Property Law - Supreme Court Quarterly Digest Jan - Mar, 2026Confiscation of Property — Death of Public Servant during pendency of Appeal — Effect on Confiscation Proceedings against spouse/relative - The Supreme Court held that confiscation proceedings initiated under the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 (BSCA) do not automatically abate or get set aside upon the death of the public servant...
Property Law - Supreme Court Quarterly Digest Jan - Mar, 2026
Confiscation of Property — Death of Public Servant during pendency of Appeal — Effect on Confiscation Proceedings against spouse/relative - The Supreme Court held that confiscation proceedings initiated under the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 (BSCA) do not automatically abate or get set aside upon the death of the public servant if the property is held by a relative or spouse who was also put to notice – Noted that "abatement" in criminal proceedings discontinuation due to the death of the accused is distinct from "acquittal" and does not constitute a comment on the merits of the case - Under Section 19 of the BSCA, confiscated property can only be returned in two specific scenarios: (a) modification or annulment of the order by the High Court, or (b) acquittal by the Special Court - Since the Act does not account for the death of a public servant as a ground for returning property, and because non-public servants can be proceeded against for holding illegally acquired assets, the High Court is required to decide such appeals on their merits rather than dropping them due to the death of the primary accused. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2016) 3 SCC 183; Gurmail Singh v. State of U.P. (2022) 10 SCC 684; P. Nallammal v. State (1999) 6 SCC 559; Para 8-12] State of Bihar v. Sudha Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : 2026 INSC 272
Doctrine of Lis Pendens in Money Decrees – Supreme Court rejected the argument that lis pendens does not apply to simple money suits - If Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act were excluded from money suits, a judgment-debtor could easily defeat the decree by alienating property before execution, rendering the judicial process meaningless - Noted that "the true difficulties of a litigant begin only after they have obtained a decree". R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150 : AIR 2026 SC 913
Joint Family Property – Burden of Proof - Supreme Court affirmed that while the mere existence of a joint family does not render all properties joint, once it is established that ancestral properties yielding income existed and acquisitions were made during the subsistence of the joint family, the burden shifts to the person asserting self-acquisition to prove the same - noted that Hindu law does not require coparceners to establish the exact source of funds for every acquisition made by the Karta if a sufficient nucleus is shown. [Relied On Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and Ors. (1954) 1 SCC 544; Pattusami Padayachi v. Mullaiammal and others MLJ (II) 1976 225; Paras 29, 30] Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126
Possession and Injunction – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had dismissed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction despite concurrent findings of possession in favor of the appellant by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court – Noted that the High Court failed to frame a specific substantial question of law regarding the correctness or validity of the findings on possession returned by the lower courts - The Supreme Court held that interference with concurrent findings of fact under Section 100 CPC is permissible only on limited grounds, such as perversity, misreading of evidence, or consideration of inadmissible evidence. P. Elaiyappan v. Natarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 219
Possession of Auction Purchaser – Supreme Court observed that while Order 21 Rule 95 CPC provides a procedure for an auction purchaser to take possession, if the purchaser actually gains possession and maintains it on the date of the suit's institution, they cannot be denied an injunction against a party with no title who seeks to interfere - Even if a specific issue on possession was not formally framed by the Trial Court, since the parties went to trial fully aware that the issue was central and led evidence accordingly, they cannot later claim prejudice - Held – The High Court erred by not considering the extensive documentary evidence (e.g., revenue records, factory registrations, tax payments) relied upon by the First Appellate Court to establish the appellant's possession - The matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration within the scope of Section 100 CPC. [Relied on Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B. Shama Rao & Ors., (1956) 1 SCC 698; B. Arvind Kumar v. Govt. of India & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 745; Paras 19-25] P. Elaiyappan v. Natarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 219
Property Law — Declaration of Title — Adverse Possession — A claim for perfection of title by adverse possession cannot be sustained against the State/Union regardless of the duration of possession if the claimant fails to prove the specific point of time and basis upon which their predecessors entered possession - a decree obtained in an earlier suit where the true owner (Union of India) was not impleaded is non-est and not binding upon the Union – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148; State of Karnataka v. K.C. Subramanya, (2014) 13 SCC 468; Paras 7- 11] Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211 : AIR 2026 SC 1303
