantive evidence of identification is the identification of the accused by the witness while testifying in Court (dock identification); Test Identification Parade (TIP) conducted during police investigation is merely corroborative and not substantive evidence - Where the accused was not named in the FIR, his name was disclosed to the victim by the police, the sketch prepared with the victim's assistance was withheld from the Court, and the child victim explicitly stated that she could identify the accused if produced, but no dock identification was elicited during her sworn testimony, relying solely on the TIP to convict the accused was fatal to the prosecution. [Paras 40–44, 53- 54] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958
Evidence Act, 1872 - Witness Conduct – Abused and Coerced Woman – Absence of Immediate Reporting or Flight – Held - Courts must not assess the credibility of abused women or witnesses to trauma against preconceived, stereotyped notions of 'ideal' or 'expected' behaviour - Silence, prolonged cohabitation, and delayed reporting often arise from trauma, terror, economic dependency, learned helplessness, and coercive control in violent relationships - Perpetrators who secure silence through terror cannot subsequently exploit that very silence or lack of flight to attack the credibility of the victim or witness - Mere access to a mobile phone where the husband controlled the saved contacts does not denote liberty. [Relied On Rana Partap v. State of Haryana, (1983) 3 SCC 327; XYZ v. State of M.P., (2021) 16 SCC 179; Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590.; Paras 65, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 78] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32(1) & Section 6 – Child Victim's Disclosure – Admissibility as Dying Declaration and Res Gestae – Held - The verbal account given by a six-year-old child to her mother narrating the sexual assault immediately after the incident forms part of the "circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death" under Section 32(1) Evidence Act, as the sexual assault and the throttling were proximate, continuous, and connected stages of a single transaction aimed at silencing her - Expectation of death is not required under Section 32(1) - The disclosure is also admissible under Section 6 as res gestae, being spontaneous and proximate to the occurrence - The statement was strongly corroborated by the post-mortem finding of a fresh tear at the fourchette. [Relied On Pakala Narayana Swami v. King-Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1997) 4 SCC 161; Paras 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050
Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 8, 24 & 103 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 293 – Conduct of Accused; Extra-Judicial Confession; Defective Investigation; Absence of Male DNA – Held - (i) An extra-judicial confession made voluntarily before family members upon being confronted is admissible and provides corroboration; (ii) The appellant's subsequent conduct under Section 8 (inquiring whether the child had revealed anything, refusing hospitalisation, and attempting immediate burial) demonstrated consciousness of guilt; (iii) Under Section 293 CrPC, a DNA analysis report submitted by a Government Forensic Science Laboratory is admissible without calling the expert as a witness, especially when the accused did not seek to summon the expert under Section 293(2) - The absence of male DNA in a vaginal smear after the body had been washed prior to post-mortem does not displace the ocular account and genital tear; (iv) Lapses in investigation (such as lodging an FIR against an unknown person or delay in recording witnesses under Section 161) cannot ensure to the benefit of the accused when trustworthy ocular and medical evidence proves the case beyond reasonable doubt. [Relied On Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403; Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500; State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Karnel Singh v. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 518; State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy, (1999) 8 SCC 715; C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567; Paras 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 106, 107, 118, 119] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050
Finance Act, 1979 (as amended by Finance Act, 1994) – Chapter V – Foreign Travel Tax (FTT) – Section 35(2), Section 35A, Section 38(3), Section 38(4), Section 38(5) read with Foreign Travel Tax Rules, 1979, Rules 4, 9, 11, and 12 – Imposition of penalty for delayed deposit of Foreign Travel Tax – Whether delayed payment is equivalent to 'failure to pay' under Section 38(3) – Automatic vs. Discretionary imposition of penalty – Doctrine of Reformatio in Peius - 'Failure to Pay' vs. 'Delayed Payment' - The expressions "fails to pay the foreign travel tax" and "the amount of the tax not so paid" under Section 38(3) of the Finance Act, 1979 contemplate absolute non-payment/failure to pay FTT into the credit of the Central Government, and cannot be equated with mere delay in making payment - Section 38(3) does not cover delayed payment of FTT; instead, delayed payment falls within the ambit of Section 38(4) read with Rules 4 and 9 of the 1979 Rules - Any deposit made prior to the issuance of a show-cause notice constitutes delayed payment, whereas deposit made after the issuance of a show-cause notice constitutes non-payment. [Relied on U.S. Technologies International Private Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2023) 8 SCC 24; Paras 35 – 48] M/s. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 880 : 2026 INSC 933
Finance Act, 1979 (as amended by Finance Act, 1994) – Chapter V – Foreign Travel Tax (FTT) – Section 35(2), Section 35A, Section 38(3), Section 38(4), Section 38(5) read with Foreign Travel Tax Rules, 1979, Rules 4, 9, 11, and 12 – Discretionary Nature of Penalty & Exclusion of Mens Rea - The presence of the word "shall" in Section 38 does not make the levy of penalty automatic upon breach of timeline - Automatic imposition of penalty and exclusion of mens rea are two distinct concepts - Even in provisions creating strict liability without proof of mens rea, imposition of penalty is not automatic where the statutory scheme provides for an adjudicatory process (issuance of show-cause notice, opportunity of representation, and personal hearing under Section 38(5) proviso and Rule 12) and discretionary condonation of delay (provisos to Rules 4 and 9) - The power to impose a penalty inherently includes the power not to impose a penalty where the breach is technical, venial, or properly explained - The question of applying minimum statutory penalty arises only after the authority judiciously concludes that a penalty is warranted. [Relied on Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1972) 83 ITR 26; Paras 37-48] M/s. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 880 : 2026 INSC 933
Finance Act, 1979 (as amended by Finance Act, 1994) – Chapter V – Foreign Travel Tax (FTT) – Section 35(2), Section 35A, Section 38(3), Section 38(4), Section 38(5) read with Foreign Travel Tax Rules, 1979, Rules 4, 9, 11, and 12 – Doctrine of No Reformatio in Peius - An appellant cannot be placed in a worse condition or situation than before simply as a result of preferring an appeal - Where the original adjudicating authority had imposed a penalty of Rs. 12,000/- and the matter was remanded by the appellate authority, enhancing the penalty to Rs. 71,29,140/- in de novo proceedings violates the rule of no reformatio in peius, which is an integral part of fair procedure, natural justice, and procedural equity. [Relied on Jyoti Plastic Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 2276; Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2025) 8 SCC 331; Paras 50, 51, 52, 53, 54] M/s. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 880 : 2026 INSC 933
Fire Insurance – Presumption of accidental fire – Limits – Where reasonable suspicion exists of instigation by insured - Held, the legal principle that the precise origin or cause of a fire is immaterial so long as the claimant is not the instigator does not apply where there is reasonable cause to suspect arson, deliberate staging, or gross lack of bonafide fire-minimization efforts by the insured - Where physical verification contradicts the very occurrence of massive structural fire damage, material has been pre-demolished, and the insured willfully engages in delaying tactics in informing authorities, the claim cannot be allowed merely by presuming the fire to be accidental. [Relied on New India Assurance Company Limited v. Pradeep Kumar, (2009) 7 SCC 787; Khatema Fibres Limited v. New India Assurance Company Limited and another, (2023) 15 SCC 327; Sri Venkateswara Syndicate v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another, (2009) 8 SCC 507; Paras 26-30] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hemkund Duplex and Board Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2026 INSC 1023
Food Safety and Standards (Labelling and Display) Regulations, 2020 — Front-of-Package Labelling Proposal — Ambiguities in FSSAI's Phased Hexagonal Warning Model - Examining an affidavit filed by the FSSAI proposing a red-coloured hexagonal warning label ("HIGH FAT", "HIGH SUGAR", "HIGH SALT", "HIGHLY SWEETENED BEVERAGE"), the Supreme Court observed that several practical aspects remain ambiguous and require scientific justification: i. Phased Implementation & Timelines: The proposal lacked fixed and binding timelines separating Phase I (triggering labels only when products are high in two or more nutrients of concern) from Phase II (triggering labels for any one nutrient) - Indefinite timelines based on commercial reformulation cannot be accepted; ii. Nutrient Threshold Criteria ("Total" vs. "Added" Nutrients): FSSAI must clarify why the proposal assesses "Added Sugar" and "Added Fat" rather than "Total Sugar" and "Saturated Fat / Trans Fat", which was the consensus reached in earlier stakeholder consultations; iii. Food Categorization & Degree of Processing: Threshold calculations must account for the distinction between moderately processed foods without additives (Group B) and excessively processed/ultra-processed foods with additives (Group C) as classified under the ICMR-NIN Dietary Guidelines for Indians, 2024; iv. Visual Accessibility, Font Size & Packaging Dimensions: A strictly text-heavy label assumes literacy across diverse demographics; FSSAI must evaluate combining words with distinct pictorial icons - font sizes (proposed as merely one point larger than the back nutrition table) and logo dimensions must be assessed in proportion to the principal display panel to prevent consumer misinterpretation, including potential confusion between the colour red and non-vegetarian dietary indicators; v. Mandatory vs. Voluntary Compliance: The Supreme Court directed the FSSAI to specify whether the FoPL regime will be enforceable mandatorily from inception or incorporate a strictly defined transitional period; vi. Nutritional Literacy in Schools: The Union of India was directed to formulate structured initiatives and curriculum integration to foster nutritional literacy among schoolchildren. [Paras 6-12, 28–32, 37, 38 – 43, 48-50] 3S and Our Health Society v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 926 : 2026 INSC 988
Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 — Section 25 — Custody Battle — Welfare and Best Interest of Child — Re-integration Process - Custody of the minor daughter restored to the father in accordance with earlier binding decrees - To prevent emotional shock, the matter was remitted to the Family Court to effect structured, phased re-integration of the child with the father, overseen by a designated expert committee consisting of CBI officers and NIMHANS psychiatric faculty. [Paras 35, 36, 78–86] R v. E, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 982 : 2026 INSC 1049
Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 — Section 7 & Section 25 — Custody of Minors — Relevant Considerations — Professional Movement vs. "Nomadic Lifestyle" — Mother's Financial and Career Endeavours - The Family Court and High Court awarded sole custody of two minor children (son and daughter) to the father, inter alia, on the ground that the mother led a "nomadic lifestyle" by frequently changing academic jobs across different Indian cities between 2019 and 2021 - Reversing this view, the Supreme Court observed that the mother, holding a Ph.D. in Engineering, was compelled to leave the matrimonial home under stressful circumstances and had to change jobs because the father persistently harassed her with numerous RTI applications at her workplace (IIT Jodhpur) - The mother's efforts to cement her standing in academia, earn financial security, and secure a respectable teaching position at the University of Hull (UK) cannot be branded as leading a "nomadic life"; such efforts demonstrate a committed approach to securing the children's future. [Paras 44 - 50] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043
Hindu Law — Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 14(1) read with Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, Section 3(2) — Enlargement of limited estate into absolute ownership — Claiming or effecting actual partition is not a sine qua non - Under Section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, upon the demise of a male Hindu coparcener intestate prior to 1956, his limited interest in the coparcenary property devolves upon his widow - Where the widow continues to hold or reside in the property backed by this pre-existing statutory right (jus ad rem) and remains in legal/constructive possession thereof at the time of commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, her limited interest blossoms into absolute ownership by operation of Section 14(1) - Actual partition between the widow and the surviving coparcener is not a sine qua non for the statutory enlargement of her right into absolute ownership. [Paras 11-15] Ganapati v. Prabhakar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 974 : 2026 INSC 1033
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — Scope of Section 14(1) vs. Section 14(2) — Meaning of 'possessed by' - The expression "possessed by" in Section 14(1) has the widest amplitude and embraces constructive or legal possession backed by a vestige of title - Section 14(2) acts strictly as a proviso and applies only where an instrument creates a fresh, independent right for the first time without any underlying pre-existing claim - As a widow's right to maintenance and succession is a pre-existing right under Shastric law recognized by the 1937 Act, Section 14(1) governs - upon becoming absolute owner under Section 14(1), the widow possesses full testamentary capacity to bequeath the property by Will. [Relied on V. Tulasamma & Others v. Sesha Reddy, (1977) 3 SCC 99; Raghubar Singh & Ors. v. Gulab Singh & Ors., (1998) 6 SCC 314; Paras 8 - 15] Ganapati v. Prabhakar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 974 : 2026 INSC 1033
