Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Supreme Court Quarterly Digest July - September 2026 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Distinction between Original Stage and Appellate Stage Objections — Inapplicability of Section 21(1) CPC at Threshold - An objection to territorial competence raised at the threshold before the Claims Tribunal must be adjudicated strictly within the parameters...
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Supreme Court Quarterly Digest July - September 2026
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Distinction between Original Stage and Appellate Stage Objections — Inapplicability of Section 21(1) CPC at Threshold - An objection to territorial competence raised at the threshold before the Claims Tribunal must be adjudicated strictly within the parameters of Section 166(2) of the Act of 1988 - The condition precedent of establishing a "failure of justice" under Section 21(1) of the CPC is attracted exclusively when an objection to territorial jurisdiction is raised or entertained at an appellate or post-award stage - Where an objection is raised prior to adjudication on merits, Section 21(1) CPC does not bar the Tribunal or High Court from ordering transmission/transfer of the claim to the competent forum. [Relied on United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta & Others, 2011 INSC 759; Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2008 INSC 1453; Balveer Batra v. New India Assurance Company, 2024 INSC 361; Paras 10-14] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Insurer is Not a "Defendant" for Conferring Jurisdiction under Section 166(2) - The phrase 'within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides' in Section 166(2) refers to the owner and/or driver of the offending vehicle, and does not encompass an insurer - Impleading an insurance company as a defendant is not mandatory under the Act - A claimant cannot invoke the territorial jurisdiction of a Tribunal solely on the ground that the insurance company maintains a branch or head office within that territory when the accident took place outside and neither the claimant nor the owner/driver resides or carries on business there. [Paras 8 - 15] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Right of Impleaded Insurer to Object to Territorial Jurisdiction - While an insurer cannot demand to be made a party as of right and is typically issued notice under Section 149(2), if a claimant elects to voluntarily implead the insurer as a contesting party respondent, the insurer acquires the right to resist the claim on all available legal grounds without restrictions, including challenging the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal. [Paras 6 - 14] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166(2) read with Section 168(1) and Section 169 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 20 & Section 21(1) — Motor Accident Claims — Territorial Jurisdiction — Forum Convenience — Meaning of "Defendant Resides" vis-à-vis Insurance Company - Scope of Territorial Options under Section 166(2) - Under Section 166(2) of the Act of 1988, an application for compensation can be instituted at the option of the claimant before the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over: (i) the area where the accident occurred; (ii) the local limits where the claimant resides; (iii) the local limits where the claimant carries on business; or (iv) the local limits where the defendant resides - The legislature has consciously omitted the phrase "or carries on business" with respect to the defendant, which departs from the broader terminology used in Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. [Paras 7-10] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Claim of Status as Legally Wedded Wife – Burden of Proof – Apportionment of Compensation - The claimant asserted the status of being the legally wedded wife of the deceased - The burden of proof, even in summary proceedings before the MACT, rests squarely on the claimant. In the absence of documentary evidence proving the factum of marriage, and where employment records indicated the status as "fiancé" without financial dependency, the claimant cannot be treated as a legally wedded wife - the High Court's equitable apportionment awarding her a share (Rs. 7,50,000/-) warrants no interference - Mathematical precision is not always sought or applied by courts; claimants are awarded just and fair compensation where what is due is not denied and what is undeserving is not awarded. [Paras 7 - 15] Reliance General Insurance Company v. Priyanka Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 897 : 2026 INSC 950
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Standard of Proof in MACT Proceedings – Preponderance of Probabilities - Proceedings before the Claims Tribunal are summary in nature - The issue of rashness and negligence is to be adjudicated on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, and not on the strict criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt - Registration of FIR and filing of chargesheet discharge the primary onus of proving negligence against the offending driver. [Relied on Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, (2009) 6 SCC 121; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & Ors., (2017) 16 SCC 680; Munna Lal Jain v. Vipin Kumar Sharma, (2015) 6 SCC 347; Sube Singh v. Shyam Singh, (2018) 3 SCC 18; Manjuri Bera v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., (2007) 10 SCC 643; Paras 6 - 12] Reliance General Insurance Company v. Priyanka Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 897 : 2026 INSC 950