Property Rights - The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court judgment that had ordered the demolition of a residential building constructed by the appellant near Visva-Bharati University – Noted that the High Court had initially ruled the construction illegal on the grounds that it was raised on preserved "khoai" land and lacked approval from the competent authority (Panchayat Samiti) - Supreme Court found that the High Court's conclusions were based on conjectures rather than scientific evidence and failed to account for the appellant's right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution - Key Legal Issues & Findings – i. Burden of Proof in PIL and Disputed Facts: The Court emphasized that in a PIL, the burden lies squarely on the petitioners to provide clear, cogent, and reliable material - held that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to resolve contested factual issues—such as the geological nature of land—which cannot be determined solely on affidavits; ii. Nature of "Khoai" Land - noted that "khoai" is not a recognized category under West Bengal revenue laws but a colloquial term for geological formations - Reports from the District Magistrate and the West Bengal Pollution Control Board (WBPCB) failed to provide objective or scientific evidence that the specific subject plot was "khoai" land; iii. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; iv. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; v. Bona Fides and Concealment of Facts: Noted that the PIL lacked bona fides as several writ petitioners owned existing residential structures within the same tract of land, a fact they failed to disclose - The petition "selectively targeted" the appellant's construction while ignoring similar surrounding structures - set aside the High Court's demolition order, and expunged adverse remarks against the Sriniketan Santiniketan Development Authority (SSDA). Due to the lack of bona fides and non-disclosure of material facts, the Court imposed costs of ₹1,00,000 on the writ petitioners. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sushanta Tagore and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 16; Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) v. Sukamani Das, (1999) 7 SCC 298; Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, (2021) 20 SCC 454; Paras 36, 45 - 47, 49 – 52, 58] Aarsuday Projects & Infrastructure v. Jogen Chowdhury, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : 2026 INSC 93
Real Estate and Statutory Compliances – Occupancy Certificate (OC) – A developer cannot compel a purchaser to accept possession without a valid Occupancy Certificate - Obtaining an OC is a statutory pre-condition integral to the lawful delivery of possession - Failure to obtain the same constitutes a deficiency in service. [Paras 25 - 29] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101
Real Estate - Subsequent Purchasers – Right to Compensation – A subsequent purchaser is entitled to seek the same relief as the original allottee - The right to claim compensation for deficiency in service travels with the allotment and cannot be denied merely because the party stepped into the shoes of the original allottee at a later stage – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Govindan Raghavan (2019) 5 SCC 725; IREO Grace Realtech Private Limited v. Abhishek Khanna (2021) 3 SCC 241; Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank (2007) 6 SCC 71; Samruddhi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction (P) Ltd. (2022) 4 SCC 103; Dharmendra Sharma v. Agra Development Authority 2024 INSC 667; Para 18-22] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101
Recovery Proceedings – Objective of Auction – The primary goal of an auction is to obtain the most remunerative price for a property through competitive bidding, ensuring transparency and fairness - A process that compromises competitive bidding increases the risk of underbidding or inadequate pricing - The principle of finality in judicial sales does not shield the process from examination regarding valuation or reserve price fixation - Recovery processes must be fair, transparent, and based on proper value assessments to balance the interests of both creditors and borrowers – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Rajiv Kumar Jindal v. BCI Staff Welfare Association (2023) 238 Comp Cas 227: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 507; Paras 15-19] Om Sakthi Sekar v. V. Sukumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : 2026 INSC 237 : AIR 2026 SC 1460
Registered Documents – Presumption of Validity – Standard of Proof to Declare a Registered Sale Deed as "Sham" – A registered Sale Deed carries a formidable presumption of validity and genuineness. Registration is a solemn act imparting a high degree of sanctity to the document; therefore, courts must not lightly or casually declare it a "sham" - The burden of proof to displace this presumption rests heavily upon the challenger, requiring material particulars and cogent evidence to demonstrate that the Deed was never intended to operate as a bona fide transfer of title. [Paras 31 - 33] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82
Registration Act, 1908 – Section 33 – Presumption as to Power of Attorney – The presumption of valid execution and authentication under Section 85 of the Evidence Act or Section 33 of the Registration Act applies only when the original document or legally admitted secondary evidence is produced - In the absence of an original or properly adduced secondary evidence, it is impermissible to apply these sections to conclude the extent of authority granted to an agent. [Para 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134 : AIR 2026 SC 938
Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 41(h) — Injunction when refused — Maintainability of suit for injunction simpliciter when title and possession are in dispute — The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision that a suit for a bare mandatory injunction is not maintainable when there is a serious cloud over the title and possession of the property - the appropriate and efficacious remedy is to seek a decree for possession and declaration of title, rather than mere injunction - A suit for mandatory injunction without seeking possession is barred under Section 41(h) as an equally efficacious relief can be obtained through the usual mode of a suit for possession. [Para 13, 16, 22, 23] Sanjay Paliwal v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 54 : 2026 INSC 61
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Sham and Nominal Documents – Loan Transaction vs. Sale Agreement – Probative Value of Contemporaneous Documents – Held that where a registered sale agreement and a separate MoU are executed on the same day, purchased from the same stamp vendor, and witnessed by the same individuals, such facts strongly probablize the defense that the sale agreement was merely security for a loan transaction rather than a genuine sale. [Paras 10-12] Muddam Raju Yadav v. B. Raja Shanker, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2026 INSC 214
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Discretionary Relief – Bona Fides of Plaintiff – Suppression of Material Facts – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss a suit for specific performance where the plaintiff suppressed the existence of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) executed on the same day as the sale agreement - held that specific performance is an equitable and discretionary relief that must be denied if there is even a slight doubt regarding the plaintiff's bona fides or if material facts have been withheld from the Court - A plaintiff approaching the Court with "unclean hands" by failing to mention a contemporaneous document that characterizes the sale agreement as a sham/nominal document for a loan transaction is not entitled to relief. Muddam Raju Yadav v. B. Raja Shanker, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2026 INSC 214
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Necessary Parties – While a lis pendens transferee is not a necessary party, the vendor remains a necessary party in a suit for specific performance to fulfill contractual obligations and special covenants - if the vendor's estate is represented by multiple substituted heirs, the death of one such heir without timely substitution of their own LRs does not lead to the abatement of the entire appeal if other heirs of the vendor are still on record – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram & Others (1971) 1 SCC 265; Bhurey Khan v. Yaseen Khan (Dead) by LRs & Ors. 1995 Supp (3) SCC 331; Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Deorajin Debi (Smt.) & Anr. AIR 1960 SC 941; Lala Durga Prasad and Others v. Lala Deep Chand and Others (1953) 2 SCC 509; Shivashankara v. H.P. Vedavyasa Char 2023 LiveLaw SC 261; Paras 36 - 44] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Equitable Relief – Refund and Restitution – Complete Justice - In a suit for specific performance concerning an Agreement to Sell from 2008, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness as he lacked the financial wherewithal to pay the balance consideration of Rs. 5.21 crores on the due date and failed to visit the Sub-Registrar's office - Noted that the respondents also failed to fulfill contractual obligations regarding property mutation and conversion - Holding that the grant of specific performance is not an equitable relief after a passage of seventeen years – Supreme Court emphasized that equity must prevent unjust enrichment and restore parties to their original positions when both are at fault - To adjust equities and bring quietus to a dispute protracted for over a decade, the Supreme Court modified the High Court's order (which had allowed forfeiture of Rs. 60 lakhs earnest money) and directed the respondents to pay a lumpsum amount of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores) to the appellant for full restitution – Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 5-8] Subhash Aggarwal v. Mahender Pal Chhabra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 6 : 2026 INSC 11
Stamp Act - Agreement to Sell - Stamp Duty - Possession - Relationship between Landlord and Tenant - Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 - The Supreme Court addressed whether an agreement to sell, entered into by a tenant who had been in possession of the property for fifty years, should be treated as a "conveyance" for the purpose of charging stamp duty under Explanation I to Article 47A of Schedule I-A of the Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 – Supreme Court noted Key Findings – i. Nexus of Possession: For Explanation I to Article 47A to apply, the delivery of possession must have a nexus to the agreement to sell meaning it must "follow" the agreement or be "evidenced" by it as a result of the sale transaction; ii. Continuance of Tenancy: Supreme Court noted that the appellant's possession remained that of a tenant and was not converted to that of a vendee - This was evidenced by the fact that the respondent successfully pursued an eviction order against the appellant as a tenant even after the agreement to sell was executed; iii. Nature of Agreement: Since the possession was not "followed by" or "evidenced" as a result of the agreement to sell, but rather preceded it by fifty years due to a pre-existing tenancy, the agreement did not constitute a "deemed conveyance" - The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and High Court, ruling that the appellant was not liable for additional stamp duty or penalty and directing the Trial Court to mark the agreement as an Exhibit. [Distinguished from Ramesh Mishrimal Jain vs. Avinash Vishwanath Patne, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 329; Paras 6-12] Vayyaeti Srinivasarao v. Gaineedi Jagajyothi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 49 : 2026 INSC 59 : AIR 2026 SC 637