Income Tax Act, 1961 — Chapter XIX-A, Sections 147, 148, 245C, 245D(4), 245D(6), 245F(2) & 245-I — Reassessment notice issued under Section 148 after final settlement order under Section 245D(4) — Bar of jurisdiction on Assessing Officer - Whether the Assessing Officer (AO) has statutory jurisdiction under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to initiate reassessment proceedings to disallow statutory deductions (Section 80IB(10)) in respect of an assessment year already concluded and settled by the Income Tax Settlement Commission (ITSC) under Section 245D(4) - Held, Chapter XIX-A is a self-contained code providing a specialized alternate dispute resolution mechanism. Once an application under Section 245C is admitted under Section 245D(1), Section 245F(2) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Settlement Commission to exercise the powers and perform the functions of an income-tax authority over the entire case for that assessment year, placing the regular assessment machinery under Sections 142 to 156 in statutory abeyance - Once a final settlement order is passed under Section 245D(4), it permanently displaces the regular assessment machinery - By virtue of Section 245-I, the order passed by the ITSC is conclusive as to the matters stated therein and cannot be reopened in any proceeding under the Act or any other law, except under Chapter XIX-A - The Settlement Commission takes into consideration the gross total income, returns filed, and permissible deductions to arrive at the net taxable income - The Assessing Officer cannot reopen the settlement or assume independent reassessment jurisdiction under Sections 147/148 on the pretext that a specific deduction was wrongly claimed or not separately adjudicated - The only recourse open to the Revenue to unsettle a concluded Section 245D(4) order is to invoke Section 245D(6) before the ITSC by establishing fraud or misrepresentation of facts, or to pursue limited judicial review under Articles 226/136 of the Constitution of India - Where an application under Section 245D(6) moved by the Revenue had already been rejected by the ITSC, the AO is completely denuded of power to reopen the assessment via Section 148 - Both the Assesses and the Revenue must "take the crust and the crumb together" under Chapter XIX-A. [Relied on Brij Lal and Ors. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Jalandhar, (2011) 1 SCC 1; Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Express Newspapers Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 374; Jyotendrasinhji v. S.I. Tripathi & Ors., (1993) Supp (3) SCC 389; Paras 21–27] Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr. v. M/s. Omaxe Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 944 : 2026 INSC 1000
Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 263, Section 80HHC read with Sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiie) & Explanation (baa) — Revisional Jurisdiction of Commissioner — Erroneous and Prejudicial to Interests of Revenue — Binding Nature of CBDT Circulars — Deductions on Export Quota Premium – i. Pre-conditions for Revision under Section 263 - The revisional power of the Commissioner under Section 263 requires the concurrent presence of two conditions - the order of the Assessing Officer must be both "erroneous" and "prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue" - An order becomes erroneous if it rests on an incorrect assumption of facts, misapplies the law, or is passed without application of mind - If two views are possible and the Assessing Officer adopts one tenable view, the Commissioner cannot exercise revisionary powers unless the Assessing Officer's view is wholly unsustainable in law; ii. Non-Binding Effect of Executive Circulars on Courts - Administrative circulars and Office Memoranda (O.M.) issued by the CBDT bind only subordinate administrative departmental officers, not Constitutional Courts - When the text of the statute or judicial interpretation runs contrary to an executive circular, the statutory enactment and judicial declaration prevail; executive circulars cannot override statutory terms or create an impermissible legal fiction; iii. Assessment without basic inquiry renders order revisable - Where the Assessing Officer mechanically allowed deduction under Section 80HHC on export quota premium on the basis of a CBDT Office Memorandum without conducting basic inquiries or applying statutory criteria under Section 28 and Explanation (baa) to Section 80HHC, the Assessment Order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue, justifying the Commissioner's invocation of Section 263. [Relied on CCE, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries, (2008) 13 SCC 1; CIT v. Amitabh Bachchan, (2016) 384 ITR 200 (SC); Paras 12–15] Orient Crafts Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 960 : 2026 INSC 1018
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 — Schedule I — Clause providing for forfeiture in E-Auction Notice — Failure of successful bidder to pay balance consideration within 90 days — Legality of forfeiture of EMD and part-consideration - Where a bidder participates in an e-auction on an 'as is where is' basis with prior notice of defects/pending litigation regarding title deeds, and voluntarily pays 25% of the bid amount (comprising 10% EMD and a portion of balance consideration) without protest, failure to deposit the remaining balance consideration within the maximum 90-day window renders the forfeiture clause in the auction notice operative and automatic - Even if Schedule I of the Liquidation Process Regulations, 2016 limits EMD to 10% of reserve price and does not expressly mandate statutory forfeiture, the explicit contractual conditions of the e-auction notice bind the bidder - The NCLT erred in applying the equitable "Triple Test" (hidden agenda to rig auction, lack of financial capacity, or prevention by extraneous reasons) to order a refund - Subsequent realization of a higher value in a re-auction reflects inherent market value and does not absolve the defaulting bidder whose failure disrupted the time-bound liquidation process - The forfeiture of the entire deposited amount was valid, and the NCLAT order affirming the forfeiture was sustained. [Relied on Potens Transmission & Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Apex Buildsys Ltd., Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1543 of 2023 (affirmed by Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4116 of 2022); Distinguished from Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, (2024) 6 SCC 641; Paras 11–17, 19–22] M/s. Asj Finsolutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Vikram Bajaj, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 998 : 2026 INSC 1062
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 61(2), Proviso — Maxim Actus curiae neminem gravabit — Limitation & Technical Portal Glitches in E-Filing — Exemption of non-functional portal period -Although the NCLAT has no statutory discretion under Section 61(2) of the IBC to condone delay beyond the outer limit of 30 + 15 days, a litigant cannot be turned away when the appeal was prevented from being e-filed within the condonable period solely due to backend technical defects and OTP failures in the tribunal's own registry/portal - Limitation runs against a litigant only when the forum is functional and capable of receiving papers - Where a bona fide attempt to e-file is established prior to the expiry of the condonable window, the court/tribunal must invoke the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the court shall prejudice no one) to exempt the days during which the portal was non-functional and treat the date of the first bona fide attempt as the date of presentation. [Relied on A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602; Distinguished from National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Anil Kohli, RP for Dunar Foods Ltd., (2022) 11 SCC 761; Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors., (2025) 9 SCC 483; Paras 13–22] Regional Provident Fund Commissioner II v. Ms Mamta Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 946 : 2026 INSC 1003
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – CIRP Costs – Real Estate Project – Time Extension Charges / Delay Penalty imposed by Local Industrial Authority – Whether delay penalty / time extension charges payable to a development authority can be mulcted on Homebuyers or Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) as CIRP Costs – Held that no, the default charges stipulated in the lease deed or subsequent policy directives specify a percentage of the lease premium to penalise a defaulting developer and serve as a deterrent against time lags - Where the defaulting corporate debtor/developer is out of the picture and the homebuyers pooled funds under a 'Pool and Build' mechanism and approved a resolution plan to complete the half-baked project, it is unjust to penalise the homebuyers and the SRA for the past sins of the Corporate Debtor - Local development authorities operate with the underlying welfare objective of facilitating urban housing and development, not merely a commercial profit motive - in such peculiar circumstances, time extension charges/delay penalties cannot be validly imposed or treated as CIRP costs - Direction of the NCLAT treating time extension charges as CIRP costs set aside - NOIDA's claim for extended charges up to the 10th year rejected. [Paras 11–16] Authorised Representative for Granite Gate Properties v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 893 : 2026 INSC 952
Insurance Act, 1938 – Section 64UM(1-A), Section 64UM(2) Proviso – Surveyors and Loss Assessors – Evidentiary value of surveyor reports – Requirement of recording reasons for appointing a second surveyor / investigative agency - Held, although the assessment of loss by an approved surveyor under Section 64UM(2) is a prerequisite for settling a claim exceeding the statutory threshold, the surveyor's report is neither sacrosanct nor conclusive and is not the last word binding either the insurer or the insured - While an insurer cannot appoint a second surveyor as a matter of course without recording cogent reasons, appointment of subsequent surveyors/investigators is fully permissible where the preliminary surveyor expressly observes serious abnormalities requiring meticulous investigation to rule out arson and hypothetical loss - consumer fora cannot ignore joint/final surveyor reports containing detailed empirical data; doing so causes a serious miscarriage of justice. [Paras 18-25] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hemkund Duplex and Board Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2026 INSC 1023
Investor Protection – High-Risk Speculative Trades – Unauthorised Fixed-Return / Ponzi Schemes run by Trading Member – Maintainability of Claim against Clearing Member - Where investors voluntarily entrust securities to a Trading Member (TM) acting unauthorisedly as a Portfolio Management/Derivatives Advisory Service assuring fixed returns a practice prohibited by Stock Exchange regulations the investors cannot hold the Clearing Member (PCM) liable for the liquidation of such securities upon the TM's default - Participants who knowingly enroll in speculative and volatile F&O trades and illegal assured-return schemes cannot seek indemnification or restitution from the PCM, with whom they had no privity, but are at liberty only to pursue appropriate legal remedies against the defaulting TM. [Paras 29–30, 45, 53, 54, 55–56] Edelweiss Custodial Services Limited v. NSE Clearing Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 891 : 2026 INSC 941
Judicial Process — Inordinate Delay in References to Larger Benches — Suggestion for Permanent Constitution Bench - Noting the grave delay in deciding references (often taking between 5 to 20 years or more, as witnessed in Anoop Baranwal and Jai Bir Singh), which causes institutional embarrassment, the Bench collectively placed the papers before the Chief Justice of India for the constitution of an appropriate Bench to resolve the vires of the 2023 Act, and urged the CJI to explore the necessity of setting up a permanent 5-Judge Constitution Bench to decide pure constitutional controversies expeditiously. Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 976 : 2026 INSC 1040
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – Section 7A & Proviso – Plea of Juvenility – Stage at which it can be raised – Effect of earlier dismissal of Special Leave Petition as withdrawn - The plea of juvenility goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the trial Court and constitutes a jurisdictional fact - Under the Proviso to Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, a claim of juvenility can be raised before any Court at any stage, even after the final disposal of the case - The dismissal of a Special Leave Petition as "withdrawn" does not constitute an adjudication on merits and does not operate as an irrevocable bar of finality preventing the High Court from entertaining an application under Section 482 CrPC to give effect to an inquiry report of the Juvenile Justice Board declaring the convict to have been a juvenile on the date of the offence - The beneficial and remedial provisions of the Juvenile Justice legislations must receive a purposive and wide interpretation. [Relied on Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., (2005) 3 SCC 551; Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2013) 11 SCC 193; Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 9 SCC 750; Paras 19–33] Mahavir @ Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 892 : 2026 INSC 942
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Relocation of Children to Foreign Jurisdiction — Cultural Ethos vs. Best Interests - Rejecting the father's contention that relocation to the UK would lead to the loss of Bengali cultural ethos, held that there is no presumption that relocating abroad deprives children of their cultural roots, particularly when the mother herself belongs to the community and can nurture them accordingly - The mother was permitted to take both children to the United Kingdom, secure their admission in school, and file an undertaking to produce them as and when directed by Indian Courts. [Paras 51, 60–62] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Section 3(iii), (iv), (vi), and (ix) — Child's Voice and Best Interest - The statutory principles of participation, best interest, safety, and non-waiver of rights under Section 3 of the JJ Act make it imperative that the disclosure, emotional comfort, and safety of the child cannot be compromised - The son's morbid fear and reluctance towards the father, established during Chamber interactions and multiple independent counselling reports, cannot be overridden - Entrusting custody to the accused parent would also jeopardize a free and fair trial. [Paras 55, 56] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043