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 166 and 168 – Fatal Accident – Multiplier Determination for Bachelor Deceased – Age of Deceased vs. Age of Dependents/Parents – Multiplier Matrix - In motor accident compensation claims arising out of the death of a bachelor, the multiplier to be applied must be determined strictly based on the age of the deceased and not on the age of the dependents or parents - The legal position is settled and no longer res integra - The deceased was 33 years old, falling squarely in the age bracket of 31 to 35 years, which attracts a multiplier of 16 as per the standardised matrix - The Tribunal and the High Court correctly applied the multiplier of 16. [Paras 13, 14] Reliance General Insurance Company v. Priyanka Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 897 : 2026 INSC 950
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 168 — Assessment of Notional Income — Skilled IT Entrepreneur — Just Compensation - Fixation of notional income at Rs. 20,000/- per month for a qualified Mechanical Engineer who obtained specialised software certifications in Oracle and Visual Basic and successfully transitioned into an IT entrepreneur running a proprietorship executing corporate software contracts in Bangalore was excessively low - Relying on corporate purchase orders, bank inquiry records, and business invoices from 2003 to 2005, the deceased's base monthly income at the time of death in October 2005 assessed realistically at Rs. 70,000/- per month - After standard statutory tax deductions, addition of 40% towards future prospects, 1/3rd deduction towards personal expenses, and applying multiplier of 17, total compensation enhanced from Rs. 7,17,634/- to Rs. 50,81,876/- along with 6% interest per annum payable solely by the State Road Transport Corporation. [Paras 26-30] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Contributory Negligence — Topographical Scene Sketch / Site Map - A rough sketch or site map prepared post-accident cannot be read in isolation or used as the exclusive foundation to apportion contributory negligence against the driver of a smaller vehicle in the absence of corroborative ocular testimony - The resting position of a lighter vehicle on a site map post-collision cannot automatically lead to an inference that it was being driven on the wrong side or caused the impact, as a collision with a heavy, speeding vehicle naturally pushes or drags the smaller vehicle forward - The contact point between vehicles is determinative, not the ultimate drag marks - The High Court's attribution of 50% contributory negligence to the deceased car driver solely based on the car's resting spot on the sketch was set aside and 100% sole negligence of the KSRTC bus driver restored. [Relied on Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., (2018) 5 SCC 656; Sunita & Ors. v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., (2020) 13 SCC 486; Paras 20 - 22.1] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 166 and 168 — Proof of Negligence — Evidentiary Value of Criminal Investigation Records vs. Criminal Court Acquittal - Police investigation records, including the First Information Report (FIR) and the final charge-sheet, constitute valid, admissible, and reliable prima facie evidence to establish rash and negligent driving in Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) proceedings - The subsequent acquittal of the offending driver in a criminal case particularly an acquittal based on the benefit of doubt does not eclipse or displace tortious liability under the MV Act - Criminal trials and civil motor accident claim adjudications operate in distinct realms - the standard of culpable rashness under Section 304A IPC is significantly higher than that of actionable negligence under the law of torts, which is governed strictly by the touchstone of preponderance of probability rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt - The High Court committed an error apparent in reversing the Tribunal's finding of sole negligence against the bus driver by predominantly relying on his criminal court acquittal and the non-examination of the claimant in the criminal trial. [Relied on ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajani Sahoo & Ors., (2025) 2 SCC 599; Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi & Anr., (2023) 13 SCC 510; Geeta Dubey & Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3779; Paras 20-22] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 168 & 169 - Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court — Beneficial Legislation - Under Order XLI Rule 27(1)(b) CPC, the Appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence if it requires