Suit for Possession – Effect of Withdrawing Previous Suit – The Appellants claimed hereditary pujariki (priest) rights based on a 1901 decree - noted that the Appellants' predecessor had filed a subsequent suit specifically seeking possession of the temple and an injunction - This subsequent filing constituted a categorical admission that the Appellants were not in possession at that time - held that a party in settled possession does not sue for possession - the Appellants withdrew the 1944 suit with liberty to file a fresh one but failed to do so for 36 years, leading to an "inevitable inference" that they had reconciled with the factual reality of not having possession. [Paras 18–20] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191
Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 105 and Section 108 — Indian Easements Act, 1882; Section 52 — Lease vs. Licence — Interpretation of Deeds — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had re-characterized a registered 99-year lease deed as a licence - held that when the nomenclature, text, and context of a document clearly indicate a "lease simpliciter," courts should not resort to purposive construction or ex-post facto circumstances to infer a different intention - A unilateral cancellation of such a registered lease deed, without bilateral agreement or meeting conditions under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, is illegal and non-est. General Secretary, Vivekananda Kendra v. Pradeep Kumar Agarwalla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2026 INSC 199
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Specific Performance – Execution of Decree – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 35, 97, 98, 101, and 102 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 19(b) – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a purchaser who acquires property during the pendency of litigation, as a transferee pendente lite, has no right to obstruct the execution of the decree and remains bound by the outcome of the proceedings, holding the transfer strictly subservient to the decree - Key findings held i. Doctrine of Lis Pendens and Transferee Pendente Lite: The principle of lis pendens enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is based on equity, good conscience, justice, and public policy - A transferee pendente lite is bound by the ultimate decree of the court, irrespective of whether they had notice of the pending suit or acted in good faith; ii. Registration of Lis Pendens (Bombay Amendment): Under the Maharashtra amendment to Section 52, once a notice of lis pendens is registered, the property cannot be transferred or dealt with so as to affect the rights of any party under a subsequent decree - The lack of knowledge of the proceedings is not a valid defense against the application of this doctrine; iii. Execution against Obstructionists: In execution proceedings for the delivery of immovable property, the Executing Court has the mandate under Order XXI Rule 97 and Rule 98 CPC to remove any person bound by the decree, including a transferee pendente lite, who resists or obstructs possession; iv. Adjudication of Rights in Execution: All questions relating to the right, title, or interest of an obstructionist arising under Order XXI Rule 97 must be determined by the Executing Court under Rule 101 and not by a separate suit - For transferees pendente lite, their title is subservient to the decree and is effectively extinguished by the court-executed sale deed; v. Interplay between Specific Relief Act and Transfer of Property Act: While Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act protects subsequent transferees for value without notice at a stage prior to the institution of a suit, it must give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act once a suit is instituted – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Celir LLP v. Somati Prasad Bafna (2024 SCC Online SC 3727); Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy (2006) 13 SCC 608; Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (2008) 5 SCC 796; Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami (1972) 2 SCC 200; Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2805); Paras 41-64] Alka Shrirang Chavan v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 44 : 2026 INSC 52
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 58(c) – Mortgage by Conditional Sale vs. Outright Sale – No transaction shall be deemed a mortgage by conditional sale unless the condition for reconveyance is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale - In the absence of such a clause in the registered Sale Deed, the transaction cannot be construed as a mortgage by conditional sale. [Paras 44 - 49] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82
Wills – Suspicious Circumstances - upheld the rejection of an unregistered Will executed 72 hours prior to the testator's death - Key suspicious circumstances included the use of a thumb impression by a testator who was literate and habitually signed documents, the involvement of a close relative as a scribe instead of a professional, and the exclusion of natural heirs - since the Appellant did not challenge the Trial Court's rejection of the Will at the First Appeal stage, the finding attained finality - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding no ground to interfere with the High Court's judgment, which had correctly applied principles of Hindu Law regarding coparcenary property and legal necessity – Appeals dismissed. Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126