Labour and Service Jurisprudence — Daily-Wagers — Unchanging Flat Wage Rates over Decades — One-Time Lump-Sum Relief - Computing back dues of daily-wagers uniformly at a historical flat rate of ₹42.50 per day over several decades (from 1992 onwards) disregards inflation, cost of living, and revised minimum wages - Remitting the matter for fresh wage determinations after decades of litigation would prejudice finality - To balance equities, a one-time lump-sum sum of ₹1,00,000/- directed to be paid to each daily-wage worker in addition to already disbursed wages. [Paras 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 59] Bihar State Ardh Sarkari Arajpati Karamchari Maha Sangh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 995 : 2026 INSC 1061
Land Acquisition — Constitutional Validity & Retrospective Scope — Interpretation of Precedents - Effect of striking down Section 3J of the NH Act — Held: Striking down Section 3J in Tarsem Singh-ensured that solatium and interest could not be denied to acquisitions made under the NH Act between 1997 and 2015 - declining prospective application in Tarsem Singh-II merely established parity that solatium and interest are universally payable across all periods; it did not mandate that pre-01.01.2015 awards must be calculated according to the higher compensation scales of the 2013 Act. [Relied on Union of India & Another v. Tarsem Singh & Others (Tarsem Singh-I), (2019) 9 SCC 304; Union of India & Another v. Tarsem Singh & Others (Tarsem Singh-II), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 235; National Highways Authority of India v. Tarsem Singh & Others (Tarsem Singh-III), 2026 SCC OnLine SC 481; Paras 6–13] Manav Bhanot v National Highway Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2026 INSC 973
Land Acquisition — National Highways Act, 1956 — Competent Authority's Determination vs. Arbitrator's Award - Nature of Section 3G(1) determination vis-à-vis Section 3G(5) Arbitral Award — Held: The initial determination of compensation by the Competent Authority under Section 3G(1) of the NH Act corresponds to an "award" passed under Section 11 of the 1894 Act (or Section 23 of the 2013 Act) - The determination of a dispute by an Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act is akin to a reference determination by a Civil Court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act - for the purposes of attracting Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, the relevant cut-off event is the date of the Competent Authority's determination under Section 3G(1) and not the date of the Arbitrator's award. [Relied On Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129; Paras 19–24] Manav Bhanot v National Highway Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2026 INSC 973
Land Acquisition — National Highways Act, 1956 — Sections 3G(1), 3G(5), and 3J — Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 — Section 24(1)(a) and Section 105 read with Fourth Schedule — Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Applicability of 2013 Act vs. 1894 Act for calculating Solatium, Interest, and Interest on Solatium for NH Act acquisitions — Relevant cut-off date — Held: Although landowners acquired under the NH Act are entitled to solatium, interest, and interest on solatium, the rate and statutory regime governing such benefits depend upon the date on which the initial compensation determination (award) was made by the Competent Authority under Section 3G(1) - Under Section 105(1) & (3) of the 2013 Act, a one-year hiatus was provided for Schedule IV enactments; the 2013 Act compensation provisions were extended to NH Act acquisitions only with effect from 01.01.2015 (via Ordinance 9 of 2014, Ordinance 5 of 2015, and subsequent notification) - if the Competent Authority's determination under Section 3G(1) was passed prior to 01.01.2015, benefits must be computed exclusively under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, even if the Arbitrator's award under Section 3G(5) was rendered subsequent to 01.01.2015. [Paras 11–13, 17-19, 22- 27] Manav Bhanot v National Highway Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2026 INSC 973
Land Revenue Act, 1964 (Karnataka) — Section 56(1) read with Proviso to Section 56(3) & Section 52 — Scope of Revisional Power and Limitation - The revisional power under Section 56(1) in respect of an un-appealed order cannot be initiated beyond the statutory limitation of three years prescribed under the proviso to Section 56(3) - Section 52 permits the application of Sections 4, 5, and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 only to appeals, not to revisions under Section 56 - Provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be imported or "smuggled in" to bypass, override, or defeat the express limitation bar contained in the proviso to Section 56(3). [Paras 9-16] M.R.R. Setty (Dead), by LRs Versus Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 889 : 2026 INSC 944
Land Revenue Act, 1964 (Karnataka) — Sections 24 and 25 (as amended by Karnataka Land Revenue (Amendment) Act, 2025) — Administrative Allotment of CTS Numbers Not an Order of a Revenue Court - The allotment of City Title Survey (CTS) numbers by a Revenue/Survey Officer is an administrative exercise, not a quasi-judicial determination between the State and a private party - the officer cannot be regarded as a "Revenue Court" within the meaning of Section 24 - The State cannot press into service the inherent power under Section 25 or its newly amended review proviso to review administrative CTS entries made decades earlier. [Paras 12, 13] M.R.R. Setty (Dead), by LRs Versus Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 889 : 2026 INSC 944
Media Guidelines & Responsible Journalism — Section 72, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 & Section 23, POCSO Act - Media outlets, journalists, and digital platforms bear a constitutional and ethical duty of restrained, empathetic journalism - Sensationalized headlines, graphic/lurid descriptions, and insensitive phraseology cause secondary trauma and are strictly deprecated - Direct or indirect disclosure of the identity of sexual assault victims or minors is statutorily prohibited under Section 72 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 23 of the POCSO Act - Media houses urged to provide dedicated columns/airtime pro bono displaying emergency helplines and protective systems. [Relied on Avishek Goenka v. Union of India & Anr., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 265 of 2011; Paras 17-19] In Re: Recent Rape Incidents in Delhi NCR, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 996
Motor Vehicles & Public Transport Safety — Total Prohibition on Window Films / Tinted Glass - Law enforcement authorities directed to strictly enforce complete prohibitions against aftermarket tinted, black, or solar-control films on vehicle windows, noting that such concealment facilitates heinous offences - Police ordered to impound non-compliant vehicles, strip illegal films, and prosecute violators without exceptions - Delhi High Court on its administrative side directed to assign the highlighted cases to designated Fast Track Special Courts and ensure trials conclude expeditiously, preferably within one year from commencement - High Court Registrar General directed to place comprehensive pendency and disposal data on record. [Para 12-14] In Re: Recent Rape Incidents in Delhi NCR, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 996
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Distinction between Original Stage and Appellate Stage Objections — Inapplicability of Section 21(1) CPC at Threshold - An objection to territorial competence raised at the threshold before the Claims Tribunal must be adjudicated strictly within the parameters of Section 166(2) of the Act of 1988 - The condition precedent of establishing a "failure of justice" under Section 21(1) of the CPC is attracted exclusively when an objection to territorial jurisdiction is raised or entertained at an appellate or post-award stage - Where an objection is raised prior to adjudication on merits, Section 21(1) CPC does not bar the Tribunal or High Court from ordering transmission/transfer of the claim to the competent forum. [Relied on United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta & Others, 2011 INSC 759; Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2008 INSC 1453; Balveer Batra v. New India Assurance Company, 2024 INSC 361; Paras 10-14] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Insurer is Not a "Defendant" for Conferring Jurisdiction under Section 166(2) - The phrase 'within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides' in Section 166(2) refers to the owner and/or driver of the offending vehicle, and does not encompass an insurer - Impleading an insurance company as a defendant is not mandatory under the Act - A claimant cannot invoke the territorial jurisdiction of a Tribunal solely on the ground that the insurance company maintains a branch or head office within that territory when the accident took place outside and neither the claimant nor the owner/driver resides or carries on business there. [Paras 8 - 15] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Right of Impleaded Insurer to Object to Territorial Jurisdiction - While an insurer cannot demand to be made a party as of right and is typically issued notice under Section 149(2), if a claimant elects to voluntarily implead the insurer as a contesting party respondent, the insurer acquires the right to resist the claim on all available legal grounds without restrictions, including challenging the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal. [Paras 6 - 14] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Claim of Status as Legally Wedded Wife – Burden of Proof – Apportionment of Compensation - The claimant asserted the status of being the legally wedded wife of the deceased - The burden of proof, even in summary proceedings before the MACT, rests squarely on the claimant. In the absence of documentary evidence proving the factum of marriage, and where employment records indicated the status as "fiancé" without financial dependency, the claimant cannot be treated as a legally wedded wife - the High Court's equitable apportionment awarding her a share (Rs. 7,50,000/-) warrants no interference - Mathematical precision is not always sought or applied by courts; claimants are awarded just and fair compensation where what is due is not denied and what is undeserving is not awarded. [Paras 7 - 15] Reliance General Insurance Company v. Priyanka Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 897 : 2026 INSC 950
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Standard of Proof in MACT Proceedings – Preponderance of Probabilities - Proceedings before the Claims Tribunal are summary in nature - The issue of rashness and negligence is to be adjudicated on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, and not on the strict criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt - Registration of FIR and filing of chargesheet discharge the primary onus of proving negligence against the offending driver. [Relied on Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, (2009) 6 SCC 121; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & Ors., (2017) 16 SCC 680; Munna Lal Jain v. Vipin Kumar Sharma, (2015) 6 SCC 347; Sube Singh v. Shyam Singh, (2018) 3 SCC 18; Manjuri Bera v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., (2007) 10 SCC 643; Paras 6 - 12] Reliance General Insurance Company v. Priyanka Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 897 : 2026 INSC 950
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166(2) read with Section 168(1) and Section 169 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 20 & Section 21(1) — Motor Accident Claims — Territorial Jurisdiction — Forum Convenience — Meaning of "Defendant Resides" vis-à-vis Insurance Company - Scope of Territorial Options under Section 166(2) - Under Section 166(2) of the Act of 1988, an application for compensation can be instituted at the option of the claimant before the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over: (i) the area where the accident occurred; (ii) the local limits where the claimant resides; (iii) the local limits where the claimant carries on business; or (iv) the local limits where the defendant resides - The legislature has consciously omitted the phrase "or carries on business" with respect to the defendant, which departs from the broader terminology used in Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. [Paras 7-10] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 166 and 168 – Fatal Accident – Multiplier Determination for Bachelor Deceased – Age of Deceased vs. Age of Dependents/Parents – Multiplier Matrix - In motor accident compensation claims arising out of the death of a bachelor, the multiplier to be applied must be determined strictly based on the age of the deceased and not on the age of the dependents or parents - The legal position is settled and no longer res integra - The deceased was 33 years old, falling squarely in the age bracket of 31 to 35 years, which attracts a multiplier of 16 as per the standardised matrix - The Tribunal and the High Court correctly applied the multiplier of 16. [Paras 13, 14] Reliance General Insurance Company v. Priyanka Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 897 : 2026 INSC 950
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 52-A — Non-compliance with statutory sampling procedure — Total failure to draw samples before a Magistrate - While minor procedural delay or lapses under Section 52-A may not automatically vitiate the trial in the absence of prejudice, total non-compliance with the statutory mandate to draw representative samples in the presence of an Executive/Judicial Magistrate and certify the inventory strikes at the root of the prosecution case, rendering the integrity of the seizure and sampling process wholly doubtful. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; Bharat Aambale v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 8 SCC 452; Nadeem Ahamed v. State of West Bengal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1779; Paras 31–34] Abdul Rajik v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2026 INSC 1001
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 42 and 50 — Applicability — Search of bags carried in open public place - Provisions of Section 42 and Section 50 of the NDPS Act do not apply where the recovery of contraband is effected from bags being carried by suspects apprehended from an open public place rather than through personal search of their bodies or search of an enclosed building/conveyance. [Para 16] Abdul Rajik v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2026 INSC 1001