the documents to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause - The MV Act is a beneficial, welfare-oriented legislation requiring summary procedure to determine "just compensation" - Where a newly married claimant (widowed within three months of marriage) could not immediately gather bank inquiry records and commercial IT invoices due to shock, trauma, and systemic banking delays, the High Court erred in rejecting the additional evidence application (I.A. No. 1 of 2024) solely on grounds of delay. Rejection overlooks substantial cause and prolongs 21 years of pending litigation - Additional evidence received on record. [Paras 23, 24, 25] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 166(1)(c) – Claim Petition by Legal Representatives – Dependency vs Devolution of Estate - Liability to pay compensation under the Act does not cease merely because of the absence of dependency of the legal representative - The right to file a claim petition extends to all legal representatives upon whom the estate devolves or who represent the estate of the deceased. [Relied on National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Magma General Insurance Company Limited v. Nanu Ram and Others, (2018) 18 SCC 130; National Insurance Company Limited v. Birender and Others, (2020) 11 SCC 356; Puttamma and Others v. K.L. Narayana Reddy and Another, (2013) 15 SCC 45; Paras 5-7] Sameem Begum v. K. Venkat Swamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : 2026 INSC 864
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Sections 166, 168 – Motor Accident Compensation – Conventional Heads – Loss of Consortium – Spousal and Parental Consortium – Enhancement of 10% every three years - The head of 'consortium' is an indispensable and vital component of just compensation in motor accident claim cases - The term 'consortium' is a compendious concept encompassing spousal consortium (loss of company, society, and conjugal affection to the surviving spouse), parental consortium (loss of guidance, care, protection, and affection to surviving children), and filial consortium (loss suffered by parents on the death of a child) - All legal representatives, including major children, who suffer on account of the vehicular death are entitled to claim and receive compensation under the head of consortium - In accordance with the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance, each surviving dependent/legal representative (spouse and children) is entitled to compensation of ₹40,000/- under the head of spousal or parental consortium, subject to a mandatory 10% enhancement every three years - the Supreme Court awarded ₹48,400/- each to the surviving wife (spousal consortium) and each of the three children (parental consortium), along with ₹15,000/- each towards funeral expenses and loss of estate. [Paras 5 - 9] Sameem Begum v. K. Venkat Swamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : 2026 INSC 864
Inapplicability of Motor Vehicles Act Multiplier Formula - The calculation paradigm and multiplier method provided under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to determine compensation in electrocution cases - In the absence of a prescribed calculation method under the Electricity Act, 2003, compensation must be determined on the overarching principle of awarding just, fair, and reasonable compensation based on proven income and relevant facts before the competent forum. [Relied on Raman v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., (2014) 15 SCC 1; Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha, (2014) 1 SCC 384; Para 15-16] Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation v. Rekha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 799 : 2026 INSC 847
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 146, 147, 149, 196, 207 & Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999 — Section 14 — Non-compliance of Section 146 MVA — Uninsured Vehicles — Technology Integration & Structural Framework Directions - Noting that nearly 56% of vehicles plying on Indian roads remain uninsured, creating severe impediments to motor accident victims receiving timely compensation, the Supreme Court issued wide-ranging directions under public interest: i. ANPR Integration for e-Challans - Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras on highways and roads must be integrated with data from the Insurance Information Bureau (IIB) and VAHAN portal to issue automatic e-challans to uninsured vehicles; ii. Handheld Devices for Traffic Police - State Police forces are to be equipped with handheld digital devices or apps linked to IIB and VAHAN portals for real-time verification of insurance status on the ground; iii. Four-Layer Structure for Private Vehicle Policies - IRDA to implement a standardized four-tier insurance policy structure for private vehicles (1. Mandatory Third-Party Only; 2. Optional Occupant/Pillion Cover; 3. Personal Accident Cover for Owner/Driver/Occupants; 4. Own Damage Cover) accompanied by a mandatory 'Customer Option Form' and 'Customer Information Sheet'; iv. Enhancement of Mandatory Multi-Year Cover Duration - Extending its earlier mandate in S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, the Court enhanced the mandatory third-party insurance period at the time of purchase/registration of new vehicles from 3 years to 4 years for new cars and from 5 years to 6 years for new two-wheelers; v. Pilot Projects — Fuel Denial & Toll Automation - IRDA and MoRTH to evolve a pilot project linking fuel supply at petrol pumps to valid insurance status (denying fuel to uninsured vehicles via ANPR cameras) - MoRTH to also implement toll plaza automation through automatic detection to eliminate congestion. [Paras 23-30] National Insurance v. Thungala Dhana Laxmi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 759 : 2026 INSC 793