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8, 20(b)(ii)(B), 20(b)(ii)(C), and Section 52-A — Search, Seizure & Sampling — Link Evidence & Chain of Custody — Unexplained delay and custody gap fatal to prosecution - To admit and rely upon a Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report in NDPS prosecutions, the prosecution must establish an unbroken chain of custody and proper link evidence demonstrating that the samples were safely kept, properly sealed, and remained untampered with from the point of seizure until receipt at the laboratory - Where sample packets do not bear identifying marks or signatures of the accused/panch witnesses, maalkhana registers lack corresponding exit entries, carrier witnesses are not examined, and an unexplained gap of five days exists between dispatch from the SP Office and receipt at the FSL, the link evidence totally collapses - Once the FSL report is rendered unreliable and discarded, no admissible evidence survives to prove the nature of the seized substance. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Tara Singh, (2011) 11 SCC 559; Paras 20–29, 30-35] Abdul Rajik v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2026 INSC 1001
National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 – Reversing the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court held – i. Traceability of Power and Competence of Executive Committee - The power to call for an annual Performance Appraisal Report is explicitly traceable to Section 12(k) of the NCTE Act, which empowers the Council to evolve a suitable performance appraisal system, norms, and mechanisms for enforcing accountability on recognised institutions - In its 48th General Body meeting held on 05.02.2019, the Council approved the substitution of 'Annual Renewal of Recognition' with the requirement of submitting a 'PAR' through a proforma to be developed by the NCTE - Under Section 19 of the NCTE Act, the Executive Committee is the statutory body entrusted to discharge functions assigned to it by the Council - It acts as the executive arm to implement the Council's decisions; thus, issuing the Public Notice through its Member Secretary to operationalise the PAR mechanism was well within jurisdiction and legal authority; ii. Incidental and Ancillary Powers of Regulators - Even absent explicit statutory empowerment, such a regulatory measure is inherently incidental and ancillary to the duties, functions, and mandate of a statutory regulator charged with achieving planned and coordinated development and maintenance of standards in teacher education - Given that NCTE itself is subjected to a performance audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), it is natural and incidental that it requires stakeholders within its regulatory sweep to furnish appraisal reports; iii. Nature of Charges Levied - The requirement to remit ₹5,000/- or ₹15,000/- while uploading the PAR on the portal is in the nature of a processing fee, which falls squarely within the incidental and ancillary powers of the statutory regulator; iv. Scope of Judicial Review over Regulatory Authorities - When examining the exercise of power by a statutory regulator, Courts must evaluate whether the authority has violated any mandatory statutory provision or transgressed its vested power, rather than adopting a pedantic or hyper-technical approach - Constitutional Courts owe a positive duty to ensure regulators exercise their statutory functions effectively, efficiently, and in an accountable manner; v. Constitutional Framework & Seven Duty Bearers of Elementary Education - Under the constitutional mandate of Article 21A read with Section 23 of the RTE Act and the NCTE Act, quality teacher education is fundamental to the life and development of children - To the five duty bearers recognized in Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Appropriate Governments, Local Authority, Neighbouring Schools, Parents/Guardians, and Elementary School Teachers), two additional duty bearers are added - (vi) The Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs) recognized under Section 2(e) of the NCTE Act, and (vii) The National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) - The regulatory duties entrusted to the NCTE and its Executive Committee are of the highest order among duty bearers; vi. Principle of Accountability in Administrative Law - Accountability is an essential principle of administrative law, comprising three constituent dimensions: (a) Responsibility (identifying duties and obligations), (b) Answerability (reasoned decision-making), and (c) Enforceability (corrective measures against dereliction of duty). [Relied on Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 56; Vijay Rajmohan v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2023) 1 SCC 329; Paras 8-25] National Council For Teachers Education v. Association of NCTE Approved Colleges Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 894 : 2026 INSC 953
National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 – Section 12(k), Section 12, Section 19, Section 17 & Section 31 – Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 23 – Regulatory Powers of NCTE and Executive Committee – Mandatory Submission of Annual Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) by Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs) – Levy of Processing Fee - Regulatory jurisdiction and powers of the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) and its Executive Committee – Validity of Public Notice mandating annual Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) with processing fees - The challenge before the Court pertained to the Public Notice dated 22.09.2019 issued by the Member Secretary of the Executive Committee of NCTE, mandating all recognised Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs) to submit an online annual Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) along with requisite fees (₹5,000/- for Central/State Government institutions and ₹15,000/- for all other categories), failing which action under Section 17(1) of the NCTE Act would be attracted - The Division Bench of the High Court had set aside the Public Notice on technical grounds, holding that the specific proforma was not formally placed before and approved by the Council and that power under Section 12(k) had not been delegated under Section 27 to the Member Secretary. National Council For Teachers Education v. Association of NCTE Approved Colleges Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 894 : 2026 INSC 953
National Security Act, 1980 — Section 3(2) — Mere filing of charge-sheet and pendency of criminal cases — Invocation of preventive detention to defeat bail — Subversion of criminal process - The mere filing of a charge-sheet amounts only to an opinion of the investigating agency and does not constitute conclusive proof of guilt or disturbance of public order - While the pendency of a criminal prosecution is not an absolute bar to preventive detention (Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal affirmed), invoking preventive detention on the very same allegations when an accused has obtained or is likely to obtain bail demonstrates that the power was used punitively rather than preventively, seeking to subvert judicial orders of bail - The mere existence of multiple cases is not per se a ground for detention absent cogent, proximate material showing an imperative need to prevent future prejudicial activity - Impugned detention order and confirmation set aside with costs of Rs. 10 Lakh imposed on the State. [Relied on Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244; Paras 49–59, 63–69] Mulla Afroz v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2026 INSC 1067
National Security Act, 1980 — Section 3(2), Section 8 — Scope of Judicial Review — Non-disclosure and non-supply of foundational material - Where the grounds of detention asserted that the detenu was identified as the mastermind via CCTV footages and call records with a "Boss," but neither the CCTV recordings nor the call records/mobile data formed part of the 22 documents relied upon or supplied to the detenu or produced before the Court, reliance on such undisclosed material is fatal to the detention order - A detention order cannot be founded on material that was never furnished to the detenu. [Relied on Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipur, (2010) 9 SCC 618; Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587; State of Rajasthan v. Talib Khan, (1996) 11 SCC 393; Paras 44–48] Mulla Afroz v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2026 INSC 1067
Partnership Act, 1932 — Dissolution vs. Retirement — Distinction and Settlement Mode - Distinction between Retirement under Section 37 and Dissolution under Section 48 — Held: While on retirement the reconstituted firm continues and the retiring partner's dues are settled as a simple debt (compensable with interest as on the retirement date), in the case of a dissolution of the firm, the entire partnership comes to an end and all accounts and surplus residues must be wound up and distributed strictly under Section 48. [Relied on Karumuthu Thiagarajan Chettiar v. E.M. Muthappa Chettiar, AIR 1961 SC 1225; Pamuru Vishnu Vinodh Reddy v. Chillakuru Chandrasekhara Reddy, (2003) 3 SCC 445; Guru Nanak Industries v. Amar Singh, (2021) 14 SCC 672; Paras 50–52] V. Sumitra Reddy v. K. Ranganadha Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 918 : 2026 INSC 979
Partnership Act, 1932 — Sections 4, 14, 46, and 48 — Nature of Partnership Assets Post-Dissolution — Continuation by Reconstituted Firm Without Settlement - Right of continuing partners to retain erstwhile firm's properties — Held: A partnership firm is not an independent legal entity; its assets belong to all partners in proportion to their shares - Continuing partners who reconstitute a new firm cannot retain the properties of the dissolved firm unless they purchase them from the dissolved partnership upon mutual agreement - Unilateral retention of such property by a reconstituted firm is illegal - Restricting an outgoing partner's entitlement to the asset valuation that existed decades prior (e.g., in 1983) while continuing partners retain appreciated property would cause serious prejudice, work gross injustice, and defeat equity. [Paras 39, 44-60] V. Sumitra Reddy v. K. Ranganadha Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 918 : 2026 INSC 979
Partnership Act, 1932 — Sections 7, 43, 46, 47, and 48 — Dissolution of Partnership at Will — Final Decree Proceedings — Valuation of Immovable Partnership Assets - Whether in the dissolution of a partnership at will, an outgoing/dissolving partner's share in immovable assets is restricted to the valuation as on the date of dissolution or on the date of assessment/liquidation in final decree proceedings — Held: Outgoing partner is entitled to their proportionate share in the real/market value realized upon liquidation or current valuation, and not restricted to historical valuation as on the date of dissolution - The date of dissolution (fixed in the preliminary decree) is relevant strictly for ascertainment and settlement of business profits and losses, and has no bearing on the partner's right to receive their proportionate value in the residue of the assets - Unless all partners mutually agree to buy out the outgoing partner's share at current market rates, the assets must be liquidated by public auction and proceeds distributed rateably under Section 48(b). [Paras 40–46, 55 - 60] V. Sumitra Reddy v. K. Ranganadha Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 918 : 2026 INSC 979
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 201 Part II – Causing disappearance of evidence of offence – Essential Ingredients – Acquittal of main offence – Legality of conviction - A conviction under Section 201 Part II IPC cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that the main crime was committed, that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed, and that the accused caused evidence thereof to disappear with the specific intention of screening the offender from legal punishment - Where the prosecution fails to establish the offences of dowry death and murder under Sections 302 and 304B IPC, resulting in an unassailed acquittal of the accused for those substantive offences, an isolated conviction under Section 201 IPC cannot be maintained and must be set aside. [Relied on Suleman Rehiman Mulani & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (1967) SCC OnLine SC 337; Kedar Nath & Ors. v. State of M.P., (1993) Supp (1) SCC 7; Para 32] Mahavir @ Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 892 : 2026 INSC 942
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 — Medical Evidence — Discrepancy Regarding Time of Incident and Absence of DNA Profiling - Where the medical officer opined that the victim's genital injuries were 5 to 7 days old with foul pus and maggots, the prosecution's narrative that the crime was committed only 2 days prior stood contradicted and unreconciled - in the absence of any DNA profiling or serological matching connecting the biological fluids (sperm) found on the victim to the accused, the prosecution failed to establish a conclusive nexus, entitling the appellant to the benefit of doubt. [Relied on Rameshwar Singh v. State of J&K, (1971) 2 SCC 715; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158; Paras 33–36, 51–59] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 (prior to 2013 amendment) read with Section 366 — Appreciation of Prosecutrix's Sole Testimony — Rule against Selective Acceptance and Partial Rejection of Evidence - While conviction for rape can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, her testimony must be of unimpeachable character and inspire the confidence of the Court - There cannot be partial rejection of the evidence of the prosecutrix to record acquittal under Section 366 IPC (holding she was a consenting major who travelled willingly) and simultaneous partial acceptance of the very same testimony to convict the accused under Section 376 IPC - Where the prosecutrix was determined to be a major (approx. 19 years old) who accompanied the accused voluntarily for 5–6 days across busy markets, intersections, and public transport without raising any hue, cry, or alarm, her testimony was a "bundle of contradictions" and not credible. [Paras 20, 20.3, 22, 22.1, 24, 25, 28, 29] Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2026 INSC 1054
Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 148, 149, 506 — Murder — Benefit of Doubt Where Links in Chain are Missing - Mere prior threats, generalized presence of villagers, or recovery of unlinked weapons/articles from the crime spot do not establish authorship of the crime - Where the prosecution alleges death was caused by a 53 kg laterite stone but fails to produce evidence as to who brought it, fails to recover the weapon, and omits to submit it for medical opinion, substantial gaps remain in the prosecution case - Where two views are reasonably possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail, entitling the appellants to an acquittal. [Relied on Tamilselvan v. State, (2008) 7 SCC 755; Kamal v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 93; Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 111; Paras 33–35] Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2026 INSC 1015
Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 148, 149, 506 — Murder — Circumstantial Evidence — Appreciation of Evidence — Night Identification — Rejection of Ocular Evidence - Unreliability of Identification in Pitch Dark Night: The testimony of related eye-witnesses alleging identification of assailants from a distance of 60 cubits during a pitch-dark night cannot be accepted - Where the source of light is a torch flashed by the assailants themselves towards the victim, it would partially blind the witnesses looking from a distance rather than enable clear identification of the assailants (Paragraph 20). Identification based merely on the sound of assault during a dark night is inherently weak, improbable, and liable to be discarded. [Paras 9, 18-29] Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2026 INSC 1015
Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 148, 149, 506 — Murder — Standard of Proof in Circumstantial Evidence — "Panchsheel" Requirements - Where direct ocular evidence is rejected, conviction can only be sustained if circumstantial evidence satisfies the Panchsheel test enunciated in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (Paragraphs 22, 23) - The circumstances must be conclusively established ("must or should be proved", not merely "may be proved"), forming an unbroken chain that points solely to the guilt of the accused and excludes every hypothesis of innocence. [Paras 24 - 32] Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2026 INSC 1015
Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 201, and 377 — Murder, Causing Disappearance of Evidence, and Unnatural Offences — Circumstantial Evidence — Missing Links in Chain of Events — Benefit of Doubt - Where conviction rests solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to establish an unbroken and complete chain of events leading solely to the hypothesis of the accused's guilt - Where there are significant gaps including unexplained seizure of ordinary consumer articles (generic packet of namkeen) before any disclosure, ante-timed/contradictory custody prior to the alleged extra-judicial confession, invalid reliance on Section 27 recoveries, uncorroborated "last seen" theory, and lack of forensic DNA matching the chain remains broken - Conviction and sentence set aside; appellant extended the benefit of doubt and ordered to be released forthwith after serving over 16 years of incarceration – Appeal allowed. [Paras 27–36, 46–50] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 306 read with Section 107 — Abetment of Suicide — Matrimonial Discord — Necessary Ingredients — Mens Rea and Actus Reus - To sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC, specific abetment as contemplated under Section 107 IPC is an indispensable requirement - There must be clear evidence of active instigation, intentional aiding, or positive acts by the accused intended to drive the deceased to commit suicide - Mere marital disputes, ordinary domestic discord, or general allegations of harassment do not, ipso facto, satisfy the ingredients of Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC in the absence of any instigation or mens rea - Where the husband, upon learning that his wife ingested poison, immediately summoned medical assistance and rushed her to the hospital, such bona fide conduct militates against an intention to abet suicide. [Relied on Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, 2010 INSC 521; Paras 14, 15] Sanjay Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2026 INSC 948
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 498-A & Section 306 — Cruelty and Abetment of Suicide — Vague and General Allegations — Failure of Prosecution to Prove Charges - Where the prosecution witnesses (relatives of the victim) depose in general and vague terms without citing specific incidents of dowry demand, cruelty, or torture, and their statements suffer from material omissions and improvements not disclosed during the police investigation, the charges under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC cannot be held to be proved beyond reasonable doubt - The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal recorded by the Sessions Court without coming to close quarters with the reasons assigned by the trial court and by resting its conviction on findings unsupported by the record. Acquittal restored. [Paras 8-17] Sanjay Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2026 INSC 948
Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 read with Section 34 – Sentencing Discretion of the Supreme Court – Modification of Sentence – Factors to be Considered – Held - In determining an appropriate special category sentence, Constitutional Courts must apply the principle of proportionality, balancing the aggravating factors of the crime with the mitigating factors of the convict - While the premeditated murder of a mother and two minor children by slitting their throats was grave, the appellants had already served over 11 and 12 years of actual custody and demonstrated satisfactory prison discipline - ordinary life imprisonment with early remission would be inadequate, but life imprisonment for the rest of their natural lives would be disproportionate - The Supreme Court, exercising its powers as a Constitutional Court, substituted the Sessions Court's illegal direction and sentenced the appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a fixed term of 25 years without the benefit of statutory remission. [Relied On Navas alias Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, (2024) 14 SCC 82; Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767; Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Paras 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34] Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2026 INSC 1048
Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 vs Sections 376AB, 376DA, 376DB – Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 – Statutory Interpretation of "Imprisonment for Life" – Held - Where the Parliament intended imprisonment for life to mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life excluding ordinary remissions, it enacted express statutory provisions to that effect, as seen in Sections 376AB, 376DA, and 376DB inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 - The Parliament chose to retain Section 302 IPC in its existing form without such express stipulations - It is impermissible for a Sessions Court to read into Section 302 IPC an enhanced punishment that the legislature chose not to insert, thereby supplementing the statutory penal code - Prescribing punishments is an exclusively legislative function. [Relied On Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Paras 14, 22, 23, 24] Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2026 INSC 1048
Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 376AB, 376(2)(f), 376(2)(n), 201 – POCSO Act; Sections 5, 6, 29 – Plea of Alibi – Held - A plea of alibi must be established with certainty to demonstrate that presence at the scene was impossible - Since the appellant's own testimony placed him back at the house prior to the throttling, the alibi collapsed - The foundational facts of penetrative sexual assault having been established through direct ocular, dying declaration, and medical evidence, Section 29 POCSO statutory presumption operates, and the false counter-plea of the appellant provides an additional link under Section 106 Evidence Act. [Relied On Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 166; Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1997) 1 SCC 283; Paras 110, 111, 113, 114, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050
Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 53 & 45 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 432 to 435 – Incompetence of Sessions Court to Impose Special Category Sentence Curtailing Statutory Remission – Held - (i) While imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 IPC means imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life of the convict, such sentence is inherently subject to the statutory powers of remission and commutation vested in the appropriate Government under Sections 432 to 435 CrPC; (ii) A Court of Session, while sentencing an accused to life imprisonment for murder under Section 302 IPC, is not competent to issue a direction that the convict shall "remain in prison till the rest of their life" so as to exclude or curtail the Government's statutory remission powers; (iii) The power to evolve and award a special category of sentence specifying a term of imprisonment beyond 14 years or for the remainder of natural life without the benefit of statutory remission as an alternative to the death penalty belongs exclusively to the Constitutional Courts (the Supreme Court and the High Courts) and cannot be exercised by the Sessions Court or any other inferior court. [Relied On Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767; Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Kiran v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2863; Ravinder Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 2 SCC 323; Paras 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25-34] Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2026 INSC 1048
Precedents — Ratio Decidendi — Application of Precedent to Differing Facts - A decision is an authority only for what it actually decides - What constitutes the ratio decidendi is the rule deducible from the application of law to the specific facts and circumstances of the case, and not conclusions based on superficially similar facts; one additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions. [Relied on Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, (1976) 3 SCC 334; Paras 10–12] Regional Provident Fund Commissioner II v. Ms Mamta Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 946 : 2026 INSC 1003
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Appreciation of Evidence — Discrepancies between Complainant and Trap/Shadow Witnesses - Where the shadow witness and official independent witness admitted during cross-examination that the alleged handing over or recovery of the tainted bribe money did not occur in their presence, and there were unresolved material contradictions regarding the exact location of recovery (shirt pocket versus trouser pocket), the prosecution failed to establish the foundational facts of demand and acceptance beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction set aside. [Relied on P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152; Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; Aman Bhatia v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013; Paras 17-22] Jaswinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2026 INSC 1031
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) — Bribery — Proof of demand and acceptance is sine qua non for establishing guilt under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) — Mere recovery of tainted money insufficient - Mere recovery of tainted currency notes or phenolphthalein powder reaction, in the absence of cogent evidence establishing a prior demand and subsequent acceptance of illegal gratification, is fatal to the prosecution's case and cannot form the basis of conviction under Sections 7 or 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Act - Proof of demand is the gravamen of the offence - In the absence of primary direct oral or documentary evidence or reliable circumstantial evidence demonstrating that the public servant voluntarily demanded and accepted gratification knowing it to be a bribe, an inferential deduction of guilt cannot be drawn. [Paras 13-21] Jaswinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2026 INSC 1031
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 — Illegal gratification — Intermediary/Conduit — Trap operation — Failure to establish complete chain of demand, acceptance, and recovery qua the accused — Non-applicability of statutory presumption - Mere recovery of tainted currency notes from an intermediary/conduit who invokes the name of the accused public servant cannot automatically result in criminal liability being fastened on the public servant - Where the investigating agency prematurely aborts the trap operation at the stage of recovery from the intermediary instead of allowing the chain to run its course to verify if the money was actually intended to reach or did reach the public servant, the link remains incomplete - Proof of demand is sine qua non for establishing the offence under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d), and statutory presumption under Section 20 arises only after foundational facts of voluntary acceptance/obtainment are established - Held, conviction cannot be sustained where residual gaps in receipt are bridged by mere speculation. [Relied on C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779; P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, (2015) 10 SCC 152; Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; State by Lokayuktha Police v. K. Rangayya, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 963; Paras 44–51, 66–74] Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 945 : 2026 INSC 999
Preventive Policing & Public Safety Audits — Interim Measures Directed - Pending review of status reports concerning the operational status of the National Database on Sexual Offenders (NDSO), Investigation Tracking System for Sexual Offences (ITSSO), Emergency Response Support System (ERSS - 112), Women Helpline (181), and Safe City Projects, the Court issued urgent time-bound directives - (i) Commissioner of Police to form dedicated district teams headed by an officer not below the rank of DSP to audit vulnerable pockets and prepare district-wise vulnerability maps; (ii) Continuous patrolling and deployment of security in public parks and transit hubs; (iii) Comprehensive lighting and CCTV audits to eradicate blind spots; (iv) Integration of citizen grievance portals (e.g., CM Jan Sunwai Portal) with geo-tagging to track and remediate infrastructure defects. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12] In Re: Recent Rape Incidents in Delhi NCR, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 996
Private International Law — Matrimonial Proceedings — Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens — Connecting Factors - Where both parties, despite solemnizing their marriage in India, lived together in London for years, established their matrimonial home and substantial financial arrangements in the UK, and the wife was a habitual resident of the UK, significant connecting factors pointed towards the UK being the forum conveniens - The UK Family Court being seized of the forum and jurisdictional objections, the Trial Court in India committed a patent error in issuing an ex-parte anti-suit injunction restraining the wife from pursuing her matrimonial claims in the UK. [Para 5] Mihir Prakash Bajoria v. Vidushi Jain Bajoria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 979 : 2026 INSC 1034
Prohibition Act, 1949 (Gujarat) — Section 98(2) read with Section 132 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 451, Section 457 [Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 497, Section 503] — Seizure of Vehicle carrying Prohibited Liquor — Interim Custody / Release of Vehicle pending Trial — Scope of Statutory Embargo - Section 98(2) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949 does not operate as an absolute embargo against the release of a seized vehicle on interim custody pending trial - The second part of Section 98(2) and Section 451 CrPC [Section 497 BNSS] operate in distinct fields - Section 98 deals with confiscation of articles when an offence has been committed, and the second part of sub-section (2) comes into play when the seized article liable to be confiscated (and not required as evidence) is forwarded to the Collector under Section 132(b) - when the seized property/vehicle is produced before the jurisdictional Criminal Court under Section 132(a) during inquiry or investigation, the Court is competent to exercise powers under Section 451 CrPC to pass appropriate orders for its proper custody - Keeping seized conveyances parked indefinitely at police stations or court premises exposes them to decay, cannibalisation, loss of roadworthiness, and causes undue economic hardship to owners without serving any fruitful purpose - Courts must dispose of interim custody applications expeditiously and judiciously by adopting safeguards such as Panchama's, photographs, videography, and imposing appropriate surety/bonds rather than leaving vehicles in a state of suspended animation - The High Court and the Courts below erred in declining interim release solely relying on Section 98(2) of the Prohibition Act - Vehicle directed to be released on interim custody subject to conditions. [Relied on Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. The State of Gujarat, 2024 INSC 285; Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283; Basavva Kom Dyamangouda Patil (Smt.) v. State of Mysore and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 358; General Insurance Council and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, 2010 INSC 225; Distinguished from State of Madhya Pradesh v. Uday Singh, (2020) 4 SCC (Cri) 473; Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2013 INSC 69; Paras 10-17] ABC Express v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 885 : 2026 INSC 940
Property Law – Title vs. Revenue Entries – Evidentiary Value of Jamabandi / Revenue Entries – "Gair Marusi Bila Lagan Bawaja Dharam Arth" - Entries in revenue records are maintained primarily for fiscal purposes; they neither create nor extinguish title to immovable property, nor do they constitute conclusive proof of ownership - The revenue description "gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth" (non-occupancy tenant without payment of rent on account of religious purpose) indicates that possession was associated with religious/charitable purposes, but it does not, by itself, establish a completed and irrevocable dedication divesting the owner of title, nor does it establish hostile assertion of ownership. [Paras 23 - 42] Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 923 : 2026 INSC 983
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Section 10 read with Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, Section 75 & IPC, Sections 323, 504, 506 — False Implication in Matrimonial Discord — Quashing of FIR - Following extensive matrimonial and custody litigation where the father had attained final custody orders up to the Supreme Court, the mother lodged an FIR alleging aggravated sexual assault of the minor child by the father - A comprehensive multi-disciplinary investigation conducted by a Special Committee of the CBI, assisted by child and adolescent psychiatrists and clinical psychologists from NIMHANS, established that the child displayed no behavioural indicators or signs of sexual trauma, the CCTV and witness statements contradicted the allegations, and the narrative was shaped by prolonged exposure to family conflict and loyalty dilemmas - Held, the prosecution was a gross abuse of process engineered solely to create a ruse to regain custody - FIR and consequential proceedings quashed. [Paras 18, 24–34, 78, 79] R v. E, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 982 : 2026 INSC 1049
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Section 34 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Section 94 – Determination of Age of Child/Victim – Inadmissibility of Baptismal Certificate Alone - The procedure for determining the age of a victim under the POCSO Act is strictly governed by the hierarchy of documents prescribed under Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 - Age must be proved firstly by the date of birth certificate from the school / matriculation certificate; in its absence, by a birth certificate issued by a corporation, municipal authority, or panchayat; and only in the absence of both, by an ossification test or latest medical age determination test - A Baptismal Certificate issued by a church authority, even if supported by oral testimony of parents, does not fall within the statutory classes of documents enumerated in Section 94 of the JJ Act - In the absence of statutory certificates or an ossification test, the prosecution fails to establish minority, rendering conviction and enhanced punishment under Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act unsustainable. [Paras 35- 38] Pynchemalangaki Bareh v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 924 : 2026 INSC 984
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 35 (erstwhile Sections 41, 41-A CrPC) — Dual Threshold Test & Safeguards against Unwarranted Arrests - Taking judicial notice of the alarming rise in false POCSO complaints by warring spouses as an "arm-twisting tactic" to settle scores or defeat custody claims, the Supreme Court laid down mandatory safeguards where two threshold conditions exist - (i) an offence under POCSO is alleged against a parent or family member residing under the same roof, and (ii) an existing matrimonial dispute of any form exists between the parents – i. Safeguard 1 (Police Investigation) - The Investigating Officer (IO) or Special Juvenile Police Unit (SJPU) shall not act in haste to make mechanical arrests - Discretion under Section 35 BNSS requires an objective "reason to believe" - The IO/SJPU shall mandatorily engage the services of an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry/clinical psychology (drawn from the DCPU register under Rule 5 of POCSO Rules, 2020) to conduct an independent evaluation of the child before taking coercive steps - In exceptional cases where material is palpable, this may be dispensed with for reasons recorded in writing - The report is an aid to exercise discretion and not the sole basis for a chargesheet or closure; ii. Safeguard 2 (Private Complaints under Section 33 POCSO Act) - Where a private complaint alleging POCSO offences is directly filed before the Special Court amid matrimonial strife, the Court must not take cognizance or issue summons mechanically - The Special Court shall order an evaluation by a child psychiatrist/clinical psychologist before forming an opinion on issuing process, unless exceptional circumstances warrant dispensing with it by written order; iii. Safeguard 3 (Guardianship & Custody Courts) - The mere registration of a POCSO FIR against a parent shall not ipso facto disqualify the parent or defeat their claim for custody; the Family Court must independently examine the prima facie veracity of the allegations on a case-to-case basis. [Relied on Geddam Jhansi and Anr. v. State of Telangana and Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263; Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana & Anr., (2025) 3 SCC 756; Ishwar Chand Sharma and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1004; Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 260; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273; Paras 48-63, 64-70, 73-77] R v. E, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 982 : 2026 INSC 1049
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) — Pending Chargesheet against Father — Disqualification from Custody — Pre-mature High Court Comments on Quashing/Merits - Where the minor son made disclosures before psychiatrists at NIMHANS resulting in the lodging of an FIR and filing of a chargesheet under the POCSO Act against the father, granting custody of the child to the father while he is facing criminal prosecution is unwarranted, unjustified, and contrary to the paramount welfare of the child - the High Court erred in making observations in a guardianship appeal labelling the POCSO allegations as a "motivated counterblast," especially when quashing proceedings were pending before the High Court of Calcutta; such adverse observations were premature and expunged - Even if the father were to succeed in quashing the FIR, the child's spontaneous apprehensions and safety cannot be subordinated to the father's claim for custody. [Paras 46(ii), 52 – 57] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) — Sections 29, 30, and 6 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 363 — Statutory Presumption of Guilt — Reverse Burden of Proof — Standard of Proof on Prosecution vs. Accused — Rebuttal of Presumption — Medical & Forensic Evidence Contradicting Oral Testimony - The statutory presumption of guilt under Section 29 and culpable mental state under Section 30 of the POCSO Act are rebuttable and do not dispense with the fundamental obligation of the prosecution to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt - The statutory presumption does not convert the prosecution's ipse dixit into gospel truth, nor does it absolve the trial court from critically scrutinising the evidence - The presumption only shifts the evidential burden once foundational facts are established - the accused can successfully rebut it on the standard of preponderance of probability, inter alia, by pointing out contradictions, demolishing witness credibility, demonstrating a mismatch between ocular and forensic evidence, or establishing a plausible defence such as prior enmity. [Paras 7 - 10] Deepak in JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 952 : 2026 INSC 1008
Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 — Departmental Enquiry — Principles of Natural Justice — Ex-Parte Proceedings Due to Willful Non-Appearance - Where the delinquent employee was duly served with the charge-sheet, submitted his written defence, and had notice of the date fixed for enquiry, but failed to appear despite having been declared medically "fit for travel" by a railway doctor, the Enquiry Officer committed no illegality in proceeding ex-parte - Principles of natural justice require affording a reasonable opportunity of defence, which was satisfied; an employee cannot subsequently invalidate proceedings by remaining wilfully absent. [Paras 27, 28] Union of India v. Ramdhani Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2026 INSC 1047
Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 — Section 6 & Section 9 read with Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 — Rules 20 & 43, Schedules I & II — Scope of "Appointment Shall Rest with Chief Security Officer" - The phrase "appointment of members of the Force shall rest with the Chief Security Officer" in Section 6 does not mean exclusive appointing power is retained solely by that officer - The proviso to Section 6 and Rule 20 read with Schedule I expressly authorize other superior officers, including the Assistant Security Officer/Assistant Commandant, to appoint Senior Rakshaks and Rakshaks - Rule 43 read with Schedule II explicitly empowers the Assistant Security Officer/Adjutant to impose the penalty of removal on Rakshaks - the disciplinary order passed by the Adjutant was strictly within statutory competence. [Paras 17–24] Union of India v. Ramdhani Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2026 INSC 1047
Railways Act, 1989 — Section 124-A — Bona Fide Passenger — Loss or Absence of Ticket — Initial Burden of Proof & Preponderance of Probabilities - Mere absence or non-recovery of a train ticket from the body of a deceased/injured passenger does not negate the claim of being a bona fide passenger - The initial burden of proof can be discharged by the claimants by filing an affidavit/statement on oath stating relevant facts, whereupon the burden shifts to the Railways to rebut the same - Where the father of the deceased specifically deposed on oath that his son had purchased a ticket which was lost along with personal effects, and railway witnesses admitted they never searched the victim's pockets when he was found injured, the initial burden stood discharged - Given that the victim remained hospitalised for over a month before succumbing to injuries, tickets are unlikely to be preserved in normal course - High Court erred in reversing the award on a narrow interpretation regarding non-production of ticket. [Paras 7-11] Sukhabhai Nanjibhai Makwana v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 994 : 2026 INSC 1056
Railways Act, 1989 — Section 124-A — Strict Liability Principle - Compensation under Section 124-A is governed by the principle of strict/no-fault liability - The plea of the Railways that the victim sustained a self-inflicted injury merely because he fell from a crowded general compartment while standing near the door cannot be sustained to defeat the claim - An investigation/DRM report prepared after an unexplained, inordinate delay (over seven months after the incident and prompted only after receiving notice of the claim petition) cannot be relied upon by the Railways to deny compensation - Railways cannot take advantage of their own delay in failing to conduct an expeditious and prompt inquiry as mandated under Rule 7. [Relied on Union of India v. Rina Devi, (2018) 2018 INSC 469; Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar & Others, (2008) 2008 INSC 577; Paras 5-12] Sukhabhai Nanjibhai Makwana v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 994 : 2026 INSC 1056