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 159 (formerly Section 158(6)) & Section 166 — Motor Accident Claims Procedure — Pending Pre-2022 Cases - To resolve long-pending Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) cases relating to accidents occurring prior to 31.03.2022, the Supreme Court directed the State Police to promptly file Detailed Accident Reports (DAR) along with relevant documents (FIR, MLC, post-mortem report, insurance policy, permit) before the concerned MACT, and assist in prompt service/production of witnesses for speedy disposal - Courts must not adopt a hyper-technical approach in motor accident compensation claims - Pursuant to the IRDA Circular dated 16.11.2009, insurance companies under a comprehensive/package policy are liable to compensate for any occupant/passenger travelling in the vehicle - Held, High Court rightly awarded compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased owner/occupant travelling as a passenger under a comprehensive insurance policy. [Relied on S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 447; General Insurance Council v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2007) 12 SCC 354; Shishu Pal @ Shish Ram & Ors v. Surjeet & Ors, 2026 INSC 63; In Re: Phalodi Accident v. National Highways Authority of India and Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 646; Abhijeet Kumar Pandey v. State of Bihar, 2023 SCC OnLine Pat 279; Paras 31-34] National Insurance v. Thungala Dhana Laxmi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 759 : 2026 INSC 793
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 168 — Child Victim Suffering Permanent Disability — Method of Determination of Just Compensation — Assessment Parameters - Child Victims vs. Adults - Child victims suffering permanent or near-total disability constitute a distinct and special category - Compensation cannot be evaluated through the same lens applied to adults. Loss suffered by a child is lifelong, continuing, and irreversible, depriving them not merely of physical capacity, but of their entire future life and human dignity - Functional Disability vs. Physical Disability - A conceptual distinction exists between medically certified physical impairment and functional disability felt in daily life - Where a 6-month-old infant suffered 90% permanent locomotor disability (post-traumatic myelopathy with paraplegia) rendering her completely dependent on others for life, her functional disability must be treated as 100% because her future earning capacity stands completely extinguished - For a minor child (up to 15 years) suffering catastrophic permanent disability, the multiplier to be applied is 18 - The High Court erred in applying a multiplier of 15 - Minor children who suffer death or permanent disability cannot be placed in the category of non-earning individuals or unskilled labourers - The loss of income must necessarily be calculated based on the matrix of minimum wages payable to a skilled worker in the respective State at the relevant time plus 40% towards future prospects - Compensation towards attendant charges for a severely disabled child requiring lifelong 24-hour assistance must be determined using the multiplier method (taking full-time skilled assistance rates and applying a multiplier of 18) rather than awarding a lump-sum nominal amount - Compensation enhanced from ₹45,40,800/- to ₹83,38,360/- along with 9% per annum interest. [Relied on Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4 SCC 413; Master Ayush v. Reliance General Insurance Company Limited, (2022) 7 SCC 738; Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmed Simon, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3692; Hitesh Nagjibhai Patel v. Bababhai Nagjibhai Rabari, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 3446; Shankar Dutt v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1193; Paras 31-76] Gayatree Pattnaik for Shreejita Pattnaik v. Arundhati Sahoo, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 756 : 2026 INSC 785
While the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 principles cannot be applied as a universal rule in every non-vehicular stray animal accident case, claimants facing pre-2020 incidents (prior to quantified statutory schemes like the Punjab Bye-Laws, 2020/2023) are entitled to an equitable lump-sum compensation evaluated on the specific attending facts of the case - Considering the prolonged litigation and severe injuries sustained, the Supreme Court awarded a lump sum compensation of ₹15,000,000 (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs) to the appellant. [Para 21-25] Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 3, 5 & 149 — Driving Licence — Non-renewal/Expired Licence — Breach of Policy Conditions — Liability of Insurer — Pay and Recover - Where a driving licence had expired and remained unrenewed for a substantial duration (between 2007 and 2010) covering the date of the accident, the High Court erred in blindly relying upon oral testimony and an official letter alleging technical loss of data without corroborative official records - Secondary evidence cannot replace primary documentary evidence unless foundational circumstances under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are pleaded and established - The owner owes a duty to verify that the driver holds an effective driving licence and takes reasonable care to get it renewed upon expiry - Failure of the owner to produce evidence of checking the licence or taking steps for its timely renewal amounts to a breach of policy terms, exonerating the insurer from ultimate liability - applying the doctrine of 'pay and recover', the Supreme Court directed the insurer to satisfy the compensation award first and recover the same from the driver and owner. [Paras 10–12, 14–18]. Reliance General Insurance v. Om Parkash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 742 : 2026 INSC 767
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 2(28), 2(34) & 39 — Motor Vehicle — Public Place — Reach Stacker — Exemption from Definition of Motor Vehicle – Held - 1. Inland Container Depot (ICD) is not a “Public Place”: An Inland Container Depot (ICD) being a custom-bonded area under Section 7 of the Customs Act, 1962, where access is restricted only to authorized personnel, does not constitute a "public place" under Section 2(34) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Members of the general public cannot claim entry to such premises as a matter of right - 2. “Reach Stacker” is excluded from the definition of “Motor Vehicle”: A Reach Stacker—a heavy machine operating on wheels designed exclusively to lift and stack shipping containers within restricted/enclosed industrial areas—does not qualify as a "motor vehicle" under Section 2(28) of the Act - Since it exceeds maximum permissible road weight limits, lacks general road safety features, requires reinforced surfaces, and is used solely in confined spaces, it falls under the exclusionary second part of Section 2(28) (a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or enclosed premises) - 3. Registration Requirement: Where transport authorities certify that a machine is a special type adapted for enclosed premises and does not fall within Section 2(28), non-registration under Section 39 is not a mere omission or violation, but a consequence of it not being a "motor vehicle". [Relied on Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 48; Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1974) 2 SCC 777; Goodyear India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 752; Tarachand Logistic Solutions Ltd. v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1851; distinguished from Natwar Parikh & Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 7 SCC 364; Western Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2016) 11 SCC 613; Paras 11-15] Container Corporation of India v. Rishi Ranjan Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 740 : 2026 INSC 763
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Conflict between "Geographical Area" and "Limitation as to Use" Clauses – Special Permit for Foreign Territory - The appellant-insurer disputed liability on the ground that the policy's geographical area was limited to "India" - the "Limitation as to Use" clause covered the vehicle's use under a "permit" within the meaning of the MVA - A special permit was validly issued under Section 88(8) of the MVA, explicitly authorizing the vehicle to ply on the Durg-Nepal route - Held, since the "Limitation as to Use" clause was cast in general terms without geographical boundaries, the existence of a valid permit extending to a foreign territory meant the policy covered the use irrespective of the geographical location - If the insurer intended to exclude cross-border territory entirely, it ought to have drafted the exclusion clearly and unambiguously. [Paras 10 - 14] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Extra-Territorial Operation of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Under Article 245(2) of the Constitution of India, laws made by Parliament cannot be deemed invalid on the ground of extra-territorial operation - The legislative intent to give the MVA extra-territorial application for cross-border transit is evident from Section 139 (power to frame rules for taking vehicles outside India) and Section 149(3) (duty of insurers to satisfy foreign judgments from reciprocating countries) - the provisions of the MVA apply to the third-party claim regardless of whether the accident took place in India or Nepal. [Para 21-30] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 147(5), Section 139, and Section 149 – Cross-Border Third-Party Insurance