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 — Sections 15U and 15Z — Discrepancies in Trading Data — Remand to Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) - Scope of Appellate Powers under Section 15Z vs. Fact-Finding Powers of SAT under Section 15U — Disputed Order Book Data — Held: Supreme Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 15Z is confined to questions of law and is not the appropriate forum to resolve disputed, contradictory, and irreconcilable electronic order book/trading volume data from the NSE and BSE - SAT, being vested with the powers of a Civil Court under Section 15U (such as summoning witnesses, examining records, and issuing commissions), is properly equipped to assess evidence - The matter was remanded to SAT to independently resolve data discrepancies, reconcile conflicting internal SEBI reports, assess surrounding corroborative materials, and arrive at fresh findings on the charge of fraud within six months. [Paras 53–59] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Vedanta Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 919 : 2026 INSC 978
Securities Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2000 – Rule 21 – Inherent / Procedural Powers of the SAT – Scope and Limitations - Rule 21 of the SAT (Procedure) Rules, 2000 regulates procedural aspects before the Tribunal and cannot be invoked as a source of substantive power to issue directions of restitution or disgorgement suo motu where the original authority (MCSGFC/NCL) itself lacks the statutory jurisdiction under the parent Act to grant such relief - An appellate tribunal is a creature of statute and cannot assume substantive plenary powers exceeding those permitted by law. [Relied on SEBI v. S. Kumars Nationwide Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 2049 of 2010; Paras 22–35] Edelweiss Custodial Services Limited v. NSE Clearing Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 891 : 2026 INSC 941
Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 – Section 9(3)(b) & Section 12A – Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 – Section 11B – Power of Clearing Corporation / Member and Core Settlement Guarantee Fund Committee (MCSGFC) to Order Restitution or Monetary Penalties – Scope of Bye-laws – Power of Disgorgement - The MCSGF Committee constituted by a Clearing Corporation (NCL) has no statutory jurisdiction or authority under the Bye-laws to direct a Professional Clearing Member (PCM) to restitute liquidated securities or pay equivalent monetary amounts - Section 9(3)(b)(iv) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 empowers Stock Exchanges to make bye-laws providing for penalties such as fine, suspension, or expulsion, but expressly prohibits "any other penalty of a like nature involving the payment of money" - The extraordinary remedy of disgorgement or restitution involving monetary liability has been exclusively conferred by Parliament upon SEBI under Section 11B of the SEBI Act and Section 12A of the SCRA, and has been consciously excluded from the bye-laws of Stock Exchanges and Clearing Corporations - Directing the restitution of shares or blocking margin collaterals with an added 5% markup amounts to imposing a monetary penalty without statutory sanction - Such powers cannot be assumed or exercised under the garb of equity, justice, and good conscience. [Distinguished from Dr. Poornima Advani v. Government of NCT, (2025) 7 SCC 269; South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P. & Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 648; Kavita Trehan & Anr. v. Balsara Hygiene Products Ltd., (1994) 5 SCC 380; Paras 42–54] Edelweiss Custodial Services Limited v. NSE Clearing Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 891 : 2026 INSC 941
Securities Law – Futures & Options (F&O) Segment – Professional Clearing Member (PCM) vs. Trading Member (TM) – Absence of Privity of Contract – Obligation to Verify Individual Client Balances Prior to Liquidating Collateral - Prior to the enforcement of SEBI's daily client-level segregation and reporting mechanism (vide Circular dated 20.07.2021) and the margin pledge/re-pledge framework (dated 25.02.2020), a Professional Clearing Member (PCM) had neither privity of contract with the individual end-clients/investors of a Trading Member (TM) nor the regulatory visibility to ascertain the real-time debit or credit positions of individual constituents - Under the then-existing NCL Regulations (including Regulations 1.7 and 4.5.4) and weekly reporting Circulars, the constituent of the PCM was the TM alone, from whom collaterals were collected on a gross basis - The prohibition against using the collaterals of one constituent for another applies to a PCM only as between different TMs, and does not impose a statutory obligation on the PCM to verify constituent-wise balances within a defaulting TM before liquidating securities proffered by that TM to meet settlement shortfalls - the PCM committed no regulatory illegality in liquidating the collaterals deposited by the defaulting TM. [Paras 26–28, 33–41, 45, 50–54] Edelweiss Custodial Services Limited v. NSE Clearing Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 891 : 2026 INSC 941
Securities Law — PFUTP Regulations — Standard of Proof and Test for Establishing Market Manipulation/Fraud - Standard of Proof for Fraud under PFUTP Regulations — Preponderance of Probabilities vs. Mere Suspicion — Held - Allegations of fraud and market manipulation cannot be sustained on conjectures, surmises, or bare suspicions - While direct evidence of a meeting of minds is rarely available in securities transactions, fraud must be established on a preponderance of probabilities through a logical inferential process grounded in objective, proximate, and surrounding facts - Where no third-party investor inducement is demonstrated by SEBI, the standard of proof required is a higher degree of preponderance of probabilities, necessitating that the tactic or device resorted to admits of no explanation other than that of fraud. [Relied On KSL Industries v. The Chairman, SEBI, 2003 SCC OnLine SAT 32; SEBI v. Kishore R. Ajmera, (2016) 6 SCC 368; SEBI v. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel, (2017) 15 SCC 1; SEBI v. Terrascope Ventures Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 403; Alupro Building Systems (P) Ltd. v. CCE, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 986; Paras 38, 41-46–48, 51] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Vedanta Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 919 : 2026 INSC 978
Securities Law — SEBI (Buyback of Securities) Regulations, 1998 — Regulations 14(3) and 15B(8) — SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP Regulations) — Release of Escrow Account vs. Inquiry into Fraud - Whether release/exemption of Cash Escrow under Regulation 15B(8) of the Buyback Regulations bars independent proceedings or finding of fraud under PFUTP Regulations — Held - No. The scope of enquiry under Regulation 15B(8) is strictly confined to determining whether the escrow deposit is liable to be forfeited or released due to non-fulfilment of the mandatory 50% target under Regulation 14(3) - The statutory mechanism for escrow forfeiture neither defines nor determines fraud - The release of the escrow amount does not operate as an automatic statutory bar or confer immunity from proceedings under the PFUTP Regulations - Release of escrow is not equivalent to the absence of fraud, and both enquiries operate in completely distinct legal fields. [Paras 23–25, 32–36, 52-57] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Vedanta Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 919 : 2026 INSC 978
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) – Sections 2(1)(c), 2(1)(f), 2(1)(m), 2(1)(zb), 2(1)(zd), 13 & 14 – Enforcement of Security Interest – Assignment of Debt – Recourse to SARFAESI Act by an Assignee Bank for recovery of debt taken over from an NBFC not covered by the Act at inception – Held that a bank governed by Section 2(1)(c) of the SARFAESI Act is fully entitled to take recourse to the provisions of the SARFAESI Act to recover a debt assigned to or taken over by it from an entity (such as a Non-Banking Financial Company) that was not a notified "financial institution" under Section 2(1)(m) at the time of creation of such debt - When an institution is already one to which the SARFAESI Act applies, the acquisition of a non-performing secured loan account by it immediately clothes the said loan account with the attributes of a "secured debt" covered under the Act - It makes no legal difference whether it is the debt along with the institution that comes within the ambit of the Act or it is the debt alone that comes within the ambit by virtue of being assigned to/taken over by a qualifying bank. [Relied on M.D. Frozen Foods Exports Private Limited and others v. Hero Fincorp Limited, (2017) 16 SCC 741; Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited v. Deccan Chronicle Holdings Limited and others, (2018) 14 SCC 783; ICICI Bank Limited v. Official Liquidator of APS Star Industries Limited and others, (2010) 10 SCC 1; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, (2004) 4 SCC 311; Paras 30-36] Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Trupti Sanjay Mehta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 886 : 2026 INSC 943
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) – Scope and Object – Applicability to "Live and Owing" Debts – Purposive Interpretation of Definition Clauses – Held that the definition clauses under Section 2(1) convey the legislative intent that the Act applies to all existing loan agreements, irrespective of whether the original lender was a notified financial institution on the date of execution of the agreement - The date of classification of a debt as a non-performing asset (NPA) has no relevance, as the Act becomes applicable qua all debts "owing and live" once the institution holding the debt comes within the purview of the Act - Borrowers cannot dissect or nit-pick definition clauses under Section 2(1) to evade the Act. Borrowers who avail loans from NBFCs not initially covered under the SARFAESI Act cannot claim immunity or an inherent right to delay enforcement through time-consuming ordinary civil proceedings upon valid assignment of such debt to a covered banking institution. [Paras 17-40] Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Trupti Sanjay Mehta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 886 : 2026 INSC 943
Service Law – Fundamental Rule 56(j) – Holistic Evaluation of Service Dossier vs. Unsubstantiated Adverse Notes – Selective Application of Precedents - The Review Committee cannot selectively rely on judgments permitting consideration of past adverse entries while failing to adhere to the equally binding principles that the entire service record must be evaluated, the immediate past must be accorded due weight, and a merit-based promotion inures to the benefit of the officer - An unverified, hearsay confidential note prepared by a superior officer recording oral allegations from private industry representatives unsupported by written complaints or proof cannot form the basis of compulsory retirement of an officer with decades of unblemished service. [Relied on Baikuntha Nath Das v. District Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299; State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel, (2001) 3 SCC 314; Rajasthan SRTC v. Babu Lal Jangir, (2013) 10 SCC 551; Central Industrial Security Force v. Om Prakash, (2022) 5 SCC 100; Paras 45–57] S.S. Das v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 921 : 2026 INSC 980
Service Law – Fundamental Rule 56(j) – Premature / Compulsory Retirement – Scope of Judicial Review – Effect of Regular Promotion on Merit Preceding Compulsory Retirement – Non-punitive character of FR 56(j) is not a blanket immunity - The Supreme Court held that while an order of compulsory retirement in the public interest under FR 56(j) is not per se punitive, it is bound by the precincts of public power and cannot be elevated into a mantra to repel all judicial challenges - A merit-based promotion granted shortly before an order of compulsory retirement stands as proof of a recent, objective assessment of the officer's entire service record and fitness to shoulder higher responsibilities - Such a promotion is irreconcilable with, and directly negates, the conclusion that the officer has become 'dead wood' or is of doubtful integrity - An order of compulsory retirement cannot be invoked as a shortcut to bypass disciplinary safeguards under Article 311 of the Constitution, nor can it be used without material, to wreck vengeance, or to serve vested interests. Selective bureaucratic reliance on isolated remarks while ignoring consistent 'Outstanding' appraisals and recent promotion constitutes malice in law, perversity, and a colourable exercise of power. [Paras 41, 46, 48–51, 58–61] S.S. Das v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 921 : 2026 INSC 980
Service Law – Pending Departmental Inquiries – Relevance in National Sports Coaching Requests - The mere existence of a pending departmental inquiry cannot be treated as an automatic, inflexible disqualification to reject an application for relieving a government employee for a national sporting camp or competition - The competent authority must balance the nature of the inquiry against the limited duration and national character of the sporting assignment - A writ court adjudicating a petition for an NOC/relieving order ought not to return conclusive adverse findings on the validity of the employee's initial appointment or service qualifications when such matters are not directly in issue. [Paras 28–30] Indian Kayaking and Canoeing Association v. Union Territory of J&K, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 922 : 2026 INSC 981
Service Law — Pension — Nature of Pension — Deferred Wage and Socio-Economic Justice - Pension is neither a bounty nor an ex-gratia payment, but payment for past service rendered and a social welfare measure aimed at rendering socio-economic justice - When an employee has rendered long and continuous service and is ultimately regularized, denial of pensionary benefits based on technicalities or artificial distinctions is unjustified. [Paras 23-27] Punjab School Education Board v. Satnam Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2026 INSC 965
Service Law — Precedent — Distinction between Officiating and Provisional/Ad Hoc Appointees - Candidates holding higher posts merely on an officiating basis are strictly governed by the ratio in BSNL v. Mishri Lal, and cannot claim parity with candidates who were provisionally promoted under earlier rules and had vested rights recognized as a one-time measure under Rule 10(3) of the 2002 Rules as dealt with in Medini C. v. BSNL – Appeals allowed. [Relied on CMD/Chairman, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. v. Mishri Lal & Ors., (2011) 14 SCC 739; State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. v. Raj Kumar & Ors., (2023) 3 SCC 773; Distinguished from Medini C. & Ors. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors., (2022) 4 SCC 562; Paras 8–10] Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. G.N. Mani Ravinder, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 951 : 2026 INSC 1007