Coverage – Accident in Nepal – Liability of the Insurer - Interpretation of Insurance Contract – Harmonious Construction – Rule of Contra Proferentem - An insurance policy must be read as a whole to determine the intent of the parties - Different clauses must be read harmoniously, and one cannot cherry-pick a single clause in isolation to base a claim while rejecting other clauses - Where a policy contains ambiguous or multiple interpretations, the one that aligns with the beneficial purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA) and favours the insured (contra proferentem rule) must be adopted. [Paras 14-16] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Statutory Overriding Effect of Section 147(5) MVA over India Motor Tariff Regulations: The insurer argued that the policy was restricted to India because no additional premium was paid to extend coverage to Nepal under General Regulation 4 (GR.4) of the India Motor Tariff (IMT) 2002. Held, Section 147(5) of the MVA contains a potent non-obstante clause which imposes liability on the insurance company to indemnify the specified persons, overriding regulatory instruments like the IMT - Non-payment of the additional premium under GR.4 does not vitiate the valid permit or statutory coverage. [Paras 17 - 22] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Validity of Indian Driving License in Nepal – Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950: The insurer contended that the deceased driver did not possess a valid driving license to drive in Nepal. Held, the driver possessed an effective Indian driving license which was verified without objection by the Nepalese authorities at the border while issuing transit documents. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal (1950) grants reciprocal privileges regarding the free movement of nationals, ensuring that a valid license issued in India is recognized for movement within Nepal. No evidence was adduced by the insurer to show the license was invalid in Nepal. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chief Electoral Officer, (2023) 6 SCC 441; Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Garg Sons International, (2014) 1 SCC 686; Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sony Cheriyan, (1999) 6 SCC 451; Shivram Chandra Jagarnath Cold Storage v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2022) 4 SCC 539; Syed Mehaboob v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 11 SCC 625; Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009) 13 SCC 710; K. Ramya v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1338; Nidhi Bhargava v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 872; Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana, (2025) 2 SCC 49; A.G. Varadarajulu v. State of T.N., (1998) 4 SCC 231; Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85; Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, (1952) 2 SCC 237; Paras 24, 25] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 168 — Just Compensation — Fundamental Objective — The objective behind the claim process under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to grant 'just and fair compensation' - Compensation is a rough estimate to ease the financial burden on dependents, aiming to place them in nearly the same financial position as if the victim had lived their natural span of life, without being arbitrary, niggardly, or a source of profit. [Relied on V. Pathmavathi and Ors. v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. (2026 SCC OnLine SC 158); Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan (2013) 9 SCC 65; Anant v. Pratap and Anr. (2018) 9 SCC 450; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur (2021) 11 SCC 780; Rajjo and Ors v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors. 2022 SCC Online SC 1699; Paras 18-24] Rashmirekha Tripathy v. Sriram General Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 654 : 2026 INSC 661
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 & 168 — Just and Fair Compensation — Determination of Annual Income — Assessment based on Income Tax Returns (ITRs) — Distinction between Salaried and Self-Employed Individuals — Held, there can be no hard and fast formula for computing the annual income of a deceased person/claimant - ITRs, being statutory documents, serve as an important reference point - For salaried individuals, only the ITR of the previous year is sufficient to showcase the annual income from salary, as the financial impact of recent promotions might only reflect in that year - for self-employed individuals or those carrying out their own business, the average income specified in the ITRs of up to the previous three years should be taken as the reference point, owing to fluctuations in business income - In cases where ITRs are filed after death or income fluctuates, surrounding circumstances such as the nature, geographic location, category, growth pattern, and potential growth of the business, as well as instances of initial negative income, must be taken into consideration. [Paras 11 - 20] Rashmirekha Tripathy v. Sriram General Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 654 : 2026 INSC 661