Service Law — Promotion — Officiating Appointments — Claim for Consideration under Old/Repealed Rules — Vested Right — Rajbhasha Adhikari Recruitment Rules, 2005 - Employees holding a post purely on a local officiating basis have no vested legal right to seek regular promotion under repealed administrative instructions or obsolete statutory rules that were never brought into operation - The right to be considered for promotion arises only under the rules prevailing on the date when the candidature is considered - An employer/State is entitled to take a conscious, non-arbitrary policy decision altering the method of recruitment (e.g., introducing a Limited Internal Competitive Examination under the 2005 Rules for executive cadre posts) - The High Court erred in directing consideration of officiating employees under pre-2005 provisions. [Paras 8, 10–12] Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. G.N. Mani Ravinder, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 951 : 2026 INSC 1007
Service Law — Recruitment & Selection — Disregard of essential eligibility criteria in advertisement — Erroneous clarification by subordinate authority — Fraud on public - When an employment notification/advertisement specifies an essential eligibility requirement (e.g., 10 years of service as Anganwadi Sevika within the same district), an appointment made in disregard thereof is illegal and amounts to a fraud on the public, as it excludes eligible candidates who did not apply on the faith of the terms - A subordinate authority like a Divisional Commissioner has no power or jurisdiction to issue an administrative clarification overriding Government Resolutions or the advertisement; any genuine doubt must be referred to the appropriate Government Department - In the absence of an express relaxation clause in the advertisement, an ineligible candidate acquires no right to the post despite selection or continuance in service. [Relied on Distt. Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 655; Paras 5–13] Sunita Lahu Panchpande v. District Collector, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 947 : 2026 INSC 1002
Service Law — Regularization — Counting of Pre-Regularization Ad-hoc/Daily-Wage Service for Pension — Applicability of Old Pension Scheme vs. Defined Contributory Pension Scheme - Where employees initially engaged on ad-hoc, contractual, or daily-wage basis prior to 01.01.2004 are subsequently regularized (even after the cut-off date of 01.01.2004) pursuant to an established regularization policy adopted by the employer, the substance of the engagement must prevail over form and nomenclature - Pre-regularization service rendered continuously, ignoring purely artificial, notional, or administrative breaks, must be computed as 'qualifying service' for the purposes of retiral and pensionary benefits under the Punjab School Education Board (Employees' Pension, Provident Fund and Gratuity) Regulations, 1991 - such employees are deemed to have entered service prior to 01.01.2004 and are entitled to the benefits of the Old Pension Scheme (GPF Scheme) rather than being compulsorily governed by the new Defined Contributory Pension Scheme. [Paras 22-33] Punjab School Education Board v. Satnam Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2026 INSC 965
Stamp Act, 1899 — Section 47-A — Scope and Pre-conditions for Reference — Requirement of "wilful undervaluation" or "fraudulent intention" — Referral to Larger Bench - Under the plain language of Section 47-A(1) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the registering officer is required to have "reason to believe" that the market value of the property or the consideration has not been truly set forth in the instrument - The terms "wilful undervaluation" and/or "fraudulent intention" are conspicuously absent in the plain statutory phraseology - Reading a culpable mindset or fraudulent intent into Section 47-A as an independent jurisdictional condition precedent amounts to judicial legislation and impermissibly alters a valuation-centric inquiry into a quasi-criminal inquiry - Coordinate Bench decisions in Ramesh Chand Bansal v. District Magistrate/Collector (1999) 5 SCC 62 and Shanti Bhushan v. State of U.P. (2023) SCC OnLine SC 489 affirm that stamp duty is assessed on actual market value under strict literal construction of a taxing statute, without equitable considerations - The two-Judge Bench expressed serious doubt regarding the correctness of the three-Judge Bench decisions in V.N. Devadoss v. Chief Revenue Control Officer-cum-Inspector of Stamps (2009) 7 SCC 438 and Registrar of Assurances v. ASL Vyapar (P) Ltd. (2024) 17 SCC 572, which held that the basis for exercise of power under Section 47-A is wilful undervaluation with fraudulent intent - On grounds of judicial propriety, the following questions were referred to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for consideration by a larger Bench - (i) Whether V.N. Devadoss (supra), followed in ASL Vyapar (P) Ltd. (supra), correctly interprets and declares that the basis for exercise of power under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act is wilful undervaluation with fraudulent intention to evade proper stamp duty, or whether power thereunder can and ought to be exercised on its own terms irrespective of culpable mindset?; (ii) Whether the decisions in Ramesh Chand Bansal (supra) and Shanti Bhushan (supra) do not lay down correct law? [Paras 8-12, 16–25] Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. District Revenue Officer (Stamps), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 907 : 2026 INSC 963
Tenders — Interpretation of Technical Experience Criterion — Specialised nature of duty - A mandatory tender condition requiring proof of successful execution of "annual collecting User Charges/Parking Fees work" for a public authority cannot be satisfied by experience in organizing temporary cattle fairs as a lessee under the Punjab Cattle Fairs (Regulation) Rules, 1968 - Levying parking fees as an incidental activity of managing a fairground space does not equate to the specialized, continuous, and accountable duty of collecting and remitting public user charges - unverified experience certificates of third-party partnership firms cannot be attributed to a sole proprietorship bidder without establishing a proven legal nexus. [Paras 25-30] Micky Traders v. L.R.Y. Labour Contractor, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 971 : 2026 INSC 1025
Tenders — Revenue considerations vs. Mandatory Eligibility - Quoting a higher financial bid (higher revenue to the public exchequer) cannot cure technical ineligibility - Comparison of financial bids is permissible only among tenderers who are first found technically eligible - otherwise, mandatory eligibility norms would be rendered completely illusory - Tender conditions cannot be mandatory in the abstract and directory in favour of a chosen bidder. [Relied on Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa & Ors., (2007) 14 SCC 517; Agmatel India (P) Ltd. v. Resoursys Telecom & Ors., (2022) 5 SCC 362; Kimberley Club (P) Ltd. v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad & Ors., 2025 INSC 1276; Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corpn. v. Anoj Kumar Agarwala, (2020) 17 SCC 577; Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489; Galaxy Transport Agencies v. New J.K. Roadways, (2021) 16 SCC 808; Paras 34, 35] Micky Traders v. L.R.Y. Labour Contractor, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 971 : 2026 INSC 1025
Tenders and Public Contracts — Eligibility Criteria — Scope of Judicial Review — Patent arbitrariness and decisions dehors the terms of the NIT - While constitutional courts exercise restraint in tender matters and ordinarily defer to the employer's interpretation of its own terms, such deference is available only when the interpretation is manifestly in consonance with the tender language and subserves its purpose - Where an interpretation cannot reasonably be borne by the text, condones non-compliance with an essential eligibility condition, or acts in patent arbitrariness, judicial review is warranted to set aside the award. [Paras 14-33] Micky Traders v. L.R.Y. Labour Contractor, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 971 : 2026 INSC 1025
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Interplay Between Stage of Investigation and Stage of Sanction under Section 45 UAPA - Extinction of Right to Default Bail - While sanction for prosecution under Section 45 UAPA and Section 196 CrPC is an embargo on the Court taking cognizance (and not a bar to merely filing a charge sheet), the sanctioning authority requires an independent review of all collected investigative material under Section 45(2) to apply its mind - Where the prosecution requires additional time to collate retrieved scientific data to present a complete report before the sanctioning authority, such grounds cannot be discarded as invalid or flimsy - The High Court erred in holding that awaiting sanction was the sole reason accepted and thereby invalidating the extension order - Since the order dated 18.01.2023 granting a valid 15-day extension was lawful and within the statutory framework of Section 43D(2)(b), the accused acquired no indefeasible right to default bail under the first proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC upon the expiry of earlier periods - the charge sheet having been filed within the extended timeframe. [Relied on State of NCT of Delhi v. Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely, (2024) 2 SCC 632; State of Maharashtra v. Surendra Pundlik Gadling, (2019) 5 SCC 178; Judgebir Singh @ Jasbir Singh Samra v. National Investigation Agency, (2023) 17 SCC 48; Paras 26 – 35] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Interplay Between Stage of Investigation and Stage of Sanction under Section 45 UAPA - Extinction of Right to Default Bail - While sanction for prosecution under Section 45 UAPA and Section 196 CrPC is an embargo on the Court taking cognizance (and not a bar to merely filing a charge sheet), the sanctioning authority requires an independent review of all collected investigative material under Section 45(2) to apply its mind - Where the prosecution requires additional time to collate retrieved scientific data to present a complete report before the sanctioning authority, such grounds cannot be discarded as invalid or flimsy - The High Court erred in holding that awaiting sanction was the sole reason accepted and thereby invalidating the extension order - Since the order dated 18.01.2023 granting a valid 15-day extension was lawful and within the statutory framework of Section 43D(2)(b), the accused acquired no indefeasible right to default bail under the first proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC upon the expiry of earlier periods - the charge sheet having been filed within the extended timeframe. [Relied on State of NCT of Delhi v. Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely, (2024) 2 SCC 632; State of Maharashtra v. Surendra Pundlik Gadling, (2019) 5 SCC 178; Judgebir Singh @ Jasbir Singh Samra v. National Investigation Agency, (2023) 17 SCC 48; Paras 26 – 35] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Section 43D(2)(b) and Section 45 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 167(2), Section 173(2), and Section 196 — Investigation — Extension of Time for Completing Investigation — Default Bail — High Court Cannot Pre-emptively Declare Investigation Complete or Sever Intertwined Reasons – i. Extension of Time under Section 43D(2)(b) UAPA — Pendency of Data Analysis & Retrieval of Forensic Evidence - An extension of time beyond 90 days up to 180 days under Section 43D(2)(b) of the UAPA is statutorily permissible upon the Public Prosecutor's report demonstrating the progress of investigation and specific reasons for continued detention - The analysis of scientific data, digital evidence retrieved from forensic science laboratories (mobile devices, hard drives, audio recordings), and financial verification of foreign funds form an integral part of ongoing investigation that must be concluded prior to filing a complete charge sheet; ii. Holistic Interpretation of Prosecutor's Report vs. Premature Declaration of Completion of Investigation - Statements in an extension application indicating that "there is enough evidence to file a charge sheet" cannot be read in isolation or ripped out of context to mean that the investigation is complete in all respects - Investigation of cognizable offences falls within the exclusive domain of the police, and Courts cannot artificially truncate or curtail statutory investigative powers or declare the investigation complete when specialized analysis of digital and financial material remains ongoing. [Paras 14 - 33] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Section 43D(2)(b) and Section 45 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 167(2), Section 173(2), and Section 196 — Investigation — Extension of Time for Completing Investigation — Default Bail — High Court Cannot Pre-emptively Declare Investigation Complete or Sever Intertwined Reasons – i. Extension of Time under Section 43D(2)(b) UAPA — Pendency of Data Analysis & Retrieval of Forensic Evidence - An extension of time beyond 90 days up to 180 days under Section 43D(2)(b) of the UAPA is statutorily permissible upon the Public Prosecutor's report demonstrating the progress of investigation and specific reasons for continued detention - The analysis of scientific data, digital evidence retrieved from forensic science laboratories (mobile devices, hard drives, audio recordings), and financial verification of foreign funds form an integral part of ongoing investigation that must be concluded prior to filing a complete charge sheet; ii. Holistic Interpretation of Prosecutor's Report vs. Premature Declaration of Completion of Investigation - Statements in an extension application indicating that "there is enough evidence to file a charge sheet" cannot be read in isolation or ripped out of context to mean that the investigation is complete in all respects - Investigation of cognizable offences falls within the exclusive domain of the police, and Courts cannot artificially truncate or curtail statutory investigative powers or declare the investigation complete when specialized analysis of digital and financial material remains ongoing. [Paras 14 - 33] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021